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dynamic spectrum access technique

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Constraint for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

Ishtiaq Ahmad∗ , Zhiqing Wei∗ , Zhiyong Feng† , Yang Bai∗ , Qixun Zhang† , Ping Zhang†

∗†

Key Laboratory of Universal Wireless Communications, Ministry of Education

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications Beijing 100876, P.R.China

email:∗ {ahmedishtiaq1971, zhiqingwei, baiyangbupt}@gmail.com, † {fengzy, zhangqixun, pzhang}@bupt.edu.cn

Abstract—This paper presents a Stackelberg game based constraint which is satisﬁed together with the interference

pricing strategy for secondary users (SUs) sharing spectrum constraint.

with primary user (PU). In the proposed model, PU imposes In literature, some works focus on using game theory

interference price on SUs to earn revenue and maintain its

minimum data rate while SUs jointly adjust their power to for resource allocation. In game theoretic framework, utility

maximize their utility functions. Since the interference from SUs functions are designed to quantify the satisfaction of users

to PU is kept under the interference constraint and SUs compete for getting resources from the common pool. Since the users

against each other for power allocation, there is the need to behave selﬁshly, the equilibrium point is not best strategy

determine a power allocation strategy which converges to the globally. Therefor pricing needs to be added in the utility

Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). Closed form expressions of price

and power allocation which satisfy both type of users in the functions to obtain system-wide desirable results [9]. In [10],

network are derived and veriﬁed with simulation. pricing based game model is presented for SUs power alloca-

tion in uplink when PU and SUs have common serving base

Index Terms—Dynamic spectrum access, power optimization, station. Existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved and a

Stackelberg game, spectrum sharing, cognitive radio network. suboptimal algorithm is proposed for SUs power allocation

and primary service provider revenue maximization.

I. I NTRODUCTION In this paper we formulate the power allocation of SUs as

a Stackelberg game where PU works as leader and imposes

Spectrum is a prime resource for wireless communication interference price on SUs to control the interference. Con-

and its scarcity makes its efﬁcient utilization highly desirable ventionally, PU interference tolerance is assumed ﬁxed but

[1]. Thus dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is getting more we propose dynamic power control so that PU can optimize

attention in next generation wireless communication networks. interference tolerance by adjusting its power according to its

In DSA the secondary network, facilitated with cognitive minimum data rate requirement and the number of spectrum

radios, may dynamically access the unused/underused licensed sharing SUs. We consider non-uniform pricing for SUs and

spectrum owned by the primary network without causing obtain unique closed form solution for the price determina-

harmful interference [2]. Two main approaches so far have tion, thus conventional time-consuming exhaustive search for

been developed in which a secondary user (SU) can access optimal values is avoided. Based on the determined optimal

the licensed spectrum. The ﬁrst approach assumes that PU is price, PU and SUs power can be easily determined.

unaware of the presence of SU and SU uses spectrum sensing The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II

[3][4] to exploit the idle period of PU. The second approach describes the system model and problem setting. Closed form

is the spectrum sharing where the primary user (PU) is aware expressions for price and power allocation are derived in

of SUs existence and is willing to share its spectrum resources Section III. The numerical results are presented in Section

with SU under certain interference constraint. In our work we IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.

focus on spectrum sharing. In this mode there are many design

questions. How to control interference? How to determine II. S YSTEM M ODEL AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION

interference threshold? What is the beneﬁt to licensed user We consider the downlink transmission for DSA network

for allowing unlicensed user to share its spectrum resources? where N SUs coexist within the coverage area of the primary

[5]. network. PU/SU consists of Primary/Secondry Transmitter

A lot of work addresses radio resource allocation in channel (PT/ST) and Primary/Secondry Receiver (PR/SR) respectively.

sharing. For example, in [6], a family of power allocation Fig.1 shows the system model and it is assumed that all

schemes aimed at achieving high SU rate with spectrum secondary links use the same frequency band as the primary

sharing cognitive radios is described. A generalized framework link. To control the interference from secondary network, we

for interference analysis with different secondary transmitter formulate bi-level Stackelberg game, which consists of one

powers and transmission probabilities is presented in [7]. SUs leader and several followers competing against each other for

admission and power control are investigated in [8] where radio resources. In our model PU acts as the leader while

each secondary link has its minimum quality of service (QoS) SUs act as followers. PU protects itself through pricing the

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN)

37

their power in a greedy manner. The objective of the game is

to ﬁnd the Stackelberg game equilibrium (SE) where neither

VLJQDO PU nor SUs have the incentive to deviate from their strategy

LQWHUIHUHQFH

unilaterally. Since the Stackelberg game consists of two non-

cooperative sub-games, its equilibrium can be found through

35 perfect NE.

65 65

III. P RICE AND P OWER A LLOCATION

67 65 67 We adopt non-uniform pricing strategy, where PU sets

different price for each SU based on its induced interference.

For a given λi , ﬁrst we calculate the optimal power p∗i of the

67 followers by solving the lower sub-game. Since utility function

(3) is concave, there exists at least one NE point which can

Fig. 1. System Model be calculated using typical water ﬁlling as

+

1 pm gmi + σi2

p∗i (λi , pm ) = − . (4)

interference from SUs and earns revenue. The SUs adjust their λi gim hi

power allocation to maximize their individual utilities non-

The solution given by (4) is the optimal strategy of ith SU

cooperatively based on the imposed interference price. Let λ

if the interference price is known. We know that transmitting

= [λ1 , λ2 , ....., λN ] and p = [p1 , p2 , ....., pN ] denote the SUs

power has to be positive, thus the ith SU can only transmit if

interference price and power allocation vectors respectively,

(5) is satisﬁed.

the leader’s sub-game or upper sub-game can be written as

hi

λi < . (5)

gim (pm gmi + σi2 )

max Um (pm , λ, p) = λi pi gim − um (pm − p̄m ) ,

pm >0,λ0 i

It means that if the interference price is too high, the respective

(1) SU will be removed from the game and not allowed to

p m hm transmit.

s.t. log(1 + 2

) > Rmin , (2) Now, to determine solution to the upper sub-game, lets ﬁrst

i pi g im + σ m

consider the rate requirement of PU given in (2). We can write

where pi and pm are the transmitting powers of ith ST and PU power allocation as the following expression.

PT respectively, hm is the channel gain from PT to PR, gim min

th 2 (eR − 1)( i pi gim + σm 2

)

is the cross channel gain from i ST to PR and σ is the pm (p) = . (6)

hm

background noise. The term i pi gim in (2) represents the

integrated interference from the secondary network to PR Replacing the value of pi in (6) with (4), we can rewrite PU

while Rmin is the minimum rate requirement of PU. In (1),

power allocation as a function of λ

i λi pi gim represents total revenue PU collects from SUs. 1 σ 2 gim

While um (pm − p̄m ) denotes the additional power required pm (λ) = R − i + Rσm2

, (7)

to create the interference tolerance for SUs transmission. i λi hi

um denotes marginal power cost and p̄m denotes the orig- min

(eR −1)

inal power required when the SUs are not operational i.e. where R= g g

hm +(eRmin −1) i imh mi

.

log(1 + p̄mσ2hm ) ≥ Rmin . th

i

Similarly, from (4) and (7), i SU power can also be written

m

Similarly the followers’ sub-game or lower sub-game can as function of λ as

be expressed as 1

+

σ2 σi2 gim

p∗i (λ) = λi g1im − hii − ghmi

i

R i λi − hi + gmi

hi Rσ 2

m

pi hi (8)

max Ui (pi , λi ) = log(1 + ) − λi pi gim . (3)

pi >0 pm gmi + σi2 Now, replacing the value of pm and pi in (7) and (8)

respectively, the upper sub-game can be reformulated as

where hi denotes the channel gain from ith ST to the re-

spective SR, gmi is the cross channel gain from PT to ith

λ g σ2

SR. In (3), the ﬁrst term represents SUs transmission rate and max Um (λ) = i 1 − i himi i − λi gim hi

gmi

R i λi

1

the second term denotes the interference cost paid by ith SU. λ>0 2

σ g 2 1

σi2 gim 2

SU can increase its transmission rate by increasing its power. − ihiim + σm − um R i λi − i hi + σm

However, increasing power will result in stronger interference (9)

to nearby PU, which will lead to increase in interference The objective function in (9) is concave, thus the ith SU

m (λ)

cost. This equilibrium can prevent the SUs from increasing optimal price λi ∗ can be determined by solving ∂U∂λ i

= 0.

142

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN)

Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution of the objective IV. N UMERICAL R ESULTS

function (9) can be expressed as In this section we evaluate the performance of our proposed

solution by numerical simulation. We consider the condition

∗
um R

λi = 2

σi gim gim gmi 2 −

σi2 gim

. (10) that three SUs sharing spectrum with one PU. Without loss

hi + hi R σ m i hi of generality, the noise power σ 2 is assumed to be unity

for all receivers. The average channel power gains between

For proof, the reader is referred to Appendix A.

STs and respective SRs and PT to SRs are supposed to be

Proposition 3.2: Assuming identical σi2 and gmi for all SUs,

identical and their values are set as 1 and 0.1 respectively. The

the optimal solution given by (10) must follow the following

channel power gains from STs to PR are assumed as follows:

condition

g1m = 0.01, g2m = 0.1, g3m = 1. It needs to be noted that

hi gim

min gim − a hi all channel gains values are normalized w.r.t. highest channel

um R < , (11)

2 2

σi2 gim

gain. The purpose of assuming ﬁxed channel gains is to study

σi + gmi R σm − i hi the impact of channel gains on interference price determination

and admission control of SUs. We set the value of additional

where a = gmi RN . power cost parameter as um = 0.001.

For proof, the reader is referred to Appendix B. Fig. 2 shows the interference price for all three SUs under

Next, lets

arrange all theSUs in descending order

as different Rmin values. It is obvious that the interference prices

h1 g1m h2 g2m hN gN m

g1m −a h1 > g2m −a h2 , ...., > gN m −a hN , for all SUs are increasing with Rmin . The interference price

then considering formula (11), the optimal interference price is highest for farthest user (SU1) and lowest for closest user

λ∗i can be written as (SU3). With increase in Rmin , interference price for SU3 and

SU2 become so high that at a certain point ( Rmin = 1.75 and

⎧

⎪ 3.75 respectively), they cannot transmit with positive power,

⎪ √ 1 , ....., √ 1

dN

⎪

⎪ b1 +c1 sN b

N +cN sN

hence are removed from the game. At Rmin = 3.75, only

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ if dN < hN

− a gN m

YN one user remains (SU1) in the game. Fig. 3 shows the power

⎪

⎪ gN m N hN

⎪

⎪ allocation of PU and SUs based on the interference price. The

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ √ 1 , ....., √ 1

, ∞ dN −1 power of PU increases with Rmin since it has to maintain

⎪

⎪ b1 +c1 sN −1 bN −1 +cN −1 sN −1

⎪

⎪

its minimum data rate while the power of SUs is decreasing

⎪

⎪ if hN gN m

⎪

⎪ gN m − a N hN YN ≤ dN −1 < since the interference price is rising. PU readjusts its power

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ when the number of SUs changes in the game. It also needs

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ hN −1 gN −1m to be noted that the power of SU1 is high even with high

⎪

⎪ gN −1m − a N −1 hN −1 YN −1

⎪

⎨ interference price. This is because its cross channel gain to

.

λ∗i = PU is the lowest thus its total cost λ1 p1 g1m remains low. The

⎪

⎪ .

⎪

⎪ reverse is true for SU3.

⎪

⎪ .

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ √ 1

, ∞..., ∞ d1

⎪

⎪ b1 +c1 sN −1

3

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ if h2

− a g2m

Y2 ≤ d1 <

price for SU1

⎪

⎪ g2m 2 h2

price for SU2

⎪

⎪

2.5

price for SU3

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪

⎪ h1

− g1m

⎪

⎪ a 1 Y1 2

Interference price

g h

⎪

⎪

1m 1 The point at which the price for

⎪

⎪ SU2 and SU3 become so high that

⎪

⎩ 1.5 they can’t transmit with +ve power

∞ else, hence removed from the game

(12)

σ2 g 1

where aK = gmk RK K, bk = khkkm , ck =

gkmhgkmk ,

√ 2

K σ 2 g

dK = Kum RK , sK = RK σm − k=1 khkkm , YK = 0.5

1

.

2 +g 2

K 2

σ gkm

k 0

σk mk RK σm − k=1 hk 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

PU minimun rate (bits/s/Hz)

It is obvious from the above expression

that allSUs can

only

hN gN m

transmit if the condition dN < gN m − aN hN YN is Fig. 2. SUs price allocation vs. PU minimum rate requirement.

satisﬁed, otherwise some SUs will be removed from the game

and their price will be set as ∞. It can also be observed from

(12) that the interference price is unique for each SU thus the V. C ONCLUSION

SE of the game is unique. The optimal value of p∗m and p∗i In this paper, we develop a game theory based model which

can be easily determined by replacing the value of λ∗i in (7) jointly maximizes the utility functions of both primary and

and (8) respectively. secondary users. In the utility function, PUs minimum rate

143

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN)

50 hi

power of PU − gmi RN

gim

power of SU1 λi <

(16)

σi2 gim

σi2 + gmi R σm2 −

40 power of SU2

power of SU3 i hi

30

The point at which SU2 From (10) we can write

Power allocation (dB)

from game

20

1

u R

m

10 λi = (17)

gim σi2 gim

hi σi2 + gmi R σm

2 −

i hi

0

−10

hi gim

gim − a hi

μm R <

−20

(18)

σi2 gim

PU minimun rate (bits/s/Hz)

σi2 + gmi R σm 2 −

i hi

Fig. 3. PU and SUs power allocation vs. PU minimum rate requirement.

where a = gmi RN and

h1

Let arrange all SUs in descending order as −

requirement is taken as constraint. Price based power alloca- g1m

g1m h2 g2m hN gN m

tion strategy is adopted to keep interference from secondary

a h1 > g2m − a h2 , ...., > gN m − a hN and

network to primary network under tolerance level. Dynamic assume identical gmi , σi2 , for all SUs, then we can rewrite the

power control is applied at PU to adjust its interference condition (18), for all SUs transmission as

min gim − a hi

number of SUs in the network. Unique closed form solution um R < (19)

of the game is derived that guarantees the convergence to

σi2 gim

the equilibrium. The performance of the proposed scheme is σi2 + gmi R σm 2 −

i hi

veriﬁed with numerical results.

R EFERENCES

ACKNOWLEDGMENT [1] M. Javan and A. Sharafat, “Distributed joint resource allocation in primary

This work was supported by the National Natural Sci- and cognitive wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications,

vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 1-12, May 2013.

ence Foundation of China (61227801, 61201152, 61121001), [2] Yuan Wu, Zhang Tengyi , and HK Tsang Danny, “Joint pricing and power

the National Science and Technology Major Project allocation for dynamic spectrum access networks with Stackelberg game

(2012ZX03006003-003), the Program for New Century Excel- model,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 10, no. 1,

pp. 1-12, January 2011.

lent Talents in University (NCET-01-0259) and the Fundamen- [3] Andrea Mariani, Andrea Giorgetti, and Marco Chiani, “Effects of noise

tal Research Funds for the Central Universities (2013RC0106). power estimation on energy detection for cognitive radio applications,”

IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 59, no. 12, pp.

A PPENDIX A 3410-3420, December 2011

[4] Waleed ul Hasan Ejaz, Najam, Seok Lee, et al, “Intelligent spectrum

Approximating λi i λ1i ≈ N in objective function (9) and sensing scheme for cognitive radio networks,” EURASIP Journal on

m (λ)

setting ∂U∂λ

Wireless Communications and Networking, Article number: 26, pp. 1-

i

= 0, we can determine optimal value as 10, 2013

gim gmi σi2 gim

[5] Mahdi Ben Ghorbel, Andrea Goldsmith and Mohamed-Slim Alouini,

∂Um σ 2 gim gim gmi

=− i + R − Rσm2 “Joint pricing and resource allocation for ofdma-based cognitive radio

∂λi hi hi i hi hi systems,” IEEE INFOCOM 2011 Workshop On Cognitive & Cooperative

Networks.

um R

+ 2 =0 [6] Mainak Chowdhury, Anubhav Singla, and Ajit K. Chaturvedi, “A family

λ of power allocation schemes achieving high secondary user rates in

(13) spectrum sharing OFDM cognitive radio,” IEEE Global Communications

From the above we can obtain Conference, GLOBECOM, 2012.

[7] N.H. Mahmood, Ferkan Yilmaz, M.S, Alouini and Geir E. Oien, “Cog-

∗
um R

nitive interference modeling with applications in power and admission

λi = 2

σi gim σi2 gim

. (14) control,” IEEE Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, DySPAN, 2012.

hi + gimhgi mi R σm 2 −

i hi [8] John Tadrous, Ahmed Sultan, and Mohammed Naﬁe, “Admission and

power control for spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks,” ieee

A PPENDIX B transactions on wireless communications, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 945-1955,

June 2011.

Putting the value of pm from (7) in λi < g p hgi +σ2 , [9] Taskeen Nadkar, Vinay Thumar, Gopavajhula P.S. Tej, Shabbir N. Mer-

im ( m mi i) chant, and Uday B. Desai, “Distributed power allocation for secondary

we can obtain following expression users in a cognitive radio scenario,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless

1 σ 2 gim hi Communications, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 1576-1586, April 2012.

gim gmi R − i 2

+ σm + σi2 < . (15) [10] Hui Yu, Lin Gao, Zheng Li, Xinbing Wang, and Ekram Hossain,“Pricing

i λi hi λi for uplink power control in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Transactions

on Vehicular Technology, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 1769-1778, May 2010.

Approximating λi i λ1i ≈ N we simplify above as

144

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