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INTRODUCTION

I. The Place of the Topica

IN THE OrGANON

Both the Topica and the de Sophisticis Elenchis have

always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle.

The two treatises are closely connected ;

the de

Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and

its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises

;

indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard

the two as forming a single work, since he twice

quotes the de Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of

the Topica.

It is generally admitted that what we call logic

and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre-

occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome

of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic

Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted

a formal treatment of the subject and the theories

put forward, for example, in the Theaetetits, Sophist,

Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into

a regular system. But while Aristotle's systematic

treatment of the process of inference and, above all, his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it

has been generally recognized that the Platonic dia-

logues contain some of the germs from which the

Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for

ARISTOTLE

example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the cate-

gories is already implicit in the recognition of the

abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re-

lation, activity and passivity. Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since

about A.D. 200 have passed under the title of the Organon or ' instrument ' of science, the most im-

portant are

(1)

the

Prior Analytics, in

which he

sets forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect without reference to the subject-matter with

which it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he

discusses the characteristics which reasoning must necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, (3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of

reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall

short of the conditions of scientific accuracy.

The

Categories and the de Interpretatione are subsidiary

treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the

proposition.

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been

expended, particularly by German scholars, in an

attempt to fix the exact order in which the various

treatises which constitute the Organon were com-

posed. The problem is complicated by the fact that

the treatises, in the form in which they have come

down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which

were evidently subjected to a certain amount of

revision due to the modification and development

of his original doctrines. This process has naturally given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would naturally occur if corrections were made or additions

inserted which were not completely adapted to the context in which they were placed.

It has been generally recognized that the whole

TOPICA

of the Topica does not belong to the same date.

H. Maier <* holds that the oldest portion consists of

Books II-VII. 2 and that it was written under the

direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the

same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have

survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points

out that the term crvAAoyicr/xo^ is not used in

the

technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it

is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late inser-

tion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the

term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and

that, consequently, Books II-VII. 2 were composed before the philosopher made his greatest contribu-

tion to logic.

He holds that Books I and VIII belong

to the same period as Book VII. 4-5, and form an introduction and conclusion to the treatise written

after the discovery of the syllogism, and that the de

Sopkisticis Elenchis was a subsequent

addition to

the Topica.

On the other hand, F. Solmsen" and

P. Gohlke « hold that Books I-VII form the earlier

portion of the work and that Book VIII and the de

Sopkisticis Elenchis were added subsequently. As regards the relation of the Topica to the rest of the Organon, Maier considers the Topica as a whole

to be earlier

than the Analytics ; Solmsen suggests

that the order was (1) Topica I-VII, (2) Posterior

Analytics I, (3) Topica VIII and de Sopkisticis Elenckis, (4) Posterior Analytics II, (5) Prior Analytics ; Gohlke holds that the traditional order of the two Analytics

is correct, and that the

Topica and de Sopkisticis

Elenckis presuppose the Analytics.

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk of the Topica embodies Aristotle's earliest contribu-

" See Bibliography.

ARISTOTLE

tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was written in part before his discovery of the syllogism.

II. The Content of the Topica

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its

author (100 a 18 IF.), " to discover a method by which

we shall be able to reason from generally accepted

opinions about any problem set before us and shall

ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying

anything self-contradictory " ; that is to say, it aims at

enabling the two participants, the * questioner ' and

the * answerer,' to sustain their parts in a dialectical

discussion.

The subject, then, of the treatise may

be described as the dialectical syllogism based on

premises which are merely probable as contrasted with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based

on premises which are true and immediate.

The

probable premises which make up the dialectical

syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as " those which

commend themselves to all or to the majority or to

the wise."

The uses of dialectic are, we are told,

three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for

general conversation, and (3) for application to the

sciences, because (a) if we can argue a question pro

and con, we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood, and (6) since the first principles

of the sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated,

the approach to them must be through the study of the opinions generally held about them. After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle,

in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the tottol which

give their name to the treatise.

The term tottoi is

TOPICA

somewhat difficult to define. They may be described

as * commonplaces ' of argument or as general prin-

ciples of probability which stand in the same relation

to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the

demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are

" the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning

is to draw its arguments." "

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident;

Books IV and V with those of genus and property ;

Books VI and VII.

1-3 with those

of definition.

Books VII. 4-5, and Book VIII, after giving some additional notes, conclude the treatise by describing

the practice of dialectical reasoning.

III. The Manuscripts

The chief manuscripts for the Topica are :

A Urbinas 35

ARISTOTLE

give a slight preference to B, the readings of which

are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C

sometimes preserves the true reading.

IV. Select Bibliography

EDITIONS

  • J. T. Buhle, Text, Latin Translation

Biponti, 1792.

and Notes,

I. Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837.

  • T. Waitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1844-1846.

  • Y. Strache and M. Walhes, Teubner Text, Leipzig,

1923.

[The

Oxford

Classical

Text, by W.

D.

Ross,

Oxford, 1958, was not available to Professor Forster.]

TRANSLATIONS

  • T. Taylor, London, 1812.

  • O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), London, 1902.

  • W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation), Oxford, 1928.

In French :

  • J. B.-Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837.

In German :

  • J. H. von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877.

  • E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922.

ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS

  • P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik,

Berlin, 1936.

TOPICA

H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Tubingen,

1900.

F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik

und Rhetorik, Berlin, 1929- J. L. Stocks, " The Composition of Aristotle's Logical

Works," Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124.

In translating the Topica I have used the text of

Bekker in the Berlin Edition, and when I translate

any other reading this is noted at the foot of the page.

  • I have constantly referred to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does not, however, seem to me

to mark any considerable advance on that of Bekker.

  • I have found Waltz's edition of the Organon of great

use, and the Latin version of Pacius is often helpful.

  • I have frequently consulted the Oxford translation

by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

I have to thank my friend and former colleague

Professor W.

S.

Maguinness, of King's College,

London, for reading through my version and giving

me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy.

He has suggested several improvements in the text

which I have been glad to adopt.

E. S. F.

[This Introduction is, with some modifications.

Professor Forster's. After his death, his edition of the Topica was seen through the press by D. J. Furley,

who also compiled the Index.]

TOniKQN

A

100 a 18

I. 'H

jLtev TTpoOeais rrjg Trpayixareias

fieOoSov

evpelv, a^* t^S" Suvqaofjieda ovWoyit^eGdai rrepl irav-

  • 20 ros rod Trporedevros TTpo^XrijxaTos i^ ivho^ojv, Kal avTol Xoyov VTrexovres firjOev epovfxev VTrevavriov. TTpcjTov ovv prjreov tl ian GvXXoyiopios Kal rive's avTOV hia^opaiy ottcjo? \r]^dfj 6 StaAe/crt/cos"

cruA-

AoytCT/xo?.

rovrov yap ^r]rovfji€V Kara rrjv rrpoKei-

IJl4.V7]v rrpaypLareiav.

  • 25 "Ecrrt hr] ovXXoycajJLog Xoyos eV a> redevrcov nvwv

erepov n rwv KeL/Jbevcov i^ dvdyKTjs avpL^aiveL Sid

Tcov K€i[Ji€vajv.

aTToSet^tS" fiev ovv ecrrtV,

orav i^

dXrjdoJv Kal Trpcnrcov 6 GuXXoycGfios 7^, rj Ik tolov-

Tcov d Sta TLVojv TTpwTWV Kal dXrjdcijv rrjg nepl avrd

  • 30 yvcjGews rrfv dpxrjv LXr](f)v StaXektikos §€ cruA-

100 b 18 Aoyto-jLtos" o e^ ivSo^ojv cruAAoyt^d/xevos*.

ecrrt

8e

dXrjOrj fjiev Kal TTpcora rd fir) St' irepajv dXXd St*

avrojv

e^ovra rrjv ttLotiv

ov

Set

ydp

20 iTTLarrjixovLKaig dpxous

iTn^rjTeiardat rd

iv

raZs

Sta

rt,

dAA' eKaGrrfv rwv dpxojv avrrjv Kad^ iavrrjv etvat

7TLGr7]v.

eVSo^a Se rd SoKovvra ttololv tj rots TiAet-

TOPICA

BOOK I

I. The purpose of the present treatise is to discover Introduc-

a method by which we shall be able to reason from rr^i.3).

generally accepted opinions about any problem set The design before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an treatise.

argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory.

First, then, we must say what reasoning is and what

different kinds of it there are, in order that dialectical

reasoning may be apprehended ; for it is the search

for this that we are undertaking in the treatise which

lies before us.

Reasoning is a discussion in which, certain things The dlffer-

having been laid down, something other than these o? reaS?n-

things necessarily results through them. Reasoning u^g:

is demonstration when it proceeds from premises which (a) De-

are true and primary or of such a kind that we have ^ve!^*^*'

derived our original knowledge of them through pre-

mises which are primary and true.

Reasoning is (6) Dia-

dialectical which reasons from generally accepted ^^^^^^

opinions. Things are true and primary which com-

mand belief through themselves and not through anything else ; for regarding the first principles of science it is unnecessary to ask any further question

as to ' why,' but each principle should of itself com-

mand belief. Generally accepted opinions, on the other hand, are those which commend themselves

ARISTOTLE

100 b

(Trots'

rj

TOLs

oo<f)o'i9, Kal tovtols Tj

TTOLOiv 1] roXg

TrXelaroLg rj rots fxaXiGTa yvcoplfjiOL? Kal ivSo^oL?.

ipiGTiKos 8'

ecrrt

(JvXXoyicjiios 6 Ik (f)aivoiJLVOJV

  • 25 eVSof60V, fJLT] ovTCxiV Se, Kal 6 i^ evSo^cuv ^ (j)ai-

vofjbevojv ivSo^cov ^atvo/xevos" .

ov yap

rrdv

ro

<f>aLv6jjL€Vov evSo^ov Kal 'iariv evho^ov.

ovdev yap

rojv Xeyopbevcav evSo^cxJV emiroXaiov e;(€t TravreXws

rrjv (jyavraoiav, Kada Trepl ras tojv ipiGTiKwv Xoycxjv dpxoL^ GViJLPe^7]K6v e^eiv Trapaxprjl-ia yap Kal ojs

  • 30 inl TO TToXv TOLS Kal fjLLKpa Gvvopdv Swafievotg

101 a /caTaSryAos" iv avrots rj rod ifjevSovs eGrl (f)VGis.

6

fiev ovv nporepos tojv piqQevrojv

ipLGTLKOJv gvX-

XoyiGfiaJv Kal GyXXoyiGfjiog XeyeGdoj, 6 Se Xolttos

ipLGTLKOS fjbV GyXXoycGfjio? ,

GvXXoyLGfios S'

OV,

i7T€LBrj (fiaiveraL pL€v GvXXoyit,€Gdat, GvXXoyl^eraL

ov.

  • 6 "Ert Se TTapa rovs elp^qixevovs arravras GvXXoyi-

GfJLOVs OL eK TCJV TTCpL Tivas eTTiGTrjfxas olKeiwv ytvo-

fjLVOL TTapaXoyiGpLOL, KaOdnep errl rrjs yeajpLerptas

Kal TOJV ravrrj Gvyyevwv GvpL^e^-qKev ex^iv.

olk

yap 6 rpoTTos ovrog Sta^epetv rcov elprjfjLevojv gvX-

  • 10 XoyLGpLOJV' ovre yap cf dXriOcov Kal Trpcorwv gvXXo- yit^erai 6 i/jevSoypa(f)6jv, ovr $ ivSo^ojv.

etV yap

rov opov ovK efjUTTLTrret' ovre yap rd ttolgi hoKovvra

Xapb^dvei ovT€ rd rots ttX^lgtols ovt€ rd rotS" go-

<j>olSy Kal TOVTOis ovT€ rd TraGiv ovre rols rrXeiGTOis ovre rols evho^ordroLS , dXX €K tojv oIk€L(x)v fxev rfj

  • 15 eTTLGTiqp.ri XrjfjLjjidrojv, ovk dXirjOcJov 8e rov GvXXoyi- Gp.6v TToielrai.

rep ydp rj rd rjpLCKVKXia irepiypd-

TOPICA, I. I

to

all or to the majority or to the wisethat is, to all

of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them. Reasoning is contentious (?) Conteu-

if it is based on opinions which appear to

be gener-

ally accepted but are not really so, or if it merely

appears to be based on opinions which are, or appear

to be, generally accepted. For not every opinion

which appears to be generally accepted is actually

so accepted. For in none of the so-called generally

accepted opinions is the illusory appearance entirely

manifest, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments ; for usually the nature of un- truth in these is immediately obvious to those who

have even a small power of comprehension. There-

fore, of the above-mentioned contentious reasonings the former should actually be called reasoning, but the other should be called, not reasoning, but con-

tentious reasoning, because it appears to reason but

does not really do so.

Furthermore, besides all the above-mentioned False

reasonings, there are false reasonings based on pre- mises peculiar to certain sciences, as happens in

geometry and the sciences kindred to it.

For this

reasonings.

kind seems to differ from the reasonings already

mentioned ; for the man who constructs a false figure reasons neither from true and primary premises nor from generally accepted opinions ; for he does not fall within the definition, since he does not take as

his premises either universally accepted opinions or

those which commend themselves to the majority or

to the wisethat is to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most distinguished of them,but his pro-

cess of reasoning is based on assumptions which are

peculiar to the science but not true ;

for he reasons

ARISTOTLE

(p€LV /X17 COS" 0€L, 7] ypa/x/xas" nvas ayeiv ^rj oj? av

axOelrjaav, rov TrapaXoyiorfJuov Troteirat.

EtSr] iJLV ovv Twv (TfAAoyicr/xcuv,

ws tvttco irepi-

AajSetv,

eoTW

ra elprnxeva.

KadoXov 8'

etVctv

20 7Tpl iravroiv twv elprjfjLevojv

/cat

rcov /xerot ravra

piq97]uo}xivcjv y €Trl roaovrov rjfjLLV Stcuptcr^co, Stdrt

nepl ovSevos

avrojv rov

aKpi^rj Xoyov olttoSoV"

vac TTpoatpovfieSa, aXK ooov tvttco Tvepl avrojv

PovXofjieOa BueXOeiV, TravreAcD? lkovov r]yovp.€VOL

Kara ttjv TTpoKeifJidvrjv p^iOohov to SvvaGuai yvwpi-

t,eiV OTTWGOVV €KaGTOV aUTCtJV.

25

II. 'ETTOjitevoy

8'

av etr] roZs

elprfpbivoLS etTretv

TTpos TToaa re

Kal rlva p^pTjort/xos"

rj

Trpayp^areia.

orL

Sr]

TTpos

Tpta,

TTpo^

yvpLyaalav, TTpos ras

ivrev^eis, Trpos ras Kara (j)LXooo(f)iav eTncrrrjp^as.

on jLtev ovv Trpos yvp^vaalav ;^po7crt/xos',

ef avrcov

30 Karagaves eon- piedoSov yap e^ovres p5.ov Trepl rov

TTporeddvros eTn^eLpelv hwrjuopieda.

Trpos 8e ra?

vrev^iSy hion ras rcov ttoXXcjv Kar7]pL6pLr]pi€voi

Solas' ovK Ik rcJov aXXorpicjv dAA' ck rcov oIk€lo)V

Soyp^drcov opuXriGopiev Trpos avrovs, /xeraptpa-

t^ovres o Tt av pur) KaXcos ^aivcovrai Xeyeiv r]puv.

35 TTpos 8e ras: Kara (j)iXoGO(j>iav iviarripLas , on hvvd-

p.€VOL TTpos dpi(f)6rpa BiaTToprJGaL paov ev eKaaroLS Karoi/jopbeda rdXrjdes re Kal ro i/jevhos. en 8e rrpos ra TTpcora rcov rrepl eKaarrjv eTTianqpuqv [dpx^^Y'

eK pi€V yap rcov olKeicov rwv Kara rrjv TrporeOelaav

emor^qpiriv dp)(oJV dSvvarov ecTreiv n rrepl avrcov,

101 b cTretSo) TTpcorat

at dp^al aTrdvrcxJV elai, hid 8e rcx)v

TTcpl e/cacrra ivSo^cov dvdyKTj rrepl avrcov SieXdeXv.

rovro 8' t8tov tj pLoXiora OLKetov rijs SiaXeKnKrjs

^ Omitting dpxcov with B corr. and C.

TOPICA, I. i-ii

falsely either by describing the semicircles improperly

or by drawing lines as they should not be drawn.

Let the above then be a description in outline

of the different kinds of reasoning.

In general, as

regards all those already mentioned and to be men-

tioned hereafter, let this much distinction suffice for

us, since we do not propose to give the exact defini-

tion of any of them but merely wish to describe them in outline, considering it quite enough, in accordance

with the method which we have set before us, to be

able to recognize each of them in some way or other.

II. After the above remarks the next point is to The uses

explain for how many and for what purposes this Jfeatiae

treatise is useful.

They are three in number, mental

training, conversations and the philosophic sciences.

That it is useful for mental training is obvious on the

face of it ; for, if we have a method, we shall be able

more easily to argue about the subject proposed. It

is useful for conversations, because, having enumer-

ated the opinions of the majority, we shall be dealing

with people on the basis of their own opinions, not of

those of others, changing the course of any argument

which they appear to us to be using wrongly. For the

philosophic sciences it is useful, because, if we are

able to raise difficulties on both sides, we shall more

easily discern both truth and falsehood on every

point.

Further, it is useful in connexion with the

ultimate bases of each science ; for it is impossible to

discuss them at all on the basis of the principles peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary in relation to everything else, and it is

necessary to deal with them through the generally

accepted opinions on each point.

This process be-

longs peculiarly, or most appropriately to dialectic

;

ARISTOTLE

eanv e^eraarLKT] yap ovaa Trpog ras aTracrojv rojv

jjuedoSojv dpxoiS oSov Xl.

  • 5 III. "Efo/xev Se reXeoJS Trjv jjLedoSov, orav ojJLolios

exoJjJLev a)G7Tp errl p7]TOpLK7Jg koI larpiKrjs Kal rojv

TOLOvrojv SvvdfJiecjv.

rovro 8' earl to e/c tcov iv-

SexofJbevojv iroielv d rrpoaLpovixeda.

ovre yap 6

prjTopiKOS K TTavros rpoirov Tretcret, ovS^ 6 larpiKos

vyLaaei- aAA' idv tojv ivSexofJidvcov purjSev irapa-

  • 10 XeLTTT], LKavois avTov ex^i'V Tr]v iTnariQpbrjv <f>riGOfJLV.

IV. YipwTOV ovv deojprjreov e/c tlvcdv tj puedoSos-

i Sr] Xd^oLpLev irpos iroaa koX iroia Kal Ik tlvojv

ol Xoyoiy

Kal TTCJS tovtojv evirop'^cropLev,

exoipiV

dv LKaVOJS TO 7TpOK€ipb6VOV.

€GTL 8' dpiOpO) tCTtt Kal

  • 15 raura, i^ cLv t ol XoyoL Kal Trepl Sv ol avXXoyL- apLoL yivovTai puev yap ol XoyoL Ik tojv TTpOTdaeojv' rrepl cov he ol GvXXoyi(TpLOi, Ta TrpopXi^puaTd cVrt. Trdaa 8e TTpoTaois Kal Trdv TTpo^Xrjpia r^ yivos r] Ihiov 7) ovpu^e^riKos hrjXol- Kal yap Trjv hia(j)opdv (hs ovoav yevLKYjv opLOv tco yevet TaKTeov.

inel 8e

  • 20 Tov ISlov to pL€V TO TL TjV elvai ar}piatV€L, to 8* ov orjpaiveii SirjpijcrOa) to ISlov els dpi(f>co Ta rrpoeiprj- pbiva p^eprj, Kal KaXeLaBco to pev to tl tJv etvat GTjpalvov opos, TO 8e Xolttov /caret ttjv kolvtjv TTepL avTCJV dTToSodelaav ovop^aoiav rrpooayopevi- gBo) Ihiov. hT]Xov ovv e/c tcov elprjpevwv otl KaTa Trjv

  • 26 vvv hiaipecFiv T€TTapa Ta iravTa Gvp,^aivei yiveaOai,

TOPICA, I. ii-iv

for, being of the nature of an investigation, it lies along the path to the principles of all methods of inquiry.

III. We shall possess the method completely when The limita-

we are in a position similar to that in which we are pro^posed^^

with regard to rhetoric and medicine and other such method,

faculties ;

that is to say, when we carry out our

purpose with every available means. For neither will the rhetorician seek to persuade nor the physician to heal by every expedient ; but if he omits none of

the available means, we shall say that he possesses

the science in an adequate degree.

IV. We must, then, first consider on what bases our subjects

method rests ; for if we could grasp to how many and m^^erials

to what kind of objects our arguments are directed of Discus-

and on what bases they rest, and how we are to be (1^4.12).

well provided with these, we should sufficiently attain

the end which is set before us.

Now the bases of

arguments are equal in number and identical with

the subjects of reasonings.

For arguments arise Proposi-

from * propositions,' while the subjects of reasonings problems.

are ' problems.' Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or

an accident ; for the differentia also, being generic in character, should be ranged with the genus. But

since part of the peculiarity indicates the essence and

part does not do so, let the peculiarity be divided

into the two above-mentioned parts and let that

which indicates the essence be called a ' definition,'

and let the remaining part be termed a ' property

'

in accordance with the nomenclature usually assigned

in these cases.

It is clear therefore, from what has

been said, that, as a result of the division just made,

there are four alternatives in all, either property or

ARISTOTLE

r) iSlov t) opov ^ yevog rj avfJipePrjKog.

fJUiqSels S'

rjfjudg vTToXd^T] Xiyeiv (hs eKaarov rovrwv Kad^ avro

XeyojJievov irporaoLS r) TTpo^X'qpbd iariv,

dAA'

on

0,770 TOVTCJV Kal TO, TTpojSAT^/xara Kal at Trporaaeis

yivovrai. hia<^ep€i 8e to TTpo^Xruxa Kal r] rrporaaLS

SO rw rpoTTO).

ovTOJ /xev ydp pr^devros, dpd ye to

^wov 77e^ov SIttovv opLOfios ioTLV dv9pa)7Tov; Kal dpd ye to l^cpov yevos ioTl tov dvdpcoTTov;, rrpo-

Taoi'S yiveTai.

edv Se,

TTOTepov to

tcpov 7Tet,6v

SIttovv opLGfJLog eoTiv dvdpcoTTov -^ ov; [Kal TTOTepov

TO i,cpov yevos eortV;]/ irpo^Xruia yiveTai. ofioLCug

Se

Kal

errl

twv

dXXcjv.

wot

etKOTCos

lua tw

35 dpiOpbcp Ta TTpo^XrjixaTa

Kal

at TrpoTdaeis

eloiv.

drro

Trdorjs ydp rrpoTdoeoJS Trpo^Xrjfia TTOiiqcreLS

fjbeTa^dXXcjv tco TpoTrcp.

V. AeKTeov Se rt opoSy tl ihiov, rt yevos, tl gvjjl-

j^e^TjKos.

102 a GTjpiaLVCxyv .

eoTt 8' 6po9 jLtev Aoyos" o to tl j^v elvai

aTToStSorat 8e r^ Adyos" dvT^ dvo/xaros" rj

Xoyos dvTl Xoyov Suvardv ydp Kal tcov vtto Xoyov

Tivd ar^fjuaivofjievayv opiuaudai.

ooot S'

ottcdgovv

dvd/xart

t7]v

aTToSoaiv TroiovvTai, hrjXov

ws ovk

aTToStSdao-tv ourot tov tov TTpdyfxaTos

6piC7[ji6v,

5 iTTeiSrj 77a? opcafjios Xoyog rtV eoTiv.

opiKov fxevTOL

Kal TO TOLOVTOV

OeTeOV, OLOV OTL KaXoV eaTL TO

Trperrov. ojjlolojs Se Kal to rroTepov raurdv ato^i^ot?

Kal iTTLOTrjijLr] rj eTepov Kal ydp rrepl tov? opLGfxovs,

TTOTepov TavTOV -r) eTepov, rj TrXetaTr] yiveTai 8ta-

Tpi^Tj.

dirXchs 8e opiKa rrdvTa Xeyeadoj ra z577d ttjv

10 avTrjv dvTa fieOoSov Toig opiapbois.

otl he TrdvTa

^ Omitting koI TTorepov

. . .

iariv ; with A B.

TOPICA, I. iv-v

definition or genus or accident. But let no one sup- pose that we mean that each of these stated by itself is a proposition or a problem, but only that problems and propositions are made up of these. The problem

and the proposition differ in the way in which they

are stated.

If we say, " Is not ' pedestrian biped

animal ' a definition of man } " or " Is not ' animal

the genus of man ? " a proposition is formed.

But if

we say, ** Is ' pedestrian biped animal ' a definition

of man, or not ? " a problem is formed.

Similarly

too with the other cases. It naturally follows, there- fore, that the problems and the propositions are equal

in number ; for you will be able to make a problem

out of any proposition by altering the way in which

it is stated.

V. We must next say what definition, property. The four

genus and accident are.

A

definition is

a phrase

fj)^ Deflni*

indicating the essence of something. The definition *^°"- is asserted either as a phrase used in place of a term,

or as a phrase used in place of a phrase ; for it is

possible to define some things also which are indicated

by a phrase.

But it is obvious that everyone who

makes an assertion by means of a term in any way

whatever, does not assert the definition of the thing,

because every definition is a phrase of a certain kind. However, such a statement as " That which is seemly

is beautiful " must also be put down as being ' de-

finitory,' and likewise the question "