5 RB V Galit

1/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 23
R.B. Michael Press vs. Galit
*
G.R. No. 153510. February 13, 2008.
R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES

ESCOBIA, petitioners, vs. NICASIO C. GALIT,
respondent.
Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC);

Appeals; Rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are accorded
not only respect but even finality if the findings are supported by
substantial evidence is not an iron-clad rule.—It is well settled
that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are
accorded not only respect but even finality if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. This is especially so when such
findings of the labor arbiter were affirmed by the CA. However,
this is not an iron-clad rule. Though the findings of fact by the
labor arbiter may have been affirmed and adopted by the NLRC
and the CA as in this case, it cannot divest the Court of its
authority to review the findings of fact of the lower courts or
quasi-judicial agencies when it sees that justice has not been
served, more so when the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies’
findings are contrary to the evidence on record or fail to
appreciate relevant and substantial evidence presented before it.
Same; Dismissals; Condonation; Waivers; Fact that the
numerous infractions of respondent have not been immediately
subjected to sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the
offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company rules;
Management pre-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
24
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24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rogative to discipline employees and impose punishment is a legal
right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived; It is
incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence to
demonstrate condonation or waiver on the part of management to
forego the exercise of its right to impose sanctions for breach of
company rules.— The mere fact that the numerous infractions of
respondent have not been immediately subjected to sanctions
cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offenses or waiver of
the company to enforce company rules. A waiver is a voluntary
and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal
right or privilege. It has been ruled that “a waiver to be valid and
effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him.” Hence, the management
prerogative to discipline employees and impose punishment is a
legal right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.
In Cando v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 666 (1990), the employee did not
report for work for almost five months when he was charged for
absenteeism. The employee claimed that such absences due to his
handling of union matters were condoned. The Court held that
the employee did not adduce proof to show condonation coupled
with the fact that the company eventually instituted the
administrative complaint relating to his company violations. Thus
it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence
to demonstrate condonation or waiver on the part of management
to forego the exercise of its right to impose sanctions for breach of
company rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Past infractions for which the
employee has suffered the corresponding penalty for each
violation cannot be used as a justification for the employee’s
dismissal for that would penalize him twice for the same offense.
—In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to
show waiver or condonation on the part of petitioners. Thus the
finding of the CA that petitioners cannot use the previous
absences and tardiness because respondent was not subjected to
any penalty is bereft of legal basis. In the case of Filipio v. The
Honorable Minister Blas F. Ople, 182 SCRA 1 (1990), the Court,
quoting then Labor Minister Ople, ruled that past infractions for
which the employee has suffered the corresponding penalty for
each violation cannot be used as a justification for the employee’s
dismissal for that would penalize him twice for the same offense.
At most, it was explained, “these collective infrac-
25
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 25
tions could be used as supporting justification to a subsequent

similar offense.” In contrast, the petitioners in the case at bar did
not impose any punishment for the numerous absences and
tardiness of respondent. Thus, said infractions can be used
collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.
Same; Same; Insubordination or Willful Disobedience;
Elements for Willful Disobedience to be a Valid Cause for
Dismissal.— For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for
dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by
a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must
have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and
must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.
Same; Same; Due Process; Employee must be given two (2)
notices before his employment could be terminated.—Under the
twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2)
notices before his employment could be terminated: (1) a first
notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second
notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is
being terminated. Not to be taken lightly of course is the hearing
or opportunity for the employee to defend himself personally or by
counsel of his choice.
Same; Same; Same; Termination of respondent was
railroaded in serious breach of his right to due process;
Petitioners are liable jointly and solidarily to pay nominal
damages to the respondent in the amount of P30,000.—In view of
the infirmities in the proceedings, we conclude that termination of
respondent was railroaded in serious breach of his right to due
process. And as a consequence of the violation of his statutory
right to due process and following Agabon, petitioners are liable
jointly and solidarily to pay nominal damages to the respondent
in the amount of PhP 30,000.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ralph P. Tua for petitioner.
Abelardo James A. Sonico for respondent.
26
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Year in, year out, a copious number of illegal dismissal

cases reach the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually end
up with this Court. This petition for review under Rule 45
registered by petitioners R.B. Michael Press and Annalene
Reyes Escobia against their former machine operator,
respondent Nicasio C. Galit, is among them. It assails the
November 14, 2001 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
62959, finding the dismissal of respondent illegal. Likewise
challenged is the May 7, 2002 Resolution denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
On May 1, 1997, respondent was employed by petitioner

R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator, whose
work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays to
Saturdays, and he was paid PhP 230 a day. During his
employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times,
totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was absent without leave for
a total of nine and a half days.
On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render
overtime service in order to comply with a job order
deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day,
February 23, 1999, respondent reported for work but
petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later
in the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copy of
an Office Memorandum was served on him, as follows:
To : Mr. Nicasio Galit
From : ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA
Re : WARNING FOR DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF HEARING
This warning for dismissal is being issued for the following
offenses:
(1) habitual and excessive tardiness
27
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 27
(2) committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing

superiors
(3) failure to work overtime after having been instructed to do
so
(4) Insubordination—willfully disobeying, defying or
disregarding company authority
The offenses you’ve committed are just causes for termination of

employment as provided by the Labor Code. You were given
verbal warnings before, but there had been no improvement on
your conduct.
Further investigation of this matter is required, therefore, you
are summoned to a hearing at 4:00 p.m. today. The hearing will
determine your employment status with this company.
(SGD) ANNALENE REYES-ESCOBIA
1
Manager
On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from

employment. The employer, through petitioner Escobia,
gave him his two-day salary and a termination letter,
which reads:
February 24, 1999
Dear Mr. Nicasio Galit,
I am sorry to inform you that your employment with this company
has been terminated effective today, February 24, 1999. This
decision was not made without a thorough and complete
investigation.
You were given an office memo dated February 23, 1999
warning you of a possible dismissal. You were given a chance to
defend yourself on a hearing that was held in the afternoon of the
said date.
During the hearing, Mrs. Rebecca Velasquez and Mr. Dennis
Reyes, were present in their capacity as Production Manager and
Supervisor, respectively.
Your admission to your offenses against the company and the
testimonies from Mrs. Velasquez and Mr. Reyes justified your
dismissal from this company,
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 71.
28
Please contact Ms. Marly Buita to discuss 13th-Month Pay

disbursements.
Cordially,
2
(SGD) Mrs. Annalene Reyes-Escobia
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal

dismissal and money claims before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration
Branch No. IV, which was docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB IV-2-10806-99-C. On October 29, 1999, the labor
arbiter rendered a Decision,
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being a finding that

complainant was illegally dismissed, respondent RB MICHAEL
PRESS/Annalene Reyes-Escobia is hereby ordered to reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits, and be paid his full backwages computed from
the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of his actual
reimbursement.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
3
SO ORDERED.”
On January 3, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the
NLRC and their appeal was docketed as NLRC NCR CA
No. 022433-00. In the April 28, 2000 Decision, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRC, petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On November
14, 2001, the CA rendered its judgment affirming with
modification the NLRC’s Decision, thus:
“WHEREFORE
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision of public respondent is accordingly modified in that the
basis of the computation of the backwages, 13th month pay and
incentive pay should be respondent’s daily wage of P230.00; how-
_______________
2 Id., at p. 72.
3 Id., at pp. 59-60.
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VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 29
ever, backwages should be computed from February 22, 1999 up

to the finality of this decision, plus the 13th month and service
4
incentive leave pay.”
The CA found that it was not the tardiness and absences
committed by respondent, but his refusal to render
overtime work on February 22, 1999 which caused the
termination of his employment. It ruled that the time
frame in which respondent was afforded procedural due
process is dubitable; he could not have been afforded ample
opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on
his behalf. It further ruled that the basis for computing his
backwages should be his daily salary at the time of his
dismissal which was PhP 230, and that his backwages
should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to the
finality of the CA’s decision.
On December 5
3, 2001, petitioners asked for
reconsideration but was denied in the CA’s May 7, 2002
Resolution.
Persistent, petitioners instituted the instant petition
raising numerous issues which can be summarized, as
follows: first, whether there was just cause to terminate the
employment of respondent, and whether due process was
observed in the dismissal process; and second, whether
respondent is entitled to backwages and other benefits
despite his refusal to be reinstated.
The Court’s Ruling
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial

agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but
even finality if the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. This is especially so when such findings of the
labor arbiter
_______________
4 Id., at p. 47. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, and concurred in by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 130-132.
30
6
were affirmed by the CA. However, this is not an iron-clad
rule. Though the findings of fact by the labor arbiter may
have been affirmed and adopted by the NLRC and the CA
as in this case, it cannot divest the Court of its authority to
review the findings of fact of the lower courts or quasi-
judicial agencies when it sees that justice has not been
served, more so when the lower courts or quasi-judicial
agencies’ findings are contrary to the evidence on record or
fail to appreciate 7 relevant and substantial evidence
presented before it.
Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to the
following offenses: (1) habitual and excessive tardiness; (2)
commission of discourteous acts and disrespectful conduct
when addressing superiors; (3) failure to render overtime
work despite instruction to do so; and (4) insubordination,
that is, willful disobedience of, defiance to, or disregard of
8
company authority. The foregoing charges may be
condensed into: (1) tardiness constituting neglect of duty;
(2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or willful
disobedience.
Respondent’s tardiness cannot be considered
condoned by petitioners
Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of

initiative, diligence, and discipline to come to work on time
everyday exhibit the employee’s deportment towards work.
Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to the general
productivity and business of the employer. This is
especially true when the tardiness and/or absenteeism
occurred frequently and repeatedly within an extensive
period of time.
_______________
6 Nautica Canning Corp., et al. v. Roberto C. Yumul, G.R. No. 164588,
October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 415, 423-424; Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA
573, 604.
7 See Basilisa Dungaran v. Arleni Koschnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August
31, 2005, 468 SCRA 676, 685; Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, August
7, 2003, 408 SCRA 484, 488-489.
8 Rollo, p. 71.
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VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 31
In resolving the issue on tardiness, the labor arbiter ruled
that petitioners cannot use respondent’s habitual tardiness
and unauthorized absences to justify his dismissal since
they had already deducted the corresponding amounts from
his salary. Furthermore, the labor arbiter explained that
since respondent was not subjected to any admonition or
penalty for tardiness, petitioners then had condoned the
offense or that the infraction is not serious enough to merit
any penalty. The CA then supported the labor arbiter’s
ruling by ratiocinating that petitioners cannot draw on
respondent’s habitual tardiness in order to dismiss him
since there is no evidence which shows that he had been
warned or reprimanded for his excessive and habitual
tardiness.
We find the ruling incorrect.
The mere fact that the numerous infractions of
respondent have not been immediately subjected to
sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the
offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company
rules. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right or
9
privilege. It has been ruled that “a waiver to be valid and
effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give 10
up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.”
Hence, the management prerogative to discipline
employees and impose punishment is a legal right which
cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.
11
In Cando v. NLRC, the employee did not report for
work for almost five months when he was charged for
absenteeism. The employee claimed that such absences due
to his handling of union matters were condoned. The Court
held that the
_______________
9 Castro v. Del Rosario, et al., No. L-17915, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA
196, 203.
10 Thomson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998, 298
SCRA 280, 293-294.
11 G.R. No. 91344, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 666, 671.
32
employee did not adduce proof to show condonation coupled
with the fact that the company eventually instituted the
administrative complaint relating to his company
violations.
Thus it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce
substantial evidence to demonstrate condonation or waiver
on the part of management to forego the exercise of its
right to impose sanctions for breach of company rules.
In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any
evidence to show waiver or condonation on the part of
petitioners. Thus the finding of the CA that petitioners
cannot use the previous absences and tardiness because
respondent was not subjected to any penalty is bereft of
legal basis. In the case of
12
Filipro v. The Honorable Minister
Blas F. Ople, the Court, quoting then Labor Minister
Ople, ruled that past infractions for which the employee
has suffered the corresponding penalty for each violation
cannot be used as a justification for the employee’s
dismissal for that would penalize him twice for the same
offense. At most, it was explained, “these collective
infractions could be used as supporting justification to a
subsequent similar offense.” In contrast, the petitioners in
the case at bar did not impose any punishment for the
numerous absences and tardiness of respondent. Thus, said
infractions can be used collectively by petitioners as a
ground for dismissal.
The CA however reasoned out that for respondent’s
absences, deductions from his salary were made and hence
to allow petitioners to use said absences as ground for
dismissal would amount to “double jeopardy.”
This postulation is incorrect.
Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence
is paid based on such arrangement. For said daily paid
workers, the principle of “a day’s pay for a day’s work” is
squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in any
wise that such
_______________
12 G.R. No. 72129, February 7, 1990, 182 SCRA 1, 3-4.
33
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 33
nonpayment of the daily wage on the days he was absent
constitutes a penalty.
Insubordination or willful disobedience
While the CA is correct that the charge of serious
misconduct was not substantiated, the charge of
insubordination however is meritorious.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal,
these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2)
the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties
13
which he had been engaged to discharge.
In the present case, there is no question that petitioners’
order for respondent to render overtime service to meet a
production deadline complies with the second requisite.
Art. 89 of the Labor Code empowers the employer to legally
compel his employees to perform overtime work against
their will to prevent serious loss or damage:
“Art. 89. EMERGENCY OVERTIME WORK
Any employee may be required by the employer to perform
overtime work in any of the following cases:
x x x x
(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on machines,
installations, or equipment, in order to avoid serious loss or
damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature;
x x x x
In the present case, petitioners’ business is a printing press
whose production schedule is sometimes flexible and
varying.
_______________
13 Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328, 335-336.
34
It is only reasonable that workers are sometimes asked to
render overtime work in order to meet production
deadlines.
Dennis Reyes, in his Affidavit dated May 3, 1999, stated
that in the morning of February 22, 1999, he approached
and asked respondent to render overtime work so as to
meet a production deadline on a printing job order, but
respondent refused to do so for no apparent reason.
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the reason why
he refused to render overtime work was because he was not
feeling well that day.
The issue now is, whether respondent’s refusal or failure
to render overtime work was willful; that is, whether such
refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude. In Lakpue Drug Inc. v. Belga, willfulness
was described as “characterized by a wrongful and perverse
mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent
14
with proper subordination.” The fact that respondent
refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge
that there is a production deadline that needs to be met,
and that without him, the offset machine operator, no
further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and
perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness.
Respondent’s excuse that he was not feeling well that
day is unbelievable and obviously an afterthought. He
failed to present any evidence other than his own assertion
that he was sick. Also, if it was true that he was then not
feeling well, he would have taken the day off, or had gone
home earlier, on the contrary, he stayed and continued to
work all day, and even tried to go to work the next day,
thus belying his excuse, which is, at most, a self-serving
statement.
After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that

respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work
despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses
against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a
difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was
the final straw that
_______________
14 G.R. No. 166379, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 617, 624.
35
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 35
broke the camel’s back, and, with his gross and habitual
tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from
service.
Due process: twin notice and hearing requirement
On the issue of due process, petitioners claim that they had
afforded respondent due process. Petitioners maintain that
they had observed due process when they gave respondent
two notices and that they had even scheduled a hearing
where he could have had explained his side and defended
himself.
We are not persuaded.
We held in Agabon v. NLRC:
“Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written
notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or
an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal
is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of
15
his separation.”
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be
given two (2) notices before his employment could be
terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of
their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the
employees that their employment is being terminated. Not
to be taken lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity
for the employee to defend himself personally or by counsel
of his choice.
16
In King of Kings Transport v. Mamac, we had the
occasion to further elucidate on the procedure relating to
the twin notice and hearing requirement, thus:
_______________
15 G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 608.
16 G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116, 125-126.
36
“(1) The first

irst written notice
notice to be served on the
employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation
within a reasonable period. “Reasonable
opportunity” under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to
the employees to enable them to prepare adequately
for their defense. This should be construed as a
period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt
of the notice to give the employees an opportunity
to study the accusation against them, consult a
union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise against
the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will
serve as basis for the charge against the employees.
A general description of the charge will not suffice.
Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which
among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should
schedule and conduct a hearing
hearing or conference
wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses
to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in
support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence
presented against them by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the employees
are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative
or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference
or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment
is justified, the employers shall serve the employees
a written notice of termination
termination indicating that: (1)
all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds
have been established to justify the severance of
their employment.”
In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious

and imminent threat to the life or property of the
employers or of other employees like theft or physical
injuries, and there
37
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 37
17
is a need for preventive suspension, the employers can
immediately suspend the erring employees for a period of
not more than 30 days. Notwithstanding the suspension,
the employers are tasked to comply with the twin notice
requirement under the law. The 18 preventive suspension
cannot replace the required notices. Thus, there is still a
need to comply with the twin notice requirement and the
requisite hearing or conference to ensure that the
employees are afforded due process even though they may
have been caught in flagrante or when the evidence of the
commission of the offense is strong.
On the surface, it would seem that petitioners observed
due process (twin notice and hearing requirement): On
February 23, 1999 petitioner notified respondent of the
hearing to be conducted later that day. On the same day
before the hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an
office memorandum which contained a list of his offenses,
and a notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the
same day. The next day, February 24, 1999, he was notified
that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael Press

had been terminated.
A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by
petitioners leads us to conclude that they only paid lip
service to the due process requirements.
The undue haste in effecting respondent’s termination
shows that the termination process was a mere simulation
—the required notices were given, a hearing was even
scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given a
real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that
petitioners had already decided to dismiss respondent from
service, even before the first notice had been given.
_______________
17 RULES IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR CODE, as amended by D.O.
09, June 21, 1997, Book V, Rule XXIII, Secs. 8 & 9.
18 Tanala v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116588,
January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 314, 321.
38
Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain
to see that there was merely a general description of the
claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was
immediately set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999—the
day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was
not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official
or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.
Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it
can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or
friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to
adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked if he
did not agree to render overtime work on February 22,
1999 and if he was late for work for 197 days. He was never
given any real opportunity to justify his inability to
perform work on those days. This is the only explanation
why petitioners assert that respondent admitted
admitted all the
charges.
In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners
simply justified respondent’s dismissal by citing his
admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the
details surrounding the offenses and the specific company
rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was
grounded.
In view of the infirmities in the proceedings, we conclude
that termination of respondent was railroaded in serious
breach of his right to due process. And as a consequence of
the violation of his statutory right to due process and
following Agabon, petitioners are liable jointly and
solidarily to pay nominal damages to the respondent in the
19
amount of PhP 30,000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 14,
2001 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62959, the April 28,
2000 Decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 022433-
00, and the October 29, 1999 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
in NLRC Case No. RAB IV-2-10806-99-C are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares
respondent’s
_______________
19 Supra note 15.
39
VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 39
Forbes Park Association, Inc. vs. Pagrel, Inc.
dismissal from employment VALID and LEGAL.

Petitioners are, however, ordered jointly and solidarily to
pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of PhP
30,000 for violation of respondent’s right to due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, dismissal of

respondent declared valid and legal.
Note.—The requirements of due process are satisfied

Note
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. (Gutierrez vs. Singer Sewing Machine
Company, 411 SCRA 512 [2003])
——o0o——
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1/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 545

R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES

Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC);

tions could be used as supporting justification to a subsequent

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

Year in, year out, a copious number of illegal dismissal

On May 1, 1997, respondent was employed by petitioner

(2) committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing

The offenses you’ve committed are just causes for termination of

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from

Please contact Ms. Marly Buita to discuss 13th-Month Pay

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being a finding that

ever, backwages should be computed from February 22, 1999 up

It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial

Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of

13 Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations

After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that

“(1) The first

In addition, if the continued employment poses a serious

that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael Press

dismissal from employment VALID and LEGAL.

Judgment reversed and set aside, dismissal of

Note.—The requirements of due process are satisfied

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