26

..ASAVAGEANDROMANTICWAR'
sPArN1833-1840
Part I: The Courseof the Fbst CadistWar
by Conrad Caims

PRELIMINARY NOTES importantwingsofthe CristinosastheLiberalesandModeratos

- borhofrhesetitles,unlike"Cnslinos",werewhatthe groups
Thisflrstarticleisa hisloricalintroduction,andwillbe followed usedto describe themselves at the time.Th€ Liberaleswere. as
by detailedexaminalions oflhe organhation,tactics,uniforms liberalsalwayshavebeenin spain. very differentfrom their
and weaponsof boih sides,and, it is hoped,a pieceon the nam€-sakes in Franceor Britain, although,as always.British
Oriamendicampaignof 1837in real life andon the wargames liberalsmadeliltle effort to understandthe diff€rence.Their
great inspirationwas the 1812Constitution.a lengthywork
Someofthe materialhasappeared before.althoughin rather inspiredby the Enlightenment, British.Americanand French
different form, in a senesof atriclesin TheForcign Coftespon revolutionaryideas,as well as Liberal notionsof what was
dpnr(newsletterof the ConrinentalWarsStudyGroup of the wrongwith Spain.It wasnot in forceuntil 1836,whenit was
V;ctorianMilitary Society)andin the VHS journal,Soldiedo/ promulgatedby a violent and successful Liberalcoup d'etat.
rr? Oxeer.To thosewho feelthey haveseenit before,I would The Liberales'herowasGeneralRiego.who hadledan earlier
saytbatI hopetheywillforgiverepetition,andunderstandthat militarytake-overin 1820,andran the govemmentuntil it was
it wasimpossible to presentthe newlyproducedpartsofthese crushedby LouisXvlll s invasionin 1823itheir mainpolitical
articlesby themselves in anysensible fashion.Thosewhowould aim was to resistroyal absolutismand what they sawas the
like further details, particularly on uniforms, and fuller obscurantist power of the Churchovcr all aspectsof Spanish
references,will, I hope, refer to the earlier articles. A life. Few were real republicansi they lendedto be strongerin
bibliographywill appear in a forthcomingedition of this the cities than in the counrryside,and were particularly
publicalion. well-represented in the regulararmy and, aboveall, in the
The singularlyapt tille is onewhichI wishI hadthoughtup NationalMilitia. Their alliancewith the Moderatos.who were
the peoplewho did are the staff of the Spanishmagazin€ on thewholethepersonalsupportersofCristina andIsabel,was
uneasy:ir couldbe arguedthat the only thing that prevented
I wouldlike to thankRon Poulterfor drawingthe platethat Moderrro.allling sr(h rhe Carli.rr on some occa.ion\.
illustratesthisarticle.andespecially RalphWeaverforhelpand panicularlyafier the 1836revolution.was th€ latter'srigid
supportthroughouton my Carlist researches. and for the refusalto compromise or negotiate.
illustrationsof thewarriorsofboth sides. The Carlisccalledrhemselves Realirrdr(royalists),andtheir
cnemiesnormallyspokeof them as the .itaccioror. The word
Carlistconesfrom their leader.or at leastfigurehead, Carlos,
THEPARTIES brotherof FerdinandVll. (To thosewho regardedhim asthe
The FirstCarlistWar wasthe first of threefull-scalecivil wars Iegitimatemonarchhe wasCharlesVi the Habsburgemperor
that Spain sufferedin a €entury.and one of the bloodiesl wecallby thattitle nasCharlesI ofSpain).WhetherCharlesor
episodes of the factionalism that wasthe distinguishingfeature lsabel was the legitimateruler can be argued€ither way.
of politicallife betweenrhe restoralionof FerdiflandVII and Womenmonarchshadbeenan ancientCastillianandSpanish
the triumphof Franco.Its causeswere.to a largeextent,also tradition.but duringtheeighteenth ceniurytheBourbonKings
thecauses of muchof thestrifeof earlytwenrieth'ceniury Spain. introduced.alongwith manyother Frenchideas,the so-called
Althoughin 1840ir appearedthat sevenyearsof strugglehad SalicLaw. whichsaysthat no $,omancanbe a queenregnant.
endedin thevictoryofoneside.Carlismwasfar fromextirpated whether or noi kabel could succeedFerdinanddependson
andwithin a decadethe army hadanorherCarlistrevolton its wheiherSaliclaw wasin forcein 1833.a conslilutionalissueI
hands. haveno int€ntionof discussing.
The contestants are normallycalledCristinosand Carlists. why did it matter? During Fcrdinand'slong, generally
and an examinationof thesenamesand their alternatives will r€actionary.and until 1830childless.reign. the hopesof a
serveto introducesomeofthe ideasandprejudicesthal inspired significantgroupof Spaniards hadbeenlinkedto the personof
the sides. Don Carlos. whose illiberal credentialswere impeccable.
Thesupporters ofthe Madridgovernment. theCristinos.owe when. to rheir surpriseand horror. Ferdinandproducedan
their nameto Maria Cristina.fourth wife of FerdinandVIl. heir. their disappointment was bitter. as until thar point $e
AfterFerdinand's deathin 1833CristinabecameQueenRegeni throne would have passedto Carloson Ferdinandsdeath.
on behalfof th€ infant IsabelII (who gavethe party a second Facedwith the impossibilityof obtainingpower by peaceful
name, lsabelinos).The Cristinoswere! as any readerat all means.and worried by Liberalinfluencein the govemment.
familiar with twentieth-century Spanishhistorywill have no theyturnedto force:asthe Cristinoscontroll€dth€ anny.they
difficultyin apprecialing, held togetheronly by determination raisedtheirown rivalhosts.
to defeatthe Carlisis,by a desireto maintai. ihe Queen"for Carlistideologyhaschangedover the years,but it is almost
fearof{indingsomethingworse', andby the circumstance that ahlaysof a fairly extremereactionarynature not until the
they w€rein €ontrolof all rhe normalmachineryof the state. 1960\ could anythingapproachinga left'wing Carlism be
includingthe armyandnavy. found.A Carliststwin aimswereto upholdthe Monarchyand
As thisarticleisbasicallya look atthenilitarysideofthewar, rheChurch.bothin theirmostiraditionalandabsolutist forms.
andI willhaveto keepthe politicalcomplexitiesto a minimum, (Notablyabseniftom the pantheonof the early Carlistswas
I will grosslyover-simplifymattersby describing the two most what was later to becomethe third immutableoblecl of
 77
adolationof many Spanishrightists,the army). They were
hostiletoliberalmodemityinall itsforms,whichtheysawasnot
only politicalincorre€t,but impiousaswell, andeveninspired
by "Lutherans"andFreemasons. This setof mind goesa long
way to explaintheir ;nabilityto rnodifytheir demandswhen
compromise wouldhavebenefittedtheir cause,lheirfrequent
atrocities(althoughthoseo{theCristinoswereperhapsat least
as bad), and such pronouncements as the DurangoDecree,
whichsaidall foreigneNtakenin armsagainstthem €ouldbe
executed. Theywereconvincedso greatlyoftheirownrightness
thattheydidnot seemto considertheeffe€tsuchde€rees hadon
foreign opinion. The generalantipathyof the Portuguese,
BrilishandFrench govemmenN ro rheCarlisls $asnora major
causeoftheir downfall,but it certainlydid themno good.
Duringthe 1820s traditionalistshadenjoyedmuchinfluence
with the government,and so were able to organisea large THENoRTHERNPRovtNcEs'ffi if
privatearmy of "RoyalistVolunteers"all over the country
naturally,this was of value to the Carlists\rhen they found
of thousands offirst-classinfantry,overa thousandmorethan
themselvesin urgent need of a real army. Despite the
passable lancers.anda smallnumberof guns full detailswill
nation-wide extentofthis organhaiion.a.d despitethefactrhat
appear in a later article. It was originally recruitedfrom
in all parts of Spain people could be found who were
volunteers from the four provinces, but theseweresoonjoined
sympa$eticto absolutism(althoughin manycitiesil wasnot
by others,notably who desertedfrom the Crislino
Castillians,
safe to air such views). Carlismwas not r€ally a national
arny. marchedfuomtheirhomelands, orwerepickedup by the
movement.There were two Carlisthomelands. eachwith its
Carlistson their roving expeditions.Like lhe Basquesand
own army,andalthoughothe.rCarlistforcesexisted,andeven
Navarrese, the Castillianswereexcellentsoldiers,andcameto
thrivedfor a while-in La ManchaandCatalonia,for example-
form one third ro halfthearmy.
oncethe armiesin the northandin Aragongaveup the Carlisi
All rhisisgettingratherahead ofevents.To returnto 1833:on
Statewasno more. It is convenientto treat the storiesof the
51hOctoberDonCarloswas proclaimed King,andarmedbands
ArmiesoftheNorth andofthe Centreseparately.
sprungup ro supporthim. Carlosappointeda former regular
general,SantosLadr6n,commandeFin-€hief,bulhis'll-train
forcesweredefeatedat theirfint battle,LosArcos.andhe was
ZUMALACARREGUI ANDTHERISEOFTHE capturedandshot.Thiswasnot a totaldisastcrfortheCarlistsl
ARMYOFTHENORTH,T$3.1835 for one thing,it taughtthemthey couldnot standin the open
Thefirst.anduntilthelate1830's mostimponant,Carlistregion againsttrainedtroopsuntil they becamesoldiersifor another,
wasthe four provincesofvhcaya (Biscay).Guipfzcoq,Alava SanlosLadr6n'ssuccessor was Tom6sZumalacarregui y de
(all Basqueprovinces)and Navarra. In th€se areas. the lmaz (1788-1835), a colonelof regularinfantryand oneof the
backboneof the Carlist movementwas provided by the greatestsoldiersof hisage.
peasantry. andwhatmadeCarlot supporters soloyalwasnotso Zumalacdrregui's aim was to producea completemodern
mucbthe absolutist ideasofrhe leadership but rhat Carloswas army.but withoutforcingits mento losetheir naturalmilitary
seenas the protectorof localrrelos (rights.laws.privileget talents.He su€ceeded. TheCarlists'abilityto moverapidlyover
againstthe centralismof Madrid althoughthe strengthof rhebrokenland.cape of muchoI the noahempro!ince5 was
traditionalreligionin theseprovinces naturallyahoin€linedthe never equalled by most Cristinos, although the Queen's
inhabitantstowardsCarlism.Even in the four provinces,th€ infantryimprovedgreatlyoverthecourseofthe warin itsability
Carlisistatewasnot unchall€nged, howev€r.The maincities to wageguerrillawarfare.(The Carlistsalmostalwaysrelied
B;lbao. San Sebastidn.Pamplona,Vitoria remainedin muchmoreon in{antrythanon anyotherarm,but thiswasnota
governmenthands.panly becausethey were heavilygarri seriousIimitationaslongasonewasfightingin the fourCarlisl
soned.parllybecause theCarlistswerenot very!killedat taking
largetowns.but alsobecausc the Carlistswerenot very skilled The first raskwasto build in the new battalionsa sDiritof
ai takinglargelowns,but alsobecause someoftheirinhabitants self-confidence while rrainingthern.Zumalacdrregui's answer
weregenuineCristinos.Ir is probablysignificant thatanEnglish ';iastostagea seriesof battles,orambushes, whichhe knewhis
visitor remarkedthat in Santandorrhat the bourgeoiswore menwouldwin. or at leastnot lose.Iforessed.he wouldbreak
-English (i.e. moderninternational) fashions.andthecountry offand disperse;ifhewon,a regularopponent foundescape far
peopleretained'Spanish dr€ss(Henderson, l, 209). moredifficult.He keptawayfrom plains,especiallyinthe early
Not surprisingly.prieststendedto be Carlists.and couldbe months.andhada habitofstartinga fight latein thedaysothat
seenleadingrttacksin their splendidblackgarb,wavinglarge theC.istinoshadlitdechanceto outflank or surroundhisforces.
crucifixes,but therewereplentyofclergywho did not support He normallycommitted onlya minorityofhis troopsat thestart
Carlos-Lawyerswererlsosaidto be in favourof the Pretender, of an engagement, holdingthe rest;n reservein open order.
perhapsbecause rheywereworriedrhatthe 1812Constiturion Lack of ammunitionwasa problem,and one that the Carlists
set up locall',?cerde c""d1ii?.id,,officialswhosejob wasto neversoldcompletely,despitethe settingup of manufacturers,
settledisputes andso reducethe nurnberof lawsuils. soZunalactlreguienforceda rigorousfire'discipline to prevent
Don Carloswasaccompanied by a large,s€ruffy,andralher hismenfrom usingup all the l0 or even4 roundsthat mightbe
mobilecourt.with morethanenoughof the peopleone might availableper soldier.Carlistsoftenreservedtheirfire until the
expecttofind courtiers,displaced supporters fromotherparts rangewasveryshort,andr€li€da lot on the bayonet.
of Spain.place'seekers. toad'eatersandpoliticiansgenerally- By theauturnnof 1834theCarlistarmyhadwona numberof
but the mostimportantand credirablepart of the Carlislslate baulesand.moreimportantly,hada veryformidableinfantry,
waslhe Army of lbe North. (TheCristinosforcefacingit borc able to fight in line. column, and square,without having
thesamename.but to avoidconfusionI willonlvusethetermto sacrificedits men'sabilitiesto act as guerrilleros.Its strategic
indicare rheCdrlisrarm)). Thi\ gre\af'om norhing ro:omeren\ achievements were less;mpressive.Many Cristino units,
28
particularlyin the mountedarm,werein poorshapein 1833,so
the government lostits chanceto crushthe rebellionin the first
months,but it becameapparentthat the Carlistshad limited
Dowerto influenceeventsoutsidetheirfour Drovinces. Tactical
developments will be coveredin moredetaitinthe nextarticle,
but itis wellto pointout herethatasCarlistsleamtthevirtuesof
regulartraining,sothe Liberales,rathermoreslowly,leamtor
re-leamtthe methodsof guerdllawarfarethat had been so
effectivein g ndingdowntheinvaderstwo decades before.The
Spanishsoldieris oneof the tougheston earth- whichwasjust
as well, consideng the privationsboth sideshad to endure-
and the Liberales'determination to put downthe dsingh too
easyto underestimate, The samestubbomness, and refusalto
giveup afterdefeats,whicheventuallydid forNapoleon'sarny, Th'o sh'ordsof typesusedby the BritishAutiliary Legion. The
in theendalsocrushedthe Carlists. two Lancet rcgimentr would have prcbabry canied the 1822
The govemmentstrategywasto €ontainthe Carlist"state", patten light cavaby sv'otd. (The specinen shoh'n is a
andto holdontothemaintownseveninCarlistareas.whichwas tooper's; officets' wererery similar). Inlanty officets cafied
undoubtedly a wiseone.(Its fritteringawayof forcesin holding the1822pattem "Gothk Hilt" somelimesin a sleelscabbardas
,
a multitudeof lesserplaces,whichcouldbe, and often were, herc, mote olten in a black leathetone with brassmountt. The
taken,wasprobablylesssensible)- But althoughthis gavethe Spanishanls would haw appearedon the hik, ratrcr than
Cristinossuitablebasesto launchoffensivesto endicatethe thoseof the East India Companyon thisspecimen.The "pipe
revolt, this secondstage proved far more difficult. One back" was an ingeniour
handicap,especially in ihe early years,was the fact that the featurc to stfun the blade lot the
terain workedto the Carlhts'advantage; anotherwasthat it
took the Cristinossome time to produceleaderswith the gavehopeto theirpoliticalambitionshaddisgusted Zumalaqir-
necessaryqualities. The govenment had, moreover, the regui so muchthat he had tried to resigncommandof the Army
unfo(unate habit of sacking generalsfrequently - one, of the North. Carlosdid not ac.ept, but it appean that, after hh
Zumalacdrregui\old commanderQuesada,only lastedftom resignation,he no longer felt so r€sponsiblefor strategic
Februaryto July 1834.In early 1835the commandof the decisions, sowentalongwith thesiege,whichheconducted with
northemarmypassed to Francis€oEspozy Mina,the legendary 14battalions and10guns.Thegarrison,5,000 menand30guns,
leaderinthe War oflndependence anda strongLiberal.As an won the greatestCristino victory to date, resistingthe siegeand
ex-guerllero he waswell awareof the virtue of light troops, killingZumalacdrregui, whodiedon 24thJune.Neveragaindid
anddid all hecouldtoraisethem.but hewaslesssuccesstulas a the Carlistsacquirea leader*ith sucha combination oftactical,
fieldcommander. In March1835he launcheda maiorattack.in inspirational andorganisational ability.His successor,Teniente
treezrngwearhe | . from Pamplona. ro try anddestroypan of rhe GeneralGonz6lezMoreno, facedup to the Cristino field army
Carlistarmy*hile Zumalacaregui,with the bulkofhis forces, on 16thJuly (now under C6rdova),at Mendigorria,and was
wasabsent.Hisplanfa;led,largely because ofthe extraordinary badlybeaten.Had not C6rdovafailedto lauochtb€ necessary
mobilityofthe Carlistarmy,and Mina wasnearlysuffounded cavalrychargeat theendofbattle,the Carlistswouldhavebeen
and destroyed.Althoughhe extricatedhis armywithout very
heavylosses(partlyby forgingZumalacerregui's signatureon
an orderwhichhe contrivedto passto anotherenemy g€neral),
and althoughsome of his forcesfought very well, Mina\ TIIE CARLISTEXPEDITIONS,1836-1837
reputationsufferedirreparableharm. He was replacedby
TheBilbaoaffairshowed veryclearlysomeof theweaknessesof
Vald€sin April1835.
the Carlists.
They lackedthe poliorceticexpertiseto takeeven
The earlysummerof that yearbroughtyet morevictoriesto
a fortress,and the army hadbeenforcedinto the
the Carlists,not only in the field but againslminor Cristino so mediocre
siegeby non-military considerations. To have held Bilbao
garrisons.It may have been these successes that led the
would have allowed the court to settledownin somethinglike
Pretenderto his first greaterror, to attackBilbaoagainstthe
advi€eof Zumalac6rregui. comfort.andwouldalso.it wascalculated, haveenhanced the
Maite^were alsonot h€lpedat this monarchs
junctureby the factthat courtiers'back-bitingat the manwho Pretender's chances of receiving aid from foreign
sympathetic to the causeofreaction- thoseofPrussia,Russia

Zumalacerregui hadwantedto attackViloria, asa firststepto

Two Spsni:h knivesof tlpes that would haveseenservicein the
1830's. The plug bayonethad sutvived as a huntsmsn'stool,
but the othet specimen,the navaja, k specifrcay fot fighting.
The vicious, stabbing blade (herc shotrn held in its open
po'ition by asptind fold: up into the handle. The knife could
be wo st'tck into a sashwith only the end of the hih shoh'ing.
an offensiveagainstMadrid. By 1836it was obviousthat
althoughthe Crhtinosmightnot be ableto crushthe Army of
theNonh by mainforce,Don Carlos*ould loseby defaultifhe
couldnotspreadthefightiflgbeyond thenorthernprovinces. As
PretenderCarloshad to take the throie to win the warl as
QueenRegent,all Cristinahad lo do waspreventhim. The
Queen'sarmiesweregainingin proficiencyall the time, andin
1835hadbeenreinforcedby lhiee substantial foreignlegions,
French,Portuguese,and British. (The Carlistsenjoyedthe
supportonly of individual aliens. molivatedby politics or
adventure.)There were Carlisl movementsin other partsof
Spain,andthe Carlistsin Aragonwerebuildingup a fomidable
army of their own. but the country as a whole remained
Cristino-ln January1836the Queen\ chief minister,Mendi-
zdbel,won avote of€onfidencein the Cortes,anditwashoped
he wouldbe ableto turn hisconsiderabletalentstoreinforcins

the army.C6rdovabuilt for.ifiedlinesaroundtbe Arnyofthe
North'sterritory,with the aim ofcutting it off from the restof
Spain,or{orcingitontotheplainsofCastille, wherehehopedto
destroy't. Although C6rdova'swinter offensiveat Arlaben,
whichwassupponedby the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,wasless
than totallysuccessful,in March 1836BanolomeoEspartero.
the risingCristinostar,won an elegantvicloryon the plainsof
Orduna.
The Carlistsattemptedto break oul of this siruationby
sending'Expeditions"all over Spain,to '\how the flag" and.
they hoped, lead and inspiretheir sympathisers, who, they
believed,would rise up and form armiesand governments
theirown oncethe Liberalarmyandmilitiaweredrivenaway.
Thiswasnot to be. Whetherbecause moreSpaniardsthan they
realisedwere hostileor apatheticto their cause,or whether
because onceoneofthe powerfulexpeditions hadpassed on its
way any partizanswho "cameout" would be left eitherto be
stampedupon by the governmentor reducedto a life of
banditry, they set up no major bodies of active Carlists.
Although the nilitary success of the expeditionsmor€ than
alarmedthc Cristinos.not eventhe factthat Madridandother
citiesunderwenta violenlLiberalrevolulionin the summerof
1836gave anyrealadvantage to the Carlists.
Neverthe less,theexpeditionswereveryimpressive exanples
of the military an. The greatestwas that of Miguel G6mez
Damas,which set out on 3rd June with 5 battalions,two
squadrons andtwo guns.andreturned,(ratherstrongerdueto
local recruiting),on 20th December,to find the main army
engaged in its secondattempton Bilbao- anotherfailure.His
original missionwas to raise insurrectionin Asturias and
Galicia,but from SantiagodeComposlella hemarchedthrough
Leon and Castilleto Aragon.At Bujaleroon 30thAugusthe
foughtandcapturcdtwo battalionsof RoyalGuards.Despite
beingroutedandmauledat Villarrobledoa monthlater,hewas
strongenoughto take C6rdobacity on lst October.In all,
G6mezcoveredabout 2.800milesin six months,traininghis
recruitsashe marched.
By the beginningof 1837both northemarmieswereled by
.iore than competentgenerals.Esparterohavingtakenover
-1836
cOMEz'sMARCH
29
of
Thk diagrltm shows, in sinplified fom, the llryout of requtar
inla try colours (the Prcvincial rcgimentsand Gua s often
had differcntflogr. This wasthe la war in which SpanLth
rcgula\ fouBht undet the rasged .nss of Bursundr, rcd on
In the comer o|als, which weresutroundedby baped fkgs or
laurel Meaths, were the arms oJ the regiment- for exanple 3
ye otr flew-de-lys on bLuefor Borbon. The clov'ns weresold
and red, t|ith nulti colourcdjewels. The fiilt battalionofeach
regi e t borc the ColoneL'scotour, vhich had superinposed
on the abo|e an e[aborate,crcwned. anrs ol Spain, ofEn
snrrcundedby ordercon chains.
The oldest reginent in the atny, El Rey, had a unique
distinction - the backqround b its flags was not h'hite, but
from C6rdoba(a far from despicable commander himsel0and
the Infante Don Sebasti6n, nephewto Don Carlos,beingin
chargeofthe Carlistforces.In MarchtheCristinosattempteda
grandthree-pronged attack:theBritishgeneralDe LacyEvans
\{as to advancefrom the fortressof SanSebastidn, by now a
semi-permanent hometo the BritishAuxiliaryLegion,Espar-
tero fiom Bilbao, and SaNfield,whoseforcesincludedthe
FrenchForeignLegion, from Vitoria. The plan was over'
ambitious,andreliedon the enemybeingunableto co-ordinate
a de[enceagain5lrhreecolumn\- a foolishassumption given
that the Carlistswere operatingon interior lines, and their
rvonderfu | speedof movement,bothstrategically andtactically.
A full desciptionofthe campaignmustawaita fu(her article,
but sufficeit to saythat Sarsfieldlet himselfbedefeatedby the
weather.and EsDaneroretiredwhenhe heardof the disaster
that befell Evanson the heightsof Oriamendi,outsideSan
Sebasti:in.
Almost at onceCarloslaunchedhis maior offensiveof the
war.ThePretenderhimselfaccompanied rheRoyalExpedition
of16 battalions. almostall thecavalry(a dozensquadrons),and
somegunnerswithoutpieces.Thereis someuncertaintyabout
thepreciscpurposcsofthisexpedition,aboutfromthe obvious
onesof "reinforcingsuccest'andgivingthe inhabitants ofthe
Carlislprovincesa breakfrornsupplyingso largean army.but
clearlyCarloswasmakinga seriousbid for power.If everthe
Carlistswere to take Madrid by for€e, this was the time.
especiallywhen the Army of the No h joined wilh the
AragoneseArny of thc Centre. Thcy may also have been
hopingtocapjtalise on desertionsin theCristinoranksfollowing
the 1836revolution-would a displayof Carlistpowerpersuade
 30
happy retreat; indeed, ir probablyma.ked the start of an
irrevenibledecline.Like all volunteers,the menof theAJmyof
the Northhada tendencytodip awayhomewhentheredid not
seemto be anyprospectoI success, althoughthistendencywas
nodilied by severedisciplineand a willingness of soldiersto
retum tothe colourswhentheysawsomepointin fighting.The
failureofthe RoyalExpeditionwasa severeblow to the belief
that Don Carlos would ever be a real king, and the
war-weariness that was to bring peaceat last datesfrom the
auturnnof 1837.The ordinaryCarlistsoldierhad turnedin his
usualexcellentperformance,but casuakies had been heavy,
€speciallyin thecavalry.Norcouldthesoldiershavebeenmuch
edifiedby the dissentin the high connand, panicularlythar
betweenthe generals.and Carlosand his civilian advisors.
Worstof all, this dissefltcontinuedafler the Army's relum to
the four nonhernprovinces,with manyofficerswillingto iry a
compromhepeace. Sebastidn wassacked; althoughhiseventual
successor, RafaelMaroto,the lastcommander ofthe Armv o{
the NorLh.was a good enoughgenerdl.he was Lopur oiher
thingsbeforehisloyaltyto the cause.

THE DIID OFTHE ARMY OFTHE NORTH,

1838-r$9
The resloflhe warin the northwasnot unmarkedby incidenr,
but canbe relatedfairly briefly.A final largeexpedition,with
the sameaimasthoseof1836,setout in March1838,underthe
Countof Negri.It consisted o{ 9 battalions,all Castillian.two
mountaingunsj and four full squadronswirh cadresfor two
more.Thestrongrelianceon Castillians mayhavebeenbecause
the Basquesand Navarreseon the Royal Expedition had
complained aboutbeingawayfromrheil homelandfor so long.
Negri took Segovia.but his expediiion,lacking food and
foolwear.thenfellbackin a miserable rerreat-EsDarterocausht
A rcpresentative Carld infantrynan and lancer,.biwn bf Ron
il on 27lhApril.rheCrrlisrtootformedsquare, burcouldior
Poulter. The cawlrynan sflanboyant haiis typiLot.Whitethe
fireontheCristinocavahyasitspowdeiwassoaked byrain,and
o inatj Spania was fat fton clop-headed, Ca bts had a
the army surrendered en rnasse. Only Negri and the cavalry
reputation for haniness. Zunalacliffegui, it is said, had escaped.On 22ndJune Espanerodeleatedlhe main Carlist
batbers accompan! his amy so the solrliers did no! hove to
army, leading to the fall of the nearby Carlist rown of
catt shdving-eq uip nent.
Pe6acerrada. andihe replaceme.lof the thencommander-in-
chiefby the above,mentioned Maroto.
someModeldrorto forsakethe Liberaladministration for the Marolo\ aim was to rebuild rhe army, and especiallyits
absolutists? mounted arm, into a force that could defeatEsparteroin a
After twovictoriesat HuescaandBarbastro.ferocious affairs
evenby the standardsof this war, and a defeatat Orr. the
Expeditionpassedthrough parts of Cataloniaheld by local
Carlists,and headedsouth io join the Army of the Centre.
Anotherdefeatat Chiyadeniedthe Carlhrsan opportunityto
recuperatein the fertile area around Valencia. and the
combinedCarlistforces.perhaps16.000foot and2,000horse,
advanced 10withina fewmileso{Madrid.Carlosneverordered
the assault despiteurgingfrom Sebastidn and frorn Ram6n
Cabrera,theleaderofthe Aragonese. Nevera decisiveman,he
hadonthisoccasion plentyofreasonsforcaution.The advance
had beenso slow rhat lhe governmentforceshad had ample
time to preparethe capiralfor artack.Carloswas no doubt
unwillingto r'sk what wasperhapsthe greatestfield army he
couldgatherin a typeof warfareat whichir wasnot eiperti he
wasno lover of bloodshed;h€ wouldhavebeendisaDpointed
lhat\o iew ot hispeople hadrakenup arm' ro 'upponrne
Expedition;and,while duringearlierstagesof his journeyhe
hadbeenin secretcommunication with Cristinawith a viewto a
negotiatedpeace,all suchcorrespondence had €easedby rhis
This sketch nnp shows the sinkttion in the s nner of 1837,
After some hesiration.and becausea large force under with the route of the Rolal Eryedition. Dotled arcoswerc
Esparterowasbearingdownon rhem,the Carlistsretreared- under Carlistcotlrol. (Bilbao, Vibtia, San Sebostidnand
Cabrerato Aragon,th€ Army of the North to irs home.being Pamplona wele Oisino). The hatchedarca is the pa of La
pursuedby Esparterowho beat it at Reiuerta-It was nor a Mancha i fested bj Ca ist iteg la^.
 31

S&A w!'e'*a&b-dt.hd*!e.B'
SCENICS

BATTLE HONOURSMINIATURES
rd. 'e s Lh i(hq r* rddns Na!.mr ffsg
t

w!,?er*r$d5d0e3Mlc

FEUDAL CASTINGS
mrd & i !*drd ir* 6d! 4pry '€

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fid{ \.'ft d.on.hsd 't-&ilr F@FF. ,-'m ud'o)1\rer1

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ACCESSORTES
GGiiFiE !-^ "dh "ntuder
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Pb*d 6diq: ta drd a x€ q !F6d

B'8Fd:lip']59Ff'11',5pF{

TheNational Militia had alrcady adoptedthe rc.land gol.I flag

that w..t to becomethe standatulrceinental flag of Ihe rcgulars
in the 1840s. This examplei,as caftied by the 2nd baialion of fu.@nres4'd:@pddmp6k
lPIPd|y,50sdl'ddlgddtl
Zaragoza. The lette6 arc ye otr, the paln and laurel h,rcath
green, the ams those of Casnle and Aragon vrith a rc.j RULES
S[iaEE- 6c.dsde: tus AE*r
inscurheon bearing a ye ow Iion rampant. Red and gold . r P u { B F P o . D 5 ! l n i n { n ' a @ )E u a o t s : 5 \ r m r s e r
bannen also flen' orer government-heldposts and forts. osEi coufRrEs: h lhn15@lPo!

Seeu3on:Saturday lTthSeptembel Phalanx'94, SlHelens.

de€isive baltle.bul. desDitesomeCarlistsuccesses andthe lack
of pay.clorhing. foorqedrandtoodin thegovernmenr arm).il
wastoo lale. Thatrarestofbattlesin thiswar.a cavalryaction, TheCristinosemployedtheirbesttroopsagainstthenorthern
tookplaceat theendof 1838at Los ArcosorSesma,wherethe Carlists.ln thenonh, theNationalMilitia wasusednormallyto
renownedCristi.o horsegeneralDiegoLeon provedMaroto's garrisontownsand villages,but in Aragon militia unitsoften
newcavalrvwasno matchfor the solendidLiberalborsemen. A formedpartoffield forces,nor alwayswithhappyresults.
similarresuhoccuredal Allo in June1839.But bv thenvarious Cabrerastartedin the ranksofthe Aragonese Carlistarmy,
Carlistbattalionshadbeenwonoverby the hopeofpeace.and butir wasnotuntilheachieved eminen€e. in 1834,thatthisforce
disputes in thecommand werechronic,theworsrbeingbetween found ils greatorganiser.Its growthwasslowerthan that of
MarotoandCarlos. Zumalacnrregui's army. and it was most unfortunatefor the
The final disaslerwasthat Carlosopenlycalledhisgenerala Carlistsasa wholethattheArmyofthe Centreonly achieved its
traitor:Maroto,andth€bulkoftheArmyofthe North.madean greateststrengthin 1838.when the Army of the Noah had
armisticeat Vergara on 24th August 1839-The symbolic alreadv started to decline. Like the other Carlist force,
"Embraceof Vergara",celebratedin numerouspicturesanda
Cabrera'sarrny enjoyed the advantageof being basedin
dioramain the MadridArmy Museum,left the Carlistofficers inaccessible and ruggedterrain,in its casethe Maestrazgo of
relativelyhappy theirtermsof surrenderwereverygenerous - Aragon,whichmadeCnsdnoatlackson its heartlanddifficult
Carlosin flighl to Francewith a few troopers,and Espanero. rosaytheleast.andthewarin thisareainvolved atleastasrnuch
withoutdoubtthe mostpowerfulmanin Spain.free to put an weary marchingand counter-marching by both sides Olher
endto the Araeonese Carlisrs. factorsmadeitevenmoreunpleasant. Because Cabrera\arrny
andcivilorganisation wasnothinglikeaswell-runasthatin the
north. and beca'rsethe Cristinosupplysysremhere was, if
CABRERAANDTHE ARMY OF THE CENTRE anything,worsethanitscounterpart in lhe northof thecountry.
I will cover the Army of the Centre. as it was rather both sides
suffered from lackof food andclothing.The conduct
optinisticallytitled, muchmore quicklythanI did the Aimyof of the war was more barbarous. with {requentmassacres of
the North. and other relativ€lyminor Carlistforces.suchas prisonersandc;vilians- the mostfamousvictimwasCabrera's
thosein CaialoniaandLa Mancha,hardlyat all. Like the main mother,shotby way of reprisal.(Her sonmorethanrepaidin
army.lhat of the Centrewasthe creationof oneman. Ram6n kind.) The freouentuse of National Militia increasedthe
Cabr€ra(1806-77), whosta.tedhisadultli{easaseminarian and bitternessas th€Carlists.not withoutreason, sawthisbodyasa
endedit as an Englishcountry gentleman- he is buried in tef.wing organisation.more politically suspectthan the
VirginiaWater.He wasa sincereenoughCarlist,but for him, Reg'rlars. (Thatoneofthe Militia'schieftaskswasalsoto keep
and for manvot his men.Carlismhad as muchto do with lhe down conservativeop;nionandg€nerallypersecute Carlists,or
advancementof asemiindependentsrateinAragonaswiththe suspectedCarlists.;ngovernment held areas did litde to endear
fortunesof the Pretender.His army wasat aimesan €ffective it to the trooDsof the Pretender.)On oc€asions, therefore,
fighringforce. althoughdisciplinewas not one of its strong while captur€dregularofficersand sergeants were shot, the
points,but it wasneverasformidableastheArmy ofrhe Nonh. rank and file were spared or forced to join the captors,but
It did co-operate with northerntroops.moslnotablyduringthe NationalMilitia takenwith themwerekilledregardless of rank.
RoyalExpedition andGomezsmarch.but it nornallyoperated Apart from tyingdownCristinounitswhichcouldhavebeen
andwasor-qanned asan independenr entiiy. used againstthe Army of the Nonh, perhapsthe greatest
 5O,OOO+SECONDHAND WARGAMES FIGT]RES
Alwaysin stock.AII scales.Most manufacturers.
SAE stating intercstsfor liststo:
WARFARE'94 PRESENTEDBY
A.J. Dumelow,
53 Stanton Road, Step€nhill,
Burton-on-Trent, Staffs DEl5 9RP.
Telephotrc:(02E3)5$556.

contibutionthe Army ofthe Centrecouldhavemadetowards

Carlistvictorywasto co,operatewith the RoyalExpedition.As
we have seen,Cabreraand some of his men did join the
expedition,andthe Aragonese €hieftainwasoneof thosewho
urgedanassaulton Madrid.He seemstohavebeendisgusted by
Carlos'srefusalto risk an attack,for he then retired to the
Maestrazgo, andthereaftertook a lineevenmoreindependent RIVERMEADLEISURECENTRE
fromtheCourt.A surpriseassaulton thenightof 25126January RICHFIELDAVENUE,READINC
1838by a Catalanlieutenantand75 menrook Morella,which
Cabrerahadbeenbesieging for two monrhs.Morellawas,and 5-6thNOVEMBER
is. a wonderfullyrugg€d and spectacularcastellaredcity, NINE WARCAME COMPETITIONS,
althoughby no meansa modernfortressin the 1830t, and ,BIG'BRING&BUY'
Cabreratumed it into the capitalof his virtuallyautonomous
viceroyalty,. PARTICIPATIONGAMES,
the head of a widely-spread civil and military
ALL TIIE USUAL TRAI'!] SIANI'St
The Cristinoscoulddo little to stopthe establishment ofthis AAR IOOD,
ramshackle Carlht state:their forceswereover-stretched asit S W I M M I N GP O O L ] O R T I I T .X
] IDS
was,havingtodealnotonlywithverywidespread banditryfrorn
wellarmedandnominallyCarlisthorsemen in La Mancha,but.
moreseriously,the Iiseofanoth€r,snaller,semi-independent
Carlistareain Catalonia.(Thearmyof rheCatalanCarljstswas
beingdisciplinedfor rhe filst time by the brutal but efficient
ex-regular general,the Condede Espafra,andit wasfortunate
for the Liberalesihat the Condewas assassinated befote his
forcescould becomea seriousthreat.) Nor did it help the
Cristinosthat theyhad to defendand garrisonso nany towns
andplacesagainstthe ever-mobileunitsofCabrera'sarmy.In Wherecan I tind2000MilitaryBooks?
the latesummerof1838the CristinogeneralMarcellinoOrra, ln the
anotherex-guerrillerowho
Independence, assembled
hadservedunderMinain theWar of
22 battalionsandperhaps25gunsto
KENTROTMAN
Catalogue
takeMorella.AlthoughOriiawasinsomewaysan ablesoldier, of course!
the siegewas markedby the incompetence of the Cdstino
adllery, supply.and command-Oda's army was lucky to
escapewithoutlossesmoreseriousthanthoseit receiv€d.Just
over a monthlater, on 1st October1838.Cabrerainflicteda
seriousdefeatin the field at Maella.
1839sawCabr€ratrying to prot€ct his 'kingdom' by building
fixed fortifications, which would alsoserveasbasesout of which
to raid Cdstinoareas,while simultaneously reducingLiberal
strongpoints in what he regarded as his own territory. It is
remarkablethat asCarlos'sown forceswere disintegrating,his
lieutenantshouldhavebeenconstructingforts morefomidable
than the fieldvorks, barricades,and trenchesso popular with
the Army of the North, and apparentlyintendingto defy the
restof Spain..Hecouldnot reallyhavebetievedthat with his
16,000foot,2,000horseand r08 gunshe couldresistnot only
the Cristinoswho had beenfacing hirn for years,but also, after
August1839,Espartero'sa.my. The latter 34 battalionsin
four divisions,six battedesand 3,000cavalry were victorious,
confident, high-classtroops.
As inthe north,thefinal campaigninAragonwasone-sided. Iot a f@ecalalogue now
TheLiberaleslookCabrera'sfortsand beathismenin thefieldl Mailorderis our speciality.
in May lS40Moreliafellafterafeebledefence. Thelastbattleof
thewar.Berga,on4th July 1840,wasa rout, andtwo dayslater
KENTROTMANLTD,
Cabreraqas one ot rhou.andsot retugee.who crossedthe UNIT11, 135 DITTONWALK,CAMBRIDGE,
borderinto France.Cabrerawouldretum to SDain.but that is CB5 8QD
anotherstory,andanotherwar.