ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA (G.R. No.

L-
24693)
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case
Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in
this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution.
The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.

The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively
put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA INC. vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

190 SCRA 597FACTS:
The petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc. is a domestic corporationcomposed of taxicab
operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience tooperate taxicabs within the City of
Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible tovehicular traffic. The petitioner filed a petition which
seeks the nullity of the MemorandumCircular No. 77-42, an administrative regulation phasing out
taxicabs more than six years old onthe ground that it is violative of their constitutional right of equal
protection of the law because itis only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.
The respondent Board of Transportation contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of
safety and comfortof the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of equal protection of thelaw

by the implementation of the said circular.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there is no violation of constitutional rights. The State, inthe exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,safety and welfare of society.
Presidential Decree No. 101 granted the Board of Transportationthe power to fix just and reasonable
standards, classification, regulations, practices,measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The Board of Transportations
reason for enforcing the Circularinitially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of
other places, aresubjected to heavier trafficpressureand more constant use and considering that traffic
conditionsare not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the
equalprotection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.

REPUBLIC V. MERALCO (G.R. NO. 141314)

Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an
average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that
should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts
collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their
favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund
or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and
statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When
private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati
only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to
regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive
rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates
does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a
reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return
on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the
public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the
said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged
in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given
equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can
no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL. 145 December 22, 1955 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma,
plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-apppelle

G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the
deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total
sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes,
under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop
years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while
section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane
and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between
the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of
the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for
the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose
for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.
RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our
nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to
thousands of laborers in the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the
important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a
regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general
welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power,
the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police
power.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit
to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police
power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude
joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders,
to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease"
which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the
said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and,
therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991
Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos
River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory
and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable
standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar,
however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for
certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the
questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that
certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable
injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the
question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and
were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution
are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for
petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of
Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed
an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984,
Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment
when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).
Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the
River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar,
on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue
only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board
made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar
had been denied due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority
of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated
as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did
in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as
well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the
correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 78164)

Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985
[which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school
year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT
and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge
denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee
for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.

Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of
1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education;
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools.

The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section 1 which states “The State shall
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to
make such education accessible to all.

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who
might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.”

Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of the Court,
is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important interest and needs -- in other
words, the public order -- of the general community. An important component of that public order is
health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to
take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.

Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical schools
do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.