Barredo vs. Garcia, G.R. No.

L-48006, July 8, 1942

SEPTEMBER 27, 2018

DOCTRINE:

Plaintiffs may choose bring cause of action under the Civil Code (as quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) rather than the Penal Code
for practical purposes. Employer is primarily (instead of subsidiarily) liable, as it was shown that he had not exercised the
standard of diligence required by the Civil Code over his employee.

FACTS:

On May 3, 1936, a Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla collided with a carriage that had Faustino Garcia as passenger. The
latter died two days later due to the injuries he sustained.

Garcia’s parents brought a criminal action against Fontanilla before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which found him guilty
of the charge. The court likewise granted the petition to reserve the right to bring a separate civil action.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed ruling in the criminal case. Meanwhile, the civil action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila against Fontanilla and his employer Fausto Barredo. CFI of Manila awarded damages to the parents
worth 2,000 plus legal interest. CA reduced the amount to 1k.

Barredo’s responsibility hinged on his failure to abide by the standard set by the Civil Code which is that of exercising care as a
good father of a family. Under this, Barredo is primarily liable.

Defendants assert that Barredo is only subsidiarily liable under Art. 100 of the RPC since Fontanilla was found guilty under that
said law.

ISSUES:

1. May the petitioners institute a separate civil action against the respondents? – YES.
2. May Barredo be held primarily liable as the employer for Fontanilla’s negligence? YES – YES.

RATIO:

Petitioners may institute separate civil action to recover damages.

Petitioners are seeking to recover damages not as a result of the felony (delito), but as a result of a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana).
The latter is recognized by the civil code as a separate legal concept.

The court has recognizes how delicts and quasi-delicts overlap, and people resort to bringing actions as quasi-delict because of
the speedier disposition of proceedings. The court sees the advantage of bringing a case under quasi-delict rather that criminal
negligence as a way to protect private rights and efficaciously bring redress to the injured party.

Barredo is primarily/directly/principally liable.

Since the present action is a separate civil suit and not an action to recover damages arising from criminal liability, Barredo’s
negligence under the Civil Code provision invoked makes him directly liable.

Preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove his negligence (instead of beyond reasonable doubt) because the case at bar is a
civil action.
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
STREET, J.:
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he
saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was
not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away
or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the
limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse
died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such
case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Jarco vs. CA

G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999

FACTS:

When respondent Criselda was signing her credit card slip at payment and verification counter in Syvels Department
Store in Makati, she felt a sudden gust of wind a heard a loud sound. She looked behind her and saw her daughter
Zhieneth (6 years old) on the floor pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter.

She was rushed to the hospital but died after 14 days.

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages.

Petitioners on the other hand, denied any liability imputing the negligence to Criselda for allowing her daughter to
roam freely in the department store. Alleging further, that the deceased committed contributory negligence when she
climbed the counter. Also herein petitioners defense is that they have exercised due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection, supervision and control of their employees.

Trial Court favored petitioners, contemplating that Zhieneth’s action is the proximate cause of the accident.

CA favored respondents on it declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the
incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years could
not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a
mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the
ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence.

(2) Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence.

HELD:
(1)NO

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9)
years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment.

(2)NEGLIGENCE.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant

negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do.

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed
to negligence.
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.

HILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs. TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his
parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO ,

FACTS: Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by
Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He
started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open the window to
call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and
given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.

He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses
Limon. They claim that the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its
defense, maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was
not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a
family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed
the trial court’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.

RULING:

YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to
install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.

During trial, it was found that the lock was defective. The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the
comfort room was actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could
not be opened from the inside.

That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are
clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that
a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. As to the
absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor,
so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence
of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient
basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is
being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
maintained.

The Court’s pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates
petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained
from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from
CLC’s own negligence.