WIRETAPPING (RA 4200)

145 SCRA 112

Ganaan v. IAC
GUTTIEREZ, JR., J.

FACTS
1. In the morning of Oct. 22, 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in
the living room of Atty. Pintor’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault filed with Office of City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico.
> After deciding on the proposed conditions, Atty. Pintor made a telephone call to
Laconico.
2. That same morning, Laconico called Edgardo Ganaan to come to his office to advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer (Atty. Leon
Gonzaga) went on a business trip.
> Ganaan went to Laconico’s office where he was briefed about the problem.
3. When Pintor called up, Laconico requested Ganaan to listen to the phone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to personally hear the
proposed conditions of the settlement.
> Ganaan heard Pintor enumerate the ff. conditions for withdrawal of the direct assault
case:
a. Money: P5,000 was increased to P8,000; P5,000 no longer for Montebon but to
Pintor, for persuading client Montebon to withdraw the case; P1,000 to the Don
Bosco Faculty Club; and P2,000 attorney’s fees to Pintor.
b. Public apology to be made by Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School (DBTHS)
c. Transfer of the son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of
DBTHS
d. Allow Montebon to continue teaching at DBTHS
e. Not to divulge the truth about settlement of the case to the mass media
4. 20 minutes later, Pintor called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions, to which Laconico answered “Yes”.
5. Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the then
DPWH office.
> Laconico, who earlier alerted friend Col. Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service
of the Phil. Constabulary, insisted that Pintor himself should receive the money.
> When Pintor received the money at Igloo Restaurant, he was arrested by the agents of
Phil. Constabulary.
6. The following day, Ganaan executed an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand
P8,000 for the withdrawal of the direct assault case.
> Laconico attached said affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion he filed against
Pintor.
7. Since Ganaan listened to the telephone conversation without his (Pintor’s) consent,
Pintor then charged Ganaan and Laconico for violating RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act).
 > Sec. 1, par. 1 of RA 4200 prov. That:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorised by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or a dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.”
8. The lower court found Ganaan and Laconic guilty of violating Sec.1 of RA 4200 and
sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied, Ganaan appealed.
9. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that: (1) the
communication between Pintor and Laconico was private in nature and thus, covered by
RA 4200; (2) Ganaan overheard the conversation without Pintor’s knowledge or consent;
and (3) the extension telephone used is covered in the term “device” as provided by RA
4200.
10. Hence this petition.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. W/N the telephone conversation bet. Pintor and Laconico was private - YES
a. In this case, the words uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a public.
2. W/N Ganaan had authority to listen to overhear - NO
a. Only Laconico gave Ganaan authority to listen to the conversation. Obviously,
Pintor, a member of the Philippine Bar, would not have discussed the alleged
demand for P8,000 for the withdrawal of the direct assault case if he knew that
another lawyer, such as Ganaan, was also listening.
3. W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement”
under RA 4200 - NO
a. Petitioner Ganaan contends that telephones and extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of commonly known listening or recording devices
nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by RA 4200. When the law was being considered in the senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already widely used. The omission
was not an oversight. Telephone lines were intentionally deleted from the
provisions of this Act.
b. Respondent contends that the extension telephone is covered by the term
“device” because it is not part or portion of a complete set of telephone
apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus
consisting of a wire and telephone receiver which is not part of the main
telephone set.
c. SC: The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
 d. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
pictograph or the other devices enumerated in RA 4200 as the use cannot be
considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line.
i. In determining the true intent is that particular clauses and phrases
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered.
> Hence, device or arrangement is not exclusive to the enumeration but
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature -
instruments, the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line and whose installation cannot be presumed - they are not of
common usage AND the purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting and recording a telephone conversation.
> In this case, the extension was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
> Also, an extension telephone is very common especially now when it
does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be
moved anywhere within ~1km radius.
> A person should safely presume that the party he is calling has an
extension telephone and that he runs the risk of a third party listening.
> No distinction between a person who held out his hand-set so that
another could hear out of it and permitting an outsider to use an extension
telephone for the same purpose.
e. In determining intent, the court also considered the Senate Congressional
Records which showed that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the
inclusion of extension telephone, they were more concerned with penalising the
act of recording than the act of merely listening to the telephone conversation.
4. W/N RA 4200 should be construed in favour of the accused - YES
a. Following the general rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed in
favour of the accused, the phrase “device or arrangement” should be construed
to exclude an extension telephone.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime violation of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.