Thea Faye B.

Cahuya JD-1A

Lim v. Felix
194 SCRA 292

Facts:
At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the
municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For
the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor
Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog,
Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho. The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same order, the court
ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty. On August 29, 1989, the entire
records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to
review the case. On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit
the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein.

Issue:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

Ruling:
NO. At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution
which requires ". . . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .",not by any other
officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.
The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate
and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his
own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient
for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
 Manalili v. Court of Appeals
280 SCRA 400
Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was
done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of
the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce
themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu
asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet
and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to
be further investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and
hence inadmissible as evidence.

Ruling:
NO. The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible
in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general
rule against a search without a warrant. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial. The Supreme
Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent court.
 People of the Philippines v. Edison Sucro
G.R. No. 93239 March 19, 1991
Facts:
Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison
SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant
and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi
proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio
told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front
of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact
that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when
confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that
Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal
act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its
compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such
lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the
fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for
its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE
existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from
the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.
 Jose Miguel Arroyo v. Department of Justice et al.
G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
Facts:
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses
indicating the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266
approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall
conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed
during the 2004 and 2007 elections. The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team
are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. 0n its initial report, the Fact/Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cota1ato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated, thus,
recommending petitioner to be subjected to preliminary investigation. The Comelec en banc then
adopted a resolution. Consequently, petitioners assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-
DOJ Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011. They argued that such action was violative of equal
protection clause since it was created with the sole purpose of investigating and prosecuting certain
persons and incidents only.

Issue:
Whether or not the creation of Joint Committee violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:
NO. Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles
out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection
clause. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order
No. 177 specifically referred to the "previous administration"; while the Joint Committee was
created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses during the
2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to
preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their
official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules, investigations may be
conducted either by the Comelec itself through its law department or through the prosecutors of
the DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that respondents are not
treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal
protection of the law is misplaced.

Republic v. Daisy Yahon

G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014
Facts:
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married
on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-
in partner. On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO against S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon. The
RTC and CA both ruled in favor of the respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9262 violates the equal protection clause between men and women.

Ruling:
NO. This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate
the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon the issue of constitutionality was raised by a
husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of
a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real
substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the
need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution
and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party
 \

People v. Jalosjos
324 SCRA 689

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons. Further, Jalosjos admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House
of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.

Issue:
Whether or not being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment and a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class.