Dear Counsel:
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure
Case: 18-6023 Document: 30-2 Filed: 01/10/2019 Page: 1 (2 of 4)
No. 18-6023
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jan 10, 2019
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Mark Hazelwood appeals his conviction and sentence on charges of conspiracy to commit
mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, and witness tampering. His motion for release on bail pending
appeal was granted on November 13, 2018, “subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as
the district court may fix in its discretion.” One of those terms, fixed by the district court on
November 20, 2018, is that Hazelwood remain confined to his home. Hazelwood objects to home
confinement and “asks this court to reverse and remand with instructions to remove home
confinement as a condition of release pending appeal or, in the alternative, to permit [him] to leave
his home from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. daily.” The government opposes the motion. Hazelwood replies.
“The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), creates a presumption against release pending
appeal.” United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir. 1988)). If the judicial officer finds that the statutory criteria
for release in § 3143(b)(1) is satisfied, “such judicial officer shall order the release of the person
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in accordance with section 3142(b) or (c) of this title[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). Under § 3142(b),
a defendant may be released on his personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond. But
if the judicial officer determines that the release described in subsection (b) will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or
the community, the judicial officer shall order the release of the person “subject to the least
district court also “may at any time amend the order to impose additional or different conditions
We review a district court’s factual findings concerning release for clear error and review
its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870, 870 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d
34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985). Hazelwood’s compliance with the terms of his pretrial release does not
negate the district court’s finding he has the means, the ability, and the travel connections to flee.
“[T]rial courts . . . are the superior tribunal for the kind of information-gathering which a sound
foundation for a bail ruling almost inevitably requires.” United States v. Krzyske, 857 F.2d 1089,
1091 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 631 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D. Penn. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). And because we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo, we need not speculate on whether it applied an overly restrictive or incorrect
standard. So long as we apply the correct standard and reach the same conclusion based on the
same facts, any error on the part of the district court is harmless. See United States v. Deppish,
554 F. App’x753, 755 (10th Cir. 2014). Hazelwood has been sentenced to a 150-month term of
incarceration. “[A] defendant who knows to a certainty that he will be spending time in prison has
a greater incentive to flee than a defendant who, prior to conviction or sentencing, may be pinning
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his hopes on acquittal or leniency.” United States v. Villines, 32 F.3d 569 (Table), 1994 WL
378243, at *3 (6th Cir. 1994). We conclude that home confinement is the least restrictive means
Hazelwood’s motion to review and modify the conditions of release pending appeal is
DENIED.