Anak dengan disabilitas atau penyakit serius. Fetus aterm yang terancam, bayi baru
lahir yang kondisinya kritis dan anak usia muda juga menyajikan pertanyaan sulit
mengenai kualitas hidup dan omisi terapi. manajemen obstetri prenatal dan perawatan
intensif neonatal kini bisa menyelamatkan nyawa dari banyak fetus abnormal dan
neonatus cacat dengan cacat fisik yang bisa saja fatal dalam beberapa dekade silam.
Namun, resultan kualitas hidup kini cenderung rendah hingga menjadi dipertanyakan
apakah manajemen obstetri agresif atau perawatan intensif akan lebih banyak
menimbulkan kerugian daripada manfaat bagi pasien. Beberapa komentator berpendapat
bahwa menghindari bahaya (termasuk bahaya iatrogenik) merupakan panduan terbaik
terhadap keputusan atas nama janin aterm dan bayi di bangsal neonatus,54 dan lainnya
berpendapat bahwa intervensi agresif melanggar nonmalefisien jika ada kondisi satu
dari tiga berikut ini: (1) ketidakmampuan untuk bertahan hidup selama masa
pertumbuhan, (2) ketidakmampuan untuk hidup tanpa nyeri berat dan (3)
ketidakmampuan untuk berpartisipasi secara minimal pada pengalaman manusia.55
Penanganan kehamilan risiko tinggi secara non agresif dan membiarkan
neonatus dengan kecacatan serius supaya mati, dalam kondisi tertentu merupakan
tindakan yang diizinkan secara moral yang tidak melanggar kewajiban nonmalefisien.
Ketika pasien memiliki kualitas hidup yang begitu rendah dimana intervensi agresif atau
perawatan intensif akan lebih memberikan kerugian daripada manfaat, dokter bisa
menunda atau menghentikan terapi pada fetus yang hampir aterm, neonatus atau bayi,
layaknya pada orang dewasa. Kondisi yang berujung pada rendahnya kualitas hidup
meliputi sejumlah kelainan antenatal yang berujung pada timbulnya kematian janin;
kerusakan otak berat akibat asfiksia persalinan; penyakit Tay-Sachs, yang melibatkan
peningkatan spastisitas dan demensia dan biasanya berujung pada kematian di usia tiga
atau empat tahun; dan penyakit Lesch-Nyhan, yang melibatkan spasm tak terkendali,
retardasi metal, mutilasi diri sendiri yang kompulsif dan kematian dini. Kasus berat
neural tube defects dimana neonatus kekurangan semua atau sebagian besar otak dan
akan berujung pada kematian juga merupakan keputusan yang dibenarkan untuk tidak
mengobati.
Sejalan dengan argumen kami di akhir bab 4, standar paling sesuai pada kasus
pasien tak kompeten termasuk neonatus kritis adalah berdasarkan kepentingan terbaik,
sebagaimana dinilai dengan perkiraan apa yang akan orang normal pertimbangkan
tentang manfaat terbaik dari pilihan yang ada. pasien kompeten dan wali berwenang
bisa menggunakan pertimbangan kualitas hidup untuk menentukan apakah terapi
bersifat opsional atau wajib (atau pada kasus ekstrim, salah). Kami simpulkan bahwa
kategori opsional dan wajib ini sebaiknya mengganti perbedaan lama dan aturan yang
ditelaah di awal bab ini.
Menyeimbangkan beberapa kesalahan dari Strategi Kevorkian ialah pada kasus bantuan
bunuh diri yang dibenarkan. Pertimbangan tindakan dokter Timothy Quill dalam
meresepkan barbiturat yang diinginkan oleh pasien berusia empat puluh lima tahun
yang menolak pengobatan dengan resiko tinggi, menyakitkan, dan sering kali tidak
berhasil pada kasus leukemia. Dia telah menjadi pasiennya selama bertahun-tahun. Dia
dan anggota keluarganya telah menyepakati tindakan tersebut sesuai keinginannya. Dia
sangat kompeten dan telah mendiskusikan dan menolak semua alternatif yang tersedia
untuk menghilangkan penderitaan. Kasus ini memenuhi persyaratan yang cukup untuk
membenarkan bantuan dokter dalam mengakhiri hidup. Kondisi ini termasuk:
Meskipun tindakan Quill memuaskan pada kondisi ini, namun beberapa orang
menyatakan keterlibatan sebagai seorang dokter yang melanggar dan tidak dapat
dibenarkan. Beberapa kritikus menggunakan argumen slippery-slope, karena tindakan
seperti Quill jika dilegalkan, dapat mempengaruhi banyak pasien, terutama orang tua.
Beberapa orang gelisah dengan tindakan yang di lakukan Quill, yang ternyata
melanggar hukum New York State terhadap bunuh diri yang dibantu. Risiko
pertanggungjawaban pidana, terlebih lagi Quill berbohong kepada medis, untuk
mengurangi pemeriksaan yang melibatkan dirinya bahwa pasien rumah sakit telah
meninggal karena leukemia akut.72
Terlepas dari masalah ini, kami tidak mengkritik niat dasar Quill dalam
menangani pasien, keputusan pasien, atau hubungan mereka. Penderitaan dan
kehilangan kemampuan kognitif dapat merusak dan merendahkan pasien begitu parah
sehingga kematian adalah pilihan terbaik mereka. Dalam situasi yang tragis ini atau
dalam antisipasinya seperti dalam kasus-dokter ini, Quill tidak bertindak salah dalam
membantu pasien yang kompeten, atas permintaan mereka, untuk membawa kematian.
Isu-isu kebijakan publik tentang bagaimana menghindari pelanggaran dan mencegah
tindakan yang tidak dapat dibenarkan harus menjadi bagian utama dari diskusi kita
mengenai bentuk-bentuk bantuan dokter yang tepat, tetapi masalah ini seharusnya tidak
mempengaruhi pembenaran moral dari tindakan dokter dalam membantu kematian
pasien dalam konteks merawat pasien.
Daftar Pustaka
52. Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life, p. 172.
53. President's Commission, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment.
54. See Frank A. Chervenak and Laurence B. McCullough, "Nonaggressive Obstetric Management." JAMA:
Journal of the American Medical Association 261 (June 16, 1989): 3439-40; and their "The Fetus as Patient:
Implications for Directive versus Nondirective Counseling for Fetal Benefit," Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy 6
(1991): 93-100.
55. Albert R. Jonsen and Michael J. Garland, "A Moral Policy for Life/Death Decisions in the Intensive Care
Nursery," in Ethics of Newborn In University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1976), p. 148. A
report fro tensive Care, ed. Jonsen and Garland (Berkeley, CA: m the Nuffield Council on Bioethics uses the
concept of "intolerability" to describe situations where life-sustaining treatment would not be in the baby's "best
interests" because of the burdens imposed by "irremediable suffering." Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and
Neonatal Medicine: Ethical Issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2006). An overview of the
development of "neonatal bioethics" indicates that physicians' judgments about neonatal intensive care now
include both the baby's chances for survival and his or her anticipated quality of life. See John Lantos and
William L. Meadow, Neonaial Bioethics: The Moral Challenges of Medical Innovation (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006), p 10 et passim
56. See Steinbock and Norcross, Killing and Letting Die. 2nd ed.; Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., Intending Death (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996); Jeff McMahan, "Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid," Ethics
103 (1993): 250-79; David Orentlicher, "The Alleged Distinction between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of
Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible o Maintain," University of Illinois Law
Review (1998): 837-59; and James Rachels, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Value of Life," in his Can Ethics
Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 69-
79.
57. Assisted.suicide is the term often used to describe this practice. Although we sometimes use this term, we also
use broader language, such as "physician-assisted dying" or physician-arranged dying. e to find euphemisms
but because the broader language provides a more accurate Although the term suicide has the small advantage
of indicating that the one whose death the final act, other conditions such as prescribing and transporting t
because of a desir description. brought authorizes or performs substances may be as causally relevant as the
"final act" itself. For related conceptu ranklin G. Miller, Robert D. Truog, and Dan W. Brock, "Moral Fictions
and Medical Ethics." see F Bloethics 24 (2010): 453-60.
58. Howard Brody, "Messenger Case: Lessons and Reflections," Ethics-In-Formation 5 (1995): 8-9; John Roberts,
(August 13, 1994): 430. "Doctor Charged for Switching off His Baby's Ventilator," British Medical Journal 309
59. Cf. James Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 292 (January 9 1975):
78-80; Franklin G. Miller, Robert D. Truog, and Dan W. Brock, "Moral Fictions Medical Ethics," Bioethics 24
(2010): 453-60; Roy W. Perrett, "Killing, Letting Die and the Bare Difference Argument," Bioethics 10 (1996):
131-39; and Dan W. Brock, "Voluntary Active Euthanasia," Hastings Center Report 22 (March-April 1992):
10-22
60. See Joseph J. Fins, A Palliative Ethic of Care: Clinical Wisdom at Life's End (Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett,
2006); and Joanne Lynn et al., Improving Care for the End of Life: A Sourcebook for Health Care Managers
and Clinicians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
61. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Ore. Rev. Stat. S 127.800 et seq. This act explicitly rejects the la guagc of
"physician-as for medication to end one's life in a humane and dignified manne sisted suicide." It prefers the
language of a right patients have to make a "request
62. See Lawrence O. Gostin, "Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: From Quinlan to Cruzan, rg, and Vacco-
A Brief History and Analysis of Constitutional Protection of the 'Right to Die,'" JAMA: Journal of the
American Medical Association 278 (November 12, 1997): 1523-28; and Yale Kamisar, "When Is There a
Constitutional Right to Die? When Is There No Constitutional Right to Live?" Georgia Law Review 25 (1991):
1203-42
63. For discussions, see Douglas Walton, Slippery Slope Argumenis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992); Govert den
Hartogh, "The Slippery Slope Argument," in A Companion to Bioethics. 2nd ed., ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter
Singer (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 321-31; Christopher James Ryan, "Pulling up the Runaway: The
Effect of New Evidence on Euthanasia's Slippery Slope." Journal Medical Ethics 24 (1998): 341-44; Bernard
Williams, "Which Slopes Are Slippery?" in Moral ichael Lockwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
ilemmas in Modern Medicine, ed. M 37; and James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10\\
64. See Timothy E. Quill and Christine K. Cassel, "Nonabandonment: A Central Obligation for Physicians," in
Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, ed. Quill and Margaret P. Battin
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), chap. 2.
65. See Franklin G. Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy E. Quill, "Can Physician-Assisted Suicide Be Regulated
Effectively?" Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 24 (1996): 225-32. Defenders of slippery-slope arguments
in this context include John Keown, Euthanasia. Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legislation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); J. Pereira, "Legalizing Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide: The
Illusion of Safeguards and Controls." Current Oncology 18 (April 2011): e38-45; and David Albert Jones, "Is
There a Logical Slippery Slope from ntary to Nonvoluntary Euthanasia?" Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
21 (2011): 379-404 Opponents include L. W. Sumner, Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011); and Report of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel, End-of-Life Decision
Making (Ottawa, ON: The Royal Society of Canada, December 2011), available at http:/www.rsc.ca/
documents/RSC_EOL_1 3_25_Twenty-five EN FINAL.pdf (accessed February 3. 2012). After examining the
laws and practical experience of jurisdictions around the world that au thorize assisted tter concludes: "Despite
the fears of opponents, it is...clear that the much- lippery slope has not emerged following decriminalization, at
least not in those jurisdictions for which evidence is available" (p. 90)
66. See, for example, Timothy E. Quill, Legal Regulation of Physician-Assisted Death-The Latest Report Cards,"
New England Journal of Medicine 356 (May 10, 2007): 1911-13: Susan Okie, "Physician- Assisted Suicide-
Oregon and Beyond," New England Journal of Medicine 352 (April 21, 2005): 1627-30; and Courtney
Campbell, "Ten Years of Death with Dignity." New Atlantis (Fall 2008): 33-46.
67. The information in this paragraph appears in the annual reports by the Oregon Department of Human Services.
See Oregon's Death with Dignity Act-2010, and previous annual reports, available at
http://public.health.oregon.gov/Provider PartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/Deathwith DignityAct/
Pages/index.aspx (accessed February 3, 2012). See also The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A Guidebook for
Health Care Professionals Developed by The Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally-Ill Oregonians,
convened by The Center tor Ethics in Health Care, Oregon Health & Science University. First Edition (print):
March 1998; Current Edition (2008 online; updated as informa- tion becomes aveilable):
http://www.ohsu,edu/xd/education/continuing-education/center-for-ethics/ ethics-outreach/upload/Oregon-
Death-with-Dignity-Act-Guidebook.pdf (accessed December 6, 2011).
68. See Report of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel, End-of-Life Decision Making, which examines the
international experience with laws authorizing assisted dying; and Guenter Lewy, Assisted Death in Europe and
America: Four Regimes and Their Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
69. See Bernard Gert, James L. Bernat, and R. Peter Mogielnicki "Distinguishing between Patients Refusals and
Requests," Hastings Center Report 24 (July-August 1994): 13-15; Leigh C. Bishop et al.. "Refusals Involving
Requests" (Letters and Responses), Hastings Center Report 25 July-August : 4; and Diane E. Meier et al., "On
the Frequency of Requests for Physician Assisted Suicide in n Medicine," New England Journal of Medicine
338 (April 23, 1998) 1193-1201.
70. Cf. Allen Buchanan, "Intending Death: The Structure of the Problem and Proposed Solutions," in Intending
Death, ed. Beauchamp, esp. pp. 34-38; Frances M. Kamm, "Physician-Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double
Effect, and the Ground of Value," Ethics 109 (1999): 586-605; and Matthew Hanser, "Why Are Killing and
Letting Die Wrong?" Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 175-201.
71. New York Times, June 6, 1990, pp. Al, B6; June 7, 1990, pp. A1, D22; June 9, 1990, p. A6; June 12, 1990, p.
C3; Newsweek, June 18, 1990, p. 46. Kevorkian's own description is in his Prescription: Medicide (Buffalo,
NY: Prometheus Rooks, 1991), pp. 221-31.
72. Timothy E. Quill, "Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making." New England Journal of
Medicine 324 (March 7, 1991): 691-94, reprinted with additional analysis in Quill, Deatlh and Dignity (New
York: Norton, 1993).