5899625

Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty-First Century
Author(s): Paul Demeny

Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2012), pp. 685-705
Published by: Population Council
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41811934
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NOTES AND COMMENTARY
Geopolitical Aspects
of Population in the
Twenty-First Century
Paul Demeny
Throughout much of human history, population - characterized,

by its size - was a distinctly minor determinant of geopolitical w
power in relations between peoples. Indeed, when differences w
sured in terms of political organization, social cohesion, and tech
and military prowess - as expressed by the ill-defined but neverthele
understood modern concept denoting the level of economic develo
population size mattered very little.
The modern age, if we date it from the fifteenth century, provid
vincing illustrations of this proposition. European countries with rel
small populations, like the Netherlands, Portugal, or Belgium, co
relative ease acquire geographically distant possessions, greatly ex
the mother countries in size of territory and population. And a s
by today's standards underpopulated, European island, England, be
center of a vast empire with large colonial populations over whic
never set. What mattered was not relative demographic size but
technology and institutional and organizational structures.
In some instances expansion was of course facilitated by relat
mographic weakness in some of the territories not yet conquered. A
of British settlers could take possession of a near-empty North A
continent. Czarist Russia became a country stretching from the Balti
the Pacific Ocean. But in conflicts between nations of comparable
development, population became an increasingly important factor. Du
Napoleonic wars, the relative size of the populations that could be mo
was a crucial determinant of the outcome. In determining what
in Moscow two hundred years ago this year, the relative size of the p
tions that could be mobilized was crucial. Within Western Europe, so
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 38(4): 685-705 (DECEMBER 2012) 685
686 Geopolitical Aspects of Population
years later, the shifting power b

ascendant Germany reflected a
And in the two world wars of the
the then dominant powers of the
Hemisphere - the far greater rela
defeat the expansionist objectives
of Nazi, Germany (and one shou
Japan) was of decisive importan
But my topic is not an examina
portance in it of the population f
world and its perspectives for th
for the coming decades. This ca
happened after the end of World
For some forty-five years, econ
was in the preceding several centu
continued to revolve around Euro
grown-up daughter of the Old Co
seemed. That Northern world was
the Churchillian term, by an iron
armed to the teeth, one dominate
the Soviet Union, the other by th
opponents, representing two very
seemed unresolvable and ominou
incalculable consequences.
Yet the ominousness of this div
between the East and the West of
fact that war between the two sid
ther side. Thus, in sharp contrast
twentieth century, peace was pre
second half, post- 1945. Wasteful
the two sides was in economic ter
reconstruction was over, brought
development. This was translate
expansion of incomes and gener
Despite widespread fears of a re
experienced by European popula
brought a baby boom nearly every
speed, a baby bust fairly soon ret
nation was a welcome developm
postwar economic expansion.
There were some positive dev
cooperation, exemplified by the
by the winners of the just-fough
Paul Demeny 687
sor, the Leagu

Principles of i
charter of hum
lines for the fo
During the de
South seemed,
major consequ
general relief o
from future fo
dencies of Euro
change was fol
stan and, later
East, scores of
with the same
these developm
wars in South E
munist China's
in close alliance with the Soviet Union.
Yet the development that really changed the long-term geopolitical map
was not the birth of new sovereign states and newly delineated frontiers: it
was demographic change itself. With the rapid introduction of Western medi-
cal interventions, mortality almost everywhere in the global South fell pre-
cipitously, generating what was soon dubbed, infelicitously but not entirely
unreasonably, a demographic explosion. With fertility change understandably
lagging behind the fall in death rates, just as was the case in Europe's demo-
graphic transition, population growth was rapid, indeed far more rapid than
any of its historical precedents. The speed of population increase experienced
by the less developed world also greatly exceeded the rate of growth gener-
ated by the Northern baby boom. And it was more sustained.
Shifting demographic balances
Although I need not describe the resulting drastic transformation of the

world's demographic picture, a few illustrative figures are worth citing as
a reminder.1 The world's population at mid-century was 2.5 billion. By the
end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, this figure had more than doubled.
Today it is 7 billion. The vastly greater part of this huge expansion of human
numbers occurred in what was called the less developed world. Europe's
demographic weight within the global total shifted sharply downward.
Numerical proportions between countries in the North and in the South
changed markedly.
Germany (within its present territory, combining its former east and
west portions) is Western Europe's most populous country. Its 1950 popula-
tion was 68 million. Today it is

38 million. Today it exceeds 180
signal success stories in demogr
has been enhanced by large-sc
1950 and 2010 are 42 million
and 74 million.
By the early 1960s, the rapid acceleration of population numbers driven
by a widening gap between birth rates and death rates was clearly perceived
by the West. The main worry was manifested in an updated Malthusian
concern. Would rapid population growth defeat efforts for social-political
modernization and consequent economic development? Could the result-
ing numbers be fed? Were other physical resources sufficient to sustain such
rapid population growth? Would the expansion be moderated and eventually
halted by rising mortality?
The needed remedy, logically enough, was identified as a reduction
of fertility. Programs were initiated by the United States and other Western
countries as part of official foreign aid to spread modern methods of birth
control. Organizations from the private sector also became active participants
in such efforts. There was plenty of evidence, it was said, that couples in less
developed countries were not as competent as Europeans in practicing effec-
tive family limitation in the era preceding the pill. Provision of modern birth
control methods through organized programs, advocates of such programs
asserted, would solve this problem.
There were critics who saw these efforts as inspired by fear within the
West of the expansion of the so-called Third World. Yet advocates of these
programs were in fact motivated by the best intentions to help economically
backward low-income populations. Sustained rapid population growth, es-
pecially in countries already populous and not richly endowed with natural
resources in demand on world markets, can in fact be a major hindrance to
economic development. This understanding was reached after many agoniz-
ing scientific and political debates, though it elicited intermittent dissenting
criticisms. By the late 1960s it emerged as a clear majority opinion of policy-
makers and development economists.
That this perception of the deleterious effects of rapid population
growth on economic development was not a malevolent imperialist inven-
tion received clear confirmation in, of all places, Communist China. China's
post-Mao leadership was vehemently growth-oriented, and it saw the danger
posed by rapid population growth in the same light as did Western analysts. It
decided to apply brakes in a fashion that was hardly conceivable in any other
society or in any other political system. In 1979, the "one-child policy" was
introduced as a "temporary" measure considered necessary to counteract the
negative economic consequences of rapid population growth. After more than
three decades, this temporary policy, though in a somewhat relaxed form, is
Paul Demeny 689
still in effect.2 I
and medium-te
At the indivi
world (as was a
ods was no dou
them. But the
would make a
proportion of c
was a grossly in
their fertility,
advantage both
the case in all h
achieving lower
Changing pre
generated by s
industrializati
models from o
cal institution
access of wom
tors of the lab
industrial and
outside world
consumption l
are also powerf
These changes
fertility beha
The end of the
centrally plann
markets and e
capitalistic econ
of globalization
technology, an
economic grow
proceeded with
Changing ec
Differentially
technological ad
reshaped demo
weight of the
that economist
a permanent co
countries, they will reshape r

prowess and the resulting incom
populations. The geopolitical con
This process is now well recog
the general public. The impendi
ence to the so-called BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The
combined population of these four countries in 2010 was slightly above 2.9
billion - a large slice of the world's total of 7 billion. The 2.9 billion of course
combines population sizes that differ greatly. The two demographic giants are
China and India, with roughly 1.3 and 1.2 billion people each. Brazil's 2010
population is 195 million, Russia's is 143 million. Each of the four countries
has shown stellar recent growth performance. Average annual per capita GDP
growth during the 16-year period between 1995 and 201 1, an OECD report
records, was 9.3 percent in China, 5.8 percent in India, and 5.4 percent in
Russia.3 Even the less rapid per capita income growth registered by Brazil - 2. 1
percent - compares favorably with the equivalent figures for the developed
world - for example, for the US (1.5 percent), Germany (1.4 percent), and
Japan (0.8 percent).4
But comparison of population growth estimates highlights major differ-
ences among the BRIC countries. The two giants are of course in a separate
league. Between 1950 and 2010 India's population grew by some 853 million,
China's by 790 million. The two countries with smaller populations offer a
much starker contrast. Brazil's population between 1950 and 2010 has nearly
quadrupled: it rose from 54 million to 195 million. Russia's population during
this period grew by roughly 40 percent: from 103 million to 143 million. As to
the future, the UN's projections of expected ("medium variant") population
change offer instructive comparisons. For the period 2010 to 2030 the UN
forecasts a gain of 298 million for India, 52 million for China, and 25 million
for Brazil. For Russia the sign of change is negative: the UN anticipates a fall
from 143 million to 136 million - a net loss of 7 million persons, despite an
estimated net immigration of 2.7 million between 2010 and 2030. This strik-
ing population loss would be a continuation of the recent trajectory. Russia's
population peaked in 1993 at 149 million, 6 million above the 2010 estimate.
This population loss was recorded despite a net immigration of some 7. 1 mil-
lion between 1990 and 2010. Russia is clearly an outlier in the BRIC quartet.
It has demographic characteristics resembling the general European/ Japanese
pattern: fertility below replacement level, combined, as in Europe at large,
with massive net immigration. The population growth effect of the fertility
shortfall is aggravated in the Russian case by higher mortality rates than those
that characterize the developed countries.
Even the few figures cited above indicate that the last two decades have
brought a massive shift in relative economic weight among countries and
continents. In 2012, China's economy in terms of aggregate income is already
Paul Demeny 691
as large as that
casts that with
the US. Of cour
but they are m
What of the
on both econo
bravely, even f
ticipates contin
but diminishing
countries. For
growth at 6.4 p
sia. The corresp
percent for OE
Implicit in suc
recent econom
tinuation and f
flows of capit
labor. Successf
mental proble
billion magnitu
consumption, i
Equally, or ev
forecasts have
and maintenanc
sources of wit
increasing ine
urban and rur
natural resou
labor-saving te
perceived as co
tenuous or at b
and governmen
toward globali
seek greater au
international c
Well-documen
ern-style free m
governments
intervals, an in
press and the m
and a limited r
of life - are lik
prove such a s
of government. In the sphere of

repossessing the "commanding he
tion of the heavy hand of the re
mean determined efforts to im
that are judged as just and desirab
Historical experience gives littl
tendencies. Rapid economic growth
ments of the population from po
political and developmental arra
recipe that worked in the early s
successful forerunners will, howe
age 35 or 40 will be college-edu
Social turmoil then will result, w
can be expected with reasonably h
political-legal correction in the ri
growth. Cultural, ethnic, and ling
nomic and political institutions of
first century will tend to increas
Responses to decline in geo

demographic weight
What should be the attitude of lo
that seem to assure for them a su
and the potential of increased n
surprised by the economic catchi
consequence of globalization. A
slow down the process but with
tries as much as the poor ones.
convergence as the one true rem
still widespread poverty of the le
best guarantee that demographic
converge, bringing to an end pat
should realize of course that the p
which the greater demographic g
a late transition to low fertility w
increasing the demographic ma
pioneers of the fertility transition
But acceptance of a relative loss
gradual fading, let alone speedy d
mere losses of population num
process. If fertility remains well
resulting population losses impl
Paul Demeny 693
formation tow
prove socially,
But cannot cou
could. Apart fr
age length of li
country, for p
a higher birth
of course is als
Population rep
Massive immig
population for
be driven both
ers seeking ma
distress but sti
can be a conven
migrations geo
rary world, it
variant project
population inc
noted above, in
roughly 300 m
2010 to 2030 e
willing immigr
Estimates of
during the mo
estimates, rece
responding fig
and for Austr
same decade wa
lion from Latin America and the Caribbean.
These are impressively large figures, even though in some of the receiving
countries the size of the recent influx, as is well demonstrated in the case of
Russia, was far from sufficient to counterbalance the losses from negative natu-
ral growth rates. Conversely, seemingly large net outflows have been typically
a small fraction òf natural population growth in the sending countries.
But what about the future evolution of international migration? The
simple answer is that we do not know: all forecasts are subject to massive
uncertainties. It is instructive, for example, to observe how the highly re-
spected and influential UN projections approach the foggy cross-border mi-
gration prospects. One uncertainty concerns the borders themselves. What
will be the delineation of countries on future world maps? Will there be
694 Ge OPOLITICAL Aspects of Population
further proliferation of sovereign s

over who will or will not be admitt
Many post-World War I and post
tendency for new states to be born
units, or, more frequently, to split
disintegration of the former Yugosl
countries provides a striking illustr
geographically nearby examples, w
Catalonia, a Wallonia, a Flanders, o
will there be a coalescence of the sta
single federal unit - perhaps withou
opt for splendid isolation? Or will t
from now, in its present form enco
some 420 million, within which the
little of its commonly understood m
could be raised for the rest of the w
an independent Texas or an independ
such issues and takes the formal s
projections - now extending to the e
Those projections, reasonably eno
predicting future fertility rates. Th
quantitatively illustrating three alte
"high," and "low." The medium va
toward a net 1 reproduction rate of
a stationary population. Such conver
decreasing fertility rate; in many ot
ment fertility levels. The high and low
total fertility rates that are some 25
century. For Russia, for example, by
2100) the medium total fertility rat
from its low point of 1.25 registere
high-variant projection fertility clim
TFR of 1 .55. These assumed end-of-c
weighted world average figures and
calculated for other countries. (For
the US is 2.1, 2.6, and 1.6, while for
sumed gaps between the high and lo
generate fairly large differences in
(and, of course, large differences in
distributions, ranging from relative
the medium projection yields a glo
by a high estimate of 1 5.8 billion an
the corresponding trio of estimates
941 million, 1.59 billion, and 506 mi
Paul Demeny 695
These figures
illustrate the m
tion trends. T
migration scen
population sizes
tion is specifie
of the present
of its absolute
by the end of t
Thus, for exa
lion. Net outm
million. The h
billion and 880
in either case,
low projections
million about
vast difference
the migratory
as zero.
Yet in recent decades the volume of international mig

shown a fairly steady upward trend. Indeed, some observer
age the "age of migration." The label reflects an increasing i
tion on the size and composition of the populations of the
receiving countries - especially the US, Canada, and Austral
of European countries such as the UK, Germany, France
symmetrical effect on the migrant-sending countries w
much more moderate, reflecting the relatively smaller
receiving countries.
Age of migration or not, the theoretical elaboration of
govern migration leave much to be desired. There exists no
"migration transition," echoing transition theory's generali
fertility and mortality change. What can be asserted with r
is that international migration will remain within the contr
countries. The UN's assumption of a creeping downward tre
may reflect the observation that short of pressing needs f
majority of the populations of immigrant-receiving countrie
see less immigration rather than more. National policies on
reflect compromises in economic interests and differing cu
attitudes and humanitarian impulses in the receiving count
the balance of forces likely to shape future international mi
UN's demographers, like numerous other observers, may be
that the age of migration is coming to an end.
Seen from the point of view of majorities of people in
receiving countries, immigration that is controlled, selectiv
small in numbers may be consider

different matter. It could eventua
respect to social, cultural, ethnic,
hardly captured by demographer
Population replenishment by r
If large-scale immigration is not

decline - actually occurring or co
that is substantially below replac
on measures that could elevate th
freedom of choice with respect
that could bring fertility back to
Future fertility of course is not
was a surprise to all demograph
there is a reasonably good chance
are currently experiencing fertil
hancing policies may not be ne
manifestations of an Adam Smithian invisible hand - combined with the
familiar types of pro-family policies that financially offset part of the costs
of children's upbringing and make women's labor force participation more
compatible with childbearing - may nudge fertility rates sufficiently close to
replacement levels to obviate the need for further measures.
But, as evidence from many countries now indicates, this benign out-
come cannot be taken for granted. The record of the standard and by intent
often explicitly pronatalist policies is generally poor. Germany's experience
indicates that seeming successes in this policy domain - such as the Scandina-
vian and French experience - are not easily replicated elsewhere. Moreover,
many signs suggest that social trends in the longer run may lead to further
aggravation of the problem of low fertility - that is, driving fertility to stabi-
lization at even lower levels than are now being experienced. Demographic
aging and the economic consequences of globalization make the modern
welfare state increasingly difficult to sustain. Once this prospect is perceived
by the young people who might be counted on to embark on building a fam-
ily with children, individually preferred but socially harmful consequences
are likely to follow. Young couples will be increasingly inclined either to have
no children or to have one or at best two. The average of a roughly evenly
divided distribution of zero, one, and two implies a population on its way to
precipitous demographic decline.
This is a pessimistic assumption, but one that cannot be dismissed as
implausible. Thus, in all the countries affected by the prospect of long-term
demographic decline, a search should be undertaken for innovative policy
measures that could offer a remedy better than can be provided by the policy
tools currently being applied.
Paul Demeny 697
Two novel p
I will briefly
though, admitt
by characterizi
development of
the stamp of t
Although the s
governing inte
tions tend to t
In the politic
discussed aspec
takes as given
ting the terms
by the state to
The second env
functions close
those observab
or more of the
population in
in combinatio
societies will t
institutions al
of political-ins
ensue in the co
On the first sc
an objective ob
disproportionat
with generous
common good,
by voters' rem
that favor the
compelling case
On the second
tion of the wel
replicating the
undermine th
state-organize
ments seek to
graphic and ec
arrangements
likely variant
assumptions c
its main social
Individuals would be left to acqui

in the domains of education, o
from private markets. Arguabl
that the state maintained a rol
enough to exert an influence on
children and to raise and educate
the labor force.
Proposal 1: Give children voting rights
In affluent societies the basic rules for state-organized intergenerational

transfers are typically set by democratically elected parliaments. Voters are
assumed to be well-informed about public affairs and able to recognize that
their personal fortunes are affected by the common good of the political entity
of which they are part; that recognition is expected to be reflected in their
voting behavior. At the same time, consideration of voters' personal interests,
especially in the economic domain, is accepted as a legitimate factor that in-
fluences their choice of political representatives.
Private markets are driven by voluntary exchanges from which both
parties to a bargain benefit. In the classic formulation of Adam Smith, it is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest. The political
marketplace is driven by a similar if less benevolent mechanism. Competing
for votes, political parties and individual candidates for office are keenly con-
scious of the play of individual economic interests, hence present platforms
and make promises that appeal to voters.
But individual economic interests tend to be strongly age-related, re-
flecting differences in time horizons, both in the short term and in the long
term. Not surprisingly, the age composition of the electorate tends to influ-
ence party platforms and promises. That influence is not straightforward.
The beginnings of the modern welfare state, signaled by the state assuming
commitments to provide basic economic security to persons in their old
age, go back to a time when the age distribution of voters was still relatively
young. Industrialization, geographic mobility, and changes in social attitudes
weakened the traditional family-based support system for the economically
dependent elderly population. The numbers of the old relative to the working
population were small: this could permit income transfers from the working
and tax-paying population to the economically inactive old at relatively mod-
est economic sacrifices by taxpayers.
Over time, with population aging, along with generous provisions for
an early retirement age and pension levels guaranteeing little decline in stan-
dard of living, these modest early commitments were eventually transformed
into the single largest public income-transfer program of the modern welfare
Paul Demeny 699
state. Close behin

expenditure, wer
amplified by the
ately devoted to
The changes in
growth in interg
replacement, ind
were highly des
security and heal
the prevailing po
have led or are lea
unsustainable an
A privileged tr
the allocations b
increasingly heav
interests and the
electorate that is
an age structure
have witnessed
typically represen
the electorate.
Given the pay-as-you-go financing of old-age support and the decreas-
ing ratio of workers to retired, the redeeming of promises made under de-
mographically more favorable conditions requires increases in tax rates or, as
resistance to further tax increases grows, government borrowing that transfers
a share of current support to the next generation of taxpayers. When deficit
financing approaches its feasible limits (set by the realities of the bond mar-
ket), a reform of the government budget, and especially of its social transfer
component, becomes inevitable. But a reduction of entitlements once granted
as a right is strongly resisted by the beneficiaries, hence reform of the transfer
system aimed at economizing budget expenditures requires painful political
decisions and generates acute intergenerational conflicts.
The main tools for reestablishing budgetary balance involve some com-
bination of an increase in the retirement age, cutting the absolute level of
pension benefits and health care expenditures, imposing income tests to the
right to state pensions (thus implicitly transforming part of what had been
formerly granted and perceived as an earned right into something closer to a
welfare payment), and, not least, cutting allocations to the younger popula-
tion and restricting other non-welfare state expenditures such as for national
defense and infrastructure. Given the relative political strength of the old-age
lobby, there is a strong probability that the resulting solution will be least
injurious to the interests of the elderly population - an outcome unlikely to
be optimal from the point of view of overall national welfare.
Some twenty-six years ago I

teract this age bias. I suggested t
disenfranchised group: those u
unqualified to participate in th
ders them unable to stand up f
group without voting rights m
18, although the age boundary so
higher. (In Japan, for example
older.) According to my propos
exercised by custodial parents. (F
vote; for boys, their fathers.)
This was in 1986 an outlandish
tions; it remains such today. Nev
given in the mid-1990s by Lee Ku
and in a 2002 pamphlet publish
a lengthy discussion among rep
sequently dubbed "Demeny vot
in Japan, New Zealand, and Hu
an article in The Economist that
prominent Dutch economist.
Most recently, on October 18,
articleon its editorial page, titled
Demeny voting in highly positiv
educated Semyon Dukach, was ide
investor in Boston. The article
readers' comments, almost unifo
ing lack of even minimal unders
human rights foundations of the
Should the obvious constituti
voting reform be removable, a su
of the electorate would occur, a
tion age distribution in most low
means radical. Analogous but fa
aged. For example, as I proposed
decade ago, in a bicameral legislat
to the upper chamber could be
expectancy: a procedure that cou
ments and one that with electron
and simple.
But the value of introducing such a proposal in the public discourse
on the interplay between political power and economic interests is not to be
measured by the evidently minimal chances of its being actually adopted.
Rather, like the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates about
Paul Demeny 701
women's right
this case about
ent generation
political decisio
those under ag
second century
by the middle o
that influence
intergeneration
Proposal 2: Re
parents with t
children in the labor force
As the long-term unsustainability of current public promises for old-age pen-

sions and for non-rationed provision of old-age health care seeps into the
public's consciousness, would-be parents will increasingly anticipate that their
old-age economic security requires accumulation of private assets that could
complement their diminished expectations for post-retirement public provi-
sions, those supported by pay-as-you-go arrangements. But saving during
the economically active years is far more difficult when couples also bear the
costs of raising children. Those couples assuming that extra burden are bound
to find themselves at a substantial disadvantage compared to individuals and
families with no children or only one child.
The now increasingly perceived and prospectively all-too-real weaken-
ing of the state's capacity to secure a post-retirement standard of living on
an acceptably adequate level is likely to emerge as a potent factor depressing
birth rates. More effective pronatalist policy measures than those presently
applied, whether they are called as such or labeled simply as pro-family poli-
cies, may then be needed.
The most plausible form of such a policy would avoid the exclusive focus
of the commonly pursued pro-family policy package that aims at improving
the current or near-term economic status of families, or women in general,
who have children. Its added novel objective would be to reestablish the direct
relationship that existed between individual fertility behavior and individual
prospects for old-age economic security before modern economic advances
and concomitant cultural changes decisively weakened and often completely
severed that linkage.
A quarter century ago I outlined a proposal that could accomplish that
objective (Demeny 1987). The proposal received little attention, but it may
acquire new relevance as public pension schemes and health care provisions
for old age are forced to undertake painful retrenchments. The central facet
of the proposed reform would be to earmark a socially agreed-upon fraction
of the compulsory contribution

pool from which pay-as-you-g
and transfer that fraction to in
ditional entitlement. The rules
the remaining, diminished, co
transfer. Those rules reflect th
their working years, although s
those with lowest earned rights
Obviously, reestablishment
individual childbearing levels
ceptable only if children's finan
the state-managed transfer fro
in no way affect children's mat
parents' receipt of such state-m
create in them a sense of obliga
My proposal satisfies these r
of wages (or perhaps of incom
nominally earmarked for their
regardless of whether parents
Description of the specific
scheme are beyond the scope of
be offered. The complex and v
provide for parents with childr
Proposals on how to make these
ly offered and debated. In cont
persons to the number of child
the subject of serious critical at
such a linkage remains virtually
is difficult to justify, given th
age offered a major support fo
state-directed pension arrangem
grafted onto existing institutio
It is evident that the level o
derly parents for the cost they
from the perspective of a fertil
contribution to a higher level of
labor force, would be strongly
contribution of workers earmar
effectiveness would require a g
taxed amount. Such a level wou
ment between retired person
former group, among parents w
productive adulthood.
Paul Demeny 703
Social changes
make the refer
two-fifth of ch
unmarried wom
loss the childra
to direct transf
should he be t
income would b
couple; widowe
dren in the lab
The direct tran
diminish the f
tribution to pe
actuarial calcula
contributions. T
sions earned from the diminished fund would of course be lower than it would
have been in the absence of the direct transfers - in fact it would be often nega-
tive. Still, preservation of the linkage is crucial. In the absence of a payroll tax
specifically earmarked for pension payments, pensions could be supported from
general revenue. But the necessarily arbitrary allocation of pensions would then
reduce the scheme to an arbitrary welfare entitlement, undercutting political
support for it - in practical terms effectively killing it.
The fraction of the total payroll tax collected that would be directly
transferred to retired parents would be substantial, but much smaller than
could be expected at first blush. Under typical current demographic and eco-
nomic conditions, contributors from within a wide younger segment of the
labor force would provide no direct transfers since their parents (mothers)
would still be of pre-retirement age and often might elect to work beyond
that age. Similarly, a wide segment of older workers would provide no direct
transfers to parents (mothers) since a large fraction of the potential benefi-
ciaries of such transfers would no longer be alive. Nonetheless, for persons
in retirement with working children, the direct transfer scheme would be a
significant material benefit, counterbalancing savings curtailed by the cost of
rearing children and helping to equalize capacities for bequests. There is no
reason to assume that introduction of the transfer scheme would weaken or
further erode voluntary intergenerational transfers within families based on
traditional family norms and affection.
Summary and conclusions
History demonstrates that population size is often a distinctly secondary factor

in determining geopolitical weight. Differences in the level of development
can trump the significance of human numbers. In a world that could be seen
as divided between developed

in second half of the twentieth
measured in terms of economic
tural influence greatly favored
minority of the global populati
amplified during the past sixt
rienced the first phase of the d
declines in mortality and conse
same time, fertility in most de
rapid population shrinkage, a
The world's demographic map w
rich countries an increasingly s
History also demonstrates tha
need not be a permanent cond
not necessarily favorable. Large
experienced economic growth ra
countries. In the most recent d
tional movement of capital, exp
of technology transfer, has acc
population numbers and expan
economic weight with far-reach
In per capita terms the adva
likely to persist for many year
in population may accentuate th
tually lead to marginalization o
Preventing population shrinkag
agenda. That task can be accomp
migration, by raising the birth
national continuity would requi
ing the birth rate. The existing
equal rights and access to the la
had some success and could be
such measures is not encouragin
that could complement these
citizens, with custodial parents
ing that right. This would aim t
influence of older voters with
entail a reform of the state-run
ing the link between the financ
of children they have raised to
Paul Demeny 705
Notes
2060:
This note is based on an address prepared for the Long-term global growth prospects,"
OECD Economic Policy Papers, 2012.
International Conference ''Demographic Devel-
opment: Challenges of Globalization (The Sev-
4 The population-weighted average of
enth Valenteevskiye Chteniya), 15-17 Novem-
annual per capita income growth, calculated
ber 2012, Lomonosov Moscow State University.
on the basis of purchasing power parities,
It was delivered, in abbreviated form, at the first
during the period 1995-201 1 was 1.5 percent
plenary session of the conference. for OECD countries and 5.6 percent for non-
OECD countries.
1 In citing population figures and projec-
tions, I rely on the 2010 Revision of popula-5 These figures are calculated as dimin-
tion estimates and projections by the Popula-
ished by the net outmigration assumed in
tion Division of the United Nations.
the UN projections. The net outmigration
2 The difficulties of enforcing the policy
stipulated for the period 2010-2030 is a mod-
have of course also eased or even disappeared.
est fraction of the projected net population
A young couple, both husband and wife work- growth: 6.1 million for sub-Saharan Africa,
ing, who acquire a one-bedroom apartment 5.2 million for India, and 23.9 million for Asia
as a whole.
on, say, the 27th floor of a modern residential
building, in Shanghai or any other large city, 6 The United States is an exception to this
are unlikely to need much persuasion from generalization. There the peak was the last
the Party to postpone their first child. And
quinquennium of the twentieth century, with
when a two-bedroom apartment becomesan estimated net influx of 8.5 million persons.
available, there may be neither desire nor op-
Net immigration to the US in the first decade
portunity to choose to have a second child. of the twenty-first century was 11.2 million,
3 The estimates and projected growth signaling a significantly diminished average
annual influx.
rates I cite are from the report "Looking to
References
Demeny, Paul. 1986. "Pronatalist policies in low-fertility countries: Patterns, performance, and
prospects," Population and Development Review 12(Supp.): 335-358.
reform, " Population and Development Review 13(1): 128-

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Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty-First Century

Author(s): Paul Demeny

Throughout much of human history, population - characterized,

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 38(4): 685-705 (DECEMBER 2012) 685

years later, the shifting power b

sor, the Leagu

Shifting demographic balances

Although I need not describe the resulting drastic transformation of the

tion was 68 million. Today it is

countries, they will reshape r

of government. In the sphere of

Responses to decline in geo

further proliferation of sovereign s

Yet in recent decades the volume of international mig

small in numbers may be consider

If large-scale immigration is not

Individuals would be left to acqui

Proposal 1: Give children voting rights

In affluent societies the basic rules for state-organized intergenerational

state. Close behin

Some twenty-six years ago I

As the long-term unsustainability of current public promises for old-age pen-

of the compulsory contribution

Summary and conclusions

History demonstrates that population size is often a distinctly secondary factor

as divided between developed

reform, " Population and Development Review 13(1): 128-

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