G.R. No.

L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for
respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A
temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile,
Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is
devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and
regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition
must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in
full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence
of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I,
Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways
or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and
yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is
parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user
or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear
of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular
Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules
and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take
such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read
as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at
the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid
motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on
December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of
suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was
concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning
Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1,
dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall
have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure
that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free
of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration
certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and
Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it
came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case
of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations
in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring
public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as
being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of
Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F.
Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an
answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a
[temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer
for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they
specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter
of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission
Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law,
equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory,
one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis
and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself
with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the
Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules
and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there
was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v.
Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and
signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in
detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-
persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far
from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after
the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could
be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense
the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and
at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo:
'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end
in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon,
and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise
prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes
even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was
held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth
in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in
his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued
said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the
supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not
backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore
that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to
require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or
more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that
exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of
the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-
lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968
Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the
other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency
vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There
is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or
compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or
obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid
down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation.
Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable
degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229
and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for
a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it
put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by
Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and
common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and
apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has
in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms
and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support
well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this
Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This
is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself
quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * *
*." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part
of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken
seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule"
in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point
is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere
invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978
against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device,
without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds of
assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter
alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient
E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion
that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at
least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would
mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for
stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they
have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles
which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained
education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden
that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in
having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of
throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978
against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device,
without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds of
assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter
alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient
E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion
that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at
least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would
mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for
stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they
have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles
which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained
education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden
that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in
having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of
throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,

vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA,
Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S.
HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before
a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the
laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of
the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit
respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.

First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an
adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is
charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the
fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission
is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."

Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf
of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their
appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law
in the Philippines.

Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in
interest in the case.

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial
of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court
holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that —

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all
our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we
said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war
may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of
war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to
create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in
the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.
This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and
may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar
Association Journal June, 1944.)

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of
war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the
right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not
erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on
our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it
is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):

. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense
against the same sovereign people. . . .

By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth
are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in the
prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
sovereignty.

In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by
the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which
provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said
executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that
counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a
tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has
yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow
them representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys
Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally
if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It
can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its
citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged
which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not
interfere with the due process of such Military commission.

For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for Violation of the
laws and customs of land warfare.

Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.

The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines
the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the
personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.

The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the Philippines as
accusers.

We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It appearing that
they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law there could not be any question
that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as with such appearance they would be practicing
law against the law.

Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved in the challenge
against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several constitutional ground. To get a
clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole context of said order which is reproduced as
follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND

REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.

I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office charged with the responsibility of
accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines and
prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.

The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army of
the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and control of the Judge Advocate
General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources evidence of war crimes committed in the
Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof
and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.

The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office information and evidence
of war crimes.

The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

(a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be convened by or
under the authority of the Philippines.

II. JURISDICTION

(a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all persons
charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority at the time of the trial.

(b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses including but not limited to the following:

(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing.

(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to murder ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory;
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper
treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or
devastation not justified by military necessity.

(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed against civilian
population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or religion ground in executive of or in
connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the local laws.

III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS

(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be appointed by the convening authority.
Such shall attend all session of the commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal
member, an alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates,
occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all proceeding
had evidence taken in that case shall be made known to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall
be announced by the president of the commission in open court.

(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.

(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he determines
to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by personal interest or prejudice,
provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally investigated or wherein his
presence as a witness is required. One specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns
the commission on an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.

(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the Commission shall be by
majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than conviction
and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.

(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the member as the
presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission present shall preside.

IV. PROSECUTORS

(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct the prosecution
before each commission.

(b) Duties. — The duties of the prosecutor are:

(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.

(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases referred for
trial.

V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION

(a) Conduct of the Trial. — A Commission shall:

(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges, excluding
irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.

(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment therefor.

(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.

(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the convening
authority.

(b) Rights of the Accused. — The accused shall be entitled:

(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to apprise
the accused of each offense charged.

(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening authority or counsel
of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.

(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support of his
defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the commission.

(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary
evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.

(c) Witnesses. — The Commission shall have power:

(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or affirmations to
witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.

(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.

(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set forth in (1)
and (2) above.

(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.

(d) Evidence.

(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the mind of a
reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the
greatest liberality to achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope
of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been signed or
issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any Government without proof
of the signature or of the issuance of the document.

(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International Red
Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator or intelligence officer, or by any
other person whom commission considers as possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.

(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the commission to contain
information relating to the charge.

(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not immediately
available.

(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government documents
of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United
Nation.

(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof
whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.

(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be considered in
mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of his
Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
commission determines that justice so requires.

(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence without any
showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or statement was procured by
mean which the commission believe to have been of such a character that may have caused the accused to
make a false statement the commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so
procured.

(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows unless
modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:

(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.

(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."

(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this or any other
time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission and the
commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close of the
case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not guilty, consider
and rule whether he evidence before the commission may defer action on any such motion and permit or
require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available evidence.

(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding member may, at
this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to submit to the commission
where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.

(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the
prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as being
admissible.

(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.

(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise directed by
the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and sentence if any. The commission may
state the reason on which judgment is based.

( f ) Record of Proceedings. — Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceeding in the trial
of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the prosecutor under the direction of the
commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy.
Such record, certified by the presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the
convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.

(g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by hanging or
shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment as the commission shall
determine to be proper.

(h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until approved
by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be carried into
execution until confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff
shall create a Board of Review to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on
duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have authority to
approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence
imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new military
commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein
otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall final and not subject to review by any
other tribunal.

VI. RULE-MAKING POWER

Supplementary Rule and Forms. — Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its procedure,
not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as may be prescribed by the
convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.

VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the appropriations
for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the accomplishment of its
mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with the recommendation of the
Judge Advocate General as approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and
billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States
Army to the Philippines Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property
Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.

Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
 Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-seven,
and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines

By the President:

EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION

Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional enactment.

The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question, is whether or not
the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in Congress by the
Constitution. .

The Constitution provides:

The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)

While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by agencies
other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the
constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President of the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the
Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines under
martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.

There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the tripartite
system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by Montequieu and accepted and
practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of America, whose Constitution, after which ours has
been patterned, has allocated the three power of government — legislative, executive, judicial — to distinct and
separate department of government.

Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in the nature of
grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may exercise any power or authority not
expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express authority of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish government office is
essentially legislative.

The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether such a
provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military commissions
jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. .

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a
usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.

It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot
exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason,
delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the said
Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote appropriations
belongs to Congress.

Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the Philippines usurped
power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.

Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive Order No. 68,
respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth Act No.
600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed
below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO

PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency which
makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with extraordinary power in order to safeguard
the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage,
lawlessness, and all subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and
by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population the establishment of an air protective
service and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem
necessary for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next
regulation which shall have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular
session of the First Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of
Philippines. Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and
other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when not engaged in any lawful
occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as may bee
necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of crops and
hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure adequate production,
controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the
unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to
regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or business
undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to
commandership and other means of transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and
continued transportation facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or
operation by the Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime
necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally,
scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control affecting the supply,
distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material, implements,
machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to requisition these commodities
subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)

SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President may designate
any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the
National Government.

SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act or of this Act
or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the authority of section one of this Act
shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand
pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or
person charge with the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally
responsible therefor.

SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the date of the
opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under the authority herein
granted.

SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as may be
necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and
ninety-eight.

SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.

SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.

Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING

THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULE AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;

SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency.

SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulation as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other
things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches,
department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth
including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to
create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of government and to
abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriation which would lapse or
otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an
administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in
existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of
the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the
payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.

SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him
under the power herein granted.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. promulgated hereunder
shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.

Approved December 16, 1941.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had
elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of
Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.

When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in their
consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as chairman of the Committee
on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to state that said
measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war
and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said
extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative power were
delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
declared national policy. (Article VI, section 26.)

It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created by
the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution. We are of the opinion
that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the
presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.

The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan can
not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of Japan, or since the middle of
1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945,
that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the Philippines with
the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and independence legislative organs, — Congress and
the President of the Philippines — would have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of
every nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive orders,
under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the
rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines democracy.

Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility that no one
can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every
year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship,
absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees of
the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit the admission of many kinds
evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether
an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation governing the trial of
twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of the United State Armed Forces in
Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our
concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-
129, and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the Homma
case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of
evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to declare
Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
 [G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary
in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created
an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.[2]
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation
on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the
owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy,
MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding
General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount
of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos,
Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged
house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases
filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she
was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986
without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to
claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of
these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security
Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth
of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount
of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]

[4]
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint
also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other
hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of
Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by
taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. [5]
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that
respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents
properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint.
In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City,
valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any
mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas
from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence
of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.[8]
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on
the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The
Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the
existing complaint.The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of
the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully
acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its many
postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been
ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one
more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial
to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to
present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held in Migrino that the
PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing
that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are
likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases
under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed
its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE
CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND
BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE,
 HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189
SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to
this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by
respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH
AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic
v. Migrino.[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in
the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. [16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to
the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry
out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration
of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel
who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; [17] or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. [18]
 Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should
fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that
Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in
this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas
Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not
to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2 nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General [19] does not suffice to
make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide
a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested
either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by
former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike
in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within
its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement,
it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result
yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence
of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited
purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
 Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly
owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the
properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find
a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to
Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated
by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the
PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO
Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what
the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No.
1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships;
and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under
Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a
previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls
under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.[27] The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.[28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding
that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be
dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and
its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations
of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep.
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken
by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to
it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG
cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives
and cronies.[29]Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing
their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30
August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have
held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. [30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of
jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. [31]
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted,
the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of
petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for
non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan
dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set
for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.[34] The motion
sought to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having
been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it
would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on
28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing
its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and
much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents
and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal
interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the
preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
plaintiff Republic.[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained
wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.[36] The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG
supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its
evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x. [37] Still on the date set,
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-
Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended
Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
 Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally
seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties
comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case
against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The
raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
.45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986
or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.[39] Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and
by the will of the Filipino people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987,
the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to
its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3
dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution);
and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant)
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that
the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously
subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the people power revolution that the
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and
constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the
locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and
to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.
xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed
by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No
one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[43] petitioner Baseco,
while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders
upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and
takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received
constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the
President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters
of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as also
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze
orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the
sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us
have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is
repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the
other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting
that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What
they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes
malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very
much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law.
The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we should
allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested
right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the
gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it
comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like
Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer,
placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss
bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe.
 Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the
search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to
the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become
convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and
allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the
Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If
sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the
PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied when
asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety
sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment

excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory.Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory
State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the
present Covenant.Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a
declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding
on the State.[46]Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights[47] of individuals
under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is
not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos
as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de
jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders
void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. [48] The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described
in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the
raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
 Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you
know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also
brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other jewelries
were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or
steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open
these containers only to find out that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this money
instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also the money
because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they
might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the Municipal
Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16
and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or contraband
which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the communications
equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search warrant considering
that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in the house
of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged
Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
 Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the
name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and
other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not
really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might
get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be contained in
attach cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms,
but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to
take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer
Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. [52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must
be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner
of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers;
GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as
taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE
PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN
OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB,
in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry;
ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly
propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as
mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-
thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words
of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to
domestic economic growth and prosperity.

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of
three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton
Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of
war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with
currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in
world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other
states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB,
never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of
treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements
or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and
the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization -- with the signing
of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. [1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated
by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the country.Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession -
- will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly
through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where
naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers
of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization
of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources
by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution
No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:

(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President
of the Philippines,[3] stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083,
a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved,
that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal
instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
 ANNEX 1

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Agriculture

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection

Agreement on Rules of Origin

Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures

Agreement on Safeguards

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

ANNEX 2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes

ANNEX 3

Trade Policy Review Mechanism

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed [7] the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:

NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and
considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at
Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper
and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral
parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral
annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor General describes these two
latter documents as follows:

The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in
favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of
commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of
financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents comment and
petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties
thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista
Paper,[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of
proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and

(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to
the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other
documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.

After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a
Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other
hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues

In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:

A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are
estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the
concurrence.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19,
Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;

E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.

G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the
 Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:[10]

1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
the rules of evidence.

4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively
ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether
petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit;
and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence
in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues
thus:

(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this
Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not
pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal
as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and

(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the
disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of
petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue.They probably realized that grave
constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here,
and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits,
rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER
BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
 In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters [14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution,[15] as follows:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.[16] As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,[17] the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, [18] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital
questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization
as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the governments economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only
exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are
violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO
Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of
the Constitution, which are worded as follows:

Article II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx
 Article XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is
wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.

Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in
their memorandum:[19]

a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):

Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.

2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement. (Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).

The Annex referred to reads as follows:

ANNEX

Illustrative List

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of
GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or
compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in
terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of
its local production; or

(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local
products that it exports.

2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1
of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:

(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;

(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign
exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
 (c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in
terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied).

The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II,
and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).

b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):

Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual
Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis supplied)

(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:

National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member
shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.

3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of
completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any
other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments,
p.22610 emphasis supplied).

It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a
WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the annexed agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the
role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-
executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners
should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13
thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement
contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

 By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution[21] is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to
implement them, thus:

On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II;
Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to
state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed
the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the
failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced
from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained
these reasons as follows:

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist
in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. x x x

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments --
the legislative and executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of
Economy
 On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the
national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as
the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. x x x

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony[27] and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State
to adopt measures that help make them competitive;[28] and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; [30] and speaks of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31] this Court
held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional
provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The
issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. [32] In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council.

WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be
taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member
which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and
the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of
six months from the date of notice of withdrawals.[33]

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development. These basic principles are found in the preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:

The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,

Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations,

Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,

Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, x x
x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the
rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in
terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT
requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products
by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary
outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For
developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a
longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived
of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree
with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform
its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy[35] does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance
for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such
strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. [36]

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning
a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, [37] the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but
one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and
to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain
any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the
Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable
prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will -- as promised by its promoters --
expand the countrys exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the
Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That
does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the
advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a
diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:

The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and framework only of the
edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but
slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and
finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and
march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far
from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. [39]Petitioners maintain that this
undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national
interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade
in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits and x x x such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide,[42] as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this
issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it
is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member
of the family of nations.Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest
of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity, with all nations."[43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. [44] One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention
or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation
of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment
of international organizations.[46] The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family
of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build
its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.[47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its
sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll members
shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such
assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for
the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice
held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of the
United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding
share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty
of members within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members
are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures
decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A
final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to make a choice
as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both bilateral and
multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:

(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to
exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the
Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in
said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal
services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.

(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on
income.

(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.

(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees
and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said
aircrafts.

(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes,
inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on
board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.

(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those
granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from
the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.

(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a
sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
 (j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the
Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges.

(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.

(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The
International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of
international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation.

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and
its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain
domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred
as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with
any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and
objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries,
by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately
from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller countrys market. [48]

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)[49] intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS,[51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:

Article 34

Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of
Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore,
Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the
consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented
process:

(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;

(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has
been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.

2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if
the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
 3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business
secrets shall be taken into account.

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the absence of proof to
the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the
said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the burden of
evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical
product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of newness of the
genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject,
Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:

SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the
patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the
article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model
shall constitute evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1)
the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process
used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of legislative
power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if
any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and
the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. [52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other documents
referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the
document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend
that the second letter of the President to the Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been
the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of
a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and
other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. [54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather
a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page [55] in
Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as
representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved
by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet to give
effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation
and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the
Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on
standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of
personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing
systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business. [57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its
integral parts,[58] as follows:

Article II

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters
to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.

2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as Multilateral
Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.

3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade
Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1994) is legally
distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the
conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as
subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).

It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members deliberation
on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, [59] the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee
yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing
the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon
understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings
of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity
of the first submission?

MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify
all matters by giving this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question
yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.

SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is
not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.

I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and
Senator Lina.

SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and
I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The Constitution does not require us to
ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to
be submitted to with the governments of the participants.

In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:

By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.

In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever
their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being
submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.

SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in
the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.

Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?

SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the
new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.

Epilogue

In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Courts
constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally,
a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[62] Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.[63]
 In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive
arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. [64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials
and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are
not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied
upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent
and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to
the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers
and the people.As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic
globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance[65] where the
East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century. He refers to
the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against
possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not
economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the
crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense,
PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry,
and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of
the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein,
averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or
amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the
parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner
prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to
import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction
permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's pray for a
writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a
memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said
incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case,
the same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally,
although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act
No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to
dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ...
." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance
to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will
have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner
must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance
with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however, that the principle requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one",3 or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear
the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in
question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive
measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our
armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for any special authority".

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein - on
which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No.
2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the
language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the
Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation
or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it
adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any
government agency that he may designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency"
from importing rice and corn.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation
of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself",
because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee
of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by
the Government as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:

1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the Philippines" and,
hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing
rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of rice and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under
its provisions; and

3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for
those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant
thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject
to the additional penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished
from officers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are
those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this
respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the
Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply
the same to transactions made by the very government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth
Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of
articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:

The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and
employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government of the Philippines and of
 chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of
any description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or
make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works
shall give preference to materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic
entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed
forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at
bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security — predicated upon the
"worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" - and the
alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of
the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice
and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities
constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing
goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the
importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency is within the
purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to
accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the
administration throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-
executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those
objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as
indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth
Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense
may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not
exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such
manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows that
Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time"11 or when he has placed the country or a part
thereof under "martial law".12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that
respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of
the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should,
nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is
said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It
implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at
liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.

And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly admit — Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people,
it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt
means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation — but under certain conditions,
which have not been, and should be complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma —

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the
Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts
constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon
the signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty
and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American jurisprudence —
in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive
relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned
contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the
rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no merit
in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But,
even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as
well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter
into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest
in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also insist that
the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the
United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII
thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case
academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice,
but from importing rice, except under the conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No.
3452 has two (2) main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our
local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such
importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importation — which has not
been consummated as yet — is legally feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in
the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because,
aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines,
the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative
view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power
to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation
is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction
prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Under Republic Act No. 2207, which took effect on May 15, 1959, it is unlawful for any person, association,
corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines. The exception is if there
is an existing or imminent shortage of such commodity of much gravity as to constitute national emergency in which
case an importation may be authorized by the President when so certified by the National Economic Council.

However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was enacted providing that the importation of rice and corn
can onlybe made by private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or modified
those parts thereof that are inconsistent with its provisions. The question that now arises is: Has the enactment of
Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting completely the government from importing rice and corn into the
Philippines?

My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in any manner provide for the importation of rice and corn in
case of national emergency, the provision of the former law on that matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent
with any provision embodied in Republic Act 3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government
agency, may therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as provided in Republic Act 2207 if there is a
declared national emergency.

The next question that arises is: Can the government authorize the importation of rice and corn regardless of
Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military
precautionary measure for military stockpile?

Respondents answer this question in the affirmative. They advance the argument that it is the President's duty to
see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are geared to the defenses of the country as well as to the
fulfillment of our international commitments in Southeast Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in
danger. The stockpiling of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense preparation in view of the limited
local supply and the probable disruption of trade and commerce with outside countries in the event of armed
hostilities, and this military precautionary measure is necessary because of the unsettled conditions in the Southeast
Asia bordering on actual threats of armed conflicts as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the Military
Department of our Government. This advocacy, they contend, finds support in the national defense policy embodied
in Section 2 of our National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:

(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the
freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the
employment of all citizens, without distinction of sex or age, and all resources.
 (b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national defense shall be effected by a
national mobilization.

(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures necessary to pass from a peace to a
war footing.

(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief
of all military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.(Emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the security of the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the core of
the preservation of our State which is the basic duty of every citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the
President employ all the resources at his command. But over and above all that power and duty, fundamental as
they may seem, there is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be supreme. This injunction can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and preservation of the State and to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil
authority. Military authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil authority, the only exception being when
the law clearly ordains otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452, contains any exception in favor
of military action concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception must be strictly construed.

A distinction is made between the government and government agency in an attempt to take the former out of the
operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the Revised
Administrative Code refers to that entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including the
various arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form
of local government, whereas a government instrumentality refers to corporations owned or controlled by the
government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people. A government agency, therefore, must
necessarily refer to the government itself of the Republic, as distinguished from any government instrumentality
which has a personality distinct and separate from it (Section 2).

The important point to determine, however, is whether we should enjoin respondents from carrying out the
importation of the rice which according to the record has been authorized to be imported on government to
government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking
being its implementation. This is evident from the manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it
appears that the contract for the purchase of 47,000 tons of rice from had been sign on October 5, 1963, and for the
purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized representatives of both our government
and the governments of Vietnam and Burma, respectively. If it is true that, our government has already made a
formal commitment with the selling countries there arises the question as to whether the act can still be impeded at
this stage of the negotiations. Though on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is gratifying to note that the
majority has expressed itself against it. This is a plausible attitude for, had the writ been issued, our government
would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was avoided by the judicial statesmanship
evinced by the Court.

BARRERA, J., concurring:

Because of possible complications that might be aggravated by misrepresentation of the true nature and scope of
the case before this Court, it is well to restate as clearly as possible, the real and only issue presented by the
respondents representing the government.

From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, we quote:

The importation of the rice in question by the Armed Forces of the Philippines is for military
stockpilingauthorized by the President pursuant to his inherent power as commander-in-chief and as a
 military precautionary measure in view the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it may added, the
recent, tension created by the Malaysia problem (Answer, p. 2; emphasis supplied.)

During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appealing in behalf of the respondents, likewise reiterated the
imported rice was for military stockpiling, and which he admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn
Administration, he emphasized again and again that rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution to people, as
there was no shortage of rice for that purpose but it was only exchanged for palay because this could better
preserved.

From the memorandum filed thereafter by the Solicits General, again the claim was made:

We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer dated October 4, 1963 that the importation of rice
sought be enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the authority vested in the President of the Philippines
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as a measure of military preparedness demanded by a real
and actual threat of emergency in the South East Asian countries. (p. 1, Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely our intention to show the necessity
for the stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is the very reason for the importation.

xxx xxx xxx

As it is, the importation in question is being made by the Republic of the Philippines for its own use, and the
rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market as to affect the price to be paid by the public. (p. 4,
Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

What we do contend is that the law, for want of express and clear provision to that effect, does not include in
its prohibition importation by the Government of rice for its own use and not for the consuming public,
regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency. (p. 5, Emphasis supplied.)

From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the respondents were not concerned with the present rice
situation confronting the consuming public, but were solely and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for
the futureuse of the army. The issue, therefore, in which the Government was interested is not whether rice is
imported to give the people a bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per ganta — for, to quote again
their contention: "the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market to affect the price to be paid by the
public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency", — but whether
rice can legally be imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the
prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority opinion ably sets forth the reasons why
this Court can not accept the contention of the respondents that this importation is beyond and outside the operation
of these statutes. I can only emphasize that I see in the theory advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous trend
— that because the policies enunciated in the cited laws are for the protection of the producers and the consumers,
the army is removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of
three economic groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is
more portentous is the effect to equate the army with the Government itself.

Then again, the importation of this rice for military stockpiling is sought to be justified by the alleged threat of
emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the existence of this supposed threat was unilaterally determined
by the Department of National Defense alone. We recall that there exists a body called the National Security Council
in which are represented the Executive as well as the Legislative department. In it sit not only members of the party
in power but of the opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the highest consultative body which deliberates
precisely in times of emergency threatening to affect the security of the state. The democratic composition of this
council is to guarantee that its deliberations would be non-partisan and only the best interests of the nation will be
considered. Being a deliberative body, it insures against precipitate action. This is as it should be. Otherwise, in
these days of ever present cold war, any change or development in the political climate in any region of the world is
apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and thereupon attempt to override
our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary
mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. One need not, be too imaginative to
perceive a hint of this in the present case.

The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion unanimously reached, is fully aware of the difficult and delicate
task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be exploited by some for their own purposes by claiming and making
it appear that the Court is unmindful of the plight of our people during these days of hardship; that it preferred to give
substance to the "niceties of the law than heed the needs of the people. Our answer is that the Court was left no
alternative. It had, in compliance with its duty, to decide the case upon the facts presented to it. The respondents,
representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and insisted that there is no rice shortage; that the imported
rice is not for the consuming public and is not supposed to be placed in the open market to affect the price to be
paid by the public; that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a measure of mobilization in the face
of what the Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened armed conflict in Southeast Asia.
Confronted with these facts upon, which the Government has built and rested its case, we have searched in vain for
legal authority or cogent reasons to justify this importation made admittedly contrary to the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because respondents never as much as pretended that the importation
fulfills the conditions specified in these laws, but limited themselves to the contention, which is their sole defense
that this importation does not fall within the scope of said laws. In our view, however, the laws are clear. The laws
are comprehensive and their application does not admit of any exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance
therewith is not difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if at all, is not urgently immediate.

In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the Supreme Court has a duty to perform under the
Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in an appropriate proceeding, all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order or regulation is in question. We can not
elude this duty. To do so would be culpable dereliction on our part. While we sympathize with the public that might
be adversely affected as a result of this decision yet our sympathy does not authorize us to sanction an act contrary
to applicable laws. The fault lies with those who stubbornly contended and represented before this Court that there
is no rice shortage, that the imported rice is not intended for the consuming public, but for stockpiling of the army.
And, if as now claimed before the public, contrary to the Government's stand in this case, that there is need for
imported rice to stave off hunger, our legislature has provided for such a situation. As already stated, the laws are
adequate. The importation of rice under the conditions set forth in the laws may be authorized not only where there
is an existing shortage, but also when the shortage is imminent. In other words, lawful remedy to solve the situation
is available, if only those who have the duty to execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for the
importation of rice, who adopt some dubious means which necessitates resort to doubtful exercise of the power of
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not comply with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed
to be a regime under the rule of law. Adoption as a government policy of the theory of the end justifies the means
brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.

For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.