2.

3 Jurisdiction over the issue

Question of law vs. Question of fact

26. Ligtas vs. People of the Philippines

GR.no 200751

Facts:

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, once inside the
plantation he harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, without the consent of said owner, Anecita
Pacate.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, the
DARAB rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was
not supported by concrete and substantial evidence, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court it stated that reliance on the DARAB
Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the land is irrelevant in the case at bar.

Contending that jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are
merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts.

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: Whether or not questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts.
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the Rules of
Court.59Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, there are exceptions to the rule that only
questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures,
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible,
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee
(7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based
(9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

A re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter
the result of the case which would entitle the accused to acquittal.

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the
essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner
having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review
of the records of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16,
2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft.
2.4 Jurisdiction over the res or the property in litigation

27. Macahilig vs Magalit

Gr 141243

Facts:

On February 5, 1965, Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit

filed with the then Philippine Fisheries Commission now (BFAR) Fishpond
Application No. 24400. , Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, filed
with the BFAR Fishpond Application No. 29972 for five of the eleven hectares
which Magalit had previously applied for.[5] On February 28, 1972, BFAR rejected
Macahiligs application for his failure to submit all the requirements.

Undaunted, Macahilig protested contending that for a period of 20 years, he had

been in actual possession of the five-hectare area included in Magalits application.
BFAR concluded that the Macahilig was merely the laborer and caretaker of
Magalit. He appealed trhe case to the IAC but the same was denied and dismissed.

Later on, Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. In that Motion, they prayed
that the trial court properly implement said IAC Decision by ordering Spouses
Macahilig to turn over to her the possession of Lot 4417] Dr. Magalit contended
that the Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because the spouses had refused to
give up the fishpond in question. Subsequently the judge issued a writ of execution
after a report was submitted by a certain Cipriano Matutino, an employee of the
DAR.

Unfazed by the unfavorable turn of events, petitioner filed with the CA, on August
12, 1993, a Petition for Certiorari[16] alleging that the trial court had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders.

Issue: Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over Lot 4417?

Ruling

CA
The CA ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued a Writ of Execution ordering the delivery of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit. The
records show that the fishpond application of petitioners husband was rejected by
the BFAR, and that petitioner did not present any other evidence to prove her right
of possession over the disputed property.

SC

Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417
when it issued its September 17, 1992 Order.
Again, we disagree. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.[29] In the latter
condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court,
may not be in the actual custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the
institution of the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents
predecessors in interest. Without taking actual physical control of the property, it
had an impliedly recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the
res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of
Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
More important, it is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She clearly submitted to its authority by her
unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517. We cannot allow her to attack its
jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her
position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a
party from challenging its jurisdiction
2.5 Jurisdiction of courts

28. MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA vs. Madrona

GR 141375

Facts:

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By
agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of
theSangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga on October
31, 1997.

No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session issued Resolution
No. 97-01, which in part reads: the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte have failed to settle amicably their boundary dispute and
have agreed to elevate the same to the proper court for settlement by any of the interested party.

The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City on September 2, 1999, a Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.

On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds that the
Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city?

Ruling:

RTC

In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held that it had
jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of
the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already
had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the
matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01.

SC

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is Section 118
of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC). Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in
which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules
governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxxxxxxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the
settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of
the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers.[21] They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the
exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also
exclusive.

Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city, it follows that regional trial courts
have the power and the authority to hear and determine such controversy.
Rule 11. Application of the totality rule. — In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the
money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate
claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action,
the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

29. Sante vs. Claraval

Gr no 173915

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages[4] against
petitioners. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged that while
she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons
and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as
follows, How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin
bitch! Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal
security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close
relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is
protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that
petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[5] on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that
the amount of the claim for moral damages was NOT more than the jurisdictional amount
of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the
total claim.

Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended
Complaint[11] increasing the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.

Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

RTC

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-Baseco Integrated Port
Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation.[7] The trial court held that the total claim of
respondent amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs
outside Metro Manila.

CA

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the
allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount ofP300,000.00,
which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.

On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time In the said decision, the appellate court
held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction.

SC

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on
April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.

The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.

The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of
petitioners utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan.
[20]It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for
damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main
action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals
was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals
in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint
from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before
the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be
allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court,[23] here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over
the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right
30. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC

GR.no 140746

Facts:

Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale,
respondent herein. While driving north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander
Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were negotiating a curve
along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the
left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance
Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but
respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.

Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners but
they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Manila, a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred
that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents Standard and Martina.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling

RTC

The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents Standard and Martina.

CA

Affirmed the trial courts ruling holding that: under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19,
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional
amount. In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00
which at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial
Court.

SC
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

xxx

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

The issue of whether respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d)
of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33
(1) of B.P. Blg. 129[9] which states, among others, that where there are several claims or causes
of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.

Respondent’s cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.

Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale

is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and
cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis
that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan,
Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on
April 15, 1994.
31. Solano vs. Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral
Gr no. 143951
Facts:
Private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint
for damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The
complaint alleges that: private respondent, together with others was on board
a tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; on the other hand a dump truck owned by
petitioner Mangaliag and driven by her employee, petitioner Solano, due to
the gross negligence, in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-
passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities; private
respondent was hospitalized and spent P71,392.00 as medical expenses;
private respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a fractured
nose and suffers from severe depression as a result thereof, for which he
should be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral
damages; as a further result of his hospitalization, private respondent lost
income of P25,000.00.
Petitioners, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in
the amount of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction.

On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral,

issued the first assailed Order denying petitioners motion to
dismiss,[6] relying upon the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[8] but it was
denied by the respondent RTC Judge in her second assailed Order, dated June
13, 2000.[9]
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively
on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed
as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that in an action for recovery
of damages arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages is not
merely an incidental or consequential claim but must be considered in the
amount of demand which will determine the courts jurisdiction.

Issue: In an action for recovery of damages, does the amount of actual

damages prayed for in the complaint provide the sole test for determining the
courts jurisdiction, or is the total amount of all the damages claimed,
regardless of kind and nature, o be computed collectively with the actual
damages to determine what court whether the MTC or the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action?
OR
Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed orders?
Ruling:
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15,
1994, provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases
exceedsP100,000.00,[26] exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction
thereof is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where
the amount of the demand in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
 In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court
specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691. Paragraph 2
of the Circular provides:

2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in

determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applied to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private
respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but
also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent
facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident.
Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be
considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual
damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent
actionable tort.
Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause
of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included
in determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with paragraph
2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
RTC Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders