NP Otan Bi SC Knowledge Development

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE
NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP/EU/MNE
Bi-Strategic Command
Knowledge Development
(Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, 9 February 2011)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE

REFERENCES
A. SG (2005) 0918 AS 1 Rev 1 - Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), dated 7
February 2006
B. SACEUR Letter - ACO Way Ahead-Effects Based Approach to Operations
(EBAO), dated 24 May 2006
C. MC 550 – MC Guidance for the military implementation of the Comprehensive
Political Guidance, dated 24 May 2006
D. MCM-0041-2010 - MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations, dated 20 July
2010
E. SACEUR Letter – Effects Based Approach to Operations - Update on Developments
and Further Guidance on ACO Way Ahead, dated 20 March 2007
F. C-M(2007)0118, NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP), dated 11
December 2007
G. BI-SC IKM Vision and Strategic Concept, dated 30 November 2007
H. MCM-0054-2007, MC Position on Military Support to Stabilisation Activities and
Reconstruction Efforts, dated 13 November 2007
I. C-M(2008)0029-COR1, Proposal on a Way Ahead on Comprehensive Approach
Action Plan, dated 2 April 2008
J. Bi-SC Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) Directive, dated 15 Sep
2008
K. Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept, dated 12 August 2008
L. Terms Of Reference For The Knowledge Development Project Team (KDPT), dated
15 February 2008
M. NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), AC/237-D(2009)0001, dated 21
April 2009
N. MC 133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning (Final), dated 7 January 2011
O. ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Interim Version 1.0),
dated 17 December 2010
P. ACO Directive 65-11 - ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence
Production Management, dated 12 July 2010
Q. NATO Assessment Handbook, Interim Version 1.0, dated 28 February 2011
ii

FOREWORD
Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-making. The
problem is that this “information” or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and
offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, de-
conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner nor is it often available
in an electronically retrievable format. Therefore, there is a need to “connect” or fuse existing
information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is
presented with a clear holistic understanding, as early as possible in the decision making
process. This is the purpose of Knowledge Development.
We are therefore proud to be able to present the first edition of The Knowledge Development
Handbook, further enabling Knowledge Development as a key contribution to NATO’s
contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.
While its emphasis is on Knowledge Development in support of the NATO Crisis Response
Planning, we believe this guide is also an invaluable resource for any analyst, military or
civilian, working in NATO, our member Nations or beyond.
Each new edition of the Knowledge Development Handbook will incorporate the latest
experience and expertise of our staffs. This edition sets out to establish a common baseline
for understanding the Knowledge Development process.
“It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success
nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things; for the reformer has enemies in all
those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the
new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from the incredulity of mankind who does not truly
believe in anything new until they actually have experience of it”
- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................ii
FOREWORD........................................................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ iv
FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... v
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1-1
Aim of Handbook ................................................................................................................................... 1-1
Development of the Handbook............................................................................................................... 1-1
Use of Handbook .................................................................................................................................... 1-1
Way Ahead - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) & Standard Operating Instructions (SOIs) ........ 1-1
Background ............................................................................................................................................ 1-2
Relationship between Intelligence and Knowledge Development ......................................................... 1-3
CHAPTER 2 – THE KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.............................. 2-1
Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 2-1
Initiating the ACO KD Process .............................................................................................................. 2-1
COLLECTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2-2
Retrieval of Existing Knowledge ........................................................................................................... 2-2
External Information Search .................................................................................................................. 2-2
Identification of potential PMESII sources ............................................................................................ 2-3
(1) Information Content Factors: ........................................................................................................ 2-3
(2) Operational Factors:...................................................................................................................... 2-4
(3) Security Factors: ........................................................................................................................... 2-4
Resource Evaluation and Validation ...................................................................................................... 2-5
Information/Information Overload ......................................................................................................... 2-5
Integration of External Information........................................................................................................ 2-6
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 2-6
Systems Analysis.................................................................................................................................... 2-7
Analysis Process ..................................................................................................................................... 2-8
Quantification and Simulation................................................................................................................ 2-9
ACCESS ............................................................................................................................................... 2-10
Knowledge Transfer ............................................................................................................................. 2-10
Generic Process Characteristics ........................................................................................................... 2-11
CHAPTER 3 - KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT AND THE PLANNING PROCESS ..................................................... 3-1
iv

Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 3-1

Initial Analysis and KD Focus ............................................................................................................... 3-1
Subsequent Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 3-1
KD Contribution to the Planning Process .............................................................................................. 3-1
CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES ..................................................... 4-1
KD Impacts on Organisational Structures .............................................................................................. 4-1
KD Integration within the NATO Command Structure ......................................................................... 4-1
Knowledge Management Centre ............................................................................................................ 4-2
Knowledge Development Centre ........................................................................................................... 4-3
Knowledge Centres at the Operational Level ......................................................................................... 4-3
Knowledge Development Entities .......................................................................................................... 4-5
In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities ......................................................................................... 4-5
CHAPTER 5 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT & TOOL SUPPORT ........................ 5-1
Knowledge Base Capability ................................................................................................................... 5-1
Source Access ........................................................................................................................................ 5-2
Disclosure Support and Access Control ................................................................................................. 5-2
Collaboration Support to KD ................................................................................................................. 5-3
Simulation Support to KD ...................................................................................................................... 5-3
Tools Support to KD .............................................................................................................................. 5-3
CHAPTER 6 – TRAINING.................................................................................................. 6-1
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................... 7-1
FIGURES
Figure 1: Knowledge Development Support to the Decision Cycle .................................................... viii
Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview ................................................................ 2-1
Figure 3: A Systems Understanding .................................................................................................... 2-7
Figure 4: Example of an Influence Diagram ...................................................................................... 2-10
Figure 5: Generic Knowledge Development Process ........................................................................ 2-11
Figure 6: Political-Military Strategic Interface .................................................................................... 3-2
Figure 7: Operations Planning Process at Strategic and Operational Levels ....................................... 3-2
Figure 8: Integration of KD Functional Entities in Current NATO Command Structure.................... 4-2
Figure 9: Knowledge Centre Integration in a JFC (illustrative structure)............................................ 4-4
Figure 10: Proposed In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities ..................................................... 4-5
Figure 11: In-Theatre and Reach-Back Knowledge Development Process ......................................... 4-6
Figure 12: The Knowledge Development/Knowledge Management Relationship ............................. 5-1

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
1. Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-making. The
problem is that this “information” or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and
offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, de-
conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner nor is it often available
in an electronically retrievable format. Therefore, there is a need to “connect” or fuse existing
information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is
presented with a clear holistic understanding, as early as possible in the decision making
process.
2. Knowledge Development (KD) is a proactive process that covers the collection, analysis,
storage and distribution of information that helps to contribute to a common and shared
understanding of the operational environment. It provides commanders and their staff with a
comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and
interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space. This approach enables
the Commander and staff to understand better the possible effects of Military, Political,
Economic and Civil actions on different systems and actors within the engagement space.
Within the different phases of NATO’s Crisis Management Process, the three key functions,
Planning, Execution, and Assessment, all rely on KD. Switching from the current traditional
reactive approach to a proactive KD approach would reduce extensive duplication of work in
the NATO Command Structure and provide a more coherent understanding at all levels of
command.
3. The primary purpose of KD is to support subsequent decision making in response to
indications and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning,
execution and assessment1 of operations. The challenge is to make the relevant information
available in a form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a
level of shared understanding that supports timely and effective decision making.
4. Two parts to any KD solution are:
a. The adaptation of processes and staff structures to break down traditional
barriers and stovepipe organisations.
b. Technical solutions that support a collaborative exchange and ease of access of
information.
5. Relationship between KD and Intelligence. NATO and national intelligence assets are
critical to the KD process and will continue to collect information regarding potential risks
and threats to the Alliance. While there are many similarities between military intelligence
process efforts and KD, there are two significant differences:
a. Firstly, NATO and national intelligence activities are focused primarily on
actual or potential adversaries within a specific country or region. However, the
ability for NATO to act effectively within a Comprehensive Approach requires
information and knowledge regarding the capabilities, interaction and influences
of all key actors across a much broader operational environment.
b. Secondly, KD encompasses the deliberate use of non-military sources beyond

1
Assessment in this sense implies operations assessment, which is defined as ‘The activity that enables
the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of
conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.’ (COPD proposed definition).
vi

the scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of

information and knowledge from IOs, NGOs, private and commercial
organisations as well as the full range of Governmental Organisations (GOs) and
agencies.
6. An essential aspect of KD is therefore the fusion of intelligence with information from
other sources in order to produce a comprehensive picture of the operational environment.
Today's Intelligence also addresses non-military sources and domains, and operational
practice will demonstrate how the delineation between KD and Intelligence can be better
defined.
7. The KD Process Overview. An iterative process that supports planning, execution, and
assessment, the Bi-SC KD concept identifies three key steps in the KD process:
a. Collection. This involves the acquisition of information by various staffs. KD is
driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas of
strategic interest prior to a crisis or by CCIRs in established areas of operation.
b. Analysis. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then
draw conclusions, deductions or implications. Analysis is required to provide
products for assessment, planning and execution. Analysis in support of a
requirement can be accomplished by a variety of techniques or approaches, such
as: Event Analysis based on single event or report; Topic Analysis on special
subjects of concern; Gap Analysis, based on requirements and existing
knowledge; Capability and Force/Ratio Analysis; Generic Pattern Analysis;
Course of Action Analysis; Effects Analysis; and Systems Analysis.
c. Access. Once knowledge has been developed it must be “transferred” to
decision makers and users in a timely manner. This will require tools and
procedures to either ‘push’ knowledge to the user, or allow the user to ‘pull’
knowledge depending on the situation and operational requirement to ensure
appropriate knowledge transfer.
8. Introduced and developed as part of KD, systems analysis is an integral part of the KD
process. To summarise, Systems Analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to
holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, nonaligned, and friendly nations or
entities. Systems Analysis integrates the analyses of study areas, such as the Political,
Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) domains.2 Systems
Analysis is a continuous, iterative and collaborative process that should be conducted in close
co-operation with internal/external Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), GOs, NGOs, and Centres
of Excellence (COEs), as required. It is successfully utilised in both the civilian and military
communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analysing and understanding
problems in complex operational environments.
9. The KD process is underpinned by the Information / Knowledge Management (IKM)
process which supports the Information Intelligence and KD requirements of the entire
organisation. KD not only uses IKM for the development of knowledge, it also is critical to
the third KD step of making knowledge accessible. It is important to note, however, that KD
and IKM are not the same. KD is the process that develops knowledge to support decision
making whereas IKM manages the provision of that knowledge across an organisation.

2
The PMESII domains are described in the Glossary.
vii

Figure 1: Knowledge Development Support to the Decision Cycle
10. Conclusion. Elements of KD and Systems Analysis thinking are already supporting
existing operations and missions, with positive feedback to indicate these decision-support
capabilities should be implemented in a more formal and coherent manner. While considered
the key enabler for the Operations Planning Process and with the importance of KD to the
execution and assessment of NATO operations, the implementation of KD, including
Systems Analysis capabilities, could also be considered a critical stand-alone capability.
“Information is not knowledge”
- Albert Einstein
viii

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Aim of Handbook
1-1. The aim of this handbook is to provide the information needed by commanders and
their staffs to gain a basic understanding of Knowledge Development (KD) a Bi-SC agreed
concept, and how it can be implemented in their respective Headquarters. This handbook
covers the fundamental KD principles,
Key Term
procedures and techniques that are
evolving within NATO, the main aspects Situational Awareness (SA) ‐ the human perception of all
of which may eventually be developed available elements of information in relation to a specific
into NATO doctrine. The handbook situation that allows for further comprehensive and
demonstrates how KD continuously informed cognitive interpretation of reality.
supports and underpins situation
awareness and understanding, planning, execution and assessment of operations within the
context of NATO’s Crisis Management Process (Reference N).
1-2. This handbook must be viewed purely as a PRE-DOCTRINAL document for
informing commanders and staff officers on the current understanding of what KD is and
how it may be applied in NATO.
Development of the Handbook

1-3. This handbook has been produced through the collaborative efforts of the Bi-SC KD
sub-working group and the KD Project Team (KDPT), the Terms of Reference of which are
at Reference M. References A through J provide the chronological step-by-step evolution of
the integration of the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations within NATO
and within the overall framework of the development of the Comprehensive Approach3.
Use of Handbook
1-4. This handbook is designed to be used by all staffs across different functional areas
within strategic, operational and tactical level HQs in NATO but is targeted mainly at those
staff elements directly engaged in KD. The handbook has been drafted with the intention of
further developing practices that are already evolving in current operations. The handbook is
not intended to be prescriptive, but to offer advice and to highlight the experiences gained to
date through experimentation and ongoing operations.
Way Ahead - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) & Standard Operating

Instructions (SOIs)
1-5. This handbook, in conjunction with the Knowledge Development Concept, lays out
the fundamental principle requirements for the successful implementation of KD in support
of the NATO’s Crisis Management Process. This pre-doctrinal handbook forms the basis for
further development of future Allied Command Operations (ACO) directives as well as the
KD related SOPs and SOIs, which provide the detailed processes and instruction required for
the practical implementation of the KD Concept.

3
ACO is implementing a NATO KD capability along nine Lines of Development; thus this Handbook
reflects the KD process and the entities as envisioned at the time of publication.
1-1

Background
1-6. KD is described in the KD Concept Paper (Reference L) as “the integration of
isolated data into a useable body of information and relationships”.4 In simple terms, it is
the process that covers the acquisition, analysis and distribution of information that helps to
contribute to a common and shared understanding of the operational environment. This
handbook explains how KD will support the operations planning process as articulated in the
ACO Comprehensive Operations
Planning Directive (COPD). The Key Terms
COPD should be referenced for Operational Environment ‐ A system of systems in which
details supporting the different actors interact within the operational environment in
corresponding terms, processes and pursuit of their interests.
concepts used in this handbook.
Engagement Space – That part of the strategic environment
1-7. KD is an evolution, not a
relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or
revolution in thinking. Processes
and information already exist has decided, to engage. This will include the related air, land,
within NATO that support sea, space environments, and associated adversary, friendly, and
decision-making. The problem is neutral systems (political, military, economic, social,
that this “information” or isolated informational and infrastructure – PMESII).
knowledge often resides in the
heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not
fused, de-conflicted or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner. Often, the
end user or decision maker, usually a commander, is left to search for and integrate
applicable knowledge in order to make a timely decision.
1-8. Knowledge Development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity
carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders
and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the
relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space.
These systems may include but are not limited to the PMESII domains. This approach
enables the Commander and staff Key Terms
to understand better the possible
effects of Military, Political, System ‐ A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related
Economic and Civil (MPEC) group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements
forming a unified whole.
actions on different systems and
actors within the engagement System Element – Specific physical, functional, or behavioural
space. This enhanced level of entities within each system. System elements can be people,
facilities, forces, information, or other components of the system.
understanding supports decision
making throughout the different Actor – A person or other human entity, including state and non‐
phases of NATO’s Crisis state entities, within the international system that uses its power
to influence others in pursuit of its interests and objectives.
Management Process including:
a. Phase 1 -

4
And it further it states: KD supports planning, execution, and assessment by providing a holistic view
of the engagement space. Systems Analysis is a specialized portion of KD which attempts to provide the
Commander and staff with a comprehensive understanding of the engagement space, such as the Political,
Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) elements and how these elements interact
as a system of systems. This understanding enables the Commander and staff to identify the most effective
Political, Military, Civil and Economic instruments. KD is a continuous, adaptive, and networked activity that
relies on trained and experienced experts.
1-2

Indications and warning (I&W) of a potential or actual crisis.

b. Phase 2 - Assessment of the developing, or reassessment of an ongoing Crisis
Situation and of its potential or actual implications for Alliance security.
c. Phase 3 - Development of recommended response options to support NAC
decision-making throughout the cycle of a crisis.
d. Phase 4 - Planning.
e. Phase 5 - Execution (including Assessment) of NAC decisions and directives.
f. Phase 6 - Transition and termination of NATO’s crisis management role.
1-9. The complex nature of contemporary security environments presents a range of
potential risks and threats to Alliance interests that cannot be resolved by military means
alone. Among the complex problems confronting the Alliance today are WMD proliferation,
international terrorism, instability from failed/failing states, environmental and humanitarian
disasters, threats to energy security, trans-national crime, and the possibility of armed
aggression. NATO’s evolving development of a comprehensive approach recognises that
dealing effectively with such complex security problems will likely require the integrated use
of political, economic and civil instruments in concert with military means based upon a
greater understanding and appreciation of the operational environment. KD addresses the
critical requirement to develop a greater understanding of complex problems by exploiting
information and knowledge from a wide range of sources. This process helps to determine
the most appropriate responses and enables the effective use of both military and non-military
means.
1-10. In order to develop an improved understanding of such complex problems, KD
includes a “systems” approach to analysis that complements other established methods of
analysis. A systems analysis approach contributes to a more holistic and dynamic view of
situation and focuses on collecting and
analysing information about the various Key Term
systems and subsystems within the Subsystem – A system that is part of a larger system.
operational environment. In addition, it
examines the relationships between
different subsystems and system elements in order to develop the knowledge required to
support decisions regarding the most appropriate response.
Relationship between Intelligence and Knowledge Development

1-11. NATO and national intelligence assets are critical to the KD process and will continue
to collect information regarding potential risks and threats to the Alliance. This includes the
possible intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries based on the different NATO
Intelligence Disciplines.
1-12. While there are many similarities between military intelligence process efforts and
KD, there are two significant differences. Firstly, NATO and national intelligence activities
are focused primarily on actual or potential adversaries within a specific country or region.
However, the ability for NATO to act effectively, especially within a comprehensive
approach, requires information and knowledge regarding the capabilities, interaction and
influences of all key actors across a much broader operational environment. A KD approach
therefore utilises subject matter experts to analyse the different actors and systems in all the
relevant PMESII domains, as well as the specific aspects of the region and operational
1-3

environment, in order to develop a much broader and more comprehensive understanding of

the engagement space.
1-13. Secondly, KD encompasses the deliberate use of non-military sources beyond the
scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of information and
knowledge from International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs), private and commercial organisations as well as the full range of governmental
organisations (GOs) and agencies. Collaboration with non-NATO entities is therefore an
essential aspect of KD, facilitating the fusion of intelligence with information from other
sources to produce a comprehensive picture of the operational environment.
1-14. Today's Intelligence also addresses non-military sources and domains, and operational
practice will demonstrate how the delineation between KD and Intelligence can be better
defined.
1-4

CHAPTER 2 – THE KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Overview
2-1. Iterative in nature, Knowledge Development is defined as a process that includes
collecting and analysing, and integrating isolated data into useable bodies of knowledge, and
making that knowledge available so that it can be shared5. A simple overview of the KD
process is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview
2-2. KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas

of strategic interest prior to a crisis
or by CCIRs in established areas of Key Term
operation. The primary purpose of Knowledge Requirement ‐ A specific need for understanding
KD is to support subsequent decision about a situation in order to make a decision.
making in response to indications
and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning, execution and
assessment of operations. The challenge is to make the relevant information available in a
form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a level of shared
understanding that supports timely and effective decision making.
Initiating the ACO KD Process

2-3. The ACO KD Process supports decision-making at all levels during each phase of the
NATO Crisis Management Process and related processes. The initiation and level of effort
of the KD process may derive from the following:
1. SACEUR nominates an Area of Interest (AOI) and allocates a priority of
Monitoring, Interest or Concern in accordance with Reference Q. In this case,
The ACO KD level of effort ranges from being broad but not particularly deep for

5
Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept dated 12 Aug 2008.
2-1

a Monitoring AOI to being very detailed for a Concern AOI.

2. SACEUR designates JFCs as responsible HQs for specific areas of potential
future NATO operations. As concerns increase over the potential for a crisis in a
particular area, SACEUR will increase the priority of the AOI, which would in
turn trigger intensified KD efforts, with increased focus and depth in support of a
preliminary planning process. It is during the planning process that CCIRs are
generated which then drive the prioritisation of information and intelligence
collection.
3. KD activities will increase to support development of SACEUR’s assessment and
potential military response options. NAC Initiating Directives will require a
substantial intensification of the KD effort in support of an ongoing planning
process.
2-4. In the event of an unforeseen crisis to which NATO responds at short notice, the ACO
KD requirement will focus on the specific AOI and the data and information relevant to the
AOI will be collected and verified. This is likely to require considerable allocation of
analytical effort to rapidly generate knowledge capable of supporting short notice intensive
crisis planning.
COLLECTION
2-5. The first stage of the KD process involves the acquisition of information and the
collection and collation of intelligence for later processing into actionable knowledge.
2-6. The KD Process depends heavily on the quality of the external information collection
resources and relationships. The sources of information for different types of operations may
differ greatly and will likely include traditional intelligence sources, data repositories of
designed information proponents and a broad spectrum of open Internet sources. Each source
will require different mechanisms for establishing reliability and the credibility of the
information collected.
Retrieval of Existing Knowledge

2-7. The quality of the initial knowledge retrieval has tremendous impact on the efficiency
and focus of further collection efforts and therefore should be supported by effective
navigation and retrieval functionalities. Experience shows that well designed search engines,
accessible to operational planners and other end users, reduce the number of unnecessary
requests for existing information or analysis products.
External Information Search

2-8. External relationships are a fundamental basis for the collection of quality
information. Sources range from classic intelligence or other agencies’ repositories to open
sources. Access to these sources requires different levels of validation, verification and
potentially the exchange of own products. For this reason the knowledge brokerage function
with these external organisations has to be considered as an essential part of a dedicated
Knowledge Management6 function.
2-9. The knowledge brokerage function might rely on formal information requests and

6
The working definition of Knowledge Management is: the ability to gather, synthesize and analyze
information about potential engagement spaces across the military, political, economic and social systems as a
precursor to successful systemic analysis.
2-2

workflow mechanisms in order to manage external information flows and to separate the
analysis activities from these Knowledge Management functions. For the responsiveness and
accuracy of analysis, it remains essential that the analysis function has direct access to
information sources for validation, in-depth research, knowledge mining and modelling
feedback. This should be facilitated and in no way restricted, by the knowledge brokerage
function.
Identification of potential PMESII sources

2-10. Holistic analysis of the engagement space requires an array of information, including
not only that provided by intelligence sources and traditional Intelligence collection means,
but also information from other non-intelligence/military sources. Open sources available
through the World Wide Web reflect an endless supply of information, although the sources
are mostly unevaluated and of undetermined reliability. Civil governmental authorities from
the international to local level, and NGOs might be able to provide reliable information.
However, each of the aforementioned groups may have competing agendas and may provide
information with the aim of influencing NATO operations to benefit their group. Those
sources of information are out of NATO control and categorized according to AJP-2.17 as
“uncontrolled” or “casual” sources. Therefore, mechanisms must be established to identify,
evaluate and access potential resources of PMESII information. PMESII collection is to be
conducted in a fully disclosed manner, with no attempt to disguise or hide NATO affiliations.
If such disclosure is ill-advised or problematic, consider utilizing other avenues, to include
traditional intelligence disciplines, to obtain the necessary information.
2-11. The challenge is to obtain access to the right information, provided at the right time,
by a reliable resource that is willing to share. The following principles provide guidance and
describe the factors that should be considered before the authorized NATO element contacts
a source8:
a. The process described is not inter-connected to or a replacement for HUMINT
activity; it will enhance and widen the collection/information acquisition efforts.
b. To identify a valuable resource for PMESII information, the following questions
need to be raised and considered before9 the intended information exchange:
(1) Information Content Factors:
(a) Does the resource have a proper knowledge about the subject,
country or culture?
(b) Were past publications/studies issued on the subject by the
potential resource? Were references provided on that subject?
(c) Is the resource in close contact with the subject of interest (in place
or liaison element)?

7
AJP-2.1(A), Intelligence Procedures, September 2005.
8
Authorized NATO Element in this context, is the element either being tasked by SACEUR, SHAPE or
the HQs COM to establish contact with this source of information. The authority to contact is dynamic based on
context and political sensitivity, and therefore cannot be proscribed en toto here.
9
The Operational Factors in sub-para (2) may be impossible to determine prior to initial contact, but it is
recommended to assess the likely answers to the degree possible as part of the resource assessment process.
2-3

(2) Operational Factors:

(a) Is the resource NATO friendly, neutral, impartial or adversarial?
(b) Has the resource cooperated with NATO/Allies before? If yes,
what is the resource’s reputation?
(c) Are the resource’s interests and aims in line with, independent of
or contradictory to NATO’s interests and goals? To what degree?
(d) Is the information seen as reliable and is this assessment confirmed
by other resources?
(e) Is the resource willing to share information?
(f) Is the resource willing to provide “one way” information, without
getting information back from NATO?
(g) Can a non-information exchange be arranged through which
NATO barters goods or services for information (i.e., food, fuel,
water, medicine, or other support activities)?
(h) Can/will the resource provide information in a timely and reliable
manner?
(i) What assessed risk does the potential resource assume by virtue of
the proposed cooperation?
(j) Are there any arrangements or memoranda of agreement ((MOU)
already in place or possible to formalize information exchange
expectations?
(3) Security Factors:
(a) Can the resource be evaluated/validated by Counter-Intelligence &
Security (CI&Sy)?
(b) Ensure that the resource has no ties (social, financial, economical
and political) to opponent forces in the AOI (as assessed and
validated by CI&Sy).
(c) Assess the potential resource’s motivations for cooperation.
2-12. Samples of potential information resources are:
a. IOs and NGOs: United Nations or European Union agencies such as the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or the
Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and affiliated organisations;
international or national governmental or non-governmental humanitarian aid
organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, OXFAM,
Care and many others.
b. Organized Crime issues: EUROPOL and INTERPOL.
c. Major Civil actors: Foreign industrial elements working in-Theatre, country
experts, cultural centres, academies, think tanks, research centres, media
publication companies (i.e., Janes), subject matter experts, and Centres of
Excellence.
2-4

d. Governments: Host nation, Alliance nations, AOI neighbouring nations and

their intelligence organisations or embassies, and national law enforcements
agencies.
Resource Evaluation and Validation

2-13. It is critical to handle and evaluate the PMESII resource information the same way
that information from traditional intelligence sources is evaluated to ensure decision makers
and planners receive reliable and accurate information. Source evaluation/validation is an
assessment of how reliable the source is and how likely the information that comes from it is
to be true and free of biases. Incoming information cannot be taken at face value.
2-14. There are many reasons why information may not be reliable or entirely accurate, not
the least of which is deception. A description how a resource and its information can be
categorized is available from NATO human intelligence governing directives. The advantage
of this categorization method will be:
 It provides a universally understood and standardized shorthand assessment of
information; and,
 Over time, it gives an indication of the capabilities of various resources and
agencies and aids the selection of those best suited for particular tasks.
2-15. Before relying on a resource’s information, a proper background check/screening by
the appropriate CI&Sy elements must be conducted. After the evaluation/validation process,
information provided by a resource must be classified through approved NATO procedures.
2-16. It should be clearly understood that through the Knowledge Development process all
information, independent of its reliability, will be processed and considered. It is vital that
only evaluated and reliable information and intelligence be used in external planning,
operations or assessments and to inform decision makers.
Information/Information Overload
2-17. Information is useless if it cannot be processed in a timely manner. Therefore,
unnecessary duplication, collection and processing needs to be avoided. At the first stage, the
requirements for information must be clearly identified. This will be done by comparing
already existing and available information (in databases/files) and operational information
requirements by the appropriate analyst. Research and analysis tools need to be used to find
the already evaluated information for operational use. In this process, the value of the
information must be assessed against operational requirements with respect to:
 Age of information.
 Reliability/accuracy.
 Scope on subject.
 Detail/depth of information.
2-18. A request for information should be submitted and processed by knowledge brokers
only after ensuring existing information will not satisfy the information requested.
Information requested or acquisitioned should be limited and focused to AOI-supporting
information, based on functional area RFIs, CCIRs or Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIRs). By using this approach, information can be developed into actionable intelligence or
knowledge. This new knowledge will itself be stored in a knowledge database to make it
2-5

available for later analysis or to support other requirements.
Integration of External Information

2-19. The integration of newly received information or derived produced knowledge into an
existing knowledge repository or knowledge base -- which is both an information acquisition
and knowledge development function -- requires:
 Establishing structural relations between distinguishable components of new
information/knowledge and the knowledge base data structure (Collation).10
 A clear understanding of process flow from each element or individual that enters
data into the knowledge repository.
 Usage of a “Master-data-format” to ensure external data can be easily provided
and integrated into existing knowledge base data structures.
 Deducting implied consequences/changes to existing context on all affected levels
of aggregation, which might be supported by an automated reasoning mechanism.
 Capturing contextually significant change history of new content to ensure
traceability and validation of changes.
 Indicating tolerated contradictions with existing context from an analytic
perspective, if deviating perspectives are to be reflected.
 Sanitising content, if necessary, and determining level of classification/disclosure.
2-20. These functions are closely related to the analysis process and may involve
corresponding data tagging in the knowledge base. Depending on volume and required skill
level, they may be distributed to specialized functions, e.g. a dedicated disclosure process and
knowledge broking process, but still need to be closely coordinated with analysis. Due to this
distribution of work, the KD process requires continuous coordination of products and
updated knowledge base content. Therefore, a well structured knowledge base is considered
an indispensable means of collective situational awareness and work coordination throughout
the whole KD process.
ANALYSIS
2-21. Analysis is defined as the study of a whole by examining its parts and their
interactions11. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then draw
conclusions, deductions or implications. Analysis is required to provide knowledge for
assessment, planning and execution. Analysis in support of a requirement can be
accomplished by a variety of techniques or approaches, such as:
 Event Analysis, based on single event or report.
 Topic Analysis, on special subjects of concern.
 Gap Analysis, based on requirements and existing knowledge.

10
Collation: Is defined in AJP 2-1(A) as “A step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in
which the grouping together of related items of information or intelligence provides a record of events and
facilitates further processing.” Collation is an integral part of the Intelligence Cycle that bridges Collection and
Production or Processing. It employs both human and IT (Information Technologies) resources, to maximize
the information collected.
11
AAP-6(2010).
2-6

 Capability and Force/Ratio Analysis.

 Generic Pattern Analysis.
 Course of Action Analysis.
 Effects Analysis.
 Systems Analysis.
2-22. Whilst many well-established analysis techniques can be used to support KD, it is the
systems perspective of an engagement space that is critical in achieving KD’s overall aim of
providing a holistic understanding. It is therefore the emerging systems analysis methodology
that is core to the overall KD process and which is explained in detail in the paragraphs that
follow.
Systems Analysis
2-23. Systems Analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to holistically
examine adversaries, potential adversaries, non-aligned and cooperative nations or entities. It
considers the operational environment as a set of complex adaptive systems in order to
identify behaviours, structures and interrelationships, and to assess strengths, weaknesses or
vulnerabilities. It is successfully utilised in both the civilian and military communities and
has proven to be particularly useful in analysing and understanding problems in complex
operational environments.
Figure 3: A Systems Understanding
2-24. Systems Analysis aims to identify a network of systems and system elements, to
identify the relationships and interactions between these system elements, and to create
actionable knowledge to achieve a desired effect. This actionable knowledge can be used to
target actions in order to attempt to affect capabilities, behaviour, or interaction and influence
of key actors and entities within the operational environment.
2-25. Systems Analysis integrates the analyses from work done on specific independent
2-7

systems, such as the PMESII domains. Systems Analysis is a continuous, iterative and
collaborative process that should be conducted in close co-operation with internal/external
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations and
Centres of Excellence (COEs), as required.
2-26. Systems Analysis supports the planning, execution, and assessment processes at the
political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the engagement space in
varying degrees of complexity commensurate with the respective current level of NATO
interest and is directly dependent on the analytical requirements. For example, a tactical view
of a particular area within the engagement space will likely require more detailed study than a
strategic view of the same area. The resulting in-depth understanding of the engagement
space allows the Commander to determine what actions will produce changes in the
behaviour of critical actors in a way that will ultimately lead to the achievement of mission
objectives.
2-27. The overall goal of Systems Analysis is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the
dynamics, capabilities, behaviour and interaction of the various systems (and their related
subsystems) within the engagement space. As these elements evolve or change in time and
space, Systems Analysis assists in providing a contextual assessment of the objectives,
capabilities, likely actions and possible effects of each of these systems.
Analysis Process
2-28. During initial analysis the preliminary focus of KD is usually only broadly specified,
e.g. a geographical region or AOI. The initial information acquisition and analysis process
relies on a balanced effort across the entire operational environment and is not influenced by
operational objectives. Such analysis permits the formulation of a preliminary understanding
of how the major actors, systems and components interact within the operational
environment. Once the mission has been established, this understanding will then form the
basis of more detailed analysis and will help identify gaps in existing knowledge and areas
requiring further study.
2-29. As the depth of analysis is further developed, the identification of specific focus areas
and operational objectives may either be derived from the analysis or given by external
guidance. The focus areas are driven by the CCIRs with the initial information requirements
being formulated by his planning staff. In the later stages of KD, focus areas may evolve
further due to changes in the situation, results of the ongoing analysis process, or due to
emerging current or future planning requirements. In most cases, the true complexity of the
operational environment, and the options for influencing the achievement of operational
objectives with desired effects only emerges as a result of the in depth iterative analysis
process. Continuous review and adjustment of the analysis is required and can only be
achieved through coordination of the KD Process and the planning, execution and assessment
processes.
2-30. The iterative Systems Analysis process generally includes the following activities:
a. Systems breakdown, in which subsystems, system elements and components
are identified and where system boundaries, structures, and general relationships
are determined.
b. Interaction analysis, which explores inherent system dynamics in order to
understand the underlying behaviour of the system over time and highlighting
2-8

the ‘cause and effect’ relationships between elements of the system.

c. Model synthesis, which re-combines the system’s elements to achieve a
comprehensive understanding of the behaviour of the system as a whole. This
helps to identify similarities, interfaces, patterns, key factors, and feedback
loops within the system in order to understand its comprehensive behaviour.
2-31. The Systems Analysis process consists of the following activities and, as it is not a
linear process, they may be re-iterated non-sequentially:
 Identify actors and their attributes, such as objectives, intentions, capabilities,
relationships and interactions.
 Identify real world objects (e.g. a bridge) and abstract objects (e.g. a political
power gap), processes and logical dependencies (e.g. bridge on Main Supply
Route also provides access route for local trade and communal worship).
 Identify normative behaviour and apply, where possible, available conceptual
patterns.12
Key Term
 Identify potential knowledge gaps.
Leverage Point – a point of pressure or
 Identify leverage points. influence that can cause a change to
 Identify possible undesired effects from the state of the system.
potential actions.
2-32. To assist in the understanding of how a particular system operates, Systems Analysis
frequently uses Influence Diagrams to help visualise how key actors (individuals, groups and
organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly
important. Influence Diagrams can be used to show where critical requirements, capabilities
or vulnerabilities exist and where the behaviour of system elements can be influenced or
affected in either a positive or negative way. These diagrams can also depict Objectives,
Criteria for Success and Decisive Points. An example of such a diagram is shown in Figure 4.
Quantification and Simulation

2-33. The lack of availability of simulation tools and analysis time may significantly limit
this phase of the analysis and thus restrict analysis of the dynamic aspects of the engagement
space. The effort to develop a system analysis model could vary significantly depending on
the method used, the time available and the desired level of fidelity/accuracy. In some cases,
a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC drill) or war-gaming might adequately serve the purpose. For
longer-term analysis, a number of simulation runs or a complete empirical study might be
more appropriate.

12
Conceptual Patterns generically capture a normative behaviour or functional characteristic of individual
actors, organisations, functional elements, processes, activities or events. Conceptual Patterns can be derived
from earlier observed behaviour based on generic knowledge, e.g. conceptual theories, lessons learned from
comparable cases and scenarios that can be applied to similar scenarios. Conceptual Patterns can serve as
templates for focused knowledge search/guidance to actionable knowledge.
2-9

Figure 4: Example of an Influence Diagram
ACCESS
2-34. Actionable knowledge is only of value if it is understandable and usable by the target
audience or decision maker. Knowledge can be provided by Subject Matter Experts or by
other specialists and needs to be evaluated within the context of a specific mission
environment or AOI. Knowledge can be either provided as a reactive response to specific
knowledge requests or by proactively distributing knowledge to try to meet all user
requirements. Good KD practice maximises knowledge distribution without overloading staff
with unnecessary and superfluous information. To make today’s complex interrelationships
between entities understandable to non-experts, new ways and methodologies need to be
found to make knowledge accessible to the target audience.
Knowledge Transfer
2-35. Like all steps in the KD process knowledge transfer must be considered as part of a
“spiral process” and not an independent final step. Continuous end-user interaction is not
possible or even desirable throughout all phases of the KD process, however, consultation
and feedback should be sought periodically to ensure suitability and acceptance of the final
product. This promotes a better situation understanding of the problem by the end user and
can lead to a refinement or change to the original information request. Validation of analysis
products is essential in achieving user acceptance during this phase and can be achieved by
the inclusion of referenced source data.
2-36. It is essential to transfer analysis results into a format and the required depth of detail
2-10

that satisfies the end user’s specific knowledge requirements (e.g. operational planning
process, COM’s Decision Brief). This step has to ensure that relevant complexity of the
operational environment is not over-simplified in favour of simplicity/swiftness of product
development and acceptance. Tool support must be tailored to enhance visualisation and
understanding of complex analysis products.
2-37. The knowledge transfer step should be facilitated by robust communication
mechanisms, user-friendly navigation systems and search engines that permit easy access to
the knowledge base. Due to the nature of some analysis products, continuous personal
contact with the end user/consumer in order to explain and, if necessary, re-model and refine
analysis products, can be beneficial.
“Knowledge is not knowledge until someone else knows that one knows”
- Lucilius, 1st Century BC
Generic Process Characteristics

2-38. The KD process is an iterative process that relies on the interaction and continuous
adjustment of information acquisition and analysis, including modelling and simulation
activities, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Generic Knowledge Development Process

2-39. The generic KD process consists of a number of steps that enable the process to
operate effectively. These steps are described as follows:
1. The Knowledge Request: Is simply a requirement for knowledge that is
2-11

identified by the staff. This may come directly from CCIRs or a Request for
Information (RFI) raised by the staffs. The knowledge request may have been
generated from a previous iteration of the KD process that caused the decision
maker to re-evaluate his knowledge requirement and either focus or broaden his
previous knowledge request. It is therefore essential that KD staff are proactive in
their approach to knowledge requests, ensuring that they fully understand the
question and the end-user’s true knowledge requirements.
2. The Information Request: This initiates the collection process that provides the
basic information and data from which the required knowledge can be developed.
Key elements of this step of the process are the roles of the Knowledge Broker
and the KD Collection Manager.
a. Knowledge Broker - Is responsible for identifying and developing sources
of information and facilitating the appropriate information exchanges with
external organisations. This may include the establishment, validation and
maintenance of relationships that facilitate a timely exchange of
information often on a ‘quid pro quo’ basis.
b. KD Collection Manager - Is responsible for managing intelligence
requirements whose answers are already available within NATO and/or
partner unit/nations’ databases. The Collection Manager coordinates all
subordinate unit intelligence collection plans, as well as establishing and
coordinating a collection prioritisation scheme for all HQ operations. This
includes coordination and prioritisation of PMESII information
requirements that have been identified as being available from external
agencies, IOs, NGOs, etc. However, the contribution of these external
sources cannot be tasked in the same way as conventional military assets.
3. Knowledge Generation: Is the sum of activities that are employed by the KD
staff in order to generate actionable knowledge -- knowledge that the human mind
can use in a causal manner. These activities include various analytical, modelling
and simulation techniques.
4. Product Access and Knowledge Transfer: Inside the KD Process all
information, independent of its reliability, will be processed and taken into
consideration. It is important, however, that only evaluated and reliable
knowledge is provided in a timely manner to the end-user for use in decision
making. Due to the sensitivity of NATO operational information and OPSEC
procedures, knowledge products may be limited to a one-way (source to NATO)
exchange. It is the role of the disclosure officer to apply the appropriate disclosure
policies and ensure that actionable knowledge is disseminated to the widest
possible audience.
2-40. Timely and adaptable feedback loops Key Term
between the different elements of the KD process
Knowledge Base ‐ The knowledge base is a
are therefore essential in providing valuable collection of data, information, expertise and
support to the decision making process. This established contacts.
feedback is achieved through appropriate technical
means, e.g. a shared knowledge base13 and

13
The working definition of knowledge base is: the collection of data, information, expertise and
established contacts possessed by ACO.
2-12

collaborative analytical support, but also through appropriate organisational structures and
synchronisation with the established battle rhythm.
2-41. Depending on the following parameters, establishment of an effective KD Process
may require anything from a number of days to many weeks/months:
 Availability of knowledge base content, i.e. source access, search effort,
transfer/releasability effort, compatibility with existing content.
 Required analysis fidelity and scope, i.e. level of detail, time frame to be
observed, validation effort.
 Complexity of the operational environment; i.e. set of relevant, interrelated
environmental variables and inherent dynamics to be captured/re-iterated due to
scenario characteristics.
 Size of the KD team and coordination effort with other staff sections, i.e.
communication and harmonisation effort.
2-13

CHAPTER 3 - KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE PLANNING PROCESS
Overview
3-1. KD supports the entire Operations Planning Process (OPP) including the planning,
execution and assessment of operations. In general, planning and analysis of the environment
are closely related. The contribution of Systems Analysis to the planning process is critical
and includes: the identification of key system elements that can be acted upon in order to
achieve desired effects; and exposure of both intended and unintended consequences. In
some cases, the assessed system reaction to some actions(s) may show that certain military
objectives, effects and Courses of Action (COAs) are not feasible and might require
adjustment.
Initial Analysis and KD Focus

3-2. In the early stages of planning, the initial general analysis and KD concerning a given
AOI will not be limited by a specific focus or driven by specific goals (end state, objectives,
desired effects, etc.). This encourages a holistic and unbiased KD on the AOI and should
start well in advance of an operation. As a situation develops, potential scenarios play an
increasing part in research and analysis.
Subsequent Analysis
3-3. During COA development, potential leverage points, critical requirements, critical
capabilities, critical vulnerabilities, and indicators for determining success should all be
identified14. During COA analysis and war gaming, dynamic system models allow for
simulation/research of the potential impact of applied tasks/actions on the operational
environment and any resulting consequences to the objectives and/or desired effects.
Specifically, in complex scenarios, this facilitates the identification of undesired effects.
3-4. Although KD is capable of supporting the planning, execution and assessment of
operations at all levels, it is likely that the greatest contribution will tend to be at the
operational and strategic levels.
KD Contribution to the Planning Process

3-5. Figure 6 on the next page illustrates the relationships between the political-military
and the strategic crisis response and operations planning processes. This figure is taken from
the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Reference O).
3-6. Figure 7 depicts a summary of the Operations Planning Process (OPP) at the Strategic
and Operational Levels and includes the key products that the process steps produce.
Readers requiring full details of the OPP should consult the COPD.

14
See Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix at Para 4-19 of the COPD.
3-1

Figure 6: Political-Military Strategic Interface
Figure 7: Operations Planning Process at Strategic and Operational Levels

3-7. There are particular elements of the planning process at the strategic and operational
level to which KD will make a significant contribution. A selection of these is detailed
below with some practical examples to show how KD expressly adds value to the
3-2

process. The products and processes are marked with letters that correspond to Figure 7.
A. Situation Awareness
3-8. Situation Awareness is significantly enhanced by the identification of key systems,

subsystems, components and actors that affect the potential engagement space/operational
environment and by the highlighting of key influences and relationships. Such analysis will
also assist in defining CCIRs above. System Summary is a specific systems analysis product
that provides a multi-dimensional dynamic overview of the operational environment based on
a cross-domain system analysis. These summaries can also include identification of system
components (i.e. strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities) that may have potential for
exploitation. These types of summaries can either be specific to each PMESII domain (e.g.
Political Summary of an AOI, Military Summary of an AOI, etc.) or can provide an overall
overview of the operational environment (e.g. AOI daily/weekly Summary) to include a
condensed review of all of the PMESII domains. Summaries may also be created at several
levels to include National, Regional, Provincial, and potentially District/City.
B. Strategic Assessment
3-9. The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to develop and coordinate a comprehensive

strategic assessment of an emerging or potential crisis and strategic military response options
for NAC consideration in support of their Political-Military Estimate (PME) process. It
establishes the essential strategic conditions required to plan and conduct military operations
as part of a comprehensive approach to achieve clearly defined NATO objectives and end-
state conditions. Systems summaries can be used to support the development of these
strategic objectives and help to define the end state conditions.
3-10. SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA) provides an assessment of the crisis in

support of the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) Phase 2.
3-11. Examples of KD contributions to the development of the SSA are:
 KD will provide updates to the dynamics of the situation and highlight the
assessed aims of the key actors (individuals and organisations) and elements
(networks, ethnic groups and their Diaspora).
 KD will enhance the Factor-Deduction-Conclusion analysis by contributing an
understanding of the dynamics operating within the engagement space and
exposing different influences and interrelationships.
3-12. KD will support the identification of desired Strategic Effects by highlighting
potential interactions and the dynamics that could result from the actions selected to achieve a
desired effect.
3-3

C. Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options
3-13. The primary purpose of Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options is to

validate the effectiveness of the execution of military operations, guiding the commander in
making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. At the operational level, the
assessment process is based on the overall analysis of metrics measuring progress of planned
actions and achievement of planned effects and objectives for the whole military mission. At
the tactical level, the focus is not on measuring effects but is on measuring the achievement
of planned actions for each particular component. For example, a KD product might be the
analysis and evaluation of the impact in the political arena and in the local population after
the assassination of a moderate political key leader by actors within the engagement space.
As another example, an insurgent group analysis goes beyond simple military capabilities to
include sources of manpower, relations with and support from local communities, religious
and other motivations, funding, etc.
D. Operational Orientation
3-14. Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis. CoG analysis is enhanced by KD based systems
analysis, which assists in identifying the Critical Capabilities (CCs) required to support the
CoG, the Critical cross-domain requirements needed to underpin these CCs and the Critical
Vulnerabilities of key actors within the Operational Environment, that may be exploited. For
example, a CoG analysis could identify the support of the local population as the CoG of an
insurgent group, but a KD based systems analysis could additionally expose the underlying
reasons for that support in the form of financial assistance for reconstruction, provision of
medical and educational facilities and micro-financing for small business start ups.
3-15. Operational Design. Systems Analysis can provide a thorough understanding of the
behaviour of the systems that make up the engagement space and assist in identifying genuine
Decisive Points and appropriate Lines of Operation. Additionally, established Decisive
Points and desired effects will provide focus for refined KD.
E. Strategic/Operational CONOPS Development
3-16. Development of the CONOPS includes an assessment of opposing forces’ most likely
and most dangerous Courses of Action based largely on military capability and these are used
to war-game Own Courses of Action. In the future, the operational concept should also
include a wider understanding of the potential actions of relevant actors, in response to
Alliance operations; and the full spectrum of cross-domain relationships. For instance, war
gaming has to include, beside RED and BLUE information, the representation of GREEN
and WHITE actors and include non-military reactions to, and impact of, Alliance activities.
For example, a KD supported war-game can highlight the undesired effects of a proposed
action such as the bombing of a bridge or broadcasting facility.
3-4

F. Strategic/Operational OPLAN Development
3-17. Traditionally, threat assessments concentrated mainly on the military threat to own
forces. KD supports and enhances this assessment by considering the full impact of the
presence of Alliance forces in theatre on the regional and local society and structures, in order
to identify all possible issues that may have an impact on the mission. It thus represents a
more comprehensive assessment drawing on a wider range of sources with a shift in emphasis
from the threat to own forces to the threat to the overall mission and achievement of the end
state. In particular, a systems analysis that imparts a thorough understanding of the behaviour
of a system in response to specific actions has the potential to offer a unique appreciation of
potential future behaviour of the actors within the system and to illuminate the range of
potential outcomes, both predictable and capricious, which could ensue. For example,
regional criminal elements may react adversely to any impact on their activities stemming
from Alliance security operations. Thoughtless use of rare local resources may trigger a
withdrawal of cooperation or cause an increase in support for extremist groups by the local
population. Hiring of locals to build up new security forces might result in unexpected bomb
attempts against volunteers and destabilise the desired objective of a Safe and Secure
Environment.
3-18. KD requires the collection of a very broad range of information and knowledge,
which must be accomplished systematically and in accordance with a plan; which, inter alia,
fulfils the needs of the CCIRs, PIRs, EEFIs and FFIRs.
3-19. Functional area annexes to the OPLANs must be developed from a knowledge driven
perspective.
G. Strategic/Operational Assessment and OPLAN Reviews
3-20. During the CONOPS Development phase of planning, at all levels of command,
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are specified which allow measurement of progress
towards the creation of an effect (i.e. demonstration of a change in system state). Knowledge
based systems analysis is a powerful methodology to highlight the valid elements that are
fundamental causes and not symptoms of a particular problem. Continued analysis of these
elements and the resultant changes in the behaviour of the system provide a vital contribution
to the assessment process. Additionally KD may assist in developing appropriate measures of
performance (MOP) for assessing mission efficiency.15

15
See current version of the NATO Assessment Handbook for additional information on assessment,
measurement of progress and MoEs.
3-5

CHAPTER 4 - ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES
KD Impacts on Organisational Structures

4-1. Structural implementation of KD within a staff structure addresses the inherently
compartmentalised, “stove piped” perspective of the problem space. The compartmentalised
approach leads to limited situation awareness, which can only partly be mitigated by
traditional means of information management. Complex and dynamic scenarios require
greater levels of staff specialisation and a better in-depth understanding of increasingly
detailed focal areas. At the same time the operating environments of these complex and
dynamic scenarios have an increased need for an overarching and coordinated staff
perception, which is hard to achieve in existing static staff structures.
4-2. In the past, staff elements have developed specialised, and thereby different, methods
of gathering, developing, analysing and processing knowledge. As the levels of maturity,
proficiency and detail vary between these methods they frequently are not interoperable.
Coordination between them is often ad-hoc and sub-optimal for generating a consistent
holistic and dynamic image of the operational environment.
4-3. KD is a method to capture and analyse the operational problem space and is
applicable to various multidimensional operational scenarios. Seen as an overarching
methodology it does not replace, but is intended to unify and enhance, existing techniques
individually represented in the traditional staff elements. A unified KD process that
encompasses all staff structures:
 Provides a more comprehensive and adaptive perspective of a currently

compartmentalised and highly dynamic problem space.
 Enhances and unifies existing, non-coherent KD techniques in various
organisational subunits.
 Transforms and captures implicit knowledge in more systematic and explicit
knowledge representations.
 Makes knowledge interoperable between subunits using unified information
formats.
 Makes knowledge persistent beyond temporarily available expertise due to
personnel fluctuation/exchange/limited access to SMEs.
KD Integration within the NATO Command Structure

4-4. The organisational structure required for successful integration of KD should be
flexible enough to allow for individual HQ requirements and will therefore vary accordingly.
Until NATO develops sufficient training capacity and suitable courses to train sufficient
numbers of staff in KD, the Alliance will have to rely on ad-hoc expertise to underpin KD.
Nonetheless, the primary responsibility for KD should reside within a core expert group of
personnel within the NATO Command Structure, with this group forming a KD community
of interest.
4-1

4-5. There are three KD functional entities currently envisioned: Knowledge Management
Centre (KMC); Knowledge Development Centre (KDC); and Knowledge Centre (KC).
Figure 8: Integration of KD Functional Entities in Current NATO Command Structure
4-6. Increases in the magnitude of the information requirements and the complexities of
information gathering from organisations outside NATO’s span of control require that a
network of knowledge must be organised and managed in such a way that KD can be
performed effectively, as shown in Figure 8. This management function should be located
within the NATO Command Structure in order to have appropriate tasking authority.
Furthermore, it will receive guidance/direction from SACEUR to begin research in a specific
area of interest and then would reach out to the various knowledge entities and task them
appropriately.
Knowledge Management Centre

4-7. The ACO Knowledge Management Centre (KMC) establishes a centralised virtual
knowledge base that consists of, inter alia, a register of experts who stand ready to provide
analytical and PMESII knowledge as well as a managed repository of data required to support
NATO threats and types of NATO operations. For all data elements there is a requirement to
know what information is required, where the information resides, in what format the
information is held, who is responsible for maintaining and updating the information, and
how this information can be exchanged. The KMC staff should have a deep understanding of
the KD process and tools, including the systems analysis process and should work in close
collaboration with the ACO Knowledge Development Centre and JFC Knowledge Centres.
4-8. The KMC, envisioned to reside at SHAPE, will:
a. Coordinate, prioritise and manage knowledge requirements of end-users and

decision-makers in support of current and possible future operations.
b. Establish and manage knowledge networks, sources and custodians, including

collaborative relationships among communities of interest and external
knowledge sources.
4-2

c. Coordinate and monitor tasks and responsibilities for collection, analysis and
production in support for prioritised knowledge requirements.
d. Establish policy guidance, ontology, rules and procedures for developing and
sharing knowledge based on common standards for metadata, information
exchanges and information assurance.
e. Oversee the establishment and maintenance of the knowledge base and

networking information infrastructure as required to organise, store, discover,
access, retrieve and exploit information and knowledge.
Knowledge Development Centre

4-9. A Knowledge Development Centre (KDC) providing a cross-cutting view across all
domains of the operational environment would utilise unrefined information accessed from
all available sources, both from within and external to the NATO Command Structure.
4-10. The strategic level KDC, as tasked by KMC, will:
a. Collaborate with experts across the knowledge network to fulfil collection and
analysis requirements in support of prioritised knowledge requirements,
including reach back support to JFCs and deployed HQs.
b. Collate, validate and integrate data, information, intelligence and knowledge

acquired through knowledge networks; initiate action to fill gaps.
c. Conduct collaborative analysis, modelling and simulations to understand

complex situations and assess a range of potential effects
d. Develop and coordinate products to enhance dynamic situation awareness with

end-users and decision makers, including visualisation.
e. Ensure the transfer of knowledge to end-users via the most effective and
efficient means as well as storage in and access to the knowledge base.16
Knowledge Centres at the Operational Level

4-11. In addition to the strategic level Knowledge Development Centre within the NATO
Command Structure, operational level Knowledge Centres should be established within each
JFC. These JFC Knowledge Centres will exchange information and knowledge with the ACO
Knowledge Development Centre and will provide knowledge in support of the
planning/decision making process at the operational level. JFC Knowledge Centres should be
focused on specific regions and/or topics, as directed by SACEUR. Each centre should
include a Systems Analysis team, with expertise in specific regional areas. These analysts
will be able to draw on the wider network of knowledge available through NATO and the
wider international community by utilising the KD management function provided by the

16
Further described later in Chapter 5.
4-3

Knowledge Management Centre at SHAPE.
COM
COS
KDA
KDA Permanently attached KD Analysis
KD Process coordination
SPECIAL STAFF
Higher Level LEGAD temporary allocation
Adjacent MEDAD
KD Reach-Back Knowledge/Information Exchange
KD Centre POLAD
(e.g. IFC) PAO
KDA
KDA
JOINT temporary
Boards/WG
KNOWLEDGE
CENTRE
OPERATIONS RESOURCES
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
Information KDA
KDA JOINT KDA
KDA JOINT
EFFECTS LOGISTICS

In-Theatre
Acquisition &
Collection MANAGEMENT
PLANS
BRANCH
CIS BRANCH
KNOWLEDGE BRANCH
BRANCH
Cell (deployed) (Knowledge
Brokering)
KDA
KDA JOINT
KDA FINANCIAL
Knowledge
Development &
SYNCHRONI - KDA JOINT
ASSESSMENT
RESOURCES ENGINEER
BRANCH
SATION & BRANCH
External
Analysis EXECUTION BRANCH
BRANCH
Sources HUMAN
Knowledge
Management
KDA
KDA RESOURCES
SITCEN/JOC BRANCH
Support
Figure 9: Knowledge Centre Integration in a JFC (illustrative structure)
4-12. A KC would be situated at each operational command level (JFC Brunssum, JFC
Naples and JFC Lisbon). The KC would:
a. Collect, prioritise and coordinate the knowledge requirements of the

Commander, including deployed and deployable HQs, with the KMC.
b. Coordinate and monitor tasks and responsibilities for collection, analysis and
production in support for prioritised knowledge requirements.
c. Collate, validate and integrate data, information, intelligence and knowledge

acquired through knowledge networks; initiate action to fill gaps.
d. Collaborate with experts across the knowledge network to fulfil collection and
analysis requirements in support of prioritised knowledge requirements,
including reach back support for deployed HQs.
e. Conduct collaborative analysis, modelling and simulations to understand

complex situations and assess a range of potential effects.
f. Use, develop and coordinate products to enhance dynamic situation awareness

with end-users and decision makers, including visualisation.
g. Ensure the transfer of knowledge to end-users via the most effective and
4-4

efficient means as well as storage in, and access, to the knowledge base.
Knowledge Development Entities

4-13. Other parts of the NATO Command Structure and non-NATO bodies may not have
formal KD entities or dedicated KD staff. This does not mean that they are not integral
elements of the KD structure who act as either key information / knowledge providers or as
interfaces to decision makers and other knowledge customers. These informal Knowledge
Development entities must be identified and considered during the development and
implementation of the KD process. Examples of these KD entities would be the Theatre
Engagement Cell at the Forward Element and HQ IS Civil Emergency Planning.
In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities

4-14. Although not mandatory, it has proven beneficial at the operational level to have both
an In-theatre and Reach-Back KD capability.
DCOM • Structure:
MAIN Main/DJSE/JLSG
COS Main
+ Special Staff
• Linkages: how & where
FWD
Exercises & Prep
they connect DJSE
KM
JPALL
Directorate • Center of gravity of
Knowledge Centre effort
Situation Centre Situation Cell
Joint Effects
Operations
COM Joint Coord COS
Directorate
Joint Plans + Personal staff and Centre DJSE
others as required
Joint Assessments
SYNC & EX Theatre

Engagement
Centre
LOG Resources
• Processes
Finance
• Products
JLSG
Resource HR • Tools
Directorate
Engineer
COM and IS
Figure 10: Proposed In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD Capabilities
4-15. Both In-Theatre and Reach-Back KD capabilities:
 Perform similar functions, but with different sources and level of analysis
granularity.
 Are tailored to the existing conditions at each location -- closeness to end-user,
technical equipment, structural implementation, availability of expertise, etc.
 Contribute to and share a common knowledge base.
 Demand close cooperation, synchronisation, and connection, both with each other
and with other staff components within the headquarters.
4-5

4-16. The In-Theatre KD capability, as illustrated at Figure 11, has a direct connection to
the In-Theatre end-users and decision making process, and is essential in closing any
communication gap that may be created by knowledge being generated from outside of the
theatre. As such, in-theatre analysts are better able to explain products to the users; including
any assumptions or limitations of the analysis.
Process Flow Information Flow Collaboration
KD Process Knowledge Broker/ In -Theatre

In -Theatre KD Collection Manager Sources
Knowledge Links to SMEs
Request Agency Reps
LNOs etc.
End-user
Customer Information
Request
Product Access & Focus Area

Knowledge Specification/
Specification/A
Transfer djustment
Adjustment CCIRM/
Collection
Management
Knowledge SENSORS
Retrieval/ Review
Apply of Relevant
Disclosure KD Analyst Content
Policy
Initial Analysis
& Model
Refinement
Knowledge
Reach Back /
Rapid Simulation Collaboration
of (System)
Analysis Results (Distributed)
Knowledge
Base
Repository Sources accessible by

KD Process Replication
Reach Back Reach Back
Reach-Back
Extensive Knowledge (Distributed)
Structuring/ Knowledge Unstructured
Integration Base Content
(Documents)
Apply Knowledge Retrieval/ Structured

Disclosure Comprehensive Content
Policy Navigation (DBs)
Disclosure
Officer
Reach Back
Extensive Analysis
Extensive and Modelling
Analysts
Simulation of (Background
(System) Analysis Knowledge
Results Generation)
Centres of Excellence
Figure 11: In-Theatre and Reach-Back Knowledge Development Process

4-17. The In-Theatre KD Capability utilises the same analysis methodology as the Reach-
Back KD Capability. However, it capitalizes on coordination with the end-user in order to
tailor/focus the analysis process and products to meet the end-users’ needs. It accesses in-
theatre information sources using established HQ information acquisition processes, develops
4-6

local liaisons and merges the products into a global knowledge base. Integration of the KD
Capability in the staff structures, synchronisation with the staff’s battle rhythm and full and
unfiltered access to information sources in theatre are essential for the success of the In-
Theatre capability. To achieve this, manning and equipment have to be balanced with the
footprint limitations in theatre. Frequently, the In-Theatre process will focus on quick-
response products and the refinement of pre-modelled products provided by the Reach-Back
KD Capability.
4-18. The Reach-Back KD capability conducts a more in-depth, comprehensive analysis, in

a broader spectrum of information and with greater level of detail. It has the capacity to scan
through extensive external databases, other organisations’ reporting systems, the internet, and
established long-term liaisons to different organisations and communities to support
continuous and validated access to such sources. The analysis process may rely on personal
contact to Centres of Excellence and Subject Matter Expert networks, with dedicated liaison
elements, knowledge exchange and consulting functions in order to facilitate the analysis
process. The common knowledge base coupled with collaborative tool support allow for
close coordination and synchronisation with the In-Theatre KD capability.
4-7

CHAPTER 5 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT & TOOL SUPPORT

5-1. The KD process is underpinned by the Information / Knowledge Management (IKM)

process, which supports the Information Intelligence and KD requirements of the entire
organisation. KD not only uses IKM for the development of knowledge, it also is critical to
the third KD step of making knowledge accessible. It is important to note, however, that KD
and IKM are not the same. KD is the process that develops knowledge to support decision
making whereas IKM manages the provision of that knowledge across an organisation.
Figure 12: The Knowledge Development/Knowledge Management Relationship
5-2. A well-defined and established Knowledge Management (KM) process will be

required to address the complex issues arising from the implementation of KD and the
requirement for KD products. It can be generally assumed that the challenges facing KM will
be similar in nature to those associated with Information Management as illustrated in Figure
12.
Knowledge Base Capability

5-3. The ability to retrieve existing knowledge significantly impacts the efficiency of the
KD process. Many electronic storage mechanisms and databases exist across NATO, many of
which are poorly maintained and are not interconnected. There is currently a virtual barrier
between operational and administrative information. A lot of data is still present in non
exchangeable formats and, even worse, in a lot of cases as cognitive data in the minds of
SMEs that is often lost when rotations take place. A thorough analysis of the PMESII
domains for a given operation requires information well beyond the military centric
information normally resident in NATO/ACO databases. To realise the full potential of KD,
there is a need to manage these multiple information sources, internal and external, structured
and unstructured.
5-1

5-4. The collection of data, information, expertise and established contacts possessed by
ACO is defined as the knowledge base. Mechanisms to manage this knowledge base,
efficiently and effectively, will have to be found, while guarding against information
overload. For electronic information, the image of a federation of databases is evoked where
common data standards, efficient pan-knowledge base search functions, collaborative tools,
and controlled data access/transfer exist. Oversight of this knowledge base will require some
central management functions, which would see synergies if twinned with existing IKM
roles. Locating opportunities and facilitating solutions for interaction between existing and
emerging systems will facilitate development of knowledge for current and future NATO
operations. The better current information is managed, the more efficiency will be realised
through reduction of duplication of effort.
Source Access
5-5. Access to information sources must be provided by established means and utilise
Information Management best practices. This should include the specification of technical
interfaces as well as inter-personnel networking relationships, e.g. headquarters staff, civilian
partners, COEs, SMEs, and Regional Advisors (RA) who might represent other agencies
(GOs, NGOs). To provide harmonised knowledge across other staff functions,
comprehensive access to all internal staff owned information products is equally essential.
5-6. In order to live up to its ambitions of “holistic and dynamic understanding”, the KD
process needs unrestricted access to open sources such as the internet and the possibility to
transfer data from these sources onto NATO networks and vice versa. Essential information
that is locked up within these repositories may not be searchable with the current search
engine or with the existing user rights and free access may need to be brokered with the
respective institutions/organisations for key NATO personnel to have access to this
information and differing points of view.
5-7. For longer-term knowledge development, formal agreements and information

exchange policies with external organisations may ensure a more responsive and validated
information gathering process. This can be facilitated by dedicated Knowledge Brokering
and Knowledge Disclosure functions embedded in the KD Process.
Disclosure Support and Access Control

5-8. The Knowledge Disclosure personnel17 within the KD process can be supported by
dedicated automated functionality. As a first step, all data/information that is available for
disclosure must be identified. The classification level of individual elements or paragraphs of
information will allow the cross-flow of information across different networks while not
compromising the security or security requirements of the source of the information. A
similar functionality may be used to support the control of access to classified knowledge

17
These personnel would be responsible for ensuring the confidentiality (of information). Information
confidentiality is defined as the property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised
individuals, entities or processes. [C-M(2007)0118, The NATO Information Management Policy, 28 Jan 08]
5-2

throughout real time knowledge exploration.
5-9. To support a distributed knowledge base with users of differing levels of security
access, each document in the system must have classification markings for each paragraph,
graph and other data components. For example, this would allow search engines configured
with individual user credentials to access appropriately classified parts of the knowledge
base. Based on formal knowledge requests, sanitised content, such as indexes/excerpts of
classified content, could then be disclosed on demand.
Collaboration Support to KD
5-10. The existence of a collaboration support network is critical for the KD process. The
use of this collaborative network throughout the process allows for the establishment of
collaborative relationships among communities of interest and external knowledge sources
and is essential to introduce different fields of expertise and different perspectives to the
overall analysis.
5-11. The foundation of any form of collaboration support is the knowledge base itself, as it
allows for sharing of information and knowledge. Therefore it is necessary that the
knowledge base:
 Is updated across all domains on a regular basis to ensure consistency and validity
of data.
 Is able to capture all stages, types, and/or formats of knowledge being produced
throughout the entire KD process.
Simulation Support to KD
5-12. Simulation support to the KD Process can utilise a wide range of available simulation
types. Currently, stock-and-flow simulation of system analysis products and agent-based
simulation to reflect certain actor/system element behaviour have been proven effective in
experimentation. Not all content is equally suitable for all simulation types. Specifically, in
support to planning purposes war gaming and COA analysis simulation support can be
considered useful, but not yet fully proven.
Tools Support to KD
5-13. Tools to enhance the way staff conduct KD can save time and increase effectiveness.
These tools can improve the manner in which staff work, collaborate and share information.
One tool that enhances the KD process is TOPFAS, Systems Analysis Tool (SAT). The
venue and format of steady state TOPFAS training is still to be decided and will be the
subject of a training needs analysis.
5-3

CHAPTER 6 – TRAINING

6-1. Training is critical to successful KD and while some ad hoc training capabilities
currently exist for various KD components (i.e. Systems Analysis methodology training
through ACT and prototype tool training through NC3A), a comprehensive training plan
must be developed through a formal Training Needs Analysis.
6-2. Training must include KD methodology, KD product KD support tool training and
because KD reaches across all staff and echelon levels, training must be scalable and tailored
to address multiple audiences. For instance, KD training must include:
 Ad-hoc capability gap training

 Individual training (i.e. systems analysts, commanders)
 Collective training (i.e. operational staff)
 Technical training (i.e. support tools)
 Train-the-trainer training
6-3. In addition to the above, it is important to recognise that training is a key factor to
maintaining a proper relationship between Knowledge Management (KM) and KD.
Therefore, KD and KM training requirements should be developed in cooperation with each
other.
The KD Training Plan

6-4. The KD Training Plan should be designed in order to provide NATO and possible
national users (moving in and out of NATO billets, both Peacetime Establishment (PE) and
Crisis Establishment (CE) with all levels of KD training. The training provisions require
sufficient capacity to support the normal NATO rotation plan, as well as the planned rotations
for NATO operations. Training should be included in existing training facilities like the
NATO School Oberammergau, the JWC and where possible with existing national
schoolhouses, in order to provide the required annual capacity. It should address, amongst
other things, the following requirements and factors:
a. Course length and facility requirements

b. Course materials, including audio/visual aids, manuals, tutorials
c. Course lesson plan/modules of instruction that are aligned as logical training
blocks
d. Standard content of each course and intended outcome
e. Expected student level of knowledge when starting the course
6-1

GLOSSARY
While many of the definitions listed below will be found in other reference publications, it
was considered useful to bring together the terms derived from the NATO Crisis
Management and Operational Planning Processes, as well as those from the evolving
integration of the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations as articulated in the
ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and terms commonly used in
the analytical processes that support KD.
ACTION - The process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement
space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective. (MCM-0041-2010,
MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010)
ACTOR - A person or organisation, including state and non-state entities, within the
international system with the capability or desire to influence others in pursuit of its interests
and objectives. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July
2010)
AREA OF INTEREST (AOI) - The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives
of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or
responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. 13 Dec 1999 (AAP-6(2010))
CONCEPTUAL PATTERN - Conceptual Patterns generically capture a normative behaviour
or functional characteristic of individual actors, organisations, functional elements, processes,
activities or events. Conceptual Patterns can be derived from earlier observed behaviour
based on generic knowledge, e.g. conceptual theories, lessons learned from comparable cases
and scenarios that can be applied to similar scenarios. Conceptual Patterns can serve as
templates for focused knowledge search/guidance to actionable knowledge. They can help
narrow down research issues and implications based on initially limited existing knowledge
on the operational environment. They provide insights into known mechanisms of
comparable systems (e.g. typical mechanisms of a warlord organisation) and thereby indicate
known leverage points and indicators. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
CONSTRAINT - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action. (COPD)
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS - Conditions that must exist for an objective to be achieved
including any conditions that cannot exist. (COPD)
EFFECT - A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements),
that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the
use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010)
END-STATE - The NAC-approved set of required conditions within the engagement space
that defines an acceptable concluding situation to be attained at the end of a strategic
engagement. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July
2010)
ENGAGEMENT SPACE - That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular
crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. This will include the
7-1

related air, land, sea, space environments, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral
systems (political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure – PMESII).
(MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010)
JOINT OPERATIONS AREA (JOA) - A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific
mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters,
such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission-
specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. 17 Jan 2005
(AAP-6(2010))
KNOWLEDGE BASE - The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, expertise
and established contacts. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT (KD) - A process that collects and analyses information,
integrates isolated data into a useable body of information based on an understanding of
systems, and makes it available so it can be shared. (MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the
use of Effects in Operations, 20 July 2010)
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (KM) - Knowledge Management (KM) The ability to
gather, synthesize and analyze information about potential engagement spaces across the
military, political, economic and social systems as a precursor to successful systemic
analysis. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
KNOWLEDGE REQUEST - Requirement for knowledge that is identified by the staff.
(Proposed definition to be ratified)
KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT (KR) - A specific need for understanding about a situation,
a system, or an element of a system in order make a decision. (COPD)
LEVERAGE POINT – a point of pressure or influence that can cause a change to the state of
the system. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
LINE OF OPERATIONS (LOO) - In a campaign or operation, a logical line linking effects
and decisive conditions in time and purpose to an objective. (COPD)
MISSION - A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 01 Aug
1982 (AAP-6(2010))
MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK - A task that the commander designates as essential to
mission accomplishment. (CPOD)
ONTOLOGY - is a formal representation of a set of concepts within a domain and the
relationships between those concepts. Ontology is used as a form of knowledge
representation about the world or some part of it. Common components of Ontology include:
a. System
b. Subsystem/system elements
c. Actors
7-2

d. Events (Instances)
e. Objects
f. Classes (Object Types)
g. Attributes (Characteristics)
h. Relations
(Proposed definition to be ratified)
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT - A system of systems in which different actors interact
within the operational environment in pursuit of their interests. They develop strategies and
allocate resources to carry out actions to gain power that enables them to influence others and
achieve their objectives. (COPD)
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE - A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved by a

campaign or operation that will contribute decisively to desired end state. (COPD)
PMESII Systems - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure.
Political Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both
formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific
geographic boundary or organisation through the application of various forms
of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and
main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic
and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.
Military The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed
and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organisational security
objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.
Economic Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all
goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only
economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.
Social The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and
acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve
personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary
groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects
such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing
and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.
Information The entire infrastructure; organisation, personnel, and components that.
collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.
Encompasses the information and communication media.
Infrastructure The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a
community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and
transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution,
sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.
(MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the use of Effects in Operations, 20 July
2010)
RESTRAINT - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action. (COPD)
STRATEGIC LEVEL - The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national
or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to
achieve them. 15 Jan 2008 (AAP-6(2010))
7-3

STRATEGIC LINE OF ENGAGEMENT - A logical line that connects diplomatic, military,

economic and civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic
objective(s) and the end-state. (COPD)
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE - Strategic objectives establish the strategic purpose for military
and non-military actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. They describe
the goals that must be achieved to establish conditions required to attain the desired end state.
(COPD).
SUBSYSTEM – A system that is part of a larger system. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
SYSTEM - A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting
or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (COPD)
SYSTEM ELEMENT – Specific physical, functional, or behavioural entities within each
system. System elements can be people, facilities, forces, information, or other components
of the system. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
TAXONOMY - The formal organisation of data or information into categories and sub-
categories. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
THEATRE OF OPERATIONS (TOO) - An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more
joint operations area. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for
operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (Proposed definition to be ratified)
7-4

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP / EU / MNE

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP/EU/MNE

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE to PfP/EU/MNE

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- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince

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Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 3-1

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the scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of

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Figure 1: Knowledge Development Support to the Decision Cycle

“Information is not knowledge”

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Development of the Handbook

Way Ahead - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) & Standard Operating

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Indications and warning (I&W) of a potential or actual crisis.

Relationship between Intelligence and Knowledge Development

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environment, in order to develop a much broader and more comprehensive understanding of

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CHAPTER 2 – THE KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Figure 2: The Knowledge Development Process Overview

2-2. KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas

Initiating the ACO KD Process

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a Monitoring AOI to being very detailed for a Concern AOI.

Retrieval of Existing Knowledge

External Information Search

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Identification of potential PMESII sources

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(2) Operational Factors:

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d. Governments: Host nation, Alliance nations, AOI neighbouring nations and

Resource Evaluation and Validation

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available for later analysis or to support other requirements.

Integration of External Information

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 Capability and Force/Ratio Analysis.

Figure 3: A Systems Understanding

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the ‘cause and effect’ relationships between elements of the system.

Quantification and Simulation

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Figure 4: Example of an Influence Diagram

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- Lucilius, 1st Century BC

Generic Process Characteristics

Figure 5: Generic Knowledge Development Process

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CHAPTER 3 - KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF

Initial Analysis and KD Focus

KD Contribution to the Planning Process