Hernandez v.

Andal
G.R. No. L-273, March 29, 1947

FACTS: Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are brother and
sisters, who acquired in common a parcel of land from their deceased father. Maria and
Aquilina sold to the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to be their
combined shares by virtue of a verbal partition made among the siblings Hernandez.
After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal but the latter
refused to sell the same. Later, Andal resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition among them and their brother and
sisters, and that there are witnesses ready to prove such partition. However, Cresencia
asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of partition is inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition

among heirs

RULING: As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of
providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of
frauds, for example, “is for evidential purposes only.” The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the
act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or
contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the
document. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to be
the essential requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and
unequivocal terms.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court contains no such express

or clear declaration that the required public instruments is to be constitutive of a
contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved,
it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. Judgment reversed.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his
wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997

FACTS: Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by
judgment in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza
was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject
the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing through
her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that
plaintiff Caniza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she
had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent need of the house on account of
her advanced age and failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;” among others.

The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since the 1960’s; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caniza as her own family,
and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the
Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them
by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since
their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for
probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect

HELD: No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can
be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” An owner’s
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that, in this case, there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
AZAOLA v. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003 5, 196

FACTS:
 An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

 This case involves the determination of the quantity of evidence required for the
probate of a holographic will.

 September 9, 1957: Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died; Francisco Azaola, petitioner

herein for probate, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Alilagros Azaola
was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson
(respondent).

 Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will a month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife; he also
testified that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will as the
handwriting of the testatrix.
 Additional evidence: residence certificates to show the signatures of the testatrix for
comparison purposes. Azaola testified that the penmanship appearing in the said
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix (as contained in the stenographic
notes).

 The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested. The lone
witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will
was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

ISSUE: WON three witnesses are necessary to establish the handwriting/ signature
contained in a will.

HELD: NO. The decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded
to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion.

RATIO:
 Where the will is holographic, no witnesses need to be present (Art. 10), and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd
results are to be avoided. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code
is merely directory and is not mandatory.

 Art. 811, Civil Code: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that
at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
 In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and
if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.”

 Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the proponent was not required to
produce more than one witness. Even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, the Court is of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot
be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify
the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.

 Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will (none
being required by law) the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who
know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare truthfully
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator."

 Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may even be impossible. This
is evidently the reason for the second paragraph of Art. 811. The law foresees the
possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or may refuse to testify), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

 The requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary

testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity.

 The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it
necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should
be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. And because the law leaves it to
the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be
drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court
expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
MANUNGAS v. LORETO- G.R. 193161 Aug. 22, 2011
DOCTRINE: As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. There is no logical reason to appoint a
person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.

FACTS:
1. This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
2. Engracia Manugas was the wife of Florentino Manugas. They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel
David Avila(Avila).
3. Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. De Manugas.
4. Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino. There she
stated that there were no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino except herself, Avila and Ramon
Manugas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino. Avila’s widow executed a waiver of rights
and participation renouncing her rights over the property of her husband in favor of Engracia.
5. Consequently, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate of Florentino distributing the
properties to Engracia and Ramon. (TAKE NOTE: At this point, the intestate estate proceedings as regards
Florentino’s properties were already terminated)
6. Thereafter, the RTC of Panabo City appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
7. Through Parreño, Engracia instituted a civil case against the Spouses Diosdado Salinas Manugas(Diosdado)
and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages. MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
due to the failure of Diosdado to file an answer.
8. After sometime, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Engracia’s
Estate in his favor before the RTC of Tagum. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino, is an
heir of Engracia.
9. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator:
a. He was not a Manugas
b. He was a debtor of the estate
10. RTC-Appointed Parreño as administrator
11. Upon MR, the RTC reversed it’s ruling while appointing Diosdado as Special Administrator.
12. CA- RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Parreño as the administrator of the estate. Thus
this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it ruled to annul the appointment of Diosdado herein petitioner as judicial administrator
and reinstating the appointment of Parreño. NO. (Relevant to our topic)

HELD: The RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion(CA did not err in reversing RTC’s order)
● The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or
even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Engracia.
● Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court.
● Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel
“It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to
the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for
removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply
to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed
as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.”
● Reiterated in Ocampo
 “While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It
has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need
to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.”

● While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until
a regular administrator is appointed as stated in Section 2 Rule 80 of the Rules of court.
○ There is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a
stranger to the deceased.
● Diosdado is a stranger to Engracia while Parreño is the latter’s relative.
○ evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested
in preserving the latter’s estate
○ Parreño is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece
of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by
doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate
● It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a
Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas.
Tan vs Gedorio
G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

Facts: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and
Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for the appointment
of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner
Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed
since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same competence as
Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of
kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the
respondent were illegitmate children).

However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the estate, the
court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a
special administrator.

Ruling: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the
latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment
of a special administrator.