1. ROGELIO ROQUE vs.

PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. When
arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”The prosecution averred
that day while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo)
were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted
Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and his
wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfo’s shout was directed at
him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo apologized for the
misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the Marquez
brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao to ask for
assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Then Reynaldo just proceeded to
petitioner’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioner’s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter
did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he was
already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear.
Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape.
Fortunately, Reynaldo’s parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency
medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that day, the petitioner went
to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed
by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the
two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house
still shouting invectives against him. Petitioner requested Tayao tos top and pacify them
but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun.

Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice. On March 12, 2007, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its Decision2
finding petitioner guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated
August 16, 2007. Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its
Decision dated February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC’s Decision, Hence,
the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution
dated July 30, 2010. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Courtwhere petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors all pertain to
“appreciation of evidence” or factual errors.

ISSUE
Whether or not the SC can entertain petition for certiorari wherein the issues imputed
pertains to “appreciation of evidence” or factual errors?

HELD:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the
review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty
other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on
certiorari. A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule
45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides.
 2. De Guzman v. People (G.R. 178512, November 26, 2014)

FACTS:
On the fateful midnight of Christmas, 1997, while Alexander Flojo (Alexander) is
fetching water, Alfredo de Guzman (Alfredo) suddenly appeared and stab Alexander in
the left part of his body causing him to sustain two stab wounds.

Cirilino Bantaya, Alexander’s son-in-law, who saw the incident, rushed him to the
hospital. The attending physician said that one of the stab wounds is fatal and would
have caused Alexander’s death if he did not get rushed to the hospital quickly.
RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of frustrated homicide
and was sentenced six months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years
and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that his intent to kill was not
established, and that any person could have inflicted the wounds. The petitioner also
insisted that he should only be guilty of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the intent to kill, which is a critical element of the crime charged, is
established in the case.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide.

HELD: (1) YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff-marks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. There is also to be no doubt about
the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for
the timely medical intervention.
(2) YES. With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical
attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

3. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and
thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and
his three year old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his
brother Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground,
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera
brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight
and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly
intervened.
Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated
to attempted murder.
(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled
the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even
though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden
attack to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend
himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

4. AH CHONG vs US
J. Carson
FACTS:
The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and was sharing the
house with the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a house boy. The
door of the room they were occupying was not furnished with a permanent lock, and as
a measure of security, they fasten the door by propping a chair against it. One evening,
Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of their
room. The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when either returned
late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” but heard no answer. The
room was quite dark, and as there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, he leaped to his feet and called out. “If you
enter the room, I will kill you.” Suddenly, he was struck by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and wildly struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was criminally liable.
HELD:
No. The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence. In the present case, the accused acted in good
faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. Had the facts been as he believed them
to be, he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act.
Moreover, the accused cannot be said to have been negligent or reckless as the facts as
he saw them threatens his person and his property. Under such circumstances, there is
no criminal liability, as the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.

US vs. AH CHONG
GR. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910

FACTS:

One night, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened by someone
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who
is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.

The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a
thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been
placed against the door.

In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back
into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.

eizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.

ISSUES:
1) Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by reason of
a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal
liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at
the time when he committed the act

2) Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes

of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code

HELD:

1) The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if
such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which
under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful
act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit.

2) The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of
the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of Article 1 of the code clearly indicate
that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes
and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general
rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor,
where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of
the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence,
and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake
of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part. "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as
they appear to him."

In this case, the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense.

5. LONEY vs. PEOPLE

482 SCRA 195
February 10, 2006

FACTS:

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s
end which caused the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days,
the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines
(PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single
act.

ISSUE:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand (NO)

HELD:

NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges

simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule
110). There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense.

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense.

The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against
two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for "the same offense." Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its
elements are present.

On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
6. Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The accused-petitioners were Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains
of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio
Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato
Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the
Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan,
Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They allegedly received information concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the
Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn to which the
accused all await. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA members, the accused
opened fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident on April 5,
1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga caused the death of
Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.

Issue:
WON the theory of mistaken belief is applicable in the present case.

Ruling:
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which
is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to
a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a
defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is
into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or
state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that
the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it
negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an
act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude
negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained
that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that
under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.