Electoral Politics and Social Change

Author(s): Duncan B. Forrester

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, No. 26/28, Special Number (Jul., 1968), pp.
1075-1077+1079-1081+1083+1085-1087+1089+1091+1093-1094
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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 Electoral Politics and Social Change
Duncan B Forrester

This paper examines popular electoral politics as an integrating factor within the political system
and as an agent of social change at the three main levels of the village, the State and the nation.
The introduction of elective politics in the village has inspired new methods of attacking and defend-
ing privilege and status. The composition of the two parallel hierarchies, traditional and elected, may for a
time appear similar but they are based on conflicting principles. Conflict may well increase, but through
it come mobility and new alignments.
Castes other than the dominant caste are beginning to be aware of themselves as corporate political
entities and will negotiate as groups to see what they can obtain through their votes. Caste consciousness
may thus seem to be strengthened but, simultaneously, relationships between castes are changed and the
basis of caste hierarchy is weakened.
The existence of factions indicates that the established leadership is not unchallenged and that poli-
tical authority is not immovably lodged with one group. Factional divisions do not usually reflect competition
between prosperous and under-privileged castes, but rather splits within the village elite.
The rather contradictory ambitions to have elections in order that local government may be demo-
cratic but not to have contests for fear of breaking up the largely mythical solidarity of the village com-
munity provide a curious illustration of the conflicts in the ideology of Panchayati Raj.
Corrupt practices in panchayat elections represent political behaviour which is radically novel in the
Indian village: they have a modernising effect because persons with traditionally higher status are compelled
to give money and concessions and even to court pollution in order to secure votes from social inferiors.
State elections bring into close relationship the styles and alignments of village politics and the new
national forms of political behaviour. They have played a significant part in building up and expressing
regional loyalties and have encouraged traditional social groups to mobilise themselves for political action
on a broader, State-wise basis.
From the voters' angle, the parliamentary contest is an appendage of the assembly contest. The
successful parliamentary candidate gains his seat largely through the good offices of his party colleagues,
the assembly candidates and local bosses. The assembly contest is between generally wealthy personalities
and concerns local issues; the parliamentary contest is generally between parties and about national and
international issues but it has an odd epiphenomenal quality because it is so dependent on the more local
fight.
Consequently, an MP is far more beholden to his party than the average MLA. As compared with
the MLA, he is more free from local pressures but he is also more responsive to the party organisation
and party discipline - which accounts for the practical absence of defections at the centre, and their
high frequency in certain States.
THE Indian political system can be It is the purpose of this paper to vation - since 1951 at the national
said to be composed of three principal isolate as far as pc ssible one of the and State levels, and more recently
strata: the politics of the village, of elements in this new-style polity which still for village panchayats in most
the State, and of the nation. Each has is common to all three strata Stat,-s - and as a foreign import they
its own distinctive structures, rules, popular electoral politics - and exa- do not, and were not meant to,, fit
and styles of political behaviour, and mine how far this is effective as anr easily and naturally into their social
each is related not only to the other integrating factor within the political context. Elections challenge and modi-
strata but to its own distinct social and system and as an agent of social change fy, and in their turn are modified by,
cultural environment. One element at the various levels. This will also already existing political and social
in political modernisation is the involve asking how far the varying structures. They encourage different
attempt to weld these strata more social contexts affect the functions and styles of behaviour, and ncw align-
closely together so that the patterns procedures of elections, and how far ments. The attitudes and behaviour
and styles of politics are similar in elections are successful in producing of a group, even its internal structure,
each and the whole system is integrat- a new type of political leadership and may be radically changed by thz exi-
ed to provide an effective channel of new styles of behaviour. Gene.ralisa- gencies of electoral strategy. And, far
political communication, a dynamic tions in a subject so complex and in more markedly, the traditional rela-
ag&zncyof development, and cursus which relatively so little data are yet tionships between groups often cannot
honorum through which new political available are, of course, hazardous and survive the impact of elections. Popu-
leadership may be recruited and train- the generalisations in this paper are lar elections raise a question mark
ed. And this new-style polity, based put forward as no more than sugges- against all established political leader-
largely on modern western principles tions for further discussion and ship. This is true equally of the tra-
and models, and ideally far more uni- inquiry.' ditional, usually hereditary, village
fied than anything in the Indian tradi- It should be clearly kept in mind leadership and of the largqlv middle
tion, is clearly intended to be an agent throughout that popular eliections with class educated elite which once do-
of social as well as political change. universal suffrage are a recent inno- minated State and national piolitics.

1075
Special Number July 1968 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAt WEEKLY

The conflict of electoral politics and than that of village politics but it is believes in democracy, and it was res-
traditional social and political patterns an indigenous one for caste, Janguage, ponsible for the introduction of uni-
is probably most marked in village and culture provide frail but never- versal 1uffragc; but it is by no means
panchayat elections. Here the social- theless traditional alignments which the clear that Indian democracy will con-
political context into which elections introduction of electoral democracy at tinue to entrust its destinies at the
are introduced tends to be strongly the State level both modifies and im- national level to people such as these.
traditional and hierarchical. Elections mensely strengthens. The very necessity of fighting elections
are an alien intrusion which strikes It is by no means easy to isolate the challenges them to compromise or go
discordant notes and cannot b'e easily social context of national elections. The under. And certainly they will have
adapted to deeply entrenched styles, average voter tends to regard the na- to accept into the inner sanctum of
alignments, and structurcs. But even tional election as little more than an national politics some who deal with
where elections seem to be successfully appendage of the State Assembly elec- power according to traditional, local,
domesticated by traditional leaders, for tions. The two primary reasons for this or regional rules.
example, winning undisputed control are probably that he has so little im- A more detailed examination of elec-
of the new elected panchayat, in reality mediate contact with the national tions at the three levels will help us
the electoral principle remains a factor government that national politics seems to discuss these questions in a clcarer
of profound disturbance. The intro- remote from his life and that, in nor-
perspective.
duction of elections to thb- villages mal circumstances, and in spite of the
under the Panchayati Raj system which Independence struggle, for most ordi-
is intended to encourage the grass-roots nary uneducated Indians, intense cmo- I
of democracy certainly presents a tional identification can hardiy stretch Panchayat Elections
fundamental challenge to a social sys- beyond the region or State. The people Elections introduce a radically new
tem which, in many of its strongest who are actively involved in national principle into village life. Even the
features, is highly uncongenial to de- ezlectionsbeyond the mere casting of a more passionate propagandists of the
mocracy. If elections are an agent of vote, and in that sense form its im- mythology of the traditional village
social change in India, this should be mediate social context, comprise community who speak of an ancient
\Lthe
seen most clearly in the villages. Is fairly small section of the population democracy and of village leaders as
it true that universal suffrage can which is well above the average in being chosen by election do not go so
spark off wide and fundamental social *zducation, w,aith and conscious na- far as to suggcst that these were for-
change at this basic level, or is social tionalism: the middle class elite,- in mal elections similar to those of today;
change perhaps the precondition of any short, which inherited dominance from they really claim no more than that
ezlectoraldemocracy that is more than the British and still tends to think of village government was a form of
a facade? politics in western categories. government by consent. Elections are
If it is possible to suggest that the an innovation intended to detonate a
CHANGE AS CONDITION OF SUCCESS train of thorough-going reform. And
cumulative effect of elections at the vil-
The States of India have since the lage and State levels is in the direction reactions within vi!lages vary, ranging
linguistic re-organisation become large- of modernisation (and this I would from total apathy or opposition to
ly natural units corresponding to real only do with careoful qualification), it enthusiastic and intelligent participa-
social divisions. State politics impinges seems probable that at the national level tion. This variety of response is what
upon the villagers' lives at countless elections tend to encourage tradition- one would expect, for the villages of
points and, therefore, State Assembly alisation. In spite of the wid-spread today vary a great deal in their social
elections arouse veqry considerable in- aloofness from national politics which rigidity and in their openness to new
terest, deep loyalties, and lasting to a great extent insulates national ideas and to change. Where the tra-
antagonisms. The State probably repre- contests from the full effects of tradi- ditional caste hierarchy is strong and
sents the largest arena within which tional ways and discourages traditional unchallcfnged and there remains in
traditional alignments, particularly leaders from seeking to penetrate to operation an effective political struc-
those of caste and language, can hope responsible positions in Delhi, national ture capable of resolving most internal
to be effective but, in order to win leaders must get votes. And this mcans disputes, the electoral principle will be
political influence through elections, that the dominant national elite must viewed with apathy, fear, or resent-
traditionally frail inter-village and caste- make adjustments with traditional local ment, as yet another attempt by out-
wide links must be strengthened, reor- and regional forces and seek the sup- siders to disintegrate the village, des-
ganised, and related to the party labels port of traditional leaders. Furthermore, troy its values, and displace its accepted
which in this stratum begin to be sig-, local or regional groups may win con- leaders. Panchayat elections are intel-
nificant. State politics is a kind of trol over a State unit of a national ligently welcomed and fit more naturally
meeting place of traditional village party and thus find themselves involved into the life of villages where the
styles of politics and the modern west- in national politics. Or, a regional traditional structure of status and
ernised styles which are dominant ai party gains a share of political in- power has already been challenged.
the'national level. Success in State elec- fluence within a State but finds it must perhaps as a consequence of education,
tions brings varied and attractive protect its regional position by gain- perhaps by - economic development,
'spoils' but the condition of success is ing a voice in Delhi. perhaps by the pervasive modernising
significant change in traditional, very In all these ways, and others too, influence of a nacrby town or city.
narrow, loyalties and traditional ways the elite in national politics finds that When government attempts to force
of operating in politics. The social its predominance is challenged by the an ealection and an elected panchayat
milieu of State politic is a wider one effects of electoral democracy. This elite on a conservative and traditional village,

1076
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
a strategy may be adopted to neu-
tralise as far as possibie the disturb-
ing effects of the innovation without
at the same time unnecessarily anta-
gonising government officials. Sometim.s
no nominations will bo filed: in the
1964 panchayat elections in Andhra
Pradesh, there were no nominations at
all for nineteen panchayats in Chittoor
District.2 In some instances there
will be an effective boycott of the
voting, demonstrating the continuing
hold of traditional leaders over the
vil agi. Frequently elzction will be
unanimous. Unanimity is officially
encouraged, for reasons I will discuss
later, but it frequently indicates apathy.
An illuminating example of the re-
action to the introduction of elections
in a highly traditional village sL.ting
is Scarlett Epstein's account of the first
panchayat election in the village of
Wangala in 1955.3 The villagers showed
no interest in the election for "the
concept of elected authority is foreign
to Wangala's indigenous political sys-
tem and therefore had little meaning
for its pzople", who are accustomed
to hereditary authority internally and
interference by officials from outsid?.
The Revenue Inspector visited the vil-
lage and discussed the forthcoming
election with thzi headman and othzr
elders. The headman and elders, how-
ever, made no attempt to publicis]
the election among the villagers, and
when t!e Inspector arrived the day
before the date fixed for the elec.ion,
ha found that no preparations at all
had been made. The elders, realising
that the Inspector had to satisfy his
superiors that an election had taken
place, tricd to bargai;n with him, ask-
ing for concessions for themselves or
the village in return for holding an
clection as desired. On the election
day, when the Inspector arrived he
found only a few elders waiting for
him, the rest of the villagers having
gone off to work in the fields as usual,
failing to understand what was expected
of them. The Inspector sent the two
town-criers to summon the people
from the fields and houses, and by
this means he gathered a small pro-
portion of the men of the village in the
village temple, and called for nomina-
tions. The headman and most other
elders refused nomination and "the
notion began to take shape among
those present that membership of the
new panchayat would involve no honour
or status, but simply a lot of duties
connected with sanitation and public
Special Number July 1968
health in the village". After a long and squabbles b-ztween a 'have' caste and
acrimonious discussion about nomina- a 'have not' caste, which will be
tions, the Inspactor, knowing at first reflLcted in great excitement at election
hand the traditional sSstem, attemptcd time. But this is not a common situa-
to obtain nominations of elders from tion for, an under-privileg.edcommunity
each lineage of the dominant caste and, can rarely hope to command a majo-
as time was drawing on, noted down rity, and is usually too economically
the first ten names mentioned and dependent on the dominant caste to bc
dcc.ared them eilectvd, disregarding the able to contest its. position. But if
refusals of some to serve. The 'elected' inter-caste rivalries are seldom an im-
members of the panchayat thus in- portant factor in, elections, it is clear
cluded some of the most and some. of that factional disputes are of great
the least respe-ctedmen in the village, importance, and elections provide a
some who were anxious to serve and focus and stimulus for old antagonisms
some who were extremely reluctan. and rivalries.6 Th i consequence is
Finally, remembering that the rcgula- frequently that elcctions are accom-
tions specified that there must be two panied by violence, the destruction of
representatives of the Harijans on the candidates' crops or houses, organised
panchayat, the two Harijan town-criers intimidation, and even murder. Such
were virtually forced by upper caste- behaviour, of course, indicates that it
men to give their formal consent and is appreciated that matters of import-
were declared "elected". ance are at stake in the election, and
that it is not simply a matter of f or-
DOMINANCE AT STAKE mally satisfying government officials
or allocating distasteful and degrading
In cases such as this, which are by duties. Where the election arous.-s in-
no means atypical, the law and the tercst it is because it is appreciated
officials responsible for enforcing it that a new kind of status is available,
are at least formally satisfied, but in that the elected members of the pan-
reality the elCtion seems farcical and chayat will not only have tedious
the rcsultant panchayat is obviously responsibilities to be cxercised under
unlikely to prove effective as an government supervision, but will be
agency of development and social in control of a substantial amount of
changa. Usually in this kind of situa- patronage and in a position to benefit
tion, the traditional panchayat will thrmseivczs and thair community.
continue2to operate as before. The It is rather ironic that it is com-
two panchayats will then exist side by monly folt that vigorously contested
sde, but the statutory panchayat will panchayat elections are undesirable and
be simply a facade to phase govern- should be discouragod. The theory is
ment, and effective powe-r will remain that such elections can prove disruptive
in the hands of the traditional leade-rs. to village unity, so that the elected
But one thing at least has changed: leaders are not generally supported and
the traditional leaders areabeginning to can achieve little. Jayaprakash Narayan
learn how to manage elections. The has argued, with very, little historical
villagers' initial reaction of virtual jusLification, that villages in ancient-
non-co-operation is entirely in terms India used to selcct their panchayats
of the traditional defensive attitude to by consensus rather than western-style
government interference. But, however elections. "It is interesting", he write,s,
grudgingly admitted, and whatever steps "to recall . . . that in the Indian village
are taken to neutralise the effects, commnunitiesthere were no elections to
elections inevitably become an agent of executive offices on the present majo-
change. rity-minority pattern, which is a divisive
In Delana, the other Mysore village and disruptive process. Instead there was
described by Scarlett Epstein, the selection by general consensus of opi-
balance of social and economic powzr nion, or sometimes by drawing lots."7
had already been affected4 and the Many people believe that this suppos-
panchayat election was regarded not edly traditional method of leader
with apathy, but as an opportunity for selection can and should be brought
the rising elite to strengthen its in- into play once more at the stage of
flucnce.5 Thus, when a degree of nomination of candidates, rendering
mobility has already been introduced, election proper superfluous. Consulta-
elections perform an important func- tions and negotiations directed towards
tion in the struggle for power. Occa- a unanimous election are sometimes
sionally, there will be inter-caste succe;ssful, but frequently fail in spite
1071
ECONOM?ICAND POLITICAL WEEKLY
of the substantial inducements offered.5
In the 1964 elections in Andhra Pradesh,
for instance, the governmen offered
'prizes' of Rs 5,000 for villages of a
population over three thousand and
Rs 2,500 for smaller villages if the
panchayats were unanimously elected.
However, in more than fifty per ccllt
of the villages a contest took place
none-the-less.9'
It may very rcasonably be doubtcd
whether a unanimous election is inI
fact generally a good thing. Traditional
leaders may use the prospect of a grant
intended to benefit the village as a
whole as a powerful disincentive to
challenge from more dynamic, modern-
minded rivals. Thus a unanimous elec-
ti(on can serve to entrench reactionary
leadeirship and peTrsuade villages to
present a patched-up and superficial
unity at' election time. In either case,
the village is incapacitated from taking
active part in development programmes.
The rather contradictory ambitions to
have elections in order that local gov-
cnmient may be democratic btit not to
have contests for fear of breaking up
the largely mythical solidarity of the
vi'llage community provide a curious
illustration of the conflicts in the ideo-
logy of Panchayati Raj. Too many
rcsponsible planners take the highly
traditionial view that conflict of
whatever sort - is undesirable and
seek to operate, by consensus a system
which has been drawn up on entirely
different principles. The result is that
election-time unanimity, when it is
formally achieved, frequently lasts no
longer than polling day, and the real
conflicts of the village are played out
for a time in a diffcrent arena from
that of Panchayati Raj. Nevertheless,
it may reasonably be doubted whether
a unanimous election entirely blunts the
innovatory force of the elective principle.
The 'Fathers' of ihe Panchayati Raj
system seem to have had two principal
and closely related purposes in mind:
they wanted the elected panchayats to
be agents of radical social and ceono-
mic change, and they wanted the tradi-
tional conservative village . Iadership
to b'e replaced by more dynamic and
modernising leaders. This new elected
leadership, it was hoped, would carry
out the innovations desired by the
government and unify the village as a
goal-oriented rather than a static com-
munity. Election was regarded as the
indispensable method for the selection
of these leaders for it was felt that it
would guarante!e that they would be
Special Number July 1968
suLpportedby those who had voted for caste, and in themselves they have no
them. But it was not, apparenitly, corporate political existence. Their
lrealised at first that election very fre- political relationships ace as indivi-
quently would reintroduce the tradi- dual clients of a master in the dominant
tional leaders or replace them with caste. Political ties run vertically in
ineffective nonentities. There are cases the system and not horizontally".'2
of young, dynamic leaders taking con- Largely under the influence of elec-
trol of a village, but they are not tions, castes other than the dominant
common.10 And youth does not neces- caste begin to be aware of themselves
sarily imply sympathy with government as corporate political entities and will
policy. On the other hand, many ob- negotiate as groups to see what they
servcrs not. that the traditional leader- can obtain through their votes. This
ship will stand for election, and be- introduces a new element of flexibility
cause of their status and the elaborate into the system: caste consciousness
network of family, caste, and econo- may seem to be strengthened, but rela-
mic relationships which they control, tionships between castes are changed,
they may be virtually certain of and the basis of caste hierarchy is
success.11 In such a situation the weakened. Upper caste candidates for
traditional leaders have their power en- office are obliged to woo lower castes
hanced. .In retaining power they may and even 'ex-untouchables' for their
be forced to uise novel techniques, but votes, and in order to do so must sit
after thq election they are likely to easy to many of the traditional rules
continue to operate much as before, of pollution governing social inter-
ie, with scanit interest in welfare and course. A high caste candidate who
developmenit or any other innovationi. assumes the customary air of superio-
Alternatively, the traditional leaders rity may well fail to win lower caste
may 'manage' the election so that votes and, at least, during the electioni
nonenltities are elected to the statutory period he is not like]y to demand from
panichayat. But even if stratagems those below him in the caste hierarchy
intended to reilder the elective princi- the traditional marks of respect. Elec-
ple ininocuLous are adopted, the intro- tions (like other modernising forces)
duction of clections has begun a sub- undercut the strict observance of the
tle alterationi of the patterni of village rules of ritual purity.
life, which is probably irreversible. Furthermore, where the ballot is
secret, economic dominance no longer
WEAKENN IN OF VERTICAL TIES
guarantees political power. Many
It is very commonily assumed that cases have been recorded of traditional
votinlg at panchayat elections is by ties being broken as a result of an
'blccks' of castes or factions. Candi- election. For example, C Parvathamma
dates almost always assume that each reports from a Mysore village that
caste or community will vote as a group "an unsuccessful candidate of the
and tend to solicit votes not from indi- Lingayat (a locally influential and
vi'dUalsbut from group leaders - the ritually high caste) party . . . severed
headman, elder, or head of a joint his ties with his kinsmen, his domes-
family. Horse-trading, based on the tic priest, and his Untouchable ser-
questionable assumption that the lea- vant's family, because they did not
der can in fact control the votes of vote for him. However, all. my infor-
his group, commonly takes place. It mants assured me that thes_ ruptured
is not rcally possible as yet to say how relations were only a temporary
far itn fact voting is by blocks and phase".13 The threat of such a break
how far it is based on individual pre- of traditional relations may often help
fercnces, but it is probably safe to to secure votes for a candidate, but
accept that in normal circumstances a the fact that his dependents can vote
caste-group in a village will vote as a against him, usually without suffering
group.. But even if this is so, the a permanent disability or penalty,
introduction of voting fundamentally indicates how elections encourage a
affects the social and political struc- new flexibility in caste relations, new
tture of the villagec community. As F group alignments, and new styles of
G Bailey points out, in the traditional behaviour.
system "one caste has direct control Factions frequently dominate village
over economic resources and it alone elections. A faction for our present
has a corporate existence: the other purposes may be defined as a division
castes derive their living by a depen- of the village community which cuts
denlt relationship upon the dominant across the caste divisions and forms
1079
Special Number July 1968
an alignment for political conflict.
Usually factions spring from a division
between antagonistic individuals, fami-
lies, or lineages within the dominant
caste. Such factions often have a long
history and may for a century or more
have divided the community into the
partisans of village Capulets and
Montagues, for the conflict at the top
continues right through the village
community and sometimes breaks out
into violence. Occasionally factions
within a village are based on two influ-
ential castes competing for dominance
rather than a split within the domi-
n-ant caste.
SYMBOLS OF CHALLENGE WITHIN ELITE
Beals and Siegel argue that fac-
tionalism "is essentially a phenomenon
of socio-cultural change".'4 But al-
though one might well argue that fac-
tions become more prominent and
numerous in a time of change, and can
themselves be agents of change, there
is no reason to believe that they have
not always been a feature of many
Indian villages. What is clear is that
where factions exist they form natural
electoral alignments. Elections pro-
vide a new outlet for factional con-
troversies and may even exacerbate
them, although elections do not often
create factions which did not exist be-
fore.'1 All this is frequently deplor-
ed, but it is probable that the existence
of factions indicates that the establish-
ed leadership is not unchallenged, and
that political authority is not immov-
ably lodged with one group.
I have said that factional divisions
do not usually reflect competition bet-
ween prosperous and under-privileged
castes, but rather splits within the
village elite. When an under-privileg-
ed caste tries to use elections directly
to better its lot, it usually fails because
the more prosperous castes 'gang up'
against it, and in any case the under-
privileged group is seldom in a posi-
tion to fight effectively for its rights.
Their leaders are not educated or
wealthy, the members of the commu-
nity have no economic security, and
most of them are dependants of upper
caste families. Cohn gives a significant
account of an election in which a lower
caste captured a majority, but was
frustrated in its use of power by a
boycott on the part of the defeated
upper castes.16 But factional conflict
does provide opportunities for lower
castes to improve their position by bar-
1080
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
gaining with the two factions or even
playing the one off against the other.
For, factionalism usually indicates a
break in the monolithic power of the
dominant caste, but does not always
disrupt the solidarity of the lower
castes. Indeed it may do the opposite,
making lower castes aware for the first
time that they have political influence
as holders of the balance.
It has become virtually a conven-
tion of the Panchayati Raj system that
the political parties should stand aloof
from village politics.17 Officially, 'at
any rate, the parties seldom evince
open interest in panchayat elections.
It is certainly true that the real group-
ings which tend to dominate panchayat
elections are not parties but local caste
or factional groups. The issues in a
panchayat election are usually entirely
local and concern old disputes and
personal or group animosities and
rivalries. But in many places there is
a strong tendency for the established
village leadership to identify itself with
the State ruling party, while their rivals
adopt the locally most significant oppo-
sition party. This is a new form of
an old phenomenon: prior to Indepen-
dence, village leaders in general sup-
ported the British; then they support-
ed Congress; now they support what-
ever party is in control at the State
level - indeed they may be thought
of as loyalists to the Raj whatever it
may be.18
This alignment of village castes and
factions with political parties is pro-
bably most true of the more politically
conscious areas such as West Bengal,
but nevertheless it is becoming clear
not only that village leaders are often
anxious to! identify themselves with
parties, but that the parties find the
temptation to become involved in pan-
chayat politics virtually irresistible.
The reason for this is perfectly simple
and understandable: Panchayati Raj
institutions dispose of a very consider-
able amount of patronage, which no
party would willingly see fall into the
hands of its rivals. Few parties have
much in the way of effective local
organisation in most of rural India;
but local factions can provide ready-
made party units, even if the alliance
between factions and party hardly
lasts beyond the election. In the
villagers' view, the election. is a con-
test between two or more leaders, each
supported by an elaborate network of
kinship ties, caste relationships, fac-
tional alliances, and personal loyalties.
it is not regarded as a contest of poli-
tical parties or rival policies and is
thought lo have little, if any, external
reference - except that the election
itself takes place at the behest of
government. The local issues may
have little bearing on the policies of
the various political parties, and
party leaders may well be entirely un-
known in the village; but the q-uestion
'who controls local patronage ? which
is decided in panchayat elections
makes it virtually impossible for the
parties not to take at least an unoffi-
cial interest in them, and in fact there
is in most places keen rivalry between
parties for control of panchayats.19
MODERNISATION
THROUGH CORRUPTION
I have mentioncd that voting is
usually by 'blocks' - caste groups,
lineages, or joint families. In normal
circumstances the candidate approaches
only the head of each block and soli-
cits the votes of the group he is
assumed to control. In. return the
candidate will often provide or promise
some concession for the group as a
whole. A group which supported the
successful candidate may reasonably
expect to bask in official favour. If
promises made during the election are
not redeemed, the group may change
its allegiance to the opposite party on
the next occasion. On the other hand,
a group which backed the unsuccess-
ful party may well be subjected to a
multitude of petty disabilities. Thus,
there is a tendency in some parts of
India for the more depressed commu-
nities to split their vote in order that
the group may not be victimised
whichever 'party' wins.20 Another
factor which tends to break up group
electoral solidarity is acute factional-
ism. If the dominant caste is bitterly
divided it will often be hard for low
caste dependants not to vote in ac-
cordance with their patron's allegiance,
and thus for all castes to be divided
at the polls. And the fact that in law
there is no official recognition of block
voting is an encouragement to the
gradual growth of a more individual
choice in elections and a slow break-
up of caste electoral solidarity.
Corruption is widespread in village
elections. W H Morris-Jones has
argued that much corruption in India
is "no more than behaviour in terms
of one idiom being looked at in terms
of another".2' But I would contend
that the corrupt practices which are
found in panchayat elections. repre-
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
s'nt political behaviour which is radi-
cally novel in the Indian village con-
text and whicth has a strong mclernis-
ing etfect. One cannot but recognise
how similar it is in many ways to
electoral corruption in nineteenth cen-
tury England.22 Nepotism and bribery
of government oflicials have been
known for centuries in India, of course,
but it is only now that those of h.gher
traditional status will set out to give
money, concessions, and privileges to
their social inferiors in return for
votes. Anyone conversant with Indian
society will realise how novel is be-
haviour such as this: "The Madigas
(an untouchable caste found in Andhra
and Mysore States) were made to spend
the night previous to the election in
the compound of the President (who
was a Kshatriya, i e, a member of a
high 'twice-born', 'clean' caste). They
were given a meal by the President.
The following morning, hefore they
were allowed to proceed to the polling
booth, the Madigas were smearcd with
the consecrated turmeric powder . . .
and made to swear in the name of
the deity that they would vote for the
President's party."':2 Here traditional
sanctions are used to support a new
style of behaviour. Bribery in itself
is usually known to be not enough;
the candidate must try to secure the
loyalty of the voter right upto the
moment when he casts his vote. To
this end he fraternises with those far
below him in the cast, hierarchy; he
feeds the voters and provides free
drink; sometimes he resorts to inti-
midation and strong-arm methods.
But in general it seems fair to say
that electoral malpractices are instru-
ments of social change - even, per-
haps, of economic redistribution in a
very minor way !
The effect of panchayat elections on
the position of the Harijans, thz
former 'Untouchables', deserves rather
more detailed attention. The Pancha-
yat Acts in, I think, every State insist
that there should be at least one Hari-
jan in each panchayat. Frequently
no Harijan in a village is anxious to
be elected, any more than the caste
villagers wish to have him on the
panchayat. But elected (or nominated)
they must be. Once elected, the Hari-
jan patich is often unwilling to
attend meetings; but he has a right, if
not a duty, to be there, and the
panches from the 'clean' castes must
like it or lump it if their Harijan
colleague chooses to attend meetings
and sit with them.24 At election time
all the adult Harijans havc votes.
Sometimes they can hold the balance
between competing factions and always
their votes are eagerly sought after by
the candidates. A caste Hindu who
hopes to win an election is almost
certain to be obliged to pollute him-
self by visiting, often for the first time,
the Harijan quarter of the village, if
not actually entering Harijan homes
and treating them as if they were his
cquLals.
In general it remains true that few
Harijans have the education, wealth,
or 'social pull' necessary for a success-
ful village political leader; but under
the influence of government policies
of Harijan uplift, this is gradually
changing. Education certainly im-
proves an individuals status within the
village, and is now more available to
Harijans than ever before. In years
to come the Harijan community is
likely to be better led and educated
and Harijans may be able to win elec-
tions on their own merits. While we
may concur with the general opinion
that at present the status, patronage,
and economic benefits channelled
through Panchayati Raj almost entire-
ly benefit the more prosperous castes,
we should also, note that possession
of the vote has substantially improved
the bargaining position of the Harijans,
and electioneering is breaking down
some ancient barriers which cannot
easily be repaired.
WOMEN BECOMEIMPORTANT
The position of women is analogous.
The fact that India has a woman
Prime Minister and that a number of
distinguished women played notable
parts in the Independence struggl_
should not be allowed to blind us to
the fact that in rural India, traditional-
ly, women have never played any part
in politics, let alone sat in panchayats.
With very few exceptions, in village
India no respectable woman took any
part in public life. Now, everywhere,
the suffrage has been granted to wo-
men and in some places there is a
stipulation that each panchayat must
include at least one woman in its
membership. It is hard to get the facts
to enablec us to compare the propor-
tion of men to women who exercise
their right to vote: one election study
reports that "approximately as many
women as men cast votes"25; another
that "the ratio of female to male voters
Special Number July 1968
at the polls was relatively low - about
one to four".'6 What does scem
generally agreed, however, is that wo-
men almost invariably vote as their
husband or the head of their joint
family tells them. A common initial
reaction to the inltroduction of elec-
tions on the part of the menfolk is to.
refuse to allow their women to take
any part. But later, when they realise
that the women's votes can be an asset
to them, they inistruct them on how
to vote and whom to vote for. But
this in itself is a substantial step to-
wards the political emancipation of
women: almost everywhere this is the
first time that women have been en-
couraged to play a role in public life
and accept any responsibility for the
broader community. And gradually
they may be expected to play a more
indepcndent role in Indian rural politics.
Where the law stipulates that -each
panchayat must include at least one
woman, the situation can become quite
comic. In a Mysore village the two
parties, obliged to nominate a woman
candidate each, and unable to find any
respectable woman both prepared to
stand and generally enotugh known to
attract votes, nominated a village tem-
ple prostitute for the one party and
a washerwoman of easy virtue, known
to be the mistress of the party leader,
for the other.27 But such cases are
not typical ! Sushil K Dey writes of
an aboriginal woman who became the
leader of a West Bengal village by
forcing the men to carry out necessary
drainage works by means of a threat-
ened strike of the village housewives.28
There was also a report in 1964 that,
in thirteen Andhra villages, all the
elected members of the panchayats were
women. It would be extremely inter-
esting to know the relationship of these
statutory panchayats to the traditioaal
-- and exclusively male - political
leadership of the villages concerned.29
It is certainly more common for the
*omen's membership of the panchayat
to be purely nominal: they are elected
to fulfil the law's requirements, but
they never attend meetings for fear
of acquiring a bad reputation as
women who sit and talk with men
other than their husbands. The political
role of women in India cannot be
changed overnight; but it should be
obvious that here again the elective
principle has started a process which
may be expected to accelerate.
The elective principle, whatever the
reaction to its introduction into village
1081
ECONOIMICAND POLITICAL WEEKLY
politics, is a disturbance of the esta-
blished order and alters the relation
of the village to State and n;tion. It
assists in the slow transformation of
the subject into the citizen - some-
thing which was not achieved at
Independence and cannot come sud-
denly. The villages are still reluctant
to accept any responsibility for gov-
ernment, and the hierarchical structure
of village life militates against demo-
cracy. It would be a major error to
suppose that the traditional village
socio-political system is dead, but it
would also be a serious mistake to
suppose that nothing has changed.
The introduction of elective politics
slowly but profoundly affects the whole
social and political structure of village
India. Old social structures - caste,
lineage, family, village - now adopt
novel behaviour and new attitudes.
Old behaviour patterns, prejudices, and
taboos are challenged. New methods
are developed of attacking and defend-
ing privilege and status. A hierarchy
of elected representatives is set up
alongside the traditional hierarchy.
Possibly the composition of the two
hierarchies may for a time seem simi-
lar, but they are based on conflicting
principles. Conflict may well increase,
and elections do more than crystallise
conflicts - frequently they multiply
and exacerbate them. And through
conflict mobility and new alignments
come to the village.
II
State Assembly Elections
In State politics, the village and the
national styles of politics meet and
mingle. And State Assembly elec-
tions3" provide an important insight
into this meeting. Superficially, State
elections look very similar to national
elections or elections in a western
democracy: party labels and slogans
are prominent, party leaders tour the
constituencies, the usual paraphernalia
of elections - posters, public meet-
ings, canvassing, committee rooms, and
are all there. But if one
so forth -
penetrates below this western veneer,
it becomes clear that the procedures
and alignmcnts and leaders of village
politics are immensely influential at
the State level also, and subtly modify
the forms of western electoral demo-
cracy. Panchayat elections may have
a direct and marked influence on sub-
sequent State elections, but th.e influ-
ence of village politics on State elec-
tions is pervasive. The very fact that
voting is an alien idea leads to com-
plex and varied reactions, some based
on total misunderstanding, others re-
presenting sophisticated attempts to
manage' the election.
In Andhiyur Assembly constituency
in Madras, for instance, in the 1962
election a considerable number of older
women were reported to have wor-
shipped the ballot boxes after exercis-
ing their franchise. In the same con-
stituency ballot papers were found
coated with turmeric - a common
sign of religious reverence.3' The
number of invalid votes is also high,
presumably because a good proportion
of voters still do not really understand
the very simple voting procedure in
spite of careful explanation by the
polling officers. But by far the most
surprising thing is that, in spite of the
novelty of elections, a relatively high
proportion of the voters actually vote
- well over fifty per cent in most of
the country in a general election.3-<
And it is remarkable how easily
bosses used to managing things in the
village game of politics learn to mani-
pulate the techniques of electoral ma-
chine politics.
The village is an established and
traditional community which provides
a challenging social context for pan-
chayat elections: it is inevitable that
there should be adaptation, sometimes
conflict, between new institutions such
as popular elections and this old con-
text. But the Indian State is not an
established and traditional social unit.
The clear intention of the Constitution
makers was that the States should be
large, heterogeneous, and multilingual
areas in which no one caste, religious
community, or language group should
be able to dominate. The States were
to be miniatures of the nation, consti-
tutionally very much designed to the
same specifications as the federal poli-
tical system. But this arrangement
collapsed with the linguistic reorgani-
sation of the States, and since 1959
the States of India have been smaller,
more numerous, and, with very few
exceptions, unilingual. From the point
of view of constitutional law, the new
States are in exactly the same position
as the old, but the effect of the re-
organisationi has been to make the
State frontiers coincide with real lingu-
istic and social boundaries. A further.
consequence is that traditional social
groupings have become far more in-
fluential in the new, smaller, and more
homogeneous States.
Special Number July 1968
Linguistic chauvinism has been a fea-
ture of Indian politics for a consider-
able time.': Selig Harrison saw it as
one of the greatest threats to the unity
of India:34 but, in fact, linguistic feel-
ing was directed not so much against
the nation and national unity as against
the multilingual States which compos-
ed the Indian Union, and against the
use of English as official language.
Linguistic redivision has allowed most
of the States to build uLp their political
identity on a firm basis of popular
feeling. The States are now not arbi-
trary divisions of the country, justifiable
only for reasons of historical accident
and administrative convenience. As
long as they were that, they were
schools of the national style of poli-
tics, but continued to be regarded by
the people as relics of colonialism. Re-
organisation brought State politics
closer to the people, and made it
easier for traditional leaders and influ-
ential regional groups to captureccon-
trol or, at least, exercise much influ-
ence over the use of power. B R
Ambedkar, the Untouchables' leader
and a major architect of the: Indian
Constitution who was for a period
N ehru's Law Minister, was perhaps
too pessimistic in seeing the formation
of linguistic States as a complete sell-
out to communalism: it "means", he
wrote, "the handing over of Swaraj to
a communal majority . . . In a lingtLiis-
tic State what would remain for the
smaller communities to look to ?"35
But he did foresee correctly 'that the
political significance of caste and com-
munity wouLldvastly increasc in State
politics.
MORE DEMOCRATIC, LESS WESTERN
Thus, in a sense, reorganisation made
State politics more democratic, but less
western in style. It meant, for one
thing, that State politics would be in-
creasingly cotnducted in the regional
language rather than English; thus
power was now open to others than
the small English-speaking elite. As
the States were smaller, communities
which had hardly any hope of influence
in national politics or in one of the
old heterogeneous States now had the
opportunity of great influence. In
general I think the influence of Brah-
mins on State politics has declined
dramatically - they form a highly
educated and privileged community,
but in few places are more than a
tiny minority. Similarly, the English
1083
ECONOMRMAND POLITICAL WEEKLY
educated, and urban middle classes are
not exercising as much influence as
they once did, but regional bqurgeoi-
sies have become very prominent.
The State Assembly constituency is
an artificial division, based almost en-
tirely on the number of electors and
paying scant attention to physical or
human boundaries, although there is
usually a fairly close relationship to
administrative areas.36 It is normally
roughly similar in size to a British
parliamentary constituency. These new
constituencics have encouraged a no-
table broadening of political horizons
for certain sections of the community.
Previously frail constituency-wide or
regional links and groupings have been
immensely strengthened since they
provide natural sinews, nerves, and
veins for the new body politic, the
State. Thus, electoral alignments may
in fact be traditional, but the consti-
tuency does not necessarily correspond
to traditional boundaries. Traditional
groups must adapt themselves to the
facts of constituency divisions if they
are to hold their own, le.t alone in-
crease their power.
All State Assembly constituencies are
now single-member, and election is by
universal adult franchise and a simple
plurality. The system, thus, has the
virtue of simplicity, which is of great
importance in a country where the
level of literacy is still so low and
where even today many villagers are
hardly aware of anything that happcns
outside their village.
FORCED INTO BROADER CONTEXT
Political and social modernisation
tends to disrupt the traditional style
of village solidarity, so that the village
is not often the real unit for voting
purposes in assembly elections.37 But
modern (or western) means of commu-
nication are still weak, and politics
has to utilise, and thereby strengthen
and transmogrify, traditional lines of
communication, in particular those of
caste and communal solidarity. Caste
provides the basic alignments of village
politics; it also supplies the natural
links between village politics and the
larger sphere. Village and caste poli-
tics are gradually drawn into a broader
context and forced to adapt it in order
to manipulate it. Traditionally, a local
caste would be united by numerous
marriage and kinship ties between
castemen living in various villages
within a fairly restricted area; occa-
sionally a caste panchayat might meet
to deal with a serious infringement of
caste rules; possibly it might share in
supporting a caste temple or choultry
in a pligrimage centre. But other in-
inter-viliage links were few. Now, how-
ever, the caste tends to organise on a
constituency, or broader, basis to pro-
tect and tight for its interests. Local
caste rivalries now find in State poli-
tics, particularly at election time, a new
forum for their expression. The same
principle appiies, as we have seen, in
village politics: factional or caste
groupings often identity themselves
with political parties, and then begin
to see State elections as yet another
trial of strength.
Selig Harrison may have oversimpli-
fied the relationship of caste and elec-
tions,38 but he has pointed out very
clearly one important truth: in select-
ing candidates and in planning a cam-
paign any political party, whatever its
principles, must pay close attention to
the caste composition and social
balance of power within each consti-
tuency. From the point of view of
the electors, the caste affiliations of the
candidates is often considered more
important than their party labels. There
are many seats which can only be won
by a candidate belonging to a parti-
cular caste and, outside the urban
areas there are few safe party seats
in which any candidate with the right
party label is virtually assured of
success.
I asked every MLA whom I inter-
viewed to give me an account of the
caste composition of his constituency.
Such information is not easily verifi-
able as there has been no census re-
turn on caste since 1931. But it seem-
ed to me significant that almost all
were able to mention the major castes
and communities in their constituencies
and had no hesitation in saying which
community was dominant and giving,
often in considerable detail, the size
and importance of each group. Success-
ful candidates in a very large propor-
tion of cases belonged to the domi-
nant caste. Clearly State elections are
fought at least as much in terms of
caste as in terms of party or the candi-
dates personality. This is true even
where parties which 'do not believe
in caste' such as the Communists or
DMK are strong. The candidates
caste and the caste composition of the
constituency are never irrelevant con-
siderations in State electoral politics.
It is important to emphasise that the
exigencies of electoral politics affect
Special Number July 1968
caste in at least two important ways.
The caste as a whole throughout a
region has to seek more sophisticated
organisation, and the viliage caste
groups become more aware of belong-
ing to a wider regional caste. The
regional caste, if it is to be effective
in advancing its interests, must deve-
lop a more modern organisation and
procedures directed explicitly towards
political goals. So far-reaching is this
change that E R Leach has asked, "If
a caste group turns itself into a poli-
tical faction does it then cease to be
a caste?" His conclusion is that it
does.3') It is also important to remem-
ber that, in most States, no one caste
is dominant in more than a few dis-
tricts. A dominant caste will seek,
therefore, to align itself with a State-
wide party (and therefore with other
castes from other parts of the State)
if it is to influence State politics. Where
one-caste parties exist they usually
tend to seek permanent alliances, or
even incorporation into, a more inclu-
sive party. Thus in 'Madrasthe Vanniya-
kula Kshatriya caste's Tamilnad
Toilers' and Commonwealth Parties
were absorbed into Congress while the
Thevar-dominated Forward Bloc,
which claims to be 'Marxist', is virtu-
ally part of the Swatantra Party.
PARTY LABELS AND POLICIES
Voters regard party labels as en-
hancing or decreasing the potential
usefulness to them of a particular can-
didate. A 'Government' candidate may
well be able to get more done. But
the voters are very little influenced by
official party policies, labels, or tradi.-
tions. Local 'big men' in general sit
fairly easy to party labels and party
discipline. They do not depend upon
the party for success and the local
party organisation is in fact their own
personal network of relationships under
another name. All this does not, of
course, apply without qualification to
urban constituencies. Th.ere the situa-
tion is modified by the very different
social milieu. This helps to account
for the frequency of floor crossing in
State Assemblies, and changes of party
label among candidates. It was re-
ported that by December 1967, a little
over nine per cent of the State legis-
lators elected in March had changed
their loyalties, some even thre.e or four
times. The three States with the high-
est number of defections - Madhya
Pradesh, UP, and H'aryana - are all
1085
Special Number July 1968
noted for factionalism based on caste
and communal considerations.40
In view of the fluidity of party
attachments it is hardly surprising that
independents contest State elections in
large numbers. Some may stand as
independents because they have never
had any party link. But it is, as we
have seen, something of a disadvantage
to be elected without a party label -
it is felt to reduce one's effectiveness
both in negotiations with officials and
in the business of the House. Yet if
one wins - or even polls a substantial
minority of votes - as an independent
it gives one a valuable bargaining coun-
ter with the party in power, which
may be willing to make significant con-
cessions in exchange for support.
GLITTERINGINDEPENDENTS
A reason for contesting as an
independent which is commonly given
is that the individual concerned fail-
ed to get the party nomination which
h- expected and desired.41 Such
candidates are seldom successful be-
cause the party has probabiy selected
in their stead someone who is in fact
considerably more influential. The
independent candidate may blot his
copy book by splitting an important
block of votes, thus antagonising both
the party and its candidate. Occa-
sionally, however, a man who has held
the seat or the nomination, or who
controls the local 'machine' is refused
the party ticket and will try to demon-
strate his continuing power by being
re-elected as an independent. Very
many independent candidates withdraw
before the poll,42 or without formally
withdrawing make no effort to fight the
election. The reason commonly given
for such behaviour is that the candi-
dates are waiting to be 'bought off'
by the serious candidates who wish to
avoid a confusing multiplicity of
candidates. Certainly, for a variety of
reasons, the number of candidates con-
testing each seat seems to be declin
ing. But even so some constituencies
seem to attract clusters of candidates
in 1962 in each of five Madras con-
stituencies eight candidates contested.
Other than independent candidates
are nominally selected by the parlia-
mentary board or election committee
of the State unit of the party. But this
procedure should not be interpreted
as making it possible for a party to
'parachute' complete outsiders into
safe constituencies. In fact, in State
politics a kind of locality rule has vir-
1086
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAWWEEKLY
tually become a convention of the
Constitution. The law lays down thaL
a candidate for an assemoly seat must
oe a voter within the State concern-
cd.42i But practice goes far bcyond
ths, and in fact candldates almost al-
ways belong within the constituency.
Not any local man is a suitable
candidate: he must have other quali-
fications: (a) he shouid be weaithy,
for he will be expected to pay at leasc
a substantial share of his election ex-
penses out of his own pocket and, if
elected, he will frequently incur ex-
penditure far in excess of his official
allowances. A poor man can hardly
kecp up the style of living expected of
an MLA, let aione fight the election.
(b) He should be local, for the cam-
paign is really about rival candidates
rather than policies or parties. Per-
sonality counts a great deal in State
el2ctions, but voters rarely trust a
candidate unless they know him pretty
well already. (c) He must be an in-
fluential community leader, with an
extensive network of family, caste, and
business ties within the constituency.
He will normally come from the domi-
nant caste, and other parties will try
to match against him candidates from
the same community. It is usually
assumed that a man's family, caste, and
clients will vote for him; opposition
tactics are intended to split this block
of votes. (d) Finally, a candidate should
be of proven ability in dealing with offi-
cials - clearly a person who can stand
up for the rights of his constituency.
It is sometimes felt that an educat-
ed man is more capable of doing this
than one who, however important in
village politics, does not feel at home
in the world of bureaucracy. But edu-
cation by itself is not enough, for
voters require to be assured that their
representative really knows his consti-
tuency and will be constantly loyal to
it. Nos amount of distinction in
broader circles can make up for the
suspicion that a man is not hundred
per cent devoted to the people who
voted for him. If a party desires a
particularly able man who does not
have a firm popular base in some con-
stituency or other to enter the legisla-
ture, it will usually try to bring him
into the upper chamber by indirect
election. The parties, thus, recognise
the narrow limits within which they
can manage elections.
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes are provided for under the
Indian electoral system by provision
of reserved seats. There is no sepa-
rate electoral roll for the Schedu.ed
Castes and Tribes, but in each State a
specified number of seats can only be
contested and occupied by members of
the appropriate community. Until
1961 there was a system of two-mem-
ber constituencies, one of the seats be-
ing reserved and the other general.
This has, however, been changed so
that now all constituencies return only
a single member, but in each State
scats are allocated to the Scheduled
Castes and Tribes in proportion to
their numbers. There is no provision
to ensure that reserved constituencies
have a majority of Scheduled Caste
voters, and in fact this rarely happens
sc that often a reserved constituency
has only a fairly small minority of
Scheduled Caste voters.44
RESERVED CONSTITUENCIES
Few Schvduled Caste candidates stand
in general constituencies, and very few
indeed of those who do are returned.45
Even in reserved constituencies, Sche-
duled Caste candidates are frequently
dependent on the local dominant caste,
and rely on the party for electoral ex-
pznses far more than other candidates.
it is a rare, Scheduled Caste candidate
who can afford to pay any consider-
able proportion of his expenses. He
is, therefore, driven either to stand as
a 'stooge' for some local 'big man' or
influential caste which will meet his
expenses, or to run merely as the
standard-bearer of a party which will
back him. Whichever electoral strategy
he adopts, if he is elected he will be
considerably less independent than
most other MLAs.
One might expect the reservation
system to encourage the growth of
small Scheduled Caste parties. This,
however, is not the case. Even
Ambedkar's Republican Party is very
weak - because only a wealthy party
can hope to influence elections even
to reserved seats. And it should
be remembered that, in reserved
constituencies, the majority of the
voteirs are likely to belong to other
castes and will hardly support the
candidate of a specifically Scheduled
Caste party. On the other hand,
tribal reservation does seem to en-
courage tribal solidarity and the deve-
lopment of tribal parties because a
considerable majority of the voters are
themselves tribals in a constituency
reserved for them.
ECONOMft AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
TABLE 1: CAMPAIGN EXPENSES IN
MADRAS ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1962
(Rs)
50,000 (2)
40,000
28,000
25,000
20,000 (2)
15,000 (2)
14,220
14,000
13,000
10,000
8,500
8,000
7,000 (3)
6.500 (2)
5,000 (5)*
4,800
3,500
3 20)1
1,100
Total Respondents: 30
* Legal limit.
Note: Figures in "rackets indicate that
more than one MLA gave the
same answer.
ELECTION EXPENSES
Election expenses in India are limit-
ed, iinder the Representation of the
People Act to Rs 5,00O for assembly
candidates and Rs 25,000 for parlia-
mentary candidates. This is in fact a
meaningless and unenforceable regula-
tion, as the Election Commission itself
admitted in its r-eport on the Third
General Election.46 In fact it appears
that the legal limits are commonly ex-
ceeded. V M Sirsakar gives a table
of electoral expenses in Poona, accord-
ing to which Congress spent between
Rs 10,000 and Rs 21,000 on each of
the four Assembly constituencies, while
other parties also in several cases ex-
ceeded the legal maximum.47 These
figures were obtained "from senior
workers of the respective parties".
In the course of interviewing Madras
MLAs, I ask:d them how they financed
their elections. Even when every al-
lowance is made for exaggeration, poor
memory, and desire to impress the in-
terviewer with the MLA's wealth, it
is pretty clear that, in most constitu-
encies, candidates spent more than tho
official maximum, in some cases very
considerably more. Some figures are
certainly on the low side: many MLAs
are well aware of the law and may
have underestimated their expenses for
fLar of awkward consequences. In one
case, I was pursued aftzr the conclu-
sion of an interview by an MLA who
demanded that I score out the figure
for expenses which he had just given
me and replace it with a 'safe' figure
of less than Rs 5,000. 1 did not ask
specifically how much was spent: thcse
figures were volunteered in the course
of more gencral discussions of elec-
toral finance.
Where does the money come from?
A very high proportion comes from
the pockets of the candidates, and, per-
haps, their friends. Congress MLAs re-
ported that they normaily paid Rs 500
to the party and in return got somc
printed material, a good deal of en-
couragement, but a direct monetary
grant only in exceptional circumstances.
The DMK normally paid Rs 1200
towards the expenses of each contest
in which an official candidate of th2
party stood - but that was little more
than a drop in the bucket. DMK
election funds were raised from small
donations and the profits from dramas,
variety shows, and public meetings with
popular speakzrs. Congress has more
reliable, numerous, and generous
sources of income, mainly from industry
and commerce. Occasionatly a wealthy
individual will finance the contest in
somr constitu_ncy in which he is in-
terested: I have records of a film star
underwriting a poverty-stricken DMK
candidate's expenses, of an industrialist
who was himself a Congress MLA
financing not only his own campaign
but also th, Congress campaign in a
nearby reserved constituency, and of
a Scheduled Caste candidate having
his entire election expznses paid by
the leader of the locally dominant
caste, whose client he was. In two
cases, MLAs reported that the candi-
date for the parliamentary seat had
contributed towards their expenses,
presumably reckoning that he stood or
fell with his fellow partymrn in the
same area.
Apparently, relatives often made sub-
stantial contributions, and probably the
same is often true of caste associations
and communal organisations. The
parties in general prefer candidates
who are capable of providing all their
own election expenses somehow or
other. Table 2 shows the replies of
MLAs to the question "How vere
funds raised for the election in your
constituency in 1962?".
On-cmay draw three conclusions fromn
Special Number July 1968
these data. First, a seat in a State
Assembly is clearly calculated to be
worth a lot of money. Second, the
party seldom contributes a substantial
proportion of election expenses and
this, on the 'he who pays the piper
calls the tune' principle, radically re-
duces party control over the legislators
and tends to make the legislature parties
amorphous alliances of members in
which discipline cannot easily be en-
forced. Third, it is almost as hard for
a poor man to enter an Indian legis-
lature as for a rich man to enter the
Kingdom of God; but if he does, he
is almost certain to be economically,
and therefore politically, dependent on
a wealthy patron.
WHERE DOES THE MONEY Go ?
What is the money spent on? As
published expense' accounts are uni-
versally acknowledged to be unrealis-
tic and very few good and detailed
election studi-s which examine this
topic have been published, we can only
answer that we don't know in any
detail, but a look at the possibilities
of expenditure in a typical campaign
can give us some ideas. Printed pro-
paganda played its part, but it is a
subordinate part in view of the low
level of literacy, although efforts are
certainly made to familiarise the voters
with the party symbols, and condition
theom to associate certain stereotypes
with the symbols. Election mretings
are held in large numbers, but are not
often well attended unless addressed
by some famous personage. In Madras,
the DMK seems to have more con-
fidencz in meetings than the Congress,
probably because DMK specialises in
chaste Tamil oratory and makes effec-
tive use of its film-star supporters.
Sometimes dramas and films are used
in electioneering - a form of propa-
ganda which has roots deep in the
Indian tradition. Transport and living
expenses for party workers can prove
TABLE 2: SOURCES OF ELECTION
FINANCE, MADRAS ASSEMBLY
CONTESTS, 1962
Party, friends, and own pocket 64
Friends and own pocket only 18
Party and friends only 10
Own pocket only 33
Party only 4
No response 77
Total Number of ILAs 206
1087
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Special Number July 1968

considerable, and sometimes there are even when they follow (as they usually by far the most important integrating
office expenses as well. do) administrative boundaries, are not factor is the fact that elections are
The vast majority of MiAs I natural social frontiers. Thus, within a contests between parties viich usually
interviewed agreed that the one really constituency, there is no developed attempt to produce consolidated lists of
effective mode of campaigning was constituency-wide network of relation- assembly and parliamentary candidates.
door-to-door canvassing. The amount of ships and communication which can I have tried to suggest earlier that the
canvassing undertaken personally by easily be adapted to political purposes. link between an assembly candidate and
the average candidate in the course of The party organisation might be ex- his party is commonly a tenuous one,
a campaign is fantastic, and although pccted to provide a constituency struc- and that assembly elections are not
not all candidates will attempt to ture of communication but, as I have usually understood by the voters as
canvass personally a very large pro- already suggested, local party organi- contests between two rival parties and
portion of the voters, they will certainly
sation prop r is generally weak or non- alternative State governments, but
try to meet at least the leaders of existent. What the party can do, how- rather as contests between weil known
each community and village in order ever, is to provide a link between the local personalities, castes, and factions.
to solicit the blocks of votes or 'vote various networks of traditional relation- The assembly candidate may find a
banks' which such men are believed to ships which have now, as a result of' party label a convenience; but for the
control. Even if the candidate is al- local politics, become nominally parliamentary candidates it is almost
ready the accepted leader of the neigh- affiliatccdto the party, and ensure that a necessity. The party is at least as
bourhood, high in caste status, a big they work together in fighting the interested in getting its men into par-
landlord, and a wealthy businessman, parliamentary election. liamont as it is in getting them into
even if he seems to have a parsonal Anothcr important factor to keep the assembly, and it expects its par-
strangehold on the life cf the consti- in mind is that the ordinary voter does liamentary and assembly candidates to
tuency, at election time if he wants to not cons:der that the parliamentary co-ordinate their campaigns. By and
win he must pay. F G i3ailey may be contest is about such vital issues as large it is the assembly candidatcs who
right in suggesting that universal suf- the State Assembly or village panchayat will attract or lose votes and in return
frage tends to discourage "corruption in clections. This attitude reflects the fact for bearing the party label they are
the Eatanswill manner", and that it that purely local issues can seldom expected to ensure that those who vote
has declined somewhat since before obtain a hearing in Delhi, whereas they for them vote for the party as well,
1952 when the franchise was restricted; are the daily bread of State and vil- i e, vote for the party's parliamentary
but the phenomenon of block voting, or lage politics. National politics remains candidate.
at least the common opinion that voters remote from 'the man in the village'.
operate in blocks and can be manipulat- Hle has no direct dealings with the ODD EPIPHENOMENAL
QUALITY
ed by their leaders, in my opinion qua- Union government, for, even in federal
lifies this effect of universal suffrage.48 In other words, from the voters'
matters, the State government frequent-
State elections bring into close re- angle, the parliamentary contest is an
ly acts as the agent of the Union. All
lationship the styles and alignments of appendage of the assembly contest,
the patronage with which he may be
village politics and the new national and the successful parliamentary can-
concerned is in the hands of the pan-
forms of political behaviour. The result didate gains his seat largely through
chayat or the State, not the Union.
is something of an amalgam. for State the good offices of his party colleagues,
Only the middle classes, the educated, the assembly
politics is comparatively new and in candidates and local
and the more substantial businessmen
practice incorporates features both of bosses. The assembly contest is bet-
are concerned with the kind of patron-
the village and the national systcmg. ween pe-rsonalities and concerns local
age which is in the hands of the issues; thz parliamentary contest is
And the situation is still a fluid one, Centre, and with the policies which
making it hard to predict in which generally between parties and about
are the peculiar business of Parliament.
direction things will flow. What one national and international issues, but it
The average voter is not really inter-
can say is that State elections have has an odd epiphenomenal quality be-
ested in the federal election, and sel-
played a significant part in building causel it is so dependent on the more-
dom has occasion to see his MP - local fight. As a consequence of all
up and expressing regional loyalties his MLA is both more accessible and
and have encouraged traditional social this, a successful parliamentary candi-
a more effective go-between with the date is far more beholden to his party
groups to mobilise themselves for po- relevant powers that be. It requires a
litical action on a State-wide basis. than the average MLA, and he is
high degree of political sophistication beholden to the local MLAs and party
to realise the significance of parliamen- bosses as well. And this is the back-
III tary politics, especially as the Union
Parliamentary Elections ground which explains how, for
government can be influenced as much example, when the succession to Lal
Indian parliamentary constituencies by the State governments as by Par- Bahadur Shastri was in dispute, the
arie very large. Each usually contains liament and most Union policies are State Chie.f Ministers were able so
500,000 to 750,000 voters. Madras State, in fact implemented by the State govern- successfully to dictate to the MPs from
with a population of over thirty-three ments acting as agents for the Centre. their States how they should vote.419
million in 1962 had forty-one parlia- In a General Election the parliament-
seven ary contest and the assembly contests The successful inte.gration of the par-
mentary constituencies, of which
liamentary and assembly campaigns and
were reserved for Scheduled Caste are closely integrated with one another.
elections shows itself in the interest-
candidates. In addition, the parliamen- Almost inNariably the parliamentary
ing fact that, although the voters are
tary constituency does not correspond constituency will coincide exactly with far less interested in the parliamentary
to any social grouping. Its boundaries. five or six assembly constituencies. But
1089
 ECONONIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Special Number July 1968

contest, the number of votes cast in
assembly and parliamnentary elections
closely corresponds. To sorRe extent
the conscientiousness of polling officials
in explaining to the voters their rights
and responsibilities in both clections
accounts for the fact that so few use
only one of their Notes. but the tigures
in Table 3 demonstrate not only the
efficiency of Indian electoral machinery
but also the expertise of party election
management. The electoral system could
hardly be better arranged for coming
to terms with established social align-
ments without necessarily capitulating
entirely to them, particularly at the
national level. Both the national parties
and the local 'big men get what they
want out of this rather subtle system
of horse-trading.
AN IMPORTANT SAY
party if they want a nominationi, anid His attendance at assembly sessions
if they winl they remain indebted to clearly gives him numerous opportuini-
the party and to the various social ties to advance the irlterests of his
groups which comprise its local constituents and keep their needs and
phalanxes. The latter may have little grouses before the public eye. And
interest in their MP's subscquent be- during the rest of the year when he
haviour, but the former expects his is at home he has a status which makes
disciplined support of the party line in him the obvious channel through
return for the party's backing and which to approach government. The
liaison with the groups which provided MP, on the other hand, represents a
electoral support. This appears to be sprawling and vast area in much of
part of the reason why floor crossing which he is hardly known. In Delhi
is so much less common in Parliament he has few opportunities to discuss
than in State legislatures and why the local affairs. Like Burke's ideal legis-
parliamentary parties are more cohesive lator, he goes to consult the national
and disciplined than most legislature interest, not merely to canvass the
parties. needs of his supporters. As compared
Close personal contact between an with the MLA he is freer from local
MP and the people he represents is pressures, but more responsive to the
impossible in view of the vastness of party organisation and party discipline.
parliamentary constituencies and the
social distance which commonly exists EDUCATED OUT OF LOCALISM

Party influence on parliamentary betwe,en the M.P and thev man in the Local 'big men' and bosses do niot
elections is also shown clearly at the village. It is uncommon for a voter stand for Parliament. They are experts
stage of candidate selection.50 It is rare to know the name of his MP, and in the village game of politics and carry
for a man to hold a dominating posi- only very seldom indeed can be tell increasing weight in State politics, but
tion in an area as large as a parlia- you what his MP looks like, what his the goals of national politics are not
mentary constituency so that the no- opinions are, and so forth. It is a of much interest to them, and the rules
mination is in his pocket. And it is physical impossibility for a candidate they find confusing. The main excep-
rare for even the most locally influen- by himself to impress his personality tion to this rule is that some of the old
tial of men to want a seat in parlia- on a constituiency so large, and if feudal princes and their families, al-
ment for themselves. Thus, the party elected he is quite incapable of main- ways experienced in some version of
doss usually have an important say taining day-to-day contact with the national style of politics and able to
in the choice of parliamentary candi- problems of his constituency. capitalise on old but persistent loyalties
dates. Usually they will choose some- Thus we can understand why the have successfully entered Parliament,
one from the State. This is for the parliamentary contests tend to attract a converting the continuing respect of
very practical reason that outsiders are particular type of candidate, very differ- their former subjects into votes. In the
distrusted, and while the candidate's ent from those who contest village and 1962 election the Maharani of Jaipur
personality is not so important a fac- State elections. Membership of Parlia- and the Maharani of Gwalior polled
tor as it is in State elections, it can ment does not enhance one"s status the highest votes in India. But, in
still prove an asset or liability to the and influence in the locality as does general, parliamentary candidates are
party. In rural constituencies it is membership of the State Assembly. those who have been educated out of
essential that the candidate speak the Furthermore, membership of Parliament localism - middle-class intellectuals
regional language and know something is virtually a full-time job which takes capable of dealing with principles and
of the special problems of the arza, one far from home for a good part of policies, interested in ideas and very
and it is a considerable advantage if the year. The MLA, on the other hand, much aware of the world outside the
he has connections with the local power is o nly away for a total of six weeks constituency, the State, and even the
structure. But in urban constituenci.s or thereabouts each year, and he nation. Professional people make ideal
it is sometimes possible to 'parachute' travels no further than the State capital. parliamentary candidates - lawyers,
in an outsider, although if he has no it is easy for him to remain the activc teachers, journalists, and doctors.
popular base in the region it is exceed- and effective leader of his area, closely Minority communities with a tradition
ingly difficult. Hopeful parliamentary in touch with the state of opinion and of learning such as the Brahmins have
candidates must go cap in hand to the the changing balance of political power. in most places a better chance of con-
testing the parliamentary seat than the
TABLE 3: TOTAL VOTES FOR STATE ASSEMBLIES AND LOK SABIIA assembly seat. The parliamentary can-
didate is usually urbanised, politically
State Assemblies Lok Sabha
sophisticated and cosmopolitan. And on
105,944,495 each of these counts he is disqualified
1952 103,801,199 from playing an effective role in village
121,842,153 120,513,915
1957 politics.
119,013,386 115,168,890
1962 It is probable that a great deal
142,178,600 145,505,660 more party money goes into parliamen-
1967
tary elections than State elections.
Note : The total electorate for the Lok Sabha is larger than
that for the State
Parliamentary election expenses are
Assemblies as it includes the voters in all the Union Territories.
1091
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Special Number July 1968

TABLE 4: COMPANYCONTRIBUTIONS10) at least Rs 6,00O,000.'-) Th is decentral- the varieties of style and kadership
PAR-ry FUNDS isation of the raising of funds is symp- within the Indian polity. But it should
(Rupees thioisanid) tomatic of the sprcad of regionalism and not be assumed that these diffcrcnices
bossism evcn within parties like Con- are necessarily permanent, or that this
Congress Swatantra
grcss with a strongly centralised formal paper has done more than analyse a
1961-2 7,904 2,076 structure, andl it illustrates also how stage in Indian political developmcnt.
(15.853) (3,632) characteristics of the lower Fevels of Frce elections were intended to inlte-
1962-3 982 54
1963-4 303 8 politics are nlow penetratilng to the grate politics and society into a
niationial arena. The parliamentary pyramidal democratic system in which
Source: Gopal Krishna: "One Party candidate is not necessarily less dlepend- leadership could be selected and trained
Dominance -- Development cnt on the party than before, but his through experience of the new demo-
and Trends", in "Party System primary loyalty is now more likely to cratic ethos, gradually percolating up-
and Elcction Studies", Bom-
bay, 1967. be to a rcgional party unit or to the wards from thc villages to Delhi: the
boss of a faction within the party three levels were not intended to be
candidates expect the rather than to the national party. water-tight compartments. The electo-
high, and ofteni
party to make a substantial contribution Another illustration of how village
ral system was calculated to ensure
towards them. Smaller parties which arc styles of politics percolate upwards by government by consent without capi-
less wealthy oftenl find it hard to get means of clections is provided by the tulating to reactionary traditional forces,
parliamentary candidates capablc of serics of outbursts of arson in the slums
to be an agent of political mobilisa-
paying a sLibstanitialsharc of their own of Madras city in the wakc of the tion and modernisation and social
expenses. In th_ Hinidui of AuLguLst15I 1967 General Election. Arson is a changc. That elections have not yet
1966, there appeared a large advertisc- favourite weapon in village factional achieved all that was hoped from them
ment inserted by the Swatanltra party. quarrels, anid frequently accompanics
need occasion no surprise; nor need
Alongside a picture of C Rajagopala- panchayat elections. There was abund-
we lament that some of the effects of
chari, the party leader, there was ant wvidence to suggest that the Madras clectoral democracy have been un-
"Rajajis Inidependence Day Alppeal: I hut-burnings were payments of grudgcs
cxpected and by many regretted. For
appeal . . . for good qualified men to aroused during the election campaignls. clections are ccrtainly a powerful agent
stand for Parliament on the Swatantra Eveni in the citi.es peoplc fall back on
of political and social change in the
ticket who are able to meet their own traditional techniques of conflict.
direction of democracy and modernity.
clectiorn expenses".
Parliamentary elections in India ar e
carefully conitrived - whether inten- Notes
ELECTION FUNDS
tionally or not - to cnsure that they
I It should be rioted that the elec-
A major part of party funds is are not dominated by traditionial social tions with which this paper is
raised immediately before Genieral alignments but can nevertheless be re- concerned are direct elections only
Elections, mainly in large sums from garded as democr-atic. The contests are -- I will not consider, for obvious
companies and indiustrialists whose to a remarkable cxtent insulated from reasons, the variouLs forms of in-
the local factionial and caste disputes direct election and nomination by
primary interests are clearly in national which members are selected for
rather than local politics. Table 4 shows which have such grcat influence on Panchayat Samitis, Zilla Parishads,
the contributions to Congress and panchayat and State elections. Indian State Legislative Councils, or the
Swatantra of 144 major Indian com- national politics has the structure of Rajya Sabha. Nor will I discuss
by consent expressed municipal elections, partly because
panies over a three year period, the govcrnmenit so small a proportion of the po-
first being an election year. The official through free elections, b ut the national pulation is involved, but also (and
returns of total expenditure in the elections sometimes look like rather more importantly) because urban-
isation in India has such complex
1962 General Election by the two carefully organised charades laid on social effects that an examination of
parties are shewn in brackets for pur- when the animosities and surplus ener- the impact of elections in urban
pos-s of comparison. gies of the participants have beel India deserves a major study to
exhausted in the villagc and State itself.
Such figures should be regarded withl
electoral contests. 2 Hinidu, June 30. 1964.
great cauttion. ln particuilarthere seems
to be a growing tendency for contri- Elections in India are not only of 3 T Scarlett Epstein: "Economic
butions towards electioni expenses to be interest as the method by which the Development and Social Change in
given dir-ect to party bosses or to new-style political leadership is recruit- SLouth India", Manchester, 1962,
pp 148-153.
particular candidat-s, perhaps, on the ed; they also represent a novel insti-
ground that this is now the more tution and pattern of behaviour which 4 We are not concerned here with
effective way of bringinlg prcssurc and intcracts with cstablished social and the - in my opinion rather ques-
tionable - explanation which Scar-
buying legislative support. Just beforc political structures in ways which are lett Epstein brings forward to
the l1967 Electioni, it was anniouincc(l inifluenltial in the shaping of Indiani account for the difference in atti-
that the Congress party clectioni fun(d democracy. The various echelons of tude to change in the two villages.
was merely ten per cent that of 1962, political leaderslhip are selected in an My point is that whatever the atti-
tude to change, elections are an
but party bosses, leaders of party fac- apparently similar manner, but 1 hope agent of social change.
tiOils, and certain selected candidates I have demonstrated that in practice an
certainly got more thani ever before. election operates differently in village. 5 Op cii pp 278-281.
C B Gupta, for instance, the UP State, and nation, and these differences 6 M N Srinivas (ed): India's
Congress boss was said to have received go far towards helping us to understand Villages", 2nd ed, Bombay, 1960, p

1093
Special Number July 1968 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

20; Ralph W Nicholas: "Factions 19 See Ralph W Nicholas: "Fac- 35 Tines of India, April 23, 1953,
--A Comparative Analysis". in tions - A Comparative Analysis"; cited in S Harrison: "Caste and
"Political Systems and the Distri- K Ranga Rao: "Leadership in a the Andhra Communists", Ameri-
bution * of Power", ASA Mono- Community Development Village'. cai Political Science Review, Vol
graphs, 2, London, 1965. Economnic Weekly, September 4, 50, No 2, 1956.
7 "Reconstruction of 'Indian polity", 1965; C V H: "Panchayat Elec-
tions in Andhra", Ecoiiontoic Week- 36 In Madras in 1962 constituencies
1960, p 51. Cited in "Political Sys- contained between 70,000 and
tems and the Distribution of ly, June 13, 1964; R H Retzlaff;
op cis, pp 116-7. This view is 120,000 voters. See F G Bailey:
Power', p 3. "Politics and Social Change", pp
challenged by C Parvathamma, op
8 For examples see Ralph :H cit. 111-2.
Retzlaff: "Village Government in
India, Bombay, 192, Chap V; K 2(0 Even strong and influential groups 37 But see F G Bailey, op cit, pp 29-
Ranga Rao: "Leadership in a may split their votes or even supply 30 and 112.
Community Development Village" candidates to both parties in order 38 See his two works already cited.
Ecoizonomic Weekly, September 4, not to be at a disadvantage which-
1965; C Parvathamma: "Elections ever side wins. See R W Nicho- 39 E R Leach (ed): "Cambridge
and Traditional Leadership in a las: "Village Factions and Politi- Papers in Social Anthropology
Mysore Village", Econtomic Week- cal Parties"'. 2: Aspects of Caste", Cambridge,
ly, March 7, 1*4. 1960, p 6.
21 I n C H Philips (ed): "Politics ajnd
9 Hinidu, June 30, 1964 and June 1, Society in India", London, 1963,
1964. 40 Hinzdtu, December 12, 1967.
p 142.
10 See B N Singh: "The lmpact of 22 See H J Hanham: "Elections and 41 In 1962 a total of 884 Congress-
the Community Development Pro- Party Management", London, men were either suspended from
gramme on Rural Leadership" in 1959, and R Wraith and E Simp- membership or expelled from the
Park and Tinker (eds): "Leader- kins: "Corruption in Developing party for contesting the -elections
ship and Political InstitUtions in Countries", London, 1963. against the official. nominees.
India", Bombay, 1960, p 363; Centre for the Study of Develop-
Kusum Nair: "Blossoms in the 23 C Parvathamma: loc cii. ing Societies "Occasional Papers
Dust", London, 1961, pp 153-159. 24 Traditionally it is considered im- 1: Party System and Election
11 Epstein, op cit, pp 278-9; F G permissible for a Harijan to sit in Studies", Bombay, 1967, p 70 n.
Bailey: "Politics and Social the presence of a caste Hindu.
42 In 1957, 367 candidates in Madras
Change", London, 1963, p 96. 25 M E Opler: "Factors of Tradition withdrew after having lodged nomi-
12 F G Bailey: ,"Tribe, Caste, aned anid Change in a Local Election in nations, and a further 97 withdrew
Nation", Manchester, 1960, p 258. Rural India", in Park and Tinker before the poll. In 1962, 390
13 C Parvathamma : "Elections and (eds): op cit, p 145. candidates withdrew after nomina-
Traditional Leadership in a Mysore 26 RetzlalT, op cit, p 108. Cf Bailey: tion, and in 1967 the number was
Village - It", Econiomiiic Weekly, "Politics and Social Change", pp 461.
March 14, 1964. 40-41. 43 Representation of the People Act,
14 See "Pervasive Factionalism", 27 C Parvathamma; /(lc cii. 1951, Section 5(c).
American Anzthropologist, Vol 62,
pp 394-417. Cf D F Miller: 28 In Park and Tinker (eds): 'Com- 44 See W J M Mackenzie: "Free
"Factions in Indian Village Poli- munity Projects in Action in India' Elections", London, 1958, 36-7.
tics". Pacific Affaihs, Vol 38, Nc op cih, p 356.
1 (Spring 1965), and Ralph W 29 Hitndu, June 30, 1964. 45 In 1962, in Madras, 140 Scheduled
Nicholas, op cit. Caste candidates contested reserv-
30 MNuchof the data on elections in ed seats and only 39 stood in gene-
15 Rztzlaff makes the interesting point Madras State int this section was ral constituencies. Only one was
that the courts, another modern collected in interviews with 148 successful in a general consti-
political institution, are also used members of the Madras Legisla- tuency.
by factions as a new context with- tive Assembly which I conducted
in which to pursue their disputes. with the help of some of my MA 46 Hintdu, February 10, 1966.
op cit, p 14. students at the Madras Christian
College in 1964-6. 47 V M Sirsakar: "Political Behaviour
Bernard S Cohn in McKim in India', Bombay, 1965, p 73.
Marriott (ed): "Village India", 31 "Report on the General Elections,
Chicago, 1955. But cf S C Dube: 1962", Madras, Government 48 F G Bailey: "Politics and Social
"India's Changing Villages, Press. Change". pp 3324; Myron Weiner
London, 1958, p 31. 32 In the Kerala Assembly election and Rajni Kothari (eds), "Indian
in 1960, 84.4 per cent of the elec- Voting Behaviour", Calcutta, 1965,
17 The theory is that the parties play torate voted, and in the 1962 pp 32-3, 43-4.
no part in Gram Panchayat elec-
tions, but are actively concerned Assembly elections only two States
(Bihar and Madhya Pradesh) had 49 See my article "After Nehru",
with Panchayat Samiti and Zilla- Parliamentary Aflairs, Spring,
Panchayat elections. But as the polls of less than 50 per cent. Michael Brecher:
1966; also
last two are normally indirect, e g, 33 Linguistic chauvinism shows itself "Succession in India", Oxford,
Gram Panchayat chairmen are in the States of southern and 1966, Chap VillI, esp pp 209-223.
usually ex o*fficiomembers of the castern 'India - Madras, Andhra,
Panchayat Samiti, it is hard to see West Bengal, Assam, for example 50 1 acknowledge my indebtedness to
how this is possible. In practicc as a highly xenophobic type of Ramashray Roy's paper "Selection
the theory is more a fiction than regionalism. In the Hindi States of Congress Candidates", publish-
a convention. See Paul Brass: such as Uttar Pradesh it is express- ed in five parts in Econiomitic anid
"Factional Politics in an Indian ed in a determined attempt to make Political Weekly, Vol 1 no 20 and
State", Bombay, 1966, pp 224-228. Hindi the effective national and Vol It Nos 1, 2, 6, and 7. He brings
official language, and a conviction out clearly that procedures and
18 Ralph W Nicholas : "Village Fac- that the Hindi areas are the heart- pressur'esare different in the selec-
tions and Political Parties"',Journial tion of candidates for Parliament
of Cotnnzontw.ealth Political Studies, land of a basically homogeneous
India. and for the State Assemblies.
Vol 2, No 1, pp 17-42; S C Dube:
"Indian Village", London, 1955, p 34 "India - The Most Dangerous 51 Econlomic antd Political Weekly,
227. Decades", Princeton, 1960. February 11, 1967.

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