Social Media and Political Participation A Moderated Mediation Model of Exposure To Disagreement and Willingness To Self Censor

Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication
Social Media and Political Participation: A Moderated

Mediation Model of Exposure to Disagreement and
Willingness to Self-Censor
Journal: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication

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Manuscript ID JCMC-18-287
Manuscript Type: Full-length Research Article

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social media, political disagreement, network heterogeneity, self-

Keywords:
censorship, expressive participation, political participation
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International Communication Association

Page 1 of 31 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication
SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 1

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3 Social Media and Political Participation: A Moderated Mediation Model of Exposure to
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6 Disagreement and Willingness to Self-Censor
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10 The goal of this study is to advance our understanding on the role of social media in contributing
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to citizens’ democratic life. Using two-wave panel data collected via face-to-face interviews in
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15 Colombia, this study explores the mechanisms by which social media use influences offline
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17 expressive participation. This study expects that people who engage with politics on social media
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will be exposed to more political disagreement, which will in turn foster offline expressive
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22 participation. In addition, this study proposes a moderated mediation model to explore how the
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24 relationship is conditioned by individuals’ levels of willingness to self-censor. Results confirm

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26 exposure to disagreement mediates the association between engagement with politics on social
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29 media and expressive participation, and the indirect effect is stronger for people with low
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31 willingness to self-censor than those with strong willingness to self-censor.
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Keywords: social media, political disagreement, network heterogeneity, self-censorship,
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38 expressive participation, political participation
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60 International Communication Association
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication Page 2 of 31

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3 Social Media and Political Participation: A Moderated Mediation Model of Exposure to
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6 Disagreement and Willingness to Self-Censor
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8 Social media has become one of the popular channels for people to get news and learn others’
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10 opinions about political issues. Recent political events such as the Arab Spring and recent U.S.
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presidential campaigns have attracted wide scholarly attention to the role of social media in
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15 participatory democracy. Many studies have confirmed that social media is positively associated
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17 with participatory behaviors, such as civic activities (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Kim,
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Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013), protest (Macafee & Simone, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013), and political
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22 participation (Choi, Lee, & Metzgar, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Lu,
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24 Heatherly, & Lee, 2016). The attention then has shifted toward identifying mechanisms of the
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26 relationships. Some researchers highlight the role of social media in growing discussion network
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29 heterogeneity (Barnidge, 2015; Choi et al., 2017; Kim & Chen, 2015; 2016; Kim et al., 2013).
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31 They address that social media increases citizens’ opportunities to encounter diverse political
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33 information and opinions, which consequently leads to a greater participatory behavior.

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Meanwhile, past studies have produced mixed evidence on the impact of experiencing
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38 political disagreement on participatory behavior. While a group of scholars found a positive
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40 relationship between exposure to disagreement and political participation (McLeod et al., 1999;
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43 Rojas, 2008; Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel‐Manor, & Nisbet, 2006), others showed that
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45 exposure to disagreement generated political avoidance and apathy by giving people pressures of
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social accountability and political ambivalence (Mutz, 2002; Nir, 2011). In this regard, the
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50 current study proposes two possible scenarios to further understand how use of social media for
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52 politics – as a source of political information and as a place to express political opinion –
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54 influences political participation, particularly in consideration of a role of exposure to
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3 disagreement. First, this study acknowledges that not all types of participatory behavior are
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6 related to exposure to disagreement in the same fashion. In fact, the relationship may rather vary
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8 depending on the characteristics of each form of participatory behavior. Second, the relationship
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10 may be also differentiated depending on certain individuals characteristics.
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In this regard, the goal of this study is to delve into these two possibilities to shed light on
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15 the relationship between engagement with politics on social media and participatory behavior.
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17 With respect to the first scenario, this study narrows in on expressive participation among the
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broad category of participatory behavior. Social media provides communication environment in
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22 which people easily encounter information and opinions that are different from their own views
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24 (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Messing & Westwood,
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26 2012), and exposure to diverse viewpoints has been known to be highly relevant to own opinion
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29 expression (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). However, studies on social media have paid
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31 relatively less attention to expressive behavior, compared to other types of participatory behavior
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33 such as civic engagement and protest (e.g., Kim et al., 2013; Valenzuela, 2013). In this regard,
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this study examines how engaging with politics on social media influences expressive
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38 participation, with an emphasis on the role of exposure to political disagreement in the
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40 relationship. This study particularly focuses on offline expressive participation. Encountering
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disagreement is expected to have a distinct impact on offline expressive behavior compared to in
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45 online setting due to the strong sense of social presence.
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47 With respect to the second scenario, this study examines how the relationship between
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49 using social media for politics and offline expressive participation is conditioned by individual
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52 characteristics. Willingness to self-censor refers to an individual desire to grasp the opinion
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54 climate to decide whether to express own opinions in public or not, and this is an individual
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3 characteristic strongly related to expressive participation (Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005).
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6 That is, social media use will increase likelihood of being exposed to political disagreement,
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8 which will in turn influence offline expressive participation; but the relationship may differ
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10 depending on one’s level of willingness to self-censor. As demonstrated by the notion of spiral of
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silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), people who have a strong desire to self-censor will be less
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15 likely to engage in offline expressive participation compared to those with low level of
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17 willingness to self-censor especially when they are exposed to disagreement.
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Overall, this study aims to advance our understanding about the influence of engaging
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22 with politics on social media on participatory behavior by outlining a mediated moderating
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24 model. The purpose of this model is twofold. First, it expects that social media use facilitates
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26 individuals’ exposure to political disagreement. Second, exposure to political disagreement
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29 encourages expressive participation, particularly when people have a low level of willingness to
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31 self-censor. To test these expectations, this study uses an original two-wave panel survey
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33 collected via face-to-face interviews with a national sample of Colombians, which is better suited
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than cross-sectional data to make causal inference. This study specifically focuses on use of
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38 Facebook, which is the most popular social media site in Colombia. The findings will contribute
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40 to the debates on the roles of social media in our democracy; whether and how social media
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strengthens or undermines the basis of deliberative and participatory democracy.
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45 Literature review
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47 Social Media and Political Disagreement
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49 Since the advent of the Internet, some scholars have expressed concerns that the Internet will be
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52 harmful for democratic society, as it may offer homogeneous and selective communication
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54 environment (e.g., Hindman, 2009; Sunstein, 2001). However, recent studies have found
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3 contradicting evidence that the online environment indeed opens a gate that facilitates citizens to
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6 communicate with others who have diverse opinions (Bakshy et al., 2015; Brundidge, 2010; Lee
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8 et al., 2014; Messing & Westwood, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2003). That is, social media would
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10 constitute a part of a society’s deliberative system for democracy by promoting citizens’ ordinary
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conversation about current issues.
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15 The phenomenon may be facilitated by features of social media platforms. First, social
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17 media blurs basic social boundaries, which often limit the flow of ideas in terms of geography,
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time, space, and situation, and thereby social media becomes a place in which diverse ideas can
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22 easily flow around. Moreover, given the weakened social boundaries, social media allows people
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24 to stay connected with loosely tied, far-reaching ‘friends’ that they may have fewer chances to
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26 interact with in offline (Bakshy et al., 2015). Such ‘friends’ networks are consisted of people
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29 with more diverse interests, backgrounds, and ideas compared to strongly tied, proximate
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31 networks (Granovetter, 1973). Accordingly, it is likely that people who use Facebook as a source
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33 for political information or a place for opinion expression are exposed to political content or
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conversation with which they may not agree with – incidentally or not –, because political
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38 content can be pushed to them by their ‘friends’ networks or through an algorithm, which also in
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40 turn encourages conversation (Anspach, 2017; Bode, 2016; Brundidge, 2010).
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Furthermore, people may be more likely to express their political viewpoints on social
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45 media than through face-to-face communication. Social media offers communication
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47 environment in which requires a relatively lower sense of social presence, which make people
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49 feel more comfortable and easy to express their opinions for controversial issues (Bargh,
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52 McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002). Moreover, social media allows users to not only get political
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54 information, but also express own opinion, recommend certain political news, and produce
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3 political content (e.g., commenting, posting, endorsing, and sharing) (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014;
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6 Valenzuela, 2013). As a result, people who engage with politics on social media would have
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8 more chances to be exposed to diverse opinions than in an offline setting. For example, more
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10 than a third of social media users reported that they have learned from social media that their
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friends’ political leanings were different than they have thought, and about three quarters have
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15 never agreed or only sometimes agreed with their friends’ political postings (Rainie & Smith,
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17 2012). These experiences may stimulate discussion with those who have different opinion.
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Studies reported that social media use predicted exposure to political disagreement
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22 (Barnidge, 2015; Kim & Chen, 2015; Kim et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Yang, Barnidge, &
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24 Rojas, 2017). Yang and colleagues (2017) found that individuals who engage with politics on
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26 Facebook (e.g., news consumption, news sharing, and opinion expression) are more likely to be
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29 exposed to political disagreement. Lee and colleagues (2014) found that use of social media for
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31 news and politics is positively associated with frequent conversation with diverse groups of
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33 people. Kim and colleagues reported that social media use for news increases discussion with
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heterogeneous networks (Kim & Chen, 2015; Kim et al., 2013). Thus, this study expects that
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38 people who engage with politics on Facebook are more likely to experience disagreement.
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40 H1. People who engage with politics on social media (Time 1) will be positively
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associated with exposure to disagreement (Time 2).
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45 Social Media and Expressive Participation
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47 Expressive participation, as a sub-dimension of broader spectrum of political
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49 participatory behavior, refers to “a form of political participation that entails the public
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52 expression of political orientations” (Puig-i-Abril & Rojas, 2007, p. 29). To date, there is no
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54 clear consensus on the conceptualization and operationalization of expressive participation. From
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3 the traditional perspective, expressive participation was often excluded from or sometimes
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6 merged into political participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Some view expressive
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8 participation as more personal expression of support for candidates or policies in public,
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10 including displaying bumper stickers and yard signs (Endersby & Towle, 1996), while others put
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more weight on the aspect of campaigning and mobilization through opinion expression,
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15 including working for a political campaign and trying to persuade someone to vote for or against
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17 a candidate (Scheufele & Eveland, 2001; Stanyer, 2005). Moreover, expressive participation is
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often operationalized as political conversation such as discussion with friends about politics and
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22 talking to public officials (Boyle et al., 2006). However, others argue that political conversation
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24 is rather a precursor of all types of participatory behavior (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, &
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26 Shah, 2010; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Thus, it is necessary to define expressive participation.
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29 There is a consensus across studies that expressive participation is public. Compared to
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31 non-public participation (i.e. voting, donating money to a candidate), individuals may feel harder
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33 to engage in expressive participation due to the pressures of being seen or heard by other people
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as well as being accountable of own opinion (Scheufele & Eveland, 2001). Second, expressive
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38 participation includes individualistic activities. Compared to collective forms of participation
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40 (i.e., attending a political rally), expressive participation is mostly operated individually in
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ordinary life (Stanyer, 2005). Thus, unlike large-scaled events held by organizations (i.e.,
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45 attending a town hall meeting), individuals decide when to engage in expressive participation,
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47 and they can repeatedly do it when they want to (Hong & Rojas, 2016). Lastly, despite the
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49 individualistic engagement, expressive participation may be social activities (Hayes, Scheufele,
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52 & Huge, 2006). Unlike electoral activities (i.e., voting), expressive participation offers chances
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54 to exchange opinion and information or even change opinions of other people who are involved.
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3 According to this conceptualization, this study operationalizes offline expressive participation as
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6 behaviors including writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine, calling to a live radio or
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8 television, and signing a petition (Puig-i-Abril & Rojas, 2007). A number of literature confirms
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10 that social media use is positively associated with overall political participatory behavior, and
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expressive participation has been used as a sub-dimension of political participation in many
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15 cases (Boulianne, 2015; Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang, 2015 for a review). This study expects that
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17 engagement with politics on Facebook has positive influence on offline expressive participation.
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H2. People who engage with politics on social media (Time 1) will be positively
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22 associated with offline expressive participation (Time 2).
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24 Furthermore, this study predicts that exposure to disagreement is associated with

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26 expressive participation. On the one hand, encountering disagreement may encourage
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29 individuals’ willingness to deliberate and refine own viewpoints as well as others (Delli Carpini,
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31 Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). This process involves revealing own opinion and exchanging with others
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33 (McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004), which is often taken place
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through expressive participation. For example, studies found that individuals who engage in
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38 expressive participation, such as writing a letter to a newspaper and calling to a live radio,
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40 showed more complex ideas rather than a fixed opinion (Cushion, Franklin, & Court, 2006;
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Leurdijk, 1997). On the other hand, encountering disagreement may motivate individuals to
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45 engage in political participation involving expression of own opinion, such as signing a petition
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47 and trying to persuade others to vote for a specific candidate, in order to influence others’
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49 viewpoints (Rojas, 2010). It is expected that encountering political disagreement motivates them
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52 to engage in expressive participation for the sake of campaigning or mobilization. Moreover,
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54 considering the characteristics of expressive participation discussed above (i.e., public,
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3 individualistic, social, iterative), evidence points to a positive relationship between exposure to
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6 political disagreement and expressive participation. Previous studies have found that exposure to
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8 political disagreement is positively related to engaging in ‘public’ activities (Scheufele &
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10 Eveland, 2009), non-electoral activities (Pattie & Johnson, 2009), and activities which repeatedly
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occur in everyday life (Hong & Rojas, 2016). Thus, the third hypotheses are created.
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15 H3. Exposure to political disagreement (Time 2) will be positively associated with offline
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17 expressive participation (Time 2).
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The Mediating Influence of Political Disagreement
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22 Taken together, this study proposes a mediation model that connects the two separate theoretical
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24 links discussed above. This causal order of the model is established based on the principle of
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26 communication mediation model, which is also called O1-S-R-O2-R model (Cho et al., 2009).
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29 The O1 (orientations) represents individual attributes and structural, situational locations, the S
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31 (stimulus) includes media use, the R1 (reasoning) refers to interpersonal discussion, the O2
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33 represents outcome orientations like political knowledge, and the R2 (response) refers to
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behavioral reactions. Applying this model to current study, the mediation model expects that
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38 engaging with politics on social media leads citizens to have greater exposure to political
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40 disagreement within the extended social networks, which will consequently promote engaging in
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offline expressive participation. Some studies have explored similar mediation models but not
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45 for expressive participation. For example, exposure to disagreement mediated the associations
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47 between social media use and civic activities (Kim & Chen, 2015) and between social media use
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49 and online political participation (Kim & Chen, 2016). Thus, the fourth hypothesis is proposed.
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52 H4. Exposure to political disagreement (Time 2) will mediate the influence of engagement
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54 with politics on social media (Time 1) on expressive participation (Time 2).
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3 The Moderating Influence of Willingness to Self-censor
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6 Now this study moves to the second scenario that the association between engagement with
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8 politics on social media and expressive participation will be conditioned by individual
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10 characteristics. Differential gains model posits that the effect of media use on participatory
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behavior is contingent on individuals’ characteristics, such as political interest and personality
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15 traits (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele, 2002; Xenos & Moy, 2007). Recent studies have
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17 begun to find the moderating role of individual characteristics in the effect of social media use on
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participatory behavior (e.g., Choi et al., 2017; Kim & Chen, 2015; Kim et al., 2013). Kim and
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22 colleagues found that both openness to experience and extraversion tendency moderate the
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24 indirect effect of social media use on civic engagement via exposure to disagreement. The effects
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26 were greater for individuals who are less open to experience (Kim et al., 2013) and who are
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29 introverted (Kim & Chen, 2015) than their counterparts.
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31 [Figure 1 about here]
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33 This study proposes that willingness to self-censor will moderate the mediation pathway
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of social media use on expressive participation through experience of disagreement (See Figure 1
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38 for conceptual model). Willingness to self-censor refers to one’s desire for “withholding of one’s
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40 true opinion from an audience perceived to disagree with that opinion (Hayes et al., 2005b, p.
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444).” That is, people’s estimation of climate of opinion influences their willingness to reveal
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45 opinion to others or not, and those with a strong desire to self-censor are less likely to express
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47 opinion compared to those with a less desire to censor own opinion (Hayes et al., 2006). As such,
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49 one’ willingness to self-censor is an individual characteristic that is strongly linked to exposure
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52 to disagreement as well as expressive behavior (Glynn et al., 1997). This study expects that
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54 willingness to self-censor may differentiate the influence of engaging with politics on social
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3 media on expressive participation. Thus, it is expected that the indirect effect of social media use
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6 for news on engaging in expressive behavior through exposure to disagreement will be
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8 contingent on individuals’ willingness to self-censor, such that the mediation effect is stronger
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10 for those who have less willingness self-censor.
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H5: The indirect effect of engagement with politics on social media (Time 1) on expressive
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15 participation (Time 2) through exposure to disagreement (Time 2) will be stronger for people
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17 with less willingness to self-censor compared to those with strong willingness to self-censor.
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Study Context
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22 This study tests the hypotheses in Colombian context. Colombia’s political system is a formal
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24 multiparty democracy. The data for this study was collected two weeks before the presidential
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26 election in June 15, 2014. This election was known as the most polarizing one in the history of
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29 Colombia with many problems involved, including negative campaigns, illegal surveillance,
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31 defamation and political fraud. The most important political issue in Colombia for the election
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33 was how to deal with armed rebels like FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia):
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whether to deal with the guerrilla groups to end the conflict using a peace process or through
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38 military solution. There were strong tensions surrounding the issue, which contributed to
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40 political polarization. The country has a market-based media system, which is closely connected
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to the interests of business (Waisboro, 2008). However, the growing popularity of social media
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45 gives Colombians opportunities to experience diverse opinions and information on ideologically
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47 polarized issues particularly when formal media system are not trusted (Papacharissi, 2015;
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49 Yang et al., 2017). As such, Colombia is a suitable context to explore the relationship on social
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52 media, exposure to disagreement, and expressive participation.
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54 Method
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3 Description of data
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6 This study utilizes a two-wave national face-to-face survey conducted in 10 cities in Colombian
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8 as a part of biennial study of communication and political attitudes administrated by XXXX and
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10 XXXX by a local professional polling company, Deproyectos Limitada. Wave 1 was collected
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between June 28 and July 29, 2014. Respondents were contacted one month later again for
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15 Wave 2. The participants were recruited from a nationally representative pool of adult urban
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17 population in Colombia, as 76 % of Colombians live in urban areas (DANE, 2014). A multi-
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stage stratified random sample procedure was implemented to randomly select respondents
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22 according to city size and census data. This procedure first allocated the number of households
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24 for each city based on city size and census data. Next, the number of city blocks was randomly
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26 chosen using housing district and strata, and then within each block, individual households were
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29 randomly selected. Lastly, an individual respondent from each household was decided using the
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31 ‘adult in the household who most recently celebrated a birthday’ technique. Polling agents
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33 visited each household to conduct a face-to-face survey with a selected respondent, and they
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visited a household up to three times, if needed, to maximize survey participation. A total 1,102
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38 responses were collected, resulting in a 55.5% response rate.1 1,042 of the original respondents
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40 participated in the second wave data collection, which resulted in a panel attrition rate of 5.4%.
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Because this study focuses on social media use, responses from those who have a Facebook
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45 account were only included. Among 1,102 total respondents of the first wave, 598 (54.3%)
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47 indicated that they had a Facebook account.2 Of those, 560 respondents participated in the
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49 second wave data collection, and all analyses were performed with these respondents.
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Response rate calculated using American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines.
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55 Only 16.8% of respondents had a Twitter account. There is no local social media site in
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3 Measures
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6 Social media use for politics. In the first wave, respondents were asked to indicate the
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8 extent to which they used Facebook to (a) read news articles posted by their contacts, (b) read the
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10 opinions of their contacts about political issues, (c) express their views on current issues, and (d)
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click, like, or share political information on a 6-point scale (0 = never, 5 = frequently). These
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15 items were averaged to create an index (M = 1.87, SD = 1.33, Cronbach’s a = .82).
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17 Exposure to disagreement. There is little consensus on operationalization and
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measurement of exposure to disagreement. Some scholars take a network-level approach, which
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22 computes the level of discussant heterogeneity within one’s discussion networks (Nir, 2005) or at
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24 one’s macrostructural location (Brundidge, 2010; Scheufele et al., 2006). Others employ an
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26 egocentric approach. This approach asks individuals’ frequency of discussion with people who
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29 have different sociodemographic information, such as gender, race or ethnicity, and religion
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31 (Brundidge, 2010; Scheufele et al., 2004), and who have inconsistent viewpoints from their own
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33 (Barnidge, 2015; Lu et al., 2016), or combination of both (Kim et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2016).
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The current study adopts the egocentric approach. Respondents were asked to indicate how often
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38 they talked about politics with those who (a) have very different political ideas, (b) are from
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40 different social status from you, and (c) are from of a very different age from you on a 6-point
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scale from (0 = never, 5 = frequently). The three items were averaged to create an index of
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45 exposure to disagreement (M = 2.72, SD = 1.45, Cronbach’s α = .88).
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47 Expressive participation. This study employed a method that a number of previous
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49 studies have used to measure political participation (e.g., Rojas, 2008; Scheufele et al., 2004).
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52 The method uses additive, dichotomous indices that ask whether respondents had participated in
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3 a variety of participatory activities. In this study, an index of expressive participation was
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6 adopted from previous studies (Puig-i-Abril & Rojas, 2007), but excluded one item which does
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8 not meet the criteria discussed earlier. The study constructs offline expressive participation by
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10 asking whether they had engaged in following activities using three items: (a) writing a letter to
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the editor of a newspaper or a magazine, (b) calling into a live radio or television show to
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15 express your opinion, and (c) signing in a petition (M = .41, SD = .81, Cronbach’s a = .71).
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17 Willingness to self-censor. This study adopted willingness to self-censor scale (Hayes et
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al., 2005). Two reverse-coded items from the original scale were removed due to translation
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22 issues (See Puig-i-Abril & Rojas, 2015). Respondents were asked to indicate how much they
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24 agree or disagree with the following statements on a 6-point scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5
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26 (strongly agree): (a) It is difficult for me to express my opinion if I think others won’t agree with
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29 what I say, (b) There have been many times I thought others around me were wrong but I didn’t
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31 let them know, (c) When I disagree with others, I’d rather go along with them than argue about
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33 it, (d) I’d feel uncomfortable if someone asked my opinion and I knew that he or she wouldn’t
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agree with me, (e) I tend to speak my opinion only around friends or other people I trust, and (f)
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38 it is safer to keep quite than publicly speak an opinion that you know most others don’t share (M
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40 = 2.19, SD = 1.28, Cronbach’s a = .85).
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Control variables. Five established demographic control variables were included in the
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45 analyses to control potential impacts on dependent variables: gender, age, education, strata, and
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47 household income. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of demographic variables. In addition to
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49 demographics, it is possible that regardless of social media use, people who consume news
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52 media more, have higher levels of political efficacy, and have strong political ideology could
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3 engage disproportionately in expressive participation. Thus, measures for ideological extremity,
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6 political efficacy, and news media use are also included in the models for control purposes.
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8 Ideological extremity was constructed using a folded scale (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009).
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10 Respondents were asked to indicate strength of their political ideology on an 11-point scale
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ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right) (M = 5.07, SD = 1.67). The absolute deviation of responses
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15 from midpoint (5) of the political ideology spectrum was computed. The two opposite ends were
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17 recorded as strong political ideology (5) and midpoint was recoded as an indication of weak
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political ideology (0) (M = 1.54, SD = 1.67).
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22 Political efficacy was measured to indicate the extent to which they agree with the
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24 following items: (a) people like me can influence what local government does, (b) I believe that
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26 the national government cares about what people like me think, and (c) city government
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29 responds to the initiatives of individuals on a 6-point scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5
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31 (strongly agree). (M = 1.82, SD = 1.29, Cronbach’s α = .79).
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33 News media use was estimated by asking to rate on a 6-point scale from 0 (never) to 5
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(frequently) how often they used the following media to get news: (a) national newspaper (M =
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38 2.05, SD = 1.51) and (b) television news (M = 3.54, SD = 1.47).
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40 [Table 1 about here]
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Results
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45 This study specified ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to test proposed hypotheses.
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47 All analyses included control variables, including demographics (gender, age, education, social
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49 status, and income), ideological extremity, political efficacy, and news media use. This study
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52 used PROCESS macro Model 4 to test H4 (the mediating role of exposure to disagreement in the
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54 relationship between social media for political information and expressive participation) and
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3 Model 14 to test H5 (whether the mediation model is contingent upon individuals’ willingness to
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6 self-censor) (Hayes, 2013). This PROCESS macro provides bootstrap confidence intervals to
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8 estimate conditional indirect relationships in which the indirect effect of the independent variable
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10 on the dependent variable through the mediating variable is contingent moderating variable.
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Zero-order correlations of all variables will be provided upon request.
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15 With respect to H1, concerning a positive association between engagement with politics
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17 on Facebook and exposure to disagreement, Table 2 indicates that social media use is
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significantly associated with exposure to disagreement (B = .12, p = .011), after entering control
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22 variables. This model explains 17.5% of the variance in exposure to disagreement. The findings
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24 show that the more individuals use social media for political information, the more likely they
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26 are to experience disagreement from their social networks. Thus, H1 was supported.
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29 [Table 2 about here]
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31 Next, H2 expected that engagement with politics on social media is also positively
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33 associated with expressive participation. In the Table 3, model 2 shows that using social media
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for politics is significantly related to offline expressive participation (B = .06, p = .029), which
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38 explains 21.5% of the variance in offline expressive participation. The findings demonstrate that
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40 the more an individual uses social media for political information and expression, the more likely
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he or she engages in offline expressive participation. Thus, these results support H2.
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45 H3 posits a positive association between exposure to disagreement and expressive
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47 participation. In the Table 3, model 3 indicates that exposure to disagreement is significantly
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49 associated with expressive participation (B = .15, p < .001), which explains 26.6% of the
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52 variance in expressive participation. The findings confirm H3, indicating the more people
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54 experience diagreement, the more likely they engage in offline expressive participation.
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3 Next, H4 predicted that exposure to disagreement mediates the relationship between
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6 social media use and expressive participation. Model 3 in the Table 3 shows the significant
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8 association between social media use and expressive participation (shown in the model 2)
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10 disappear after exposure to disagreement is entered into the model as a mediator (B = .04, p =
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.096). This indicates that the relationship between social media use and expressive participation
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15 is mediated by exposure to disagreement. The significance of indirect pathway was tested using
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17 PROCESS macro based on a bootstrapping technique, which analyzed the 95 percent confidence
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intervals (CI) related to the mediation effects of exposure to disagreement with 5,000 bootstrap
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22 samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The analysis shows that the mediation pathway of social
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24 media use on expressive participation mediated through exposure to disagreement was

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26 statistically significant (B = .02, SE = .01), CI = [.005, .036]). Thus, H4 is supported.
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29 [Figure 2 about here]
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31 Lastly, H5 proposes a moderated mediation model that the indirect effect of exposure to
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33 disagreement on the relationship between use of social media for politics and offline expressive
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participation will be contingent on individuals’ levels of willingness to self-censor (See Figure
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38 1). As shown in the model 7 in the Table 2, there is a negative and significant interaction effect
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40 between exposure to disagreement and willingness to self-censor on expressive participation (B =
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-.04, p = .013). The significance of the moderated mediation pathway was tested using
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45 PROCESS macro with 5,000 bootstrap samples. The results indicate that the mediation pathways
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47 of social media use for political engagement on offline expressive participation through exposure
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49 to disagreement are significant for respondents with different levels of willingness self-censor at
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52 low (one SD below the mean) (B = .023, SE = .01, CI = [.006, .049]), the mean (B = .017, SE =
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54 .01, CI = [.004, .034]), and high (one SD above the mean) B = .010, SE = .01, CI = [.003, .026])
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1
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3 (Aiken & West, 1991; Hayes, 2013). To better understand the patterns, the interaction is plotted
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6 in Figure 2. As exposure to disagreement increases, people with a high willingness to self-censor
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8 are less likely to become involved with expressive participation compared to those who have a
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10 low willingness to self-censor. Therefore, these results confirm H5 that the indirect effect of
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exposure to disagreement on the relationship between use of social media for political
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15 engagement and offline expressive participation is stronger for individuals with low willingness
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17 to self-censor and weaker for those with high willingness to self-censor.
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Conclusion
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22 This study aims to advance our understanding of the role of social media in contributing to
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24 citizens’ democratic life. First, the results showed that engaging with politics on social media
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26 positively affects offline expressive participation. The findings provide consistent patterns with
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29 ample evidence reported about positive associations between social media use and overall
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31 political participation (Boulianne, 2015; Skoric et al., 2015). In particular, the results show a
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33 significant effect of using social media for politics on offline expressive participation. While
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previous studies have found that using online media promotes online expressive participation
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38 (i.e., commenting on news online, expressing opinion on current issues on social media and
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40 participating in online forums) (Puig-i-Abril & Rojas, 2007; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009), some
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found no significant link between online news use and offline expressive participation (Puig-i-
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45 Abril & Rojas, 2007). A possible explanation is that using social media for political information
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47 may be more effective than the broader category of “online news use” in encouraging offline
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49 expressive participation. As an egocentric public sphere, social media expands people’s offline
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52 social networks, leading them to be exposed to more diverse political news and opinions from
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54 weak ties networks (Rojas, Barnidge, & Abril, 2016). Even if they disagree with the viewpoint of
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3 ‘friends’, they may still tend to pay some attention to such political content, as they personally
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6 trust or at least know them (Bode, 2012). This feature of social media platform is suitable for
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8 motivating deliberation and participation, because offline political participation in general
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10 requires more resources than online political participation (Best & Kruger, 2005).
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Accordingly, the second set of results found exposure to political disagreement mediates
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15 the association between social media use and expressive participation. The results indicate that
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17 engaging with politics on social media increased experience of disagreement within their social
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networks. The greater exposure to diverse news and opinions will consequently lead to greater
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22 levels of engagement in offline expressive participation. According to the communication
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24 mediation model (Cho et al., 2009), the results shed light on the mechanisms of the effect of
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26 social media use on expressive participation by connecting two lines of separate evidence using a
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29 mediator: exposure to disagreement. The mediation model is consistent with the findings in
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31 South Korea (Kim & Chen, 2015) and the United States (Kim & Chen, 2016). Thus, this study
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33 adds the evidence in the Latin American context to the literature.

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This study also confirmed the proposed moderated mediation model. As the differential
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38 gains model suggested, social media influences political behavior at different levels across
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40 individuals. The results revealed that the indirect effect of social media use on expressive
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participation through exposure to disagreement was contingent on individuals’ levels of
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45 willingness to self-censor. The indirect effect of social media use was stronger for those who
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47 have low willingness to self-censor and weaker for those who have high willingness to self-
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49 censor. The findings demonstrated that engaging with politics on social media is particularly
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52 beneficial for low self-censors compared to high self-censors when the goal is offline expressive
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54 participation. Thus, high willingness to self-censor attenuates the effect of exposure to
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3 disagreement on expressive participation. Still, using social media for political information
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6 increased expressive participation even for those with high willingness to self-censor. Having
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8 greater experiences of diverse news and opinion may contribute to reducing some worries or
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10 fears about expressing opinion in public that people with strong willingness to self-censor may
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have. They may get used to interact with others who disagree with them in person, and such
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15 experiences lead them to deliberate opinions of own and others, which make them become
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17 knowledgeable, confident about political issues (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Scheufele et al.,
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2004). Overall, the results demonstrate that social media use is beneficial for people with high
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22 and low willingness to self-censor for offline expressive participation, and the effect is greater
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24 for those with low willingness to self-censor.

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26 Additionally, in response to a meta-analytic review that expressed doubt about a causal
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29 relationship between social media use and participatory behavior (Boulianne, 2015), the current
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31 study used two-wave panel data, which gives further evidence of the causal relationship. The
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33 communication mediation model (Cho et al., 2009) also guided establishing the causal ordering
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of the proposed models. Importantly, as discussed above, complex political context in Colombia
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38 provides an ideal case to examine willingness to self-censor and offline expressive participation.
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40 Some limitations need to be noted. First, this study only included Facebook use and did
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not consider the influence of using other social media sites on its outcomes. Because social
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45 network sites operate differently, individuals may have different experiences when they seek and
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47 access political information on Facebook than on Twitter (Gottfried, 2014). Moreover, as user
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49 characteristics (e.g., political interest, political efficacy, gender) of social network sites are
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52 varying, their reactions to the political information on social media can be differently patterned
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54 (Barthel, Shearer, Gottfried, & Mitchell, 2015; Halpern, Valenzuela, & Katz, 2017). Future
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3 studies should test the models proposed in this study with other social media sites and investigate
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6 the differences across different social media. Moreover, as incidental exposure is common on
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8 social media, which affects the ways to engage in political content on social media (Bode, 2016;
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10 Weeks, Lane, Kim, Lee, & Kwak, 2017), future study should consider the influence of incidental
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versus purposeful exposure on expressive participation.
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15 In addition, the current study only examined offline expressive participation as a
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17 behavioral outcome. Expressive participation was chosen due to the relative lack of evidence
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compared to other forms of participatory behavior such as civic engagement and political
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22 participation. However, expressive participation takes relatively fewer resources and risks and
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24 gives less pressures for continuous engagement and responsibility when comparing with other
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26 forms of participatory behavior. Thus, future studies should investigate the models with other
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29 forms of participatory behavior. This study is also limited by the generalizability of the findings.
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31 The findings can be at best generalized to the populations that have similar socioeconomic,
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33 political, cultural, and institutional contexts with Colombia. It should be also considered that the
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data was collected Colombia’s urban population when interpreting the results.
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38 Despite the aforementioned limitations, this study extends our understanding of whether
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40 engaging with politics on social media influences citizens’ engagement in offline expressive
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participation and how the relationship is mediated through exposure to disagreement and
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45 conditioned by willingness to self-censor. Given the increasing popularity of social media as a
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47 source for political information, the findings confirm that social media makes a contribution to
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49 sound deliberative and participatory democracy. Having political information from social media
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52 may facilitate social interaction with others who may have different perspectives in politics,
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54 which may construct citizens’ democratic life more diverse and flourish.
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17 Rainie, L., & Smith, A. (2012). Politics on social networking sites. Pew Internet and American
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24 Rojas, H. (2008). Strategy versus understanding: How orientations toward political conversation
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29 Rojas, H. (2010). “Corrective” actions in the public sphere: How perceptions of media and media
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47 Scheufele, D. A. (2002). Examining differential gains from mass media and their implications
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45 response to political disagreement on social media. Computers in Human Behavior, 70,
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47 22-29. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.12.079
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49
50
51 Table 1. Demographic characteristics of respondents
52 Variable N (%)
53 Gender Male 234 (41.8)
54 Female 326 (58.2)
55
Education Incomplete primary school 7 (1.3)
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58
59

1
2
3 Complete primary school 11 (2.0)
4
5
Incomplete secondary school 52 (9.3)
6 Complete secondary school 205 (36.6)
7 Incomplete college 141 (25.2)
8 Complete college 112 (20.0)
9 Graduate school or more 32 (5.7)
10
Variable M (SD)
11
12 Age 33.73 (12.52)
13 Strata (Median) 2.79 (1.11)
14 Monthly household income (Colombian Peso) $1,001,000.00 - $2,000,000.00##
15 Notes. N = 560, # Colombian system of household energy level. The higher values of strata mean
16 the bigger houses and more energy usage. ## This equals to USD $328.42 – $656.19.
17
18
19
Table 2. Results from OLS regression analyses showing the relationships between social media
Fo
20
21 use for political information and exposure to disagreement
22 Exposure to disagreement
23
rP
Independent variable Block 1 Black 2

24
B (SE) B (SE)
25
26 Constant .98 (.40)* .98 (.39)*
ee
27 Gender (female = 2) -.05 (.12) -.05 (.12)

28 Age -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
29 Education .15 (.06) **
.11 (.06)
rR
30
Strata .11 (.07) .13 (.07)
31
32 Income .03 (.06) .02 (.05)
Ideological extremity .04 (.04) .05 (.04)
ev
33
34 Political efficacy .31 (.05)*** .30 (.05)***
35 News media use .10 (.06) .08 (.06)
36
iew
Social media use for political information .12 (.05)*

37 2 ***
Total R (%) 16.3 17.5***
38
39 Note. N = 476; Cell entries are OLS unstandardized beta coefficients (B) with standard errors in
40 parentheses (SE); *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
41
42
43 Table 3. Results from OLS regression analyses showing the relationships between social media
44 use, exposure to disagreement, and willingness to self-censor as well as expressive participation
45
46
Expressive participation
47 Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
48 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
49 Constant .37 (.23) -.37 (.23) -.51 (.22) *
-.28 (.24) -.58 (.26)
50 Gender (female = 2) -.02 (.07) -.01 (.07) -.01 (.07) -.00 (.07) -.02 (.07)
51
52
Age -.00 (.03) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
53 Education .04 (.03) .02 (.03) .00 (.03) -.00 (.03) -.0 (.03)
54 Strata .02 (.04) .03 (.04) .01 (.04) .01 (.04) .00 (.04)
55 Income .10 (.03)** .10 (.03)** .10 (.03)** .09 (.03)** .09 (.03)**
56
57
58
59

1
2
3 Ideological extremity .04 (.02) .04 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02)
4 *** *** *** ***
5
Political efficacy .21 (.03) .20 (.03) .16 (.03) .16 (.03) .16 (.03)***
6 News media use -.04 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.06 (.03) -.06 (.03) -.05 (.03)
*
7 Social media use .06 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03)
8 Exposure to disagreement .15 (.03)*** .14 (.03)*** .23 (.05)***
9 Willingness to self-censor -.08 (.03)** .05 (.06)
10 Disagreement * -.04 (.02)*
11
Willingness to self-censor
12
13 Total R2 (%) 20.7*** 21.5*** 26.6*** 27.9*** 28.8***
14 Note. N = 476; Cell entries are OLS unstandardized beta coefficients (B) with standard errors in
15 parentheses (SE); *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
16
17
18 Willingness
19 to self-censor
Fo
20 Exposure to (Time 2)
21 disagreement
22 (Time 2)
23
rP
24 Social Expressive
25 media use participation
26 (Time 1) (Time 2)
ee
27
28
29 FIGURE 1. Conceptual models (a) Mediation: Indirect relationship of social media use (Time 1)
rR
30 and expressive participation (Time 2) through exposure to disagreement; (b) Moderated

31 mediation model: Indirect relationship of (a) is contingent on willingness to self-censor
32
ev
33
34
35
36
iew
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
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53
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55 FIGURE 2 Moderation effect of willingness to self-censor.
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59

Social Media and Political Participation A Moderated Mediation Model of Exposure To Disagreement and Willingness To Self Censor

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Social Media and Political Participation A Moderated Mediation Model of Exposure To Disagreement and Willingness To Self Censor

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Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication

Social Media and Political Participation: A Moderated

Journal: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication

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social media, political disagreement, network heterogeneity, self-

International Communication Association

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 1

24 relationship is conditioned by individuals’ levels of willingness to self-censor. Results confirm

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 1

33 information and opinions, which consequently leads to a greater participatory behavior.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 2

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 3

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 4

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 5

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 6

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 7

24 Furthermore, this study predicts that exposure to disagreement is associated with

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 8

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 9

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 10

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 11

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 12

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 13

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 14

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 15

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 16

24 media use on expressive participation mediated through exposure to disagreement was

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 17

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 18

33 adds the evidence in the Latin American context to the literature.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 19

24 for those with low willingness to self-censor.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 20

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 21

33 Computers in Human Behavior, 52, 211-218. doi:10.1016/- j.chb.2015.06.011.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 22

24 Brundidge, J. (2010). Encountering “difference” in the contemporary public sphere: The

33 Campaigns, reflection, and deliberation: Advancing an O-S-R-O-R model of

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 23

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 24

24 Publicly observable political activity in a polarized opinion climate. Political

33 political participatory behaviors. International Journal of Communication, 10, 1743–

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 25

33 protest engagement via social media. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 26

33 Research, 22(3), 343-363.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 27

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 28

24 and expression on social media. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 22(6),

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 29

Independent variable Block 1 Black 2

27 Gender (female = 2) -.05 (.12) -.05 (.12)

Social media use for political information .12 (.05)*

SOCIAL MEDIA AND OFFLINE EXPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION 30

30 and expressive participation (Time 2) through exposure to disagreement; (b) Moderated

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