SY ’18-19

ADMIN LAW 2B

ELECTION LAW

COMPILED JURISPRUDENCE

L Y C E U M O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S | C O L L E G E O F L A W - M A K A T I

 ELECTION LAW OUTLINE
I. Primary Powers of COMELEC
• Article IX (C) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
• Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. 881 as amended)
• Election Automation Law (R.A. No. 8436 as amended by R.A. No.
9369)

• Cayetano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166388, January 23, 2006

• The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the
COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable
expertise in the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.

• Manzala v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176211, May 8, 2007

• Clearly, from the decision of the trial court, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction to review,
revise, modify, or even reverse and set aside the decision of the former and substitute it with its
own decision. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution also
mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as
criminal cases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open
for review and the appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleading.

• Dibaratun v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010

• When there is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the elections and to call
for special elections.
• Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of elections, two
conditions must concur: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or
even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have
affected the result of the elections. The cause of such failure of election could only be any of the
following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

• Panlilio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009

SECTION 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner. The powers and duties of
the Presiding Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending
before the Division shall be as follows:
(a) To issue calls for the sessions of the Division;
(b) To preside over the sessions of the Divisions;
(c) To preserve order and decorum during the sessions of the Division;
(d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or ruling and temporary restraining orders in
cases already assigned to the Division;
(e) To decide all questions or order, subject to appeal to the full Division; and
(f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon consultation with the other
members of the Division.
In the present case, The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over petitioners election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders.

• Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154796, October 23, 2003

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision,
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 resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en
banc.

It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear
from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:

Sec. 3. The Commission in Sitting in Divisions. The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear
and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional
remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens arms of the
Commission.

The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which
expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by
the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first
in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its
quasi-judicial powers.

• Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 194139, January 24, 2012.

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course.

Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, although it confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

• De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000

Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or
basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its
power to appoint and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the
questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the
power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the
implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws
passed by Congress.

The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its
power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs
power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
domain.

• Suliguin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166046, March 23, 2006

Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on Elections, where
the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the
Commission the power to declare such proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

• Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all

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 contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution
(Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in
pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To
achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective
positions.

The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its
authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.

COMELEC’s investigative power includes the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during
a fact-finding investigation despite previous notice and order to attend.

The powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial
functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are
genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.

COMELEC has the power to charge petitioner indirect contempt based on Section 52 (e), Article VII of
the Omnibus Election Code. And is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELECs Rules of Procedure,
Section 2. (Indirect Contempt).

• Capalla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201121/201127/201413, June 13, 2012

The Automated Election System contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a
government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code
but also by RA 9184.

II. Suffrage
• People v. Corral, G.R. No. L-42300, January 31, 1936
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is
not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to
such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good…Among the
generally excluded classes to vote are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts.

The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to
preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony,
or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold
office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection
and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.

I. Qualification and disqualification of voters

• The Overseas Absentee Voting Act (R.A. No. 9189)
• Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006
the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to
vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.

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 Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad
exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register
and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
elections

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded
thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This
may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225
which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children

below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and
political rightsunder Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the
petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of
suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such
absurd situation.

• Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad is
not physically present in the country. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit with
intention to return is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to
have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or
permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to
return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Under the law, he must be given the opportunity to
express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Overseas Absentee Voting Act.

However, the provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress. The provision putting it into the hands of the Comelec is
unconstitutional.

Congress also By vested itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Here, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring such provision of law unconstitutional.

I. Registration of voters
II. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

• Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008

In terms of purpose, voters inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are different proceedings;
one refers to the application to be registered as a voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the
application to be a candidate. Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and
entail different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where they may be
said to converge or interface. One such commonality is on the matter of residence. Section 9 of Republic

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 Act 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act (VRA), requires that voters shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election. The OEC, on the other hand, requires under its Section 74
that the would-be candidate state material facts such as, among others, his residence. Under the
combined application of Section 65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC), a
local official must among others have the same residency requirement as required under the
VRA. Another point of convergence is on the candidates status as a registered voter; a candidate for a
local government position must be a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, province, or city
where he or she intends to run for office.

The remedies available in the two proceedings likewise differ. Velascos remedy from the adverse
decision in his petition for inclusion as voter is as provided under Section 138 of the OEC quoted
above. From the MTC, the recourse is to the RTC whose decision is final and executory, correctible by
the Court of Appeals only by a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the approval of a certificate of candidacy or its denial is a matter directly
cognizable by the COMELEC, with the decision of its Division reviewable by the COMELEC en
banc whose decision is in turn reviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Section
7, of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

The factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings
on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on
and do not rise to the level of a res judicata ruling with respect to the COMELEC. The reason is that
inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings. We further
added that a decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action
in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. Otherwise
stated, a ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the
COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in
a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by
law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding.
III. Political parties
a. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties
b. Registration

• Alliance for Barangay Concerns Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

193256, March 22, 2011.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party,
organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution

Based on the provision above, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political
parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds.
The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides:

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The Comelec may motu proprioor upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
xxx

It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the
registration of the ABC Party-List.

The COMELEC has the constitutional mandate to register political parties, organizations and coalitions, and
to cancel their registration on legal grounds; hence, the COMELEC en banc, in this case, has the
prerogative to direct that a hearing be conducted on the petition for cancellation of registration of the ABC

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 Party-List. The COMELEC en banc stated in its Resolution that only then can the petition be resolved on its
merits with due regard to private respondent's right to due process.

• Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve
any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their
activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party
only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The
Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and
its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case[17] that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

• Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
“the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular
purpose

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration
on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

IV. Candidacy
a. Qualifications of candidates

• Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
a. actual removal or change of domicile;

b. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one;

c. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

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 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one
only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports
the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

• Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002

The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they
resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside
in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his
wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former
place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner
worked as a private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This
is proof of animus manendi.

When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding
the victors right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election
laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge petitioners
disqualification, respondent must clearly demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. Respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

• Villafuerte v. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014

The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for
elective office. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one’s qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the
public as to one's identity is not within the scope of the provision

Hence, petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a
material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the COC cannot be
considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office.

There is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC,
respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility
or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.

Respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then incumbent
Governor of the province, popularly known as "LRay." Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur
know who respondent is. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name MIGZ16 written
as respondent’s nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters
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 • Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court
may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections. Comelec
committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

• Poe-Llamanzares, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 (see digest)

b. Filing of certificates
1. Effect of filing
2. Substitution of candidates
3. Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate
4. Nuisance candidates
5. Petition to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy
6. Effect of disqualification
7. Withdrawal of candidates

• Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

It did not affect SEC 66. Candidates holding appointive office.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title
I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

• Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008

Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to 'enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative referendum
and recall. The assailed Orders were issued by the COMELEC in the performance of its duty to promote
free, orderly and honest elections.

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 The Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is vested with the power of direct control and supervision
over the board of canvassers; hence, it took cognizance of the complaint in the omnibus motion which
questioned the conduct of the special elections by Special Municipal Board of Canvassers

• Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006

RE: Pre-mature campaigning

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Votes cast in favor of the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified.

However, there is an exception which rests on two assumptions: that the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified and that the voters nonetheless voted for him despite knowing that he is
disqualified. The petitioners failed to prove the applicability of the exception to this case. The rule on
succession shall apply. The Vice Mayor shall be the Mayor.

• Planas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167594, March 10, 2006

The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction

in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC,

et al.,

x x x It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there
has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the
assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues.

In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes,
the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that
point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.

Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensors proclamation the denial of his COC due course was not
yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed
his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case.

V. Campaign
1. Premature campaigning (no longer an election offense)
2. Prohibited contributions
3. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
4. Limitations on expenses
5. Statement of contributions and expenses

• Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613. September 11, 2009|and Penera v.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613 (Resolution), November 25, 2009
RE: Unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period.
Premature campaigning cannot be committed by someone who is not yet a candidate. A candidate
may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but
even before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature
campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign
period.
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 • Pangkat Laguna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002
Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered campaigning. The term
campaigning should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person to vote
for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the meaning of the term. Examining the definition
and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity found in COMELEC Resolution
3636, the Commission is convinced that only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes
will be covered by the definition and enumeration.

In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which
duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of the questioned sports and
education programs. The number of items purchased and the amount involved were within the regular
purchases of the provincial government. How the funds were sourced and how the program was
implemented, as correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for us to resolve for such issue is way
beyond our constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.

• Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema
Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the
COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those
in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising
contracts is actually a must because non-compliance is considered as an election offense

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,the law’s concern is not
to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure
equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources

VI. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers (Please see link below)

https://www.lawphil.net/administ/comelec/comres2004/comres_6669_2004.html

1. Composition
2. Powers

VII. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law

1. Petition no to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
2. Petition for disqualification
3. Petition to declare failure of elections
4. Pre-proclamation controversy
5. Election protest
6. Quo warranto

ß
• Benito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 106053, August 17, 1994
Two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared, thus:
(1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and
(2) the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure
may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
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 • Carlos v. Angeles, G.R. No. 142907, November 19, 2000
Election Protest – Under RTC
Requisites:
1. the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and
2. the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones.

It is only when these two conditions are established that the annulment of the election can be justified
because the remaining votes do not constitute a valid constituency.

Failure of Election – Under COMELEC

Requisites (See Benito v Comelec)
Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances
where a failure of elections may be declared, namely:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or

(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

• Borja v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120140, August 21, 1996

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as
mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption
of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his
service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

• Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323, July 3, 1992

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on
the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity.

Petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not
announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election
campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes,
pledges or support for or against a candidate.

When he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image
assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore,
the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards.

• Villegas v. COMELEC, G.R. L-52463, September 4, 1980

The present Constitution empowered the Commission on Elections to be "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the National Assembly
and elective provincial and city officials.

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 Pre-proclamation controversy v. Election protest
RATIO: since Private respondent had already been proclaimed as the provincial governor of Negros
Oriental and the grounds specified in the pre-proclamation controversy are the same grounds alleged
in the election protest, the better remedy for petitioner is to proceed with the election protest.

• Aggabao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction overall contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s own jurisdiction begins

It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June
14, 2004As such, Aggabao’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His
remedy is not this petition for certiorari.The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab
initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

VIII. Prosecution of election offenses

• People v. Basilla, G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989

The COMELEC is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses and prosecute such but at the same time as mandated by Sec 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code but at the same time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the
assistance of the other prosecuting arms of the government (prosecutors)

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