KNOWLEDGE/POWER AND POSTMODERNISM: Implications for the Practice of a Critical Social

Work Education
Author(s): Peter Leonard
Source: Canadian Social Work Review / Revue canadienne de service social, Vol. 11, No. 1
(Winter/hiver 1994), pp. 11-26
Published by: Canadian Association for Social Work Education (CASWE)
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 KNOWLEDGE/POWER AND
POSTMODERNISM

Implications for the Practice of a Critical

Social Work Education

Peter Leonard

Michel FOUCAULT deliveredhis inaugural lecture as professorof

"histoireet systèmede pensée/' entitled"L'ordre du discours,"at the
Collège de France,Paris,in December 1970. We maytakethiseventas a
significantstep in the gradual unfoldingof a major challenge to the
knowledgeclaimsof theestablishedphysicaland social sciencesand pro-
fessionsbya man who had alreadypublishedHistoire de lafolieà l'âgeclas-
sique(1961) , Les mots
etleschoses
(1967) , and du savoir(1969) ,
L'archéologie
all subsequentlyissued in English (Foucault, 1967, 1970, 1972). Earlyin
his inaugurallectureFoucault putsforwarda hypothesis"in orderto fix
the terrain"withinwhichhis futureworkwould be undertaken,though
we can also take it as the ground upon whichhis precedingwoťk had
been based. Foucaultstateshis hypothesisin thefollowingWay:

Abrégé
Les post-modernistes ont grandement critiquéles revendications selon les-
quellesla modernité a contribué à l'émancipation de la racehumainegrâceà la
recherche de la raison,de l'ordre,de la scienceetde l'objectivité,parceque ces
revendications sonteurocentriqueset ontentraînéla domination des peuples
et de la nature.La remiseen questionde la connaissanceobjectiveet des
valeursuniverselles comportedes répercussions profondes pourle féminisme,
le marxisme et les autresdoctrines axées surl'émancipation. L'articleadopte
une perspective critiquepost-moderniste et en décritles répercussions sur
notrecompréhension de l'histoiredu servicesocial,surla penséeet les règles
de cettediscipline,les formes de connaissance que sonenseignement véhicule,
ainsique surlesméthodesd'enseignement.
PeterLeonardisa professorintheSchool ofSocialWork atMcGillUniversity.
Thisarticle
isan extended
version ofa papergivenattheannualconference oftheCanadianAssocia-
tionofSchools
ofSocialWork inOttawa infune1993.

CanadianSocialWorkReview, VolumeII, Number 1 (Winter

1994)/ Revuecana-
dienne
deservicesocial,volume 11,numéro1 (hiver
1994)
inCanada/ Imprimé
Printed au Canada
11

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12 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

I am supposingthatin everysocietytheproduction ofdiscourseis at

oncecontrolled,selected,organizedand redistributedaccordingtoa
certainnumberofprocedures, whoseroleis toavertitspowersandits
danger,tocope withchanceevents, toevadeitsponderous, awesome
(Foucault,1991,p. 135)
materiality.
To statea hypothesisin these termsis immediatelyto show the anti-
positivistintentof his enterprise- a complex, imaginative,poetic, and
culturalchallenge to the assumed domains and mechanicallanguage of
the dominantdiscoursesof social researchand of philosophicaland his-
toricalaccounts of the "human sciences'' and theirassociated profes-
sional technologies.In his investigationinto the "rules of discourse,"
Foucault identifiesexclusionas a major means by whichwhatwe think
and say,whatwe consider to be "the truth,"is subject to prohibitions,
rejections,limitations,and numerous other formsof controlof which
we are hardlyconscious. "[0]nly one truthappears before our eyes:
wealth,fertility In con-
and sweetstrengthin all itsinsidiousuniversality.
trast,we are unaware of the prodigiousmachineryof the will to truth,
withitsvocationofexclusion" (Foucault,1991,p. 139).
That the willto truthor knowledgeis involvedin power,control,and
exclusionis largelyhiddenwithinanygivenepoch; thisis the reasonwhy
Foucaultgiveshis attentionto the knowledge/powerrelationsof earlier
historicalperiods. He is interestedin discursivechange."What it is pos-
sible to saywill change fromone era to another.In science a theoryis
not recognisedin itsown period ifitdoes not conformto thepowercon-
sensus of the institutionsand officialorgans of science" (Seiden, 1989,
pp. 100-101). Disciplines, within Foucault's perspective,operate as
another "principle of limitation"because, to belong to a discipline,
statementsmust fulfilcertain conditions,referto a specificrange of
objects,and laterfitinto a particulartheoreticalfield."Disciplinescon-
stitutea systemof controlin the productionof discourse,fixingitslimits
throughthe action of an identitytakingthe formof a permanentreac-
tivationof therules" (Foucault,1991,p. 144).
These introductory commentshave focused on Foucault's approach
to the rules of discourse in order to set the scene for what follows.
Foucault's work assumes the impossibilityof objective knowledge
because truthis definedby power relations,a social phenomenon and
not a universalabsolute. Foucault has been variouslydescribed,from
neo-conservative(partly because of his pessimism) to neo-Marxist
(because of his emphasison the social constructionof realitybyruling
classes), but he rejected attemptsto be labelled. He would certainly
rejectthe label "postmodernist"today,not least,perhaps,because post-
modernismis a confused and confusingarrayof social and cultural
theoriesand practicesthatresistsimple categorization.They do, how-
ever, constitute a diverse challenge to dominant ideas for which
Foucault'sworkmustbe reckonedan importantpart.

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 13

Modernity
Let us firstidentifythe targetagainstwhichthe challenge,in itsvarious
forms,is mounted.Because we deal here withsocialworkeducation,itis
the knowledgeclaims of the social sciences and theirallied professions
to whichI shall give attention,thoughthisconstitutesonlyone part of
the overalltargetof currentsocial and culturalcriticism.1 Statedbriefly,
the contemporary social sciences may be seen as the inheritors of that
European Enlightenmentproject,originating in the early 17thcentury,
in whichreason and orderwere to be themeans bywhichthe ignorance,
superstition, cruelty,and disorderof the MiddleAgeswere to givewayto
universalknowledgeand human progress(see Bauman, 1992; Behler,
1990). The notion of science as objective knowledgeof the physical
world was to become the cornerstoneof what was later to be called
"modernity"- the dominationof naturein the interestsof human wel-
fareand, possibly,happiness.Althoughmodernityas the triumphof rea-
son is marked at its beginningby certainnames- FrancisBacon, Vol-
taire- Foucault pointsto the specificwaysin whichthisrationalknowl-
edge was constructed:
[A]t the turnof the 16thand 17thcenturies - and particularly in
England - a will to knowledgeemergedwhich,anticipatingits
present content,sketched outa schemeofpossible, observable,meas-
urableand classifiable objects;a willto knowledge whichimposed
upon theknowing subject- in somewaystakingprecedenceoverall
experience - a certain position,a certainviewpoint, and a certain
function(lookratherthanread, verify ratherthancomment ) a willto
knowledgewhichprescribed . . . the technologicallevel at which
knowledgecould be employedin orderto be verifiable and useful.
(Foucault,1991,p. 137)
This usefuland verifiableknowledge,the resultof the applicationof
reason to the natural and social world,became the basis of the disci-
plines and professions(economics, engineering,medicine,physicalsci-
ences) whichwereto transform theWestand, throughtheriseofcapital-
ism, release and exploit new forcesof productionat an unprecedented
rate.The protagonistsof modernity, fromAdam Smithto Marx, saw in
thisexplosion of knowledgeand productiona recordofhuman progress
and a potentialforfurtheradvancement.Modernity, throughits"grand
theories,"especially those of capitalism and socialism,is seen stillas a
means of emancipationfrompoverty, disease, and ignorance:the nega-
tiveside of continuous "modernization,"includingthe exploitationof
people and of nature,need not continuebut can be subordinatedto its
positiveside, namely,the achievementof human freedom.The social
sciencesare seen as a crucialpartof thisemancipatoryprojectofmoder-
nitybecause, throughcarefullyestablishedscientificknowledgeof the
social world,expertisecan be developed that enables professionalsto

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14 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

intervenepurposefully in order to enhance human capacitiesand man-

age those disorganizationsand dislocationsthatare an inevitableside-
effectofsocial change.

Postmodern critique
If modernityrepresentsthe triumphof reason over nature and tradi-
tion,of planned orderoverdisorder,of the creationof new social struc-
tures in accordance with a grand design, of the pursuitof objective
knowledgeas a means of human emancipation,we maytake postmod-
ernism as representinga direct challenge to all of these intellectual
assumptionsand social practices.Lookingback at thebirthofmodernity
as a set of ideas and activitiesemergingamong European intellectual
élites in the 17thcenturyintenton creatinga rationalsocial world,we
can see now how culturallyand historically relativemanynotions and
practiceswere. They became, eventually, the ideological foundationsof
successfulbourgeoisrevolutionsagainstanciensreames,but theyclaimed
not to be just appropriateeconomic, political,and social practices,but
to be universaltruths,the necessaryconditionsof human progress.This
claim to universalityand objectivityhas made modernitysubject to cri-
tiques thatemphasize its eurocentricand androcentricroots.Foucault,
as we have seen, subjectsthe dominantdiscourseon reason to a critique
that focuses on its controllingand excluding rules- the will to truth
througha historically specificsocio-culturaltrack,whichclaims univer-
sality and thereby banishes from the discourse the experiences and
formsof knowledgegeneratedbynon-Europeans,bywomen,and bythe
mostsubordinateclasses.
The postmodernistcritique questions, furthermore,modernity's
claimsto be the intellectualvehicleforprogresson the grounds,as Lyo-
tard (1989) argues,thatforeverytechnologicaladvance,foreveryincre-
mentin human freedom(of speech, of belief,of democraticchoices of
who shall govern us), we must acknowledge accompanying crimes
againsthumanity."I use the name of Auschwitz,"Lyotard(1989, p. 89)
writes,"to point out the irrelevanceof empiricalmatter,the stuffof
recentpast history,in termsof the modern claims to help mankindto
emancipate itself."Modernitymay mean materialand social progress
forsome populations;the modern historyof imperialism,colonialism,
economic "development,"and warfaremeans exploitation,impoverish-
ment,culturaldestruction,and death forothers.Modernity'shistoryof
progress/oppressionhas taken place in the name of grand theories,
"metanarratives"to use Lyotard'sterm,whichserveto legitimatedomi-
and professionaldiscourses.At one level,these
nant political,scientific,
metanarratives have emergedas overarchingtheoriesabout "the market
economy," "the dictatorshipof the proletariat,""racial purity,""the
whiteman's burden," "the inferiority ofwomen," or currently "the new

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 15

worldorder."At anotherbut connected level,dominantgrand theories

have been articulatedwithinprofessionalpractices:psychiatric classifica-
tion of mentalillness,psychosocialdefinitionsof familydysfunction, or
pathology models of child sexual abuse.
The objection of postmodernismto modernityrests not only on
modernity'sclaims to universal truthson the basis of overarching
theoriesthatrule out alternativeformsof knowledge,but on the totali-
tarianfeaturesof itsdominantdiscourses.As a systemof belief,moder-
nity,it can be argued, demonstratesclearlywhatMarx meant by "ideol-
ogyas a materialforce,"foritsinstitutions of control- education,social
-
welfare,thejudicial system,and others determinethe language with
which the social world and its issues and problems are discussed and
acted upon. Foucaultwritesabout thissocial appropriationof discourse
as reflectingclass, gender, ethnic, and other forms of domination:
"Everyeducational systemis a politicalmeans formaintainingor modi-
fyingthe appropriationof discourse,withthe knowledgeand the power
itcarrieswithit" (Foucault, 1991,p. 146).
For Foucault, and for others profoundlycriticalof modernity,the
primeexample of a controllinguniversaltruthcan be found in itscon-
ception of a unified,essentialsubject.Foucaulťs historicalstudiessuch
as Madnessand Civilization(1967) are historiesof subjugation,which
reject the notion of a universalessentialsubjectivity thatcan serve as a
normativestandard legitimatingprofessionaland scientificpower. In
thewordsof Lemert (1992, p. 38), "subjectivity is the code wordof mod-
ernismwhichmasksthe truthof modernitythatsubjectsare subjectedto
the dominantculturaland economic interestsof capitalism."In place of
the dominant notion of an essential subjectivity, postmodernwriters
, the
emphasizedifference experiences of individual diversesubjectswhose
exclusionsand subordinationscan be understoodmore fullyin all their
complexity, an understandingthatis partof social and politicalpractice
and does not claim the statusofuniversalhistoricaltruth.
The challengepresentedto formsofemancipatorypoliticsbythe idea
thatthereare no universaltruthsis a considerableone. Postmodernism
maybe seen as an oftenuneasyallyof feminismin thelatter'scritiqueof
the universalistclaims of the dominant discourses of patriarchy(see
Nicholson, 1990). The uneasiness lies in the problem that,in rejecting
universalism,perhaps feminismlimits its own political claims. Flax
(1987) points out the contradictionmost clearly:if feministssay that
knowledgeis sociallyconstructed,thentheycannotalso saythatfeminist
theoryis truein anyabsolute sense. This is the problemof relativismto
whichfeministshave givena greatdeal of attentionand to whichwe will
return.

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16 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

Contradictions of postmodernism
The currentdebate on the knowledgeclaims of scientificand profes-
sional disciplines- the relation between knowledge and power-
demands close attentionin social workeducation. If professionaleduca-
tion reproduces,throughits discourse and practices,eurocentricand
androcentricclaimsto universaltruthand objectivity and so definesreal-
ityin the interestsof normative order, then intellectual and political
challenges to professional education are necessary.Drawing on post-
moderncritiqueand thework of Foucault is exceptionallydifficult, how-
ever,because the assault on modernity is both wide-ranging - encom-
passingphilosophy,sociology,culturalstudies,architecture, literarycriti-
-
cism,and other disciplines and markedby profoundpoliticalcontra-
dictions.2Postmodernismin all itsdiversemanifestations cannot be uti-
lized as an unambiguously"progressive"critique,as some authorssuch
as Moore and Wallace (1993) appear to suggest.
Foucault is essentiallypessimisticabout the possibilityof overcoming
dominantdiscourse in the interestsof subordinatepopulations,partly
because revolutionsimplyreplaces one dominantdiscourseforanother
equally controllingand excludingone. Lyotard(1989) attacksthe left
foritstotalitarian"metanarratives," and Foucault (1991) arguesthatthe
form of discourse called doctrine depends on exclusion and rejection
mechanismsthatenable itssubjectsto identifyinadmissibleutterances,
speech labelled heresyor unorthodoxy.For Foucault,doctrineis
thesign,themanifestation and theinstrument ofa prioradherence -
adherenceto a class,to a socialor racialstatus, nationality an
to a or
a revolt,
toa struggle,
interest, resistanceoracceptance.Doctrinelinks
individualsto certaintypesof utterance whileconsequently barring
themfromall others.Doctrineeffects a dualsubjection, thatofspeak-
ingsubjectsto discourse, and thatofdiscourseto thegroup,at least
ofspeakers,
virtually, (p. 146)
We mayfindin thispassage tracesof the right-wing notion of "political
correctness"as a label withwhichto castigatetheleft,butwiththesignif-
icantdifferencethatFoucaultarguesthatexclusionand rejectionmech-
anismsare activewithinall politicaland religiousdoctrines,a point to
whichwe shallreturnlater.
While some elements in postmodern critique may be politically
ambiguousor at least uncomfortable,more generally(see Agger,1990)
we also may often detect an outrightneo-conservativerejection of a
planned welfarestate on the grounds that the ideological fantasiesof
politiciansare corruptingand thatsocialwelfarehas become a source of
social problemsratherthan a means to theiralleviation.Insofaras post-
modernismis a critiqueofWestern"reason," it is also post-rationalistin
the sense that it stands against the overconfidentsweep of Enlighten-
mentreason,and thusoftenreflectsthe despairand disgustthatcomes

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 17

withthe perceivedfailureof the attempt,in Agger'swords,"to impose

reason'sorderon therecalcitrant, bitterworld" (p. 13).
If,as some Marxistcriticssuggest,postmodernismreflectsa particular
historicalperiod in the West characterizedby increased cynicism,the
erosion of a self-confident belief in progress,and culturalproduction
dominatedby the transientand the trivial,then perhapswe should see
postmodernism,inJameson's(1984) words,as "the culturallogic of late
capitalism"and resistit. Certainly,thereis a case to be made that,while
it has produced some highlyrelevantcriticismsof modernity, much of
whatmightbe describedas culturalpostmodernismreflectsthe interest,
lifestyles,and angstof a professionalmiddle class, a yuppie world cap-
tured in Agger's (1990) polemical attack: "Hip endures as the quin-
tessentialpostmodernsensibility, expressinga combinationof self-satis-
factionand aversionto thepassionsand polemicsof thepolitical" (p. 9).
Postmodernismcan functionas a politicsthatis relativist because, if
thereremainsno singleuniversalstandard(reason, truth)upon which
tojudge whatwe knowor whatwe should do, thenwe mustsee truth, jus-
tice, and moral behaviour as entirelyhistoricaland culturalartifacts.
Mass politicsleads to new formsof despotism,and so we are urged to
embrace a new individualismbased upon difference.Withinthisreduc-
tionistand relativistperspective,the best we can expect frompoliticsis
continuingstrugglearound the specificinterestsof particularpopula-
tions in which the major social divisions- such as gender,class, race,
ethnicity, age, differential - fragmentinto smallerand
ability,sexuality
smaller units, which seek homogeneityof interestsand experiences
withinthemselvesas a basis fortheirpressuregroup politics.Withinthis
perspective,temporarycoalitionsof interestsmaybe organizedforspe-
cificpurposes, but the mass movementsand broad politicsthat once
characterizedsocialist parties are consigned, along with the idea of
socialismitself,to the dustbinof history:theyhave no partin a postmod-
ernworld.
Attentionto thisemergingformof politicsstemmingfroma critique
of modernityand itsclaims to knowledgeis clearlyan importantpartof
a criticalsocial workeducation.For me, however,engagingin thedebate
is onlythe firststep in an attemptto forgenew formsof education that
maybenefitfromelementsof postmodernistcritique.Developingwithin
social workeducation a profoundlycriticalattitude,whichis scepticalof
all receivedideas, demands fromus an interrogationof both modern-
ism and postmodernism,but it is not an interrogationthatshould leave
us neutral.Criticalsocial workeducation is a frankly partisanenterprise:
it attemptsto stand alongside oppressed and impoverishedpopulations
and againstdominationand exploitation.Being partisanmeans, I sug-
gest,sayingwhereyou stand personallyin relationto some of the issues
discussedhere so far.It is timeto focus,therefore,on the implicationsof

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18 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

modernismand postmodernismforthe practiceof a criticalsocial work

education.

Critical postmodernism as part of modernity

We mustbegin,I believe,byacknowledgingthe twocontradictory sides
of modernity. One side might be seen as emancipatory: the develop-
ment of a rationalscepticismwhich rejected traditionas an invariable
guide to action and, throughthe growthof capitalism,released huge
productiveforcesthathave the potential,yetto be realized,forhuman
betterment.The other side of modernitymightbe characterizedas
domination:the triumphal"conquest" of natureand the subordination
and exploitationof populations,legitimatedin the name of universalis-
ticclaims,and whichhave the potential,almostrealized,of self-destruc-
tion. Furthermore,modernity,especially in its most recent forms,
appears to have lost its capacityfor scepticism,as its eurocentricand
androcentriccommitmentto reason and science became a set of cultur-
allyfounded dogmas thatdenychallenge. In respondingto the contra-
dictionsof modernitywe can usefullyadopt a critical postmodernist per-
spective,whichrejectsthe neo-conservative individualismand self-inter-
est of a postmodernist"cultural logic of late capitalism." Instead, it
develops a critiqueof modernity(of whichpostmodernismis seen as a
part) that continues its emancipatoryproject in the formof feminist,
anti-colonial,environmentalist,
socialist,anti-racist, and other political
struggles but also emphasizes a common ground underlying thisdiver-
sity.
The argumentthat postmoderncritiquemust take place withinthe
project of emancipatorymodernityis made stronglyby Lovibond
(1989), a feministphilosopherwho, while acknowledgingthe accuracy
of manypostmodernperceptions,is also scepticalof its more extreme
claims.She suggeststhatfeministsshould continueto see theirefforts as
concerned withglobal emancipation,withthe "universalstandpoint,"
and not be sidetrackedbypostmodernemphasison the local, the differ-
ent, the particular.She writesthatthe feministmovement"should per-
sistin seeing itselfas a component or offshootof Enlightenmentmod-
ernism,ratherthan as one more 'exciting' feature (or clusterof fea-
tures)in a postmodernsocial landscape" (p. 28).
In its critiqueof modernity, criticalpostmodernismopposes the idea
thateconomic and cultural"modernization"on a global scale, linkedas
it oftenis withcorporatecapitalistexploitationin the supposed interest
of "scientificadvance," is necessarilya requirementof human progress,
especiallywhere it is accompanied by culturalgenocide and environ-
mental destruction.In essence, critical postmodernismattemptsto
develop a new concept of the normativewhich is neithercompletely
absolutistnor totallyrelativist;throughcross-cultural dialogue it seeks,

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 19

forexample,to investigatethe relationshipbetweenlocal, culturallyspe-

cificvalues and widernotionsof universalhuman rights,acknowledging
thatboth are specifichistoricalproducts.Dialogue about the normative
linkswithscepticismabout knowledgeclaims in providinga means by
whichcriticalpostmodernismengages in the deconstructionof itsown
emancipatoryassumptions.This reflexivestance enables us to examine
our assumptionsabout socialjustice, equality,and rationality in lightof
our critiqueof the eurocentrismand androcentrismof modernistthink-
ing. Self-interrogationis also, perhaps,the basis of more modest claims
concerning our own political beliefs: feminism and Marxism, for
example,are no longerrequiredto claim the statusof absoluteTruthin
the formof feministscience or historicalmaterialism.Rather,we may
see them as disruptiveinterventionsinto dominant discourses,social
practicesemergingfromspecificculturaland historicalconditions.Of
course, these alternativedisruptiveinterventionsmay,givencertaincir-
cumstances,become a partof dominantdiscourse;when thisoccurs,we
willneed to be trueto our criticalpostmodernperspectivein attempting
to identifythose mechanisms of exclusion and rejection to which
Foucault referredin his commentson doctrine,and eitherresistor, at
theveryleast,question them.
The criticalpostmodernismof whichI writemaintains,then,a ques-
tioning attitude towardsits own "metanarratives,"recognizing their
dangers- the attractiveness of dogma, the temptationsof certainty, the
urge to controlothers"in their own interests."
We recognizein a practi-
cal waythatpoweris not simplylocated in one place- the centralmech-
anismsof capitalism,patriarchy, or institutionalracism- but is diffused
throughoutthe social order and takes manynew forms.These newer
formsof power,especiallythoseof culturalproductionand professional-
ism,are a particulartargetof postmodernand Foucauldian analysis,for
theyare both formsof knowledge/powerdirectedtowardshomogeniz-
ing, controlling,and discipliningsubject populations. In recognizing
thatpoweris diffusedand has a symbioticrelationshipwithknowledge,
criticalpostmodernism,if it is to avoid the pessimismof Foucault and
the despairof Lyotard,mustexcavatea place forresistance,forour abil-
ityto act togetherin our overdeterminedworld of economic and cul-
turalproduction.We mustturnawayfromthe conception of a unitary,
"the code word of modernism,"and towardsthe
essentialsubjectivity,
resolutely anti-determinist idea of multipleand interactingsubjectivities
whichconnectto thepolitical.

Implications for social work education

If,as I have argued,we should approach social workeducation fromthe
perspectiveof criticalpostmodernism,can we identifyin more detail
some of the implicationsof this perspective?While elaborate model-

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20 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

buildingwould be not only prematurebut also inconsistentwith the

exploratoryand tentativethrustof postmodernism,it is possible never-
thelessto identifyour approach to the historyof social work,to social
work discourse and its rules, to the formsand sources of knowledge
included in social workeducation,and to educational methods,which
appear to be consistentwitha criticalpostmodernperspective.

History
We beginwithhistoryon the groundsthat,ifwe aim to develop emanci-
patory forms of social work practice and education, then we must
acknowledge,describe,and confrontthe originsof social workin struc-
tures and practicesof domination. I turn once more to the work of
Foucaultas exemplifying the kindof profoundlycriticalapproach to our
own historyas an occupation and professionthatwe should, I believe,
adopt. Foucault's Madnessand Civilization(1967) is an example of his
general thesis about discourses- in this case that on "madness"- in
whichhe identifiesthe rulesof exclusionwithinthe discourseand shows
that the opposition between true and false knowledgeis a historically
constituteddivision.Specifically, Foucaultrenouncesthe usual portrayal
of psychiatry as a historyof the advance of science and humanityover
ignorance,superstition, and brutality.In place of a historyof increasing
psychiatric enlightenment,Foucault triesto unearththe preconditions
thathad to existbeforepsychiatry could be established,and whichhave
continued to determineits historicaltrajectoryof knowledge,power,
and control.Foucault attemptsto discoverhow a complex and diverse
set of social valuationsabout behaviour,previouslylargelyundifferen-
tiated,came to be transformed, fromthe beginningof the 18thcentury,
into a set of "officiar'classifications
wherebymadness became a condi-
tion separate and excluded from mainstream life: unreason was
excluded fromreason. Foucault argues thattransformations in the dis-
course on madness providedthe basis forthe establishmentof psychia-
trybecause the asylumkeepers and doctors then had an object (mad-
ness,unreason,fallacy)to confrontin the name of reason and science.
Foucaultmaybe faultedperhapsfornot exploringsufficiently the mate-
rial concomitantsof these changes in discourse,althoughhe points to
accompanyingeconomic crisesand increasesin povertyin France and
Britainas relevantsocial pressurestowardsa more efficientmanage-
mentand controlof thepoor and themad.
How mightwe characterizethe historyof social work,and whatkinds
of investigations of thishistorymightbe undertaken?Arewe temptedto
see our historyas one of increasingenlightenmentfoundedon humani-
tarianvalues and advancesin the social sciences?To read Foucault'shis-
toryof madness is to experience a powerfulmethod of investigation of
the effectthata discourseclaimingto be scientifichas on the practices

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 21

withina particularfield and how mechanismsof exclusion develop in

answerto specificneeds. When we turnto our own historyas a profes-
sion developing in North America and Britainfromthe 19th century
onwards,we see, I suggest,a storyof exclusion,classification, and subor-
dinationsimilarto thatof Foucaulťs historyof the preconditionsforthe
establishmentof psychiatry.
A Foucauldian historyof social work mightbegin by showingthat,
before social work could be established as a modern profession,
equipped withan appropriatepanoplyof institutional powersand tech-
niques, certainpreconditionswere necessary:the identificationof the
object of itsinterventionsand the establishmentof itsmoral and politi-
cal purposes.The storywould show thatitsobject was determinedby a
patriarchalbourgeoiscommitmentto the regulationof the poor,a class
relation in which the charitable target was, more specifically,"the
deservingpoor." As madness was separated fromother conditionsaf-
flictingvariouspopulations,so furthercategorizationsubdividedpeople
specificallywithinthe lowerclasses. We mightwishto trace the mecha-
nismswherebythe object of social workbecame furtherdividedintodif-
ferent"client groups" of predominantlyworking-class subjects,espe-
ciallywomen, who were to be influenced and whose resistancewas to be
overcome by interventionfromoutside the class. Perhaps we mayfind
that the need for interventionoriginatedin the belief that the poor
were among the "dangerous classes" who needed to be reformedin
order to reduce deviance, disease, and chaos and to advance civilized
standards.Because their institutionalincarcerationor segregationin
ghettoswas unlikelyto be entirelysuccessfulas a preventivemeasure,
moralinterventionin thefamilywas deemed necessary.
This account of the historyof social workwould surelyshowthat,true
to itsaspirationsto modernityand itswishto severitslinkswiththe "lady
bountiful" symbol of feudal and early capitalist relations between
classes,social workwas obliged to clothe itsmoralisticsurveillanceand
controlin the mantleof scientificrationality.3 Social workbroughtpatri-
archal bourgeois reason, objectivity, method,and organizationto bear
on the irrationality,
subjectivity,chaos, and disorganizationof the casual-
ties among the subject classes. We maywish to trace the waysin which
thesemodernistvalueswereconstitutedintoa social workdiscoursethat
articulateda scientificlanguage appropriateto an occupation intenton
professionaladvancement.

Discourse
Constructinga Foucauldian historyof social workshould not be seen as
simplyan interestingacademic exercise,but as a means of identifying
the origins,exclusions,changes,and lastingtendenciesin the discourse
on social workas we engage in it today.To whatextentdoes it remaina

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22 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

discoursebased upon a beliefin the possibilityand actual existenceof

objectiveprofessionalknowledgeand in theneutrality of scientificclassi-
fication?To what extent do the discourse and its attendantpractices
demonstratethe continuationand, perhaps,increased intensityof the
age-old tasksof surveillanceand control,of a relationbetween actors
and those who are predominantlyacted upon? If discoursedetermines
whatcountsas knowledge- the consensusof dominantforces- we can
see, in fact,thatsocial workand social workeducation have a founda-
tional belief in "expert" knowledgeas the means by which science is
applied to human problems. Professionalsocializationinto the domi-
nant paradigmof objective,specialized technicalknowledgeis the pri-
marytaskof schools of social work.It is a systemof knowledgeproduc-
tion and professionaladvancementbased upon mechanismsof accredi-
tationand the establishmentof standardsof practice.Althoughconsid-
erable ideological disputeexistswithinthissystemof knowledgeproduc-
tion about the politicsof the means and ends of practiceand of educa-
tion,social workis almost invariablyseen as benign in its effects,or at
least in itsintentionsand possibilities:it could hardlybe otherwise,for
how would we justifyourselvesmorallyunless we believed thatwe were
engaged in an enlightened, progressive,emancipatory enterprise?
Foucault, and many postmoderncritics,argue preciselythe opposite:
that enlightenment,progress,and emancipation,code words of mod-
ernism,have legitimatedthe subordinationand homogenizationof sub-
ject populations to the logic of capital accumulation throughprofes-
sional discoursesand practices.
A professionaldiscoursesuch as thatof social workis based upon an
assumptionof expertknowledgeas an increasingly close approximation
to the truthabout what existsin the objectiveworld- our diagnosis,
assessment,interpretation - and because of thisexcludes,withdiffering
degrees of rigidity,outside knowledge.This monopolyoverwhatcounts
as knowledgemay lead us to question whetherthe discoursesof social
workpracticeand educationcan have been essentiallybenign.The rules
of exclusionthathave operated so powerfully in social workto privilege
formsand sources of knowledgethatare eurocentric,patriarchal,and
bourgeoisare an essentialmeans of ideological domination.The taskof
a criticalsocial workpracticeand education mightbe seen as the search
foralternativesourcesof knowledge,both thosethathave been subordi-
nated as partof the social mechanismsof class,gender,and ethnicdomi-
nation and those thathave flourishedoutside the discoursesof objec-
myth,and folklore.
tive,scientificknowledge,in literature,
Where does thissearchforalternativesources of knowledgein social
workeducation lead us? What sortof relativismare we to encounteron
the way?Once again, feministworkon thisissue provesto be of critical
importance.Unlike Lovibond (1989), referredto earlieras a defender

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 23

of feministmodernity,Nicholson (1992) develops a carefulanalysisof

the problemof relativity froma feministperspectivebystartingwiththe
postmodernistassumptionthat human historycannot be captured by
one grand theory.Grand theories,she maintains,reflectthe theorists'
own cultures.But ifwe giveup general theory,she asks,willwe then be
unable to decide among social and politicalperspectives,which are in
conflict?In answeringthis question Nicholson provides some useful
guidelines.
Nicholson argues (see also Habermas, 1984) that we only need to
become relativistifwe cannot suggestcross-cultural criteriafortruthor
validityupon which to decide in a situationof conflict.We can, however,
tryto explicate the criteriafor truthembedded in social practicesand
develop cross-cultural tools of adjudicationthroughdialogue. Once we
have renounced our claims to universalobjectivity, then, Nicholson
argues, relativismdevelops when communication breaks down as a
result,forexample,of differencesof traditions, rules,and notionsabout
the legitimacyof knowledgeclaims.Althoughtherecan be no guaran-
tees about the validityof our knowledgeand beliefs,we can give maxi-
mumattentionto organizingsatisfactory modes ofcommunicationwith-
in whichto examine and debate whatwe knowand believe.

Educational practice
If, as I am suggesting,criticalsocial workeducation must renounce a
commitmentto privileged,objectiveknowledge,take a sceptical,ques-
tioningapproach to all metanarratives, includingits own, and explore
alternativeaccounts,histories,and experiences of our social^world,by
whatapproaches to educational practicemightthisbe achieved?That I
turn,at this point, to the work of Paulo Freire (see especiallyFreire,
1970) mayseem, at firstsight,to be paradoxical,and so it is. Freireis an
unrepentantmodernist,committedto an emancipatorymass politics
wherebythehistoricalpossibility ofhumanfreedomcan be struggledfor
because human beings,in hisview,followingMarx,have an "ontological
vocation" to become more fullyhuman (see McLaren & Leonard,
1993). In a spiritthatmaintainsa critical,scepticalattitudeto metaphysi-
cal claimsas to our ontologicalvocation,we maystilldrawupon Freire's
approach to bankingand dialogicalformsof education as one thatcon-
nectscloselywitha postmodernperspectiveon knowledge/power.
We may take Freire's account of the dominant practice of banking
education,where "usefuland established"knowledgeis investedin stu-
dents througha process of socialization to ruling conceptions of the
social world,as the model, par excellence, of modernistrationalityand
order.This bankingmodel manifestsitselfin the authority and powerof
teachersand institutions and the relativepowerlessnessof students,who
are expected to reproduce the knowledgeof the "authorities"and sub-

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24 Revue canadienne de service social, volume 11 (hiver)

mit to the rules of dominant discourses.Freire's account of banking

education illuminateshow the "social appropriationof discourses,"in
Foucault's phrase, takes place and how the exclusion of subordinate
formsof knowledgeand of hidden historiesof oppressionacts to repro-
duce dominantdiscoursesand theirsedimentationin relationshipsof
power.
What is differentabout Freire's account, compared with that of
Foucault, is that it stands against the pessimism and fatalismthat
afflictedFoucaultbecause it seeks in the practiceof dialogue an alterna-
tiveto bankingeducation. Dialogical education is not a fullyestablished
alternativeformof learningwithinWesterncountries;ratheritis a set of
social practicesto be struggledforin a spiritof revolutionary optimism.
We mayinterpretthe practiceof dialogical education as a challenge to
the knowledge/powerconnection of dominant discourses and their
rules of exclusion. It is a practicein which teachersand studentswork
togetherin the constructionof formsof knowledgethatenable themto
develop a criticalconsciousnessof the social worldin a collective,rather
thanin an individualistand competitive,spirit.For Freire,likeFoucault,
knowledgeis alwaysproblematicbecause it is historicallyconstructed
withinspecificsocial structuresreflectingparticularsocial relationsof
class,gender,ethnicity, and culture.
Although there is plenty of evidence of the problems faced in
attemptsto use a dialogical model of education withinWesterneduca-
tional systems,not least because of itsvulgarizationin radical rhetoric
and tokenism(see McLaren & Leonard, 1993), nevertheless,I believe
that Freire'sapproach has a significantplace in a criticalpostmodern
education. In the firstplace, dialogical education rejectsthe idea of a
monopolyof "expert" knowledgein the controlof the teacherwho sim-
ply transmitsit to the student.If knowledgeis sociallyand historically
constructed,then dialogical education should be concerned not only
with unearthing "hidden" knowledgesreflectingthe diverse experi-
ences and worldviewsof subordinatepopulations,but also withdisputes
about the nature of all formsof knowledge.If the notion of objective,
universaltruthsis rejected,thenall absolutistknowledgeclaimsmustbe
metwithequal scepticism:alternativeknowledges,reflectinga range of
gender, class, ethnic, and culturalexperiences, must be treatedwith
respectas social practicesbutwithinan educationalarena of criticalplu-
ralism.Just as social workersmight,from a postmodern perspective,
attemptto be co-authorswiththeirclientsof alternativeaccountsof cli-
ents' lives- differentnarrativeswhich elucidate a range of meanings
ratherthan a single authoritativeinterpretation - so, similarly,might
teachersand studentstogetherbuild the different knowledgesnecessary
forpractice.

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Canadian Social WorkReview,Volume 11 (Winter) 25

In a systemof university-based professionaleducation founded pre-

dominantlyon the idea of expertknowledgeas objectiveand therefore
privileged,developinga criticalsocial workeducation is a revolutionary
task.It is a taskalreadybegun, especiallywithindevelopmentsin femi-
nist,multicultural, and anti-racist
education: a reflectiveand self-critical
postmodernperspectiveon knowledge/powerwill,I believe,contribute
much to these developments.In one of his more optimisticreflections
on "being on the otherside of discourse/'Foucaultpresentsus withthe
challengeof the uncertainty we facewhenwe recognizethe possibility of
there being formsof knowledgedifferentfromour own: "There are
timesin lifewhen the question of knowingifone can thinkdifferently
than one thinks,and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely
necessaryif one is to go on looking and reflectingat all" (Foucault,
1991,p. 406).

NOTES
1 Foranexcellent critical
account ofmodernism andpostmodernism from a Marxistper-
seeDavidHarvey's
spective, (1990)TheCondition AnEnquiry
ofPostmodernity: into
theOri-
ginsofCulturalChange. Fora debateamongmajorprotagonists intheliterary andcul-
turalfieldsee,forexample, Postmodernism:
ICADocuments (1989)editedbyLisaAppig-
nanesi.
2 Thecontradictions ofbothmodernity andpostmodernism arewellargued inHarvey's
(1990)bookandBenAgger's (1990)TheDeclineofDiscourse:
Reading,Writing andResis-
tance
inPostmodern ,from
Capitalism I havedrawn
which inwhat
substantially follows.
3 In England at theendofthe19thcentury, thedominant discourseoftheCharity
Organization Societywastheindividualismandvictim-blaming represented bySocial
Darwinism. Whatwasexcludedfromthisdiscourse wasan alternative modernist
accountstemming from theCOS'sarch-rivals
intheFabian whose
Society, socialreform-
ismandcommitments tocentralized
planningwerelatertobecome onecornerstone of
theideology oftheBritish LabourParty.However, someofthebourgeois women who
wereCOScaseworkers became covert
Fabians,secretly thedominant
resisting COSdis-
course(Todd,1955).

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