Torts and Damages1

Torts and Damages Syllabus 1
` Cordillera Career Development College

Condensed by Susana C. Gapla-ew-Umayat
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CORDILLERA CAREER DEVELOPMENT COLLEGE
College Of Law for the 2nd Semester 2018-2019
Torts and Damages (Saturday:1:00-3:00 p.m.)
Syllabus
Compiled by Susana C. Gapla-ew-Umayat
TORTS AND DAMAGES

Syllabus
I. The Conceptual Framework
A. The Concept of a Tort
1. Tort in Common Law

a. Etymology
b. Definition
c. Common Theme
2. Tort Under Philippine Law

a. Existence of “Philippine Tort Law“
i. Intent of the Framers
ii. Civil code test
Art. 1902 Old Civil Code (cf Art. 2176 Civil Code)
b. Scope of Philippine Tort Law
c. Definition of Tort under Philippine Law
*Naguiat v. NLRC G.R. No. 116123, March 13, 1997
*Vinzons-Chat V. Fortune G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
d. Elements of Tort
*Garcia v. Salvador G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007
*Lucas v. Tuaño G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009
*Ocean Builders v. Sps. Cubacub, G.R. No. 150898,
Apr 13,2011 (See Bersamin dissent)
3. The Purpose of Tort Law
B. The Concept of Quasi Delict
1. Historical Background
Barredo v. Garcia G.R. No. 48006, July 8, 1942
2. Nature
Arts. 1157 (cf 1089 old code)
3. Governing Provisions
Art. 1162
4. Definition
Art. 2176 Civil Code (cf 1902 old code)
5. Scope
a. Intentional Acts
Art. 2176
Cangco v. Manila Railrod G.R. No. 12191, Oct. 14, 1918
Elcano v. Hill G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977
Andano v. IAC G.R. No. 74761, Nov. 6, 1990
Baksh v. CA G.R. No. 97336, Feb. 19, 1993
b. Damage to Property
Cinco v. Canonoy G.R. No. L-33171, May 31, 1979
6. Elements
Art. 2176
*Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74751, Nov. 6, 1990
C. The Relationship Between Tort and Quasi-Delict
1. District concepts
2. Framework
D. Quasi-Delict and Delict
1. Distinguishing quasi-delict and delict

*Barredo v. Garcia G.R. No. 48006, 8 July 1942
2.Overlap between quasi-delict and delict

*Barredo v. Garcia, Supra
*Elcano v. Hill, Supra
*Andamo v. IAC, Supra
*L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa G.R. No. 158995, Sept. 26 2006
E. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual
1.Distinguishing culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual
a.Source
*Cangco v. Manila Railroad, Supra
b. Burden of Proof
*FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento G.R. No. 141910, Oct. 6, 2002
c. Applicability of the Doctrine of Proximate cause
*Colala v. CA, G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000
c. Defense of Employer for negligence of Employee
2.Is there an Intersection?

Art. 2176
*Foree v. Miranda, G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959
*Consolidated Bank v. CA G.R. No. 138569, Sept. 11, 2003
*Air France v. Carrascoso G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966
*Far East v. CA G.R. No. 108164, February 23, 1995
*PSBA v. CA, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
*Syquia v. CA G.R. No. 98695, Jan. 27, 1993
*Light Rail Transit v. Navidad G.R. No. 145804, Feb. 6, 2003
II. Negligence
A. Concept of Negligence
Art. 1173
1. Determining the diligence required

Art. 1173
*Jorge v. Sicam G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
*Far Eastern Shipping v. CA G.R. No. 130068, Oct. 1, 1998
*PNR v. Branty, G.R. No. 169891, Nov. 2, 2006
* PNR v. CA, G.R. No. 157658, 15 Oct. 2007
2. Default standard of diligence

Art. 1173
B. Degrees of Diligence
*Anedo v. Rio G.R. No. L-6870, May 24, 1954
*Marinduque v. Workmen’s G.R. No. L-8110, June 30, 1956
*Ilao Oreta v. Ronquillo G.R. No. 172406, Oct. 11, 2007
C. Standard of Conduct
1. Importance of a Standard of Conduct
2. The Fictitious Person
a. Common law’s reasonable person

b. Civil law’s “good father of a family”
Art. 1173
*Picart v. Smith G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
*Sicam v. Jorge G.R. No. 159617, Aug. 8, 2007
*Corinthian Gardens v. Spouses Tanjangco G.R. No. 160795,
June 27, 2008
3. Special Circumstances
*Anonuevo v. CA G.R. 130003, 20 Oct. 2004
*Heirs of Completo v. Albayda G.R. No. 172200, July 6, 2010
*Pacis v. Morales G.R. No. 169467 Feb. 25, 2010
4. Children
*Taylor v. Manila Railroad G.R. No. 4977, March 22, 1910
*Jarco Marketing v. CA G.R. No. 129792, Dec. 21, 1999
*Ylarde v. Aquino G.R. No. L-33722, July 29, 1986
5. Experts
a. In general
*Far Eastern Shipping v. CA; G.R. No. 130068, Oct. 1, 1998
*Culion v. Philippines Motors, G.R. No. 32611, Nov. 3, 1930
b. Pharmacist
*US v. Pineda G.R. No. L-12858 Jan. 22, 1918
*Mercury Drug v. De Leon G.R. No. 165622, 10-17-2008
c. Medical Professionals
*Cruz v. CA G.R. No. 1224-15, Nov. 18, 1997
*Dela Torre v. Imbuido G.R. No. 192973, 9-29-14
*Casumpang v. Cortejo G.R. Nos. 171127, 171217 & 171221,
March 11, 2015
*Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc. G.R. No. 191018,
Jan. 25, 2016
D. Presumptions of Negligence
A. In Motor Vehicle Mishaps
1. Previous Violation
Articles 2184
2. Simultaneous Violations
Article 2185
Tison v. Sps. Ponasin, G.R. No. 173180, August 24, 2012
Sanitary Steam v. CA G.R. 119092, December 10, 1998
Añonuevo v. CA G.R. No. 130003, 20 October, 2004
B. Possessions of dangerous weapons or substance

Art. 2188
C. Common Carriers
Articles 1734, 1735, 1752
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
1. Definition
2. Statement of the Rule
3. Elements
a. Nature of the accident

b. Control over the cause
*Professional Services v Agana G.R. No. 126297;
*Josefa v. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014
*BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
c. No contribution to the injury from the injured
4. Effect of direct evidence

*Layugan v. IAC G.R. No. 73998, Nov. 14, 1988
*Tan v. Jan Transit, G.R. No. 183198, Nov. 25, 2009
*College Assurance v. Belfranlt, G.R. No. 155604, Nov. 22, 2007
5. Nature of the rule
6. Effect of the rule
7. Justification for the rule

*DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
8. Res ipsa inquitor versus expert testimony in medical negligence cases

*Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 122445, Nov. 18, 1997
*Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R. Nos. 171127, 171217 & 171221,
March 11, 2015
*Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc., G.R. No. 191018,
January 25, 2016
*Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, Dec. 18, 2008
*Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009
*Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354, Dec. 29, 1999
*Cruz v. Agas, Jr. v. G.R. No. 204095, June15, 2015
*Rosit v. Davao Doctor’s Hospital, G.R. No. 210445, December 2,
2015
*Solidum v. People, G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014
E. Defenses against charge of negligence
A. Plaintiff’s negligence to proximate cause

Article 2179
*Bernardo v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 9308, Dec. 23, 1914
*PLDT v. CA, G.R. No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1980
*Manila Electric v. Remoquillo, G.R. No. L-8328, May 18, 1956
*Cagayan II Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Rapanan,
G.R. No. 19988
B. Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff
Article 2179 2214
1. Definition of Contributory Negligence

*M.H. Rakes v. The Atlantic, G.R. No. L-1719, Jan. 3, 1907
*Ma-ao Sugar v. CA, G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990
*Añonuevo v. CA, G.R. No. 130003, October 2004
*NPC v. Heirs of Sonkin, G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015
2. Distinguishing Contributory Negligence from proximate cause
3. Effects of contributory negligence

*Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160700, Feb. 23, 2005
*PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006
*Genobiagon v. CA, G.R. No. 40452, October 12, 1989
C. Fortuitous Event
1. Definition
Article 1174
*Sicam v. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, Aug. 8, 2007
2. Defense and Exceptions

Article 1174
3. Elements
*Sicam v. Jorge, Supra
4. Three-Step Analysis
Article 1174
*Juntilla v. Fontanar, G.R. No. L-45637, 5-31-1998
*South Eastern College v. CA, G.R. No. 126380, July 10, 1998
D. Plaintiff assumption of risk/volenti non-fit injuria

Article 1174
*Afialda V. Hisole, G.R. No. L-2075, Nov. 29, 1949
*Ilocos Norte v. CA, G.R. No. 53401, Nov. 6, 1989
*Calabas v. CA, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
*Nikko Hotel v. Roberto Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005
*Pantaleon v. American Express, G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010
E. Prescription
Article 1146
*Kramer v. CA, G.R. No. 83524, October 18, 1989
V. Cause
A. Different Categories
1. Proximate
*Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, Oct. 22, 1957
*Mercury Drug b. Baking, G.R. No. 156037, May 25, 2007
*Pilipinas Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 105410, July 25, 1994
2. Concurrent
*Far Eastern v CA. G.R. No 130968, October 1, 1998
*Ruks Konsult and Construction v Adworld Sign, G.R. No. 204866, 1-
21-2015
3. Remote
*Manila Electric v Remoquillo, G.R. No. L-8328, May 18, 1956
*Gabeto v Araneta, G.R. No. 15674, October 17, 1921
*ANECO v Balen, G.R. No. 173146, November 25, 2009
4. Intervening
Phoenix construction v IAC G.R. No. L-65295, March 10 1987
B. Tests to Determine Proximate Cause
1. Best for/sine qua non

*Bataclan v Medina, supra
2.Sufficient Link
*Dy Teban c Jose Ching, G.R. No. 161803, Feb. 4, 2008
3. Substantial Factor
4. Mixed Considerations
*Dy Teban v Jose Ching, supra
5. Cause v Condition
Phoenix construction v IAC, supra
6. Last Clear Chance

a. History and Rationale
b. Statement of the Rule
c. Application
*Picart v Smith, supra
*Phoenix v IAS, Supra
*Glan v IAC G.R. No. 70493, May 19, 1989
*Canlas v GA G.R. No. 112160, 28 February, 2000
*Lapanday v Angala, G.R. No. 153076, June 21, 2007
*Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA,
G.R. No. 138569, Sept. 11, 2003
*Consolidated Bank v CA G.R. No. 80880, Feb. 6, 1991
*Bustamante v CA, G.R. No. 79051-51, Nov. 14, 1989\
*Engada v CA G.R. No. 140 698, June 20, 2003
VI. Persons Vicariously Liable
A. Persons Exercising Parental Authority
1.Parents
Article 2180
*Libi v IAC, G.R. No. 10890, September 18, 1992
*Tamargo v CA, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
2.Guardians
Article 2080
3.Other Persons exercising parental authority

Article 2180
Article 216-217, 221, Family Code
B. Teachers and Schools
1.Under the Civil Code

Article 2180
*Palisoc v Brillantes, G.R. No. L-29025, Oct. 5, 1988
*Amadora v CA, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
*Salvadora v IAC, G.R. No. 70458, Oct. 5, 1988
2.Under the Family Code

Article 218, Family Code
*St. mary’s Acadaemy v Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
*St. Joseph’s College v Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
C. Owners/Managers of Establishments/Employers
1.Distinguishing the 4th and 5th Paragraph

Article 2180
*Philippine Rabbit v Phi American, G.R. No. L-25142, March 25, 1975
2. When Applicable
a. Employer-employee Relationship
*Sps. Jayme v Apostol, G.R. No. 163609 Nov. 27, 2008
*Professional Services v. Agenda, G.R. No. 126297, Jan. 31, 2007,
2-11-2008, 2-2-, 2010
*Casumpang v Cortejo, g.R. No. 171127, 171217, 171221, March
11, 2015
*Mendoza v Sps. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014
*R. Transport Corp. v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161, 2-18-2015
* Laconsay v. Berog Y Caraos, G.R. No. 188686, 12-3-2014
b. Within the range of designed tasks

*Filamer v IAC, G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992
*NPC v CA, G.R. No. 119121, August 14, 1998
*Valenzueal v CA, G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996
3. Presumption of Negligence
4. Rebuttal of Presumption
*Lampesa v De Vera, G.R. No. 15511, February 14, 2008
*Mercury Drug v Huang, G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007
*child Learning Center v Tagario G.R. No. 150920, Nov. 25, 2005
*Mendoza v Sps. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014
D. The State
Article 2180
*Meritt v Government G.R. No. 11154 march 21, 1916
*Rosele v Auditor General G.R. No. L-1120 August 31, 1948
*Fontanilla v Maliaman G.R. No. 55963, Dec. `1, 1989
G.R. No.55963, 730045, 27 February, 1991
*Sps. Jayme v Apostol, G.R. No. 163609 Nov. 27, 2008
VII. Persons Specifically Liable
A. Possessor or Use of Animals

Article 2183
*Afiada v Filsode, G.R. No. L-2075 29 November, 1949
*Vestil v IAC G.R. No. 74431, 6 November, 1989
B. Owner of Motor Vehicle

Article 2184
*Chapman v Underwood, G.R. No. 9010, 28 March, 1914
*Casdo v Yu Ke Thai, G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968
C. Provinces, Cities, Municipalities

Article 2181
*Guilatco v Dagupan, G.R. No. 61516, March 21, 1989
*Quezon City v Dacara G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005
*Jimenez v city of Manila, G.R. No.71049, May 29, 1987
D. Proprietors of Buildings
Article 2190-2192
E. Engineer/Architect of collapsed building

Article 1723
F. Head of a family for things thrown/falling

Article 2193
G. Owners of enterprises/other employers

Article 1711-1712
H. Manufacturers/Producers
Article 2187
*Pascual v Ford Motor Company Phils, G.R. No. 220667, January 27, 2016
I. Persons who interfered with contractual relations

Article 1314
*Gilchrist v Cuddy, G.R. No. 9356, February 18, 1915
*So Ping bun v CA, G.R.No. 120554, Sept. 21, 1999
*Lagon v CA, G.R. No. 119107, March 18, 2005
*Gov. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
*Inocencio v Hospicio de San Jose, G.R. No. 201787, September 25, 2013
VIII. Human Relations TORTS
A. Abuse of Rights
Article 19
*Globe Mackay v CA, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
*Albenson v CA, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
*Amomoy v Gutierrez, G.R. No. 140420, 15 February, 2001
*UE v Jader G.R. No. 132344, 17 February, 2000
*Pantaleon v American Express, Supra,
*California Clothing v Quiňones, G.R. No. 175822, Oct. 23, 2013
*Sesbreno v CA G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
B. Illegal Acts
Article 20
Garcia v Salvador, supra
Comsavings v Sps. Capistrano, G.R. No. 170942, August 28, 2013
C. Acts Contra bonus Mores
1.In General
Article 21
*Wassmer v.Velex G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
2. Moral Seduction
*Tanjangco v. CA, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
*Baksh v CA G.R. No. 97336, 19 February, 1993
3.Public Humiliation
*Pe v Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
*Grand Union v Espino, G.R. No. L-48250, 28 Dec., 1979
*Carpio v Valmonte, G.R. No. 151860
4.Malicious Prosecution
a.Under Common Law
b.Under Philippine Law
i.Definition
ii. Statutory Basis
iii. Elements
*Que v. IAC, G.R. No. 66865, January 13, 1989
*Magbanu v Jensay, G.R. No. 132659, 12 February 2007
5. Depressive Dismissal
*Quisaba c Sta. Ines G.R. No. L-38000, August 30, 1974
D. Violation of Human Dignity

Article 26
*Sps. Guanio v Makati, Shangrila St. Louis v CA, G.R. No. L-46061, Nov. 14, 1984
*Gregorio v. CA, G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
*Sps. Hing v Chiacuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013.
E. Dereliction of Duty
Article 27
F. Under Competition
Article 28
*Willaware Products Corporation v Jesichris Manufacturing Corp. G.R. No.
195549, 2 September, 2014
IX. Independent Civil Action
A. Violator of Civil and Political Rights

Article 32
*MHP Garments v CA, G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
*Silahis v Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006
*Vinzons-Chato v Fortune, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007 and Dec. 23, 2008
*Sesbreno v CA, G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
B. Information Fraud, Physical Injuries

Article 35
1.In General
*Madiza v. Caro, G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983
2.Defamation
*Arafiles v Phil Journalism, G.R. No.
*MVRS v Islamic G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
*Yochengco v Manila Chronicle, G.R. No. 184315, November 25, 2009
3.Fraud
*Heirs of Simon v Elvin Chan, G.R. No. 157547, 23 February 23, 2011
*Consing v People G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
4.Physical Injuries
*Capuno v Pepsi cola, G.R. No. L-19331, April 30, 1965
*Corpuz v Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
*Madeja v Caro, G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983
*Bonite v. Zosa, G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988
*Dulay v CA, G.R. No. 10817, April 3, 1995
C. Neglect of Duty
Article 34
D. “Catch All”, Independence Civil Action Article

Article 35
PART TWO – DAMAGES
I.The Concept of Damages
A. Importance and Definition
B.When Allowed
*Custodio v CA, G.R. No. 11600, February 9, 1996
C. Law on Damages
Articles 2195-2198
D.Types of Damages
Article 2197
E.Apportionment of Damage
*People v Halil Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
II.ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
A. Definition/Purpose
Article 2199
B. Proof Required
1.Pleading and proof of actual damages

2.Nature and Loss of Proof
*Gatchalian v Delim, G.R. No. 56487, Oct. 21, 1991
*Oceaneering Contractors v Baretto, G.R. No. 184215
C. Loss Covered
1.In General
Art. 2200
*PNOC v CA G.R. No. 107578, Oct. 8, 1998
*Candano v Sugata On G.R. No. 163212, March 13, 2007
2.In Contracts and Quasi-Contract

Art. 2201
*Spouses Zalamea v CA G.R. No. 104235, 18 Nov. 1993
*BPI Family v Franco G.R. No. 123498, Nov. 23, 2007
3.In Crimes and Quasi-delicts

Articles 2202, 2204
*People v Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009
*PNOC v CA, G.R. No. 107518, Oct. 8, 1998
*Llorente v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 85464, Oct. 3, 1991
4.Earning Capacity Business Standing

Article 2205
a.Loss or impairment of earning capacity
*Gatchalian v Delim, G.R. No. 56487, Oct. 21, 1991
*Mercury Drug v Huang, G.R. No. 172122 June 22, 2007
b.Injury to business standing or commercial credit
D. Death by crime or quasi-delict

Article 2206
i.Civil/Death indemnity
*People v Halil Gamboa, supra
ii.Loss of earning capacity

Article 2205
*People v Lopez, G.R. No. 188902, February 16, 2011
*Philippines Hawk v Lee
*Pleyto v Lomboy G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004
*People v Ibañez, G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
E. In rape cases
*People v Astrologo, G.R. No. 169873, June 8, 2007
*People v Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011
*People v Baňago, G.R. No. 128384 June 29, 1999
*People v Bartolini, G.R. No. 179498, August 3, 2010
F. Attorney’s Fees
Article 2208
*Manila Electric v Ramoy G.R. No. 158911, 3-4-08
*Briones v Macabagdal, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010
*Bank of America v Phil. Racing, G.R. No. 150228, July 30
*Sps. Andrada v Pilhino, G.R. No. 156448, Feb. 23, 2011
*PNCC v APAC, G.R. No. 183804. September 11, 2013
*Aquino v Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015
G. Interest
Article 2209-2213
*Frias v San Diego-Sison, G.R. No. 155223, April 3, 2007
*Nacar v Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013
H. Duty to minimize
Article 2203
*Lim v CA G.R. No. 125817, January 16, 2002
*Mackay Radio v Rich, G.R. No. L-22608, June 30, 1969
I. Mitigation of Damages
Article 2214-2215
*Sweet Lines v CA, G.R. No.L-46340, April 28, 1983
*Ong v Bognadol, G.R. No. 149140 September 12, 2006
III. MORAL DAMAGES
A. Purpose
*Kierulf v CA G.R. No. 99301, March 13, 1997
B. When recoverable
1.Moral Suffering is the proximate result

Article 2217
2.Within Specific Cases

Article 2219-2220
*Arco Pulp and Paper Co, Inc v Lim G.R. No. 206806, June 25
a.A crime offense resulting in physical injury

i.Includes crime resulting to death
ii.Need to testimony on moral suffering
*People v Cleofas and Pirame, G.R. No. 121998, 9 March, 2000
*People v Vilarme G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013
*Carlos Arcoma y Maban v CA 134784, December 9, 2002
b.Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries

*B.F. Metal v Lomotan, G.R. No. 170813 16 April 2008
*Laconsay v Berog y Caraos, G.R. No. 188686, December 3, 2014
c.Seduction, Abduction, Rape or other lascivious acts

*People v Lizano, G.R. No. 174470, April 27, 2007
d.Illegal or Arbitrary Detention or Arrest

*People v Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, Feb. 4, 2010
e.Illegal Search
f.Libel, Slander or any other form of defamation

*Occena v Icamena, G.R. No. 82146, Jan. 22, 1990
g. Malicious Prosecution
*Expert Travel v CA, G.R. No. 130030, 25 June, 1999
*Industrial Insurance v Bondad, G.R. No. 136722, April 22, 2000
*Sps. Suntay v Keyser Mercantile, G.R. NO. 208462, December 10, 2014
h. Acts mentioned in Article 309

Article 309
i.Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35
Article 21, Act Bonos Mores
Article 21
*Triple Eight v NLRC, G.R. No. 129584, 3 Dec., 1998
Article 26 Violation of Human Dignity

*Concepcion v CA, G.R. No. 120706, Jan. 31, 2000
Article 27 Refusal or Neglect of Duty
Article 27
Article 28 Unfair Competition

Article 28
Article 32
*Manila Electric v Sps Chua, G.R. No. 160442, July 5, 2010
*Cojuangco v CA, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999
j. Willful inquiry to property

Article 2220
*Manila Electric v Ramoy, supra
*Regala v Carin, G.R. No. 1888715, April 6, 2011
k. Breach of Contract in Bad Faith

Article 2220
*Francisco v Ferrer, G.R. No. 130030, June 25, 1999
*Bankard v Feliciano, G.R. No. 141761, July 28, 2006
*BPI Express Card Corp. v Armovit, G.R. No. 163654
*PAL v Lopez, G.R. No. 156654 Nov. 20, 2008
*Sps. Valenzuela v Sps. Mano, G.R. No. 172611, July 9, 2010
C. Who May Recover
1. Relatives of Injured Person

Article 21219
*Sulpicio Lines v Curso, G.R. No.157009
2. Juridical Persons
*ABS-CBN v CA, G.R. No. 128690, Jan. 21, 1999
*Filipinas Broadcasting v Ago, G.R. No. 141994, Jan. 17, 2005
*Republic v Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007
*Crystal v BPI, G.R. No. 178008, October 9, 2013
D. Factors Considered In Determining Amount
*Lopez v Pan American, G.R. No. L-22415, March 30, 1966
IV. NOMINAL DAMAGES
A. Purpose and When Recoverable
1. Violation of a Right
Article 2221-2222
*People v Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 8011
*Almeda v Cariňo, G.R. No. 152143, January 13, 2003
*Gonzales v PCIB, G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011
2. No Actual Loss caused or proven

*Areola v CA, G.R. No. 95641, September 22, 1994
*PNOC v CA, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998
*Francisco v Ferrer, G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001
*China Airlines v CA, G.R. No. 129988, 14 July 2003
*Turin Ace v Rufina, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006
3. Under Consideration of Equity

*Sps. Guanio v Makati Shangri-la, G.R. No. 190661, February 7, 2011
B. Nature and Determination of Amount
1. Small but substantial
2. Commensurate to injury suffered

*Gonzales v People, G.R. No. 159950, Feb. 12, 2007
*Pedrosa v CA, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001
3. Special Reasons Extant in the case

*Robes-Francisco v CFI, G.R. No. L-41093, October 30, 1978
*People v Bernardo, G.R, No. 144316, March 11, 2002
C. Effect of Award
V.TEMPERATE DAMAGES
A. When Awarded
1. Nature of care prevents determination of actual loss

Article 2224
2. Cases where amount of loss not proven

*Pleno v CA, G.R. No. 56505, May 9, 1988
*Tan v OMC, Carriers, G.R. No. 190521, January 12, 2011
3. In addition to actual damages

*Ventanilla v Centeno, G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961
a. Chronic and continuing injury

*Ramos v CA, supra
b. In addition to civil indemnity
c. In addition to other actual damages proven
B. Factors in determining amount
1.In General
Article 2224
*De Guzman v Tumolva, G.R. No. 188072, October 19, 2011
2. Receipts amounting to less than Php25,000.00
*People v Lucero, G.R. No. 179044, 12-6-2010
*Serrano v People, G.R. No. 175023, 7-5-2010
*People v Andrea, G.R. No. 135697, 8-15-13
3. No receipts provided
*People v Gidoc, G.R. No. 185162, 4-24-09
*People v Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, 2-7-03
VI.LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A. Definition and Purpose
1. Definition
Article 2226
*Suatengco v Reyes, G.R. No. 162729, December 17, 2008
Article 2228
2. Purpose
Article 2227
*HL Carlos v Marina G.R. No. 147614, January 29, 2004
*Titan v Uni-Field, G.R. No. 153874, March 1, 2007
B. Reducing the amount
1. When iniquitous or unconscionable

Article 2227
2. Possible Tests
a. Apply rules on penalty causes

*Linguitan v CA, G.R. No. 138677, 2-12-2012
*RCBC v CA, G.R. No. 128833, April 20, 1998
b. Attorney’s Fees test

c. Applying precedent
d. Proportionality test
e. Necessity test
*Henry Dela Rosa Co v Admiral United Savings Bank,
G.R. No. 154740, April 16, 2008
f. Where in pari delicto
* Sy v CA, G.R. No. L-398853, August 17, 1983
g. Consider actual damages
VII.EXEMPLARY/CORRECTIVE DAMAGES
Damages
A. Purpose
Article 2229
B. When Imposed
1. In General
Articles 2229-2233
2. In addition to other types

Article 2234
*PNB v CA, G.R. No. 100630, April 2, 1996
3.Renunciation in advance
Article 2230
4.In Crimes
Article 2230
*People v Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, 23 August 2001
*People v Diunsay,Jalandoni, G.R. No. 174277, 2-8-2007
*People v Dalisay,G.R. No. 188106, Nov. 25, 2009
*People v Dadulla, G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011
5.In Quasi-Delicts
Article 2231
*Kapalaran Bus Lines v Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, Aug. 25, 1989
*Baliwag, Transit v CA, G.R. No. 116624, September 20, 1996
*Philtranco v CA, G.R. No. 120553, June 17, 1997
6. In Contracts and Quasi-contracts

Article 2232
*Munsayac v De Lara, G.R. No. L-21151, June 26, 1968
*Singapore Airlines v Fernandez, G.R. No. 142305, Dec. 10, 2003
Questioned handwritings, signatures, and
documents; how examined; proof of genuiness
JANET CARBONELL VS. JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES, REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER AND
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VIRGILIO A. CARBONELL, G.R. No. 205681, July 01, 2015.
“x x x.
Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997, which was
clearly established by the evidence presented during the trial. Under Section 22,⁠6 Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of proving the
genuineness of the handwriting are through a witness familiar with such
handwriting or a comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting
and the admitted genuine specimens of the handwriting. In this case,
respondent, the purported writer or signatory to the Deed of Absolute Sale,
testified that her signature was forged. To prove the forgery, respondent
presented, among others, her Canadian and Philippine passports, driver’s
license, citizenship card, and health card, showing her genuine signature which
was clearly different from the signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale.⁠7 Comparing the genuine signature of respondent on these documents
with her purported signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, the RTC found
“significant differences in terms of handwriting strokes, as well as the shapes
and sizes of letters, fairly suggesting that the plaintiff [Julita A. Carbonell-
Mendes] was not the author of the questioned signature.”⁠8 Signatures on a
questioned document may be examined by the trial court judge and compared
with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the issue of authenticity of
the contested document. As held in Spouses Estacio v. Dr. Jaranilla:⁠9
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination
of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts,
especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined
by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing
ones.SECTION 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.” ⁠10
"x x x.
Right to NBI questioned document examination -
G.R. No. 192274
G.R. No. 192274
The Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey P. Marquez
v. Sandiganbayan,[15] where the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the
motion of the accused therein to cause the NBI to examine the documents already
submitted to the court. In said case, the Court wrote:
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his
signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations
were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and
must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact
that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his
burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to
support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative
force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter
is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he
cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the
original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft
court.
At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court.
It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line withSECTION 22 of
Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present
his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense
to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy
frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The
court should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be
taken will not be in violation of the rules.
The Marquez ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. InMarquez, the accused
had requested for the examination of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests by the NBI from the beginning. Records of the case showed that
right upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, while the case was still with
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the accused already sought referral of the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI for
examination. At that stage, OSP denied his plea. In the case at bench, the trial had already
started and, worse, the accused’s motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
At any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was without prejudice
as the RTC stated that he could utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the
presentation of defense evidence.
x x x."
Due process and forensic document examination

May I share a pleading I have filed in the Supreme Court in re: a petition I had previously filed in behalf of
a client in a criminal case a new forensic document examination by the National Bureau of Investigation to
counterbalance the disputed examination previously conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory. Read the 2
jurisprudence/discussed below.
"x x x.
THE PETITIONER x x x, by counsel, respectfully states:
1. The issue is not whether it is MANDATORY or INDISPENSABLE on the part of the trial court to order a
questioned document examination, or whether the reports and findings of expert witnesses are BINDING on
the courts. The petitioner knows the standard and traditional Remedial Law doctrines on expert evidence and
expert witness. He knows that the participation of expert witnesses in judicial proceedings is not mandatory.
But he also knows that it will be very useful, in the interest of truth and justice, for the trial courts to avail
themselves of the technical expertise of expert institutions, like the National Bureau of Investigation. In fact, it is
standard and routine on the part of the courts to use the expertise of the NBI in hotly contested criminal cases.
That was precisely why he filed a motion invoking the wisdom and discretion of the trial court a quo to allow
him, through the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), to cause the conduct of questioned document
examination of the papers, forms, and other instruments that were previously examined by the PNP Crime
Laboratory at the behest of the private respondent without prior notice to or participation of the petitioner.
2. The petitioner doubted, and continues to doubt, the motives, intentions, and the conduct of the questioned
document examination by the PNP Crime Laboratory at the behest of and in cahoots with the private
respondent. There was apparently a conspiracy to pin down the petitioner as early as the fact-finding
investigation stage at the PNP level. That was the reason why he filed a motion for an NBI questioned
document examination before the trial court.
3. His intention was pure: To protect his human and constitutional rights to fair play, due process of law, and equal
protection of the law. This is the spirit of full disclosure which is the very essence of fair, just, open and credible
judicial proceedings.
4. It is interesting to ask: Why are the People of the Philippines and the private respondent taking a very hard line
on this harmless procedural issue? Is there something that a new NBI questioned document examination might
discover and reveal which might be adverse to their theory of culpability of the petitioner? If the People of the
Philippines and the private respondent intend to see that real and true justice is done in this case, without
unduly delaying the underlying criminal case a quo, why are they fighting, tooth and nail, this very harmless
procedural evidentiary issue all the way to the Supreme Court?
5. The humble, sincere and determined stance of the petitioner in raising this very crucial procedural issue all the
way from the trial court level up to the Supreme Court level shows one things: That he is not hiding anything
and that he courageously and sincerely wants a full disclosure and examination of all the relevant and material
evidence, pro and con, to see to it that genuine justice is administered in the criminal case a quo.
6. Moreover, how can the petitioner ably and competently rebut, contradict, and weaken an antagonistic expert
witness except through another expert witness of an equal stature. He has the constitutional and statutory right
to full disclosure and full presentation of evidence, pro and con, as an accused in a criminal case. To deprive
him of the right to secure and present countervailing expert evidence (NBI questioned document examination)
through an appropriate motion, which was in effect intended to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law and the
administration of justice in the very first place, would be most unfair, unjust, and uncompassionate and would
destroy the very spirit of fair play and justice.
7. It is instructive to summarize and discuss the recent case of JOEY P. MARQUEZ vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
5TH DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, G.R. Nos. 187912-14, January 31,
2011.
The SB-5th Division denied Marquez’s Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the
Questioned DocumentsSECTION of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). From the records, as a result
of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque for the years
1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies
were discovered involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of
Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city. Before
arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Mayor Marquez
sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the
reinvestigation of the cases against him. These were denied by the OSP. On July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the
subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers
were forged.
By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its’ documentary exhibits had
already been formally offered in January 2006 and had been duly admitted by the anti-graft court. The
prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned transactions during the COA audit investigation,
Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety of the transactions. He did
not claim forgery either when he filed his Joint Counter-Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no
allegation of forgery was made. The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court
and posited that since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on the competence of his
subordinates, there could be no “palpable mistake,” thus, he was estopped from alleging that his signatures on
the subject documents were forged. The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the
proceedings. In his Reply, Marquez insisted that he never admitted that his signatures on the disbursement
vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests were his and that his motion was not intended to
delay the proceedings. In its’ Rejoinder, the prosecution reiterated its’ earlier arguments and added that
Caunan testified and identified the signatures of Marquez in the subject vouchers. It further noted that
Marquez moved to refer the documents to the NBI only two and a half (2 ½) years after the formal offer of said
documents.
In the subject February 11, 2009 Resolution, the anti-graft court denied the motion of Marquez.
CitingSECTION 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion
of handwriting experts would be helpful in the examination of alleged forged documents, the same was neither
mandatory nor indispensable, since the court can determine forgery from its own independent examination.
The motion for reconsideration of Marquez was likewise denied. Aggrieved, Marquez interposed his petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court raising this lone: THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN
- 5TH DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 AND
MAY 20, 2009 DENYING THE PETITIONER’S MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE FOR
EXAMINATION BY THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS SECTION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION WHICH DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS
TWIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.
In fine, the Supreme Court held that one of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the
Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present
one’s defense. It stated that under Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of theNATURE and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court stated that in the aforecited case, it was well settled that due process in criminal
proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properlyCLOTHED with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only
upon lawful hearing.
It added that while the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it
means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give
form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to
submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this
amounts to a denial of due process, the Supreme Court held.
In the said case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the disbursement
vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot
be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on
the party alleging forgery. Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his
signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable
opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI. If he is denied
such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally
considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the
original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.
The Supreme Court assured that, at any rate, any finding of the NBI would not be binding on the graft court. It
would still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line withSECTION 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless,
Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense, it added. How the prosecution, or
even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his
strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not
control how he would defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the
rules.
The Supreme Court stated that contrary to the assertion of the prosecution, this move of Marquez was not a
mere afterthought to delay the prosecution of the case. From the records, it appeared that as early as
November 24, 2003, even before arraignment, upon his alleged discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez
already sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI
and reinvestigation of the cases against him. At that stage, his plea was already denied by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OCP).
Apparently, Marquez did not abandon his quest, the Supreme Court stated. In his Omnibus Motion dated April
1, 2008 filed with the SB-4th Division, Marquez did not only move for the inhibition of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, but also moved for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization
to the NBI. Since the latter was not acted upon, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation reiterating his plea,
this time with the SB-5th Division, it added.
If the case had been delayed, the Supreme Court held, it was because of the denial of the simple request of
Marquez. If it was granted in the first instance, the trial of the case would have proceeded smoothly and would
have been over by now. If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would be convicted for having
failed to prove forgery, he could not be prevented from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence
in his defense.
The Supreme Court stressed that the fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is immaterial and
irrelevant. His failure or omission to do so may affect the appreciation and weight of his defense, but it should
not bar him from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence, it added.
The Supreme Court continued that in denying Marquez’ motion, the SB-5thDivision offered no valid explanation
other than the fact that, being the trial court, it may validly determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence. While it was true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of
Marquez were genuine or not was subject to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the
veryNATURE of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence was submitted to the court at the
hearing. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court. Only after
evidence was offered and admitted that the court could appreciate and evaluate it. The prosecution had
already offered its evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense, the
Supreme Court added.
The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered and duly admitted by the anti-graft court
could not preclude an examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court
personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners, the Supreme Court stated.
It is noteworthy to stress the philosophy stated by the Supreme Court in the said case, that is, in the conduct of
its proceedings, a court is given discretion in maintaining the delicate balance between the demands of due
process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and
rid society of criminals on the other. Indeed, both the State and the accused are entitled to due
process. However, the exercise of such discretion must be exercised judiciously, bearing in mind the
circumstances of each case, and the interests of substantial justice.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his choice in his
defense, the SB-5th Division committed grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the Supreme
Court, it stated. The anti-graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the
Questioned DocumentsSECTION of the NBI for examination at the soonest time possible and for the latter to
immediately conduct such examination and to submit the results to the court within a reasonable time, it added.
8. In another recent case, i.e, MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, et. al. vs. ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA
BRAVO, G.R. No. 171497, April 4, 2011, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in the matter of
the appreciation of questioned document examination reports. The CA’s judicial appreciation of the questioned
documents was poor and unreliable.
In that case, the CA, after examining the questioned signature and standard signatures of Tamani ruled that
“although there are slight dissimilarities between them, one could not ignore the glaring and striking similarities
of strokes and pattern of handwriting in the questioned and standard signatures of Demetrio Tamani. We opine
that the similarities of strokes are more prominent and pronounced than the dissmilarities and the apparent
dissimilarities are overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned and the standard signatures.”
The Supreme Court stated that indeed, at first glance, it was easy to see why the CA ruled the way it did,
considering the presence of similarities between the questioned signature and standard signatures of Tamani.
However, after painstakingly reviewing the testimonies of the expert witnesses and the documentary evidence
at hand, the Supreme Court was more inclined to believe that the signature of Tamani appearing on the August
17, 1959 Deed of Sale was forged as could be gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the document examiner
from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The Supreme Court noted that Sorra testified that the questioned signature was executed in a slow and drawn
manner, while the standard signatures were executed in a fast manner. Moreover, the line quality of the
questioned signature, particularly the letters “o,” “m” and “n” exhibited hesitation and patchings, while the
standard signatures exhibited equal distribution of ink line and had good line quality. In addition, the lateral
spacing of the questioned signature was crumpled, while the lateral spacing of the standard signature is
normal. Particularly, the chart below illustrates the specific differences noted by Sorra in her testimony, the
Supreme Court stated, thus:
Letter Questioned Signature Standard Signatures

Capital letter D Exhibit movement Continuous and fluent
impulse
Letter E No initial stroke Connected and has a
small initial stroke
Letter M First hump is rounded First hump is pointed and
angular
Letter T “T-crossing” located at “T-crossing” is above the
middle letter t middle of the letter t
Letter O Constricted and patched O is Very obvious
Letter M Patched- after the first Three humps
hump there is a small
stroke
I dot Long and slanting to the Smaller and slanting to
right the left
Letter N Connected with letter a Two humps

and has only one hump
Terminal stroke Tendency to go to the Tendency to go upward
right and is fluent
The Supreme Court stated that during cross-examination, Sorra explained that the differences she accounted
for were not “variations,” which are normal and usual deviations. She explained that variations were attributable
to the fact that humans are not machines, such that it would be impossible to have two perfectly identical
handwriting samples. Instead, Sorra clarified that the differences were “different” based on the hesitation in
writing in the questioned signature. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities between the questioned signature
and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case involved a “simulated forgery” or a copied
forgery, such that there would be similarities, but the similarities would be superficial.
The Supreme Court held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. It held that while it admittedly
was unable to fully comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical
inNATURE and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that this Court had observed a good
number of the differences noted by her. Moreover, while it was not unmindful of the testimony of Albacea, the
document examiner from the NBI, this Court was more inclined to believe the findings of Sorra, because unlike
Albacea, Sorra limited her examination to Exhibits “S-1 to S-11” and “S-19.” Albacea, on the other hand,
considered all 19 specimen signatures. Noticeably, Exhibits “S-12” to “S-18” were executed several years apart
from the questioned signature which was supposedly written in 1959. However, the dates of execution of
Exhibits “S-12” to “S-18” covered years ranging from 1933 to 1952 and 1974. Thus, the Supreme Court held
that Sorra was correct when she opted to disregard the said Exhibits in her examination. Lastly, while it was
improper for the RTC to rely solely on Sorra’s credentials, her superior credentials, compared to that of
Albacea, give added value to her testimony.
9. FINALLY, THERE IS A NEED TO SUSPEND THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE PRESENTATION STAGE PENDING
COMPLETION AND SUBMISSION BY THE NBI OF ITS DOCUMENT AND HANDWRITING EXAMINATION
REPORT TO THE TRIAL COURT.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the questioned Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated x x x, and its questioned Resolution, dated x x x, be VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new
one issued ALLOWING the conduct of an NBI document and handwriting examination of all the relevant
and material documents in re: the underlying criminal cases in the trial court a quo, subject to such terms and
conditions and/or guidelines as this Honorable Court and/or the trial court may
prescribe; AND, further, SUSPENDING the defense evidence presentation stage pending completion and
submission by the NBI of its document and handwriting examination report to the trial court.
Further, the petitioner humbly prays for such and other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.
Las Pinas City, August 5, 2011.

Torts and Damages1

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Torts and Damages1

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Torts and Damages Syllabus 1

` Cordillera Career Development College

TORTS AND DAMAGES

I. The Conceptual Framework

A. The Concept of a Tort

1. Tort in Common Law

2. Tort Under Philippine Law

3. The Purpose of Tort Law

B. The Concept of Quasi Delict

C. The Relationship Between Tort and Quasi-Delict

D. Quasi-Delict and Delict

1. Distinguishing quasi-delict and delict

2.Overlap between quasi-delict and delict

E. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual

1.Distinguishing culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual

2.Is there an Intersection?

1. Determining the diligence required

2. Default standard of diligence

1. Importance of a Standard of Conduct

2. The Fictitious Person

a. Common law’s reasonable person

A. In Motor Vehicle Mishaps

B. Possessions of dangerous weapons or substance

D. Res Ipsa Loquitur

2. Statement of the Rule

a. Nature of the accident

4. Effect of direct evidence

5. Nature of the rule

6. Effect of the rule

7. Justification for the rule

8. Res ipsa inquitor versus expert testimony in medical negligence cases

E. Defenses against charge of negligence

A. Plaintiff’s negligence to proximate cause

1. Definition of Contributory Negligence

2. Distinguishing Contributory Negligence from proximate cause

3. Effects of contributory negligence

2. Defense and Exceptions

D. Plaintiff assumption of risk/volenti non-fit injuria

B. Tests to Determine Proximate Cause

1. Best for/sine qua non

6. Last Clear Chance

VI. Persons Vicariously Liable

A. Persons Exercising Parental Authority

3.Other Persons exercising parental authority

B. Teachers and Schools

1.Under the Civil Code

2.Under the Family Code

1.Distinguishing the 4th and 5th Paragraph

b. Within the range of designed tasks

VII. Persons Specifically Liable

A. Possessor or Use of Animals

B. Owner of Motor Vehicle

C. Provinces, Cities, Municipalities

E. Engineer/Architect of collapsed building

F. Head of a family for things thrown/falling

G. Owners of enterprises/other employers

I. Persons who interfered with contractual relations

VIII. Human Relations TORTS

C. Acts Contra bonus Mores

D. Violation of Human Dignity

IX. Independent Civil Action

A. Violator of Civil and Political Rights

B. Information Fraud, Physical Injuries

D. “Catch All”, Independence Civil Action Article