ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
Bellosillo, J:
Doctrine:
Substantial compliance is acceptable where
the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the
reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the
testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
destroy the testamentary privilege. It is enough
that the lawyer read the will in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses.
Facts:
The testator did not read the final draft of
the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the
lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read
the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The
latter 4 followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on,
a codicil was executed, and by that time, the
testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But
the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were
unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of
the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of
the notarial will) and the notary public who
followed the reading using their own copies.
Issue:
Was there substantial compliance to the
reading of the will?
Held:
Yes, there is substantial compliance to the
reading of the will.
Ratio:
Article 808 not only applies to blind
testators, but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are incapable of reading their
wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the
notary public and the instrumental witness.
However, the spirit behind the law was served
though the letter was not.
In this case, there was substantial
compliance. Substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to
protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and
inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the
testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgement
take place.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the
length of time that this case has remained pending,
this decision is immediately executory. Costs
against petitioner.
1. Liberal Interpretation
SEBASTIAN V. PANGANIBAN
G.R. NO. 39797 MARCH 12, 1934
Goddard, J:
Doctrine:
The attestation clause is not written as
clearly as it should have been. It can, however, be
further conceded that, while precision of language
in drafting an attestation clause is desirable, it is
sufficient it from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
fulfills the requirements of the law.
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
CFI of Bulacan denying the probate of the will of
Pedro Pañganiban y Jacob upon the ground that the
attestation clause was fatally defective in that it did
not strictly comply with the law.
The attestation clause in question and the
will are in the Tagalog dialect. As translated into
Spanish by the Honorable Judge of the trial court
the attestation clause is as follows:
Nosotros, Francisco Sebastian,
Gregorio Sebastian y Miguel Martin,
todos casados y mayores de edad y
vecinos de Hagonoy, afirmamos que
este testamento del Sr. Pedro
Pañganiban y Jacob, de cuatro
paginas utiles, fue firmando por el
testador al pie y en los magenes de
todas sus hojas en presencia de
nosotros tres, y nosotros firmanos
igualmente al pie y en los margenes
de todas las paginas en presencia
del señor Pedro Pañganiban y Jacob,
quien, segun vimos, estaba en sun
sano y cabal juicio, aunque
padeciendo de cierta enfernedad,
aqui en Hagoonoy, hoy 14 de mayo
de 1927.
The appellant assigns the following:
Al dictar decision en el presente
asunto, el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Bulacan incurrio en
error, al concluir ’que la clausula de
atestiguamiento en cuestion no esta
edactada estrictamente de acuerdo
con las disposiciones de la ley. En
ella no se hace constar que los
testigos firmaron al pie y en todas
las paginas del testamento, en
presencia de los otros.
The appellees make no objection to the translation
of the trial court while the appellant contends that
a more liberal translation could have been made.
From an examination of several Tagalog-English
dictionaries it is quite possible that this could have
been done. However this court accepts the
translation made by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the will must be probated?
Held:
Yes, the will must be probated
Ratio:
In the case of the Estate of the deceased
Magdalena Ozoa 58 Phil.928, It was held that
At once it can be conceded
that the attestation clause is not
written as clearly as it should have
been. It can, however, be further
conceded that, while precision of
language in drafting an attestation
clause is desirable, it is sufficient it
from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the
attestation clause fulfills the
requirements of the law. In this
instance it is contended on the one
hand that the attestation clause fails
to state that the testatrix signed
each and every page of the will in
the presence of the three witnesses
and in the presence of each other,
and on the other hand that the
language is susceptible of a contrary
meaning. In this connection it should
be recalled that the attestation
clause was a part of the will
prepared in the Visayan dialect,
which may be deficient in words
properly usable in a will, and that in
the translation therefrom, clauses
may be placed out of the regular
order. While the words ’we have
each signed, the same and each
page thereof in the presence of said
testatrix and in the presence of each
other’ would be expected to relate
to the attesting witnesses, it is
possible to find that the quoted
words also relate to the testatrix.
Otherwise stated, the word ’we’
could include both the testatrix and
the attesting witnesses.
Dispositive:
In view of the facts in this case and the decisions
cited above, this court is of the opinion that the
error assigned by the petitioner-appellant should
be sustained and the judgment of this court will be
that the will of the deceased Pedro Pañganiban y
Jacob be ordered admitted to probate, and
accordingly the judgment of the trial court is
reversed without special pronouncement as to
costs.
GIL V. MURCIANO
G.R. No. L-3362 March 1, 1951
Jugo, J:
Doctrine:
The attestation clause of the will is fatally
defective for not stating that the alleged testator
signed the will, which is the precise purpose and
most essential element of the clause. Without it,
there is no attestation at all.
Facts:
The will and testament of the deceased
Carlos Gil was presented for probate in the CFI
Manila with Roberto Toledo y Gil (decedent's
nephew) and Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano
(decedent's sister) opposing the application.
Toledo's legal right to intervene was
questioned by the proponent of the will, and the
objection was sustained in an order which was
affirmed by this court in G. R. No. L254. As a result,
Toledo was eliminated from the case and did not
appear when the trial was resumed. The
proceeding seems to have held in abeyance
pending final disposition of Toledo's appeal. Early in
1945, before the application was heard on the
merit, the record, along with the will, was
destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after
liberation.
In the reconstitution, a stipulation of facts
was submitted in which, according to the appealed
order, "both parties…agreed that the will as
transcribed in the record on appeal in Case G. R.
No. L254 is a true and correct copy.”
CFI Manila admitted to probate the alleged
will and testament
On the other hand, the oppositors contend
that the will is invalid since the attestation clause
did not state that the testator signed the will; it
declared only that it was signed by the
witnesses.The will reads:
IN THE NAME OF GOD, AMEN
I, Carlos Gil, 66-year-old resident of
Porac, Pampanga, IF, finding myself
healthy and in full possession of my
intellectual, freely and
spontaneously powers, without
violence, coercion, fraud or illegal
influence stranger, grant and
ordered this my last will and
testament in Castilian, a language
that I possess and understand, as
follows:
1. I declare that during my marriage
to my wife Isabel today Herreros had
no children;
2. declare that I'm properties
located in Manila and Pampanga
Province;
3. I and my dear wife awarded Isabel
Herretos all my property as movable
and immovable property located in
Manila and Pampanga, under the
condition that when it dies and if
remaining assets have inherited it
from me, that these remnants goods
awarded to Don Carlos Worrell.
4. I appoint as executor of my estate
after my death Dr. Galicano Colonel
whom I have absolute confidence,
with relieving bail;
In testimony of all of which sign this
my will and left margin of each of its
two pages, useful with the
attestation clause in the presence of
witnesses, who then signed each of
these pages and clause Witnessing
my presence each with that of
others, now Porac, Pampanga, IF,
the 27th of May 1939.
 CARLOS GIL
Testification:
We the undersigned, all adults,
certify: the will that precedes this
written in the Spanish language
known to the testator, composed of
two useful pages with the
attestation clause paginated
consecutively in letters and numbers
at the top of the box as well as all
the leaves of the same, in our
presence and that each of us have
witnessed and signed the document
and all the leaves thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each
of us.
(Sgd.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA
(Sgd.) RAMON MENDIOLA
(Sgd.) MARIANO OMAÑA
Carlos Gil executed a last will and
testament. However, this will was destroyed and
needed to be reconstituted. The parties submitted
a stipulation of facts agreeing “that the will as
transcribed in the record of appeal” in another case
is “a true and correct copy.” CFI admitted the will to
probate. Opposition is based on the invalidity of
the will, since the attestation clause did not state
that the testator signed the will. SC reversed the CFI
and denied probate of the will.
Issue:
Whether the will is valid because the
attestation clause is defective?
Held:
NO, will is not valid because attestation
clause of the will is fatally defective for not stating
that the alleged testator signed the will, which is
the precise purpose and most essential element of
the clause. Without it, there is no attestation at all.
Ratio:
The error is not merely clerical. This is too much
of a clerical error for it effects the very essence of
the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or
correct only in matters of form which do not affect
the substance of the statement.
A correction by inference cannot be made
under Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was
amended, contained the following:
…But the absence of such
form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it
proven that the will was in
fact signed and attested as in
this section provided.
However, Act No. 2645, besides increasing
the contents of the attestation clause, entirely
suppressed the abovequoted provision. This would
show that the purpose of the amending act was to
surround the execution of a will with greater
guarantees and solemnities.
The testator cannot certify his own
signature. It is contended that the deficiency in the
attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of
the body of the alleged will. It is evident that one
cannot certify his own signature, for it does not
increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would
be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps.
Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot
cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation
clause of the witnesses.
The rules of statutory construction are
applicable to wills, but only to the body and not
the attestation clause. While rules of statutory
construction apply to documents and wills, said
rules apply to the body of the will containing the
testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation
clause, which must be so clear that it should not
require any construction.
There is no reason why wills should not be
executed by complying substantially with the clear
requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to
supply essential elements. The right to dispose of
property by will is not natural but statutory, and
statutory requirements should be satisfied.
Dispositive:
Probate of the will denied, intestate estate
declared. The decision appealed from is reversed,
denying the probate of the alleged will and
declaring intestate the estate of the deceased
Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee.

CANEDA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 103554 MAY 28, 1993
Regalado, J:
Doctrine:
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the
defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is
not substantial compliance with Article 805.
Facts:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a
widower without any children and already in the
twilight years of his life, executed a last will and
testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.He
was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator
was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real
and personal properties to several people all of
whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
Four months later, Mateo Caballero himself
filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and
testament, but numerous postponements pushed
back the initial hearing of the probate court
regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away
before his petition could finally be heard by the
probate court.Thereafter one of the legatees,
Benoni Cabrera, sought hisappointment as special
administrator of the testator’s estate. Thereafter,
the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces
of the testator, instituted a second petition for
intestate proceedings. They also opposed the
probate of the testator’s will and the appointment
of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by
William Cabrera as special administrator and gave
an order that the testate proceedings for the
probate of the will had to be heard and resolved
first.In the course of the proceedings, petitioners
opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on
the ground that on the alleged date of its
execution, the testator was already in poor state of
health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Also the genuineness of the
signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting
witnesses and the notary public testified that the
testator executed the will in question in their
presence while he was of sound and disposing
mind and that the testator was in good health and
was not unduly influenced in any way in the
execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision
declaring the will in question as the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero.CA affirmed
the probate court’s decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the
will of the testator is fatally defective or can be
cured under the art. 809.
Held:
No, it does not comply with the provisions
of the law.
Ratio:
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by
Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
attesting witnesses. Theattestation clause need not
be written in a language known to the testator or
even to the attesting witnesses.It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding
the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required
by law has been observed.
Therefore, the attestation clause provides
strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a
will and to insure the authenticity.It is contended
by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and
all its pages in their presence and that they, the
witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other. And the Court agrees.The attestation clause
does not expressly state therein the circumstance
that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The phrase, “and he has signed
the same and every page thereof, on the space
provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not
the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words” as his last will and
testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
That the absence of the statement required by law
is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be probated.Also, Art. 809
does not apply to the present case because the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of
the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The defect in this case is not only with
respect to the form or the language of the
attestation clause. The defects must be remedied
by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself
which is clearly lacking in this case. Therefore, the
probate of the will is set aside and the case for the
intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the
defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is
not substantial compliance with Article 805.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED and the impugned decision of
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to
forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-
R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE
Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active
case and thereafter duly proceed with the
settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
A. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
GAN V. YAP
RODELAS V. ARANZA
G.R. NO. L-58509 DECEMBER 7,
1982
Revolva, J:
Doctrine:
If the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will.
Facts:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal
for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds
of:
1. Rodelas was estopped from
claiming that the deceased left a will
by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the
testator as required by Rule 75,
section 2of the Rules of Court;
2. The copy of the alleged
holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not
a will, it was merely an instruction as
to the management and
improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by the decedent;
3. The holographic will itself, and not
an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect
because lost or destroyed
holographic wills cannot be proved
by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills.
4. The deceased did not leave any
will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by
law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas
filed an opposition. The CFI set aside its order and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will
stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil.
509, 522,
 And that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B.
Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more
than 14 years from the time of the execution of the
will to the death of the decedent and the fact that
the original of the will could not be located shows
to that the decedent had discarded the alleged
holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied.
Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to
forward the case to the SC as it involves a question
of law not of fact.
Issue:
Whether or not a holographic will which
was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy?
Held:
Yes, holographic will which was lost or
cannot be found cannot be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
Ratio:
If the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic
will may be allowed because comparison can be
made by the probate court with the standard
writings of the testator. The probate court would be
able to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509,
the Court ruled that “the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself
must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as
material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8
of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even
a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court
dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion
for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the
Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition
to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is
hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
KALAW VS RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-40207 SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
Melenciano-Herrera, J:
Doctrine:
When the holographic Will in dispute had
only one substantial provision, which was altered
by substituting the original heir with another, but
which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator,
the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains
in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the Will as first written should be given
efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix.
Facts:
On Sept 1971, herein private respondent,
Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his
deceased Sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for
the probate of her holographic will. But the
proceeding was objected by one Rosa Kalaw. It
appears that the holographic will, as first written:
a) named her (Rosa), also a sister of the
testatrix as sole heir, and that
b) she was also named as sole executrix.
However, the will appears to contain 2 alterations.
First, Rosa's name, designated as the sole
heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was
written above it. Such was not initialed. Second,
Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and
Gregorio's name was written above it. This
alteration was initialed by the testator.
 Thus, her opposition was based on the fact
that the will containing alterations, corrections, and
insertion is without the proper authentication by
the fill signature of the testatrix as required by Art.
814 w/c reads: “In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic
will the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature”
She now argues that the holographic will, as
first written, should be given effect and probated so
that she could be the sole heir thereunder. TC
denied petition to probate
Issue:
Whether or not the original unaltered text
after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the TC for lack of authentication by the
full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or
not, with Rosa as sole heir?
Held:
No, the original unaltered text after
subsequent alterations and insertions were not
voided by the TC for lack of authentication by the
full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or
not, with Rosa as sole heir
Ratio
Article 814 of the Civil Code
In case of insertion,
cancellation, erasure
or alteration in a
holographic will, the
testator must
authenticate the
same by his full
signature.
Generally, when a number of erasures,
corrections, cancellation, or insertions are made by
the testator in the will but the same have not been
noted or authenticated with his full signature, only
the particular words erased, corrected, altered will
be invalidated, not the entirety of the will. This
general rule has exceptions, as in this case. When
the holographic will had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the
original heir with another, and the same did not
carry the requisite full signature of the testator, or
simply put, where the change affects the essence of
the will of the testator, the entirety of the will is
voided or revoked. To rule that the first will should
be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change
of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be
given effect either as she failed to authenticate it
in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full
signature.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and
the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
Teehankee, J:concurring:
I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a
sole question of law, is bound by the trial court's
factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the
holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and
instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as
sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the
testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar
that the testatrix who was obviously an educated
person would unthinkingly make such crude
alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and
writing an entirely new holographic wig in order to
avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should
be noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister
Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the
testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out
"sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother
Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.)
Probate of the radically altered will replacing
Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied,
since the same was not duly authenticated by the
full signature of the executrix as mandatorily
required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The
original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir
cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial
court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her
own handwriting substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so
that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole
heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid
will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill
succeed to her intestate estate.

1. Date
ROXAS DE JESUS vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR
G.R. NO. L-38338 JANUARY 28, 1985
Gutierrez, J:
Doctrine:
As a general rule, the "date" in a
holographic Will should include the day, month,
and year of its execution. However, when as in the
case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only
issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code,
probate of the holographic Will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance.
Facts:
After the death of spouses Andres G. de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R.
Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R.
Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of
Administration had been granted to the petitioner,
he delivered to the lower court a document
purporting to be the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973,
respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of
the probate of the holographic Will on July 21,
1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that
after his appointment as administrator, he found a
notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a
letter-will addressed to her children and entirely
written and signed in the handwriting of the
deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I
want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was
corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de
Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise
testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the
holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana
R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of
their mother and positively Identified her signature.
They further testified that their deceased mother
understood English, the language in which the
holographic Will is written, and that the date
"FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was
executed by their mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another
compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"
assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana
R. de Jesus because of the following:
 it was not executed in accordance
with law,
 it was executed through force,
intimidation and/or under duress,
undue influence and improper
pressure, and
 the alleged testatrix
acted by mistake
and/or did not intend,
nor could have
intended the said Will
to be her last Will and
testament at the time
of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose
C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of
the holographic Will which he found to have been
duly executed in accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that
the alleged holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by
Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the
law requires that the Will should contain the day,
month and year of its execution and that this
should be strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco
reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the
probate of the holographic Will on the ground that
the word "dated" has generally been held to
include the month, day, and year.
Issue:
 Whether or not the date "FEB./61 "
appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with
the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
Held:
Yes, the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of
the Civil Code
Ratio:
ART. 810. A person may execute a
holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself.
It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs
from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements regarding the due execution of Wills.
We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil
Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent
intestacy —
The underlying and fundamental objectives
permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this
Project consists in the liberalization of the manner
of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes,
but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise
of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the testator.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without
undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will
has been executed in substantial compliance with
the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad
faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated,
said Will should be admitted to probate.
We have carefully reviewed the records of
this case and found no evidence of bad faith and
fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wills and Testaments. There is no
question that the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated,
and signed by the testatrix herself and in a
language known to her. There is also no question as
to its genuineness and due execution. All the
children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness
of the holographic Will of their mother and that she
had the testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of said Will. The objection interposed by
the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the
holographic Will is fatally defective because the
date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will
is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be
entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a
holographic Will should include the day, month,
and year of its execution. However, when as in the
case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only
issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code,
probate of the holographic Will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate
of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is reinstated. SO ORDERED.
LABRADOR V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NOS. 83843-44 APRIL 5, 1990
Paras, J:
Doctrine:
The law does not specify a particular
location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in
the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator.
Facts:
 Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land
to his heirs. However, during probate proceedings,
Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the
ground that the will has been extinguished by
implication of law alleging that before Melecio’s
death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT
No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat.
The trial court admitted the will to probate
and declared the TCT null and void. However, the
CA on appeal denied probate on the ground that it
was undated.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged holographic will
is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of Civil Code.
Held:
Yes, the alleged holographic will is dated, as
provided for in Article 810 of Civil Code.
Ratio:
The law does not specify a particular
location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in
the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. The intention to show March 17 1968
as the date of the execution is plain from
the tenor of the succeeding words of
the paragraph. It states that “this being in the
month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and
this decision and or instruction of mine is the
matter to be followed. And the one who made this
writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their
father.” This clearly shows that this is a unilateral
act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was
executing a will.
Dispositive:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby
REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio
Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The
private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the
petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). SO ORDERED.
2. Witness
AZAOLA V. SINGSON
G.R. NO. L-14003 AUGUST 5, 1960
Reyes, J.B.L, J:
Doctrine:
Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot
be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having
the probate denied. Where the will is holographic,
no witness need be present and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be
avoided.
Facts:
When Fortunata Vda de Yance died,
Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the probate of
the former’s will, whereby Maria Milgaros Azaola
was made the sole heir as against the nephew of
the deceased Cesario Singson. Francisco witnessed
that one month before the death of the testator,
the same was handed to him and his wife.
The opposition to the probate was on the
ground that:
 the execution of the will was procured
by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner
and his wife, and
 that the testatrix did not seriously
intend the instrument to be her last will,
and that the same was actually written
either on the 5th or 6th day of August
1957and not on November 20, 1956 as
appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that
under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present three witnesses who could declare
that the will and the signature are in the writing of
the testatrix, the probate being contested.
Issues
1. Whether or not the proponent was
bound to produce more than one witness?
2. Whether or not Article 811 is mandatory?
Held:
 1. No, the proponent was not bound to
produce more than one witness.
2. No, first paragraph of Article 811 of the
Civil Code is not mandatory but
discretionary.
Ratio:
Article 811. In the probate of
a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of
the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall
be required.
In the absence of any
competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the
court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to.
1. No. Since the authenticity of the will was
not being contested. But even if the genuineness of
the holographic will were contested, we are of the
opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code
cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having
the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will,
none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent.
It may be true that the rule of this article
(requiring that three witnesses be presented if the
will is contested and only one if no contest is had)
was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments. But it cannot be ignored that the
requirement can be considered mandatory only in
the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because
the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential
to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is
holographic, no witness need be present and the
rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are
to be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert
evidence is conditioned by the words “if the Court
deem it necessary”, which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the Court should be
convinced of the will’s authenticity. Where the
prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill
is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of those
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in
fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The
duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available
lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested
as the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.
2. The rule of the first paragraph of Article
811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not
mandatory. Considering, however, that this is the
first occasion in which this Court has been called
upon to construe the import of said article, the
interest of justice would be better served, in our
opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to
adduce additional evidence, including expert
witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
Dispositive:
In view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered
remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions
to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion.
But evidence already on record shall not be
retaken. No costs.
CODOY V. CALUGAY, 312 SCRA 333
G.R. NO. 123486 AUGUST 12, 1999
Pardo, J:
Doctrine:
Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory if the genuineness of the writing is
contested.
Facts:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay,
Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with
the RTC Misamis Oriental a petition or probate of
the holographic will of the deceased, who died on
January 16, 1990. The assessed value of the
decedents property, including all real and personal
property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her
death.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition alleging
that the holographic will was a forgery and that the
same is even illegible. This gives an impression that
a third hand of an interested party other than the
true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal
executed the holographic will.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses
and various documentary pieces of
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their
evidence filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming
that respondents failed to establish sufficient
factual and legal basis for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal. LC granted Demurrer to Evidence and
the petition for probate is denied.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal, and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once
again reiterated the testimony of the following
witnesses, namely:
1. Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, CFI Misamis
Oriental, where the special proceedings for
the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased was filed. He produced and
identified the records of the case. The
documents presented bear the signature of
the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis
for comparison of the handwriting of the
testatrix, with the writing treated or
admitted as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered.
2. Generosa Senon, election registrar of CDO,
was presented to produce and identify the
voters affidavit of the decedent. However,
the voters affidavit was not produced for
the same was already destroyed and no
longer available.
3. Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal was
her aunt, and that after the death of
Matilde’s husband, the latter lived with her
in her parents house for 11 years, from
1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11)
years of close association with the
deceased, she acquired familiarity with her
signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings,
and the deceased always issued receipts. In
addition to this, she (witness Matilde
Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting
the records of the accounts, and carried
personal letters of the deceased to her
creditors. Matilde Ramonal Binanay further
testified that at the time of the death of
Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a
holographic will dated August 30, 1978,
which was personally and entirely written,
dated and signed, by the deceased and that
all the dispositions therein, the dates, and
the signatures in said will, were that of the
deceased.
4. Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he
was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and
handled all the pleadings and documents
signed by the deceased in connection with
the intestate proceedings of her late
husband, as a result of which he is familiar
with the handwriting of the latter. He
testified that the signature appearing in the
holographic will was similar to that of the
deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal,
but he cannot be sure.
5. Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the
DENR, Region 10. She testified that she
processed the application of the deceased
for pasture permit and was familiar with the
signature of the deceased, since the
deceased signed documents in her
presence, when the latter was applying for
pasture permit.
 6. Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents,
testified that she had lived with the
deceased since birth, and was in fact
adopted by the latter. That after a long
period of time she became familiar with the
signature of the deceased. She testified that
the signature appearing in the holographic
will is the true and genuine signature of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
CA ruled that the appeal was meritorious.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the
having the probate denied. No witness need be
present in the execution of the holographic
will. And the rule requiring the production of three
witnesses is merely permissive. CA sustained the
authenticity of the holographic will and the
handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the
will to probate.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory?
Held:
Yes. Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory.
Ratio:
We are convinced, based on the language
used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory
order. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to
give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the
evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
Not all the witnesses presented by the respondents
testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of the testator. Augusto Neri, clerk of
court, merely identified the record of Special
Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not
presented to declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic was that of the
deceased. Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar
of CDO, was presented to identify the signature of
the deceased in the voters affidavit, which was not
even produced as it was no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified to the
genuineness of the signature of her deceased aunt
based on the posting records of accounts of
tenants. She did not declare that she saw the
deceased sign a document or write a note. Ms.
Binanay kept the fact about the will from
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the
deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of
keeping the will a secret to petitioners and
revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal. Evangeline Calugay declared that the
holographic will was written, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testator because she lived
with her since birth. She never declared that she
saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
Fiscal Waga merely supposes that it seems to be
the deceased’s signature because it is similar to the
signature of the project of partition made by her.
The will was found not in the personal
belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of
the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she
revealed that the will was in her possession as early
as 1985, or five years before the death of the
deceased. There was no opportunity for an expert
to compare the signature and the handwriting of
the deceased with other documents signed and
executed by her during her lifetime. The only
chance at comparison was during the cross-
examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the
documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she
is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer
of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the
testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven
strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will
dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a
letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are
different. In the letters, there are continuous flows
of the strokes, evidencing that there is no
hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic
will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting by the
deceased.
Dispositive:
Decision appealed from is set aside. The
records are ordered remanded to the court of
origin with instructions to allow petitioners to
adduce evidence in support of their opposition to
the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
B. CONFLICTS OF LAW
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
GR NO. 12767 NOVEMBER 16, 1918
Street, J:
Doctrine:
The intrinsic validity of succession is
governed by the law of the decedent.
Facts:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden, May
25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the
United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from
1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was
married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately
thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a
soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result
of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson
a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few
months after their marriage. This child was
christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish
Lutheran Church upon October" 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier
from the service of the United States he continued
to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November
20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a
decree of divorce from him in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A
little later Johnson appeared in the United States
on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a
certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From
Chicago he appears to have gone to Sweden, where
a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case,
was taken in which he appeared in a group with his
father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba
Ingeborg, who was then living with her
grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was
concluded, the deceased returned to Manila,
where he prospered in business and continued to
live until his death.
In this city of Manila, he appears to have
entered into marital relations with Alejandra
Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit,
Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion,
baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized
December 9, 1907. The other two children
mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased
by Simeona Ibañez.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition
was presented in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the
ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his
death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States
of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his
father’s will.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was deprivation of
due process on the part of the petition?
2. What law should govern regarding the
intrinsic validity of the will?
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in
applying the law of Illinois in this case?
Held:
1. No, there was no deprivation of due process
on the part of the petition
2. The law of the state of Illinois should govern
regarding the intrinsic validity of the will.
3. No, the trial court did not err in applying the
law of Illinois in this case.
Ratio:
1. Due publication was made pursuant to this
order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily
Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted
that in view of the statute concerned which
reads as
A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is
a citizen or subject, and which might
be proved and allowed by the law of
his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the
same effect as if executed according
to the laws of these Islands” the
“state”, being not capitalized, does
not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because
during this time, Philippines was still
a territory of the US).
Thus, in the case of In re Davis,
the proceeding as to the probate of
a will is essentially one in rem, and
in the very nature of things the state
is allowed a wide latitude in
determining the character of the
constructive notice to be given to the
world in a proceeding where it has
absolute possession of the res. It
would be an exceptional case where
a court would declare a statute void,
as depriving a party of his property
without due process of law, the
proceeding being strictly in rem, and
the res within the state, upon the
ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was
unreasonably short.
From what has been said it follows that the order
of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and
void merely because the petitioner was
unavoidably prevented from appearing at the
Original hearing upon the matter of the probate of
the will in question. Whether the result would have
been the same if our system of procedure had
contained no such provision as that expressed in
section 113 is a matter which we need not here
consider.
2. The evidence adduced upon this point in
the trial court consists of the certificate of
naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in
connection with certain biographical facts
contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of
naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that
upon the date stated the testator became a citizen
of the United States, and inferentially also a citizen
of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial
court it appears that, when Johnson first came to
the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in
the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the
Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these
Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge,
no evidence was adduced showing that at the time
he returned to the United States, in the autumn of
1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State
of his permanent domicile; and on the contrary the
certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that
time he 'claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
This is in accordance with that provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United states which says that every citizen of
the United States is a citizen of the State wherein
he resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is
that a person transferring his domicile from one
State to another loses his citizenship in the State of
his original abode upon acquiring citizenship in the
State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new
State citizenship extinguishes the old. That
situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that
which arises when a citizen of an American State
conies to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he
cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere
change of domicile does he lose that which he
brought with him.
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this
estate, it should appear that any legacy given by
the will or other disposition made therein is
contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will
must necessarily yield upon that point and the law
must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be
forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois
arid not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by
the general provisions here applicable in such
matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of
the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order
of succession, as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of
the nation of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate.
3. Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial
court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the
law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is
not now available to the petitioner, first, because
the petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different
from what the court found, and, secondly, because
the assignment of error and argument for the
appellant in this court raises no question based on
such supposed error. Though the trial court may
have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law
prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could
not be set aside, even upon application made
within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear
affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong.
Dispositive:
It follows that the trial court committed no error in
denying the relief sought. The order appealed from
is accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
C. JOINT WILLS
DELA CERNA V. REBECA-POTOT
GR. NO. L-20234, 23 December 1964
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
Doctrine:
Article 818 of the Code prohibits the
execution of joint wills, whether they be for the
reciprocal benefit of the testators, or for the benefit
of a third person. However, it must be noted that if
a probate court erroneously admitted a joint will to
probate, the error thus committed would be
considered an error of law and not of jurisdiction.
Therefore, such an error must be corrected by
appeal; failing which the erroneous decision would
become final.
The foregoing notwithstanding, please note
that in the following case, the joint will, while
deemed operative with respect to the husband,
was considered void as to the wife.
Facts:
On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la
Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last
will and testament in the local dialect whereby they
willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during
our marriage together with all the improvements
thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our
niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood,
because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot,"
and that "while each of the testators is yet living,
he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the
two lands aforementioned,"
The said two parcels of land being covered
by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 4677, both situated in
sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon,
province of Cebu. Bernabe de la Cerna died on
August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was
submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela
before the CFI of Cebu which, after due publication
as required by law and there being no opposition,
heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31,
1939, in Special Proceedings No. 499,
"declara legalizado el documento Exhibit A
como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado
Bernabe de la Cerna con derecho por parte de su
viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora
el propio tiempo segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los
frutos de los terranos descritos en dicho
documento; x x.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on
October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate
of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned
was filed before CFI of Cebu, but for failure of the
petitioner, Manuela R. Potot, and her attorney,
Manuel Potot, to appear for the hearing of said
petition, the case was dismissed on March 30,
1954.”
 CFI ordered the petition heard and declared
the testament null and void, for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil
Code. However, CA reversed on the ground that the
decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due
execution of the testament. Further, CA declared
that this form of will has long been sanctioned by
use, and the same has continued to be used; and
when, as in the present case, one such joint last will
and testament has been admitted to probate by
final order of a court of competent jurisdiction,
there seems to be no alternative except to give
effect to the provisions thereof that are not
contrary to law, as was done in the case of
Macrohon v Saavedra
Hence, this appeal by the heirs intestate of
the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint will is void?
Held:
The joint will is deemed operative with
respect to the husband but was considered void as
to the wife.
Ratio:
A final judgment rendered on a petition for
probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world and public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgment of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finis set litium.
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the
late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the
1939 decree admitting the will to probate. The
contention that being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on
whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts,
and here they have spoken with finality when the
will was probated in 1939.
On this court, the dismissal of their action
for partition was correct. But the CA should have
taken into account, also, to avoid future
misunderstanding, that the probate decree of 1939
could only affect the share of the deceased
husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include
the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia
Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose
interest in the conjugal properties the probate
court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because
her estate could not then be in issue. Be it
remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator's
lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will,
insofar as the estate of the wife was
concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and
adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered
a separate will of each testator.
Thus regarded, the holding of the CFI of
Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was
correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question.
Therefore, the undivided interest of
Gervasia Rabaca should pass upon her death to her
heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heirs, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the
only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
Dispositive:
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATIONS, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No costs.
D. WITNESSESS
GONZALES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J:
Doctrine:
It is enough that the qualifications
enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to
the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb
and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code.
Facts:
Isabel Andres Gabriel died on June 7, 1961
without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent),
niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of
Isabel’s will designating her as the principal
beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten
in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to
death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina
Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds:
 the will is not genuine,
 will was not executed and attested
as required by law,
 the decedent at the time of the
making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her
age and sickness, and
 the will was procured through undue
influence
The trial court disallowed the probate of the
will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a
petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was
executed and attested as required by law when
there was absolutely no proof that the 3
instrumental witnesses are credible.
Issue:
1. Can a witness be considered competent
under Art 820-821 and still not be considered
credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence
on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is
honest or upright?
Held:
1. Yes, witness be considered competent
under Art 820-821 and still not be
considered credible as required by Art.
805.
2. No, there no requirement that there
must be evidence on record that the
witness to a will has good standing in
his/her community or that he/she is
honest or upright
Ratio:
1. The petitioner submits that the term
credible in Article 805 requires something more
than just being competent and, therefore, a witness
in addition to being competent under Articles 820-
821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The
competency of a person to be an instrumental
witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art.
820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on
the appreciation of his testimony and arises from
the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth.
In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio
del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May
3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
“Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is
another to be a credible witness, so credible that
the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts
may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may
thereafter decide whether to believe or not to
believe his testimony.
2. There is no mandatory requirement that the
witness testify initially or at any time during the
trial as to his good standing in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and for being
reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such
attributes are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party)
in order that his testimony may be believed and
accepted by the trial court.
It is enough that the qualifications
enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to
the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb
and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code.
Dispositive:
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
E. CODICILS AND INCORPORATION BY
REFERNCE
F. REVOCATION
GAGO V. MAMUYAC
GR. NO. 26317 JANUARY 29, 1927
Johnson, J:
Doctrine:
The presumption, while disputable, may be
reinforced by testimony regarding the
circumstances of the alleged revocation of the will.
And if the presumption of revocation should apply,
a duplicate copy of the said will cannot be admitted
to probate.
Facts:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the
probation of a last will and testament of Miguel
Mamuyac. It appears from the records that on or
about the 27th day of July 1918, Miguel Mamuyac
executed a last will and testament. The petition for
probation of said will was denied upon the ground
that the deceased had on the 16th day of April
1919, executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February 1925, the
present action was commenced. Its purpose was to
secure the probation of the said will of the 16th day
of April 1919.
On the other hand, Cornelio Mamuyac,
Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and Catalina
Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging
a) that the said will is a copy of the second
will and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac;
b) that the same had been canceled and
revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac,
and
c) that the said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
The trial court denied the probation of said
will of April 16, 1919, upon the
ground that the same had been canceled and
revoked in the year 1920. The basis of the decision
are the following:
a) That Exhibit "A" is a mere carbon copy
of its original which remained in the
possession of the deceased testator
Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before
his death as per testimony of witnesses
Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the
testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos
Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920,
the original of Exhibit "A" (will of 1919)
actually canceled by the testator Miguel
Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar
that inasmuch as he had sold him a
house and the land where the house
was built, he had to cancel it (the will of
1919), executing thereby a new
testament.
b) Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the
testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that
the will executed by the deceased
(Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in
the possession of father Miguel
Mamuyac. The opponents have
successfully established the fact that
father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in
1920 another will.
c) The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of the
deceased, who was living in the house
with him, when crossed-examined by
attorney for the opponents, testified
that the original of Exhibit "A" could not
be found.
On the other hand appellant contends that will in
question had been executed with all the formalities
required by law and that the oppositors were not
estopped from alleging the fact that the original
will is a mere carbon copy
Issue:
Whether or not the 1918 will was revoked
by the testator?
Held:
Yes, the 1918 will was revoked by the
testator.
Ratio:
 With reference to the said cancellation, it
may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court,
that the will in question had been canceled in 1920.
The law does not require any evidence of the
revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved.
It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the
revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation
has taken place must either remain unproved or be
inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a
will which cannot be found is shown to have been
in the possession of the testator, when last seen,
the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was canceled
or destroyed. The same presumption arises where
it is shown that the testator had ready access to the
will and it cannot be found after his death. It will
not be presumed that such will has been destroyed
by any other person without the knowledge or
authority of the testator.
The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while
varying greatly, being weak or strong according to
the circumstances is never conclusive, but may be
overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed
by the testator with the intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of
1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the
positive proof that the same had been canceled, we
are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of
the lower court are in accordance with the weight
of evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will, the
burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to
establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the
proponents, the burden is on the contestant to
show that it has been revoked. In a great majority
of instances in which wills are destroyed for the
purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the
act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence
of its cancellation perishes with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the
courts with great caution. When it is proven,
however, by proper testimony that a will was
executed in duplicate and each copy was executed
with all the formalities and requirements of the
law, then the duplicate may be admitted in
evidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been lost and was not canceled or
destroyed by the testator.
Dispositive:
After a careful examination of the entire
record, we are fully persuaded that the will
presented for probate had been canceled by the
testator in 1920. Therefore, the judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding as
to costs, it is so ordered
ESTATE OF MALOTO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-76464 FEBRUARY 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J.:
Doctrine:
The burning of a will is one of the modes of
revocation. In Article 830, the act of destroying the
document must be done by the testator himself, or
by a third person pursuant to the testator's express
direction and in his presence.
Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating or canceling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in
his presence and under his express direction.
Facts:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died
leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio
Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the
deceased did not leave behind a last will and
testament, these four heirs commenced an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their
aunt's estate.
However, while the case was still in
progress, Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino
executed an agreement of extra judicial settlement
of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the
division of the estate into four equal parts among
the parties.The Malotos then presented the extra
judicial settlement agreement to the trial court for
approval
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a
former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty.
Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled
"KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBULUT-AN (Testamento)",
dated January 3, 1940, and purporting to be the
last will and testament of Adriana.
Atty. Palma claimed to have found the
testament, the original copy, while he was going
through some materials inside the cabinet drawer
formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was
submitted to the office of the Clerk of CFI Instance
of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo
and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger
and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana
than what they received by virtue of the agreement
of extra judicial settlement they had earlier signed.
The will likewise gives devises and legacies
to other parties, among them being the petitioners
Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and
Constancio, joined by the other devisees and
legatees named in the will, motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings
therein and for the allowance of the will.
When the trial court denied their motion,
the petitioners came to us by way of a petition for
certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the
trial court. As we stated earlier, we dismissed that
petition and advised that a separate proceeding for
the probate of the alleged will would be the
appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised
by the petitioners.
CA ruled that there is no clear revocation of
will.
Issue:
Whether or not the will was revoked by
Adriana?
Held:
No, will was not clearly revoked by Adriana.
Ratio:
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the
following cases:
1) By implication of law; or
2) By some will, codicil, or other writing
executed as provided in case of
wills; or
3) By burning, tearing, canceling or
obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by
some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction. If burned, torn,
canceled or obliterated by some other
person, without the express direction of the
testator, the will may still be established,
and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents and due execution,
and the fact of its unauthorized destruction,
cancellation, or obliteration are
establishedaccording to the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction
of a will, like burning in this case, does
not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless
the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi
on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that
the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence
of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will
itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi, or the
intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a
state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating or canceling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in
his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana's maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be
a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto.
For another, the burning was not proven to have
been done under the express direction of Adriana.
And then, the burning was not in her presence.
Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were
one in stating that they were the only ones present
at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered
as the will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing
the evidence presented by the respondents as
oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the
testimony of the two witnesses who testified in
favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive."
We share the same view. Nowhere in the records
before us does it appear that the two witnesses,
Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both
illiterates, were unequivocally positive that the
document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed
was the will only because, according to her, Adriana
told her so. Eladioo btained his information that the
burned document was the will because Guadalupe
told him so, thus his testimony on this point is
double hearsay.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an
important matter of public interest that a
purported will is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
very foundations x x x."
One last note. The private respondents point out
that revocation could be inferred
from the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of
the properties mentioned in the will had
been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of
the properties remained at the time of
death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more
valuable properties have been acquired
after the execution of the will on January 3, 1940.
Suffice it to state here that as these
additional matters raised by the private
respondents are extraneous to this special
proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken
up after the will has been duly probated
and a certificate of its allowance issued.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE, the Decision dated
June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22,
1986, of the respondent Court of Appeals, and a
new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the
private respondents. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY
MOLO V. MOLO
G.R. NO. L-2538 SEPTEMBER 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
It is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention
to make a new testamentary disposition as a
substitute for the old, and the new disposition is
not made or, if made, fails of effect for same
reason. The doctrine is limited to the existence of
some other document, however, and has been
applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law.
The rule is established that where the act of
destruction is connected with the making of
another will so as fairly to raise the inference that
the testator meant the revocation of the old to
depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the
new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will
intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative,
the revocation fails and the original will remains in
full force.
Facts:
Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one
in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The
latter will contained a revocation clause which
expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without
any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife,
herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.
Only a carbon copy of the second will was
found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of
the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but
subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
As a result, the petitioner filed another
petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had
already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the
1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue:
Whether or not the 1918 will can still be
valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will?
Held:
Yes, the 1918 will can still be valid despite
the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939
will.
Ratio:
The court applied the doctrine laid down
in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having
been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce
the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch
as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate
that the testator deliberately destroyed the original
of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in the will he executed
in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when
the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo,
who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in
his possession until he executed his second will in
1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate
on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked
by her attorney to look for another will, she found
the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or
files of the testator. She did not find the original.
The first will in question was attested, as
required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo
Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. The
first two witnesses died before the commencement
of the present proceedings. So the only
instrumental witness available was Angel Cuenca
and under our law and precedents, his testimony is
sufficient to prove the due execution of the will.
However, petitioner presented not only the
testimony of Cuenca but placed on the witness
stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public who prepared
and notarized the will upon the express desire and
instruction of the testator, The testimony of these
witnesses shows that the will had been executed in
the manner required by law. We have read their
testimony and we were impressed by their
readiness and sincerity. We are convinced that they
told the truth.
The earlier will can still be probated under
the principle of dependent relative revocation. The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended
to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old,
and the new disposition fails of effect for some
reason.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the order appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
DIAZ V. DE LEON
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922
Romuladez, J:
Doctrine:
Revocation of the will must have a clear
animus revocandi
Facts:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second
will was not deemed in conformance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his
first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to
him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to
tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and
his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his
physician about the incident wherein he replied
that the will has already been destroyed.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid revocation
of the will?
Held:
Yes, there was a valid revocation of the will.
Ratio:
His intention to revoke is manifest from the
facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change
the provisions he made in the first will.
 From the evidence submitted in this case, it
appears that the testator, shortly after the
execution of the first will in question, asked that
the same be returned to him. The instrument was
returned to the testator who ordered his servant to
tear the document. This was done in his presence
and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After
some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio
Mapa about the will, said that it had been
destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest
from the established fact that the testator was
anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he
had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by
the testator's own statements to the witnesses
Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital
where he was confined. The original will herein
presented for probate having been destroyed
with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as
the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
Dispositive:
Judgement is affirmed with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
G. REPUBLICATION OF WILLS
IV. ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF
WILLS
A. INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
GUEVARA V. GUEVARA
G.R. NO. L-48840 DECEMBER 29, 1943
Ozeta, J:
Doctrine:
Suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy for without probate, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
Facts:
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931
wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a
legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter
Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his
natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was
never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that
only his son Ernest possessed the land which he
adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the
will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the
acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the
recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of
a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment
contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will
was not probated. She alleged that the disposition
in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals
sustained Rosario's theory.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the probate of a will can be
dispensed with?
2. Whether or not it is correct to use the other
part of the estate to pay the debts of the
decedent?
Held:
1. No, the probate of a will cannot be
dispensed with.
2. Yes, it is correct to use the other part of the
estate to pay the debts of the decedent.
Ratio:
1. Rosario's contention violates procedural law
and considered an attempt to circumvent the last
will and testament of the decedent. The
presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy for without probate, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
The law enjoins the probate of the will and
public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is
attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have
no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs
who might agree to the partition of the estate
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that
the various legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or that they
had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will
cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of
the custodian of the will to present it to the court
for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and
nobdy raises any question as to the authenticity
and due execution of the will, none of the heirs
may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because
the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because
the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem,
cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without
offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his
property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among
which are the publication and the personal notices
to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
The law enjoins the probate of the will and
public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is
attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have
no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs
who might agree to the partition of the estate
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that
the various legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or that they
had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will
cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of
the custodian of the will to present it to the court
for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and
nobody raises any question as to the authenticity
and due execution of the will, none of the heirs
may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because
the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because
the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem,
cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without
offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his
property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among
which are the publication and the personal notices
to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
2. As to the conveyance of the southern half of
the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter's assumption of the
obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the
Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious
because: "(a) it has not been proven that the
charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than
the value of the property; and (b) neither has it
been proven that the defendant did not comply
with the conditions imposed upon him in the deed
of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of
Appeals found" "It appears that the defendant has
been paying the debts left by his father. To
accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable
portions of the above-mentioned land. And we
cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless
it is proven that they have exceeded the value of
what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July
12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the
inheritance." The finding of the Court of Appeals on
this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon
the respondent, who did not appeal therefrom.
Dispositive:
 Wherefore, that part of the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of
original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of
Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described
in said certificate of title belongs to the estate of
Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto
M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's
assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of
the deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment
of said court insofar as it awards any relief to the
respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the parties herein are
hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A
to the proper court for probate in accordance with
law, without prejudice to such action as the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the
responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule
76. After the said document is approved and
allowed by the court as the last will and testament
of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and
legatees therein named may take such action,
judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to
partition the estate of the testator, taking into
consideration the pronouncements made in part II
of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of the
three instances.
GALLANOSA V. ARCANGEL
G.R. NO. L-29300 JUNE 21, 1978
Aquino, J:
Doctrine:
A decree of adjudication in a testate
proceeding is binding on the whole world. The Civil
Law rule that an action for declaration of
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe cannot
be applied to last wills and testaments.
Facts:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower
and was survived by his brother Lito. In his
will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in
the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla, and,
should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½
share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa.
Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first
marriage who grew up under the care
of Florentino. His other properties were
bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will
was wile. Opposition was registered by Florentino’s
brother, nephews and nieces.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did
not present any evidence, the Judge admitted the
will to probate. The testator’s legal heirs did not
appeal from the decree of probate and from the
order of partition and distribution. Later, the
legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of
land against Pedro alleging that they had been in
continuous possession of those lands and praying
that they be declared owners thereof.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later
granted by the Judge on the ground of res judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of
dismissal. After 15 years after the dismissal of the
first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the
will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of
the will” alleging fraud and deceit. The court
dismissed said action. However, the court set aside
the dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal heirs have a cause
of action for the “annulment” of the will
of Florentino and for the recovery of the
61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the
petitioners?
Held:
No, the legal heirs have no cause of action
for the “annulment” of the will of Florentino and
for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land
adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
Ratio:
The SC held that the lower court committed
a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its order
of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case
and the first civil case which is the same as the
instant case. It is evident that second civil case is
barred by res judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will. That means
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind
at the time he executed the will and was not acting
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
that the will was signed by him in the presence of
the required number of witnesses, and that the will
is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned
in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal
action for the forgery of the will. After the finality
of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the
voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised
anymore.
The SC also held that the decree
of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in
rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover,
the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a
judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the
merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former
judgment under the Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred
in saying that the action for the recovery of the
lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art.
1410 of NCC (the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and
testaments.
The Rules of Court does not sanction an
action for “annulment” of a will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution of the will.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is
binding on the whole world. After the period for
seeking relief from a final order or judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final
judgment or order can be set aside only on the
grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law or (b) that the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud.
In the latter case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four (4) years from the discovery
of fraud. The Civil Law rule that an action for
declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and
testaments.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of
May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are reversed trial set
aside trial its order of dismissal dated January 10,
1968 is affirmed. Costs against the private
respondents. SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF GUIDO V. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 124320 MARCH 2, 1999
Purisima, J:
Doctrine:
The determination of who are the legal
heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.
Facts:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal
heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the
owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of
520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235
square meters, more or less situated in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. Then
petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of
the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development
Corporation (Golden Bay) under two TCT. With the
discovery of what happened to subject parcels of
land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT
and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO.
493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its
Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty
WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH
DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before
Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus,
Cavite.
Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions
of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed
with the RTC an Amended Complaint to implead
new and additional defendants and to mention the
TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court
dismissed the Amended Complaint.
On the other hand, the private respondents
presented a Motion to Dismisson the grounds that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that
plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they
have not established their status as heirs, that the
land being claimed is different from that of the
defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by
laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by
the respondent court in its Order holding that
petitioners have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it - except the allegations that they
are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays
- that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple.
Issue:
1. Whether or not certiorari is the right
remedy?
2. Whether or not the grant of the motion to
dismiss is proper?
Held:
1. No, certiorari is not the right remedy.
2. Yes, the grant of the motion to dismiss is
proper.
Ratio:
1. To begin with, petitioners Petition
for Certiorari before this Court is an improper
recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an
appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong,
is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a
proper subject of certiorari[7]. Where appeal is
available as a remedy, certiorari will not lie.
2. The determination of who are the legal
heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.
The trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as
one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
The respondent court did the right thing in
dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, which
stated no cause of action. If the suit is not brought
in the name of or against the real party in interest,
a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition
under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
PASTOR V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-56340 JUNE 24, 1983
Plana, J:
Doctrine:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a
will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Facts:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio
were survived by their two legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia),
and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42%
share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the
probate court appointed Quemada as special
administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
whether or not covered or affected by the
holographic will.
Consequently, Quemada instituted against
Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance
of alleged properties of estate which included the
properties subject of the legacy which were in the
names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who
claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and
not by inheritance. The probate court issued an
order allowing the will to probate. The order was
affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC
dismissed the petition and remanded the same to
the probate court after denying reconsideration.
For two years after remand of the case to
the probate court, all pleadings of both parties
remained unacted upon. Not long after, the
probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic
validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr.
and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit, no hearing was held.
Instead, the probate court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers.
While the reconveyance suit was still pending in
another court, the probate court issued Order of
Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question
of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and
ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was
directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42%
royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which
Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself
as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr.
and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to
answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Being “immediately executory”, Quemada
succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment. The oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the
probate court ordered suspension of payment of all
royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until
after resolution of oppositor’s motion for
reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his
wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorariand
prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the writ of execution and
garnishment issued by the probate court. However,
said petition was denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved
with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity?
Held:
No, Probate Order did not resolve with
finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic
validity.
Ratio:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a
will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the
assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order
allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the
disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in
the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it
is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will
“with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate administration
aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the
suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession
of real and personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the
question of ownership of the properties listed in
the estate inventory, considering that the issue of
ownership was the very subject of controversy in
the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was,
therefore, error for the assailed implementing
Orders to conclude that the Probate Order
adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
the mining properties and royalties, and that,
premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion
of the said Probate Order directed special
administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is reversed. The
Order of execution issued by the probate Court
dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders
issued subsequent thereto in alleged
implementation of the Probate Order dated
December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated
November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, are
hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper
proceedings, subject to the judgment to be
rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R. SO ORDERED.
JIMENEZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990
Fernan, CJ.:
Doctrine:
The patent reason is the probate court's
limited jurisdiction. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
Facts:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez
and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4)
children, who are Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra
and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage,
Lino Jimenez acquired five parcels of land in
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino
married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot
the seven petitioners namely Tomas, Visitacion,
Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all
surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died in 1951 while
Genoveva Caolboy died on in 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez
filed a petition before the CFI of Pangasinan,
praying to be appointed as administratrix of the
properties of the deceased spouses Lino and
Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the
supposed heirs of the deceased spouses which
included herein co-petitioners and the four children
of Lino Jimenez by Consolacion Ungson, his
previous wife.
In October, 1979, herein private respondent
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr.,
filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name
and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from
the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the
union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and
not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and
because they have already received their
inheritance consisting of five parcels of lands in
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
In March of 1981, petitioner Virginia
Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
Caolboy. In May of 1981, she filed an inventory of
the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five
parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
As a consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for
the exclusion of these properties from the
inventory on the ground that these had already
been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto,
Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father
Lino Jimenez.
On the other hand, Private respondent
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial and
documentary evidence in support of his motion
while petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other than cross-
examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no
evidence of her own, oral or documentary.
The probate court ordered the exclusion of
the five parcels of land from the inventory on the
basis of the evidence of private respondent
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among of:
the Tax Declaration showing that the subject
properties were acquired during the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion
Ungson and a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964
wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject
properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to
his children by a previous marriage, who are
Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles. The
motion for reconsideration of said order was
denied on January 26, 1982.
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the
CAon a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA
dismissed the petition because Genoveva Caolboy,
who is petitioners' mother, had admitted that the
subject parcels of land had been adjudicated to the
children of the previous nuptial, the subject
properties could not have been acquired during the
marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy
because they were already titled in the name of
Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before Lino's
marriage to Genoveva in 1940, the claim of Virginia
Jimenez was barred by prescription because it was
only in 1981 when they questioned the
adjudication of the subject properties, more than
ten (10) years after Genoveva had admitted such
adjudication in a public document in 1964, and
lastly, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of
laches. This decision became final and executory.
Two years after, petitioners filed an
amended complaint dated December 10, 1984
before the RTC of Pangasinan to recover
possession/ownership of the subject five parcels of
land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy and to order private
respondents to render an accounting of the
produce therefrom.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds that the action
was barred by prior judgment in CA. However,
petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending that the action was not barred by prior
judgment because the probate court had no
jurisdiction to determine with finality the question
of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated
in a separate action and the action instituted in
1981 was not barred by prescription or laches
because private respondents' forcible acquisition of
the subject properties occurred only after the
death of petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in
1978.
RTC resolved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of res judicata.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the settlement proceeding
(testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of
ownership?
2. Whether or not res judicata exists as to bar
petitioners' present action for the recovery
of possession and ownership of the five
parcels of land?
Held:
1. No, the settlement proceeding (testate or
intestate) the lower court has no jurisdiction
to settle questions of ownership.
2. No, res judicata does not exist as to bar
petitioners' present action for the recovery
of possession and ownership of the five
parcels of land.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners' present action for recovery of
possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only
pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive
being prima facie, a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land.
The patent reason is the probate court's
limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing
parties and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
It has also been held that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force
to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
2. Res judicata does not exist because of the
difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in
S.P. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of
the five parcels of land. Moreover, while
admittedly, the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch in S.P. No.
5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited
jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to
title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a
separate proceeding. On the other hand, Civil Case
No. 16111 was lodged before the RTC of
Pangasinan, Branch in the exercise of the court's
general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate
or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules
for a final determination of the issue of ownership
of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the
determination of the question of title to the subject
properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional,
petitioners are not barred from instituting the
appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private
respondents in their motion to dismiss do not
appear to be indubitable. Res judicata has been
shown here to be unavailable and the other
grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by
private respondents are seriously disputed. The
allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of
Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private
respondents,) forcibly intruded into and took
possession of the disputed properties only in 1978,
after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the
action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it
would appear that the same has not yet prescribed
or otherwise barred by laches.
There are a number of factual issues raised
by petitioners before the lower court which cannot
be resolved without the presentation of evidence
at a full-blown trial and which make the grounds for
dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged
admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed
of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact
itself of adjudication, there being no showing that
the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a
judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such
adjudication could have been effected.
The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss
not being indubitable, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the
respondent appellate court is hereby REVERSED.
Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional
Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed
to proceed in said case with dispatch.
AGAPAY V. PALANG
G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997
Romero, J:
Doctrine:
Donation mortis causa cannot be done by
the decedent to the a cohabited spouse who is not
a legal spouse and the cohabitation is under a legal
impediment.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol
with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his
second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom
he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of
agricultural land and the transfer certificate was
issued in their names. She also purchased a house
and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later
issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of
land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a
complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda. They
sought to get back the riceland and house and lot
allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation
with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and
ordered the respondents to provide for the
intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties from
Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda?
Held:
No, the properties from Miguel's second
marriage cannot be granted to Erlinda
Ratio:
The agricultural land and house and land
cannot be granted to Erlinda. The sale of the
riceland was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is
Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases
of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was
null and void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and
unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must
be stressed that actual contribution is required by
this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which
states that efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish
by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store
but failed to persuade SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age
and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase
price of subject property, there being no proof of
the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda
allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she
was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property testified that Miguel Palang provided
the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
Carlina Palang.
The transaction was properly a donation
made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.
As regards to the donation of their conjugal
property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of
their daughter, was also void. Separation of
property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there is an
express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment which resulted from the parties’
compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so
inferred.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO
ORDERED.
DOROTHEO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Ynares-Santiago, J:
Doctrine:
Even if the will is intrinsically not valid but
that it has attained final and executory decision on
which the party had the opportunity to challenge
before the higher tribunals but failed to do so can
no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the
remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if
the party does not avail of other remedies despite
its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or
court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed
and is satisfied with the decision or order.
 No intestate distribution of the estate can
be done until and unless the will had failed to pass
both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its
intrinsic validity
Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate
children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime
in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who
claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the
court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from
said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void."
The trial court granted the motion and
issued an order and ruled that Lourdes Legaspi is
not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the
provisions of the last will and testament of
Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose
Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only
heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes which shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although she admitted that they were not married
to each other. Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the CA, but
the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellant's brief within the extended period.
This dismissal became final and executor. A
writ of execution was issued by the lower court to
implement the final and executory Order.
Consequently, private respondents filed several
motions including a motion to compel petitioner to
surrender to them the TCT covering the properties
of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to
surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a
motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion. An Order
was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the
final and executory, as well as the Order directing
the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground
that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence
not final in character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs
the distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses.
Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order.
Thus, private respondents filed a petition before
the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two
assailed Orders of Judge Zain B. Angas.
Issue:
May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given
effect
Held:
Ratio:
A final and executory decision or order can
no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January
30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial
court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made
by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a
lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to
negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the
essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is
binding on the whole world.
If no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same
attains finality by mere lapse of time. It has been
consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due
time from a judgment or order of the trial court,
the same attains finality by mere lapse of time.
Thus, the order allowing the will became
final and the question determined by the court in
such order can no longer be raised anew, either in
the same proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the character of
res judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed. Such
final order makes the will conclusive against the
whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due
execution.
Probate proceedings deals generally with
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. It should be noted that probate
proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated,
particularly on three aspects:
• whether the will submitted is
indeed;
• the decedent’s last will and
testament;
• compliance with the prescribed
formalities for the execution of
wills;
• the testamentary capacity of the
testator;
• and the due execution of the last
will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution
includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or
undue influence and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery, that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
Intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Even if
the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs
the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession,
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot
be given effect. Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. This is specially so when
the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void.
Such determination having attained that character
of finality is binding on this Court which will no
longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the
will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and
executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies
provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action,
then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order.
Under Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the
law of successional rights that testacy is preferred
to intestacy. But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test
and safeguards provided by law considering that
the deceased testator is no longer available to
prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from
the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually
onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to
give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate
distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void,
the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the
intrinsic validity. If it is extrinsically valid, the next
test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy
apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his
will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties
of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only
beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a
final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively
to the testator or properties which are part of the
conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters
with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be
properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his and that of
his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as
administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and,
therefore, is not an heir.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
NUFABLE V. NUFABLE
G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999
Gonzaga-Reyes, J:
Doctrine:
Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner
can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-
owned property. It does not alienate the other
share from the successional rights.
Facts:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of
land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or
less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived
by his children, Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor
and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition
for probate filed by said heirs and after due
publication and hearing, the then CFI of Negros
Oriental issued an Order dated March 30, 1966
admitting to probate the last will and testament
executed by the deceased Edras Nufable.
Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966,
spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable
mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod
to the DBP. The said mortgagors became delinquent
for which reason the mortgaged property was
foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973. Nelson
Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable
purchased said property from DBP.
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed
Nufable filed with the lower court a complaint
dated July 25, 1985 to Annul Fraudulent
Transactions, to Quiet Title and To Recover
Damages against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silnor
Nufable and his mother Aquilina Nufable.
The trial court ruled that the deed of slae
excuted by DBP in favour of the defendants be
declared null and void as far as the three fourths
rights that belongs to the plaintiffs, the three
fourths rights over the above parcel in question be
declared as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth
right to each of them,
On the other hand, defendants contend that
the late Angel Nufable was the exclusive owner of
said property, that as such owner he mortgaged the
same to the DBP, that said mortgage was
foreclosed, the DBP became the successful bidder
at the auction sale, that ownership was
consolidated in the name of the DBP, and that
defendant Nelson Nufable bought said property
from the DBP thereafter. During this period, the
plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which
were public, never filed any third party claim nor
attempted to redeem said property as
redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale
Issue:
1. Whether or not the probate court
committed an error in settlement of the
estate?
2. Whether or not the the petitioner has the
right to mortgage the entire property?
3. Whether or not the property is in trust with
the buyer regharding with the other share?
4. Whether or not the DBP is indispensible
party?
Held:
1. No, the probate court did not commit an
error in settlement of the estate.
2. No, the petitioner has no the right to
mortgage the entire property.
3. Yes, the property is in trust with the buyer
regharding with the other share.
4. No, DBP is indispensible party.
Ratio:
1. As a general rule, courts in probate
proceedings are limited only to passing upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
the due execution thereof, the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said
court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provision of the will. The question of the
intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.
 The records show that upon petition for
probate filed by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable
before CFI of Negros Oriental and admitting to
probate the last will and testament executed by the
decedent. Thereafter, the same court approved the
Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the
late Esdras Nufable wherein they agreed that the
parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental remains undivided for community
ownership but respecting conditions imposed
therein in the will.
In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated that they
have no objection as to the manner of disposition
of their share made by the testator, the expenses of
the proceeding and that they have already taken
possession of their respective shares in accordance
with the will. Verily, it was the heirs of the late
Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on
the disposition of their shares. The probate court
simply approved the agreement among the heirs
which approval was necessary for the validity of
any disposition of the decedents estate.
2. It should likewise be noted that the late
Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the
entire property located at Manjuyod was
mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel
Custodio with DBP, the other heirs of Esdras
namely, Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo had already
acquired successional rights over the said
property. This is so because of the principle
contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the
effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether
the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras
Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or
thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was
approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to
be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras
Nufable specifically referred to the subject property
in stating that the land situated in the Poblacion,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided
because this must remain in common for them, but
it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers
and sisters to construct a house therein. It was
therefor the will of the decedent that the subject
property should remain undivided, although the
restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years
pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouse
mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March
15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire
property. Angels right over the subject property
was limited only to pro indiviso share. As co-owner
of the subject property, Angels right to sell, assign
or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-
owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the
co-owned property.
Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the
rights of co-owners over a co-owned
property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall
have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment. As a mere part
owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other
co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the
elementary rule that no one can give what he does
not have.
Moreover, respondents stipulated that they
were not aware of the mortgage by petitioners of
the subject property. This being the case, a co-
owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-
owned property when his share is mortgaged by
another co-owner without the formers knowledge
and consentas in the case at bar. It has likewise
been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited
property is not binding against co-heirs who never
benefitted.
Furthermore, the Deed of Sale executed by
spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor of
respondents Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo wherein
the former sold, ceded and transferred back to the
latter the portion of the subject property bolsters
respondents claim that there was co-
ownership. Petitioner Nelson himself claimed that
he was aware of the aforesaid Deed of Sale.
3. Anent the second ground of the petition,
petitioners allege that the DBP acquired ownership
of the land in question through foreclosure,
purchase and consolidation of
ownership. Petitioners argue that if petitioner
Nelson Nufable had not bought said land from the
DBP, private respondents, in order to acquire said
property, must sue said bank for the recovery
thereof, and in so doing, must allege grounds for
the annulment of documents evidencing the banks
ownership thereof. Petitioners contend that since
petitioner Nelson Nufable simply bought the whole
land from the bank, they cannot be deprived of the
ownership of without making any pronouncement
as to the legality or illegality of the banks
ownership of said land. It is argued that there was
no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity of the
banks acquisition of said land; and that neither was
there a finding by the court that the bank illegally
acquired the said property.
As adverted to above, when the subject
property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had
no right to mortgage the entire property but only
with respect to his pro indiviso share as the
property was subject to the successional rights of
the other heirs of the late Esdras. Moreover, in case
of foreclosure, a sale would result in the
transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible
only if the seller can be in a position to convey
ownership of the things sold. And in one case, it
was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective
unless the mortgagor has title to the property to be
foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining pro
indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the
party rightfully entitled thereto, who are the
private respondents herein.
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code,
when land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust is established by implication of law
for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise, under
Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in
consolidating ownership over the subject property
in its name terminate the existing co-
ownership. Registration of property is not a means
of acquiring ownership.[23] When the subject
property was sold to and consolidated in the name
of DBP, it being the winning bidder in the public
auction, DBP merely held the portion in trust for
the private respondents.When petitioner Nelson
purchased the said property, he merely stepped
into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights
and obligations appertain thereto.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not
the DBP should have been impleaded as party-
defendant in the case at bar. Petitioners contend
that DBP was never impleaded and that due
process requires that DBP be impleaded so that it
can defend its sale to petitioner Nelson Nufable;
and that it was the duty of private respondents,
and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead the bank
and ask for the annulment of documents
evidencing the banks ownership of the disputed
land.
4. Private respondents do not question the
legality of the foreclosure of the mortgaged
property and the subsequent sale of the same to
DBP. The subject property was already purchased
by petitioner Nelson from DBP and the latter, by
such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to
the former. Clearly, petitioners interest in the
controversy is distinct and separable from the
interest of DBP and a final determination can be
had of the action despite the non-inclusion of DBP
as party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an
indispensable party, did not have to be impleaded
in this case.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in
the decision appealed from, the petition for review
on certiorari is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
B. GROUNDS OF DISALLOWANCE
NEPOMUCENO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
Gutierrez, J:
Doctrine:
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil
Code is against the making of
a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage.
Facts: 1. Yes, the court can pass on the intrinsic
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in validity of a will in this case.
Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and 2. No, the donation made by the testator in
Testament where he named and appointed favor of herein petitioner
petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole was not valid.
and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the will that the testator was legally Ratio:
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had 1. As a general rule is that the court's area of
two legitimate children, but since inquiry is limited to the an examination and
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This
wedded wife and had been living with general rule is however not inflexible and absolute
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on and an exception the court may if it isagainst the
December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo law and the public policy. Given exceptional
and the petitioner herein, Sofia, were married on circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. to do what the situation constrains it to do and may
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his itself admitted on its face the relationship between
children his entire estate and the free portion the testator and the petitioner.
thereof to herein petitioner. Subsequently, The will was validly executed in accordance
the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of with law but the court didn't find it to serve a
the last will and testament of the practical purpose to remand the nullified provision
deceased, but the legal wife of the testator Rufina in a separate action for that purpose only since in
and her children filed an opposition the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
alleging inter alia that the execution of the will was look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
procured by undue and improper The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the which voids a donation made between persons
time of the execution of the will, the guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the
testator was already very sick and that the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
petitioner having admitted her living in 2. There is no question from the records about
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting the fact of a prior existing
integrity and thus letters testamentary marriage when Martin Jugo lived together in an
should not be issued to her. ostensible marital relationship for 22
The lower court denied the probate of the will on years until his death. It is also a fact that Martin
the ground that as the testator Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno contracted
admitted in his will to cohabiting with the a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Tarlac.
petitioner because on the face of the will, the The man was then 51 years old
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno contends
The appellate court declared the will to be that she acted in good faith for 22
valid except that the devise in favor of the years in the belief that she was legally married to
petitioner is null and void. the testator. The records do not
sustain that she acted in good faith for 22 years in
Issue: the belief that she was legally
1. Whether or not the court can pass on the married to the testator, since the last will and
intrinsic validity of a will in this case? testament itself expressly admits
2. Whether or not the donation made by the indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
testator in favor of herein petitioner between the testator and petitioner,
was valid. the devisee.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of
Held: the Civil Code is against the making of
a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation
which becomes void. The giver cannot give even
assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the
legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
OZATEA V. CUARTERO
G.R. No. L-9776 July 31, 1957
Labrador, J:
Doctrine:
After the executor has qualified, his
authority over the decedent's property reaches
back to the time of the decedent's death, and
covers all acts done by him in the interest of his
trust.
Facts:
On May 5, 1955, the special administrator
filed a petition in court for authority to pay the
accounting firm of Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co. the
sum of P3,650, for services rendered in taking
inventory of assets in 1950, tax consultations in
1950 to 1954, and preparation of income tax
returns for 1953 and 1954.
The court below denied this motion, on the
ground that the services covered by the fees of the
accounting firm were rendered to the former
special administrator Philippine Trust Company.
Upon being notified of the denial of the special
administrator's petition to pay it, the accounting
firm appeared in court and asked for the
reconsideration of the order of denial.
On the other hand, Opposition to this
motion for reconsideration was filed by heirs
Teresa, Carmen, Consuelo, Manuel, Elena and
Alfredo, all surnamed Palanca y Cuartero, on the
following grounds, that the fees for services in the
taking of the inventory in 1950 of Mr. Ozaeta was
not yet the special administrator when said services
were rendered, the tax consultations from 1950 to
1954 cover years in which Mr. Ozaeta was not yet
the special administrator, and as the same was
rendered during the incumbency of the Philippine
Trust then the fees should be paid for by Mr. Ozaeta
himself.
The court refused to grant the
reconsideration of its original order denying the
petition, and so appeal therefrom was taken to this
Court.
Since the pendency of the case in court, the
oppositors-appellees have presented a withdrawal
of their opposition, on the ground that they have
already assigned their rights, titles and
participations in the said estate to the eight
children of Rosa Gonzales Vda. de Palanca, and no
longer have any interest in the estate, nor do they
have any personality to further intervene in the
proceedings. A similar motion has also been filed
by Sebastian Palanca, who states that he has
transferred his share to the inheritance to Carlos
Palanca, Jr. For their part Rosa Gonzales Vda. de
Palanca and her eight children have filed a
statement expressing conformity to the payment of
the fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the services rendered to the
special administrator named in the will, previous to
his actual appointment as such and at his instance,
are chargeable against the estate.
Held:
Yes, the services rendered to the special
administrator named in the will, previous to his
actual appointment as such and at his instance, are
chargeable against the estate.
Ratio:
There is no question that the services
rendered were for the benefit of the estate. The
Rules require that the administrator should submit
an inventory of the properties of the estate within
three months from his appointment (Sec. 1, Rule
84, Rules of Court). As Mr. Ozaeta expected to be
appointed administrator of the estate immediately,
in view of his designation as executor of the will of
the decedent, it was proper, necessary and
expedient for him, even before his actual
appointment to employ the services of accountants
in order that they can prepare the accounts or the
inventory in due time and within the period
prescribed by the Rules.
The general rule is that acts done by an
executor in the interest of his trust, prior to his
qualification as such, become binding on the estate
upon his qualification
In Baker vs. Cauthorn:
After the executor has qualified, his
authority over the decedent's property
reaches back to the time of the decedent's
death, and covers all acts done by him in
the interest of his trust....Under the
evidence in this case, we think the executor
of the will of Nancy L. Baker could have the
claim of appellees, and rightfully insisted
upon its allowance as a credit in his
settlement of the trust.
The services rendered in the years 1953-54 were
also as useful to the estate as those rendered in
connection with the preparation of the inventory.
Whoever may have contracted the services of the
accountants, whether it was Mr. Ozaeta before his
appointment or the Philippine Trust, such services
were for the benefit of the estate and have
redounded to the estate's benefit.
Dispositive:
For the foregoing considerations, the order denying
payment to the firm of Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co.
of the sum of P3,650 is hereby reversed, and the
authority for the payment of the same by the
special administrator from the funds of the estate is
hereby granted. Without costs.
COSO V. FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-16763 DECEMBER 22, 1921
Ostrand, J:
Doctrine:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a
testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have
that effect the influence must be “undue”.
Facts:
The will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the
testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides
for the payment to her of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for
expenses incurred by her in taking care of the
testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to
1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a
severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a
married man and resident of the Philippine Islands,
became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in
1898 and that he had illicit returns with her for
many years. After his return to the Philippines she
followed him in Manila in February 1918, and
remained in close communication with him until his
death in February, 1919. There is no doubt that she
exercised some influence over him and the only
question for our determination is whether this
influence was of such a character as to vitiate the
will.
The English and American rule in regard to undue
influence is thus stated:.
Mere general or reasonable
influence over a testator is not
sufficient to invalidate a will; to have
that effect the influence must be
"undue." The rule as to what
constitutes "undue influence" has
been variously stated, but the
substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to
avoid a will, the influence exerted
must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make his express
the will of another, rather than his
own.1awphil.net
. . . such influence must be actually
exerted on the mind of the testator
in regard to the execution of the will
in question, either at time of the
execution of the will, or so near
thereto as to be still operative, with
the object of procuring a will in favor
of particular parties, and it must
 result in the making of testamentary
dispositions which the testator
would not otherwise have made. . . .
. . . and while the same amount of
influence may become "undue"
when exercised by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to
testator, the mere fact that some
influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not
invalidate a will, unless it is further
shown that the influence destroys
the testator's free agency.
Issue:
Whether or not there is undue influence to
invalidate the will?
Held:
No, there is no undue influence to invalidate
the will.
Ratio:
The burden is upon the parties challenging
the will to show that undue influence, in the sense
above expressed, existed at the time of its
execution and we do not think that this burden has
been carried in the present case. While it is shown
that the testator entertained strong affections for
Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence
so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to
"destroy his free agency and make him express the
will of another rather than his own." He was an
intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to
have known his own mind, and may well have been
actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in
making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate
son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying
Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for
him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not
undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No
imposition or fraud has been shown in the present
case.
Influence gained by kindness and affection
will not be regarded as `undue,' if no imposition or
fraud be practiced, even though it induces the
testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition
of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to his
wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
It may be further observed that under the
Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to
dispose of his property by will is limited to only a
portion of his estate, and that under the law in
force in these Islands before the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the only outside influences
affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit,
and fraud. The present doctrine of undue influence
originated in a legal system where the right of the
testator to dispose of his property by will was
nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater safeguards in
regard to execution of wills may be warranted
when the right to so dispose of property is
unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent it
is in this jurisdiction. There is, therefore, certainly
no reason for giving the doctrine of undue
influence a wider scope here than it enjoys in the
United States.
Dispositive:
For the reasons stated, the decision of the
lower court disallowing the will of Federico
Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered
that the will be admitted to probate. No costs will
be allowed. So ordered.
REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 110207 JULY 11, 1996
Romero, J:
Doctrine:
There is no extra-judicual partition if there is
forgery of signature and improper notary.
Facts:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land
owned by pettitioner’s and respondents’ father.
Petitioner alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial
Partition (Deed) was entered into between him and
the respondents.
Petitioner managed to register 335 sq.m. of
the land under his name; while 50 sq.m. of the land
was registered under the name of his sister, Paula
(one of the respondents). After discovering the
registration of the Deed, respondents denied
having knowledge of its execution and disclaimed
having signed the same; nor did they ever waive
their rights, shares and interest in the subject
parcel of land. According to respondents, subject
Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and
that their signatures thereon were forged. They
also assert that one Atty. Jose Villena,
the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed was
not even registered in the
list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale selling 240 square meters of the land
to his children. After the property was partitioned,
petitioner, his children and private respondent
Paula allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners’
Partition dividing the property among themselves.
This led the respondents to file a Complaint for
“Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order” before
the RTC, which ruled that private respondents’
signatures on the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Settlement were indeed forged and
simulated. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Deed was forged?
2. Whether or not petitioners had become
absolute owners of the subject property by
virtue of acquisitive prescription?
Held:
1. Yes, the Deed was forged.
2. No, petitioners had become absolute
owners of the subject property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription
Ratio:
1. It must be noted that under the certification
of one Pedro P. Rollon, OIC, Record and Notarial
Reports of Pasay City, no such Extrajudicial Partition
and Settlement subject of this case notarized by a
certain Atty. Jose Villena was ever recorded. Nor
was Atty. Villena officially appointed as Notary
Public for and in Pasay City on the aforesaid date.
Instead, it appears that the original copy of
the Deed, as published in the Daily Mirror, was
notarized by one Atty. Primo M. Beltran in Pasay
City and not in Makati, as shown by the Affidavit of
Publication. More importantly, petitioners did not
dispute the fact that the alleged residence
certificates of private respondents shown to the
trial court were in the possession of petitioner
Florentino which the Court of Appeals found to be
unnatural since residence certificates are supposed
to be in the physical possession of their owners as
ready proofs of their identities and for purposes of
dealing with the government and other agencies. It
added that it cannot be inferred that the Deed was
indeed executed by petitioners by facilely
presenting a group picture purportedly showing the
parties before the signing of the questioned
document when said group picture may have been
taken on another occasion.
This Court agrees with private respondents
that while Rustico Reyes, Jr., son of petitioner
Florentino and private respondents' only other
brother did not join the complaint, neither did he
sign the subject Deed considering that he should
have been a signatory thereto, being the heir of the
brother of the parties.
2. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of
the lower court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals regarding the existence of forgery. Factual
findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal. Petitioners’
ludicrous claim that private respondents imputed
no deception on his part but only forgery of the
subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures
is nothing short of being oxymoronic. For what is
forgery and simulation of signatures if not arrant
deception. The allegation made by petitioner that
the execution of a public document ratified before
a notary public cannot be impugned by the mere
denial of the signatory is baseless. It should be
noted that there was a finding that the subject
Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that
time was not commissioned as a notary in
Pasay City.
3. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership
and possession of the subject parcel of land since
they could not have been possessors in good faith
of the subject parcel of land considering the finding
that at the very inception they forged the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they
claim to be the basis for their just title. Having
forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of
private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad
faith. The forged Deed containing private
respondents’ simulated signatures is a nullity and
cannot serve as a just title. There can be no
acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel
of land in dispute is titled property, i.e., titled in the
name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of
both petitioner Florentino and the private
respondents.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the
petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.