CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D.

2D
G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., vs.
VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR)

FACTS: On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to
“govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources.” On
April 9, 1995, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. But shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942,
(March 30th), the President entered into an Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. Subsequently, DENR Secretary
Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise
known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942 which was also later
repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in signing
and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No.
7942, the latter being unconstitutional.

ISSUE: What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical
or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements
as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the
State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and
actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the
board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational,
financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to
contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

G.R. No. 148267 August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS: A petition was filed by respondent Sulu Resources Development Corporation for
Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA). Petitioner Armando C. Carpio filed an
opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and
Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to
explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties. the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution dated September 26, 1996,
upholding petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim.

Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with
the requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules and Regulations. On June 20,
1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was
denied by the Board
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
Petioner appealed to CA. the CA relying in the case of Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in nature.

ISSUE: WON appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board should
be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals,
or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner

HELD: Petitioner submits that appeals from the decisions of the MAB should be filed with the
CA. the CA ruled and respondent agrees that the settlement of disputes involving rights to mining
areas and overlapping or conflicting claim is a purely administrative matter, over which the MAB
has appellate jurisdiction. The CA refused to take jurisdiction over the case because, under
Section 79 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, petitions for review of MAB decisions are to
be brought directly to the Supreme Court

In the case at bar, petitioner went to the CA through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision. Given the difference in the reason for and the
mode of appeal, it is obvious that Pearson is not applicable here.

In Pearson, what was under review was the ruling of the CFI to take cognizance of the case which
had been earlier decided by the MAB, not the MAB Decision itself which was promulgated by
the CA under Rule 43. The present petitioner seeks a review of the latter.

Pearson, however, should be understood in the light of other equally relevant jurisprudence. In
Fabian v. Desierto, the Court clarified that appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA, under the requirements and conditions
set forth in Rule 43. This Rule was adopted precisely to provide a uniform rule of appellate
procedure from quasi-judicial agencies

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to
handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In Metro
Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC
decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of fact and law. At the
very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have been made in grave
abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the
constitutional duty of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court first Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB
may be reviewed by this Court on a "petition for review by certiorari." This provision is obviously
an expansion of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not
consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court would unnecessarily burden it

Second when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA
pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, such transfer relates only
to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The
aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided

Third the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.

Fourth the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902
factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which
is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
Fifth he judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.

Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA 7942 is
likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as amended
by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In brief,
appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 169080

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v. MACROASIA
CORPORATION , et al.
G.R. No. 172936 December 19, 2007
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORP. v. HON. ANGELO REYES, et al.
G.R. No. 176226
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v. BLUE RIDGE
MINERAL CORPORATION and MACROASIA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 176319
MACROASIA CORPORATION v. BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION

FACTS: In 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral
and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term of
25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216 hectares at
Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke’s Point, Palawan. Infanta’s corporate name was changed to Macroasia
Corporation. In 1997, Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts on the
following grounds: (1) the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal
taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure
of Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the concentration of
Macroasia on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of nickel ore
from Celestial’s property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining areas to commercial
production; and (7) the willingness of Celestial to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia. Blue
Ridge also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other
mining rights of Macroasia and Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in
Brooke’s Point.
The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining Lease Contracts
of Macroasia. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas. It upheld Blue
Ridge’s petiotion only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach and the said leased
areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid
Lebach’s areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB. Lebach did
not file any notice of appeal and the resolution became final and executory. The MAB affirmed
the POA findings that Macroasia abandoned its mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia
did not comply with its work obligations from 1986 to 1991. The MAB found that it was Blue
Ridge that had prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not
Celestial. Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration. In 2004, MAB issued a Resolution
holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly
entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a
mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a petition for
cancellation is not a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec.
77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or contests during the MPSA
application and not when the claims and leases were already granted and subsisting.
In 2005, Celestial assailed the Resolution before the CA. Blue Ridge filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. The CA Twelfth Division affirmed the MAB Resolution.
Celestial filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 169080). The CA Special Tenth Division canceled
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
Macroasia’s lease contracts and granted Blue Ridge prior and preferential rights. It treated the
cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Upon inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that
sometime in December 2005 two MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR Secretary,
were issued in favor of Macroasia. The Blue Ridge filed a Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No.
172936) to invalidate the MPSAs issued to Macroasia. Macroasia and Celestial filed petition
(G.R. No. 176319, G.R. No. 176226) to assail the CA’s Resolution granting Blue Ridge prior and
preferential rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not POA and MAB have jurisdiction to cancel Mineral Agreements.

HELD: In G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319, RA 7942 or The Philippine Mining Act of
1995 is silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement. RA 7942 is also silent as to who is
empowered to cancel existing lease contracts and mineral agreements. After a scrutiny of the
provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations,
executive issuances, and case law, the Court ruled that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the
following reasons: (a) The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates
from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources
under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987; (b) RA 7942
confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources, particularly Sections 8
and 29 of; (c) Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over
the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements; (d)
The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be
inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and
termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA; (e) Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware
of the stipulations in the Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52, the cancellation of
which they sought from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that the parties are the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the DENR Secretary as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia)
as lessee, thus, the DENR Secretary has the power to cancel the lease contracts for violations of
existing laws, rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of the contracts. The court ruled
that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on the breach of the mineral
agreement even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls
within the jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and not POA.
In G.R. No. 172936, the records showed that the DENR Secretary did not gravely abuse
his discretion in approving and signing MPSA in favor of Macroasia. Moreover, a preferential
right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in the grant of a mining agreement.
It has not yet been transformed into a legal and vested right unless approved by the MGB or
DENR Secretary. RA 7942 further confers exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the DENR
Secretary to approve mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative function within the
scope of his powers and authority. In exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR
Secretary, through the MGB, has the best competence to determine to whom mineral agreements
are granted. Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the decisions of the administrative
offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, while it is true that the subject mining claims are under litigation, this does not
preclude the DENR and its Secretary from carrying out their functions and duties without a
restraining order or an injunctive writ. Otherwise, public interest and public service would unduly
suffer by mere litigation of particular issues where government interests would be unduly
affected. In the instant case, it must be borne in mind that the government has a stake in the
subject mining claims. Also, Macroasia had various valid existing mining lease contracts over
the subject mining lode claims issued by the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an advantage over
Blue Ridge and Celestial insofar as the administrative aspect of pursuing the mineral agreements
is concerned.
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176229 are dismissed while the
petition under G.R. No. 176319 is granted.
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INT’L. PTY. LTD.,
WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.

FACTS: In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (Columbio FTAA) to the expoloration and development of
possible mineral resources in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by the Tampakan Companies. The Option Agreement
also provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC
Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims. In 2000, WMC
Resources executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with Lepanto, however the Tampakan
Companies sought to exercise its right of first refusal. The petitioner filed a case against WMC
Philippines and the Tampakan Companies. The case was dismissed.
In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Shares of Stocks. The DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA. The
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the
President on several grounds. One of which is that it violates Section 40 of the Mining Act (RA
No. 7942). The petition was dismissed. The appeal before the CA was also dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should be applied to the Columbio FTAA.

HELD: No. Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should not be applied to the Columbio FTAA. The
Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines in March
1995, before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on April 1995. In the case at bar,
there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively.
Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind Section 40 of RA No. 7942 is applicable
to the Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the President for the validity of its
transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory that petitioner sought the approval of the
DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its July 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement
with WMC Resources. Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of petitioner that it
recognized that the provision of the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of the DENR
Secretary with respect to the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President
with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio
FTAA, would be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would
effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said
FTAA. Furthermore, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, it will effectively modify the
terms of the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the
exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.

G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioners John are officers for Mining Operations of Marcopper Mining
Corporation in Marinduque. The tailings stored by Marcopper in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque
leaked into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In a few days, millions of tons of tailings had been
discharged. Marcopper was charged with violation of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067), the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA No. 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property. The MTC quashed the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984 but maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of
the RPC. In 1998, the RTC Branch 94 ordered the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984 reinstated. Petitioners filed a petition with the CA. The petitioners contend that they should
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
only be charged for violation of Article 365 of the RPC since the acts complained of in the other
charges are the same acts complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.
The CA affirmed the decision of Branch 94 and their motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charges filed against petitioners, except the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, should be quashed for duplicity of charges

HELD: No. As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is
the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for “the
same offense." In the case, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present. However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be
charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD
1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others. Consequently,
the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is
consistent with settled doctrine.
There is duplicity of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.
The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is
consistent with settled doctrine. On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC “absorbs” the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony, such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property,
cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes, such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942.
What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the
latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO in his own behalf
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Benito Cachili, ConchitaBumolo, Patricio Dumlao, Jacinto
Aliguyon, Alfonso Maddawat, Toledo Gillao, Jose Tigo and Peter CabiggatBumolo,
DALTON PACIFIC RESOURCES, INC., OROPHILIPPINES VENTURES INC., and the
MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD (MAB)

FACTS: Marcopper Mining Corporation registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu,
NuevaVizcaya with the DENR. The private respondents also registered their mining claims in the
same area. The claims were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA). The petitioner entered into an Option Agreements over the mining claims with
respondents. The petitioner was granted the exclusive right to explore the mining claims for three
years. In 1982 and 1987, the petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the
DENR and Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), but in 1991, the petitioner informed the
respondents that it was terminating the Agreements. It was found out that the area was relatively
weak and of limited tonnage which did not justify further drilling for big tonnage of low grade
gold exploration target. On the same year, the PPA and petitioner’s subsequent request for
reconsideration was rejected by the DENR, however, DAR issued a clearance for six months. The
petitioner appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) where the previous decision was
affirmed. MAB also denied petitioner’s motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the
PPA was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

HELD: No. The petition lacks merit. Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which
have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdictions are accorded by the Court not
only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence. In this instance, there is no reason
to disagree with respondent MAB. The petitioner terminated the Option Agreements with
respondents but it still showed interest when it filed a PPA over the area. Petitioner’s action of
filing a PPA over the area it previously found relatively weak and of limited tonnage was absurd.
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
Furthermore, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat
River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a)
confirmation as early as May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
(b) the July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c)
plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its June
1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner
contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation
based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering
Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have anything to support
it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying
the PPA had already settled the issue.

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006

PICOP RESOURCES, INC. v. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION, and THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD

FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI)
entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement) with Banahaw Mining and Development
Corporation (Banahaw Mining) for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial
operation of CMMCI’s 18 mining claims in Agusan del Sur. In 1998, Banahaw Mining was issued
a Mines Temporary Permit which upon expiration was renewed thrice. Also, in a Memorandum
of Agreement, PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining a right of way to its mining claims. In 1991,
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining sold its rights and
interests over 37 mining claims to Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals).
This included those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. The CMMCI
approved the assignment and recognized Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. In 1997,
MPSA applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of
1995. PICOP opposed the application. In 1998, the Panel Arbitrator disapproved the application.
Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with MAB. Base Metals’ MPSA’s were reinstated. The
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.
The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not impair PICOP’s timber
license. Base Metals had already secured the necessary Area Status and Clearance from the
DENR and the areas applied for are not closed to mining operations. The CA denied PICOP’s
Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-
Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to mining
application pursuant to RA 7942.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals’ MPSA are closed to mining
operations

HELD: No. There is no merit to PICOP’s contention that the area covered by Base Metals’
MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. RA 7942 does not
disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in
timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits
mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest
reserves, and forest reservations. Furthermore, these provisions do not require that the consent of
existing licensees be obtained but that they be notified before mining activities may be
commenced inside forest concessions. PICOP also failed to present any evidence that the area
covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the
National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) pursuant to a law, presidential decree,
presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
In addition, the Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual
undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. The
Court emphasized that the reinstatement of Base Metals’ MPSA does not automatically result in
its approval. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements outlined in DENR
Administrative Order (DAO 96-40), including the publication/posting/radio announcement of its
mineral agreement application.

G.R. No.L-49109. December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. v. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C.
FERNANDEZ

FACTS: Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., a mining corporation, alleges that it holds fifty
mining claims in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
In 1977, PD No. 1214 required holders of mining claims to file a mining lease application. The
petitioner filed a mining lease application, but "under protest", with a reservation that it is not
waiving its rights over its mining claims. The petitioner also filed an action to question the
constitutionality of PD No. 1214. The petitioner claimed that its fifty mining claims had already
been declared as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte in land registration proceedings previously instituted.
However, the respondents alleged that petitioner failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.
Furthermore the respondents contend that, provided that petitioner's mining claims were valid, if
they are deemed abandoned and cancelled due to non-compliance with the legal requirements for
maintaining a perfected mining claim, under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
petitioner has no valid and subsisting claim which could be lost through the implementation of
PD No. 1214, thus giving it no standing to question the Decree. On the contrary, the petitioner
claimed that it already had a vested right over its mining claims even before PD No. 1214.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional. It is a valid exercise
of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral
deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not
cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which
their locators had failed to obtain a patent. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over
the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the
public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for
themselves the minerals found therein. Moreover, PD No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State.”

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION v. BALITE PORTAL
MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE
ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF
DAVAO (PMRB-Davao)

FACTS: The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, a rich tract of mineral land situated
in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. In 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over the Diwalwal area. In
1991, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act which
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
authorized the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) to declare and set aside small-scale
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale
miners under certain conditions. Subsequently, DENR Secretary Factoran issued Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest
land open to small-scale mining. A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission
of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before
the DENR Regional Executive Director. While the case is pending, Marcopper assigned its EP
No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM). The SEM applied
for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit which was approved.
In 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted and mining
cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA). In 1997, the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997, authorizing the issuance
of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines. The
petitioner filed a complaint. The RPA reiterated the validity of the EP No. 133. The petitioner
elevated the case to the CA but it was dismissed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed
memorandum order did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute.

HELD: No.The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the challenged MO 97-03
did not conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a
study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.
Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner’s
rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State,
which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is
necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
Pursuant to Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control
and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral
resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first
option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy
enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover
of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by
the gold rush. As implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest
in settling for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.

G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO
ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO
ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION

FACTS: In 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights over the mining
claims to the petitioner. In 1962, the President of the Philippines granted several mining patents
on mineral claims located at UngayMalobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Subsequently, free patents
were granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of
titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos
Stilianopulos, and the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation
of patents and that the original certificates of title issued be declared null and void. The trial court
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to institute the case
because the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public domain and the action
for reversion should be instituted by the Republic through the Solicitor General. The petitioner
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the previous decision.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that the
lands in question belong to the public domain;
(2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

HELD: (1) No. The Court ruled for the private respondents. Applying Article XIII, Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution to the case at bar, the Court conclude that the issuance of the lode patents
on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to
it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of
the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands
in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the
land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize,
the minerals which may be found on or under the surface. Although the original certificates of
titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private respondents, the former cannot
prevail over the latter for the provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of their
issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of the public domain.
(2) No. The appellate court did not err in concluding that the petitioner has no personality to
institute the action for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it
has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and
thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion.

G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628

APEX MINING CO., INC. v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., et al.
G.R. No. 152619-20
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE v. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., et al.
G.R. No. 152870-71
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, et al. v. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION

FACTS: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM) filed a motion for reconsideration
to assail the decision of the Court which held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133
in favor of SEM violated a condition in the permit which provides that the EP 133 shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents.
SEM did not submit any evidence to prove that it was an agent of MCC. The Court also ruled that
it violated Presidential Decree No. 463 and that the EP 133 is already expired. Pursuant to Section
5 of Republic Act No. 7942 (Mining Act of 1995), it further held that it is within the prerogative
of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or
to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to
applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified. Apex
and Balite asked the Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept their
application for exploration permit. CamiloBanad, et al., also filed a motion for reconsideration
and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to
SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in Presidential
Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself;
(2) WhetherSoutheast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the disputed area,
which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution;
(3)Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this case is
contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16
July 1991, 199 SCRA 278);
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
(4)Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as mineral
reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area;
(5)Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was belatedly
raised.

HELD: (1) Exploration Permit 133 was issued in favor of MMC on 10 March 1986, when PD
No. 463 was still the governing law. An exploration permit cannot be assigned without the
imprimatur of the Secretary of the DENR. Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or
individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. While PD
No. 463 has already been repealed by EO No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former law
nonetheless remains applicable. Hence, the transfer or assignment of exploration permits still
needs the prior approval of the Secretary of the DENR. Not only did the assignment of EP 133 to
SEM violate Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463, it likewise transgressed one of the
conditions stipulated in the grant of the said permit. Furthermore, with the expiration of EP 133
on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
(2) SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its supposed right was
extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by its violation of the condition
prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM
has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact,
the same has been withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed
area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department.
(3) The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining Co.,
Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were not attendant in the latter,
such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting
its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since
this assignment was effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR.
(4) Assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, it cannot assert any mining right
over the disputed area, since the State has taken over the mining operations therein, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 297. Since the Executive Department has control over the exploration,
development and utilization of the resources in the disputed area, SEM’s exploration permit,
assuming that it is still valid, has been effectively withdrawn. The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 297 is in accord with jura regalia, where the State exercises its sovereign power
as owner of lands of the public domain and the mineral deposits found within, pursuant to Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
(5) The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was raised
belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration. Even
if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation is found to be in harmony with the
Constitution and other existing statutes.
The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed upon because they
are not parties to the instant cases. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the
MGB to accept their applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the
Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to
award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity. The Court cannot pass upon
the issue of whether or not MMC complied with the mandatory exploration work program, as
such was a non-issue and was not raised before the Court of Appeals and the lower tribunals.
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by CamiloBanad, et al. and Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation are denied for lack of merit. The Motion for Clarification of Apex
Mining Co., Inc. and the Manifestation and Motion of the Balite Communal Portal Mining
Cooperative, insofar as these motions/manifestation ask the Court to direct the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau to accept their respective applications for exploration permits, are denied. The
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated 25 January 2007 of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation is denied.
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
G.R. No. 163101
BENGUET CORPORATION v. DENR-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
and J.G. REALTY AND MININGCORPORATION

FACTS: In 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims
with a total area of 288.8656 hectares in SitioBagong Bayan, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims, including the option to develop
the mining claims upon written notice to J.G. Realty. In 1989, Benguet issued a letter informing
J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims, but in 1999, J.G. Realty sent a letter
informing Benguet that it was terminating the RAWOP due to violations of the contract. Benguet
insisted that there was no valid ground for the termination of the RAWOP because Benguet
complied with its obligations. In 2001, the RAWOP was cancelled upon petition of J.G. Realty.
Upon appeal, the Mining Adjudication Board (MAB) assailed the previous decision. Their
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Benguet filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether there was serious and palpable error when the Honorable Board failed to
rule that the contractual obligation of the parties to arbitrate under the Royalty Agreement is
mandatory;
(2) Whether the Honorable Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it sustained the
cancellation of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach of contract despite the absence of
evidence;
(3) Whether the Questioned Decision of the Honorable Board in cancelling the RAWOP
prejudiced the substantial rights of Benguet under the contract to the unjust enrichment of JG
Realty.

HELD: The petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper remedy.The last
paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the “Philippine Mining Act of 1995”
states, “A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the
[MAB].” Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the
MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
(1) There is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The
arbitration provided by the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) is compulsory, while the nature of the
arbitration provision in the RAWOP is voluntary, not involving any government agency. There
can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an
administrative agency. Hence, the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered
into by the parties, must be held binding against them. In sum, on the issue of whether POA
should have referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no
jurisdiction over the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law. The Court ruled
that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet. What
Benguet should have done was to immediately challenge the POA’s jurisdiction by a special civil
action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the
proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of
institution of the original action with the POA would be anathema to the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA was based on two grounds: (a) Benguet’s
failure to pay J.G. Realty’s royalties for the mining claims; and (b) Benguet’s failure to seriously
pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over the mining claims. In the instant case, the
obligation of Benguet to pay royalties to J.G. Realty has been admitted and supported by the
provisions of the RAWOP. Thus, the burden to prove such obligation rests on Benguet. In fact,
Benguet never even alleged that it continuously followed-up the application with the MGB and
that it was in constant communication with the government agency for the expeditious resolution
of the application. Such allegations would show that, indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting
the MPSA application and clearly failed to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP.
(3) The cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid grounds and is, therefore, justified.
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP, which
CRUZ, Vanessa Evans D. 2D
left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further developing the mining claims, was
brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for
its predicament.
G.R. No. 179674 July 28, 2009
PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION v. MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in mining business. In 2000, the Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA No. 153-2000-1) was issued to the petitioner for the exploration,
development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a
4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan. Respondent, also a corporation engaged in mining
business, filed an application for Application for Exploration Permit over the same area in 2003.
Prior to petitioner’s opposition, the petitioner’s MPSA was cancelled. In 2005, the Mines and
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. The Panel of
Arbitrators dismissed the petitioner’s Verified Protest/Opposition. Petitioner appealed to the
MAB then to the CA. The petition was dismissed. The CA also denied the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for
Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed out of time.
(2) Whether or not the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 2005-03 in February
2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the issuance by MGB of EP No.
05-001 in favor of private respondent in September 2005 rendered the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic.

HELD: (1) Yes. The Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of
the respondent was filed beyond the reglementary period.
In the present case, notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent
were published in newspapers, announced on the radio, and posted in public places. The posting
was done the latest, so we reckon the last possible date petitioner could have validly filed its
Verified Petition/Opposition with the Panel of Arbitrators therefrom.
Since the notice of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was last
posted on July 28, 2005, the 30-day reglementary period for filing any adverse
claim/protest/opposition thereto ended on August 27, 2005. As petitioner explained, however,
August 27, 2005 was a Saturday; and August 29, 2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday,
so the next working day was August 30, 2005, Tuesday. Petitioner did send its Verified
Protest/Opposition, through registered mail, on August 30, 2005, as evidenced by the Affidavit
of Service of even date and Registry Receipts No. 10181; No. 10182; No. 10183; and No. 10184.
Nevertheless, the Court still could not consider the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner as
having been filed within the reglementary period. The Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner
to the Application for Exploration Permit of respondent is deemed filed with the Panel of
Arbitrators only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee on September 6, 2005, clearly beyond
the reglementary period, which ended on August 30, 2005.
(2) Yes. The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner because
it has become moot and academic.
When the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petitioner had nothing more to
protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001 to private
respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to seek the cancellation thereof. The Panel of Arbitrators
cannot simply consider or convert the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application
for Exploration Permit of respondent as a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 05-001. Since
the Panel of Arbitrators can no longer grant petitioner any actual substantial relief by reason of
the foregoing circumstances, then the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner was appropriately
dismissed for being moot and academic. Furthermore, the Panel of Arbitrators only has
jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant
of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing. The
authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of respondent is lodged with the MGB, and
not with the Panel of Arbitrators.