BY adding to,
Article – Criminal Procedure
Section 8-303
Annotated Code of Maryland
(2018 Replacement Volume)
8-303
(a). IN GENERAL. AT ANY TIME AFTER THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, THE COURT IN
WHICH IT WAS ENTERED, UPON MOTION OF THE STATE, MAY VACATE THE
JUDGMENT UPON THE GROUND THAT:
(1) THE PERSON WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME AND THE ACT ON WHICH THE
CONVICTION WAS BASED IS NO LONGER A CRIME;
(5) ANY OTHER REASON JUSTIFYING RELEASE FROM THE JUDGMENT, IN THE
INTEREST OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE.
(1) BE IN WRITING;
(2) STATE IN DETAIL THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE MOTION IS BASED;
(1) THE STATE SHALL NOTIFY THE PERSON OF THE FILING OF THE MOTION UNDER
THIS SECTION.
(2) A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION MAY BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
NOTICE OF ITS FILING, OR WITHIN SUCH FURTHER TIME AS THE COURT MAY
ORDER, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN.
(1) BEFORE A HEARING IS HELD ON A MOTION FILED UNDER THIS SECTION, THE
VICTIM OR VICTIM’S REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE HEARING AS
PROVIDED UNDER § 11-104 OR 11-503 OF THIS ARTICLE.
2 Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 588, 556 A.2d 230, 235 (1989). #4 intended to incorporate GTTF
situations.
(2) A VICTIM OR VICTIM’S REPRESENTATIVE HAS THE RIGHT TO ATTEND A
HEARING ON A MOTION FILED UNDER THIS SECTION AS PROVIDED UNDER §
11-102 OF THIS ARTICLE.
(e). HEARING.--
(2) THE COURT MAY DISMISS A MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING IF THE COURT
FINDS THAT THE MOTION FAILS TO ASSERT GROUNDS ON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRANTED.
(f). RULING. --
(1) IN RULING ON A MOTION FILED UNDER THIS SECTION, THE COURT MAY
VACATE THE CONVICTION AND DISCHARGE THE PERSON.
(2) THE COURT SHALL STATE THE REASONS FOR ITS RULING ON THE RECORD.
(1) THE STATE IN A PROCEEDING UNDER THIS SECTION HAS THE BURDEN OF
PROOF.
(g). APPEAL. --
STATE OF MARYLAND *
* * * * * * * * * * *
To the Honorable Barbara Baer Waxman, Administrative Judge of the District Court of Maryland
for Baltimore City:
Now comes Marilyn J. Mosby, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Antonio Gioia, Chief
Counsel to the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State’s
Attorney for Baltimore City, and move this Honorable Court to pass an order1 vacating the
convictions for possession of marijuana in the 3,778 criminal actions listed in the attached
1 A petition for a writ of coram nobis is a civil proceeding. Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 111
(1999). Given the number of criminal cases to which the petition relates, filing of the petition in
the criminal actions is not practicable. Maryland Rule 15-1202(a).
2 Exhibit A includes all District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City cases identified to date by
the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office from 2011 through the present where a defendant
was convicted of possession of marijuana.
!1
Introduction
The State herein seeks coram nobis relief, a concededly extraordinary remedy, Duncan v.
State, 236 Md. App. 510, 526, 182 A.3d 268, 277 (2018), to right an extraordinary wrong, the
disparate effect on African-Americans in Baltimore City from the arrest, prosecution, and
conviction for possession of marijuana. The sordid history of marijuana prohibition lies in ethnic
and racial bigotry. It has been observed, “Marijuana gives rise to insanity -- not in its users but in
the policies directed against it.”3 The genesis of this insanity can be traced to the early part of the
twentieth century, which brought forth a large influx of Mexicans into America seeking to escape
the violence of the Revolution of 1910. Many of these immigrants, as a part of their culture,
cannabis was used by Americans at this time as a purported tonic for a variety of ailments, it
published of the "Marijuana Menace" and of crimes committed by Mexican immigrants while
ostensibly under the influence of it. By 1931, twenty-nine states had passed laws outlawing the
possession of marijuana.4 The 1933 repeal of alcohol prohibition did nothing to slow the train of
3 Eric Schlosser, “More Reefer Madness”, The Atlantic, April 1997 issue.
4 See www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html.
!2
marijuana criminalization. Driving that train was one Harry Anslinger, commissioner of the then-
nascent National Bureau of Narcotics. Anslinger described marijuana users as follows, “most are
Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos, and entertainers. Their Satanic music, jazz, and swing, result from
marijuana use.” “[T]he primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” 5
passed the Marijuana Tax Act, effectively outlawing marijuana by imposing heavy taxes on the
sale, possession, and transportation of cannabis. The final descent into legislative madness
occurred in 1970 when the United States Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act,6 which
repealed the Marijuana Tax Act, but classified cannabis in the same category as heroin, as a
Schedule 1 drug. Maryland thereafter followed suit and maintains this schedule I classification to
The Court of Appeals in Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000) identified five
(1) "The grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional,
jurisdictional or fundamental character." 361 Md. at 78.
(2) "[A] presumption of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the burden of proof
is on the coram nobis petitioner." Id.
5Common Sense for Drug Policy, “The Devil Weed and Harry Anslinger”, www.csdp.org/
publicservice/anslinger.htm.
6 Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
!3
(3) "The coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing significant collateral
consequences from the conviction." 361 Md. at 79.
(4) "Basic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis
proceedings." Id.8
(5) "One is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a coram nobis proceeding
if another statutory or common law remedy is then available." 361 Md. at 80.9
It cannot be gainsaid that equal protection of the laws, as secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, is a fundamental right. “[N]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that “the history of the narcotics legislation
in this country ’”reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal
machinery -- detection, prosecution and punishment -- tighter and tighter.’" Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1144 (1981) quoting from Gore v. United States, 357
U.S., [386] at 390 [1958]). Recent history has incontrovertibly established that the “turning of
the screw” during the “war on drugs” has been applied disproportionately tighter against the
African-American community.
8 The State avers that the claims presented herein have not been previously waived.
9 The State further avers that all persons named in this action have no other statutory or common
law remedy available in which to challenge their respective conviction.
!4
In 1986, the United States Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
created, inter alia, a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in five (5) grams
of crack cocaine and the identical mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in five hundred
(500) grams of powdered cocaine. In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which
reduced the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity from 100:1 to 18:1. 10 This sentencing
Americans served roughly the same prison time for non-violent drug offenses as whites did for
violent offenses.11
were almost three times more likely than Whites to be arrested for marijuana possession. For the
same period, African-Americans in Baltimore City were 5.6 times more likely than Whites to be
arrested for marijuana possession.12 Yet research indicates that marijuana usage is roughly the
10 In Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012), the United States Supreme
Court applied the Fair Sentencing Act's more lenient mandatory minimum provisions to pre-Act
offenders who were not sentenced after the Act took effect.
11 See www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law.../fair-sentencing-act.
12 See www.aclu-md.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-mdpage.pdf.
13 See www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!5
• During 2001 through 2010, there were over 8 million marijuana arrests in the
United States, 88% of which were for possession.
• Marijuana arrests increased between 2001 and 2010 and accounted for over half
(52%) of all drug arrests in the United States,
• Marijuana possession arrests accounted for nearly half (46%) of all drug arrests.
• A black person was 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession
than a white person, even though Blacks and Whites use marijuana at similar
rates.
• Racial disparities in marijuana possession arrests exist in all regions of the
country14
Even after 2010, when many states across the U.S. now have some form of a law legalizing
marijuana for personal use, the Drug Policy Alliance found that racial disparities continue to
• In Colorado, marijuana arrests for white people decreased by 51%, but only decreased by
33% for Latino people and 25% for black people between 2012 and 2014.
• The post-legalization arrest rate for black people in Washington is double the arrest rate
for other races and ethnicities.
• A black person in Washington, D.C. is 11 times more likely than a white person to be
arrested for public consumption of marijuana.15
2014 a new law made possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana a civil infraction. In 2010,
before decriminalization of possession of small amounts of marijuana, the rate of arrest for
marijuana possession in Maryland was the fourth highest in the nation. Police arrested one out of
every 250 people for marijuana possession.16 Black individuals comprised only 30% of the
14 https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
15 http://www.drugpolicy.org/legalization-status-report.
16 https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!6
state's population in 2010, but 58% of arrests for marijuana possession. Baltimore City had the
largest rate of disparity of marijuana arrests with black individuals being 5.6 times more likely to
be arrested for marijuana possession, according to the 2010 report. 17 In Baltimore City, racial
disparities continue to exist after the decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana. BPD
records reflect that in 2015, BPD issued 44 citations for possession of marijuana (after
decriminalizing 10 grams or less of marijuana); of those who were cited 39 were African
American (89%). In 2016, BPD issued 199 such citations; 187 were issued to African Americans
(94%). In 2017, BPD issued 431 citations; of those marijuana possession citations, 410 were
issued to African Americans (95%). The plurality of these 2017 citations by far were issued in
laws, the grounds in this proceeding for challenging the criminal convictions are of a
constitutional character.
In Skok, supra, the Court of Appeals identified both deportation/removal and enhanced
sentencing under recidivist statutes as sufficient bases for a reviewing court to find that a coram
conviction. The State maintains that Skok should not be read as holding that deportation/removal
and enhanced sentencing are the exclusive bases for finding that “significant collateral
17 https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!7
This fact could not have been made more clear by the Court of Special Appeals in State v.
Hicks, 139 Md. App. 1, 9, 773 A.2d 1056, 1061 (2001), wherein the Court stated,
Although Skok assigned as reasons for its decision the intervening changes in
immigration law, and recidivist statutes, it did not carve out a special remedy
limited only to those persons subject to a recidivist statute or deportation
proceeding.
0-0-0
Nowhere in the Skok opinion does the Court of Appeals suggest that a court
considering a coram nobis petition must look to the particular circumstances of
the petitioner to see whether a new recidivist statute or change in immigration law
applies before considering his petition. Id., 139 Md. App. at 10, 773 A.2d at 1061.
conviction has been found by courts to be a “significant collateral consequence” for purposes of
seeking coram nobis relief. In United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075, n.12 (4th Cir.
1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in affirming the granting of
coram nobis relief by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to former
Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him
vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.” Parker v. Ellis, 362
U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 909 (1960) (Chief Justice Warren dissenting). (Emphasis
supplied).
“Reputational harm” for purposes of coram nobis relief is not limited to felony offenses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.
!8
0-0-0
No court to our knowledge has ever held that misdemeanor convictions cannot
carry collateral legal consequences. Any judgment of misconduct has
consequences for which one may be legally or professionally accountable. See
Miller v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 679 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (letter
of admonition in attorney's permanent record for which he is professionally
accountable constitutes sufficient adverse consequence for Article III)). Id. 828 F.
2d at 606-07.
consequences that flow from a criminal conviction: denial of eligibility for government benefits,
significant social and psychological difficulties, public housing eligibility, use of criminal history
by private landlords as a screening device, convictions operating as a de facto basis for job
denial, and for those convicted individuals who are employed, much lower earnings than
The State avers that the individuals named in this proceeding are indeed suffering
“significant collateral consequences” from their challenged conviction for purposes of coram
nobis relief. Furthermore, these individuals were neither informed nor aware on the day that they
entered their respective pleas of these collateral consequences. Judges did not advise defendants
of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea as they were not required to so. Maryland Rule
4-242(c), both in its current and past iterations has required that a defendant be advised, inter
alia, of the “consequences of a plea.” This requirement, however, extends only to an advisement
of the direct, as contrasted with, the collateral consequences of the plea. Yoswick v. State, 347
Md. 228, 240, 700 A.2d 251, 257 (1997). “Direct consequences” has been held to mean the
!9
maximum sentence “on the table” as a result of pleading guilty, see Bryant v. State, 47 Md. App.
551, 424 A.2d 1115 (1981) or advisement of a plea-bargained sentence. State v. King, 71 Md.
Vaughn v. State, 232 Md. App. 421, 429, 158 A.3d 1060, 1065 (2017), where a known
specific collateral consequence was held insufficient to justify coram nobis relief, is no bar to the
relief sought here. Vaughn, who pled guilty to a charge of third-degree sex offense, was informed
by the court of the collateral consequence of his plea, sex offender registration, when he pled
guilty. Vaughn is also distinguishable where, as here, the collateral consequences have increased
in both severity and unfairness, in light of the continued disparate enforcement, well-documented
There is no reasonable basis to charge the individuals named in this proceeding with
knowledge, at the time of their pleas, of the draconian significant collateral consequences that
ensued. We are not dealing here with individuals who are challenging malum in se offenses such
that it might be objectively reasonable to saddle them with knowledge of significant collateral
conduct of which is patently innocuous. Finally, the collateral consequences are in fact, very real,
ongoing, and not merely theoretical. See Graves v. State, 215 Md. App. 339, 353, 81 A.3d 516,
524 (2013).
Although the State recognizes that this Honorable Court must conduct its own review of
the arguments presented herein, the State’s position, tantamount to a confession of error, is
entitled to “great weight” by this Honorable Court. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88
!10
S. Ct. 1889, 1900 (1968). See also Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413 (N.D.
Cal. 1984)(Where that confession of error is made by the official having full authority for
prosecution on behalf of the government it is entitled to even greater deference, citing Sibron,
supra.)
The Court of Appeals in Skok justified its recognition of an “expanded scope” of coram
nobis review on the basis of “contemporary conditions and public policy.” Id., 361 Md. at 77,
760 A.2d at 660 (2000). Contemporary attitudes and public policy toward marijuana have
changed dramatically in the past few years. Marijuana is now legalized for recreational and
medical purposes in Washington, D.C. and ten states. “Medical marijuana” laws now exist in an
additional twenty-three states, including Maryland. 18 Only seventeen states still criminalize
marijuana possession for all purposes. Contemporary conditions and public policy toward the
collateral consequences flowing from same strongly militate in favor of granting coram nobis
Conclusion
1413. The writ of error coram nobis is warranted “under circumstances compelling such action to
!11
achieve justice.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511, 74 S. Ct. 247, 252 (1954). Justice
can only be served by the granting of coram nobis relief to these individuals.
Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby
State’s Attorney for Baltimore City
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _____ day of January, 2019, a copy of the State’s foregoing
Petition for Coram Nobis was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
!12
1 North Charles St.
Baltimore, Md. 21201-3751
_____________________________________
Michael Schatzow
Chief Deputy State’s Attorney for Baltimore City
120 East Baltimore Street, 9th Floor
Baltimore, MD 21202
(443) 984-6000
MSchatzow@stattorney.org
!13
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
STATE OF MARYLAND *
STATE OF MARYLAND *
* * * * * * * * * * *
To the Honorable Michel Pierson, Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City:
Now comes Marilyn J. Mosby, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Antonio Gioia, Chief
Counsel to the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State’s
Attorney for Baltimore City, and move this Honorable Court to pass an order1 vacating the
convictions for possession of marijuana in the 1,050 criminal actions listed in the attached
1 A petition for a writ of coram nobis is a civil proceeding. Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 111
(1999). Given the number of criminal cases to which the petition relates, filing of the petition in
the criminal actions is not practicable. Maryland Rule 15-1202(a).
2Exhibit A includes all Circuit Court for Baltimore City cases identified to date by the Baltimore
City State’s Attorney’s Office from 2000 through the present where a defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana. It also includes 19 cases where a defendant was convicted of attempted
possession of marijuana, and 12 cases where a defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess
marijuana.
!1
Introduction
The State herein seeks coram nobis relief, a concededly extraordinary remedy, Duncan v.
State, 236 Md. App. 510, 526, 182 A.3d 268, 277 (2018), to right an extraordinary wrong, the
disparate effect on African-Americans in Baltimore City from the arrest, prosecution, and
conviction for possession of marijuana. The sordid history of marijuana prohibition lies in ethnic
and racial bigotry. It has been observed, “Marijuana gives rise to insanity -- not in its users but in
the policies directed against it.”3 The genesis of this insanity can be traced to the early part of the
twentieth century, which brought forth a large influx of Mexicans into America seeking to escape
the violence of the Revolution of 1910. Many of these immigrants, as a part of their culture,
cannabis was used by Americans at this time as a purported tonic for a variety of ailments, it
published of the "Marijuana Menace" and of crimes committed by Mexican immigrants while
ostensibly under the influence of it. By 1931, twenty-nine states had passed laws outlawing the
possession of marijuana.4 The 1933 repeal of alcohol prohibition did nothing to slow the train of
marijuana criminalization. Driving that train was one Harry Anslinger, commissioner of the then-
3 Eric Schlosser, “More Reefer Madness”, The Atlantic, April 1997 issue.
4 See www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html.
!2
nascent National Bureau of Narcotics. Anslinger described marijuana users as follows, “most are
Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos, and entertainers. Their Satanic music, jazz, and swing, result from
marijuana use.” “[T]he primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” 5
passed the Marijuana Tax Act, effectively outlawing marijuana by imposing heavy taxes on the
sale, possession, and transportation of cannabis. The final descent into legislative madness
occurred in 1970 when the United States Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act,6 which
repealed the Marijuana Tax Act, but classified cannabis in the same category as heroin, as a
Schedule 1 drug. Maryland thereafter followed suit and maintains this schedule I classification to
The Court of Appeals in Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000) identified five
(1) "The grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional,
jurisdictional or fundamental character." 361 Md. at 78.
(2) "[A] presumption of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the burden of proof
is on the coram nobis petitioner." Id.
(3) "The coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing significant collateral
consequences from the conviction." 361 Md. at 79.
5Common Sense for Drug Policy, “The Devil Weed and Harry Anslinger”, www.csdp.org/
publicservice/anslinger.htm.
6 Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
!3
(4) "Basic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis
proceedings." Id.8
(5) "One is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a coram nobis proceeding
if another statutory or common law remedy is then available." 361 Md. at 80.9
It cannot be gainsaid that equal protection of the laws, as secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, is a fundamental right. “[N]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that “the history of the narcotics legislation
in this country ‘reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal
machinery -- detection, prosecution and punishment -- tighter and tighter.’" Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1144 (1981) quoting from Gore v. United States, 357
U.S., [386] at 390 [1958]). Recent history has incontrovertibly established that the “turning of
the screw” during the “war on drugs” has been applied disproportionately tighter against the
African-American community.
In 1986, the United States Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
created, inter alia, a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in five (5) grams
8 The State avers that the claims presented herein have not been previously waived.
9 The State further avers that all persons named in this action have no other statutory or common
law remedy available in which to challenge their respective conviction.
!4
of crack cocaine and the identical mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in five hundred
(500) grams of powdered cocaine. In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which
reduced the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity from 100:1 to 18:1. 10 This sentencing
Americans served roughly the same prison time for non-violent drug offenses as whites did for
violent offenses.11
were almost three times more likely than Whites to be arrested for marijuana possession. For the
same period, African-Americans in Baltimore City were 5.6 times more likely than Whites to be
arrested for marijuana possession.12 Yet research indicates that marijuana usage is roughly the
• During 2001 through 2010, there were over 8 million marijuana arrests in the
United States, 88% of which were for possession.
• Marijuana arrests increased between 2001 and 2010 and accounted for over half
(52%) of all drug arrests in the United States,
10 In Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012), the United States Supreme
Court applied the Fair Sentencing Act's more lenient mandatory minimum provisions to pre-Act
offenders who were not sentenced after the Act took effect.
11 See www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law.../fair-sentencing-act.
12 See www.aclu-md.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-mdpage.pdf.
13 See www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!5
• Marijuana possession arrests accounted for nearly half (46%) of all drug arrests.
• A black person was 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession
than a white person, even though Blacks and Whites use marijuana at similar
rates.
• Racial disparities in marijuana possession arrests exist in all regions of the
country14
Even after 2010, when many states across the U.S. now have some form of a law legalizing
marijuana for personal use, the Drug Policy Alliance found that racial disparities continue to
• In Colorado, marijuana arrests for white people decreased by 51%, but only decreased by
33% for Latino people and 25% for black people between 2012 and 2014.
• The post-legalization arrest rate for black people in Washington is double the arrest rate
for other races and ethnicities.
• A black person in Washington, D.C. is 11 times more likely than a white person to be
arrested for public consumption of marijuana.15
2014 a new law made possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana a civil infraction.
of arrest for marijuana possession in Maryland was the fourth highest in the nation. Police
arrested one out of every 250 people for marijuana possession.16 Black individuals comprised
only 30% of the state's population in 2010, but 58% of arrests for marijuana possession.
14 https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
15 http://www.drugpolicy.org/legalization-status-report.
16 https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!6
Baltimore City had the largest rate of disparity of marijuana arrests with black individuals being
5.6 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession, according to the 2010 report.17
In Baltimore City, racial disparities continue to exist after the decriminalization of small
amounts of marijuana. BPD records reflect that in 2015, BPD issued 44 citations for possession
of marijuana (after decriminalizing 10 grams or less of marijuana); of those who were cited 39
were African American (89%). In 2016, BPD issued 199 such citations; 187 were issued to
African Americans (94%). In 2017, BPD issued 431 citations; of those marijuana possession
citations, 410 were issued to African Americans (95%). The plurality of these 2017 citations by
far were issued in the Western police district (42%).In light of this clear pattern of a racially
disproportionate impact of enforcement of drug laws, the grounds in this proceeding for
In Skok, supra, the Court of Appeals identified both deportation/removal and enhanced
sentencing under recidivist statutes as sufficient bases for a reviewing court to find that a coram
conviction. The State maintains that Skok should not be read as holding that deportation/removal
and enhanced sentencing are the exclusive bases for finding that “significant collateral
This fact could not have been made more clear by the Court of Special Appeals in State v.
Hicks, 139 Md. App. 1, 9, 773 A.2d 1056, 1061 (2001), wherein the Court stated,
17 https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-report-racial-disparities-marijuana-arrests.
!7
Although Skok assigned as reasons for its decision the intervening changes in
immigration law, and recidivist statutes, it did not carve out a special remedy
limited only to those persons subject to a recidivist statute or deportation
proceeding.
0-0-0
Nowhere in the Skok opinion does the Court of Appeals suggest that a court
considering a coram nobis petition must look to the particular circumstances of
the petitioner to see whether a new recidivist statute or change in immigration law
applies before considering his petition. Id., 139 Md. App. at 10, 773 A.2d at 1061.
for purposes of seeking coram nobis relief. In United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067,
1075, n.12 (4th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
affirming the granting of coram nobis relief by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland to former Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel and five co-
defendants, observed,
Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him
vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.” Parker v. Ellis, 362
U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 909 (1960) (Chief Justice Warren dissenting). (Emphasis
supplied).
“Reputational harm” for purposes of coram nobis relief is not limited to felony offenses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.
0-0-0
!8
No court to our knowledge has ever held that misdemeanor convictions cannot
carry collateral legal consequences. Any judgment of misconduct has
consequences for which one may be legally or professionally accountable. See
Miller v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 679 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (letter
of admonition in attorney's permanent record for which he is professionally
accountable constitutes sufficient adverse consequence for Article III)). Id. 828 F.
2d at 606-07.
consequences that flow from a criminal conviction: denial of eligibility for government benefits,
significant social and psychological difficulties, public housing eligibility, use of criminal history
by private landlords as a screening device, convictions operating as a de facto basis for job
denial, and for those convicted individuals who are employed, much lower earnings than
The State avers that the individuals named in this proceeding are indeed suffering
“significant collateral consequences” from their challenged conviction for purposes of coram
nobis relief. Furthermore, these individuals were neither informed nor aware on the day that they
entered their respective pleas of these collateral consequences. Judges did not advise defendants
of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea as they were not required to so. Maryland Rule
4-242(c), both in its current and past iterations has required that a defendant be advised, inter
alia, of the “consequences of a plea.” This requirement, however, extends only to an advisement
of the direct, as contrasted with, the collateral consequences of the plea. Yoswick v. State, 347
Md. 228, 240, 700 A.2d 251, 257 (1997). “Direct consequences” has been held to mean the
maximum sentence “on the table” as a result of pleading guilty, see Bryant v. State, 47 Md.App.
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551, 424 A.2d 1115 (1981) or advisement of a plea-bargained sentence. State v. King, 71
Vaughn v. State, 232 Md. App. 421, 429, 158 A.3d 1060, 1065 (2017), where a known
specific collateral consequence was held insufficient to justify coram nobis relief, is no bar to the
relief sought here. Vaughn, who pled guilty to a charge of third-degree sex offense, was informed
by the court of the collateral consequence of his plea, sex offender registration, when he pled
guilty. Vaughn is also distinguishable where, as here, the collateral consequences have increased
in both severity and unfairness, in light of the continued disparate enforcement, well-documented
There is no reasonable basis to charge the individuals named in this proceeding with
knowledge, at the time of their pleas, of the draconian significant collateral consequences that
ensued. We are not dealing here with individuals who are challenging malum in se offenses such
that it might be objectively reasonable to saddle them with knowledge of significant collateral
conduct of which is patently innocuous. Finally, the collateral consequences are in fact, very real,
ongoing, and not merely theoretical. See Graves v. State, 215 Md. App. 339, 353, 81 A.3d 516,
524 (2013).
Although the State recognizes that this Honorable Court must conduct its own review of
the arguments presented herein, the State’s position, tantamount to a confession of error, is
entitled to “great weight” by this Honorable Court. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88
S. Ct. 1889, 1900 (1968). See also Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413 (N.D.
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Cal. 1984)(Where that confession of error is made by the official having full authority for
prosecution on behalf of the government it is entitled to even greater deference, citing Sibron,
supra.)
The Court of Appeals in Skok justified its recognition of an “expanded scope” of coram
nobis review on the basis of “contemporary conditions and public policy.” Id., 361 Md. at 77,
760 A.2d at 660 (2000). Contemporary attitudes and public policy toward marijuana have
changed dramatically in the past few years. Marijuana is now legalized for recreational purposes
in Washington, D.C. and ten states. “Medical marijuana” laws now exist in an additional twenty-
three states, including Maryland.18 Only seventeen states still criminalize marijuana possession
for all purposes. Contemporary conditions and public policy toward the recreational use of
consequences flowing from same strongly militate in favor of granting coram nobis relief in
these case.
Conclusion
1413. The writ of error coram nobis is warranted “under circumstances compelling such action to
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achieve justice.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511, 74 S. Ct. 247, 252 (1954). Justice
can only be served by the granting of coram nobis relief to these individuals.
Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby
State’s Attorney for Baltimore City
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _____ day of January, 2019, a copy of the State’s foregoing
Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
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Baltimore, Maryland 21202
_________________________________
Michael Schatzow
Chief Deputy State’s Attorney for Baltimore City
120 East Baltimore Street, 9th Floor
Baltimore, MD 21202
(443) 984-6000
MSchatzow@stattorney.org
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