Aboitiz Shipping v. CA (G.R. No.

84458)

Date: November 23, 2016Author: jaicdn0 Comments

Facts:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the
latter to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. An hour after the passengers and
Viana had disembarked the vessel the crane operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who
had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there. He went back and while he was
pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to
his death. A complaint for damages was filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana
ceased to be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable. CA
affirmed the trial court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has
left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely
by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s
premises to claim his baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the
petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to
bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time
of his tragic death.
Gacal vs. PAL Case Digest

Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines

(183 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 55300 March 16, 1990)

Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers of PAL plane at Davao Airport for a flight to
Manila, not knowing that the flight, were Commander Zapata with other members of Moro National Liberation Front.
They were armed with grenades and pistols. After take off, the members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed
the pilot to fly directly to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in Zamboanga airport for refueling,
because the plane did not have enough fuel to make direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began to taxi at the runaway
of Zamboanga airport, it was met by two armored cars of the military.

An armored car subsequently bumped the stairs leading inside the plane. That commenced the battle between the
military and the hijackers, which led ultimately to the liberation of the plane’s surviving crew and passengers with the
final score of ten passengers and three hijackers dead.

Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case fortuito or force majeure, which would exempt an aircraft from liability for,
damages to its passengers and personal belongings that were lost during the incident?

Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from liability under Art 1174 of the civil code, it is necessary
that the following elements must occur: (a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent of human will; (b)
the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury
to the creditor.

Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the
skyjacking incident staged buy the MNLF without connection to the private respondent, hence, independent of will of
PAL or its passengers.

The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation in a normal manner and it cannot be faulted for
negligence on the duty performed by the military. The existence of force majeure has been established thus exempting
PAL from payment of damages.
La Mallorca v. CA

Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination, they alighted from the bus.
But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the
bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Mariano’s daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.
Issue:
Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted
Held:
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected
by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to
leave the current premises.

La Mallorca vs. CA Case Digest

La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)

Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and
Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and
operated by the defendant.

They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three
tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were
below the height which fare is charged in accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.

After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefore, among whom were the
plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by
his wife and children. Mariano led his companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters
away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing,
his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while
unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending
to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled about
10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board without getting his bayong from conductor.
He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he
saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child
was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent.

For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage
was already terminated?

Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not
unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and
passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s servant or employee in removing
his baggage from the car.

It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.

The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must
have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand
him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance
that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent
had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a
common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the
latter was still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the
bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under
their contract of carriage.
FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PAULIE CAORONG and HER MINOR CHILDREN, 305 SCRA 14 (1999)

FACTS:

 Pauli Caurong filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, a bus company operating in Northern Mindanao, for the death of her
husband, Atty. Talib Caorong. Atty. Caurong was shot by Maranaos in an ambush involving said bus.

 BACKGROUND OF THE STORY:

o In November 1989, a bus of Fortune was involved in an accident with a passenger jeepney resulting in the deaths of several
passengers.

o Crisanto Generalao, a local field agent of the Philippine Constabulary, conducted an investigation on the accident and found that
the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that several Maranaos were planning to burn some of Fortune’s buses for revenge.

o Generalao informed Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of Fortune, about the plot, and Bravo assured him that they would take
the necessary precautions for safety.

o Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board the vehicle. The leader of the
group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos
were already pouring gasoline on the bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver
jumped out of the vehicle. Caorong was shot to death as a result.

 RTC dismissed the complaint:

o Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion of providing its buses with security guards is not an omission of
petitioner’s duty. The evidence showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyond petitioner’s control.

 CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:

o Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take
any safety precautions at all.

o One available safeguard that could have absolved Fortune from liability was frisking of incoming passengers en route to
dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to do. The frisking system is not novel in sensitive
and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing to take necessary precautions to ensure the safety of its passengers;

2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

HELD: Petitioner is liable. Attack was not a fortuitous event.

 Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of other passengers, if its employees
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the act.

 Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.

 If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons and the large quantity of gasoline the
malefactors carried with them.

 A common carrier is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages. 1

 The seizure of the bus was not force majeure. Of the four elements to constitute an event as caso fotuito, the element of
“unforeseeable or unavoidable circumstances” was lacking. The seizure of the bus was foreseeable, given the fact that petitioner
was well-informed of the possibility, days before the incident. This situation was likened to a case2 where the common carrier failed to
take safety precautions despite warnings of an approaching typhoon.

 Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, since all he did
was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither an act of negligence or recklessness

1
Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines.
2 Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals