LMC Topics: (Caveat: Update based on topics given)

Case: pa-basketball court ni Mayor without approval of the Sanggunians concerned:

Suggested basis for answer:
Section 335 of RA 7160 (LGC) is clear and specific that NO PUBLIC MONEY (no honey) shall be appropriated or applied
for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental pronciple in local fiscal administration that LG funds and
monies shall be spent solely for public purposes... Only construction and improvement, repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with LG funds (Albon vs Fernando (494 SCRA 141 GR 148357
June 30, 2006).
Pursuant to Section 16 (General Welfare Clause) and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of LGU, as provided for
under Section 22 (LGU), the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panglungsod/Bayan shall approve ordinances and pass resolutions
for an efficient and effective local government....
I dont know if there is a case which allowed an approved appropriation for infrastructure as an implied approval for a project
by mayor which requires approval by the Sanggunians concerned. Please share if you know any.
Case of Sangguian Panglungsod Member who resigned and was appointed by Vice Mayor as Secretary:
Elements of Resignation:
1) intent to reliquish office
2) voluntary act
3) must be in writing

But in case of Sanggunian members, it may be made orally during open session (Section 82, LGCC). Resognation takes effect
upon acceptance, and deemed accepted if not acted upon within 15 days (silence means YES)
But in his appointment as secretary of the Sanggunian by the VM, my readings suggest, (CAVEAT) that the local chief
executive may employ casual employees without approval of the CSC for not more than 6 months (Section 77, LGC)
So deemed resigned siya orally and not employed pa as Secretary.

Case of prohibiting nightclubs and employing dancers in city hall (I forgot already):
Baka lumusot pag invoke nyo as reason ang Section 16 LGC on General welfare stating every LGU shall exercise.... bla bla
efficient and effective governance and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare within theit respective
territorial jurisdiction. LGU shall: ...
(5) improve public morals
But the SC has declared unconstitutional an ordinance which forbids running of nightclubs, sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars and similar business establishments, and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operation as it
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanend deprivation of property and is practically confiscatory. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that cannot bt used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must recognized as taking of property without just compensation. Private property which is NOT noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may NOT, ny zoning, be destroyed without just compensation (City if Manila vs Laguio 455 SCRA 308)
But the employment of the dancers as gov employees (may be allowed for a period not more than 6 months) Local Chief
Executive may appoint casual employees without approval by the CSC. (Sec 77, LGC)

Case involving public use for housing of 100 poor:

The idea of "public use" means exclusely used by the public has been DISCARDED. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, the exercise of Eminent Domain is justifiable. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use. (Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs Reyes 123 SCRA ____ (1983)
Furthermore, the care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience as consistenly as may be woth private rights. It extends to all the great
public needs and in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government (Binay vs
Domingo 201 SCRA 508)

League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC GR 176951 Dec. 21, 2009

Like the situation given, League filed cityhood bill (1996)
Amendment in 1997
Creation contested as it has not met income requirement
League assailed the Cityhood law (1997 amendment)
ANSWER:
Contention valid.
Although Congress intends the subject Cityhood laws (1997 amendment increasing the income requirement), exemption may
be accorded to the League based on the fact that each had pending bill before the enactment of the amendment aiming for
Cityhood (1996) and approved 2008. It may be allowed as a matter of equity and fairplay (ie that the laws enacted at that time
allows a lower income).

Case involving indigenous neighbor

Answer: While the power to create barangay has been delegated to Sangguniang Panlalawigan and S. Panglungsod, Congress,
in order to enhance the delivery of basic services in Indigenous Cultural Communities, may create barangays in such
communities notwithstanding the requirements set forth by law [Section 385(a), LGC]
Case of Acting Gov Pinakyaw
Answer: A Vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor os actually a quasi-governor. For the purpose od exercising
his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed a NON-MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN for
the time being (Gamboa vs. Aguirre, GR 134213, July 20. 1999)

LOCAL INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM

Local initiative. DEFINED
o Legal process whereby the registered voters [RVs] of a LGU may directly PROPOSE, ENACT, AMEND
[PEA] any ordinance. It may be exercised by ALL RVs of the province, citiesm municipalities, barangays.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INITIATIVE & LOCAL INITIATIVE vs REFER ENDUM

- INITIATIVE is the power of the RVs to propose amendments to the Constitution/propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose. LOCAL INITIATIVE is the legal process whereby RVs of LGU may
directly PEA any ordinance. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation
of their elected representatives, WHILE REFERENDUM consists of the electorate approving or rejecting what has
been enacted by a legislative body. [Case: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492]

INITIATIVE: PROCEDURE
A. Number of signatures of votes
a. At least 1,000 in provinces and cities
b. AL 100 in municipalities
c. AL 50 in barangays
 B. If NO FAVORABLE ACTION taken by SANG concerned within 30 days from presentation, the proponent
through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving NOTICE
thereto to the SANG concerned.
C. Propositions shall be numbered serially e.g. Roman Numeral I + COMELEC to assist in formation
D. Proponents shall have the ff. days from notice above-mentioned to collect signatures:
Period to collect signatures
a. 90 days in Provinces and cities
b. 60 days in municipalities
c. 30 days in barangays
E. Petition shall be signed before the election registrar/designated rep AND in the presence of a representative of the
proponent and rep of the SANG concerned in a public place in the LGU.
F. Upon lapse of the period, COMELEC shall certify W/N the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure
to obtain the required number of signatures defeat the proposition.
G. If required number is obtained, COMELEC shall set a date for the initiative during which the proposition is
submitted to the registered voters in the LGU for the approval:
a. Within 60 days from date of certification by the COMELEC– P
b. 45 days; same – M
c. 30 days; same – B
The initiative shall be held on the date set, after which the results thereof be certified and proclaimed by the
COMELEC.
H. If proposition is approved by a majority of votes cast, it shall take effect 15 days after certification by the COMELEC
as if affirmative action had been taken thereon by the SANG and Local Chief Executive concerned.

LIMITATIONS
A. ON local initiative
a. Power of initiative shall NOT be exercised more than once a year.
b. It shall extend ONLY to matters within the power of the SANG to enact
i. In delineating the scope of initiative or referendum, Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution
includes any act of a local legislative body. The Constitution includes ordinances and resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
ii. Section 3 (6) RA 6735 expressly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects
of a local initiative on local legislations. Section 124 of the LGC includes all matters within the legal
powers of the SANG to enact in the scope of initiative, which includes resolutions [Garcia vs
COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279]
c. If at any time BEFORE the initiative is held, the SANG concerned adopts in toto the proposition presented
and the Local Chief Executive approves the same, the initiative shall be cancelled. HOWEVER, those against
such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
B. ON the SANGGUNIAN
a. Any proposition or ordinance approved through initiative or referendum shall NOT be repealed, modified or
amended by SANG concerned within 6 months from date of approval thereof, and any be amended,
modified, or repealed by SANG within 3 years by three-fourths (¾) vote of all members, provided that in
case of Barangaym the period shall be 18 months after the approval thereof. (Sec. 125, LGC)

REFERENDUM
- The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the COMELEC within 60 days in case of
province and cities, 45 days in case of municipalities, and 30 days in case ofbarangays.

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE (Sec. 118, LGC)

- Boundary disputes between and among LGUs shall be, as much as possible, be settled AMICABLY

Nature and Power

 - Power of provincial board to settle boundary dispute is of administrative nature – involving the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix a common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities.
- The agreement between the municipality of Jimenez and Sinacaban (embodied in a resolution of a provincial board
declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality) is INVALID as it would effectively amend EO 258
creating the municipality of Sinacaban. It is contrary to the technical description of the territory of the municipality as
per E0 258, and therefore NOT BINDING. The power of the SANG. PANLALAWIGAN to settle boundary
dispute is limited to implementing the law creating the municipality and, any ALTERATION of boundaries NOT in
accordance with the law is NOT implementation but AMENDMENT of the law, which would exceed their authority.
[Jimenez vs. Baz, 256 SCRA 182]

Jurisdiction
- The LGC confers jurisdiction in settling boundary disputes to the ff:
o SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD/SANG. BAYAN
 Involving two or more barangays in the SAME city or municipality;
o SANG. PANLALAWIGAN
 Two/more municipalities within SAME PROVINCE.
o Joint SANGGUNIANS of provinces concerned
 Those involving municipalities of component cities of different provinces; and
o Joint SANG. of the PARTIES
 Those involving a COMPONENT CITY/MUNICIPALITY on one hand, and HIGHLY
URBANIZED CITY on the other hand, OR two or more HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES; jointly
referred to the respective SANGs of the parties
- Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of diff. provinces shall be jointly referred to for
settlement to the SANGGUNIANS of provinces concerned. (Sec. 118, LGC)

- In the event SANGs fails to effect a settlement within 60 days from date the dispute was referred to it, it shall issue a
certification to this effect. The dispute shall then be formally tried by the SANG. concerned which shall decide the
issue within 60 days from the date of certification.

- Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the SANG.
concerned to the proper RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute which shall decide the appeal within 1 year
from the filing thereof.

- In Calanza vs. PICOP [GR 146622, April 24, 2009] case, SC said RTC CANNOT exercise appellate jurisdiction
over the case since there was NO PETITION filed and decided by the SANG. PANLALAWIGANs of Davao
Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since LGC
allocates such power to the SANG.PANs of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur.

- WHEN LGC IS SILENT ON JURISDICTION.

o Sec. 118 (d) of LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, NOT an independent component city. While Kanaga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
(d) does NOT apply to them. Since there is NO legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over the
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, the
general rule governing jurisdiction should be used. The applicable provision is found in Section 19 (6) of BP
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691, which provides the RTC shall
exercise ORIGINAL JURISDICTION in cases NOT within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or-quasi-judicial functions. [Municipality of Kanaga vs. Madrona, 402
SCRA 330]

PROCEDURE
 1. AMICABLE SETTLEMENT (reason is as stated earlier)
2. FORMAL HEARING – In the event SANG fails to effect an amicable settlement within 60 days from date the
dispute was referred to it, it shall issue a certification to that effect. The dispute shall then be formally tried by the
Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of certification.

In case NO SETTLEMENT of BD between municipalities is made, the BD should be elevated to the RTC of the
PROVINCE.
FAILURE of COURT to decide within period prescribed by law does NOT divest/deprive it of its jurisdiction to
decide the case, BUT ONLY makes the judge thereof liable for administrative sanction. In Jimenez vs. Baz (ibid), the
SC declared that the RTC was correct when it ordered a relocation survey to determine to which municipality the
barangays belonged.
3. APPEAL – within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision to the
SANG. concerned to the proper RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute which shall decide the appeal within
1 year from the filing thereof.

In Mun. of Sta. Fe vs. Mun. of Aritao [GR 140474, September 21, 2007], SC held that it is only in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the
SANG.PANLALAWIGAN elevate the same.

Calanza vs PICOP case

- No boundary dispute in this case.
- FACTS: Calanza, et al are approved applicants of small-scale mining permits for purpose of exacting gold with area of
operation in Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. Gov. Lopez of Davao Oriental approved said application. Since
mining areas applied for by petitioners were within PICOP’s logging concession area under TLA covering forest lands
of Prov. Of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte, naki-negotiate si petitioners for
entry into mining site at Brgy. Catihan, Mun. of Boston, Davao Or.
- BUT PICOP REFUSED ENTRY (Big Word).
o REASON:
 PICOP has exclusive right of occupation, possession and control over the area being a logging
concessionaire
 Mining permits were defective since the mining area is situated in Surigao del Sur.
- Petitioner filed with RTC praying to enjoin PICOP from prohibiting them to enter and operate in mining sites.
- PICOP countered: (1) RTC of Davao does not have jurisdiction over the complaint since the disputed area is situated
in the Province of Surigao del Sur; and (2) that the petitioners permits are void since it violated sec. 5 of RA 7076,
which allegedly prohibits the issuance ofmining permits over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or forest
reservation unless their status iswithdrawn by the competent authority.
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioners:
o Barangay Pagtilaan (as claimed by PICOP) or Catihan (as claimed by petitioners) is within the territory of the
Province of Davao Oriental.
o Section 465 (b) (3) of RA 7160 (LGC of 1991, states that the governor has the power to issue licenses and
permits. Hence, the RTC ruled that the governor is vested with the power to issue the small-scale mining
permits to the petitioners.
- CA reversed:
o RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang
panlalawigans of the two provinces and the RTC has only appellate jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the
Local Government Code of 1991.
o GOV has NO POWER to issue SSM permits since authority is vested with Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board.
- SC: Petition is NOT meritorious, and should be DENIED
o There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a Local Government Unit
(LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs.
 o This is NOT a case where the SANG.PANLALAWIGANS of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur jointly
rendered a decision resolving the boundary dispute of the two provinces and the same decision was elevated
to the RTC. Clearly, the RTC CANNOT exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was NO
petition that was filed and decided by the SANGPANLAs of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither
can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the Local Government Code
allocates such power to the SANGPANLA of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has NO
original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a
TOTAL NULLITY. Hence, judgment rendered by court without jurisdiction is NULL and VOID and may
be attacked anytime. It creates no right and produces no effect.

o Petitioners are bound by the procedures for application of permit from PMRB as provided in RA 7076.
Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners
were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without
legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.

PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE and MUN. of CALUYA vs. Hon. Calabocal, Roxas Oriental Mindoro, Province of
Oriental Mindoro and Mun. of Bulalacao [GR 209146, June 8, 2016] ***fresh na fresh! Last year lang!
FACTS:
- Dispute is between the Province of Antique and the Province of Oriental Mindoro for “territorial jurisdiction,
dominion, control and administration” over Liwagao Island (114 Ha white-sand fuckin’ beach island located between
two provinces).
- Around 1978 and 1979, MAYOR Dolores Bago (Mayor Bago), then Mayor of Mun of Bulalacao, Or. Mindoro, agreed
to LEND the administration of Liwagao island to Oscar Lim (Mayor Lim of Mun. of Caluya, Antique). The
agreement was made ORALLY (lol) and WITHOUT executing any formal documents to this effect. The condition
attached to the agreement was that the island would be returned upon termination of either party”s terms in office.
- The terms of both mayors ended in 1987. Mayor Lim allegedly returned Liwagao Island to the Municipality of
Bulalacao. However, the Municipality of Caluya continued to exercise administration over the island.
- 15 April 2002 – the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution confirming its jurisdictional
rights and dominion over Liwagao Island. However, according to respondents, Municipality of Caluya and the
Province of Antique continued to claim and exercise authority over Liwagao Island.
o Respondent: Despite the fact that it is the Province of Oriental Mindoro and the Municipality of Bulalacao
that provide government services to the island, petitioners “continued collecting real property taxes” from
Liwagao”s inhabitants.
- 20 February 2012 – the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution calling for a joint session
between SANG. PANLA of PROVINCE of Oriental Mindoro and SANG. PANLA of PROVINCE of ANTIQUE
for the settlement of claim over the Island of Liwagao.
- Upon receipt, Vice Governor of Antique wrote the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro of her willingness
to conduct a joint session to settle the boundary dispute.
- 25 May 2012 – Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Antique issued Resolution informing Oriental Mindoro that it was NOT
amenable to any form of settlement over the jurisdiction of Liwagao Island and asserted that the same rightfully
belongs to their province. (Suplada yung nagoral-ly lend! Bat nga naman makikisettle yung nagpahiram). Thereafter,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro issued a resolution directing the Provincial Legal Office to file the
necessary legal action to claim Liwagao Island.
- 12 September 2012 – Respondent filed petition before RTC of Roxas, Or. Mindoro.
- Petitioner answered:
o The maps of [NAMRIA] and DENR show Liwagao Island to be part of Caluya, Antique.
o All national agencies of the government have always considered the island to be part of Caluya.
o The people living there have always recognized Caluya’s jurisdiction over the island, e.g. “registered their
births, paid real property taxes and voted in Caluya, Antique.”
o RTC lacks jurisdiction since under Section 118, paragraph (c) of the Local Government Code, jurisdiction
over boundary disputes between municipalities of different provinces is vested on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigans of the provinces involved.
- 23 April 2013 RTC RULING: (23 April 2013 Ruling): special and affirmative defenses invoked by the Province of
Antique and the Municipality of Caluya. Specifically, petitioners argued that the case involved a boundary dispute that
should have first been brought to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned for settlement. RTC DISAGREED and
DENIED the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction.
o The respondent claimed that the subject government unit is a part of its territory. Clearly, the issue revolves
and gravitates on who between the petitioner and respondent is the owner of sitio Liwagao, barangay
Maasim, and NOT merely a boundary dispute because both parties claim the whole government unit of sitio
Liwagao and not merely a part thereof to constitute it as boundary dispute to fall under Section 118,
paragraph c of the Local Government Code.
o The respondent claims that it should have been brought first to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concern (sic)
for settlement. The court is not in accord with such contention because the Sanggunian of Antique already
issued 25 May 2012 Resolution categorically declaring SANG.PANLA of ANTIQUE is NOT AMENABLE
to any form of settlement. Hence, the court believes that it would be an exercise in futility for the petitioners
to agree with respondents' argument. (As correctly pointed out by Atty. Kristine Grace L. Suarez in her
memorandum) NO law precluding a party to a case from availing of any legal remedies available. In this case,
the petitioners logically opted to institute this case which is an action for recovery and declaration of
jurisdiction/dominion.
- 17 July 2013 RTC Resolution : MR DENIED
o The real issue in this case is not a boundary dispute between the petitioners and respondents but whether or
not the former can recover back what it had lent to the latter.
- Liwagao Island was under the peaceful and exclusive territorial and political jurisdiction by the Municipality of
Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. In fact, voluminous documents clearly show that Liwagao is within the Municipality of
Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. This alone strongly indicates that the issue in this case is not a boundary dispute because
these documents indicate that Liwagao Island is within the Municipality of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. If it is true as
claimed by the respondents that Liwagao Island is within its territorial and political jurisdiction, why would then
Mayor Lim of Caluya, Antique still need to secure the consent of the then Mayor Bago of Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro to temporarily exercise jurisdiction over the Island of Liwagao. (May point nga naman si RTC).
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO
o Enjoin all proceedings of the court a quo and of the respondent judge during the pendency of the case
o writ of certiorari be issued, reversing the questioned Orders of the respondent judge dated April 23, 2013 and
July 17, 2013 in dismissing the case.
o writ of prohibition be issued permanently enjoining respondent judge from taking cognizance of this case.
- 14 October 2013 – Court issued TRO enjoing respondent RTC from further proceeding with the enforcement of the
Orders dated 23 April 2013 and 17 July 2013.
- Petitioner’s argument:
o RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the
case does NOT involve a boundary dispute. Petitioner insist case simply a BD when “two entities disagree as
to where the boundary between them lies.”
o RTC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents' petition because "the SANG. PANLAs of both the
provinces of Antique and Oriental Mindoro, sitting jointly, have primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over this boundary dispute.
o RTC ONLY has jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the SANG. PANLAs in a boundary dispute
in accordance with Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code. They aver that the petition filed with the RTC
was not an appeal but an original complaint, which alleges that the parties concerned failed to settle the
dispute.
o RTC CANNOT exercise appellate jurisdiction over respondent’s petition since NO petition for the
adjudication of the BD has yet been filed and decided by SANG.PANLAs of Antique and Oriental Mindoro,
usually in a form of resolution. Calling of joint session does NOT qualify as such as it did NOT lay claim
over Liwagao Island.
- Respondent:
o Technicality attacks:
 the instant case was filed one day after the lapse of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition
for certiorari/prohibition;
  petitioners also failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed RTC orders and to file the
required number of copies of the petition; and (3) petitioners failed to pay the filing fee within the
reglementary period.
- petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
o order of the RTC should be filed with the CA and not with SC.
- RTC has jurisdiction over their petition because the same is not an appeal but an, “an original legal action to recover
and get back the Island of Liwagao.”
- Respondent insist NO BD and that NO law precludes party from availing of any legal remedies available to
respondent under law.
- Even if assuming it is the SANG. PANLAs of the Provinces of Oriental Mindoro and Antique that have jurisdiction,
factual circumstances rendered it impossible for these legislative bodies to resolve the issue involving the Island of
Liwagao. SANG. PANLA of Antique categorically proclaimed that it was NOT amenable to any form of settlement.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the respondents' petition for recovery of property and declaration of territorial
and political jurisdiction/dominion over Liwagao Island.
RULING: YES. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. RTC has jurisdiction over the dispute. However, the RTC's ruling
that the case does NOT involve a boundary dispute is INCORRECT.
- Boundary dispute involving different local government units is defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) [Administrative Order No. 270. Issued on 21 February 1992] of the Local Government Code [ RA
7160]. Specifically, Rule III, Article 15 states:

RULE III
Settlement of Boundary Disputes

ARTICLE 15. Definition and Policy. — There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the
territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall,
as much as possible, be settled amicably.

- Boundary dispute may involve "a portion or the whole" of a local government unit's territorial area. Nothing in this
provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local government units,
there exists a boundary dispute.
- The allegations in the complaint filed before the RTC point to a boundary dispute, as defined under the Local
Government Code.
- Respondents are asserting their lawful jurisdiction over Liwagao Island as against another local government unit that
currently has jurisdiction over the same. whether the case is denominated as recovery of possession or claim of
ownership, respondents' objective is the same: for respondents to regain their alleged territorial jurisdiction over
Liwagao Island.
- Respondent Province of Oriental Mindoro itself acknowledges that the conflict is a “boundary row” between itself
and the Province of Antique, as stated in the Resolution calling for joint session to “adhere to the basic principle of
amicably settling said boundary dispute…” Hence, they are bound by their own assertion, and cannot claim otherwise.
- Having established that the case involves BD:
o the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their
boundary disputes.
o Section 118 (c), LGC: Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (please refer to the
above procedure na lang. Pagod nako mag-type)
- It must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid down in the Local Government Code. However,
petitioners failed to perform their concomitant responsibility under the same law, leaving respondents with no other
recourse but to bring the matter to court. Petitioners cannot demand that respondents now follow the procedure
when they themselves have made it impossible for any party to follow the same. The Province of Antique's Resolution
 stating that the Province of Antique was not amenable to any form of settlement, effectively blocked any way to
continue following the steps in the IRR.
- Petition before the RTC must be upheld. Otherwise, they will be left without any recourse or legal remedy to assert
their claim over Liwagao Island. Such uncertainty is unacceptable, as the fate of the island's residents rest in the
immediate resolution of the dispute.

PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
- GOV / MAYORs: PROHIBITED from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation.
- SANG members may practice their profession, engage in ANY occupation or teach EXCEPT during SESSION
hours.
o EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION:
 Q: Who can practice profession during session hours?
 ANS: Physicians/Doctors may practice during session hours ONLY in emergency cases but NO
physician profession fee/compensation. Thank you only.
- SANG members who are LAWYERS: Shall NOT
 The “DO NOT BITE THE HANDS OF THE PERSON THAT FEEDS YOU” doctrine
(JOKE!!!)
o Appeal as counsel in any civil case where LGU is adverse party
o Appear as counsel in criminal case where accused is officer of the National or Local Gov. accused of an
offense committed IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE.
o Collect a fee for appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official.
o Use property and personnel of the government EXCEPT when the SANG members is defending the interest
of the government.
- In Catu vs. Rellosa [AC 5738, February 19, 2008]:
o VGR, a lawyer and a punong barangay and chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, presided over the
conciliation proceedings in an ejectment case. The parties to the case were NOT able to amicably settle their
dispute. Then one of the parties sought his legal assistance and VGR handled her case. In the course thereof,
he prepared and signed pleadings including the answers with counter claim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. (Ready to battle)
o He is sued not for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
o The Court held that the rule applies ONLY to a lawyer who has left the government service in connection
“with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.” Accordingly, as Punong Brgy., he was NOT
forbidden to practice his profession. HOWEVER, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department (DILG Secretary), as required by the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Acting as counsel for a
party without first securing the required written permission, he is NOT ONLY engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law BUT ALSO violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.”