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2009 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES

Case Title Pag

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JUMAQUIO vs. VILLAROSA (G.R. No. 165924 - January 19, 2009) 2

MIAQUE vs. PATAG (G.R. Nos. 170609-13 - January 30, 2009) 5

DE VERA vs DE VERA (G.R. No. 172832 - April 7, 2009) 8

POLINTAN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 161827 - 13

April 21, 2009)

SY TIONG SHIOU vs SY CHIM (G.R. No. 174168 - March 30, 2009) 17

VERGARA, vs THE HON. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. No. 174567 - 33

March 12, 2009)
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RESTYJUMAQUIO,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
San Jose City Regional Trial Court, Branch 39
G.R. No. 165924
January 19, 2009

NACHURA, J.:
Assailed through a certiorari petition before this Court are the September 7,
2004 1 and the September 28, 20042 and the 3 June 2004 resolution3 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 of San Jose City in Criminal
Case Nos. SJC-78-04 and SJC-79-04.
The case originates from an incident that happened on August 2, 2003,
when petitioner Resty Jumaquio allegedly threatened and assaulted two
young men, then ages 13 and 17. As narrated by the minors, in the morning
of the said date, Resty, a neighbor, upon seeing the younger child, belted
out his anger and yelled, " Putang ina mong bata ka namumuro ka na sa
akin, at susunugin ko ‘yung pamilya mo!" 3 (You, son of a bitch, I’ve had
enough of you, I’ll burn your family!). That evening too, while the minors
and their mother were traversing the road fronting another neighbor’s
house, petitioner, who was then having a drinking session, cursed them.
Aghast, the mother cursed him back. Resty thence threw a stone towards
the older child, but missed him. When the children’s father went out of their
nearby house, Resty picked up another stone to fling towards the father, but
the older child rushed to Resty to grab it. At that moment, Resty repeatedly
punched the 17-year-old. The younger child came to the rescue, but he too
received a blow on his left cheek. The family hurried home when Resty
bellowed at his son for the latter to get a gun. Resty then pelted stones at
the family’s house, shouting, "Putang ina ninyo, zone leader ako papatayin
ko [kayong] lahat!" 4 (You, sons of bitches, I am a zone leader, I will kill you
all!).
On account of that altercation, two separate Informations 5 were filed
with the RTC of San Jose City, which pertinently read as follows:
Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04
xxxx
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RESTY JUMAQUIO, with the
crime of GRAVE THREATS in relation to R.A. No. 7610, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 2, 2003, in the City of San Jose, Republic of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten the minor [name withheld], a 13-year-old boy, with the
infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by uttering the
following words, to wit:
"PUTANG INA MONG BATA KA NAMUMURO KA NA SA AKIN AT
SUSUNUGIN KO YONG PAMILYA MO"
to the damage and prejudice of [name withheld].
That the above acts of the accused debases, degrades, and
demeans the dignity of the complainant and impairs his normal
growth and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. April 29, 2004.
 3

xxxx
Criminal Case No. SJC-79-04
-
-
xxxx
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RESTY JUMAQUIO, with the
crime of PHYSICAL INJURIES in relation to R.A. No. 7610, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 2, 2003, in the City of San Jose, Republic of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, box and hit the minors [names withheld], 13 years old and 17
years old, respectively, thereby causing physical injuries to the latter,
which required medical treatment for a period of three to five (3 to 5)
days, to their damage and prejudice.
That the above acts of the accused debases, degrades, and demeans
the dignity of the complainant (sic) and impairs their normal growth
and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. April 29, 2004.
xxxx6
The trial court consequently issued the warrant of arrest and fixed the bail
at P80,000.00 for each case, which, on motion of petitioner, was reduced to
P40,000.00 each in surety bond. 7
After posting bail and before the arraignment, petitioner moved for the
quashal of the informations for being duplicitous. He argued that, under the
informations, he stood charged with several crimes - grave threats and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, and physical injuries and another
violation of the aforesaid law; that grave threats in relation to R.A. No. 7610
could not be considered a crime; and that the said separate crimes could
not even be complexed, as neither may be considered to fall within the
ambit of Section 10, R.A. No. 7610. 8 Following Section 3(e), Rule 117 9 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the informations should therefore
be quashed. 10
In his opposition to the motion, the City Prosecutor countered that the
allegations in the questioned informations, and not the designation of the
crimes therein, should prevail. The informations charged separate violations
of R.A. No. 7610 - Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04 for the single offense of child
abuse committed through the use of threatening words, and Criminal Case
No. SJC-79-04 for the separate offense of child abuse through the infliction
of physical injuries. 11 The crimes committed by petitioner would be
punishable under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. 12
In the assailed September 7, 2004 Order, 13 the RTC denied the motion. The
trial court further denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed September 28, 2004 Order. 14
Discontented, petitioner filed directly before this Court the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
We dismiss the petition.
Immediately apparent is that the instant petition disregards the hierarchy of
courts. While our original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is not
exclusive – it is shared with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the RTC – the
choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left entirely to the
 4

party seeking the writ. 15 The principle of hierarchy of courts serves as a

general determinant of the appropriate forum for the said petition. A
becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first-level courts should be
filed with the RTC; and those against the latter, with the CA. 16 A direct
recourse to this Court is warranted only where there are special and
compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to justify such action.
17
As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task
of dealing with causes in the first instance. 18This is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent the
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. 19
Here, petitioner directly lodged before us the certiorari petition, when he
should have filed it in the CA. Clearly, the same ought to be dismissed.
Furthermore, as a rule, when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
petitioner’s remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in his motion to quash. In the event
that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal
therefrom is the next appropriate legal step. 20
But even if we were to ignore petitioner’s procedural transgressions, the
petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit. As correctly argued by the
City Prosecutor, the questioned informations separately charge two distinct
offenses of child abuse—Criminal Case No. SJC-78-04 for child abuse
committed through the use of threatening words, and Criminal Case No.
SJC-79-04 for child abuse through the infliction of physical injuries. Thus,
contrary to his contention, petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of
grave threats and child abuse in the first case, and slight physical injuries
and child abuse in the second. Though the crimes were erroneously
designated, the averments in the informations clearly make out an offense
of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. 21 Under the said law,
"child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes psychological and physical abuse, cruelty, emotional
maltreatment or any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. 22 In
the first information, petitioner is charged with child abuse by uttering
debasing, demeaning and degrading words to the minor. In the second, he
is charged with child abuse by inflicting physical injuries that debase,
demean and degrade the dignity of the children as human beings. What
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense
but the actual facts recited therein. 23 Moreover, an information is not
duplicitous if it charges several related acts, all of which constitute a single
offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses. 24 The
specific acts are only alleged to complete the narration of facts. 25
Parenthetically, the Court observes that the information in Criminal Case
No. SJC-79-04 alleges that petitioner committed child abuse against two
different offended parties. Inasmuch as petitioner does not object to the
information on that ground, we refrain from any discussion on the matter.
With the foregoing disquisition, and with the view that the petition is limited
to the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of the motion to quash, the
Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
 5

SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and
Leonardo-De Castro, * JJ.,concur

BERNIE G. MIAQUE,
vs.
HON. VIRGILIO M. PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, VICENTE C. ARAGONA,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 170609-13

January 30, 2009

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 assailing the orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August 25, 20052
and September 19, 20053 in Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411
captioned People of the Philippines versus Bernie Miaque, et al.
On January 31, 2000, five Informations for libel4 were filed in the RTC of
Iloilo City, Branch 26, against petitioner Bernie G. Miaque and three others.5
In an order dated February 17, 2005,6 these Informations were quashed for
lack of jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations
failed to allege either that private respondent (therein private complainant)
Vicente Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offenses or that the alleged libelous remarks were
printed or first published in Iloilo City.7
On June 22, 2005, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jerry Marañon issued a
resolution recommending the filing of Informations for libel against
petitioner and his co-accused. Accordingly, five new Informations for libel
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were filed against
petitioner and his co-accused in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33, presided
by respondent Judge Virgilio M. Patag.
The new Informations were similarly worded as those previously quashed
but with these added allegations: (1) Aragona, Regional State Prosecutor VI
of the Department of Justice, held office at the Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or
(2) the alleged libelous remarks were written, printed and published in Iloilo
City (on the pertinent dates thereof). Said Informations were likewise signed
and filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marañon.
In view of the filing of the new Informations, petitioner filed his motions
(dated August 8, 2005) not to issue warrants of arrest and, if already issued,
to recall them and remand the Informations to the Provincial Prosecutor’s
Office for preliminary investigation.8 In an order dated August 25, 2005,
respondent judge denied petitioner’s motions on the ground that petitioner
was beyond the court’s jurisdiction as he was not under the custody of the
court.9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated
September 19, 2005. Hence, this petition.
 6

Petitioner challenges the August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 orders
of respondent judge for being contrary to law and for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. He contends that the Informations were filed
without the mandatory preliminary investigation. Moreover, the new
Informations were filed by one who had no authority to do so because these
were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office and not the Iloilo City
Prosecutor’s Office. Jurisdiction over the subject matter supposedly
belonged to the latter. Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of respondent
judge to recall the warrants of arrest issued against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the
Philippines, contends that the quashed Informations were merely amended
to include the allegations that Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at
the time of the commission of the offenses or that the libelous remarks were
printed and first published in Iloilo City. A new preliminary investigation was
therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, the OSG alleges that the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner in view of the filing of his
August 8, 2005 motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was
tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is incorrect for it
violates the hierarchy of courts.10 A regard for judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the
latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.11 This rule, however, may be
relaxed when pure questions of law12 are raised as in this case.
We grant the petition. The Informations must be quashed.
One of the issues raised in the petition is the authority of the Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office to file and sign the new Informations against petitioner.
The offenses charged in each of the new Informations were alleged to have
been committed in Iloilo City but said Informations were filed by the Iloilo
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.
Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 127513 provide:
SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals’ Staffing. -- There shall
be in each province and each subprovince; one provincial fiscal and such
number of assistant provincial fiscals as may hereinafter be provided for.
There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of assistant city
fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.
xxx
SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. – The
provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:
a) xxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information
or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. xxx
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel were committed in Iloilo City.
Who then had the authority to file and sign the new informations against
petitioner and his co-accused? The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:14
[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances, in
the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in the Municipal Trial Court of the
 7

city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions
enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary
informations or complaints prepared against the persons accused. xxx15
The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged with
the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
was clearly bereft of authority to file the new Informations against
petitioner. An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.16 The court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information. We
held in People v. Hon. Garfin:17
It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
and the subject matter thereof. xxx Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The foregoing considered, the Informations corresponding to Criminal Case
Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were fatally defective. The common infirmity in
the Informations constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured.18
There was no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could
never be the basis of a valid conviction.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August 25, 2005 and September
19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 05-
61407 to 05-61411 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of
new Informations by an authorized officer. The warrants of arrest issued are
likewise QUASHED.
SO ORDERED.
 8

ROSARIO T. DE VERA vs GEREN A. DE VERA

G.R. No. 172832
April 7, 2009
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse the February 28, 2006 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its May 24, 2006 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
91916.
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Petitioner Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren)

and Josephine F. Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. They were thus indicted in
an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 2003, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Geren A. De Vera being previously united in lawful
marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, and without said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y
Francisco, who likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. De
Vera’s previous marriage with Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting,
said second marriage having all the essential requisites for its validity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty." However, in a Motion4 dated
April 8, 2005, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the
meantime in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The motion was opposed5 by petitioner on the ground that not all
the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were
present. She added that "voluntary surrender" was raised only as an
afterthought, as Geren had earlier invoked a "voluntary plea of guilty"
 9

without raising the former. Finally, she posited that since the case was
ready for promulgation, Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained.
In an Order6 dated June 6, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted
Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. Thus, on even
date, the RTC promulgated Geren’s Sentence,7 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Geren A. de Vera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as charged in the Information and
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances (Plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender), and no aggravating circumstance and applying the provision of
Article 349 in relation to paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR, as
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS ofPRISION CORRECCIONAL,
as maximum.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied, petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration8 of the decision
but the same was denied in an Order9dated August 25, 2005.
In the meantime, on June 8, 2005, Geren applied for probation10 which was
favorably acted upon by the RTC by referring it to the Probation Officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila.11
For failure to obtain favorable action from the RTC, petitioner instituted a
special civil action for certiorari before the CA. However, she failed to
persuade the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC
Order and Sentence, and the assailed resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration. In sustaining the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the CA maintained that all its
requisites were present.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN:
A. IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
CAGAS REGARDING THE REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER TO
BE APPRECIATED IN THE INSTANT CASE.
B. IT INCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE ORDER AND SENTENCE BOTH
DATED JUNE 6, 2005 AND THE ORDER DATED AUGUST 25, 2005
RENDERED BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN APPRECIATING THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLEA OF GUILTY AND VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 130139, AN ACT THAT WARRANTS THIS HONORABLE COURT
TO EXERCISE ITS APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISCRETION.12
The petition lacks merit.
While we are called upon to resolve the sole issue of whether the CA
correctly denied the issuance of the writ of certiorari, we cannot ignore the
procedural issues which the trial and appellate courts failed to appreciate.
In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for
certiorari before the CA, petitioner sought the modification of the court’s
judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken
 10

application of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender." The

eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren.
Is this action of petitioner procedurally tenable?
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A judgment of conviction may, upon
motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or
before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or
has applied for probation.
Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be
corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for
reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.13
Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren
of bigamy, it was petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the
reconsideration14 of the RTC decision. This was timely opposed by Geren,
invoking his right against double jeopardy.15 Although the trial court
correctly denied the motion for lack of merit, we would like to add that the
same should have been likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of the Rules.
As explained in People v. Viernes,16 the rule on the modification of
judgments of conviction had undergone significant changes before and after
the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules. Prior to the 1964 Rules of
Court, we held in various cases17 that the prosecution (or private
complainant) cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a
promulgated judgment, for to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The 1964 amendment, however, allowed the prosecutor to move
for the modification or the setting aside of the judgment before it became
final or an appeal was perfected. In 1985, the Rules was amended to include
the phrase "upon motion of the accused," effectively resurrecting our earlier
ruling prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment
of conviction. Significantly, the present Rules retained the phrase "upon
motion of the accused." Obviously, the requisite consent of the accused is
intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more
serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have
overlooked.18
Equally important is this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Court of
Appeals19 on the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari assailing a
judgment of conviction. In that case, the trial court convicted the accused of
homicide. The accused thereafter appealed his conviction to the CA which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil
indemnity. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
prosecution, then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The OSG prayed that the appellate
court’s judgment be modified by convicting the accused of homicide without
appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. In effect, the OSG
wanted a higher penalty to be imposed. The Court declared that the petition
constituted a violation of the accused’s right against double jeopardy;
hence, dismissible. Certainly, we are not inclined to rule differently.
 11

Indeed, a petition for certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds.

In People v. Veneracion,20 we entertained the petition for certiorari initiated
by the prosecution to resolve the issue of whether the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in imposing a lower penalty. In that case, the trial judge, fully
aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refused to impose the
penalty of death because of his strong personal aversion to the death
penalty law, and imposed instead reclusion perpetua. In resolving the case
in favor of the prosecution, the Court concluded that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the
imposition of the proper penalty. By so doing, we allowed a modification of
the judgment not on motion of the accused but through a petition initiated
by the prosecution. But it was an exceptional case. Here and now, we
reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in apparently void judgments
where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The aggrieved parties, in such cases, must
clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.22 Obviously, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a
court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Consequently, the trial court’s action
cannot come within the ambit of the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court’s action becomes an improper object
of, and therefore non-reviewable by, certiorari.23
Even if we dwell on the merit of the case, which had already been done by
the appellate court, we find no cogent reason to grant the instant petition.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should
be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the
surrender was voluntary.24 The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred
for his search and capture.25 Without these elements, and where the clear
reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the
need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating
circumstance.26
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas27 and in People v.
Taraya,28 the Court added a fourth requisite before "voluntary surrender"
may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is no pending
warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of arrest had been
issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the "surrender" could
not be considered "voluntary."
In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion
of the cemetery where a police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he
 12

voluntarily gave himself up. The Court held that if the accused did then and
there surrender, it was because he was left with no choice. Thus, the
"surrender" was not spontaneous.
In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking
for him (because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the
police station where he confessed that he killed the victim. Notwithstanding
such surrender and confession to the police, the Court refused to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr.,29 the accused surrendered to the authorities
after more than one year from the incident in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to mitigate the
accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment of the
commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the
trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a pending
warrant for his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is
not applicable because the accused therein did not surrender but was
caught by the police. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest had, in fact, been
issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for implementation. In
Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused
went to the police station, not for purposes of acknowledging his culpability,
nor to save the government the expense and trouble of looking for and
catching him, but actually to deny his culpability.
In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on
February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding
probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren
surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the
accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the
warrant of arrest.30
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the
surrender. As distinguished from the earlier cases, upon learning that the
court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even
before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren
already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered
by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court
was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary
surrender."
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the
issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender
"involuntary." In People v. Oco,31 the Court appreciated the mitigating
circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his
arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the
accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the
pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual
facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals February 28, 2006 Decision and its May 24, 2006 Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91916 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13
 14

SESINANDO POLINTAN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161827
April 21, 2009

x---------- ----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition[1] for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the 21 October 2003 and 21 January 2004
Resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26859. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal of Sesinando Polintan (Polintan) for failure to
file appellant’s brief within the time prescribed.

The Facts

Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph S. Lee filed two informations[3] dated

29 June 1993 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 224, Quezon City, charging Polintan with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. The two cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
Q-93-46199 and Q-93-46200. During his arraignment on 28 August 1993,
Polintan pleaded not guilty to both charges.

On 14 September 1993, the RTC provisionally dismissed the two cases

because Polintan agreed to settle the civil aspect of the cases. On 30
August 1994, the RTC granted the motion to revive the two cases.

On 9 November 1994, the RTC set the presentation of evidence. The

prosecution presented several pieces of evidence: (1) testimonies of Dolores
Cajucom and Luisito Rivera; (2) photographs of Polintan; (3) cash vouchers
of David Motors and Marketing Corporation; (4) signatures of Polintan; (5)
chattel mortgages; (6) promissory notes; (7) City Trust Banking Corporation
Check Nos. 441615 and 618149; (8) drawn against insufficient funds
notations; (9) demand letters; (10) memorandum of preliminary
investigation, and (11) complaint-affidavit.

Polintan failed to appear during the presentation of evidence. The

records showed that a notice of hearing was mailed to Polintan on 8 March
1995 and that the notice was not returned to the RTC. Thus, the RTC
considered the two cases submitted for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

In a Decision[4] dated 17 January 1996, the RTC found Polintan guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. The RTC held that:
 15

[T]he case of the prosecution is air tight and conclusive to convict

the accused. The inability and/or failure of the accused to appear
and testify in these two (2) cases must be probably due to his
belief and conviction that he could not rebut the incontrovertible
testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution. The
accused must have realized the futility of disproving prosecution
evidence.

The prosecution has proved and established the guilt of

the accused Sesinando Polintan beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has established that the accused issued and has
drawn the two (2) subject checks of City Trust Banking Corp.
against insufficient funds (DAIF) which were dishonored when
presented for payment and encashment at the bank as evidenced
by the notation — DAIF — on the dorsal side of the said two (2)
checks. The accused could not therefore escape from his
culpability and liability to the private complainant for the issuance
of the two (2) dishonored checks.[5]

Polintan filed an omnibus motion[6] for new trial and reconsideration of

the 17 January 1996 Decision. In an Order[7] dated 24 May 2002, the RTC
denied the omnibus motion. On 3 July 2002, Polintan filed a notice[8] of
appeal. In an Order[9] dated 14 August 2002, the RTC denied the notice of
appeal for being filed out of time. Polintan filed a motion[10] for
reconsideration of the 14 August 2002 Order. In an Order[11] dated 18
November 2002, the RTC, “[i]n the higher interest of justice,” granted the
motion for reconsideration.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Resolution[12] dated 8 August 2003, the Court of Appeals granted

Polintan’s three motions for extension of time to file his appellant’s brief and
directed Polintan to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. In
a Resolution dated 21 October 2003, the Court of Appeals considered the
appeal abandoned and dismissed it. In a very urgent ex-parte
motion[13] dated 27 October 2003, Polintan prayed, “in the broader interest
of justice and fair play,” that his brief be admitted. Polintan filed a
motion[14] for reconsideration of the 21 October 2003 Resolution. In a
Resolution dated 21 January 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion. The Court of Appeals held that:

In his Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s

Brief, accused-appellant’s counsel stated that he instructed Mr.
Perez to file said brief on June 11, 2003 before he left for
Camarines Sur. However, when he reported to the law firm on
October 22, 2003, he learned that Mr. Perez failed to file it.

Granting that Mr. Perez overlooked such responsibility,

and, if indeed said appellant’s brief was ready and about to be
filed on June 11, 2003, this Court is in a quandary why the
 16

appellant’s brief was only filed on October 29, 2003, a week after
appellant’s counsel allegedly reported back to the law firm, when
said law firm is just a few meters away from this Court.

xxxx

Records show that the accused-appellant was granted by

this Court a total of seventy-five (75) days extension, from March
30, 2003 or until June 13, 2003. Yet, he failed to do so, which
failure can only be construed as lack of interest to pursue his
appeal.[15]

Hence, the instant petition. Polintan claims that the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 8 of Rule 124, should not be followed.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is unmeritorious.

Paragraph 1, Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court states that:

The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee

or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either
case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8 is clear — the Court of Appeals may, motu proprio and with
notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed, except where the appellant is represented
by a counsel de oficio.

In the present case, (1) the Court of Appeals, motu proprio, dismissed
the appeal; (2) the Court of Appeals furnished Polintan with notice to show
cause why his appeal should not be dismissed; (3) Polintan failed to file his
brief within the time prescribed; and (4) Polintan was not represented by a
counsel de oficio.

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and must be exercised in
accordance with the law. InSpouses Ortiz v. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court
held that:

[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due

process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules, Failing [sic] to do so, the right to
appeal is lost. Rules of Procedure are required to be followed.
 17

The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.

[17]
The Court cannot tolerate Polintan’s habitual failure to follow the Rules
of Court and his flimsy excuses. First, Polintan failed to appear before the
RTC during the presentation of evidence. He alleged that he was not duly
notified of the hearing because he had moved from the address on
record. However, when members of the Criminal Intelligence Division of
Camp Crame apprehended him, he gave the same address. Second,
Polintan failed to file his notice of appeal within the time prescribed. He
alleged that his counsel was in Naga City. Third, Polintan failed to file his
appellant’s brief within the time prescribed. He alleged that his counsel was
in Camarines Sur.

Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the

orderly and speedy disposition of justice.[18] The Rules must be followed,
otherwise, they will become meaningless and useless.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The

Court AFFIRMS the 21 October 2003 and 21 January 2004 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26859.

SO ORDERED.
 18

SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY, JOLIE ROSS TAN, ROMER TAN,
CHARLIE TAN, and JESSIE JAMES TAN vs SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN
SY,
G.R. No. 174168
March 30, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY vs SY TIONG SHIOU and JUANITA

TAN,
G.R. No. 179438

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

These consolidated petitions involving the same parties. although

related, dwell on different issues.

G.R. No. 174168.

This is a petition for review1[1] assailing the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91416.2[2]

On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed by Sy Chim and

Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy) against Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy,
Jolie Ross Tan, Romer Tan, Charlie Tan and Jessie James Tan (Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. The cases were
later consolidated. Two of the complaints, I.S. Nos. 03E-15285 and 03E-
15286,3[3] were for alleged violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144

1
[1]Rollo (G.R. No. 174168), pp. 10-33.
2
[2]Id. at 37-60; penned by Associate Justice Renato S. Dacudao with the concurrence of Associate Justice Remedios Salazar
Fernando and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
3
[3]Id. at 85-94.
 19

of the Corporation Code. In these complaints, the Spouses Sy averred that

they are stockholders and directors of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the
corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et al., officers of the corporation, to
allow them to inspect the books and records of the business on three
occasions to no avail. In a letter4[4] dated 21 May 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. denied the request, citing civil and intra-corporate cases pending in
court.5[5]

In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and 03E-15288,6[6] Sy

Tiong Shiou was charged with falsification under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and perjury under Article 183
of the RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy Tiong Shiou executed under
oath the 2003 General Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated
that the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had decreased despite the fact
that they had not executed any conveyance of their shares.7[7]

Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor that the issues
involved in the civil case for accounting and damages pending before the
RTC of Manila were intimately related to the two criminal complaints filed by
the Spouses Sy against them, and thus constituted a prejudicial question
that should require the suspension of the criminal complaints. They also
argued that the Spouses Sy’s request for inspection was premature as the
latter’s concern may be properly addressed once an answer is filed in the
civil case. Sy Tiong Shiou, on the other hand, denied the accusations
against him, alleging that before the 2003 GIS was submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the same was shown to
respondents, who at that time were the President/Chairman of the Board
and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that they did not object to
the entries in the GIS. Sy Tiong Shiou also argued that the issues raised in
the pending civil case for accounting presented a prejudicial question that
necessitated the suspension of criminal proceedings.

On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution

recommending the suspension of the criminal complaints for violation of the
Corporation Code and the dismissal of the criminal complaints for
falsification and perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou.8[8] The reviewing prosecutor
approved the resolution. The Spouses Sy moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution, but their motion was denied on 14 June 2004.9[9] The
Spouses Sy thereupon filed a petition for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), which the latter denied in a resolution issued on 02
4
[4]Id. at 83.
5
[5]Civil Case No. 03-106456-00 is for Accounting and Damages pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
46. Incidentally, the other petition, G. R. No. 179438 is an offshoot of this civil case.
6
[6]Id. at 95-104.
7
[7]The 2003 GIS, compared to the 2002 GIS showed a decrease from 33.75 % to only 17.40 % ownership of the outstanding
capital stock of the corporation for Sy Chim and a decrease from 16.88% to 8.70% ownership of the outstanding capital stock for
Felicidad Chan Sy.
8
[8]Id. at 111-118; penned by Assistant City prosecutor Bernardino L. Cabiles.
9
[9]Id. at 137-143.
 20

September 2004.10[10] Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was

likewise denied in the resolution of 20 July 2005.11[11]

The Spouses Sy elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the Court of Appeals

through a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DOJ. The appellate court granted the petition12[12] and directed
the City Prosecutor’s Office to file the appropriate informations against Sy
Tiong Shiou, et al. for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144 of
the Corporation Code and of Articles 172 and 183 of the RPC. The appellate
court ruled that the civil case for accounting and damages cannot be
deemed prejudicial to the maintenance or prosecution of a criminal action
for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code
since a finding in the civil case that respondents mishandled or
misappropriated the funds would not be determinative of their guilt or
innocence in the criminal complaint. In the same manner, the criminal
complaints for falsification and/or perjury should not have been dismissed
on the ground of prejudicial question because the accounting case is
unrelated and not necessarily determinative of the success or failure of the
falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held
that there was probable cause that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed
falsification and that the City of Manila where the 2003 GIS was executed is
the proper venue for the institution of the perjury charges. Sy Tiong Shiou,
et al. sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but their
motion was denied.13[13]

On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No.

179438 with G.R. No. 174168.14[14]

Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in affirming,

modifying or reversing the recommendations of the public prosecutor
cannot be the subject of certiorari or review of the Court of Appeals because
the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body within the purview of Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely on the separate opinion of former
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15[15]
wherein he wrote that this Court should not be called upon to determine the
existence of probable cause, as there is no provision of law authorizing an
aggrieved party to petition for such a determination.16[16] In any event, they
argue, assuming without admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be
subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
DOJ has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila. They claim that the Spouses Sy’s
10
[10]Id. at 183-185.
11
[11]Id. at 207-209.
12
[12]Id. at 37-66; Decision dated 31 May 2006.
13
[13]Id. at 71-72; Resolution dated 8 August 2006.
14
[14]Id. at 528-529.
15
[15]324 Phil. 568, 619-620 (1996).
16
[16]Rollo, (G.R. No. 174168), pp. 22-23.
 21

request for inspection was not made in good faith and that their motives
were tainted with the intention to harass and to intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou,
et al. from pursuing the criminal and civil cases pending before the
prosecutor’s office and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46.
Thus, to accede to the Spouses Sy’s request would pose serious threats to
the existence of the corporation.17[17] Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. aver that the
RTC had already denied the motion for production and inspection and
instead ordered petitioners to make the corporate records available to the
appointed independent auditor. Hence, the DOJ did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the recommendation of the City Prosecutor
of Manila.18[18] They further argue that adherence to the Court of Appeals’
ruling that the accounting case is unrelated to, and not necessarily
determinative of the success of, the criminal complaint for falsification
and/or perjury would unnecessarily indict petitioner Sy Tiong Shiou for the
said offenses he may not have committed but only because of an outcome
unfavorable to him in the civil action.19[19]

Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and

that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the
presence of probable cause.20[20] Moreover, it is settled that the preliminary
investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is
the function of the prosecution.21[21] This Court has adopted a policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of information against the supposed offender.22[22]

As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions. Hence, the

principle of non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of
discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.23[23]

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ gravely abused its
discretion when it suspended the hearing of the charges for violation of the
17
[17]Id. at 27.
18
[18]Id. at 28
19
[19]Id. at 29.
20
[20]Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 350, 360-361.
21
[21]Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 499 (2002).
22
[22]Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 139912, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 386, 406.
23
[23]Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129 (2002)
 22

Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it

dismissed the criminal complaints.

A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a

civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed since howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The reason behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.24[24]

The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve any prejudicial
question.

The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case No. 03-106456
pending before the RTC Manila, Branch 46, seeks the issuance of an order
compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true accounting of
all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid to, received and earned by the
corporation since 1993 and to restitute it such amounts, proceeds and
funds which the Spouses Sy have misappropriated. The criminal cases, on
the other hand, charge that the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from
getting inside company premises and from inspecting company records, and
that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically the Spouses
Sy’s shares in the corporation. Surely, the civil case presents no
prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a finding that the Spouses Sy
mishandled the funds will have no effect on the determination of guilt in
the complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the
Corporation Code; the civil case concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shiou’s
refusal to allow inspection of the records, while in the falsification and
perjury cases, what is material is the veracity of the entries made by Sy
Tiong Shiou in the sworn GIS.

Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds that there is
enough probable cause to warrant the institution of the criminal cases.

The term probable cause does not mean ‘actual and positive cause’
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It
is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of

24
[24]Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460, 470 (1995).
 23

constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.25[25]

In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may be arrived at,
or in order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present. This is
based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without
which there should be–at the most–no criminal offense.26[26]

Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:

xxx

The records of all business transactions of the corporation

and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to inspection by
any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at
reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in
writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
expense.

Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to

allow any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its records or
minutes, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be
liable to such director, trustee, stockholder or member for
damages, and in addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall
be punishable under Section 144 of this Code: Provided, That if
such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the
Board of Directors or Trustees, the liability under this section for
such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who
voted for such refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a
defense to any action under this section that the person
demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's
records and minutes has improperly used any information
secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes
of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting
in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand.

Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:

Sec. 144. Violations of the Code.—Violations of any of the

provisions of this Code or its amendments not otherwise
25
[25]Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 360.
26
[26]G.R. No. 178511, 4 December 2008, citing Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130191, April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721.
 24

specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not

less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more than ten
thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a
corporation, the same may, after notice and hearing, be dissolved
in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude
the institution of appropriate action against the director, trustee
or officer of the corporation responsible for said violation:
Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed
to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a corporation
provided in this Code.

In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, et al.,27[27] the Court had
the occasion to enumerate the requisites before the penal provision under
Section 144 of the Corporation Code may be applied in a case of violation
of a stockholder or member’s right to inspect the corporate books/records
as provided for under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. The elements of
the offense, as laid down in the case, are:

First. A director, trustee, stockholder or member has made a

prior demand in writing for a copy of excerpts from the
corporation’s records or minutes;

Second. Any officer or agent of the concerned corporation

shall refuse to allow the said director, trustee, stockholder or
member of the corporation to examine and copy said excerpts;

Third. If such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or

order of the board of directors or trustees, the liability under this
section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or
trustees who voted for such refusal; and,

Fourth. Where the officer or agent of the corporation sets up

the defense that the person demanding to examine and copy
excerpts from the corporation’s records and minutes has
improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of
any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a
legitimate purpose in making his demand, the contrary must be
shown or proved.28[28]

Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of the

Corporation Code, the defense of improper use or motive is in the nature of
a justifying circumstance that would exonerate those who raise and are able
27
[27]Id.
28
[28]Id.
 25

to prove the same. Accordingly, where the corporation denies inspection on

the ground of improper motive or purpose, the burden of proof is taken from
the shareholder and placed on the corporation.29[29] However, where no such
improper motive or purpose is alleged, and even though so alleged, it is not
proved by the corporation, then there is no valid reason to deny the
requested inspection.

In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the denial of
inspection was predicated on the pending civil case against the Spouses Sy.
This is evident from the 21 May 2003 letter of Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.’s
counsel30[30] to the Spouses Sy,31[31] which reads:

Gentlemen:

We write in behalf of our clients, SY SIY HO, INC. ( Guan Yiac

Hardware); SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE ROSS TAN;
CHARLIE TAN; ROMER TAN; and JESSE JAMES TAN, relative to
your letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be informed that a case for
Accounting and Damages had already been filed against your
clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 46, denominated as Civil Case No. 03-
106456.

We fully understand your desire for our clients to respond to

your demands, however, under the prevailing circumstance this
would not be advisable. The concerns that you raised in your
letter can later on be addressed after your clients shall have filed
their responsive pleading in the abovesaid case.

We trust that this response will at the moment be enough.32

[32]

Even in their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 23 September 2003,33[33] Sy

Tiong Shiou, et al. did not make any allegation that “the person demanding
to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation’s records and minutes
has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination
of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or
was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his
demand.” Instead, they merely reiterated the pendency of the civil case.
There being no allegation of improper motive, and it being undisputed that
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy’s request for
inspection, the Court rules and so holds that the DOJ erred in dismissing the
criminal charge for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the
29[29]Id. citing 5A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §. 2220, 2008.
30
[30]Atty. Elvin P. Grana of A. Tan, Zoleta and Associates Law Firm.
31
[31]The law firm of Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako.
32
[32]Rollo, (G.R. No. 174168), p. 83.
33
[33]Id. at 106-108.
 26

Corporation Code.

Now on the existence of probable cause for the falsification and/or

perjury charges.

The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense of falsification

of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4; and/or perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The elements of falsification of
public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;34[34] (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent to injure a third person.35[35] On the other hand, the
elements of perjury are: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath
or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or
affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.

A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be filed within thirty

(30) days following the date of the annual or a special meeting, and must be
certified and sworn to by the corporate secretary, or by the president, or
any duly authorized officer of the corporation.36[36] From the records, the
2003 GIS submitted to the SEC on 8 April 2003 was executed under oath
by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila, in his capacity as Vice President and General
Manager.37[37] By executing the document under oath, he, in effect,
attested to the veracity38[38] of its contents. The Spouses Sy claim that the
entries in the GIS pertaining to them do not reflect the true number of
shares that they own in the company. They attached to their complaint the
2002 GIS of the company, also executed by Sy Tiong Shiou, and compared
the entries therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS. The Spouses Sy
noted the marked decrease in their shareholdings, averring that at no time
after the execution of the 2002 GIS, up to the time of the filing of their
criminal complaints did they execute or authorize the execution of any
document or deed transferring, conveying or disposing their shares or any
portion thereof; and thus there is absolutely no basis for the figures
reflected in the 2003 GIS.39[39] The Spouses Sy claim that the false
34
[34]“Legal obligation “means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated, REYES, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO 210, (15th Ed., Rev. 2001).
35
[35]Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 464 Phil. 102, 115 (2004).

.
36
[36]Rollo, p. 317; As stated in the instructions on the GIS Form.
37
[37]Id. at 321.
38
[38]Id.; “that the matters set forth in this General Information Sheet x x x are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,”
last page of the GIS Standard Form.
39
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statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the wrongful intent of

injuring them. All the elements of both offenses are sufficiently averred in
the complaint-affidavits.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ holding, citing the case of
Fabia v. Court of Appeals, that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction no longer
precludes the simultaneous filing of the criminal case with the
corporate/civil case.40[40] Moreover, the Court finds that the City of Manila
is the proper venue for the perjury charges, the GIS having been subscribed
and sworn to in the said place. Under Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.41[41] In Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice,42[42] the Court held that the felony is consummated when the false
statement is made.43[43] Thus in this case, it was alleged that the perjury
was committed when Sy Tiong Shiou subscribed and sworn to the GIS in the
City of Manila, thus, following Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the City of Manila is the proper venue for the offense.

G. R. No. 179438.

This petition assails the decision44[44] and resolution45[45] of the Court of

Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81897.

On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho &

Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family corporation doing business under the
name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter46[46] to the
corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) stating that the control,
supervision and administration of all corporate funds were exercised by Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy), corporate president and
assistant treasurer, respectively. In the same letter, Juanita Tan disclosed
that Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the
corporation’s banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the
total bank remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the
corporate financial statements, accounting books and records. Finally,
Juanita Tan sought to be free from any responsibility

[39]Supra note 6.
40
[40]Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 397 (2002).
41
42
43
44
45
46
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over all corporate funds. The Board granted Juanita Tan’s request and
authorized the employment of an external auditor to render a complete
audit of all the corporate accounting books and records. 47[47] Consequently,
the Board hired the accounting firm Banaria, Banaria & Company. In its
Report48[48] dated 5 April 2003, the accounting firm attributed to the Spouses
Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994
to 2002.49[49]

A demand letter50[50] was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy on

15 April 2003. On the same date, the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly
stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other important
documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred
residence and ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the
corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses Sy
before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.51[51] A search warrant was
subsequently issued by the Regional Trial Court.52[52]

On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice President and General

Manager, called a special meeting to be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the
positions vacated by the Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou was subsequently
elected as the new president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice
President.53[53] Despite these developments, Sy Chim still caused the
issuance of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June 2003 in his
capacity as the alleged corporate president.54[54]

Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed

its Amended Complaint for Accounting and Damages55[55] against the
Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true
accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company
since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount.56[56] The complaint
also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary
injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the
ground of lack of authority.

By way of Answer,57[57] the Spouses Sy averred that Sy Chim was a

mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan Sy merely performed clerical
functions, as it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan, who have
been authorized by the corporation’s by-laws to supervise, control and
administer corporate funds, and as such were the ones responsible for the
unaccounted funds. They assailed the meetings called by Sy Tiong Shiou on

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
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the grounds that the same were held without notice to them and without
their participation, in violation of the by-laws. The Spouses Sy also pursued
their counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

On 9 September 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to

File Third-Party Complaint,58[58] praying that their attached Third Party
Complaint59[59] be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his
spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for
misappropriating corporate funds.

On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file
the third-party complaint, and forthwith directed the issuance of summons
against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.60[60] On 16 January 2004, their
counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not
furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order,
which resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their
answer to the third-party complaint; thus, they opted not to file a motion
for reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision dated 26 May 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.61[61] The appellate court
declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(Interim Rules), it not being included in the exclusive enumeration of
allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2 thereof. Moreover, even if such a
pleading were allowed, the admission of the third-party complaint against
Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan still would have no basis from the facts or
the law and jurisprudence.62[62] The Court of Appeals also ruled that the
respondent judge committed a manifest error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and in summarily
declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their
answer within the purported reglementary period. The Court of Appeals set
aside the trial court’s 8 October 2003 Order admitting the third-party
complaint, as well as the 19 December 2003 Order, declaring Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer. The trial
court was further ordered to dismiss the third-party complaint without
prejudice to any action that the corporation may separately file against Sy
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.63[63]

The Spouses Sy filed a motion for reconsideration, but their motion

was denied on 29 August 2007.64[64]

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59
60
61
62
63
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Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court that a third-
party complaint is not excluded or prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that their third- party complaint is not
actionable because their action is not in respect of the corporation’s claims.
They add that the disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in
multiplicity of suits.

The third-party complaint should be allowed.

The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-

Corporate Controversies read:
Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.—The following pleadings are
prohibited:
(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or

order, or for re-opening of trial;

(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or

any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling
reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and

(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar

intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons.
Such motion must be verified and under oath.

Rule 2, Sec.2. Pleadings allowed.—The only pleadings allowed to

be filed under these Rules are the complaint, answer, compulsory
counterclaims or cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the
answer to the counterclaims or cross-claims.65[65]

There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is not included in

the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones.
Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched
rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.66[66] Statutes, including rules,
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as
will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading
idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the
whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import
of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation
upon some and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that
65
66
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the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that
the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and
operative to the widest possible extent.67[67] Otherwise stated, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.68
[68]

This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim
Rules, which reads:

Sec. 3. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally

construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding.69[69]

Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,

with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the
third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. In
fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party
complaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the
original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant.
Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party
complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising
from one particular set of facts.70[70]

It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed

by the Interim Rules, and the allowance of the filing of third-party
complaints is premised on one objective—the expeditious disposition of
cases. Moreover, following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the
Interim Rules, and taking into consideration the suppletory application of
the Rules of Court under

67
68
69
70
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Rule 1, Sec. 271[71] of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party
complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in controversies governed by
the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered
beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
are not complete strangers to the litigation as in fact they are the moving
spirit behind the filing of the principal complaint for accounting and
damages against the Spouses Sy.

The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy
should be admitted.

A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive

basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of
indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing
of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to
the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the
original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s liability arises out
of another transaction. The defendant may implead another as third-party
defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground
of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the
liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant.72[72]

In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the

allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be
examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie
show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or other relief from the third-party defendant.73[73]

The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers of the

corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its corporate funds, hence they
are duty bound to render a full, complete and true accounting of all the
amounts, proceeds and funds paid to, received and earned by the
corporation since 1993 and to restitute to the corporation all such
amounts, proceeds, and funds which they took and misappropriated for
their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff and
its stockholders.74[74] On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the
Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and
complete control of the day-to day operations and complete control and
custody of the funds of the corporation, and hence they are the ones
liable for any shortfall or unaccounted

71
72
73
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difference of the corporation’s cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and

Juanita Tan should render a full, complete and true accounting of all the
amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and earned by the corporation
since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the
complaint for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the Spouses Sy
moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be declared as directly and
solely liable in respect of the corporation’s claim for accounting and
damages, and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are adjudged
liable to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay
all amounts necessary to discharge their liability to the corporation by way
of indemnity or reimbursement.

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on

the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very
same claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is
clear therefore that the Spouses Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of
the plaintiff corporation’s claims,75[75] and thus the allowance of the third-
party complaint is warranted.

WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:

G.R. No. 174168

The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91416 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 179438

The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of

Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81897 are SET ASIDE and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19 December 2003 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

SEVERINO B. VERGARA, vs THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J.

LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO,
G.R. No. 174567
March 12, 2009

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EN BANC

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for certiorari and mandamus76[1] assails the 17 March

2004 Resolution77[2] and 22 August 2005 Order78[3] of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) in OMB-L-C-02-1205-L. The
Ombudsman dismissed the case filed by Severino B. Vergara (petitioner)
and Edgardo H. Catindig against Severino J. Lajara as Calamba City Mayor
(Mayor Lajara), Virginia G. Baroro (Baroro) as City Treasurer, Razul Requesto
as President of Pamana, Inc. (Pamana), and Lauro Jocson as Vice President
and Trust Officer of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company (Prudential
Bank) for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019).79[4]

The Facts

On 25 June 2001, the City Council of Calamba (City Council), where

petitioner was a member, issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001. The
resolution authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the
vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site.80[5]
During the public hearing on 3 October 2001, the choice for the new city
hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay
Saimsin, Calamba.81[6]

On 29 October 2001, the City Council passed Resolution No. 280,

Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by
Pamana with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of
P129,017,600.82[7] Mayor Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and
deliver the required documents.83[8]

On 13 November 2001, the City Government of Calamba (Calamba

City), through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following agreements:

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77
78
79
80
81
82
83
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1. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

The MOA with Pamana and Prudential Bank discussed the terms and
conditions of the sale of 15 lots with a total area of 55,190 square
meters. The total purchase price of P129,017,600 would be payable
in installment as follows: P10,000,000 on or before 15 November
2001, P19,017,600 on or before 31 January 2002, and the balance of
P100,000,000 in four equal installments payable on or before 31 April
2002, 31 July 2002, 31 October 2002, and 31 January 2003.84[9]
2. Deed of Sale
Under the Deed of Sale, Calamba City purchased from Pamana and
Prudential Bank 15 lots with a total area of 55,190 square meters,
more or less, located in Brgy. Lecheria/Real, Calamba, Laguna with
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Numbers 159893, 159894,
159895, 159896, 159897, 158598, 162412, 162413, 204488,
66140, 61703, 66141, 66142, 66143, and 61705.
3. Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
Calamba City mortgaged to Pamana and Prudential Bank the same
properties subject of the Deed of Sale as security for the balance of
the purchase price.
4. Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
Calamba City’s IRAs from January 2002 to 31 January 2003 were
assigned to Pamana and Prudential Bank in the amount of
P119,017,600.
On 19 November 2001, the above documents were endorsed to the
City Council. Petitioner alleged that all these documents were not ratified by
the City Council, a fact duly noted in an Audit Observation Memorandum
dated 9 August 2002 and issued by State Auditor Ruben C. Pagaspas of the
Commission on Audit.

Petitioner stated that he called the attention of the City Council on the
following observations:

a) TCT Nos. 66141, 66142, 66143, 61705 and 66140 were registered
under the name of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company
(PSEDC) and neither Pamana nor Prudential Bank owned these
properties. Petitioner pointed out that although PSEDC had executed
a Deed of Assignment85[10] in favor of Pamana to maintain the road
lots within the PSEDC properties, PSEDC did not convey, sell or
transfer these properties to Pamana. Moreover, petitioner claimed
that the signature of Fr. Efren O. Rivera (Fr. Rivera) in Annex A of
the Deed of Assignment appeared to be a forgery. Fr. Rivera had
also submitted an Affidavit refuting his purported signature in Annex
A.86[11]
b) Petitioner claimed that there was no relocation survey prior to the
execution of the Deed of Sale. 87[12]
c) Petitioner alleged that with respect to the two lots covered by TCT
No. 61703 with an area of 5,976 square meters and TCT No. 66140

84
85
86
87
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with an area of 3,747 square meters, Fr. Boyd R. Sulpico (Fr. Sulpico)
of the Dominican Province of the Philippines had earlier offered the
same for only P300 per square meter.88[13]

d) Petitioner contended that TCT Nos. 66141, 66142, 66143 and 61705
are road lots. The dorsal sides of the TCTs bear the common
annotation that the road lots cannot be closed or disposed without
the prior approval of the National Housing Authority and the
conformity of the duly organized homeowners’ association.89[14]
e) Petitioner claimed that an existing barangay road and an access
road to Bacnotan Steel Corporation and Danlex Corporation were
included in the Deed of Sale90[15]

Petitioner maintained that since the pieces of evidence in support of

the complaint were documentary, respondents have admitted them
impliedly.91[16]

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

On 17 March 2004, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution (Resolution)

finding no probable cause to hold any of the respondents liable for violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.92[17]

The Ombudsman found that the subject properties have been

transferred and are now registered in the name of Calamba City under new
Certificates of Title.93[18] Moreover, the reasonableness of the purchase
price for the subject lots could be deduced from the fact that Calamba City
bought them at P3,800 per square meter, an amount lower than their zonal
valuation at P6,000 per square meter. The Ombudsman added that it was
common knowledge that the fair market value of the lots was higher than
their zonal valuation, yet the lots were acquired at a lower price. The
Ombudsman also found that the terms and conditions of payment were
neither onerous nor burdensome to the city government as it was able to
immediately take possession of the lots even if it had paid only less than ten
percent of the contract price and was even relieved from paying interests
on the installment payments. The Ombudsman ruled that there was no
compelling evidence showing actual injury or damage to the city
government to warrant the indictment of respondents for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019.94[19]

On 27 September 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner questioned the lack of ratification by the City Council of the
contracts, the overpricing of lots covered by TCT Nos. 61703 and 66140 in

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89
90
91
92
93
94
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the amount of P19,812,546, the inclusion of road lots and creek lots with a
total value of P35,000,000, and the lack of a relocation survey.95[20]

In an Order dated 22 August 2005 (Order), the Ombudsman denied the

Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.96[21] The Ombudsman held
that the various actions performed by Mayor Lajara in connection with the
purchase of the lots were all authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as
manifested in the numerous resolutions. With such authority, it could not be
said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the lands in question.
The lack of ratification alone did not characterize the purchase of the
properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential
Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City.97[22]

On the alleged overpricing of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61703 and
66140, the Ombudsman ruled that it could be discerned from Fr. Sulpico’s
affidavit that the said parcels of land were excluded from the offer, being
creek easement lots.98[23]

On the lots covered by TCT Nos. 66141, 66142, and 66143, the
Ombudsman resolved that new titles were issued in the name of Pamana
with PSEDC as the former registered owner.99[24]

The Ombudsman finally declared that the absence of a relocation

survey did not affect the validity of the subject transactions.100[25]

Petitioner contended that the assailed Ombudsman’s Resolution and

Order discussed only the alleged reasonableness of the price of the
property. The Ombudsman did not consider the issue that Calamba City
paid for lots that were either easement/creeks, road lots or access roads.
Petitioner alleged that it is erroneous to conclude that the price was
reasonable because Calamba City should not have paid for the creeks, road
lots and access roads at the same price per square meter. Petitioner
claimed that the additional evidence of overpricing was a letter from Fr.
Sulpico who offered the road lots covered by TCT Nos. 61703 and 66140 at
P300101[26] per square meter.102[27]

In their Comment, Mayor Lajara and Baroro (respondents) argued that

as frequently ruled by this Court, it is not sound practice to depart from the
policy of non-interference in the Ombudman’s exercise of discretion to
determine whether to file an information against an accused. In the
assailed Resolution and Order, the Ombudsman stated clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which the case was based and as such, petitioner
had the burden of proving that grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance of the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman. Respondents
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96
97
98
99
100
101
102
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maintained that in a meager three pages of argumentation, petitioner failed

to point out the grave errors in the assailed Resolution and merely raised
issues which have been disposed of by the Ombudsman.103[28]

Respondents claimed that out of the six PSEDC-owned lots that were
sold to Calamba City, the ownership of the four lots had already been
transferred to Pamana as evidenced by the new TCTs. Respondents added
that even if TCT Nos. 66140 and 61703 were still in PSEDC’s name,
ownership of these lots had been transferred to Pamana as confirmed by Fr.
Sulpico, the custodian of all the assets of the Dominican Province of the
Philippines.104[29] Respondents also refuted the alleged overpricing of the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 66140 and 61703. Respondents contended that Fr.
Sulpico’s letter offering the lots at P350105[30] per square meter had been
superseded by his own denial of said offer during the meeting of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on 14 November 2002.106[31]

On the absence of ratification by the City Council of the MOA, Deed of

Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, respondents explained
that Section 22107[32] of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) spoke of prior
authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did
not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate
and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the
motion to enact Resolution No. 280.108[33]

On the non-conduct of a relocation survey, respondents noted that

while a relocation survey may be of use in determining which lands should
be purchased, the absence of a relocation survey would not, in any manner,
affect the validity of the subject transactions.109[34]

The Ombudsman, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,

claimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed in
dismissing the complaint-affidavit for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.110
[35] The Ombudsman reasoned that to warrant conviction under Section
3(e) of RA 3019, the following essential elements must concur: (a) the
accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.111[36]
The Ombudsman contended that when Mayor Lajara entered into and
implemented the subject contracts, he complied with the resolutions issued
by the City Council.

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104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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The Ombudsman cites the following circumstances to show that the

action taken by Mayor Lajara neither caused any undue injury to Calamba
City nor gave a private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference. First, the purchase price of P3,800 per square meter or a total of
P129,017,600 for the site of the new City Hall was reasonable. The initial
offer of the seller for the property was P6,000 per square meter, an amount
equal to the zonal value. Second, Calamba City took immediate possession
of the properties despite an initial payment of only P10,000,000 out of the
total purchase price. Third, the total purchase price was paid under liberal
terms as it was paid in installments for one year from date of purchase.
Fourth, the parties agreed that the last installment of P25,000,000 was
subject to the condition that titles to the properties were first transferred to
Calamba City.112[37]

In its Memorandum, the Ombudsman asserted that petitioner had not

substantiated his claim by clear and convincing evidence that TCT Nos.
66141, 66142, and 66143 are road lots. The sketch plan presented by
petitioner could not be regarded as conclusive evidence to support his
claim. The Ombudsman also refuted petitioner’s claim that TCT Nos. 68601
and 68603 were included in the Deed of Sale.113[38]

The Ombudsman maintained that petitioner’s contention that the

prices for TCT Nos. 66140 and 61703 were jacked up was belied by the
affidavit of Fr. Sulpico stating that the said lots were excluded from the offer
as they were creek/easement lots.114[39]

The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not
a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts
on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City
Council and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City
Council’s stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the
subject lots.115[40]

The Ombudsman added that mandamus is not meant to control or

review the exercise of judgment or discretion. To compel the Ombudsman
to pursue a criminal case against respondents is outside the ambit of the
courts.116[41]

Aggrieved by the Ombudman’s Resolution and Order, petitioner

elevated the case before this Court.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The issues in this petition are:

1. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion

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amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the Ombudsman

dismissed for lack of probable cause the case against respondents
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;
2. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the Ombudsman
failed to consider the issue that Calamba City had acquired road
lots which should not have been paid at the same price as the other
lots; and
3. Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots
should bear the ratification by the City Council of Calamba.

The Ruling of the Court

On the determination of probable cause by the Ombudsman

and the grave abuse of discretion in the acquisition of road lots

The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed in Section

12, Article XI of the Constitution which states:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof.

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution vests in the Office of the

Ombudsman the following powers, functions, and duties:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of
any government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report
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any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate

action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the government,
and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law. (Boldfacing supplied)

Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), or the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
granted the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative authority. Section
13 of RA 6770 restates the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Sec. 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as

protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or employees of the
government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.

Section 15(1) of RA 6770 substantially reiterates the investigatory

powers of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of government, the investigation of such cases;

Jurisprudence explains that the Office of the Ombudsman is vested

with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on
complaint of any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.117[42] The Ombudsman’s power to
investigate and to prosecute is plenary and unqualified.118[43]

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The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal

case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not.
The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint should the Ombudsman find
the complaint insufficient in form or substance, or the Ombudsman may
proceed with the investigation if, in the Ombudsman’s view, the complaint
is in due form and substance.119[44] Hence, the filing or non-filing of the
information is primarily lodged within the “full discretion” of the
Ombudsman.120[45]

This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the

exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers. The
Ombudsman, which is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”121[46]
However, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s
action when there is grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court may be exceptionally invoked pursuant to Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.122[47] We have enumerated instances where
the courts may interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory powers:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance.123[48]

These exceptions are not present in this case. However, petitioner

argues that the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dwelt only on the
alleged reasonableness of the price of the property. Petitioner claims that
the Resolution did not pass upon the more serious issue that Calamba City
had paid for several lots that the City should not have paid for because they
were road lots.

The Ombudsman, in issuing the assailed Resolution, found no probable

cause to hold any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019. The Ombudsman found that the subject lots were bought at
P3,800 per square meter, an amount lower than their zonal valuation of
P6,000 per square meter.

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Based on this computation, Calamba City paid for a total area of

33,952 square meters124[49] instead of the original 55,000 square meters as
authorized in the City Council’s Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001. Contrary
to petitioner’s allegation that Lot 5 with an area of 3,062 square meters and
Lot 8 with an area of 3,327 square meters are easement/creeks and road lot
respectively,125[50] the sketch plan126[51] submitted by petitioner as Annex
L in his Affidavit-Complaint and the TCTs127[52] of the properties indicate
that these are parcels of land.

A perusal of the records shows that the findings of fact by the

Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence. As long as substantial
evidence supports it, the Ombudsman’s ruling will not be overturned.128[53]
Petitioner, in arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion, raises questions of fact. This Court is not a trier of facts, more so
in the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor
even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion can be raised.129[54] The rationale behind this rule
is explained in this wise:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.130[55]

In this case, the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack

of probable cause based on the Ombudsman’s appreciation and review of
the evidence presented. In dismissing the complaint, the Ombudsman did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and

circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.131[56] Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than
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127
128
129
130
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bare suspicion and can never be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even

convincing logic.132[57]

In Rubio v. Ombudsman,133[58] this Court held that what is contextually

punishable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is the act of causing any undue
injury to any party, or the giving to any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of the public officer’s functions. In
this case, after evaluating the evidence presented,134[59] the Ombudsman
categorically ruled that there was no evidence to show actual injury or
damage to the city government to warrant the indictment of respondents
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Further, this Court held in Pecho v.
Sandiganbayan,135[60] that “causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence.” Here, the Ombudsman found that petitioner had
not substantiated his claim against respondents for the crime charged. This
Court is not inclined to interfere with the evaluation of the evidence
presented before the Ombudsman.

We reiterate the rule that courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s

exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless there are
compelling reasons. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, or lack of
it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Besides, to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of
abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at
all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without
jurisdiction.136[61]

On the ratification by the City Council of all

documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots

Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of

Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do
not bear the ratification by the City Council.

In the assailed Order, the Ombudsman held that the various actions
performed by Mayor Lajara in connection with the purchase of the lots were
all authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as manifested in numerous
resolutions. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase
of the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits.

In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman,

through the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the ratification

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by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief
executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior
authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is
the City Council’s stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to
purchase the subject lots.

Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, provides:
Section 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no

contract may be entered into by the local chief executive
in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy
of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and
compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that :
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and
Compensation. - xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor
shall:
xxx
(vi) Represent the city in all its business
transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the sangguniang
panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance;
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law
speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and not ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued
Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Resolution No. 280 states:

RESOLUTION NO. 280
Series of 2001

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MAYOR OF CALAMBA,

HON. SEVERINO J. LAJARA TO PURCHASE LOTS OF PAMANA INC.
WITH A TOTAL AREA OF FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS
(55,000 SQ. M.) SITUATED AT BARANGAY REAL, CITY OF CALAMBA
FOR A LUMP SUM PRICE OF ONE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE MILLION
 46

SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P129,017,600),

SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND FOR THIS
PURPOSE, FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE HON. MAYOR SEVERINO J.
LAJARA TO REPRESENT THE CITY GOVERNMENT AND TO EXECUTE,
SIGN AND DELIVER SUCH DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AS MAYBE SO
REQUIRED IN THE PREMISES.

WHEREAS, the City of Calamba is in need of constructing a

modern City Hall to adequately meet the requirements of
governing new city and providing all adequate facilities and
amenities to the general public that will transact business with
the city government.

WHEREAS, as the City of Calamba has at present no

available real property of its own that can serve as an appropriate
site of said modern City Hall and must therefore purchase such
property from the private sector under terms and conditions that
are most beneficial and advantageous to the people of the City of
Calamba;

NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Kagawad S. VERGARA duly

seconded by Kagawad R. HERNANDEZ, be it resolved as it is
hereby resolved to authorize the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon.
Severino J. Lajara to purchase lots of Pamana, Inc. with a total
area of fifty five thousand square meters (55,000 sq.m.) situated
at Barangay Real, City of Calamba for a lump sum price of One
Hundred Twenty Nine Million Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P129,017,600) subject to the availability of funds, and for
this purpose, further authorizing the Hon. Mayor Severino J.
Lajara to represent the City Government and to execute,
sign and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so
required in the premises.137[62] (Emphasis supplied)

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City

Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into
contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it
cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject
lots. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the
properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential
Bank or one that caused undue injury to Calamba City.

In sum, this Court has maintained its policy of non-interference with

the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion, not only out of respect for these
constitutionally mandated powers but also upon considerations of

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practicality owing to the myriad functions of the courts.138[63] Absent a

clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, we uphold the findings of the
Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution

and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-02-1205-L dated 17 March 2004
and 22 August 2005, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

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