[ GR No.

L-23614, Feb 27, 1970 ]

PEDRO M. BERMEJO v. ISIDRO BARRIOS +

DECISION

142 Phil. 655

ZALDIVAR, J.:

These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together.

These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First

Instance of Capiz, rendered on June 3, 1964, dismissing two

petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction:

one filed by petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo against City Judge Isidro

Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela of Roxas City, docketed as

Special Civil Case No. V-2721; and the other filed by

petitioner Jovita Carmorin against the same respondents, docketed

as Special Civil Case No. V-2723.

In G. R. No.L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe"

(her identity at the time was unknown) were charged in the city

court of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification

of public or official document in an information filed by the city

fiscal. It was alleged in the information that on or about the 25th

day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being private
individuals, conspired and confederated together and mutually

helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and

executed a document consisting of an amended petition

for habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin,

petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales,

respondents", which petition Pedro M. Bermejosigned while Julia

"Doe" placed her thumbmark over the name "Jovita Carmorin",

which petition was subscribed and sworn to by the two accused

before the Clerk of Court and filed in the Court of First

Instance of Capiz, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669, thus

the two accused stated and made it appear in the amended peti-tion

that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of

the petitioners when in truth and in fact the

said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it,because it was in

fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition

as Julia Carmorin.

Relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary

investigation had been conducted by him and that he had examined

the witnesses under oath before filing the information, the City

Judge, Hon. Isidro O. Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963, an

order for the arrest of accused Bermejo. To prevent his

incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the

information, alleging in substance: (1) that the information did not

charge an offense because the amended petition

for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court

of First Instance of Capiz), allegedly falsified, is not a document

contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised

Penal Code, and that in a previous judgment of the Court of First

Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus proceedings it was declared

that the thumbmark in the amended peti-tion was that

of Jovita Carmorin; and (2) that the court did not acquire

jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued for his

arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the same without

first examining the witnesses under oath and in the form of

searching questions and answers as required under Repub-lic Act

3828.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash,

contending that the petition for habeas corpus is a public document;

that the provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to

municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle

of res judicata, or conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be invoked

by the accused. After Bermejo had filed a supplement

to his motion to quash and a reply to the city fiscal'sopposition,

respondent City Judge, on October 5, 1963, issued an order denying

the motion to quash.

On October 14, 1963, Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration,

but the same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction

before the Court of First Instance of Capiz, naming as respondents

City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending

that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion in

filing an information against him without conducting the proper

preliminary investigation, and that the City Judge committed a

grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash,

raising practically the same issues that he raised in the motion to

quash before the city court, and praying that res-pondent City

Judge be enjoined from hearing the criminal case against him

during the pendency of the special civil action in the Courtof First

Instance.

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent

City Fiscal QuiricoAbela with perjury, on August 23, 1963, in the

same city court of Roxas City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for

allegedly having "subscrib-ed and swore to an affidavit . . . . that she

was really the one who signed with

her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin . . . . the amended petition

for habeas corpus . . . . when in truth and in fact, as she very well

knew, she had not done such act of signing with

her thumbmark said petition and it was another person, who

signed with a thumbmark said petition as Jovita Carmorin. . . ."

The city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary

investigation in accordance with law before fil-ing the information.

On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had

conducted the proper preliminary investigation, respondent City

Judge Barrios issued an order for the arrest of

accused Carmorin. After posting a bond, said accused, thru her

counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo (the same person accused in the

fal-sification case), filed a motion to quash the informa-tion,

alleging substantially, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction

over her person because the war-rant of arrest issued for her arrest

was improvidently issued, the respondent City Judge having issued

the same without examining the witnesses personally in the form of

searching questions and answers in violation of Republic Act 3828,

and that no offense was commit-ted by the accused because it had

already been declared by the Court of First Instance of Capizin

the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that

the thumbmarkappearing in the petition for habeas corpus was the

true thumbmark of accused Carmorin.

After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to quash,

and the accused, her reply, on October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios

issued an order denying the motion to quash. Carmorin's motion

for reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition

for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the

Court of First Instance of Capiz, also naming as respondents City

Judge Barrios and City Fiscal Abela, imputing abuse of discretion

on the part of City Fiscal Abela in filing an information against her

without conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and on

the part of respondent Judge Barrios in denying her motion to

quash, raising the same questions raised by her in her motion to

quash before the city court, and also praying that respondent City

Judge he enjoined from hearing the case pending decision of the

special civil action.

On November 22, 1963, respondent city fiscal filed answers to the

two petitions, admitting some of the allegations in the petitions,

and denying others; and setting up the affirmative defense that the

orders of respondent City Judge in the criminal cases against the

two petitioners can not be the subject of the petitions for certiorari

and prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Capiz because

the city court of RoxasCity issued said orders in the exercise of

its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz,

so that the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions

for certiorari and prohibition filed before it, pursuant to Section

87,paragraph (c) of Republic Act 296, as amended by Section 6 of

Republic Act 3828.

Herein petitioners filed their replies to respondents' answers,

asserting that the Court of First Ins-tance of Capiz has jurisdiction

to take cognizance of the two cases for certiorari and prohibition

with preliminary injunction. After the parties had filed their

memoranda in support of their respective contentions regarding

the jurisdiction of the court, the Court of First Instance

of Capiz issued an order, on January 6, 1964, declaring that it had

jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two special civil actions for

certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the

court set the hearing of the two cases for January 24, 1964.

During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly,

Atty. Bermejo appeared and testified in his behalf and in behalf of

his co-accused Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abela testified for

the prosecu-tion. Thereafter, the parties filed their

memoranda. On June 3, 1964, the Court of First

Instance of Capiz rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions,

without pronouncement as to costs. Their joint motion for

reconsideration having been denied, herein petitioners brought the

present appeals to this Court.

Before resolving the questions posed in these appeals, We consider

it necessary to rule on the matter regarding the jurisdiction of the

Court of First Ins-tance of Capiz to take cognizance of the two

petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction

a question that was properly raised by the respondents in the court

below, although this question is not now raised in the present

appeals. We hold that the Court of First Instance of Capiz erred in

taking cognizance of the two petitions. Section 6 of Republic Act

3828, amending Section 87, paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act of

1948, provides in part, as follows:

"Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and

sub-provinces and judges of municipal courts shall have

like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try

parties charged with an offense committed with-in their

respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided

by law does not exceed prisioncorreccional or

imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not

exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the

absence of the dis-trict judge, shall have like

 jurisdic-tion within the province as the Court of First

Instance to hear applications for bail.

"All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph

with justices of the peace of capitals and

municipal court judges shall be tried and decided on

the merits by the respective justices of the peace or

municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded

and de-cisions therein shall be appealable direct to the

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may

be."[1]

The crime of falsification of a public or official document by a

private individual, of which petitioner Bermejo is charged in the

city court of Roxas City in Criminal Case No. 4451, is punishable

with prision cor-reccional in its medium and maximum periods,

while the crime of perjury of which petitioner Carmorin is charged

in Criminal Case No. 4452 before the city court of Roxas City is

punishable with arrestomayor in its maximum period

to prision correccional in its minimum period.[2]Undoubtedly,

these two cases fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city

court of Roxas City and the Court of First Instance

of Capiz. This Court, interpreting the aforequoted provision of

Republic Act 3828, ruled that "[w]here the municipal court (city

court of Manila) has taken cognizance of a criminal case in its

concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, appeal

must be taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court;

and where the Court of First Instance has taken cog-nizance of such

appeal in its appellate jurisdiction and refused to elevate the case to

the Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without

jurisdiction.[3]And this rule applies even if the order is not a

judgment on the merits because in cases of this nature the Court of

First Instance exer-cises no supervisory jurisdiction over the city

court, and having concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with

"like jurisdiction" as the Court of First Instance.[4] It is Our view,

therefore, that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in

Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723, now appealed to this Court,

is null and void because said court has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the

City Judge and the City Fiscal of Roxas City should have been filed

with the Court of Ap-peals in aid of the latter's appellate

jurisdiction over direct appeals from the decision or order of the

city court. We note, however, that the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Capiz is correct insofar as it had dismissed the two

petitions in question.
Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the

petitioners in filing their petitions for certiorari and prohibition

with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance

of Capiz and the error of the latter court in taking cognizance of

those petitions should not deter Us from ruling on the questions

raised in the present appeals. The record shows that these

proceedings have been pending for more than six years, and were

We to remand these cases to the courts below so the petitions

for certiorari should be brought up to the Court of Appeals, our

action would only cause further delay.

We shall, therefore, decide whether herein petitioners are right in

assailing the correctness or lega-lity of the proceedings in the city

court of Roxas City in connection with the two criminal cases filed

against them, as they now contend in the present ap-peals.

While petitioners maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal

of Roxas City has no power to initiate the investigation of cases

without a previous complaint by an offended party, they now admit

in their brief that under the existing laws he can commence such

pre-liminary inquiry.[5] Nevertheless, petitioner Bermejo contends

that before the city fiscal can conduct such preliminary

investigation, there must be a violation of the law, and in the

instant case he avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of his
argument is that the petition for habeas corpus not being a

document as contemplated in Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code,

the city fiscal is precluded from conducting the preliminary

investigation, much less from filing the information,

because Bermejo could not be prosecuted for falsification of the

alleged public or official document.

The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U. S.

v. Orera,[6] a "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other

duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or

set forth. In U. S. v. Asensi,[7] this Court held that any instrument

authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with

the solemnities required by law, is a public document.

Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court,[8] enumerates the

following as public writ-ings:

"(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the

sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and

of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive,

whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

"(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private

writings."
The same principle also obtains in the United States, that

"defendant's pleadings and papers, which were involved in civil

actions and which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk

of superior court in which action was pending, were 'public

documents' and were within scope of subject matter of statute

making alteration of court records an offense."[9] Considering that

the petition for habeas corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669)

alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of

one Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed

and sworn to before Clerk of Court Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed

with the Court of First Instance ofCapiz, forming, therefore, a

part of the court records in said proceed-ings, it cannot be disputed

that said petition is a public or official document as

contemplated in Articles171 and 172 of the Revised Penal

Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he committed

no crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he

connived or conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying said

petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin placed

her thumbmark therein when in fact she did not do so.

Petitioner Bermejo likewise complains that not-withstanding his

request to be present at the preli-minary investigation, the same

was conducted in his absence or behind his back thus denying him
his day in court. We find, however, in the record - and the

court a quo so found too - that on March 11, 1963, a subpoena was

issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requir-ing him to appear at the

office of the city fiscal of Roxas City on March 14, 1963 in an

investigation. This subpoena was received by Bermejo on March 12,

1963, and on the same day he sent a letter to the city fiscal, which

was received by the latter in the afternoon of the same day,

requesting that the investigation be postponed to March 19, 1963

because he (Bermejo) had to attend to another case which was

scheduled to be heard on the same date. The city fiscal acceded to

his request, but because the fiscal's office failed to notify him of the

hearing on March 19, 1963, Bermejo was not present when the

investigation was conducted on that day. The preliminary

investigation was conducted on the very day requested by Bermejo,

and after finding that there was a prima facie case the city fiscal

filed the informa-tion against him on August 22, 1963.

It appears, therefore, that while the city fiscal failed to notify

petitioner Bermejo that his request for postponement was granted,

which should have been done, it can also be said that Bermejo was

not entirely blameless it the preliminary investigation was

conducted in his absence. It was he himself who set the date of the

investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not

bother to come on the date he fixed. Neither did he try to find out

what action the city fiscal had taken on his request for

postponement, on any day before the date of the hearing set by him,

although he is living in Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his

office. Moreover, the information was filed five months later, and

this petitioner never inquired, at least as to the status of his

case. This behavior of petitioner cannot merit Our approval. It is

obvious that he failed to employ the standard of care or reasonable

diligence that is expected ofhim. His unwarranted absence on

the day of the hearing which he himself requested, coupled with his

seeming indifference or unconcern about his case, is a clear

indication that he was guilty of gross negligence in the protection of

his rights. If he did not have his day in court, it was because of his

own negligence. If he was really interested to attend the

investigation, as he now pretends, he should have taken painsto

communicate with the city fiscal. This Court had ruled that in the

application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be

safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of

opportunity to be heard.[10] Since petitioner Bermejo was afforded

the opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation but did

not take advantage of it, he has no one to blame but

himself. Anyway, said petitioner's rights can still be amply

protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city

court where he can cross-examine the witnesses and present his

evidence.[11]

Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify

petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary

investigations ex parte, their rights to due, process could not have

been violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary

investigation. The numerous authorities[12] supporting this view

are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because

Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has

no application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of

Court took effect on January 1, 1964 while the preliminary

investigations conducted by the city fiscal were conducted in

1963.[13] The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they

cannot be given retroactive effect.[14]

Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not

abuse his discretion in conducting the preliminary investigations

and that he filed the informations against herein petitioners in

accordance with law, there is, therefore, no merit in the assert-ion

of petitioners that the warrants of arrest issued for their arrest were

illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that the orders of arrest were

tainted with irregularity, still the posting by petitioners of their bail

bonds amounted to a waiver of the effect of said defects.

"There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of

arrest was irregularly issued. Section 87 of the Judiciary

Act as amended by Republic Act 3828 requires that the

Municipal Judge issuing the same, personally, examine

under oath the witnesses, and by searching questions

and answers which are to be reduced to writing. Here,

instead of searching questions and answers, we have

only the af-fidavits of respondent and her one

wit-ness. Moreover, said affidavits were sworn to

before Judge Cabungcal, not before

Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.

"However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner

constitutes a waiver of the irregularity attending her

arrest. Besides, by her other personal appear-ances

before the municipal court and the court a quo,

petitioner voluntarily submittedherself to the court's

jurisdiction. Hence, the absence of preli-minary

examination becomes moot already, the court having

acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and

 could therefore proceed with the

preliminary investigation proper." (Doce v. Branch II,

Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., supra; Luna-v.

Plaza, L-27511, November 29, 1968).

The other point raised by petitioners in their contention that the

respondent City Judge abused his discretion in denying their

motion to quash is that there was a judicial declaration in

the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that

the thumbmark appearing in the petition was the

genuine thumbmark of JovitaCarmorin, and that pronouncement

is now conclusive so that they cannot be prosecuted for falsification

or perjury, as the case may be. This particular question should

rather be submitted and threshed out in the city court during the

trial. The record of the habeas corpus proceeding is not

before Us, and We have no means of knowing what actually

transpired in that proceeding. The proper determina-tion of this

question will involve not only the in-troduction and consideration

of evidence, but also calls for a detailed inquiry on the principle

of estoppel by, or conclusiveness of, judgment.

Also devoid or merit is the other error pointed to by petitioners

with respect to the alleged admission by respondents that they

acted illegally, cap-riciously, or in excess of jurisdiction. A cursory

examination of their answers would reveal that what was admitted

by respondent was the fact of the filing by petitioners of their

pleadings, but not the allega-tions contained therein, for, as shown

in the record, respondents have staunchly defended their acts and

insisted that their actuations are legal or in accordance with law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of

First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is

set aside for having been rendered by the court without jurisdiction,

and the instant appeals are dismissed. We declare that the

warrants of arrests issued, and the informations filed,

in CriminaI Cases Nos. 4451 and 4452 of the City Court

of Roxas City, are in accordance with law, and these cases should be

remanded to the City Court of Roxas City for trial on the merits. No

pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO,

Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent

TUASON, J.: chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion

with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound
over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of
origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on
the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney

to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges
and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the
complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could
be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by
law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section
11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance. cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his
right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of
the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito
and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had
allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so
that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the
peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the
sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said
that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it
or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice,
to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
truth." chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what
they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of
the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation
may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority

went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the
part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
anew. chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed

with costs against the petitioner
EDGARDO PINGA, G.R. No. 170354

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

THE HEIRS OF GERMAN TINGA, and

SANTIAGO represented by VELASCO, JR. JJ.,

FERNANDO SANTIAGO,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

June 30, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and

procedure[1] necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents

on points of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court.

One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to

fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the

defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate

action.[2] The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence

holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to

justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory counterclaim.[3]

In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former

jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The relevant facts are simple enough. Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was

named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction[4] filed with

Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of San Miguel,

Zamboanga del Sur, by respondent Heirs of German Santiago,

represented by Fernando Santiago. The Complaint[6] dated 28 May

1998 alleged in essence that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente

Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent,

cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees

therein. Respondents prayed that petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined

from committing acts of depredation on their properties, and ordered to

pay damages.

In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim,[7] petitioner and his

co-defendant disputed respondents ownership of the properties in

question, asserting that petitioners father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom

defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession

thereof since the 1930s.[8] They alleged that as far back as 1968,

respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a

complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. It

was further claimed that respondents application for free patent over the

properties was rejected by the Office of the President in 1971. Defendants

in turn prayed that owing to respondents forcible re-entry in the

properties and the irresponsible and reckless filing of the case, they be

awarded various types of damages instead in amounts totaling P2,100,000

plus costs of suit.[9]

By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed.

Moreover, respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence.

It appears that on 25 October 2004, the RTC already ordered the

dismissal of the complaint after respondents counsel had sought the

postponement of the hearing scheduled then.[10] However, the order of

dismissal was subsequently reconsidered by the RTC in an Order dated 9

June 2005, which took into account the assurance of respondents counsel

that he would give priority to that case.[11]

At the hearing of 27 July 2005, plaintiffs counsel on record failed

to appear, sending in his stead a representative who sought the

postponement of the hearing. Counsel for defendants (who include herein

petitioner) opposed the move for postponement and moved instead for the

dismissal of the case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents

had failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time, in fact

not having presented their evidence yet. On that ground, the complaint

was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants to present

their evidence ex-parte.[12]

 Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] of the order

issued in open court on 27 July 2005, opting however not to seek that

their complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be

dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte.

Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC allowing petitioner to

present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established

jurisprudence. They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v.

Ruymann[14] and Domingo v. Santos,[15] which noted those instances in

which a counterclaim could not remain pending for independent

adjudication.

On 9 August 2005, the RTC promulgated an order granting

respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing the counterclaim,

citing as the only ground therefor that there is no opposition to the

Motion for Reconsideration of the [respondents].[16] Petitioner filed a

Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an

Order dated 10 October 2005.[17] Notably, respondents filed an

Opposition to Defendants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, wherein

they argued that the prevailing jurisprudential rule[18] is that compulsory

counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of

action, and a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the

dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims.[19]

 The matter was elevated to this Court directly by way of a Petition

for Review under Rule 45 on a pure question of law, the most relevant

being whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the

dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.

We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does

not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,

compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is

without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

On a prefatory note, the RTC, in dismissing the counterclaim, did

not expressly adopt respondents argument that the dismissal of their

complaint extended as well to the counterclaim. Instead, the RTC

justified the dismissal of the counterclaim on the ground that there is no

opposition to [plaintiffs] Motion for Reconsideration [seeking the

dismissal of the counterclaim].[20] This explanation is hollow, considering

that there is no mandatory rule requiring that an opposition be filed to a

motion for reconsideration without need for a court order to that effect;

and, as posited by petitioner, the failure to file an opposition to the

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is definitely not one among the

established grounds for dismissal [of the counterclaim].[21] Still, the

dismissal of the counterclaim by the RTC betrays at very least a tacit

recognition of respondents argument that the counterclaim did not survive

the dismissal of the complaint. At most, the dismissal of the counterclaim

over the objection of the defendant (herein petitioner) on grounds other

than the merits of the counterclaim, despite the provisions under Rule 17

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutes a debatable question of

law, presently meriting justiciability through the instant action. Indeed, in

reviewing the assailed orders of the RTC, it is inevitable that the Court

consider whether the dismissal of the complaint, upon motion of the

defendant, on the ground of the failure to prosecute on plaintiffs part

precipitates or carries with it the dismissal of the pending counterclaims.

Our core discussion begins with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable

cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the

complaint due to the plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute,

is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his

counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in marked

contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which

were superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals

due to failure to prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of

the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own
motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to

failure to prosecute on the pending counterclaims. As a result, there arose

what one authority on remedial law characterized as the nagging question

of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the

dismissal of the counterclaim.[22] Jurisprudence construing the previous

Rules was hardly silent on the matter.

In their arguments before the RTC on the dismissal

of the counterclaim, respondents cited in support City of Manila v.

Ruymann,[23] Domingo v. Santos,[24] Belleza v. Huntington,[25] and Froilan

v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,[26] all of which were decided more than five

decades ago. Notably though, none of the complaints in these four cases

were dismissed either due to the fault of the plaintiff or upon the instance

of the defendant.[27]

The distinction is relevant, for under the previous and current

incarnations of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is Section 3, Rule 17 that

governs the dismissals due to the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the

complaint, as had happened in the case at bar. Otherwise, it is Section 2,

Rule 17, which then, and still is now, covered dismissals ordered by the

trial court upon the instance of the plaintiff.[28] Yet, as will be seen in the

foregoing discussion, a discussion of Section 2 cannot be avoided as the

postulate behind that provision was eventually extended as well in cases

that should have properly been governed by Section 3.

Even though the cases cited by respondents involved different factual

antecedents, there exists more appropriate precedents which they could

have cited in support of their claim that the counterclaim should have

been dismissed even if the dismissal of the complaint was upon the

defendants motion and was predicated on the plaintiffs fault. BA Finance

Corp. v. Co[29]particularly stands out in that regard, although that ruling is

itself grounded on other precedents as well. Elucidation of these cases is

in order.

On the general effect of the dismissal of a complaint, regardless of cause,

on the pending counterclaims, previous jurisprudence laid emphasis on

whether the counterclaim was compulsory or permissive in character. The

necessity of such distinction was provided in the 1964 Rules itself,

particularly Section 2, Rule 17, which stated that in instances wherein the

plaintiff seeks the dismissal of the complaint, if a counterclaim has been

pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs

motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the

defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for

independent adjudication by the court.[30] The

vaunted commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, remarking on Section 2,

Rule 17, noted that [t]here are instances in which a counterclaim cannot

remain pending for independent adjudication, as, where it arises out of, or

is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the

subject matter of the opposing partys claim.[31]

This view expressed in Morans Commentaries was adopted by the Court

in cases where the application of Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of

Court was called for, such as in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete,[32] and Dalman v.

City Court of Dipolog City.[33] The latter case warrants brief elaboration.

Therein, the plaintiff in a civil case for damages moved for the

withdrawal of her own case on the ground that the dispute had not been

referred to the barangay council as required by law. Over the objection of

the defendant, who feared that her own counterclaim would be prejudiced

by the dismissal, plaintiffs motion was granted, the complaint and the

counterclaim accordingly dismissed by the trial court. The Court refused

to reinstate the counterclaim, opining without elaboration, [i]f the civil

case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein.[34] The

broad nature of that statement gave rise to the notion that the mandatory
dismissal of the counterclaim upon dismissal of the complaint applied

regardless of the cause of the complaints dismissal.[35]

Notably, the qualification concerning compulsory counterclaims was

provided in Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules, the provision governing

dismissals by order of the court, and not Section 3, Rule 17. As stated

earlier, Section 3, which covered dismissals for failure to prosecute upon

motion of the defendant or upon motu proprio action of the trial court,

was silent on the effect on the counterclaim of dismissals of such nature.

Spouses Sta. Maria, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[36] decided in 1972,

ostensibly supplied the gap on the effect on the counterclaim of

complaints dismissed under Section 3. The defendants therein

successfully moved before the trial court for the dismissal of the

complaint without prejudice and their declaration in default on the

counterclaim after plaintiffs therein failed to attend the pre-trial. After

favorable judgment was rendered on the counterclaim, plaintiffs

interposed an appeal, citing among other grounds, that the counterclaim

could no longer have been heard after the dismissal of the complaint.

While the Court noted that the adjudication of the counterclaim in

question does not depend upon the adjudication of the claims made in the

complaint since they were virtually abandoned by the non-appearance of

the plaintiffs themselves, it was also added that [t]he doctrine invoked is

not available to plaintiffs like the petitioners, who prevent or delay the

hearing of their own claims and allegations.[37] The Court, through Justice

JBL Reyes, noted:

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the

counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not available
to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents
or delays the prosecution of his own complaint. Otherwise, the trial
of counterclaims would be made to depend upon the maneuvers of the
plaintiff, and the rule would offer a premium to vexing or delaying
tactics to the prejudice of the counterclaimants. It is in the same spirit
that we have ruled that a complaint may not be withdrawn over the
opposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is one that arises
from, or is necessarily connected with, the plaintiffs action and cannot
remain pending for independent adjudication.[38]

There is no doubt that under the 1964 Rules, the dismissal of a

complaint due to the failure of the plaintiff to appear during pre-trial, as

what had happened in Sta. Maria, fell within the coverage of Section 3,

Rule 17. On the other hand, Section 2 was clearly limited in scope to

those dismissals sustained at the instance of the plaintiff.[39] Nonetheless,

by the early 1990s, jurisprudence was settling on a rule that compulsory

counterclaims were necessarily terminated upon the dismissal of the

complaint not only if such dismissal was upon motion of the plaintiff, but

at the instance of the defendant as well. Two decisions from that period

stand out in this regard, Metals Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of

Appeals[40] and International Container Terminal Services v. Court of

Appeals.[41]

In Metals, the complaint was expunged from the record after the

defendant had filed a motion for reconsideration of a trial court order

allowing the filing of an amended complaint that corrected a

jurisdictional error in the original complaint pertaining to the

specification of the amount of damages sought. When the defendant was

nonetheless allowed to present evidence on the counterclaim, the plaintiff

assailed such allowance on the ground that the counterclaim was

compulsory and could no longer remain pending for independent

adjudication. The Court, in finding for the plaintiff, noted that the

counterclaim was indeed compulsory in nature, and as such, was auxiliary

to the proceeding in the original suit and derived its jurisdictional support

therefrom.[42] It was further explained that the doctrine was in consonance

with the primary objective of a counterclaim, which was to avoid and

prevent circuitry of action by allowing the entire controversy between the

parties to be litigated and finally determined in one action, and to

discourage multiplicity of suits.[43] Also, the Court noted that since the

complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it was as if no claim was

filed against the defendant, and there was thus no more leg for the

complaint to stand on.[44]

 In International Container, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss

which was granted by the trial court. The defendants counterclaim was

dismissed as well. The Court summarized the key question as what is the

effect of the dismissal of a complaint ordered at the instance of the

defendant upon a compulsory counterclaim duly raised in its

answer.[45] Then it ruled that the counterclaim did not survive such

dismissal. After classifying the counterclaim therein as compulsory, the

Court noted that [i]t is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim

that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication, that is,

without adjudication by the court of the complaint itself on which the

counterclaim was based.[46]

Then in 1993, a divided Court ruled in BA Finance that the

dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial,

upon motion of the defendants, carried with it the dismissal of their

compulsory counterclaim.[47] The Court reiterated the rule that a

compulsory counterclaim cannot remain pending for independent

adjudication by the court as it is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original

suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. [48] Express

reliance was made on Metals, International Container, and

even Dalman in support of the majoritys thesis. BA Finance likewise

advised that the proper remedy for defendants desirous that their

counterclaims not be dismissed along with the main complaint was for

them to move to declare the plaintiffs to be non-suited on their complaint

and as in default on their compulsory counterclaim, instead of moving for

the dismissal of the complaint.[49]

Justice Regalado, joined by Chief Justice Narvasa, registered a

strong objection to the theory of the majority. They agreed that the trial

court could no longer hear the counterclaim, but only on the ground that

defendants motion to be allowed to present evidence on the counterclaim

was filed after the order dismissing the complaint had already become

final. They disagreed however that the compulsory counterclaim was

necessarily dismissed along with the main complaint, pointing out that a

situation wherein the dismissal of the complaint was occasioned by

plaintiffs failure to appear during pre-trial was governed under Section 3,

Rule 17, and not Section 2 of the same rule. Justice Regalado, who

ironically penned the decision in Metals cited by the majority, explained:

Turning back to Rule 17, it is readily apparent that Sections

2 and 3 thereof envisage different factual and adjective situations.
The dismissal of the complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of
plaintiff, for whatever reason he is minded to move for such
dismissal, and, as a matter of procedure, is without prejudice
unless otherwise stated in the order of the court or, for that matter,
in plaintiff's motion to dismiss his own complaint. By reason thereof,
to curb any dubious or frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his benefit or
to obviate possible prejudice to defendant, the former may not dismiss
 his complaint over the defendant's objection if the latter has a
compulsory counterclaim since said counterclaim would necessarily be
divested of juridical basis and defendant would be deprived of possible
recovery thereon in that same judicial proceeding.

Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not

procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him
and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at
the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as
extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of
defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether
defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory,
is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to
prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is
considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.
This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of
evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same
arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely
terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only
work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further
provision into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom
although neither exists even by mere implication. Thus understood,
the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless
be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as
alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part,
unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented
to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.[50]

Justice Regalado also adverted to Sta. Maria and noted that the objections

raised and rejected by the Court therein were the same as those now

relied upon by the plaintiff. He pointed out that Dalman and International

Container, both relied upon by the majority, involved the application of

Section 2, Rule 17 and not Section 3, which he insisted as the applicable

provision in the case at bar.[51]

The partial dissent of Justice Regalado in BA Finance proved opportune,

as he happened then to be a member of the Rules of Court Revision

Committee tasked with the revision of the 1964 Rules of Court. Just a few

months after BA Finance was decided, Justice Regalado proposed before

the Committee an amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 that would explicitly

provide that the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff

shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his

counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. The amendment, which

was approved by the Committee, is reflected in the minutes of the

meeting of the Committee held on 12 October 1993:

[Justice Regalado] then proposed that after the words upon the
courts own motion in the 6th line of the draft in Sec. 3 of Rule 17, the
following provision be inserted: without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. The Committee agreed with the proposed
amendment of Justice Regalado.

Justice Herrera observed that under Secs. 1 to 3 of Rule 17, it is not the
action that is dismissed but the complaint. He asked whether there is
any distinction between complaint and action. Justice Regalado opined
that the action of the plaintiff is initiated by his complaint.

Justice Feria then suggested that the dismissal be limited to the

complaint[.] Thus, in the 1st line of Sec. 1, the words An action will
be changed to a complaint; in the 2nd line of Sec. 2, the words an
 action will be changed to a complaint and in Sec. 3, the word
action on the 5th line of the draft will be changed to complaint. The
Committee agreed with Justice Ferias suggested amendments.

CA Pao believed that there is a need to clarify the counterclaim

that the defendant will prosecute, whether it is permissive or
compulsory or all kinds of counterclaims.

Justice Regalado opined that there is no need of making a

clarification because it is already understood that it covers both

counterclaims.[52]

It is apparent from these minutes that the survival of the counterclaim

despite the dismissal of the complaint under Section 3 stood irrespective

of whether the counterclaim was permissive or compulsory. Moreover,

when the Court itself approved the revisions now contained in the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, not only did Justice Regalados amendment to

Section 3, Rule 17 remain intact, but the final version likewise eliminated

the qualification formerly offered under Section 2 on counterclaims that

can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.[53] At

present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff,

now recognizes the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim

either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal of the

complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature

of the counterclaim.
In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice

Regalado expounds on the effects of the amendments to Section 2 and 3

of Rule 17:

2. Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the
dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed,
the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the
same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have
his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint
had been dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court
within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiffs motion to
dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available
to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. A similar alternative procedure, with the same underlying
reason therefor, is adopted in Sec. 6, Rule 16 and Sec. 3 of this Rule,
wherein the complaint is dismissed on the motion of the defendant or,
in the latter instance, also by the court motu proprio.

xxxx

2. The second substantial amendment to [Section 3] is with respect to

the disposition of the defendants counterclaim in the event the
plaintiffs complaint is dismissed. As already observed, he is here
granted the choice to prosecute that counterclaim in either the same or
a separate action. x x x x

3. With the aforestated amendments in Secs. 2 and 3 laying down

specific rules on the disposition of counterclaims involved in the
dismissal actions, the controversial doctrine in BA Finance
Corporation vs. Co, et al., (G.R. No. 105751, June 30, 1993) has
been abandoned, together with the apparent confusion on the
proper application of said Secs. 2 and 3. Said sections were
distinguished and discussed in the authors separate opinion in that case,
even before they were clarified by the present amendments x x x.[54]
Similarly, Justice Feria notes that the present rule reaffirms the right of

the defendant to move for the dismissal of the complaint and to prosecute

his counterclaim, as stated in the separate opinion [of Justice Regalado

in BA Finance.][55]Retired Court of Appeals Justice Herrera pronounces

that the amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 settles that nagging question

whether the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the

counterclaim, and opines that by reason of the amendments, the rulings

in Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA Finance may be

deemed abandoned.[56] On the effect of amendment to Section 3, Rule 17,

the commentators are in general agreement,[57] although there is less

unanimity of views insofar as Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned.[58]

To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, including the amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines

that were inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents arising

after the effectivity of the new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA

Finance, or even the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily

dismissed along with the complaint, clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine extends

as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil
Procedure. If, since then, such abandonment has not been affirmed in

jurisprudence, it is only because no proper case has arisen that would

warrant express confirmation of the new rule. That opportunity is here

and now, and we thus rule that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of

the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute

any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate

action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court

that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the

counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17 mandates that the dismissal of the

complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute

the counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to

dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim.

Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the

merits of the counterclaim.

It would be perfectly satisfactory for the Court to leave this matter at that.

Still, an explanation of the reason behind the new rule is called for,

considering that the rationale behind the previous rule was frequently

elaborated upon.
 Under Act No. 190, or the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions

promulgated in 1901, it was recognized in Section 127(1) that the

plaintiff had the right to seek the dismissal of the complaint at any time

before trial, provided a counterclaim has not been made, or affirmative

relief sought by the cross-complaint or answer of the defendant.[59] Note

that no qualification was made then as to the nature of the counterclaim,

whether it be compulsory or permissive. The protection of the defendants

right to prosecute the counterclaim was indeed unqualified. In City

of Manila, decided in 1918, the Court explained:

By paragraph 1 [of Section 127], it will be seen that, where the
defendant has interposed a counterclaim, or is seeking affirmative relief
by a cross-complaint, that then, and in that case, the plaintiff cannot
dismiss the action so as to affect the right of the defendant in his
counterclaim or prayer for affirmative relief. The reason for that
exception is clear. When the answer sets up an independent action
against the plaintiff, it then becomes an action by the defendant
against the plaintiff, and, of course, the plaintiff has no right to ask

for a dismissal of the defendants action.[60]

Nonetheless, a new rule was introduced when Act No. 190 was replaced

by the 1940 Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 30 of the 1940 Rules

specified that if a counterclaim is pleaded by a defendant prior to the

service of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be

dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can

remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. This

qualification remained intact when the 1964 Rules of Court was

introduced.[61] The rule referred only to compulsory counterclaims, or

counterclaims which arise out of or are necessarily connected with the

transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim,

since the rights of the parties arising out of the same transaction should be

settled at the same time.[62] As was evident in Metals, International

Container and BA Finance, the rule was eventually extended to instances

wherein it was the defendant with the pending counterclaim, and not the

plaintiff, that moved for the dismissal of the complaint.

We should not ignore the theoretical bases of the rule distinguishing

compulsory counterclaims from permissive counterclaims insofar as the

dismissal of the action is concerned. There is a particular school of

thought that informs the broad proposition in Dalman that if the civil case

is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein,[63] or the more

nuanced discussions offered in Metals, International Container, and BA

Finance. The most potent statement of the theory may be found

in Metals,[64] which proceeds from the following fundamental premisesa

compulsory counterclaim must be set up in the same proceeding or would

otherwise be abated or barred in a separate or subsequent litigation on the

ground of auter action pendant, litis pendentia or res judicata; a

compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the main suit and derives its

jurisdictional support therefrom as it arises out of or is necessarily

connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of

the complaint;[65] and that if the court dismisses the complaint on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction, the compulsory counterclaim must also be

dismissed as it is merely ancilliary to the main action and no jurisdiction

remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.

The first point is derived from Section 4, Rule 9, of the 1964 Rules of

Court, while the two latter points are sourced from American

jurisprudence. There is no disputing the theoretical viability of these three

points. In fact, the requirement that the compulsory counterclaim must be

set up in the same proceeding remains extant under the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure.[66]At the same time, other considerations rooted in actual

practice provide a counterbalance to the above-cited rationales.

Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral

characteristics as a complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action

constituting an act or omission by which a party violates the right of

another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the

counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while

the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a

counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.

It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint

somehow eliminates the cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the

counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case, especially as a

general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form the

counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other

than the plaintiffs very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such

acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have

occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only apparent

exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim

that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely

causes the violation of the defendants rights. Yet even in such an

instance, it remains debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of

the complaint is sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action

maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.[67]

These considerations persist whether the counterclaim in question is

permissive or compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is

connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject

matter of the opposing partys claim, does not require for its adjudication

the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the

court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim. [68] The

fact that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are founded
within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient

causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint. The

dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the boundaries

of time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the defendant,

or vice versa. While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of

litigation

by the plaintiff, either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be

iniquitous to similarly encumber the defendant who maintained no such

initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the

counterclaim or neglects to timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of

the counterclaim be premised on those grounds imputable to the

defendant, and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.

The other considerations supplied in Metals are anchored on the premise

that the jurisdictional foundation of the counterclaim is the complaint

itself. The theory is correct, but there are other facets to this subject that

should be taken into account as well. On the established premise that a

counterclaim involves separate causes of action than the complaint even

if derived from the same transaction or series of transactions, the

counterclaim could have very well been lodged as a complaint had the
defendant filed the action ahead of the complainant.[69] The terms

ancillary or auxiliary may mislead in signifying that a complaint innately

possesses more credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many

instances wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is

meritorious. In truth, the notion that a counterclaim is, or better still,

appears to be merely ancillary or auxiliary is chiefly the offshoot of an

accident of chronology, more than anything else.

The formalistic distinction between a complaint and a counterclaim does

not detract from the fact that both of them embody causes of action that

have in their end the vindication of rights. While the distinction is

necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules of

procedure, it should be remembered that the primordial purpose of

procedural rules is to provide the means for the vindication of rights. A

party with a valid cause of action against another party cannot be denied

the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the good fortune

of filing the case first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the

previous procedural rule and correspondent doctrine, which under their

final permutation, prescribed the automatic dismissal of the compulsory

counterclaim upon the dismissal of the complaint, whether upon the

initiative of the plaintiff or of the defendant.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a

more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any

judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not

on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is

palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand

independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from

dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or

order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the

same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now

unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by

reason of the dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 9 August

2005 and 10 October 2005 of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of San

Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur in Civil Case No. 98-012 are SET ASIDE.

Petitioners counterclaim as defendant in Civil Case. No. 98-012 is

REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to hear and

decide the counterclaim with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001]
 MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners,

vs. CIRIACO, LEON, VICTORINA, TOMASA and PABLO,

all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served
separately on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must
expressly direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of
the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and
the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
42971. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, without anymore touching on the merit of the judgment, we hereby

SET ASIDE the default Order of June 18, 1992 which the lower court had
improvidently issued as well as the ensuing judgment which suffers from the same fatal
infirmity. Let the case be remanded to the lower court, which is directed to promptly set
the case for pre-trial conference in accordance with the present Rules, and for further
proceedings.[2]

Also assailed is the September 11, 1998 CA Resolution[3] which denied

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The appellate court summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:

The record shows that on October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De
Guia, Tomasa De Guia and Irene Manuel filed with the court below a complaint for
partition against defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia. They alleged
x x x that the real properties therein described were inherited by plaintiffs and
defendants from their predecessors-in-interest, and that the latter unjustly refused to
have the properties subdivided among them. Shortly after defendants filed their
traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff
Tomasa De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had
become an unwilling co-plaintiff.

It is further shown in the record that on June 11, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court issued
a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies
of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned out
that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon
plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to
present their evidence ex-parte.

It appears that on July 6, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the
June 16, 1992 Order which declared them as in default. They explained therein that
they received the Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of June 18, 1992, giving them
no chance to appear for such proceeding in the morning of that day. The Motion was
opposed by plaintiffs who pointed out that per Postal Delivery Receipt, defendants
counsel actually received his copy of the Notice on June 17, 1992 or one day before the
date of pre-trial. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, plaintiffs further urged
that counsels receipt of the said notice on June 17, 1992 was sufficient to bind
defendants who received said notice on the next day. Finally, they faulted defendants
for failing to support their Motion for Reconsideration with an affidavit of merit
showing among others that they had a meritorious defense.

In an Order dated August 19, 1992, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied
and on June 11, 1993, judgment was rendered ordering the partition of the controverted
parcels of land.[4]

The CA Ruling

The CA sustained respondents claim that the trial court had improperly declared
them in default. It held that the Notice of pretrial received by their counsel a day
before the hearing did not bind the clients, because the Rules of Court in effect at the
time mandated separate service of such Notice upon the parties and their counsel. Said
the appellate court:

In fine, we hold that the lower court committed a reversible error in declaring appellants
as in default for their failure to attend the pre-trial conference [of] which they were not
properly served x x x notice and in subsequently rendering the herein appealed
judgment. And while we commend the lower court for its apparent interest in disposing
of the case with dispatch, the imperatives of procedural due process constrain us to set
aside the default order and the appealed judgment, both of which were entered in
violation of appellants right to notice of pre-trial as required by the Rules.[5]

Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues

Petitioners impute the following alleged errors to the CA:

I

The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not finding
private respondents as in default despite the existence of fraud, for being contrary to
law, and for being contrary to the findings of the trial court.

II

The Respondent Court, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in reversing the trial courts
Decision notwithstanding private respondents violations of Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Revised Circular No. 28-91.

III

The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not
affirming the compromise agreement which has the effect and authority of res judicata
even if not judicially approved.

IV

The Respondent Court gravely erred in not applying Rule 135, Section 8 as warranted
by the facts, admission and the evidence of the parties.[7]

In the main, petitioners raise the following core issues: (1) the propriety of the
trial courts order declaring respondents in default; and (2) petitioners allegation of
procedural prejudice.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue: The Propriety of the Default Order

When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule
20 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:
SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been filed,
the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference
to consider:

x x x x x x x x x.

This provision mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the
parties and their lawyers.[8] In Taroma v. Sayo,[9] the Court explained:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, therefore, the Court in reaffirming the ruling that
notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record,
restates that while service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is
best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his
counsel at counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation
of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and
assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written authority to
represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party
who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. (emphasis supplied)

Hence, before being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and

their counsel must be shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial
conference.[10] Moreover, if served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly
direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial
conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the
judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.[11]

In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or
after the pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day.Moreover, although the Notice
was also sent to their counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he
inform his clients of the pretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby
notified that the above-entitled case will be heard before this court on the 18th day of
June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial.[12]

Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents,
amounted to a lack of notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default
and in denying them the opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.

Of course, this situation would not have arisen under Section 3,[13] Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It specifically provides that notice of pretrial shall be
served on counsel, who is charged with the duty of notifying the client. Considering
the milieu of the present case, however, such amended proviso is not applicable.
Second Issue: Allegation of Procedural Bias
 Petitioners allege that, to their detriment, the appellate court disregarded
established procedural precepts in resolving the case, and that it did so for three
reasons. First, respondents Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default,
filed with the trial court, was merely pro forma because the former lacked the
requisite notice of hearing. Second, it also lacked an affidavit of merit. Third,
respondents Appeal Brief did not contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Granting that respondents Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default
was pro forma, this issue has become moot, not only because the trial court had
denied such Motion, but also because what was appealed was the judgment rendered
by the lower court. For the same reason, we must also reject petitioners insistence that
an affidavit of merit was absent. In any case, there was no need to attach an affidavit
of merit to the Motion, as the defenses of respondents had been set out in their
Answer.

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial

justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not
condone the shortcomings of respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the
merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that [i]t is within the inherent power of
the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice.[14]

One last point. Petitioners fault the CA for remanding the case to the trial court,
arguing that the appellate court should have resolved the case on its merit.

We understand petitioners apprehension at the prospect of re-hearing the case;

after all, it has been nine years since the filing of the Complaint.However, their claim
and the evidence supporting it -- and respondents as well -- can be best threshed out
and justly resolved in the lower court. In this regard, we cannot pass upon the validity
of the Agreement of Partition between Mariano de Guia and Ciriaco de Guia, for such
action would amount to a prejudgment of the case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 [ GR Nos. 99289-90, Jan 13, 1992 ]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. CONRADO M.

VASQUEZ +

DECISION

G.R. Nos. 99289-90

REGALADO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction, and the addendum thereto, petitioner seeks to enjoin

the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila from

proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic

Act No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for

violation of Presidential Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case

No.91-94897 for libel.

In Criminal Case No. 16698[1] filed before the Sandiganbayan,

petitioner stands charged as follows:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused

Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the

Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and

 Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest,

partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

criminally approve the application for legalization of

aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,

1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated

April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of

the same, thereby causing undue injury to the

government and giving unwarranted benefits and

advantage to said aliens in the discharge of the official

and administrative functions of said accused.

Contrary to law."

In Criminal Case No 91-94555[2] pending before the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, petitioner, together with Daisy Montinola and

Fermin Pacia, are accused of a violation of Presidential Decree No.

46 allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola

and Fermin Pacia, all public officers, being then the

Commissioner, Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry

and employee of the Commission on Immigration and

 Deporta-tion, respectively, in conspiracy with each

other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawful-ly and

criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and other

valuable things from several (F)ilipino and foreign

businessmen the same being given by reason of their

respective official positions for past favor and expected

favor and better treatment in the future from said

accused, in the discharge of their respective official

functions.

Contrary to law."

The information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor with

the Regional Trial Court of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case

No. 91-94897[3] indicts petitioner for the crime of libel, as follows:

"That on or about May 24, 1988, at the Office of the

Commission on Immigration and Deportation, Port

Area, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdictions

of this Honorable Court, the accused, Miriam

Defensor-Santiago, a public officer, being then the

Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and

Deportation, acting in such capacity and taking

advantage of her official position, did then and there

with malice aforethought, wilfully, unlawfully and

 feloniously call, utter, state, impute and make

scurrilous and defamatory statements against Maria S.

Tatoy, by portraying the latter, then Chief of the

Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and

Deportation to be a corrupt employee, a perennial

trouble-maker who has filed administrative cases

against all the commissioners under whom she served

and the Certificate Section of which she was the head as

'not only useless but the most corrupt unit in the CID',

in the presence of newspaper reporters and media

personalities, thereby finding print in the newspapers,

which tend to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt

of said Maria S. Tatoy, to the damage and prejudice of

the latter.

Contrary to law."

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24,

1991[4] ordering the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 3, to respectively cease and desist from proceeding with

Criminal Informations Nos. 11698 for violation of Republic Act No.

3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of Presidential Decree

No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took into

consideration the fact that, according to petitioner, her

arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably

advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and

affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right

to meet said contingency.

Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations,

respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminal charges are

meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, in

violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which

provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be

free from any form of harassment and discrimination."

Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very

essence of fair play by choosing to file the informations at a time

when petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the injuries which

she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only after three (3) years

from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in 1988 by

disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and

Deportation (CID); and that in filing the criminal informations just

a year before the presidential elections, respondent Ombudsman in

effect wants to detain petitioner by reason of her political

aspirations. She further submits that the instant petition seeks to

prevent respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from

proceeding against her in an oppressive and vindictive manner and

to afford adequate protection to her constitutional rights. She

consequently posits that, on the foregoing premises, her present

recourse should be considered as an exception to the general

prohibition against petitions of this nature in criminal cases.

In their Comment, respondents Ombudsman and Special

Prosecutor refute the claims of petitioner, explaining in the process

the sequence of events which led to the filing of the three (3)

informations, in this wise:

"The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and Criminal

Case No. 91-94555were taken cognizance of by the Office of the

Ombudsman upon the same having been prominent-ly published

in the January 10, 1989 issue of the 'Manila Standard'. The

investigation was originally handled by then Investigator Gualberto

de la Llana but, on request of the petitioner, was reassigned to the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime in March,

1989. The case was handled by an investigating panel which

submitted its draft resolution only on March 29, 1990. After the

usual reviews by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, and of the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the resolution was

submitted for final action of respondent Ombudsman in late March,

1991.

"A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the

issuance by the Ombudsman of the Memorandum for

the Office of the Special Prosecutor directing the filing

of the two (2) informations which have been docketed

as Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and

Criminal Case No. 91-94555 of the Manila Regional

Trial Court x x x.

"The said Memorandum, as may be noted on the face

thereof, is dated April 26, 1991, or two (2) days before

petitioner met the vehicular accident on April 28, 1991.

"Respondent Ombudsman received the informations

prepared by the Office of the Special Prosecutor only on

May 13, 1991. Per office routine, after respondent

Ombudsman approved the informations, they were

forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor which

filed the same in the appropriate courts on May 13,

1991.

"The record thus attests to the fact that the filing of

Criminal Cases Nos. 16698 and 91-94555 was already a

settled matter as early as two days before petitioner's

unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was in

accordance with routine procedure, and impelled in

some way by media's impatient and irritating inquiries

as to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the

petitioner's cases, induced no doubt by premature

persistent false reports that the cases against petitioner

had been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

"With respect to the libel case which was filed with the

Manila Regional Trial Court on May 24, 1991, docketed

therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897, the record will

also show that the information in this case could have

been filed as early as October 12, 1990 when the

resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner

for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman. x x

x How-ever, on the day it was to be filed, some lawyers

of the petitioner came and asked the respondent

Ombudsman to defer the filing of the information

inasmuch as they intend to file a motion for

reinvestigation, which they did on October 29, 1990.

The reinvestigation was denied in a Memorandum

dated 25 March 1991 of Special Prosecution Officer

 Reynaldo L. Mendoza (approved by respondent

Ombudsman on April 22, 1991) and an information was

subsequently filed on May 24, 1991.

"Like in the previous two (2) cases, the filing of

Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel had no relation at

all to the accident which befell the petitioner on April

28, 1991. Its filing after that accident was caused by a

clearly delaying tactic on the part of the petitioner. It is

rather unkind for petitioner to impute ill-motivation on

the part of the respondents for something she herself is

to blame."[5]

The Court accordingly also takes note of the aforesaid disclosures of

respondent Ombudsman that it was petitioner, personally or

through counsel, who made representations with said respondent

which he granted and caused him to defer action for some time on

the complaints which were ultimately filed against her.

It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition

will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that

public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately

investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in

specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to

afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.[6]

The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had

authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary

investigation or to file an information as in the case at bar.

Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretion and

is endowed with the competence to determine whether the

complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to merit such

referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the

first instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of

are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The Special

Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss

the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigative and

adjudicatory proceedings.[7] But if, as emphasized by respondent

Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during the preliminary

investigation constitute very valid grounds to charge petitioner

Santiago and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan and the

Regional Trial Courts of Manila," no compelling reason would exist

for us to rule otherwise.

Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to

enjoin criminal prosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to

prevent the strong arm of the law from being utilized in an

oppressive and vindictive manner.[8] She then postulates that as

one who has consistently topped all major presidential surveys

from 1990 to 1991, the filing of the information's against her will

prejudice her standing in the presidential surveys. This is,

contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a mere

verisimilitude.

At any rate, we definitely cannot subordinate the demands of public

interest and policy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner.

We have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to

the pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the

informations in question were filed with the vindictive intention to

oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate her

constitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed to

impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public

respondents. Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that,

and convincingly explains why, he "has no purpose, motive nor

desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the

highest position in the land."[9] This is made no more apparent

than in the various memoranda[10] approved by respondent

Ombudsman establishing that the admitted facts of record are

sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes

charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisite

quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases.

Petitioner submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and

raises the following defenses: that the donations received were not

for personal use but were distributed to the CID employees in a

raffle held during the CID Christmas party; that the legalization of

aliens who arrived the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in

accordance with the authority vested in her by Executive Order No.

324 and was intended to assure family unity; and that the

defamatory words were made against Maria Tatoy only in

self-defense.

We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass

upon these asseverations of petitioner which we note have

previously been raised during the preliminary investigation. She

will of course, have all the opportunity to ventilate and substantiate

the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these

cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora

for the adjudication thereof. Accordingly, we quote with approval

this portion of the Comment of respondent Ombudsman:

"In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the

petitioner had not made any denial of the operative

facts on the basis of which the charges have been filed.

Instead, petitioner relies on her perceived defenses on

her interpretation of the said acts and the laws

applicable thereto.

"Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of

P.D. 46, petitioner admits the solicitation of donations

and the giving of the same by those from whom such

donations were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act

by claiming that the donations were not given for her

'personal use' but for the purpose of the Christmas

party of the Commission on Immigration and

Deportation. Whether this claim would negate the

applicability of P.D. 46 would involve an inquiry into

certain facts which could only be ascertained during the

trial of the case. Significantly, petitioner had not denied

that the solicitation of said gifts was at her instance, and

that she even scolded a certain Renato Orlanda whom

she requested to sign the solicitation letters, but who

refused to do so for fear of committing a violation of the

law punishing such act.

"With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a

violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner has

also not denied that she admitted and approved the

legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines

after January 1, 1984, which act is contrary to the

express provision of Executive Order No. 324. She

reasons out her doing so by putting forth certain alleged

principles and provisions of the same Executive Order

which could be interpreted as giving her such authority

to disregard the express prohibition in Executive Order

No. 324. Again, these are matters of defense which the

petitioner should prove during the trial.

"In the libel case (Criminal Case No. 91-94897),

petitioner likewise admits having uttered the words

constituting the bases thereof in a television interview.

She does not deny its libelous nature. She claims

justification for having uttered the defamatory words

against complainant Maria Tatoy on the ground of

self-defense. Allegedly, Tatoy in an earlier interview,

had mentioned about desiring to form a labor union

among the employees of CID, but that the petitioner

was against such move. Respondents fail to see how

said statement of Tatoy could be considered as

 defamatory to justify a libelous response thereto on the

ground of self-defense."[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are

hereby DISMISSED,the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the

temporary restraining order issued in this case is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR NO. 157866, Feb 14, 2007 ]

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS v. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL

PAREDES +

DECISION

544 Phil. 635

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With

Prayer For Provisional Remedy filed by petitioners Augusto

Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14

February 2003 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

124, Caloocan City, denying their Motion to Suspend Execution in

Civil Case No. C-19097.

The instant controversy arose from a verified complaint for

Ejectment filed by private respondent Avelino Banaag on 31

January 1997 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch

49, Caloocan City, against petitioners. Private respondent alleged

that he is the registered owner of the disputed property identified

as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan

City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025

of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Private respondent

averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property

without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were

made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate

the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the

matter to the Lupon Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse

proved futile since the parties were not able to settle

amicably. Private respondent then filed an ejectment suit before

the MeTC.

On 23 April 1997, petitioners filed their answer denying having

unlawfully deprived private respondent possession of the contested

property. Petitioners claimed that they have resided in the subject

lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,

Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO),

as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO's

president in their favor.

On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To

Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is

part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85,

in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of

Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and

demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that

the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in

Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National

Capital Region.

In an order dated 7 August 1997, the MeTC denied said

manifestation and motion. It ratiocinated that the injunction

issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the

territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is

not within the territorial area of same, the injunction it issued is

null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

For failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise agreement

during the preliminary conference, they were required to submit

their respective position papers containing their positions on the

following issues: (a) whether or not the torrens title of private

respondent is a valid basis of his right to eject petitioners, (b)

whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and

(c) whether either the private respondent or petitioners are entitled

to their respective claims for damages.

In their position paper, petitioners insisted that they are entitled to

the possession of the land because they have been occupants

thereof as early as 1978, long before the property was acquired by

private respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long,

the MeTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as

ejectment suit applies only to instances where possession of the

land lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition,

they claimed that private respondent has not proffered any

evidence that he has prior physical possession over the property.

Petitioners reiterated their posture in the motion to suspend

proceedings wherein they urged the MeTC to respect the Writ of

Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. They also

alleged that private respondent's certificate of title originated from

a fictitious title.

In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private

respondent. It opined that TCT No. 196025 in private respondent's

name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his

inherent right to possess the same. This title entitled private

respondent better right to possess the subject property over

petitioners' Certificate of Occupancy executed in their favor by

PIADECO. It held that it has jurisdiction over the controversy

since private respondent filed the case within one year from the

time the demand to vacate was given to petitioners. The decretal

portion of the decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the

plaintiff, ordering defendants Augusto Mangahas,

Victor Solis, Elisa M. Dionila, Joselito Mangahas and

Rogelio Verdejo and all persons claiming right under

them as follows:

1) To vacate the lot in question by removing their

houses erected thereat and restore possession of the lot

to the plaintiff;

2) To pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for their

use of the premises for the period from August, 1996

until the property is vacated at the rate of two thousand

(P2,000.00) pesos per month;

3) To reimburse to plaintiff the sum of ten thousand

(P10,000.00) pesos as and for attorney's fees; [and]

4) To pay the costs of this suit.[2]

On 2 December 1999, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case

was docketed as Civil Case No. C-19097. In a Decision dated 16

November 2000, the trial court affirmed in toto the MeTC

decision. It ruled that the MeTC was correct in denying

petitioners' motion to suspend proceedings anchored on the Writ of

Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC reasoning

that the writ of the latter court is limited only to its territorial area,

thus, the same has no binding effect on the MeTC of Caloocan

City. It sustained the MeTC's ruling that the latter court has

jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed within the

reglementary period from the date of demand to

vacate. Furthermore, the RTC stated that the validity of private

respondent's title cannot be assailed collaterally in the instant case.

On 18 December 2000, petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration which the RTC denied in a resolution dated 1 June

2001.

Unfazed, petitioners appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of

Appeals on 6 June 2001 which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

65076.
In a Decision[3] dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was,

likewise, denied in a Resolution dated 20 November 2002.

The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on

13 December 2002.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 2000, private respondent filed with

the RTC a motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed

by petitioners. In an order dated 12 September 2001, the RTC

granted the motion.

To implement and enforce its decision, the same court on 27

September 2001 issued a Writ of Execution. On 28 September

2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Reconsider Order dated 12

September 2001 which was denied in an order dated 5 February

2002.

On 17 January 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend

Execution before the RTC. Said motion was denied in an order

dated 14 February 2003. On 05 March 2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho

implemented and enforced the writ of execution.

Hence, the instant recourse.

At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners' direct recourse

to this Court viapetition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari,

Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter

disregard of the hierarchy of courts and should have been

dismissed outright. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs

of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas

corpus and injunction is not exclusive.[4] It is shared by this Court

with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.[5] Such

concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the petitioners unbridled

freedom of choice of court forum.[6] A direct recourse of the

Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be

allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,

clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[7]

In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or

compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence,

the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Equally noteworthy is petitioners' resort to this Court through

petition for declaratory relief. This action is not among the

petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court.[8] Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions

for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e.,

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or

validity of statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is

exclusive, petitioners' action to declare the RTC order denying their

motion to suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated,

should warrant the outright dismissal of this case.[9]

At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already

been elevated, this Court deems it wise to resolve the controversy

on the merits.

Petitioners assail the Order dated 14 February 2003 of the RTC

Caloocan City and its Decision dated 16 November 2000 on the sole

ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order and

Decision by virtue of the Writ of Injunction issued on 10 November

1997 by the Quezon City RTC.

It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the

injunction order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already
been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 65076 affirmed the Decision of the RTC in Civil

Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had become final and executory

per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002.[10] The relevant

portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:

The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary

Injunction dated November 10, 1997 which emanated

from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should

have prompted the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan

City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then

pending before it. It was the petitioners' contention

that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is

enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both

cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of

the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically

regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232

SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the

territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits

(OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995).

 Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to

each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the

territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial

Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus

defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the

branch concerned for purposes of determining the

venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil

or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may

exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"

Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners'
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction
writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate

presides.[11]

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon

City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle,

whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision

was predicated continue.[12] Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court

has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent
appeal.[13] The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be

terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of

his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[14]

Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already
been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there

would be no end to litigation. As elucidated in Hufana v. Genato[15]:

It is well established that when a right or fact has been

judicially tried and determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should

be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with

them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of

the case and what was once irrevocably established as

the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be

binding between the same parties as long as the facts on

which the decision was predicated, continue to be the

facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding

effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be

relitigated anew since said issue had already been

resolved and finally laid to rest in that aforementioned

case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by

the principle of res judicata, but at least by

conclusiveness of judgment.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners'
motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won
case. It must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when

subsequent events would render execution of judgment unjust.[16] Petitioners did not allege

nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to
vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners' Motion to Supend Execution dated 14

February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR NO. 157866, Feb 14, 2007 ]

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS v. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL

PAREDES +

DECISION

544 Phil. 635

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With

Prayer For Provisional Remedy filed by petitioners Augusto

Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14

February 2003 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

124, Caloocan City, denying their Motion to Suspend Execution in

Civil Case No. C-19097.

The instant controversy arose from a verified complaint for

Ejectment filed by private respondent Avelino Banaag on 31

January 1997 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch

49, Caloocan City, against petitioners. Private respondent alleged

that he is the registered owner of the disputed property identified

as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan

City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025

of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Private respondent

averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property

without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were

made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate

the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the

matter to the Lupon Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse

proved futile since the parties were not able to settle

amicably. Private respondent then filed an ejectment suit before

the MeTC.

On 23 April 1997, petitioners filed their answer denying having

unlawfully deprived private respondent possession of the contested

property. Petitioners claimed that they have resided in the subject

lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,

Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO),

as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO's

president in their favor.

On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To

Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is

part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85,

in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of

Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and

demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that

the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in

Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National

Capital Region.

In an order dated 7 August 1997, the MeTC denied said

manifestation and motion. It ratiocinated that the injunction

issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the

territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is

not within the territorial area of same, the injunction it issued is

null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

For failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise agreement

during the preliminary conference, they were required to submit

their respective position papers containing their positions on the

following issues: (a) whether or not the torrens title of private

respondent is a valid basis of his right to eject petitioners, (b)

whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and

(c) whether either the private respondent or petitioners are entitled

to their respective claims for damages.

In their position paper, petitioners insisted that they are entitled to

the possession of the land because they have been occupants

thereof as early as 1978, long before the property was acquired by

private respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long,

the MeTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as

ejectment suit applies only to instances where possession of the

land lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition,

they claimed that private respondent has not proffered any

evidence that he has prior physical possession over the property.

Petitioners reiterated their posture in the motion to suspend

proceedings wherein they urged the MeTC to respect the Writ of

Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. They also

alleged that private respondent's certificate of title originated from

a fictitious title.

In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private

respondent. It opined that TCT No. 196025 in private respondent's

name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his

inherent right to possess the same. This title entitled private

respondent better right to possess the subject property over

petitioners' Certificate of Occupancy executed in their favor by

PIADECO. It held that it has jurisdiction over the controversy

since private respondent filed the case within one year from the

time the demand to vacate was given to petitioners. The decretal

portion of the decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the

plaintiff, ordering defendants Augusto Mangahas,

Victor Solis, Elisa M. Dionila, Joselito Mangahas and

Rogelio Verdejo and all persons claiming right under

them as follows:

1) To vacate the lot in question by removing their

houses erected thereat and restore possession of the lot

to the plaintiff;

2) To pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for their

use of the premises for the period from August, 1996

until the property is vacated at the rate of two thousand

(P2,000.00) pesos per month;

3) To reimburse to plaintiff the sum of ten thousand

(P10,000.00) pesos as and for attorney's fees; [and]

4) To pay the costs of this suit.[2]

On 2 December 1999, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case

was docketed as Civil Case No. C-19097. In a Decision dated 16

November 2000, the trial court affirmed in toto the MeTC

decision. It ruled that the MeTC was correct in denying

petitioners' motion to suspend proceedings anchored on the Writ of

Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC reasoning

that the writ of the latter court is limited only to its territorial area,

thus, the same has no binding effect on the MeTC of Caloocan

City. It sustained the MeTC's ruling that the latter court has

jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed within the

reglementary period from the date of demand to

vacate. Furthermore, the RTC stated that the validity of private

respondent's title cannot be assailed collaterally in the instant case.

On 18 December 2000, petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration which the RTC denied in a resolution dated 1 June

2001.

Unfazed, petitioners appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of

Appeals on 6 June 2001 which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

65076.
In a Decision[3] dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was,

likewise, denied in a Resolution dated 20 November 2002.

The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on

13 December 2002.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 2000, private respondent filed with

the RTC a motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed

by petitioners. In an order dated 12 September 2001, the RTC

granted the motion.

To implement and enforce its decision, the same court on 27

September 2001 issued a Writ of Execution. On 28 September

2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Reconsider Order dated 12

September 2001 which was denied in an order dated 5 February

2002.

On 17 January 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend

Execution before the RTC. Said motion was denied in an order

dated 14 February 2003. On 05 March 2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho

implemented and enforced the writ of execution.

Hence, the instant recourse.

At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners' direct recourse

to this Court viapetition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari,

Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter

disregard of the hierarchy of courts and should have been

dismissed outright. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs

of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas

corpus and injunction is not exclusive.[4] It is shared by this Court

with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.[5] Such

concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the petitioners unbridled

freedom of choice of court forum.[6] A direct recourse of the

Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be

allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,

clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[7]

In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or

compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence,

the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Equally noteworthy is petitioners' resort to this Court through

petition for declaratory relief. This action is not among the

petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court.[8] Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions

for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e.,

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or

validity of statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is

exclusive, petitioners' action to declare the RTC order denying their

motion to suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated,

should warrant the outright dismissal of this case.[9]

At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already

been elevated, this Court deems it wise to resolve the controversy

on the merits.

Petitioners assail the Order dated 14 February 2003 of the RTC

Caloocan City and its Decision dated 16 November 2000 on the sole

ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order and

Decision by virtue of the Writ of Injunction issued on 10 November

1997 by the Quezon City RTC.

It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the

injunction order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already
been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 65076 affirmed the Decision of the RTC in Civil

Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had become final and executory

per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002.[10] The relevant

portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:

The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary

Injunction dated November 10, 1997 which emanated

from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should

have prompted the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan

City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then

pending before it. It was the petitioners' contention

that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is

enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch [as] both

cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of

the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically

regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232

SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the

territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits

(OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995).

 Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to

each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the

territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial

Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus

defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the

branch concerned for purposes of determining the

venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil

or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may

exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"

Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners'
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction
writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate

presides.[11]

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon

City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle,

whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision

was predicated continue.[12] Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court

has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent
appeal.[13] The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be

terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of

his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[14]

Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already
been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there

would be no end to litigation. As elucidated in Hufana v. Genato[15]:

It is well established that when a right or fact has been

judicially tried and determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should

be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with

them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of

the case and what was once irrevocably established as

the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be

binding between the same parties as long as the facts on

which the decision was predicated, continue to be the

facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding

effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be

relitigated anew since said issue had already been

resolved and finally laid to rest in that aforementioned

case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by

the principle of res judicata, but at least by

conclusiveness of judgment.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners'
motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won
case. It must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when

subsequent events would render execution of judgment unjust.[16] Petitioners did not allege

nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to
vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners' Motion to Supend Execution dated 14

February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 93262, Nov 29, 1991 ]

DAVAO LIGHT v. CA +

DECISION

G.R. No. 93262

NARVASA, J.:

Subject of the appellate proceedings at bar is the decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 1967 entitled "Queensland

Hotel, Inc., etc. and Adarna v. DavaoLight & Power Co.,

Inc.," promulgated on May 4, 1990.[1] That decision nullified and

set aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Regional

Trial Court of Davao City[2] in Civil Case No. 19513-89 on

application of the plaintiff (Davao Light & Power Co.), before the

service of summons on the defendants (herein respondents

Queensland Co., Inc. and Adarna).

Following is the chronology of the undisputed material facts culled

from the Appellate Tribunal's judgment of May 4, 1990.

1. On May 2, 1989 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (hereafter,

simply Davao Light) filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum

of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc.

and Teodorico Adarna (docketed as Civil Case No. No.

19513-89). The complaint contained an ex parte appplication for a

writ of preliminary attachment.

2. On May 3, 1989 Judge Nartatez, to whose branch the case was

assigned by raffle, issued an Order granting

the ex parte application and fixing the attachment bond at

P4,600,513.37.

3. On May 11, 1989 the attachment bond having been submitted

by Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued.

4. On May 12, 1989, the summons and a copy of the complaint, as

well as the writ of attachment and a copy of the attachment bond,

were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant

to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.

5. On September 6, 1989, defendants Queensland and Adarna filed

a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to

issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was

promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,

1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the

cause and over the persons of the defendants.

6. On September 14, 1989, Davao Light filed an opposition to the

motion to discharge attachment.

7. On September 19, 1989, the Trial Court issued an Order denying

the motion to discharge.

This Order of September 19, 1989 was successfully challenged by

Queensland and Adarna in a special civil action

of certiorari instituted by them in the Court of Appeals. The Order

was, as aforestated, annulled by the Court of Appeals in its Decision

of May 4, 1990. The Appellate Court's decision closed with the

following disposition:

" * * the Orders dated May 3, 1989 granting the

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, dated

September 19, 1989 denying the motion to discharge

attachment; dated November 7, 1989 denying

petitioner's motion for reconsideration; as well as all

other orders emanating therefrom, specially the Writ of

Attachment dated May 11, 1989 and Notice of Levy on

Preliminary Attachment dated May 11, 1989, are hereby

declared null and void and the attachment hereby

ordered DISCHARGED."

The Appellate Tribunal declared that -

" * * While it is true that a prayer for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary attachment may be included in the

 complaint, as is usually done, it is likewise true that the

Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of

the defendant until he is duly summoned or voluntarily

appears, and adding the phrase that it be

issued 'ex parte' does not confer said jurisdiction before

actual summons had been made, nor retroact

jurisdiction upon summons being made. * * ."

It went on to say, citing Sievert v. Court of Appeals,[3] that "in a

proceeding in attachment," the "critical time which must be

identified is * * when the trial court acquires authority under law to

act coercively against the defendant or his property * *; " and that

"that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the

court over the person of the defendant in the main case."

Reversal of this Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 4, 1990 is

what Davao Light seeks in the present appellate proceedings.

The question is whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment

may issue ex parteagainst a defendant before acquisition of

jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his

voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

The Court rules that the question must be answered in the

affirmative and that consequently, the petition for review will have

to be granted.

It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has

been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff

has been vested in the court, but before acquisition of jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or

his voluntary submission to the court's authority), nothing can be

validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that

the validity of acts done during this period should be dependent on,

or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over

the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the

acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over

the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object

thereof.

An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the

complaint or other initiatory pleading.[4] By that act, the

jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the

action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity;[5] and it is

thus that the court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or

nature of the action.[6] And it is by that self-same act of the

plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other appropriate

pleading) --- by which he signifies his submission to the court's

power and authority -- that jurisdiction is acquired by the court

over his person.[7] On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant is obtained, as above stated, by the service of

summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary

submission to the authority of the court.[8]

The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of

routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons

issues to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the

sheriff, and finally, service of the summons is effected on the

defendant in any of the ways authorized by the Rules of

Court. There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time

between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service

of summons on the defendant. During this period, different acts

may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court which are of

unquestionable validity and propriety. Among these, for example,

are the appointment of a guardian ad litem,[9] the grant of

authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper

litigant,[10] the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a

matter of right without leave of court,[11] authorization by the

Court of service of summons by publication,[12] the dismissal of

the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.[13]

This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of

preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership

or replevin.[14] They may be validly and properly applied for and

granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules

of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or

other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at

any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken

into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any

judgment that may be recovered.[15] It is a remedy which is purely

statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction

of the provisions granting it.[16] Withal no principle, statutory or

jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before

acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the

commencement of the action or at any time thereafter."[17] The

phrase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to

the date of the filing of the complaint -- which, as above pointed out,

is the date that marks "the commencement of the action;"[18] and

the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the

defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying

quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced -- by the

filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and

other fees -- the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of

preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites

laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before

or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has

been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the

plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for

attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading

(counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial

Court to issue the writ ex parte at the commencement of the action

if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and

substance.

In Toledo v. Burgos,[19] this Court ruled that a hearing on a

motion or application for preliminary attachment is not generally

necessary unless otherwise directed by the Trial Court in its

discretion.[20] And in Filinvest Credit Corporation

v. Relova,[21]the Court declared that "(n)othing in the Rules of

Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory

requisites for the issuance of a writ of attachment." The only

pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon consideration of

"the affidavit of the applicant or of some other person who

personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists,

that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 ** (Rule 57),

that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be

enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or

the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to

recover, is as much as the sum for which the order (of attachment)

is granted above all legal counterclaims."[22] If the court be so

satisfied, the "order of attachment shall be granted,"[23] and the

writ shall issue upon the applicant's posting of "a bond executed to

the adverse party in an amount to be fixed by the judge, not

exceeding the plaintiff's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay

all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all

damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the

court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled

thereto."[24]

In Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

decided on April 18, 1989,[25] this Court had occasion to

emphasize the postulate that no hearing is required on an

application for preliminary attachment, with notice to the

defendant, for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of
the remedy ** (since the) time which such a hearing would take,

could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of

his property before a writ of attachment issues." As observed by a

former member of this Court,[26] such a procedure would warn

absconding debtors-defendants of the commencement of the suit

against them and the probable seizure of their properties, and thus

give them the advantage of time to hide their assets, leaving the

creditor-plaintiff holding the proverbial empty bag; it would place

the creditor-applicant in danger of losing any security for a

favorable judgment and thus give him only an illusory victory.

Withal, ample modes of recourse against a preliminary attachment

are secured by law to the defendant. The relative ease with which a

preliminary attachment may be obtained is matched and paralleled

by the relative facility with which the attachment may legitimately

be prevented or frustrated. These modes of recourse against

preliminary attachments granted by Rule 57 were discussed at

some length by the separate opinion in Mindanao Savings &

Loans Asso. Inc. v. C.A., supra.

That separate opinion stressed that there are two (2) ways of

discharging an attachment: first, by the posting of a counterbond;

and second, by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance.

1.0. The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious mode of

lifting an attachment already enforced against property, or even

of preventing its enforcement altogether.

1.1. When property has already been seized under attachment, the

attachment may be discharged upon counterbond in accordance

with Section 12 of Rule 57.

'SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon

giving counterbond. -- Atany time after an order of

attachment has been granted, the party whose property

has been attached or the person appearing in his behalf,

may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to

the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the

court in which the action is pending, for an order

discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the

security given * * in an amount equal to the value of the

property attached as determined by the judge to secure

the payment of any judgment that the attaching

creditor may recover in the action.* *'

1.2. But even before actual levy on property, seizure under

attachment may be prevented also upon counterbond. The

defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking
the discharge of the attachment by a counterbond. This is made

possible by Section 5 of Rule 57.

'SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. -- Theofficer

executing the order shall without delay attach, to await

judgment and execution in the action, all the properties

of the party against whom the order is issued in the

province, not exempt from execution, or so much

thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's

demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the

clerk or judge of the court from which the

order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the

applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such

demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the

value of the property which is about to be attached, to

secure payment to the applicant of any judgment

which he may recover inthe action. ** .' (Emphasis

supplied)

2.0. Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary

attachment may also be lifted or discharged on the ground that it

has been irregularly or improperly issued, in accordance with

Section 13 of Rule 57. Like the first, this second mode of lifting an
attachment may be resorted to even before any property has been

levied on. Indeed, it may be availed of after property has

been released from a levy on attachment, as is made clear by said

Section 13, viz.:

'SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or

irregular issuance. -- The party whose property has

been attached may also, at any time either BEFORE or

AFTER the release of the attached property, or before

any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon

reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the

judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court

in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge

the attachment on the ground that the same was

improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made

on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has

been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor

may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other

evidence in addition to that on which the attachment

was made. ** .' (Emphasis supplied)

This is so because, "(a)s pointed out in Calderon v. I.A.C., 155

SCRA 531 (1987), 'The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to

have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by

simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment

writ, instread of the other. Moreover, the filing of a counterbond is

a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously

sought out by the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which,

in most instances * * would require presentation of evidence in

a fullblown trial on the merits, and cannot easily be settled in a

pending incident of the case.'"[27]

It may not be amiss to here reiterate other related principles dealt

with in MindanaoSavings & Loans Asso. Inc. v. C.A.,

supra.,[28] to wit:

(a) When an attachment may not be dissolved by a

showing of its irregular or improper issuance:

" ** (W)hen the preliminary attachment is issued

upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's

cause of action; e.g., 'an action for money or property

embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to

his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a

corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or

clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by

any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful

violation of duty,' (Sec. 1 [b], Rule 57), or 'an action

against a party who has been guilty of fraud in

contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon

which the action is brought' (Sec. 1 [d], Rule 57), the

defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve

the attrachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering

to show the falsity of the factual averments in the

plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ

was based -- and consequently that the writ based

thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued (SEE

Benitez v. I.A.C., 154 SCRA 41) -- the reason being that

the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ

would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the

action. In other words, the merits of the action would

be ventilatedat a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at

the regular trial. Therefore, when the writ of

attachment is of this nature, the only way it can be

dissolved is by a counterbond (G.B. Inc. v. Sanchez, 98

Phil. 886)."

(b) Effect of the dissolution of a preliminary

attachment on the plaintiff's attachment bond:

 " * * . The dissolution of the preliminary attachment

upon security given, or a showing of its irregular or

improper issuance, does not of course operate to

discharge the sureties on plaintiff's own attachment

bond. The reason is simple. That bond is 'executed to

the adverse party, ** conditioned that the ** (applicant)

will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the

adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by

reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally

adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto'

(SEC. 4, Rule 57). Hence, until that determination is

made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the

attachment, his bond must stand and cannot be

withdrawn."

With respect to the other provisional remedies, i.e., preliminary

injunction (Rule 58), receivership (Rule 59), replevin or delivery of

personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also

issue ex parte.[29]

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court

prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant, as above indicated -- issuance of summons, order of

attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointment of

guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute

the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by the

plaintiff as it matter of right without leave of court[30] -- and

however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not

and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless

jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court,

either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or

his voluntary submission to the court's authority. Hence, when the

sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the

writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not

only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of

the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule

57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a

copy of the complaint and order for appointment of

guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicitly directed by Section 3,

Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of all such documents is

indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness,

to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the

grounds therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent

attachment of his property by the posting of a counterbond in an

amount equal to the plaintiffs claim in the complaint pursuant to

Section 5 (or Section 12), Rule 57, or dissolving it by causing

dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in

Rule 16, or demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's

affidavit or bond in accordance with Section 13, Rule 57.

It was on account of the failure to comply with this fundamental

requirement of service of summons and the other documents above

indicated that writs of attachment issued by the Trial

Court ex parte were struck down by this Court's Third Division in

two (2) cases, namely: Sievertv. Court of Appeals,[31] and BAC

Manufacturing and Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et

al.,[32] In contrast to the case at bar -- where the summons and a

copy of the complaint, as well as the order and writ of attachment

and the attachment bond were served on the defendant -- in Sievert,

levy on attachment was attempted notwithstanding that only the

petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was

served on the defendant, without any prior or accompanying

summons and copy of the complaint; and in BAC Manufacturing

and Sales Corporation, neither the summons nor the order

granting the preliminary attachment or the writ of attachment itself

was served on the defendant "before or at the time the levy was

made."

For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and

reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment may properly

issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant

requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it

may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with

notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the

writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or

contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of

summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of

guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not

incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the

order of attachment, and the plaintiffs attachment bond.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the challenged

decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED, and the

order and writ of attachment issued by Hon. Milagros C. Nartatez,

Presiding Judge of Branch 8, Regional Trial court of Davao City in

Civil Case No. 19513-89 against Queensland Hotel or Motel or

Queensland Tourist Inn and Teodorico Adarna are hereby

REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR NO. 162416, Jan 31, 2006 ]

 CHESTER DE JOYA v. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ +

DECISION

516 Phil. 717

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court

to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent

judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for

violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in

relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts

that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable

cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him

and his co-accused.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the

Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the

filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall

personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and

its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss

the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to

 establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he

shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if

the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a

warrant issued by the judge who conducted the

preliminary investigation or when the complaint or

information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this

Rule.In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,

the judge may order the prosecutor to present

additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and

the issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty

(30) days from the filing of the complaint or

information.

x x x[1]

This Court finds from the records of Criminal Case

No. 03-219952 the following documents to support the motion of

the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest:

1. The report of the National Bureau of

Investigation to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito

R. Zuño as regards their investigation on the

complaint filed by private complainant Manuel

Dy Awiten against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia

Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated

estafa. The report shows that Hao induced Dy to

invest more than a hundred million pesos in State

Resources Development Management

Corporation, but when the latter's investments

fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy

as payment for his investments were dishonored

for being drawn against insufficient funds or that

the account was closed.[2]

2. Affidavit-Complaint of private complainant

Manuel Dy Awiten.[3]

3. Copies of the checks issued by private

complainant in favor of State Resources

Corporation.[4]

4. Copies of the checks issued to private

complainant representing the supposed return of

his investments in State Resources.[5]

5. Demand letter sent by private complainant to

Ma. Gracia Tan Hao.[6]

6. Supplemental Affidavit of private complainant

to include the incorporators and members of the

 board of directors of State Resources

Development Management Corporation as

participants in the conspiracy to commit the

crime of syndicated estafa. Among those included

was petitioner Chester De Joya.[7]

7. Counter-Affidavits of Chester De Joya and the

other accused, Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny S. Hao.

Also included in the records are the resolution issued by State

Prosecutor Benny Nicdao finding probable cause to indict

petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa,[8] and a

copy of the Articles of Incorporation of State Resources

Development Management Corporation naming petitioner as

incorporator and director of said corporation.

This Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the

existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a

warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would

lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an

offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It

bears remembering that "in determining probable cause, the

average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to

the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his

knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense

of which all reasonable men have an abundance."[9] Thus, the

standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less

stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As

long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the

accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a

warrant of arrest against him.

The foregoing documents found in the records and examined by

respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant

was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources

Development Management Corporation; that he issued several

checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation;

that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private

complainant, purportedly representing the return of his

investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient

funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being

incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of

its activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown

to establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of

arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of
the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should

be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely

determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of

an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to

determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally

review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a

probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial

evidence.[10] In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,

the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present

additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable that the

resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly

explains the bases for his findings that there is probable cause to

charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the

Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.

The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual

findings of the trial court, which include the determination of

probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in

exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the

prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause,

that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm

of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The

facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the

exception.

In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not

entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he

continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's

jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for

the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such

jurisdiction, thus:

x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how

the court acquires such jurisdiction:

1. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This

is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition

or initiatory pleading before the court by the

plaintiff or petitioner.

2. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:

This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or

submission by the defendant or respondent to the

court or by coercive process issued by the court to

him, generally by the service of summons.

3. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is

conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the

parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the

voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

4. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is

determined and conferred by the pleadings filed

in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in

a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by

their implied consent as by the failure of a party

to object to evidence on an issue not covered by

the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

5. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or

thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is

acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by

the court of the thing in question, thus placing it

in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment;

or by provision of law which recognizes in the

court the power to deal with the property or

subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction,

as in land registration proceedings or suits

involving civil status or real property in the

Philippines of a non-resident defendant.

Justice Regalado continues to explain:

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the

case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the

person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has

jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the

personal status of the plaintiff or property in the

Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest.

In such cases, the service of summons by publication

and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with

due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the

Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing

business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue

or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or

proceeded against before our courts or administrative

tribunals.[11]

Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner

to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its

jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the

court's jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold

the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of

arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows

an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process.

It should be remembered that he who invokes the court's

jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

NILO PALOMA, G.R. No. 157783

P e t i t i o n e r,

Present:

PUNO,

Chairman,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
 CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO,

MAXIMA SALVINO, BRYN Promulgated:

BONGBONG andVALENTINO

SEVILLA, September 23, 2005

R e s p o n d e n t s.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner NILO PALOMA

is in quest of the reversal of the Decision[1] and the Resolution,[2] dated 15

November 2002 and 01 April 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 42553, affirming in toto the Orders dated 12 March

1996 and 28 June 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
Palompon, Leyte, in Civil Case No. PN-0016, dismissing his complaint

for mandamus for being prematurely filed.

The undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and

as unraveled from the records, follow:

Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the

Palompon, Leyte Water District by its Board of Directors in 1993. His

services were subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No.

8-95[3] dated 29 December 1995, which was passed by respondents as

Chairman and members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water

District, namely: Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn Bongbong and

Maxima Salvino, respectively. The Board, in the same Resolution,

designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as Officer-in-Charge.[4]

Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition

for mandamus[5] with prayer for preliminary injunction with damages

before the RTC on 11 January 1996 to contest his dismissal with the

prayer to be restored to the position of General Manager.[6]

Petitioner obdurately argued in his petition that the passage of

Resolution No. 8-95 resulting in his dismissal was a capricious and

arbitrary act on the part of the Board of Directors, constituting a travesty

of justice and a fatal denial of his constitutional right to due process for

the grounds relied upon therein to terminate him were never made a

subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to explain the acts he

was said to be guilty of. Fundamental is the rule and also provided for in

the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that no officer or employee in the

Civil Service shall be suspended, separated or dismissed except for cause

and after due process, so stressed petitioner.[7]

On 25 January 1996, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the

petition for lack of jurisdiction and want of cause of action.[8]

On 12 March 1996, the trial court issued the assailed order

dismissing the petition, with the fallo:

WHEREFORE, all foregoing considered, the complaint

thus filed for mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ for Preliminary
Injunction with Damages is hereby DISMISSED for being a
premature cause of action. Without pronouncement as to costs.[9]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration likewise failed to sway the

trial court by Order dated 28 June 1996.[10]

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Complaint on 29 March 1996 with the Civil

Service Commission (CSC) against same respondents herein, for alleged

Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal.[11]

On 06 November 1996, the CSC issued its Decision[12] exonerating

respondents from the charge of violating the Civil Service Law when they

voted for the termination of petitioners services as General Manager of

the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Thus, the CSC dismissed[13] the

complaint filed by petitioner before it, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, the instant complaint of Mr. Nilo

Paloma former General Manager of Palompon Water District
against Messrs. Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn Bongbong
and Ms. Maxima Salvino for Violation of Civil Service Law and
Rules and Illegal Dismissal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of
prima facie case.[14]

In its Decision[15] dated 15 November 2002, the Court of Appeals

yielded to the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by

petitioner, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Orders of the
 Regional Trial Court dated 12 March 1996 and 28 June 1996 in
Civil Case No. PN-0016, are AFFIRMED in toto.[16]

Equally unavailing was petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was

denied by the Court of Appeals on 01 April 2003.

Affronted by the ruling, petitioner elevated the matter to us via the

instant petition, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17.[17]

The central inquiry raised in this petition is whether or not the

Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its challenged

decision. Concretely, we are tasked to resolve: (1) whether or

not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon,

Leyte Water District to reinstate the General Manager thereof, and (2)

whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal

dismissal of petitioner.

Petitioner, in his brief, is emphatic that the Court of Appeals

overlooked the fact that mandamus may lie to compel the performance of
a discretionary duty in case of non-observance of due process. He

enthuses that the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that as an

aggrieved party, he need not exhaust administrative remedies and may

resort to court action for relief as due process was clearly violated.[18]

Espousing a contrary view, respondents posit that petitioner

breached the rule against forum shopping as he filed another complaint

for illegal dismissal against them with the CSC after obtaining an

unfavorable ruling in his Petition for Mandamus filed before the

RTC.[19] Not only is petitioner guilty of forum shopping; he, too, is guilty

of submitting a false certificate against forum shopping as the

certification he appended with the present petition omitted the fact that he

had previously filed a similar case with the CSC, so respondents

say.[20] Respondents theorize, as well, that the instant case has already

been rendered moot by the dissolution of the Palompon, Leyte Water

District and its subsequent absorption by the municipal government of

Palompon effective 1 June 1999.[21] Finally, it is respondents resolute

stance that it was fitting for the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial courts

ruling dismissing the petition filed by petitioner inasmuch as Section 23

of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 128 indeed clearly states that the

General Manager shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.[22]

 We are not won over by petitioners avowals. The petition ought to

be denied.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides-

Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial

duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary

duty.[23] Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of

discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public

officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be

exercised and not that of the court.[24]

In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198,[25] otherwise known as THE

PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973,which was

promulgated on 25 May 1973, categorically provides that the general

manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors, viz:

Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of

the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall
appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an
attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their
compensation. Said officers shall serve at the pleasure of the
board.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on

15 August 1975 to read:

SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the

board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint,
by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties
and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure
of the board. (Emphasis supplied)

Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the

Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate petitioner because the Board

has the discretionary power to remove him under Section 23 of P.D. No.

198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.

The case of Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis

Society, Inc.[26] delineated the nature of an appointment held at the

pleasure of the appointing power in this wise:

An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing

power is in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with
the desire of the Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts
to replace the incumbent, technically there is no removal but only
an expiration of term and in an expiration of term, there is no
need of prior notice, due hearing or sufficient grounds before the
incumbent can be separated from office. The protection afforded
by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-Laws on Removal Of Officers
and Employees, therefore, cannot be claimed by
petitioner.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent

termination are clearly within the wide arena of discretion which the

legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is the

Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here,

considering that the petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the

formers services obviously ceased to be pleasurable to the latter. The

Board of Directors of a Water District may abridge the term of the

General Manager thereof the moment the latters services cease to be

convivial to the former. Put another way, he is at the mercy of the

appointing powers since his appointment can be terminated at any time

for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or

due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence,

petitioner is treading on shaky grounds with his intransigent posture that

he was removed sans cause and due process.

Yes, as a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service

shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law as

provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. As

exception to this, P.D. No. 198, which we held in Feliciano v.

Commission On Audit [28] to be the special enabling charter of Local

Water Districts, categorically provides that the General Manager shall

serve at the pleasure of the board.

Correlatively, the nature of appointment of General Managers of

Water Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14

of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,

otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

 Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which
shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the
service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing
authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent
with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to
the availability of funds.
The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:
(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment
is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of
funds for the same;
(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when
appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority or at his pleasure;
(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the
appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the
resignation, separation or termination of the services of the
incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished;
and
(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is
for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court has previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil

servants who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and whose

appointments are covered by Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules

Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 as cited above. Thus,

in Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[29] petitioner was hired

as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine

Assistance Program-BOT Center. In upholding the termination of his

employment prior to the expiration of his contract, we held that petitioner

serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. This Court ruled

in Orcullo

A perusal of petitioners employment contract will reveal that his

employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase unless
terminated sooner. Thus, while such employment is co-terminous
with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the
pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated
in his employment contract. We agree with the appellate courts
interpretation of the phrase unless terminated sooner to mean that
his contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996
to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30, 2000 if
terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP.
(Emphasis supplied)

Neither is it the Courts business to intrude into the Congressional

sphere on the matter of the wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of

the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do

not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a

statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the

government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional

grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it

transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No

such transgression has been shown in this case.[30]

 Moreover, laws change depending on the evolving needs of society.

In a related development, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo inked into

law Republic Act No. 9286, which amended Section 23 of P.D. No. 198

providing that thereafter, the General Manager of Water Districts shall

not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. Rep.

Act No. 9286 reads:

Republic Act No. 9286

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL

DECREE NO. 198, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE
PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS
AMENDED

Approved: April 2, 2004

...
Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 23. The General Manager. At the first

meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as
practicable, the Board shall appoint, by a majority
vote, a general manager and shall define his duties
and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be
removed from office, except for cause and after due
process. (Emphasis supplied.)

...

Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.[31]
 Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the

retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to

be of prospective application. The general rule is that in an amendatory

act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive

effect.[32] Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights

that have already become vested,[33] the rule in statutory construction is

that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation

unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a

retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from

the language used.[34]

First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it

should retroact to the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original

law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act No. 9286 that it

or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Third, Rep. Act No.

9286 is a substantive amendment of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has

changed the grounds for termination of the General Manager of Water

Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, shall serve at

the pleasure of the Board. Under the new law, however, said General

Manager shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due

process. To apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such

as the case at bar, will rob the respondents as members of the Board of
the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D.

No. 198 to terminate petitioner at their pleasure or discretion. Stated

otherwise, the new law can not be applied to make respondents

accountable for actions which were valid under the law prevailing at the

time the questioned act was committed.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was

terminated by the Board of Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23

of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9286.

Petitioner, next, heaves censure on the Court of Appeals for

subscribing to the trial courts view that the petition for mandamus was

prematurely filed. We recall in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton[35] that

water districts are government instrumentalities and that their employees

belong to the civil service. Thus, [t]he hiring and firing of employees of

government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil

Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Tanjay was

clear-cut on this matter:

. . . Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original

charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent
Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the country, they
come under the coverage of the civil service law, rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
 Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case

at bar is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e.,courts cannot and will

not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the

jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question

demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the

special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal

to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[36] In Villaflor v.

Court of Appeals,[37] we revisited the import of the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, to wit:

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to

apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the
question involved is also judicial in character. . .

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is

clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld
the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over the
payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In Concerned
Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
vs. Vasquez [240 SCRA 502], the Court recognized that the
MWSS was in the best position to evaluate and to decide which
bid for a waterworks project was compatible with its
development plan. (Emphasis supplied)
 In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies

like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the

employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is

within the field of their expertise.[38]This is consistent with the powers

and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the

Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law

and other pertinent laws,[39] including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the Decision and the Resolution dated 15 November 2002

and 01 April

2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

42553, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 136048. January 23, 2001]

JOSE BARITUA and JB LINE, petitioners, vs. NIMFA

DIVINA MERCADER in her capacity and as guardian of

DARWIN, GIOVANNI, RODEL and DENNIS, all surnamed

MERCADER; LEONIDA Vda. de MERCADER on her behalf

and on behalf of her minor child MARY JOY MERCADER;

SHIRLEY MERCADER DELA CRUZ; MARIA THERESA

MERCADER-GARCIA; DANILO MERCADER; JOSE

DANTE MERCADER; and JOSEFINA

MERCADER, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Manchester ruling requiring the payment of docket and other fees as a
condition for the acquisition of jurisdiction has no retroactive effect and applies only
to cases filed after its finality.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the April 17, 1998 Decision[1] and the October 28, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 40772. The decretal portion of said Decision reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing premises considered, the DECISION appealed
from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the loss of earnings of the late
Dominador Mercader is reduced to P798,000.00.[3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

 The Court of Appeals sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoang, Northern Samar (Branch 21). Except for the modification of the loss of
earnings, it affirmed all the monetary damages granted by the trial court to
respondents. The decretal portion of the assailed RTC Decision reads as follows:[4]

WHEREFORE, on preponderance of evidence, judgment is for [herein respondents]

and against [herein petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the former:

(a) As compensatory damages for the death of Dominador Mercader -- P50,000.00;

(b) For the loss of earnings of the late Dominador Mercader -- P1,660,000.00, more or
less, based on the average life span of 75 years from the time of his death who earned a
net income of P5,000.00 monthly out of his business;

(c) Actual damages of P30,000.00 receipted purchases of goods in Manila; P5,750.00

for the first class coffin and a 15-day wake services evidenced by a receipt marked Exh.
D; [P]850.00 for the 50 x 60 headstone, receipt marked Exh. E and P1,590.00 -- Deed
of Absolute Sale of a burial lot, marked Exh. F;

(d) 25% of whatever amount is collected by [respondents] from [petitioners] but no less
than P50,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per hearing by way of attorneys fees;

(e) As moral damages -- P50,000.00;

(f) As exemplary damages -- P30,000.00; and

(g) To pay the costs.

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:

The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. [Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed
a motion to dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or
for bill of particulars on the primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead Jose
Baritua as an indispensable party and that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong
and non-existent party. [Respondents] filed an opposition to the said motion and an
amended complaint.

In an Order dated December 11, 1984 the trial court denied the aforesaid motion and
admitted the amended complaint of [respondents] impleading Jose Baritua and alleged
the following:
(10) The late Dominador Mercader is a [b]usinessman mainly engaged in the buy and
sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and bring[s]
them to Laoang, Northern Samar for sale at his store located in the said locality;

(11) Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late Dominador Mercader boarded [petitioners]
bus No. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU at [petitioners] Manila Station/terminal, bound for
Brgy. Rawis, Laoang Northern Samar as a paying passenger;

(12) At that time, Dominador Mercader had with him as his baggage, assorted goods
(i.e. long pants, short pants, dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in [petitioners] bus;

(13) The late Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his destination considering
that on March 17, 1983 at Beily (Bugco) Bridge, Barangay Roxas, Mondragon,
Northern Samar, while he was on board [petitioners] bus no. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU,
the said bus fell into the river as a result of which the late Dominador Mercader died. x
x x.

(14) The accident happened because [petitioners] driver negligently and recklessly
operated the bus at a fast speed in wanton disregard of traffic rules and regulations and
the prevailing conditions then existing that caused [the] bus to fall into the river.

[Respondents] then filed a motion to declare [petitioners] in default which motion was
opposed by [petitioners]. [Respondents] withdrew the said motion prompting the trial
court to cancel the scheduled hearing of the said motion to declare [petitioners] in
default in an Order dated January 23, 1985.

In its answer, [petitioners] denied specifically all the material allegations in the
complaint and alleged the following:

2. The alleged person of Dominador Mercader did not board bus 142 at [petitioners]
Manila station/terminal x x x as a (supposed paying passenger). There is even no
statement in the complaint that Dominador Mercader (if it were true that he was a
passenger of bus 142 at the [petitioners] Manila station/terminal) was issued any
passenger-freight ticket conformably with law and practice. It is a fact of public
knowledge that, in compliance with existing rules and laws, [Petitioner] Baritua, as a
public utility operator, issues, thru his conductors, in appropriate situations, to a true
passenger, the familiar and known passenger and freight ticket which reads in part:

NOTICE

Baggage carried at owners risk x x x liability on prepaid freight otherwise declared.

xxxxxxxxx
Whole Fare Paid P ______________

Declared value ____________ x x x.

Description of Freight _____________________________

Signature of Owner.

3. It is also a fact of public knowledge that [Petitioner] Baritua does not have any
Manila station/terminal, because what he has is a Pasay city station.

4. [Petitioner] Baritua had no prior knowledge that, on or about March 17, 1983, and/or
previous thereto, the Bugko Bailey Bridge (across Catarman-Laoang road) in Barangay
Roxas, Mondragon, Northern Samar, was in virtual dilapida[ted] and dangerous
condition, in a state of decay and disrepair, thus calling for the concerned government
and public officials performance of their coordinative and joint duties and
responsibilities, to repair, improve and maintain that bridge, in good and reasonably
safe condition, but, far from performing or complying with said subject duties and
responsibilities, the adverted officials concerned, without just cause, not only failed and
neglected to cause such needed repair, improvement and maintenance of the Bugko
Bailey Bridge, on or prior to March 17, 1983, but also failed, and neglected to either
close the Bugko Bridge to public use and travel, and/or to put appropriate warning and
cautionary signs, for repair, improvement, maintenance, and safety purposes. So that,
as a proximate and direct consequence of the aggregate officials nonfeasance, bad faith,
negligence, serious inefficiency, and callous indifference to public safety, that Bugko
Bridge collapsed inward and caved in ruin, on that March 17, 1983, while Barituas bus
142 was cautiously and prudently passing and travelling across the said bridge, as a
result of which the bus fell into the river and sea waters, despite the exercise and
compliance by Baritua and his driver of their duties in the matter of their requisite
degree of diligence, caution and prudence, Baritua also exercised and complied with
the requisite duty of diligence, care, and prudence in the selection and supervision over
his driver, contrary to the baseless imputation in paragraphs 14 and 20 of the original
and amended complaints. Moreover, Baritua and his driver did not violate any traffic
rule and regulation, contrary to plaintiffs insinuation.

5. Furthermore, [Petitioner] Baritua and his driver have no causative connection with
the alleged death of Dominador Mercader who, according to a reliable source, was
already seriously suffering from a lingering illness even prior to his alleged demise.
Baritua also learned lately, and so it is herein alleged that Dominador Mercader
contributed considerably, to, and/or provided the proximate and direct cause of his own
death, hence, he himself is to be blamed for whatever may have happened to him or for
whatever may have been sustained by his supposed heirs, vis--vis the suit against the
wrong party.

6. Baritua and his driver, as earlier stated, did not commit any actionable breach of
contract with the alleged Dominador Mercader or the latters supposed heirs.

7. There is no factual nor any legal basis for plaintiffs proffered claims for damages.

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

8. Based on the preceding averments, plaintiffs have neither a cause nor a right of
action against [Petitioner] Baritua and his driver.

8.1. The allegation that supposedly the x x x [p]laintiffs are the compulsory heirs of the
late DOMINADOR MERCADER x x x (par. 8, complaint) is too vague and too broad,
as the subject allegation is a bare and pure conclusionary averment unaccompanied by
the requisite statement of ultimate facts constitutive of a cause or right of action.

8.2. Even assuming arguendo, without however conceding, plaintiffs statement of a

cause of action, the complaint is nonetheless replete with false and impertinent matters
which fit the rule on striking out pleadings or parts thereof. To mention only a glaring
few:

8.2.a. The allegation on exemplary damages x x x is impertinent and immaterial in the

complaint against a supposed employer. For, even theoretically assuming, without
however admitting a negligent act-omission on the part of a driver, nevertheless, in
such a hypothetical situation, the causative negligence, if any there was, is personal to
the wrongdoer, i.e., the employee-driver, to the exclusion of the employer.

8.2.b. The allegation on supposed minimum life of 75 years and on he expects to earn
no less than P1,680,000.00 x x x is false, a pure hyperbole, and bereft of factual and
legal basis. Besides, what jurisprudential rule refers to is only net earning. The law
abhors a claim, akin to plaintiffs allegation, which is manifestly speculative, as it may
not exist at all. Furthermore, the questioned allegation in the plaintiffs original and
amended complaints is not preceded by the requisite statement of definitive facts, nor
of any specific fact, which could possibly afford a rational basis for a reasonable
expectation of supposed earning that could be lost, or impaired.

8.2.c. Likewise, the allegations that allegedly x x x the late Dominador Mercader
boarded x x x Bus No. 142 x x x and that supposedly the latter had a baggage x x x
containing drygoods x x x in which case [petitioners have] to pay the value thereof in
such amount as may be proven by [respondents] in court during the trial x x x, apart
from being false, are offensive to the rule on concise statement of ultimate facts. The
assailed allegations also contravene Interim Rule 11, (i)f any demand is for damages in
a civil action the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. In consequence of this
averment, [respondents] have not yet paid the correct docket fee, for which reason,
[respondents] case may be dismissed on that ground alone.

8.3. In violation also of the same Interim Rule 11, regarding the requisite definitive
amount of claim, the allegation on the supposed funeral expense x x x does not also
indicate any specific amount. So with the averment on supposed moral damage which
may not be warranted because of absence of allegation of fraud or bad faith, if any,
there was, apart from want of causative connection with the defendant.

8.4. The allegation in paragraph 15 of the original and amended complaint is also a pure
conclusionary averment, without a factual premise.

9. [Petitioner] JB LINE, impleaded in the amended complaint, is merely a business

name and sole proprietorship of defendant Baritua. As such, JB Line is not a juridical
person, nor an entity authorized by law to sue and be sued, hence, it cannot legally be a
party to any action. With this averment, correlated with that in paragraphs 4-5 hereof,
[respondents] amended complaint is essentially a suit against a wrong party.[5]

The RTC, after due trial, rendered the aforesaid assailed Decision.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts award of
monetary damages in favor of respondents, except the amount of Dominador
Mercaders lost earnings, which it reduced to P798,000. It held that petitioners failed
to rebut the presumption that in the event a passenger died or was injured, the carrier
had acted negligently. Petitioners, it added, presented no sufficient proof that they had
exercised extraordinary diligence.

Hence, this Petition.[6]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our

consideration:
I

Did the honorable Court of Appeals (CA) gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed
to pass sub silencio the trial courts failure to rule frontally on petitioners plea for a bill
of particulars, and ignored the nature of respondents prayer in the complaint pleading
for an award of --
 a) P12,000.00 -- representing the death compensation;

b) An amount to be proven in court, representing actual damages;

c) P1,660,000.00 or more as may be proven during the trial, by way of loss of

earnings;

d) An amount to be proven in court as and by way of funeral expenses;

e) An amount to be proven during the trial, representing moral damages;

f) An amount to be determined by this Honorable Court, representing

exemplary damages;

g) An amount equivalent to 25% of whatever amount the plaintiffs would be

able to collect from the defendant but in no case less than P50,000.00 plus an
additional amount of P1,000.00 per hearing as and by way of Attorneys fees;

II

Did the CA also ignore the fact that the trial court was not paid the correct amount of
the docket and other lawful fees; hence, without jurisdiction over the original and
amended complaints or over the subject matter of the case;

III

Did the CA likewise arbitrarily disregard petitioners constitutional right to procedural

due process and fairness when it ignored and thrust aside their right to present evidence
and to expect that their evidence will be duly considered and appreciated; and

IV

In awarding excessive and extravagant damages, did the CA and the trial court adhere
to the rule that their assailed decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
laws on which they are based?[7]

Distilling the alleged errors cited above, petitioners raise two main issues for our
consideration: (1) whether the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, and (2) whether the CA disregarded petitioners
procedural rights.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

 First Issue: Jurisdiction

Petitioners contend that since the correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees
were not paid by respondents, then the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.

The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA,[8] held that [t]he court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. x x x.

Generally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the

commencement of the action,[9] unless such statute provides for its retroactive
application.[10] Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is
finally terminated.[11] The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first instance.[12]

The Manchester ruling, which became final in 1987, has no retroactive

application and cannot be invoked in the subject Complaint filed in 1984.The Court
explicitly declared:

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.[13] (emphasis supplied)

Second Issue: Petitioners Procedural Rights

Motion for a Bill of Particulars

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it passed sub silencio on
the trial courts failure to rule frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars.

We are not impressed. It must be noted that petitioners counsel manifested in

open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten
days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so.[14] He, however, filed the aforesaid
motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven days past the deadline set by the trial
court.[15] Moreover, such motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its
filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the
amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:

Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare
his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten
(10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of,
the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.[16] (emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners Right to Adduce Evidence

Petitioners also argue that their right to present evidence was violated by the CA,
because it did not consider their contention that the trial judges who heard the case
were biased and impartial. Petitioners contend, as they did before the CA, that Judge
Tomas B. Noynay based his Decision on certain chosen partial testimonies of
[respondents] witnesses x x x. They further maintain that Judge Fortunato Operario,
who initially handled the case, questioned some witnesses in an overzealous manner
and assum[ed] the dual role of magistrate and advocate.[17]

These arguments are not meritorious. First, judges cannot be expected to rely on
the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them. In
other words, the mere fact that Judge Noynay based his decision on the testimonies of
respondents witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of
petitioners. Second, we find no sufficient showing that Judge Operario was
overzealous in questioning the witnesses. His questions merely sought to clarify their
testimonies. In all, we reject petitioners contention that their right to adduce evidence
was violated.
Alleged Failure to State Clearly the Facts and the Law

We are not convinced by petitioners contention, either, that both the trial and the
appellate courts failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law involved in
the case. As can be gleaned from their Decisions, both courts clearly laid down their
bases for awarding monetary damages to respondents.

Both the RTC and the CA found that a contract of carriage existed between
petitioners and Dominador Mercader when he boarded Bus No. 142 in Pasay City on
March 16, 1983. Petitioners failed to transport him to his destination, because the bus
fell into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the
fall, he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning.
 We agree with the findings of both courts that petitioners failed to observe
extraordinary diligence[18] that fateful morning. It must be noted that a common carrier,
by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to carry
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do
so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.[19] In case of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755[20] of the Civil Code.

We sustain the ruling of the CA that petitioners failed to prove that they had
observed extraordinary diligence.

First, petitioners did not present evidence on the skill or expertise of the driver of
Bus No. 142 or the condition of that vehicle at the time of the incident.

Second, the bus was overloaded at the time. In fact, several individuals were
standing when the incident occurred.[21]

Third, the bus was overspeeding. Its conductor testified that it had overtaken
several buses before it reached the Bugko Bailey Bridge.[22]Moreover, prior to
crossing the bridge, it had accelerated and maintained its speed towards the bridge.[23]

We therefore believe that there is no reason to overturn the assailed CA Decision,

which affirmed that of the RTC. It is a well-settled rule that the trial courts factual
findings, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding, if they are
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
and influence.[24] As clearly discussed above, petitioners have not presented sufficient
ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.

Finally, we cannot fault the appellate court in its computation of the damages and
lost earnings, since it effectively computed only net earnings in accordance with
existing jurisprudence.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003]

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its

Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI, petitioner, vs. Hon.

 FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF

ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M.

CODILLA SR., respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction

over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city, it follows that regional trial courts have the power and
the authority to hear and determine such controversy.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

[1]

Court, seeking to annul the October 29, 1999 Order issued by the
[2]

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Civil Case
No. 3722-O. The decretal portion of the assailed Order reads as
follows:
For the foregoing considerations, this Court is not inclined to approve
and grant the motion to dismiss[,] although the municipality has all the
right to bring the matter or issue to the Supreme Court by way of
certiorari purely on question of law.
[3]

The Facts

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga

and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue
to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga
on October 31, 1997.

No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of

the joint session issued Resolution No. 97-01, which in part reads:
x x x IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED x x x to pass a resolution certifying
that both the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte have failed to settle amicably
their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the same to the
proper court for settlement by any of the interested party (sic).[4]

To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the
RTC of Ormoc City (Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the following grounds:
(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim;
(2) That there is no cause of action; and
(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has
not been complied with[.] [5]

Ruling of the Trial Court

In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the

RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local
Government Code had been substantially complied with, because
both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their
differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court
via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed
venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under
Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of
Kananga filed this Petition.[6]

Issue

In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of

whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an
independent component city.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

 Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the

authority to hear and determine a cause. It is a question of law. As
[7] [8]

consistently ruled by this Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is

vested by law. Because it is a matter of substantive law, the
[9]

established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [10]

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of
the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code
(LGC), which provides:
[11]

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary

Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among local government
units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the
same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within
the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of
different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on
the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or
more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement
within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it
shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the
issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to
above.
Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more highly
urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted
under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC,
[12]

it continued to exist and operate as such.

However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179. Section 89
[13]

thereof reads:
Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of
the Province of Leyte.
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or
highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city,
because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in
Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a
[14]

plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions

[15]

representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither

a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner
asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent
chartered city.[16]

Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a

component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute
with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component
city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them.
Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable
settlement was reached. A resolution to that effect was issued, and
the sanggunians of both local government units mutually agreed to
bring the dispute to the RTC for adjudication. The question now
is:Does the regional trial court have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim?
We rule in the affirmative.
 As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be
conferred or waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law
[17]

and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by

estoppel. It should not be confused with venue.
[18]

Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the

instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
[19]

as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law

[20]

provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a
municipality and an independent component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of
[21]

a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to
the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not
only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that
[22]

boundary disputes should be resolved with fairness and certainty. We

ruled as follows:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra
vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples
welfare. x x x.
 Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes have sown costly conflicts
in the exercise of governmental powers and prejudiced the peoples
welfare. Precisely because of these disputes, the Philippine National
Oil Company has withheld the share in the proceeds from the
development and the utilization of natural wealth, as provided for in
Section 289 of the LGC.[23]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged

Order AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 48754, Nov 26, 1941 ]

EMILIO V. REYES v. APOLONIO R. DIAZ +

DECISION

73 Phil. 484

MORAN, J.:

This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the

ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The

supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is

sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has duly filed his

certificate of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or

has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated

to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee

in his counter-protest.

Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the

Supreme Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction

of any trial court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised

Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3

and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate

jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior

court is in issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as

used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as

to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by reason of

its employment in a broader sense." (15 C. J. 735; Johnson vs.Wells,

91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626; Vinal vs. Continental Constr.,

etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597;

29 SE 452.) There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited

nothing which may lend the word "jurisdiction" therein used a

broader meaning than jurisdiction over the subject-matter. On the

contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law,

which is to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to cases

of vital importance involving questions of fundamental char- acter,

such, for instance, as the question of validity of statute, treaty or

ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which

may affect the very existence of the government, or criminal cases

wherein life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, we are of

the opinion, and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which confers

appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such

question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or

upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but that which has

reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial

court over the subject-matter as determined by law.

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and

determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in

question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is conferred by the sovereign

authority which organizes the court and defines its powers (Banco

Espafiol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off.

Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. Vera, G. R. No. 45674).

The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the

subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of

jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the

different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the

matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very

life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise

to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court

of the land. In the instant case, there is no such question of

jurisdiction as above described. Both parties agree that if the due

filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial

court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial

court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is,

therefore, no question between the parties as to what the

jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The

real question between them is one of fact whether or not the

protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not

until this fact is proved can the question of jurisdiction be

determined. Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction

within the purview of the legal provisions above quoted. Whether

certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the

pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be

true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question may

encroach upon issues completely foreign to those defined in the

pleadings, but in such case the question of jurisdiction that may

arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of

jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and

decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and

jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. (Banco Espafiol

Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No.

7, 3d Sup. p. 216.) But in some instances it is said that the court

should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15 C. J. 734;

Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587, 33 N.E. 676), meaning thereby that

the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues

raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be

distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the latter

being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings.

Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the

subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or

implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an

issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no

timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done

when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth,

jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is

involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for

instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the

defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to

that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At any

rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue

is a question that requires nothing except an examination of the

pleadings, and this function is without such importance as to call

for the intervention of this Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is a

well-settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not

private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the

ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and

which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any
question as to their illegality. (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781;

Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689; Cosculluela vs. Gaston, 63 Phil.

41).

Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for

further proceedings.