EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his
opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can
be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed,
is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and
laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are
all involved in the subject now to be considered.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce
the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status
of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional
questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is
as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating
these people.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a
permanent settlement,

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan
is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes
in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and

"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that
said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by
the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2
which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
 "Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the
Interior, on February 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for
the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which
they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation
of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff
of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and
2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon
the decide.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

 SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code,
which read as follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian

who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant
to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding
sixty days.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase
in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands
with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton
history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard
for the legislation on the subject.

II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book
VI, Title III, in the following language.

LAW I.
 The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at
Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on
November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law,
and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that
they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great
care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes.
To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at
various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious
memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved
that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from
one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal
benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives
rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted
and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance
and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and
who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of
their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes
more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies,
we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies,
and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the
laws of this title.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW VIII.

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long,
wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the
Spaniards.

LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY

HELD BY THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided
they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by
them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW XIII.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY,
OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of
the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos,
priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that
en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios,
we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered
fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.

Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE

"INDIOS."

We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than
two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in
the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.

LAW XXI.

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on
October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards
who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways
of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them,
the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes,
besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs,
idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which
we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the
imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not
be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care
in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers
who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos),
 who are children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate
them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as
an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand,
it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races
that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations
which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.

It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to
allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial
of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed
to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the
punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded
against, thus giving and customs of isolation.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within
the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study
of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local
 authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after
finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops
of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians,
Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for
the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of
proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well
as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following:

DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed
by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the
differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which
occupy a part of its territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules.
These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to
their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all
the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of
the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the
appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools,
and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the
administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first
day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in
the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously
indicated.

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only
in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose
the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of
these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the
bell.

5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined
in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia
Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their
lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought
by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the
prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other
transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained
and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.

9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity
among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural
law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and
give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the
exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for
twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect
such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.

10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered,
shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town
hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with
the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when
the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the
putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the
Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the
organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they
shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and
cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones
where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.

12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to
my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within
the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
 13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be
applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a

council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the
application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs
of provinces and priests and missionaries.

15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions
of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph
of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their
tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace
and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform.
Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for
the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and,
with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to
have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It
divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that
is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which
are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law.

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act;
Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963,
the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547,
548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because
referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL

GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers
by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions
shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire
the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his
supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order
and individual freedom shall be maintained.
 SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes
has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-
seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial
board.

SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by
the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions
in questions.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.

The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to
be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found
in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act
No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code
of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned
Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444,
2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.

The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code
of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)

D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving
to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion,
and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of
this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine
Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine
Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its
true meaning.

In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions
of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was
recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again,
the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the
"territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and
again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section
of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422,
Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)

If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.

At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce
the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so
many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."'
(See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands,
pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive
Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq,
and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the
Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian
tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:

. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-
called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without
compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact
that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence,
uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance.

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much
of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was
the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:

Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been
recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-
Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The
number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them
in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
 The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which
the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the
doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.

The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction
of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should
be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of
the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:

As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the
Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than
of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make
the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that
 all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations
with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,
including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they
live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much
a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject
to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated
with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not
come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living
with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax,
inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from
all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of
the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned.
Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition
similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes
are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations
are not subject thereto.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved
by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes
of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the
following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is
hereby published for the information of all concerned:

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that
they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes
may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .

Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same
law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so
attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other
members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule
should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case
may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for
former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a
man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the
well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection
or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same
as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,

Collector of Internal Revenue,

Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No.
1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April
16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations
is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a
minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled
to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the
law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The
opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:

In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person
in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the
person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No.
1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court
shall hold otherwise.

Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of
the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its
natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of
the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in
the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based
on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later
would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
 The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it
its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
religion of the individual.

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et
seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to
be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer
and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War
Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics
of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.

In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.

The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres
de Rozas de Filipinas, says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It
may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it
has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt
this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino
languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name
 was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back
into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."

The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine
(Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)

III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its
dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that
followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation
of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by
civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."

A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886],
118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives
Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and
since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and
of a complex character.

Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United
States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed
and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself,
by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without
the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part
of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only
mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in
other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these
relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation
not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union
or of the State within whose limits they resided.

The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance
to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever
the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race
 once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as
to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never
has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on
all the tribes.

In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their
interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected
to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the
limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts
to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political
in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff
[1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11
Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone
Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415;
Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286;
U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.)
Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full
authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians
thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.

The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing
upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of
Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged
in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and
were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from
the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of
the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated
some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from
the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued
an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha
Indian Territory.

The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest
and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it
was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government
had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws
passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse
with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the
persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned.
It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must
be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
 The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge,
in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States
or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.

2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of
the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory,
as the respondent has been directed to do.

4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within
the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts.
(See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation,
without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy
is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the
courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may
forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in
the United States.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in
his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to
the "necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454
of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with
the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution
of the law? Is not this "necessary"?

The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator
out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of
the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice
Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously
made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The
Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been
exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department."
(See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,
reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S.,
598.)

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?"
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people
who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as
plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and
none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to
discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the
court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian"
refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.

The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession
of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to
keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
 Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the
same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others
. . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own
will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of any free
government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will. But
it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety
of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure
of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the
safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197
U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person
of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As
enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live
an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that
purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right
to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done
by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland
[1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S.,
578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without
restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See
Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al.,
66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel
of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs,
or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to
all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S.,
82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery
shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment,
since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of
sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these
crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition
of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of
broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary,
no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219
U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be
held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its
purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and
add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not
interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not
doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and
that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the
foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation,
it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former
attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests
in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection,
the following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the
site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the
work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed
to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its
continuance and development.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to
be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:

"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a
nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy
to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with the object of
making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will
ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them."

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."
This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
 (a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.

(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.

( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-
Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in
order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given
to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to
organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the
control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude
and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with
their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the
more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in
the following unequivocal terms:

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement
and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate
means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social,
and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent
the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the
"habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully
formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here,
we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their
more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement
of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to
gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in
fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the
bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the
Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they
be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other
instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection
for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom
is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they
are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all
the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress
of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be
in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod
on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and
damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they
wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a
heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and
do not practise liberty in a rightful way?

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as
to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any
measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean
that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed
in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times
point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what
has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward
people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their
personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending
sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and
superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law?
To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful
citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward
brothers.
 The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities.
They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially
established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement
in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao
does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They
do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living
a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one
place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving
about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from
one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam
all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long
to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you
can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those
citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the
apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of
any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the
enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances.
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression
is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper
the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful
forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of
government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the
Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along
time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike
to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt
University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by
such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice
may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must
be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good
and the good of the country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should
be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments
of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is
a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077 June 12, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintifff-appellee,

vs.
JACOB ROSENTHAL and NICASIO OSMEÑA, defendants-appellants.

Claro M. Recto and Hilado, Lorenzo and Hilado for appellant Rosenthal.
Jose M. Casal for appellant Osmeña.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

Appellants, Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with having violated Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law, under the following
informations:

CASE NO. 52365

That in or about and during the period comprised between October 1, 1935 and January 22, 1936,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the said Nicasio Osmeña and Jacob Rosenthal, two of ten promoters, organizers, founders
and incorporators of, the former being, in addition, one of the members of the board of directors
of, the O.R.O. Oil Co., Inc., a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines
and registered in the mercantile registry of the Bureau of Commerce, with central office in the
said city, the main objects and purposes of which were "to mine, dig for, or otherwise obtain from
earth, petroleum, rock and carbon oils, natural gas, other volatile mineral substances and salt, and
to manufacture, refine, prepare for market, buy, sell and transport the same in crude or refined
condition", and the capital thereof in their articles of incorporation, the accused herein included,
consisting of 3,000 shares without par value, 400 shares of which having been subscribed by the
said accused at 200 shares each and paid partly by them at the price of only P5 per share, according
to the said agreement which shares were speculative securities, because the value thereof
materially depended upon proposed promise for future promotion and development of the oil
business above mentioned rather than on actual tangible assets and conditions thereof, did then
and there, with deliberate intent of evading the provisions of sections 2 and 5 of the said Act No.
2581, and conspiring and confederating together and helping each other, willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously trade in, negotiate and speculate with, their shares aforesaid, by making personally or
through brokers or agents repeated and successive sales of the said shares at a price ranging from
P100 to P300 per share, as follows:

The accused Nicasio Osmeña sold 163 shares to nine different parties, and the accused Jacob
Rosenthal sold 21 shares to seven others, without first obtaining the corresponding written permit
or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as by law required.

CASE NO. 52366

That in or about and during the period comprised between October 1, 1935, and January 22, 1936,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the said Nicasio Osmeña and Jacob Rosenthal, two of the ten promoters, organizers,
founders and incorporators of, the former being, in addition, one of the members of the board of
directors of, the South Cebu Oil Co., Inc., a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines and registered in the mercantile registry of the Bureau of Commerce, with central
office in the said city, the main objects and purposes of which were "to mine, dig for, or otherwise
obtain from earth, petroleum, rock or carbon oils, natural gas, other volatile mineral substances
and salt, and to manufacture, refine, prepare for market, buy, sell and transport the same in crude
and refined condition", and the capital stock of which, as per agreement of all the incorporators
thereof in their articles of incorporation, the accused herein included, consisting of 2,800 shares
without par value, 200 shares of which having been subscribed by the accused Nicasio Osmeña,
and 100 shares of which having been subscribed by the accused Jacob Rosenthal and paid by both
at the price of only P5 per share, according to the said agreement, which shares were speculative
securities, because the value thereof materially depended upon proposed promise of future
promotion and development of the oil business above mentioned rather than on actual tangible
assets and conditions thereof, did then and there, with deliberate intent of evading the provisions
of sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581, and conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously trade in, negotiate and speculate with, their shares
aforesaid, by making personally or through brokers or agents repeated and successive sales of the
said shares at a price ranging from P100 to P300 per share, as follows:
 The accused Nicasio Osmeña sold 185 shares to nine different parties, and the accused Jacob
Rosenthal sold 12 shares to seven others, without first obtaining the corresponding written permit
or license form the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as by law provided.

Upon motion of Jacob Rosenthal, the Court of First Instance of Manila granted him separate trial
although, when the cases were called for hearing, the court acceded to the motion of the prosecution that
the two cases be tried jointly inasmuch as the evidence to be adduced by the government therein was the
same, without prejudice to allowing the defendants to present their proof separately. After trial, the lower
court, on March 22, 1937, in separate decisions, found the defendants guilty as charged in the
informations. In case No. 52365 Jacob Rosenthal was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs; Nicasio Osmeña was sentenced to
pay a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the
costs. In case No. 52366 Jacob Rosenthal was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs; Nicasio Osmeña was sentenced to
pay a fine of P2,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the
costs. The defendants duly perfected their appeal from these judgments and the cases were originally
elevated to the Court of Appeals but, upon motion of the Solicitor-General, the same were forwarded to
this court in view of the fact that the constitutionality of Act No. 2581 has been put in issue by appellants.
Two separate briefs have been filed by Rosenthal and Osmeña. In the brief for appellant Rosenthal the
following "joint assignment of errors" is made:

1. In declaring that according to the report of the geologist contracted by the O.R. Oil Co. and the
South Cebu Oil Co. to explore the properties leased to said companies, "no habia ninguna
indicacion de que hubiese petroleo en aquellos terrenos", when in truth what the report stated was
that in so far as the O.R.O. Oil Co. land was concerned, the territory covered by the lease if full
of possibilities; and with respect to the South Cebu Oil Co. lease, that no further investigations
and expenses be made "unless favorable test results are obtained on the northern lease."

2. In declaring that the exploration leases were, subsequent to the findings of the geologist,
cancelled by the government, implying thereby that as no oil was found in said lands, the leases
were cancelled; when in truth the cancellation was based on supposed violation of those provisions
of the corporation law prohibiting the setting up of interlocking directorates.
3. In declaring that the defendant, of his 200 shares of stock in the O.R.O. Oil Co., sold twenty-
one shares to different persons and on different dates, one share having been sold directly to one
E.F. Pimley; five, thru a firm of brokers known as Mackay & McCormick, to Arthur Hoyer, Wm.
Scheunig, and Modesto Bautista, in the proportion of two, two and one, respectively; and fifteen
shares directly to Henry J. Belden, R.T. Fitzimmons and D.P. O'Brien, in the proportion of five
shares to each of them — when in truth only that to E.F. Pimley was sold to the latter by the
defendant, while those eventually transferred to Hoyer, Scheunig and Bautista were sold directly
to the said firm Mackay & McCormick, which bought them on its own risk and account, and the
remaining fifteen transferred to Belden, O'Brien, and Fitzimmons were loaned by Rosenthal to
Nicasio Osmeña, who was not until now either returned those shares or paid their value.

4. In also declaring that of his 100 shares of stock in the South Cebu Oil Co., the defendant sold
twelve to various persons and on different dates, when in truth only one of these shares was sold
by the defendant to E.F. Pimley, and the remaining eleven, two of which were transferred to Arthur
Hoyer, two to William Scheunig, one to Jose de la Fuente, one to Crispin Llamado, one to A.M.
Opisso, and four to Ines Galano, were sold and transferred, in one single transaction, to the said
firm of brokers directly, which firm bought said shares on its own risk and account.

5. In declaring that the shares sold to Mackay & McCormick were brought by the latter on credit
at P250 each, to be resold by it at P300 each, and that out of the proceeds of the sale of these
shares the defendant received the price agreed upon between him and the said brokerage firm, or
P250 per share, when in truth and in fact there was no agreement between the parties as to whether
the said firm was to sell said shares to others or whether those shares were to be kept and retained
by it on its own risk and account.

6. In declaring that the corporations had not begun exploration work on the territory covered by
their leases, and that they had no tangible properties.

7. In declaring that while the defendant needed no permit to sell his own stock, the corporations
as issuer being the ones bound to obtain the permit required by the Blue Sky Law, nevertheless
he (the defendant) was guilty of a violation of said law because the possession of the shares held
and sold by him was not in good faith, in that his acquisition thereof was not made in the ordinary
and normal course of the business of the corporations, but that said shares were purchased to
indirectly promote the enterprise for which the corporations were formed; the said defendant
having paid in full to the corporations the value of said shares of stock.

8. In holding as proven that the possession of the defendant of his own stock, which he paid for
in full, was not a possession in good faith, because he, as an incorporator (fundador), should have
known that no permit in writing had been issued the corporations by the Insular Treasurer for the
sale of said stock.

9. In overruling the objection to the admission of Exhibit 1-b, and in holding that a permit had not
been issued by the Insular Treasurer for the sale of the stocks of the corporations.

10. In holding that there were repeated and successive sales made by the defendant Rosenthal of
his own shares of stock.

11. In holding that although the defendant was the absolute owner of the stock he sold, his repeated
and successive sales of such stock prove that this claim of ownership (esta pretension de
propriedad) was but a means employed by him to sell said stock at prices very much higher than
those he paid for them.

12. In holding that said stock was sold by the defendant without the required permit having been
first issued by the Insular Treasurer, and that the sale was effected as if such permit had been
actually issued (como si en realidad pudieran venderse por haberse expedido tal permiso).

13. In holding that as a result of an investigation conducted by the City Fiscal, the defendant
refunded to Belden, O'Brien and Fitzimmons and others the amount they paid for the stock they
purchased.

14. In holding that the opinion given by the Chief of the Insurance Division of the Office of the
Insular Treasurer to the effect that the defendant could sell the said stock without a permit as long
as no false representations were made by the said defendant, can not and does not exempt the
latter from criminal responsibility even though no false representations whatsoever were made by
the aforesaid defendant.

15. In holding that the prima facie presumption in section 8 of the law to the effect that the claim
of ownership is not bona fide when repeated and successive sales of such stock are effected, has
 been totally destroyed by the fact that said stock absolutely belongs to the defendant, and in not
further holding that because of such absolute ownership the defendant could have legally disposed
of such stock in as many sales as he saw fit without any permit from the Insular Treasurer.

16. In not holding that the Blue Sky Law contravenes the constitutional provisions of the Jones
Act in so far as such law constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers to the Insular
Treasurer, and in so far as it does not afford equal protection before the law.

17. In not absolving the defendant.

In the brief for appellant Osmeña the following "relacion conjunta de errores" is in turn submitted:

1. Al no sobreseer esta causa despues de promulgada la Ley No. 83 del Commonwealth, no obstante haberse llamado su
atencion al hecho de que esta Ley derogaba la Ley No. 2581 de la Legislatura Filipina, bajo cuyas disposiciones ha sido
procesado el acusado.

2. Al condenar al acusado por infraccion de la "Blue Sky Law", no obstante reconocerse en la decision que consta en las pruebas
que el acusado Osmeña no ha of recido en venta ninguna de aquellas acciones, ni ha hecho manifestaciones falsas a nadie para
poder venderlas, y que la mayor parte, si no todos los que las compraron, estaban satisfechos de la inversion de su dinero en la
adquisicion de tales acciones.

3. Al condenar al acusado por haber vendido acciones especulativas sin licencia, cuando no se probo: (a) que las acciones de
la O.R.O. Oil Co., Inc., y de la South Cebu Oil Co., Inc., eran especulativas por su naturaleza, y (b) que el acusado Osmeña
carecia de licencia para venderlas.

4. Al declarar que la posesion por el acusado Osmeña de sus acciones de la O.R.O. Oil Co., Inc., y de la South Cebu Oil Co.,
Inc., no era de buena fe y que no las habia adquirido por su propia cuenta sino para la promocion indirecta de un provecto de
negocio o empresa especulativa.

5. Al no declarar que la "Blue Sky Law" es contraria a las normas constitucionales que gozaba al tiempo de su promulgacion :
(1) porque contiene en sus disposiciones una delegacion indebida de facultades legislativas; (2) porque es vaga e incierte en
sus disposiciones y, por tanto, nula; y (3) porque infringe el derecho de igual proteccion ante la ley, viola la libertad de
contratacion y contraviene el derecho de adquirir, gozar y disponer libremente de la propriedad privada, siendo su
promulgacion, por tanto, un acto de opresion y de verdadera tirania.

6. Al no absolveral acusado Nicasio Osmeña..

To meet the foregoing errors assigned by the appellants, plaintiff-appellee contends:

(a) That the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 83 did not have the effect of relieving
appellants from criminal liability.

(b) That the appellants acted as promoters of the O.R.O. Oil Co. and the South Cebu Oil Co.

(c) That the shares of the two corporations are speculative in nature.
 (d) That the appellants sold their shares in said corporations without permit or knowing that the
latter did not have the permit required by law.

(e) That the appellants are not entitled to the exemption provided in section 8 of the Blue Sky Law
(Act No. 2581).

(f) That the Blue Sky Law is valid and constitutional.

Most of the errors assigned by the appellants deal with questions of fact. This is particularly true with
reference to errors one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen of
appellant Jacob Rosenthal, and error four of appellant Nicasio Osmeña. There is no material discrepancy
regarding the facts, and we shall proceed to consider the legal questions propounded, which are in the
main set forth by the Solicitor-General in his brief.

It is contended by the appellants that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds. (1) That it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer: (2) that it does not afford
equal protection before the law; and (3) that it is vague and ambiguous.

Under section 2 of Act No. 2581, every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to
offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under
obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated
therein and to pay the required tax of twenty pesos. Certain securities listed in section 3 are exempted
from the operation of the Act. Section 5 imposes upon the Insular Treasurer the mandatory duty to
examine the statements and documents thus filed and the additional duty to make or cause to be made, if
deemed advisable by him, a detailed examination of the affairs of the applicant. Section 5 also provides
that "whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the
examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the
right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue
to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person,
partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this Act, and that such person,
partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to offer the securities named in
said certificate or permit for sale"; that "said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, whenever in his
judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit", and that "an appeal from the
decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance."
Appellants argue that, while Act No. 2581 empowers the Insular Treasurer to issue and cancel certificates
or permits for the sale of speculative securities, no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide
said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making
his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being
unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. We are of the opinion that
the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding
the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act
must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor "has complied with
the provisions of this Act", and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law,
means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No.
2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a
certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation "is in the public
interest." In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against
"speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of
stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations", — we incline to hold that "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the
Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits. As we observed in the case of People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad (G.R. No.
45655, June 15, 1938), "siendo el objecto de la ley el evitar especulaciones ruinosas, es claro que el
interes publico, es, y debe ser la razon en que el Tesorero Insular deba basar sus resoluciones." And the
term "public interest" is not without a settled meaning.

Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated
criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is
a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The
purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show
the contrary. . . . (New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S., 12, 24, 25; 77
Law. ed., 138, 145, 146.) (See also Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495; 540;
79 Law. ed., 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711, 712.)

In this connection, we cannot overlook the fact that the Act No. 2581 allows an appeal from the decision
of the Insular Treasurer to the Secretary of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Insular
Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time
to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain
efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of
governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the
rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities
have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is
frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a
great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation
of powers and that is that the maximum of delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest
delegare, attributed to Bracton (De Legibus et Consuetudinious Angliae, edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press [1922], vol. 2, p.167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law
(D.17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation", not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments. The difficulty lies in the fixing of the limit and
extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to
decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative
purpose intended to be achieved.

Counsel for appellant Jacob Rosenthal also argues that the Insular Treasurer possesses "the discretionary
power to determine when a security is a speculative security and when it is not" because "he is given the
power to compel any corporation, association or partnership already functioning, to surrender to him for
examination its books and accounts enumerated in section 2, 'whenever he has reasonable ground to
believe that the securities being sold or offered for sale are of a speculative character.'" It should be
observed, however, that section 1 of Act No. 2581 defines and enumerates what are "speculative
securities" and all the other provisions of the Act must be read and construed in conjunction and harmony
with said section.

Laws of the different states of the American Union similar in nature to Act No. 2581 were assailed on
constitutional grounds somewhat analogous to those involved in the case at bar, but the decisions of both
the state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States have upheld their constitutionality. In the
case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co. (242 U.S., 539), the contention was made that the Blue Sky Law of
Ohio, which requires the commissioner before granting a license to "be satisfied of the good repute in
business of such applicant and named agents", and which empowers said commissioner to revoke the
license or refuse to renew it upon ascertaining that the licensee "is of bad business repute; has violated
any provisions of this act or has engaged, or is about to engage, under favor of such license, in illegitimate
business or in fraudulent transactions", is unconstitutional because the law has failed to give a standard
to guide or determine the decision of the commissioner leaves "room for the play and action of purely
personal and arbitrary power", but the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the contention and
held:

Besides it is certainly apparent that if the conditions are within the power of the State to impose,
they can only be ascertained by an executive officer. Reputation and character are quite tangible
attributes, but there can be no legislative definition of them that can automatically attach to or
identify individuals possessing them, and necessarily the aid of some executive agency must be
invoked. The contention of appellees would take from government one of its most essential
instrumentalities, of which the various national and state commissions are instances. But the
contention may be answered by authority. In Gundling vs. Chicago (177 U.S., 183), an ordinance
of the City of Chicago was passed on which required a license of dealers in cigarettes and as a
condition of the license that the applicant, if a single individual, all of the members of the firm, if
a co-partnership, and any person or persons in charge of the business, if a corporation, should be
of good character and reputation, and the duty was delegated to the mayor of the city to determine
the existence of the conditions. The ordinance was sustained. To this case may be added Red "C"
Oil Manufacturing Co. vs. North Carolina (222 U.S., 380, 394, and cases cited); Mutual Film
Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of Ohio (236 U.S., 230); Brazee vs. Michigan (241 U.S.,
340, 341). See also Reetz vs. Michigan, (188 U.S., 505); Lieberman vs. Van de Carr (199 U. S.,
552). (Pp. 553, 554.)

In the case of Leach vs. Daugherty (238 P., 160), where the contention was advanced that section 6 of
the Corporate Securities Act of California which authorized the corporation commissioner to refuse to
grant a broker's certificate, if he is not satisfied of the "good business reputation of the applicant", is
unconstitutional because "no rules, regulations, or specifications are set forth in the said Corporate
Securities Act defining what shall constitute 'good business reputation,'" it was ruled that "Considering
such objection, it would appear that the leading case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co. (242 U.S., 539; 37 Sup.
Ct., 217; 61 Law. ed., 480; L.R.A., 1917F, 514; Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643), is so conclusively against the
petitioner's contention that little room is left for argument", and that "it is well-settled principle of law in
this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of
facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a
regulated business."

In the case of G.F. Redmond & Co. vs. Michigan Securities Commission (222 Mich., 1; 192 N.W., 688),
in which it was argued that the provision in section 11955 of the Compiled Laws of 1915 (Michigan Blue
Sky Law), authorizing the commission to revoke a license for "good cause" upon notice to the dealer and
a hearing duly had, is unconstitutional because the term "good cause" is so vague and indefinite that the
law practically vested upon the commission arbitrary powers, the court said:

The term "good cause" for revocation, as employed in the statute, relates so clearly to the conduct
of the licensed business, within the limits fixed by law, as to negative any arbitrary official action,
and is so comprehensive of unlawful, irregular, fraudulent, unauthorized, and forbidden business
management and transactions conducted as to demand no more particular specification of its
meaning and its application.

Must the law map out , for the guidance of the licensee, a code of ethics and post danger signals
against inhibited and dishonest practices? The defendant had no right to have the conduct of its
business charted by specifications of forbidden practices involving revocation of the license. The
general scope and expressed purpose of the law, together with open and fair dealing, entered the
license, and transgression thereof constituted good cause for revocation thereof. (P. 689.)

In the case of State ex rel. Central Steam Heat & Power Co. vs. Gettle (Wis. [1928], 220 N.W., 201),
where it was argued that the requirement of the Wisconsin Blue Sky Law (St. 1925, sec. 184.09 [3]; Law
1927, c. 444) that the Railroad Commission shall find that the "financial condition, plan of operation,
and the proposed undertakings of the corporation are such as to afford reasonable protection to the
purchasers of the securities to be issued", is unconstitutional for the reason that (1) the Legislature has
no power to regulate the issuance of securities in order to protect the investing public; (2) the Legislature
does not provide a standard to control the commission; (3) the statute is so indefinite and uncertain in its
meaning as to be incapable of administration; and (4) the statute delegates to the railroad commission
legislative power, the court said:

This is but a usual provision found in the many so-called Blue Sy Laws, the constitutionality of
which has been upheld by the courts generally. The constitutionality of similar provisions has
been so thoroughly considered by this court that further discussion thereof is unnecessary. The
 following cases abundantly establish the constitutionality of this provision. (State ex
rel. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company vs. Railroad Commission of
Wisconsin, 137 Wis., 80; 117 N.W., 846; Appleton Water Works Co. vs.Railroad Commission of
Wisconsin, 154 Wis., 121; 142 N.E., 476; 47 L.R.A. [N.S.], 770; Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1160; State ex
rel. City of Milwaukee vs. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co., 169 Wis., 183; 172 N.W.,
230; City of Milwaukee vs. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 183 Wis., 498; 196 N.W., 853;
Wisconsin Southern Ry. Co. vs. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 185 Wis., 313; 201 N.W.,
244; Kretuzer vs.Westfahl, 187 Wis., 463; 204 N.W., 595.)

Another ground relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional is that it
denies equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his
securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions.
In disposing of this contention we need only refer to the case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co., supra, wherein
the Supreme Court of the United States held:

"Discriminations are asserted against the statute which extend, it is contended, to denying
appellees the equal protection of the laws. Counsel enumerates them as follows:

"Prominent among such discriminations are . . . between an owner who sells his securities in a
single transaction and one who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . "

We cannot give separate attention to the asserted discriminations. It is enough to say that they are
within the power of classification which a state has. A state "ay direct its law against what it deems
the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so
none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed . . .. If a
class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the
14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not
distinguishable from others not embraced in the law.

Counsel for appellant Nicasio Osmeña further alleges that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground
that it is vague and uncertain. A similar contention has already been overruled by this court in the case
of People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, supra. An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground
of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to
determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. The circumstance that
this court has no more than one occasion given effect and application to Act. No. 2581 (Valhalla Hotel
Construction Co. vs. Carmona, 44 Phil., 233; People vs.Nimrod McKinney, 47 Phil., 792;
People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, supra) decisively argues against the position taken by appellant
Osmeña. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held
invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and
give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can
devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the
reach of those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811.)

Reaffirming our view in People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, supra, we hold that Act No. 2581 is valid
and constitutional.

Taking up now the question raised with reference to the speculative nature of the shares of the ). O.R.O.
Oil Co. and the South Cebu Oil Co., we find that section 1, paragraph (b) of Act No. 2581, in defining
speculative securities, provides:

. . . The term "speculative securities" as used in this Act shall be deemed to mean and include:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) All securities the value of which materially depend upon proposed or promised future
promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets and conditions.

At the beginning, and at the time of the issuance of the shares of the O.R.O. Oil Co. and the South Cebu
Oil Co., all that these companies had were their exploration leases. Beyond this, there was nothing
tangible. The value of those shares depended upon future development and the uncertainty of "striking"
oil. The shares issued under these circumstances are clearly speculative because they depended upon
proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets and
conditions.

Appellants next contend that in view of the repeal of Act No. 2581 by Commonwealth Act. No. 83, they
have been relieved of criminal responsibility. Assuming that the former Act has been entirely and
completely abrogated by the latter Act — a point we do not have to decide — this fact does not relieve
appellants from criminal responsibility. "It has been the holding, and it must again be the holding, that
where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which penalized the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law." (People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil.,
126, 132; Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. U.S., 218 U.S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046; U.S. vs. Cuna, 12
Phil., 241; U.S. vs. Aron, 12 Phil., 778; U.S. vs. Tonga, 15 Phil., 43; U.S. vs. Molina, 17 Phil., 582.)

Appellants further contend that they come under the exception provided in section 8 of Act No. 2581.
This section provides:

This Act shall not apply to the holder of any speculative security who is not the issuer thereof, nor
to the person who has acquired the same for his own account in the usual and ordinary course of
business and not for the direct or indirect promotion of any enterprise or scheme within the
purview of this Act, unless such possession is in good faith. Repeated and successive sales of any
speculative securities shall be prima facieevidence that the claim of ownership is not bona fide,
but is a mere shift, device or plot to evade the provisions of this Act. Such speculators shall incur
the penalty provided for in section seven of this Act.

Under this section, there are clearly two classes of persons to whom the law is not applicable: (1) Persons
who hold speculative securities but who are not the issuers thereof; and (2) persons who have acquired
the same for their own account in the usual and ordinary course of business and not for the direct or
indirect promotion of any enterprise or scheme within the purview of this Act, provided (the law uses the
term "unless") such possession is in good faith.

Passing upon the questions of fact necessarily involved in the application of section 8 of Act No. 2581,
the trial court in case No. 52365 makes the following findings with reference to Nicasio Osmeña:

. . . El acusado Osmeña no ha adquirido por su propia cuenta en el curso ordinario y corriente de los negocios en la O.R.O. Oil
Co. Las acciones por el vendidas, pues las adquirio mediante suscripcion como uno de los fundadores de dicha corporacion,
pero si para la promocion indirecta de un proyecto de negocio o empresa para el cual se habia organizado le corporacion,
habiendo pagado totalmente el importe de dichas acciones a la misma corporacion; ni tampoco las poseia de buena fe, puesto
que como fundador y miembro de la junta directiva de dicha corporacion debia saber que no se habia expedido por el Tesorero
Insular ningun permiso por escrito a al corporacion para la venta de dichas acciones. Y las ventas sucesivas y repetidas de esas
acciones que tenia en la misma corporacion, aunque tales acciones eran suyas por haberlas el obtenido de la corporacion
mediante suscripcion y pago del importe correspondiente prueban que esta pretension de propiedad ha sido solamente un medio
de que se ha valido para vender tales acciones a precios mucho mayores que el importe por por haberse expedido tal permiso.
The same findings, mutatis mutandis, are made in case No. 52366 against the same appellant, and against
Jacob Rosenthal in the two cases. Even if we could, we do not feel justified in disturbing the findings of
the trial court. The good faith set up by appellant Rosenthal for having acted on the advice of one Garcia,
an officer in the Insular Treasury, and the subsequent devolution by him of amounts collected from some
of the purchasers of the shares may be considered as a circumstance in his favor in the imposition of the
penalty prescribed by law but does not exempt him from criminal responsibility. (People vs. McCalla,
63 Cal. App., 783; 220 Pac., 436; 367 U.S., 585; 69 Law. ed., 799; 45 Sup. Ct., 461; People vs. Fernandez
and Trinidad, supra.)

The judgments of the lower court are affirmed, with the modification that the fines are reduced as to
accused Jacob Rosenthal from P500 to P200 in each case, and as to accused Nicasio Osmeña, from
P1,000 to P500 in case No. 52365 and from P2,000 to P1,000 in case No. 52366, with subsidiary
imprisonment for both in case of insolvency, and costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191 April 30, 1957

SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.
SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and
Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon for petitioners.
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for respondents.

FELIX, J.:

San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the
National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250 square miles and an average depth of
approximately 6 fathoms (Otter trawl explorations in Philippine waters p. 21, Exh. B), is considered as
the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in 1950, trawl1 operators
from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On
account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion
of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants
of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. This move was manifested in the
resolution of December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), passed by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the
operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition
the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl
fishing at a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same League of
Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by
banning the operation of trawls therein (Exh. 4). The Provincial Governor also made proper presentations
to this effect and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl fishermen were likewise presented to the President
by social and civic organizations as the NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections) and the
COMPADRE (Committee for Philippine Action in Development, Reconstruction and Education),
recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if such inquiry
would substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing method was detrimental to the welfare
of the majority of the inhabitants (Exh. 2).

In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz.,
1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by
Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037), apparently in answer to a
resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during
the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz., 5198)
was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries, represented by the
Legal Adviser of said Department and a Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, answered
the complaint alleging, among other things, that of the 18 plaintiff (Exequiel Soriano, Teodora Donato,
Felipe Concepcion, Venancio Correa, Santo Gaviana, Alfredo General, Constancio Gutierrez, Arsenio
de Guzman, Pedro Lazaro, Porfirio Lazaro, Deljie de Leon, Jose Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio
Salgado, Porfirio, San Juan, Luis Sioco, Casimiro Villar and Enrique Voluntad), only 11 were issued
license to operate fishing boats for the year 1954 (Annex B, petition — L-8895); that the executive orders
in question were issued accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau of Fisheries of the
use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the general welfare of the public could be
disregarded, and set up the defenses that since plaintiffs question the validity of the executive orders
issued by the President, then the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Fisheries were not the real parties in interest; that said executive orders do not constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of law, and therefore prayed that the complaint be dismissed (Exh. B,
petition, L-8895).

During the trial of the case, the Governor of Camarines Sur appearing for the municipalities of Siruma,
Tinambac, Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said province, called the attention of the Court that the
Solicitor General had not been notified of the proceeding. To this manifestation, the Court ruled that in
view of the circumstances of the case, and as the Solicitor General would only be interested in
maintaining the legality of the executive orders sought to be impugned, section 4 of Rule 66 could be
interpreted to mean that the trial could go on and the Solicitor General could be notified before judgement
is entered.

After the evidence for both parties was submitted and the Solicitor General was allowed to file his
memorandum, the Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, the last part of which reads as follows:

The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact that Congress has seen
fit to define under what conditions it may be done by the enactment of the sections cited, in the
mind of Congress must be of transcendental significance. It is primarily within the fields of
legislation not of execution: for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in definite
territorial waters. The court can not accept that Congress had intended to abdicate its inherent
right to legislate on this matter of national importance. To accept respondents' view would be to
sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel Bay now, it
may be Davao Gulf tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by Congress. This being the
conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Until the trawler is outlawed by legislative
enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation. The remedy for
respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the Legislature. The
result will be to issue the writ prayed for, even though this be to strike at public clamor and to
annul the orders of the President issued in response therefor. This is a task unwelcome and
unpleasant; unfortunately, courts of justice use only one measure for both the rich and poor, and
are not bound by the more popular cause when they give judgments.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid; the
injunction prayed for is ordered to issue; no pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioners immediately filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of injunction which was
opposed by the Solicitor General and after the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court
issued an order dated February 19, 1955, denying respondents' motion to set aside judgement and
ordering them to file a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955, as a condition for the
non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by petitioners pending appeal. The Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit, and the Court, acting upon the motion for
new trial filed by respondents, issued another order on March 3, 1965, denying said motion and granting
the injunction prayed for by petitioners upon the latter's filing a bond for P30,000 unless respondents
could secure a writ of preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court on or before March 15, 1955.
Respondents, therefore, brought the matter to this Court in a petition for prohibition and certiorariwith
preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. L-8895, and on the same day filed a notice to appeal from
the order of the lower court dated February 2, 1955, which appeal was docketed in this Court as G.R.
No. L-9191.

In the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners (respondents therein) contended among other
things, that the order of, the respondent Judge requiring petitioners Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955,
had been issued without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or at the very least with grave abuse of
discretion, because by requiring the bond, the Republic of the Philippines was in effect made a party
defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one against the Government which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to entertain; that the failure to give the Solicitor General the
opportunity to defend the validity of the challenged executive orders resulted in the receipt of
objectionable matters at the hearing; that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not empower a court of law
to pass upon the validity of an executive order in a declaratory relief proceeding; that the respondent
Judge did not have the power to grant the injunction as Section 4 of Rule 39 does not apply to declaratory
relief proceedings but only to injunction, receivership and patent accounting proceedings; and prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing its order of
March 3, 1955, and for such other relief as may be deem just and equitable in the premises. This petition
was given due course and the hearing on the merits was set by this Court for April 12, 1955, but no writ
of preliminary injunction was issued.

Meanwhile, the appeal (G.R. No. L-9191) was heard on October 3, 1956, wherein respondents-appellants
ascribed to the lower court the commission of the following errors:

1. In ruling that the President has no authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80
banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;
 2. In holding that the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes has not been delegated
to the President of the Philippines under the Fisheries Act;

3. In not considering Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 as declaring a closed season pursuant
to Section 7, Act 4003, as amended, otherwise known as the Fisheries Act;

4. In holding that to uphold the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 22 and 80 would be to sanction
the exercise of legislative power by executive decrees;

5. In its suggestion that the only remedy for respondents and the people of the coastal towns of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the Legislature; and

6. In declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid and in ordering the injunction prayed
for to issue.

As Our decision in the prohibition and certiorari case (G.R. No. L-8895) would depend, in the last
analysis, on Our ruling in the appeal of the respondents in case G.R. No. L-9191, We shall first proceed
to dispose of the latter case.

It is indisputable that the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 in response to the clamor
of the inhabitants of the municipalities along the coastline of San Miguel Bay. They read as follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22

PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY

In order to effectively protect the municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other aquatic resources of the area, I, RAMON
MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order that:

1. Fishing by means of trawls (utase, otter and/or perenzella) of any kind, in the waters comprised
within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited.
2. Trawl shall mean, for the purpose of this Order, a fishing net made in the form of a bag with
the mouth kept open by a device, the whole affair being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the
bottom of the sea to capture demersal, ground or bottom species.

3. Violation of the provisions of this Order shall subject the offender to the penalty provided under
Section 83 of Act 4993, or more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the eighth. (50 Off. Gaz. 1421)

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, ENTITLED

"PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY"

By virtue of the powers voted in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the

Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, so as to allow fishing
by means of trawls, as defined in said Executive Order, within that portion of San Miguel Bay
north of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province
of Camarines Sur. Fishing by means of trawls south of said line shall still be absolutely prohibited.

Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of September, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred
and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 4037).

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 80.

FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, AS

AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66, DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 1954.

By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the

Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 66 dated September 23, 1954, so as to allow
fishing by means of trawls, as defined in Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, within the
portion of San Miguel Bay North of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the
Municipality of Mercedes, Province of Camarines Norte to Balocbaloc Point in the Municipality
of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur, until December 31, 1954, only.
 Thereafter, the provisions of said Executive Order No. 22 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means
of trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full
force and effect as originally provided therein.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and fifty-four and of the Independence of the Philippines, the ninth. (50 Off. Gaz. 5198)

It is likewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity of said executive orders in their petition for a
writ of injunction and/or declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that the
lower court, upon declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid, issued an order requiring the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond for P30,000
if the writ of injunction restraining them from enforcing the executive orders in question must be stayed.

The Solicitor General avers that the constitutionality of an executive order cannot be ventilated in a
declaratory relief proceeding. We find this untenable, for this Court taking cognizance of an appeal from
the decision of the lower court in the case of Hilado vs. De la Costa, et al., 83 Phil., 471, which involves
the constitutionality of another executive order presented in an action for declaratory relief, in effect
accepted the propriety of such action.

This question being eliminated, the main issues left for Our determination with respect to defendants'
appeal (G.R. No. L-9191), are:

(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their
capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against
them;

(2) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80,
banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other words, whether said Executive Orders
Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were issued in accordance with law; and.

(3) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

Counsel for both parties presented commendable exhaustive defenses in support of their respective
stands. Certainly, these cases deserve such efforts, not only because the constitutionality of an act of a
coordinate branch in our tripartite system of Government is in issue, but also because of the number of
inhabitants, admittedly classified as "subsistence fishermen", that may be affected by any ruling that We
may promulgate herein.

I. As to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a
judgment. An exception is offered by section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

SEC. 4. INJUNCTION, RECEIVERSHIP AND PATENT ACCOUNTING, NOT STAYED. —

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction or in a receivership
action, or a judgment or order directing an accounting in an action for infringement of letter patent,
shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal. The trial court, however, in its discretion, when an appeal is taken from a judgement
granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, may make an order suspending, modifying,
restoring, or granting such injunction during the pendency of an appeal, upon such terms as to
bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.

This provision was the basis of the order of the lower court dated February 19, 1955, requiring the filing
by the respondents of a bond for P30,000 as a condition for the non-issuance of the injunction prayed for
by plaintiffs therein, and which the Solicitor General charged to have been issued in excess of
jurisdiction. The State's counsel, however, alleges that while judgment could be stayed in injunction,
receivership and patent accounting cases and although the complaint was styled "Injunction, and/or
Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction", the case is necessarily one for declaratory relief, there
being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction.
But aside from the title of the complaint, We find that plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the nullity of
Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and for such other
relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court has already held that there are only two requisites
to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to be protected, and
that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right (North Negros Sugar
Co., Inc. vs.Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question that at least 11 of the complaining trawl
operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is
undeniable that the executive enactment's sought to be annulled are detrimental to their interests. And
considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, rests
in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the facts of the particular
case (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil,, 225, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439), We find no abuse of discretion when the
trial Court treated the complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment
pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party defendants in Civil Case No. 24867 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila are Salvador Araneta, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and,
Deogracias Villadolid, as Director of Fisheries, and were sued in such capacities because they were the
officers charged with duty of carrying out the statutes, orders and regulations on fishing and fisheries. In
its order of February 19, 1955, the trial court denied defendants' motion to set aside judgment and they
were required to file a bond for P30,000 to answer for damages that plaintiffs were allegedly suffering at
that time, as otherwise the injunction prayed for by the latter would be issued.

Because of these facts, We agree with the Solicitor General when he says that the action, being one
against herein petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, and
to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government for as
regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of
the Philippines (L. S. Moon and Co. vs. Harrison, 43 Phi., 39; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and
others). The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent
(Tolentino vs. Carlos 66 Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, 34 Phil., 167, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez et al. vs. Camus et al. * G.R. No. L-6725, promulgated
October 30, 1954). However, as the records show that herein petitioners failed to put up the bond required
by the lower court, allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor General's Office (giving
the impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their
control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings in G.R. No. L-8895,
were enforced, if at all,2 in accordance with section 4 of Rule 39, which We hold to be applicable to the
case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a bond,
becomes moot and academic.

II. Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial judge extending the controversy
to the determination of which between the Legislative, and Executive Departments of the Government
had "the power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters" instead of limiting the same to the real
issue raised by the enactment of Executive Orders No. 22, 26 and 80, especially the first and the last
"absolutely prohibiting fishing by means trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay",
ruled in favor of Congress had not intended to abdicate its power to legislate on the matter, he maintained
as stated before, that "until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from
San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and population of the
coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to Legislature," and thus declared said Executive Orders Nos.
22, 66 and 80 invalid".

The Solicitor General, on the contrary, asserts that the President is empowered by law to issue the
executive enactment's in question.

Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003, known as the Fisheries Law, the latter two sections as amended
by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows:

SEC. 6. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED. —Words and terms used in this Act shall be
construed as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

TAKE or TAKING includes pursuing, shooting, killing, capturing, trapping, snaring, and netting
fish and other aquatic animals, and all lesser acts, such as disturbing, wounding, stupefying; or
placing, setting, drawing, or using any net or other device commonly used to take or collect fish
and other aquatic animals, whether they result in taking or not, and includes every attempt to take
and every act of assistance to every other person in taking or attempting to take or collect fish and
other aquatic animals: PROVIDED, That whenever taking is allowed by law, reference is had to
taking by lawful means and in lawful manner.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 13. PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS. — Except for scientific or educational
purpose or for propagation, it shall be unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs and the small fish,
not more than three (3) centimeters long, known as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the
Philippines. Towards this end, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be authorized to
provide by regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on THE USE
OF ANY FISHING NET OR FISHING DEVICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH
EGGS; Provided, however, That the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall permit the
 taking of young of certain species of fish known as hipon under such restrictions as may be
deemed necessary.

SEC. 75. FISH REFUGEES AND SANCTUARIES. — Upon the recommendation of the officer
or chief of the bureau, office or service concerned, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
may set aside and establish fishery reservation or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered
in the manner to be prescribed by him. All streams, ponds and waters within the game refuge,
birds, sanctuaries, national parks, botanical gardens, communal forest and communal pastures are
hereby declared fishing refuges and sanctuaries. It shall be unlawful for any person, to take,
destroy or kill in any of the places aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or
take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs.

Act No. 4003 further provides as follows:

SEC. 83. OTHER VIOLATIONS. — Any other violation of the provisions of this Act or any rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the
Court.

As may be seen from the just quoted provisions, the law declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the
taking (except for scientific or educational purposes or for propagation), destroying or killing of any fish
fry or fish eggs, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources) is authorized to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or fishing
device (which includes the net used by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as
to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the
manner prescribed by him, from which no person could lawfully take, destroy or kill in any of the places
aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom any small or immature fish,
fry or fish eggs. It is true that said section 75 mentions certain streams, ponds and waters within the game
refuges, . . . communal forest, etc., which the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries, but this
enumeration of places does not curtail the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish
refuges and sanctuaries, which naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel Bay in Camarines.
From the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal Mayors held at Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on
December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), the following manifestation is made:

WHEREAS, the continuous operation of said trawls even during the close season as specified in
said Executive Order No. 20 caused the wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their
eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie; in order
to save the shrimps specie from eventual extermination and in order to conserve the shrimps specie
for posterity;

In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL and addressed to the President of the Philippines (Exh. 2), in
support of the petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen (allegedly 6, 175 in number), praying that trawlers
be banned from operating in San Miguel Bay, it is stated that:

The trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed.
They destroy the fish foods which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions
of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea: algea, shell
fish and star fish . . .

The absence of some species or the apparent decline in the catch of some fishermen operating in
the bay may be due to several factors, namely: the indiscriminate catching of fry and immature
sizes of fishes, the wide-spread use of explosives inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of
the bay, and the extensive operation of the trawls. (p.9, Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A)

Extensive Operation of Trawls: — The strenuous effect of the operations of the 17 TRAWLS of
the demersal fisheries of San Miguel Bay is better appreciated when we consider the fact that out
of its about 850 square kilometers area, only about 350 square kilometers of 5 fathoms up could
be trawled. With their continuous operation, is greatly strained. This is shown by the fact that in
view of the non-observance of the close season from May to October, each year, majority of their
catch are immature. If their operation would continue unrestricted, the supply would be greatly
depleted. (p. 11), Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A)

San Miguel Bay — can sustain 3 to 4 small trawlers (Otter Trawl Explorations in Philippine
Waters, Research Report 25 of the Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of the
Interior, p. 9 Exhibit B).
According to Annex A of the complaint filed in the lower court in Civil Case No. 24867 — G.R. No. L-
9191 (Exh. D, p. 53 of the folder of Exhibits), the 18 plaintiffs-appellees operate 29 trawling boats, and
their operation must be in a big scale considering the investments plaintiffs have made therefore,
amounting to P387,000 (Record on Appeal, p. 16-17).

In virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the manifestation just copied, We are of the opinion
that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine
waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of
his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.

Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or
ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs and fry's which
should be preserved, can the President of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority? Section
10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:

SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.

Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. — Administrative

acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of
operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or
ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties
by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders.

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that:

All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under
the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper
 distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned
to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible
for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and
responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and supervision.

For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the Department
Head of the Executive Office.

One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed
under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general
supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.). Moreover, "executive
orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of
a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines,
shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department"
(Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders
was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive Orders, was made
a party defendant in one of the cases at bar (G.R. No. L-9191).

For the foregoing reasons We do hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of
1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.

III. But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute and undue delegation of the powers
of Congress?

As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary
involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, wile in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234, 239. See also Rubi, et al. vs. The
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660).

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held:

 THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact
any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created
the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself
does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make
it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471,
which have been aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish
eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed
necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or
fish eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be
prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places,
or, in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (See. 75); and (d) it
penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than
P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83).

From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the
Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the
promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the
exhibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother
shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps
specie" (Exh. F), and that, "the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep
into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches
net millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea" (Exh- 2).

In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and
immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any
fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to
that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. Consequently,
when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued
Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within
the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in consonance
and strict conformity with the law.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations We render judgement, as follows:

(a) Declaring that the issues involved in case G.R. No. L-8895 have become moot, as no writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued by this Court the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila Branch XIV, from enforcing his order of March 3, 1955; and

(b) Reversing the decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L-9191; dissolving the writ of injunction
prayed for in the lower court by plaintiffs, if any has been actually issued by the court a quo; and
declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority
of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act.

Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO,
in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON:
BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed
in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and,
insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by
petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary
restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan
Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did
in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive
quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification
The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and
regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on
December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along
streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their
presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos],
President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways
or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have
at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the
sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more
on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof
shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and
rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to
registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more
than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate
to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November
15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner
shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle,
one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor
vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the
implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President
Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early
warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30,
1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that
respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction
No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter
of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the
following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December
10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that
it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said
administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with
the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be
attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and
official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders,
Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of
Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative
Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No.
229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him
they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness
because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at
the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the
rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who
could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified
set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C.
Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised
and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory
injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days
from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary
restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations
and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning
a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they
specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition
to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716
as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular
No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue
delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and
factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer."18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances
and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating
that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules
and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of
legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They
are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the
1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the
Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to
refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of
petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot
survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted
at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded
by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that
while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.'
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice
Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It
is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes
aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with
the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare
occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has
been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v.
Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To
promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * *
*. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules
and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt
from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute
here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare
it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation
cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the
prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed
26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's
statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court:
Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the
case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the
installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death
of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in
the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to
the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest
permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was
exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not
an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400
meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular
early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle
which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand,
a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is
all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the
Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in
Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early
warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like
petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or
obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor
vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same
substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative
order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral,
nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires
at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the
early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce
it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said
requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or
immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing
order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it.32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of
power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative,
view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the
appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel,
'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice
Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they
are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate
policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be.
The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable
under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should
be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired
the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally
without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with
authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an
assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid
the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as
in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given
expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force
and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is
delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
"[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in
the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit
any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such
a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for
insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting
Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially
pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the
mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts.
The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S.

LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges
during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April
1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order
of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
 Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the
Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his
duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine
Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members.
The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the
following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of
medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments,
appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms,
facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in
accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor
of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that
has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided,
That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
 (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register
of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos
each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training
which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b)
hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate
of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth
certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.

xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools
of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:

2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of
medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the
scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing
 rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for
admission into the medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give
other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement
the information derived from the NMAT.

xxx xxx xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year,
1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring
supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance
to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent
Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year
1987.1988.1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin
the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative
order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court
would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative
order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge,
the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion,
violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect of human rights. "
 (b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs."

(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote
total human liberation and development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide
with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged
the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision
invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms.
That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as
the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of
basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made
their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the
contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools.
When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note
that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined
to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all
who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board
of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows
from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three
great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like
the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education
and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago
in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and
that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare,
adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman
Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in
the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal
and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by
then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
 legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
"safe transit upon the roads. 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
"the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the
body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners
have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or
"inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added
on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private.
Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither
commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation
or administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the
government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs — in a word, the
public order — of the general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health
and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question
is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What
we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading
the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional
schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS
Order which provides that
 the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than
that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff
scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years.
Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available
in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level
of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and
immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious,
leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as
they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W.

ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District,
Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental),
ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone
District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and
CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga
City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND
XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X,
CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National
Treasurer, respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON.
SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA
CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region,
and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by
the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing
the Executive Order and statute in question.

The facts are as follows:

Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of
Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the
cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of
creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.

On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region,
Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,

That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October
12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —

(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.

(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become
parts of Region IX.

(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
 (6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region
IX.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of
Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan,
Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that

There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within
the existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case
of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz —
and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13,
Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which
in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the
existing administrative regions."

The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao
del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region
XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other
words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus

Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in

Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government
agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.

With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes
the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize.
Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of
statutory construction.

The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring
(reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order
 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not
valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance
appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives
of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities.1

As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX
were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City,
who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it
unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the
power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to
reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center
of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the
exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as a mere
incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the Constitution.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill
up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.
He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan,3 in which the
power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that —

[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces,

municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a
more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper
 regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed
character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as
something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.

He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities
which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated
by the establishment of the autonomous region.

Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:

1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by
generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national government,
including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective,
economical and development-oriented governmental framework:

(a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;

(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process;

(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping

of purposes, functions, activities, and programs;

(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-

ministerial and corporate organizational structures;

(e) Further development of the regionalization process; and

(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships

among government entities.

For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the
President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies,
 entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including
all government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range
of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid
related aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and
units.

2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:

xxx xxx xxx

f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies,

instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand,
amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities,
including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations,
their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters.

g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes and objectives of this Decree.

Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend,
or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX,
§13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;

(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and

(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in
which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote
in favor of it; and

(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of
Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines,
with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial
institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government."4 The Commission on Reorganization created under the law
was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the
President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of
its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective
only upon the approval of Congress.5

Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided
the country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of
the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742
which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by
P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region
IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo
to Zamboanga City.

Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate
is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law
requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments [seeArt. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial
and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."7 The power conferred on the President is similar to
the power to adjust municipal boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as
"administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the
power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient
standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any
event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered
or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes
on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the
same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business."12 Indeed, as the
original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization
of administrative regions.

Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the
statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions
is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.

Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional
autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall
remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims:
 The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent
of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions
(provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or
untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not
even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the
President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following
dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even
participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of
Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did
not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato,
from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII;
(5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan
from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby
rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under
RA No. 6734. 15

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not
vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this
provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge
the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the
regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped
with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be
no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so
that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region
IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the
President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is
noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is
irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O.
No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation
and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5)
existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the
regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress.
But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change
or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest
that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional
center.

It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City
may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other
infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather
than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of
legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more
adequate record than that presented by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the
actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit
the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned
application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed
to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R.
No. 41200). 1

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is
one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of
this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case
as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both
in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the
exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four
years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon
appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five
years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and
final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have
the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition
for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila,
seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of
Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating
on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that
"las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos
los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands
convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason
that:

. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la
misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse
indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de
una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la
superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda
el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented
by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set
for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-
three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose
signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his
appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was
circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and
that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person
who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of
an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.

On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events,
said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of
the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent
Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici
curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City
of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for
the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the
motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937.
But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered
"the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed
by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent
inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."

The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
 (1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to
apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City
of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that
Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a
probation officer.

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would
not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as
required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer
willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of
Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section
11 of the same Act.

II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu
Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu
Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:

(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.

(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on
June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.

(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.

(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but
without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the
respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.

IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit
his co-respondent to jail.

Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of
probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional
because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the
absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it
constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the
legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the
Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the
provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section
28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without
uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila,
in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the
issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument
held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore
Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act
No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October
9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf
of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and
the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were
presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937,
alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the
Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution
may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that
this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.

Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums,
challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.

As special defenses, respondents allege:

(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of
the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.

(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners
is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.

(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.

(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed
jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.

(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should
not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court
while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question
submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie
because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the
Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal
from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule
in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable
to the superior court.

(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason
that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial
within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve
in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this
court.lawphi1.net

(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of
the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his
answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of
the said motion.

(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism
because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an
irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the
trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.

(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court
retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with
law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the
 courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the
petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.

(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the
appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the
moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook,
19 Fed. [2d], 827).

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221
is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and
does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on
the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from
constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in
probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the
Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot
be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section
11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this
court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points
raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.

In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that
the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and
in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of
passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this
court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into
the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the
findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own
admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As
already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.

After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions
presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of
these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties.

To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It
is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr
vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)

The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the
ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs.
Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may
be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines.
It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas
corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary
injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case.
(12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
[1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court
[1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases
cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the
present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972,
popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating
to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This
court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No.
2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70
Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief
Justice, said:

By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are
exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that
the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial
court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co.
vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous
persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the
Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it
and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon
the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D,
545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law.
ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection
to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the
respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in
prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The
general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether
the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of
the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases
ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior
court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented
by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala.,
42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799;
Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185;
Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)

Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No.
4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after
their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common
law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and,
according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio,
the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People
vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894],
141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United
States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the common law
the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to
inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:

Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and
upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess
ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their
authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since
it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of
powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also
is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the
right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute,
elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and
 that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the
power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial
function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the
power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct,
therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature.

It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of
some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260
Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been
squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the
private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below,
declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose
rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex
County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not
consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it
because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may
not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare
a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment,
will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and
official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on
the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the
constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not
raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the
private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general
rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested
in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the
issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may
not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26
Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise
of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there
is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any
stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it
has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the
first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the
case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer
vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co.,
[1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State
vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional
question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with
emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise
the constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that
the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila,
is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought,
has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act
of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of
Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base
their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief
law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only
those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to
begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not
properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here
raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily
it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12
C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But
we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re
Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of
authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings,
either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the
duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears
that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville
& B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214
Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And
it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where
it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to
the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in
these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad,
supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the
private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not
now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney
General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan,
through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of
the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of
Michigan, through Champlin, J.:

. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last
proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only
in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than
if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the
legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only
parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in
speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The
 people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)

In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought
by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of
the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:

. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is always
interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.

"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and
need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific
injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80
Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or
county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan.,
803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs.
Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).

Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W.,
1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S.,
91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State
[1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs.
Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana
said:

It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty
of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the
argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth
Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of
New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor
 (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney
to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to
enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should
not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney
to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a
judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality
is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party
litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer
on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the
ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is
immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state
treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.

It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled
to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not
so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of
criminal laws.

The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state
may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite
direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but
that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the
People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before
this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized
challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of
respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped
from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented
before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is
not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying
upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.

It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to
the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where
its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper,
to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20
F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been
held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the
decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div.,
398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242
U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458;
Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party
is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co.
vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306).
There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No.
4221 now being assailed.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation
Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the
courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation;
that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation
Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about
four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of
suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L.,
pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616;
Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and
Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation
confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy,
we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main
issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling
on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in
support of the view we have taken can not be found.

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution.
This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article
VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with
the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases,
it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This
is of the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of
every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu
[1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson
[1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but
cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments
of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective
Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.

One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the
fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality
of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone
conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court.
We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to
the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted
in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to
certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13,
1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law .
. . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing
the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the
determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive
should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad
constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court
is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by
him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us
from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary
for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we
are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it
and as we understand it.

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force
at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-
General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and
forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.)
The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive"
found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law,
pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction
(Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-
General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a
person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can
only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not
extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States
(Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal
pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has
been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained
or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872],
109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The
reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere
"removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment
attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence,
inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending
upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold
office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation"
and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution
but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance
of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has
remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under
the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The
exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any
legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority.
The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person
properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others
except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where
the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is
exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor
interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act
No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and
void. But does it?

In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916],
242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief
Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under
the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend
sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in
the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court
through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition
of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind
may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an
enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment,
recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things
adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the
National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation
law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec.
724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of
probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)

In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme
Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment
by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of
March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet
expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was
assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the
following statement:

Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a
form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61
L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court
denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed
out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the
future . . .

Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In
1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920,
the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never
reached for definite action.

If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to
its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states
of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the
law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and
Adults [1928], Chap. I.)

The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs
vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:

Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have
been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive
review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the
authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also
 to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d],
762), likewise construing the Probation Act.

We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation
law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number
of earlier cases.

We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally
enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This
conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A,
1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate
and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in
State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the
court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this
power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the
sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain
or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed,
the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably,
the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts — particularly the trial courts — large
discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice
can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the
penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are
not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts
being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil.,
506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within
the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the
evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within
the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but
more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph
1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen
but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at
least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code
provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the
penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions
of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes,
"the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall
impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal
Code.)

Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form
the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty
is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision
of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within
the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over
seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence
has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).

But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is
more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the
Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No.
4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing
the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile
Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the
original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act
No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to
"humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties
prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the
trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the
criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that
in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation
are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with
the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a
wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as
announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which
the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parteBates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga.,
327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the
contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in
the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts,
the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and
in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."

We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for
the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or
otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895],
89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel.
Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla.,
108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs.
Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912],
67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev.,
361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E.
858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich.,
15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)

Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook
[1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs.
States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166;
122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114
Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People
[1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371;
Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N.
E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner
[1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs.
Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237
Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel.
Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82
Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel.
Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich
[1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re
Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla.,
Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910],
87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34
Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn.,
100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State
[1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S.
W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122
Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com.
[1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex
rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to
follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature
to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel.
Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular
mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a
sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the
charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may
determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional
provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912],
18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)

Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different
from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141
N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of
New York said:

. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood
when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former
was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The
suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely,
but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative
when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in
the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18
Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U.
S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)

The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were
 used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in
the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was
understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it
was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any
degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has
so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial
department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal
jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, — a power inherent in such
courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary
judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under
the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they
have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors
of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp.
294, 295.)

In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation
Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of
the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged
from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer
shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the
conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
— subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the
non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve
the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)

The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from
it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution
of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as
purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense.
The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs
the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power,
 and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926],
10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)

Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass
vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most
strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be
conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial
suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the
power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence
on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through
Harper, J.:

That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between
a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence
to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr.
R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases,
pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to
grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the punishment
assessed to a less punishment.

In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court
of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913,
now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not
impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice
Holloway, the court said:

. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the
time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086.
A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws
 which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission
of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs.
Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the
one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the
sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs.
State, 97 Ind., 373).

Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which
vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is granted, and
these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the
notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will
disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)

We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete
as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus
place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States
[1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)

2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not
for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative
power?

Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere.

The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution
of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This
principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a
misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the
English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into
America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of
the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of
the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws
to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec.
142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has
located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made
until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of
any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley
on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908],
11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919],
39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141;
32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle
of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs
by the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws
cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been
held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power,
but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice,
subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to
Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U.
S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195
U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be
done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101
N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be
republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a
judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56
Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon
with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has
been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A.,
113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332;
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated
by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines
provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and
tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In
times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be
authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have
existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L.,
p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing
rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General,
in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of
the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They
are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative
power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which
should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative
bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale
revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof —
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the
standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule,
an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d],
847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case
at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to
determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are
fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation
Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard
or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality
leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial
boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed
in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds,
is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St.,
77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of
this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In
the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General
authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for
the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held
proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of
the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the
agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details
of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry
into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U.
S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of
Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez
[1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)

It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands
of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation
of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat.
1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896],
92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may
be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions
as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the
government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis.,
616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs.
Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency,
however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity
arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public
Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX,
No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI,
pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations
finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following
language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which
permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances
are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is
granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of
no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative
determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case
require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York
[1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as
a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the
contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See,
also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.)
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power
to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not
made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained
by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the
law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A
provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have
any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to
appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its
pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say when — the provincial boards may
appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various
provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based
solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified
contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than
legislature itself.

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided
that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the
Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except
by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation
of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions
of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted
that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended
as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general,
and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11
Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:

By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is
declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be
exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular
cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of
rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the
reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of
James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the
kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and
suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article
in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by
legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it
is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part
thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a
dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the
parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English
Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere,"
is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.

The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would
be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to
standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that
the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in
our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious
and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any
one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
 circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which
all others under like circumstances are exempted.

To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the
owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious
disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether
or not during the current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that
section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed
that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish
in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger
vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in
State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road
system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the
provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the
same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county
for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair,
under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the
inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be
enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question,
to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it
became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require
the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by
its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is
. . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the
question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge
before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our
constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present
case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had
been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that
suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell
vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other
localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may
jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people.
(6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should
receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They relate to
subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways,
may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the
impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities
to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which
it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p.
148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters
of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in
general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so
unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the
provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering
that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of
probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should
take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the
legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in
abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.
(Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)

It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression
of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this
power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It
has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It
is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people
and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of
the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936],
35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of
power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power
shall not be delegated.

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the
Philippines.)

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of
our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many
constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws,
sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley
vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U.
S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255;
Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable
must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas.,
1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61
Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed.,
536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation
of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province
may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province
may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province
but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason
that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation
by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation
Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if
no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation
officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the
Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of
said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations
suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But
whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities
requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting
aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23
Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880],
100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing
vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30
Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012;
Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs.
Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907],
209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167;
78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law
it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law.
ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R.,
386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section
11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force
in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given
year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and
have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of
the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S.,
150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net

Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914],
234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the
equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880
(101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial
uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations
in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was
involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent
enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in
section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the
defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the
prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against
him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates
that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the provinces — was
considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city
as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation
where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments
of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a
separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found
in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also
repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next
inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.

In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the
courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs.
Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard
Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R.,
596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule
concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:

. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this,
the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128
A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55
Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions
must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner
contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou.,
969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22
 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the
invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what
remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide,
also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895],
158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)

It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative
on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should
be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably
linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the
bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be
deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned
from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent
entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such
action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate
the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory.
There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without
the probation system.

Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every
probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police
officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court
upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are
enumerated in section 3 of the Act:

That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;

(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;

 (c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;

(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;

(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning
his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside
within a specified place or locality;

(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused
by his offense;

(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and

(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.

The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under
section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and
appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that
probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under
section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation
officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed
with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke,
continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence
originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every
probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the
period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed
concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition,
and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most
suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court
having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and
condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the information of the
Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with
the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided
for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so
requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole
officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."

It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces
under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:

There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a
Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-
General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred
pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the
Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative
personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess
the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix
the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions
shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.

But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly
not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be
said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to
act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office
established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the
law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4);
that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the
probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer"
to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation
officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation
officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer
who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention
of the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in
the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province
of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions
of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.

That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are
provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may
be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But
much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend
the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for
any purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.

Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government
defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should
they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the
purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the
central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of
Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the
intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers
in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the
sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the
administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to
be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice
of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended
that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as
intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under
the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the
provinces without probation officers.

Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of
the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of
his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender.
It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals
aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long
as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72
Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of
society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we
believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our
fundamental law.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able
counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the
cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command
for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the
legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported
better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad
[1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain
adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by
clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States.
This line of approach is justified because:

(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States
and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the
Philippines;

(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to
the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United
States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),

(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace
the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
p. 1317);
 (d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York
[1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments
of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel.
Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919,
141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions
and environment.

Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly,
granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.

Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of
paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the
Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice.1 After a demurrer to the complaint
of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig
River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power.
Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig
River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.

Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to
a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it
is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission
bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting
an illegal delegation of legislative power.

The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the defense
in asking for the discharge of the prisoner on the first ground stated by the defense, that the rule of the
Collector cited was unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of the delegation
of legislative power.
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized
to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands,
and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5
and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered,
and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into
effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made
and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this
Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars,
United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section
seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.

Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no
difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage,
mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with
hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. This spot is
near the mouth of the river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of taking on and discharging
freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right sense a part of the harbor, without having recourse
to the definition of paragraph 8 of Customs Administrative Circular No. 136, which reads as follows:

The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the lighterage
and harbor business) shall be considered to include its confluent navigable rivers and lakes, which
are navigable during any season of the year.

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use
more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the
proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.
The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19
and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and
1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also
to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.

This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature
to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can
not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's
Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United
States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make
such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and
providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the
misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of
Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals.
(U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and
to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively
lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases
reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law
authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an
improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):
 The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the
Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The
regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . .

In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel the
power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al., 135 Mass. 175).

In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood
Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues
authorizing them to do so, the court saying:

Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and
regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such
rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.

Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and
is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed
in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not
material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an
additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.

We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section
Act No. 1136.

So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts
Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine
of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., reserve his opinion.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but
hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
 Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued
a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that
the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not
have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made
in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since
the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This
was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule"
laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be
the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances
may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest
they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need
to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of
the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing
sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair
play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown
would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King
John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to
all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled
to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is
to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted
with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of
power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law
of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach
of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number
of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the
need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he
has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need
to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the
most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before
he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which
call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending
the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small
farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts
of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The
law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were
then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their
number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price,
cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police
power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be
a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes
an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could
be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is
no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by
the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed
with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under
the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court
of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,
to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this
case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke
them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright
and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA,

FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION
(FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY,
in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation
and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six
(26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing
importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy
materially depend on the oscillation of oil.

First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry
other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market
without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan
Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex,
Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country.2

In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that
petroleum and its products are vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable
prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.3 It created the Oil
Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline,
kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and
to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry.4

In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of
Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by
multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing companies were owned
by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude
oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was done locally by
foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets.
On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry.5 PNOC engaged in the
business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of
ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of Bataan
Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country.6 PNOC later put up its own marketing
subsidiary — Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first
time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.

In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by
exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of
crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction
of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:

1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on
petroleum products subject to tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate
adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation
with the Board of Energy,
 3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of
the fund through an appropriate order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring
payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing
and/or marketing petroleum products, or

4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies
in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed
using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.7

By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country — Caltex, Shell and the government-
owned PNOC.

In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy
Regulatory Boardto regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting,
processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public
necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions:

1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be

charged by duly franchised gas companies which distribute gas by
means of underground pipe system;

3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the

provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended . . . ;

4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of

existing refineries and license refineries that may be organized after
the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions as are
consistent with the national interest; and

5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any

petroleum product, or when public interest so requires, it may take
such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary
adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the
 payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund . . . by persons or entities
engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may be
determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover
its cost of importation.8

On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to
prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the
government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and
conservation.9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of
government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of
dependency on oil-fired plants.10 The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and
investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of
four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the
energy industry."

Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of
Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation
to the Aramco Overseas Company.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It
enacted R.A. No.8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the
deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject
only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy.11

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During
the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The
following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing,
marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation
of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and
pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price
of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.

The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.

On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry
through E.O.No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180.
Section 5(b) provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty
shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported
refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for
which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1,
2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum
products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but
instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff
differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other
players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing
refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign
to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada,
Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the
constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No.
7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the
full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the
implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed
terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:

xxx xxx xxx

E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of
1992," provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the
Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and time
table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to
the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative

need to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following
 recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the
Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been
stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world
market had been stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning
to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and
(iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve
(12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional
framework for the administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and
responsibilities of various government agencies;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a
truly competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and
adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of
Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the
President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be
declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF
fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.
Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the
three existing oil companies — Petron, Caltex and Shell — in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No.
392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they
pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they
did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered
the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing
the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days . . . subject to
further orders as conditions may warrant."

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues
bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1)
whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have
the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive issues are: (1)
whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title — one subject requirement of the Constitution; (2)
whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or
not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not
E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the
petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil
industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this
Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable
controversy.

Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.12 The courts, as guardians of
the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.13 We held in
the recent case of Tanada v. Angara:14

xxx xxx xxx

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.

Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which
deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our
statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180
because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The principle of
separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our
courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every
now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed.
Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said
law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In
language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,16 we stressed:

xxx xxx xxx

 Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however,
in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching
importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no
good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are
significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad,
it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision17 of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do
not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title
— one subject rule. We have consistently ruled18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue
all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.19 We hold that section 5(b) providing for
tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream
oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and
make them rely less on imported petroleum.20 We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision
when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A.
No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate
its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation — Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No.
7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the
 full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market"
and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in
meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they
contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered
the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.

The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as
1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility
Commissioners,21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal
engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of
delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been
developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the
abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA,22 thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely
observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing
complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the
constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi
v. United States23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."24

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground
of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180
that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it
for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March
1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as
far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and
cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to
practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly
established.25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion
that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more
general standards in other cases.26

It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate
standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O.
No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that the
Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in
fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No.
8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy
and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in
the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight
by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show
that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF
fund must not be in deficit.27 We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully
the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF
fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive
department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability
of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation,
the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any
right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to
make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the
principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for
the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of
crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of
E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion
of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have
been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule
that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are:

(1) Section 5 (b) which states — "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the
effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate
of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%)
except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil.
Provided, that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only
by an Act of Congress."
 (2) Section 6 which states — "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and
products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum
inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40)
days of supply, whichever is lower," and

(3) Section 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies
in the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price
unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the
detriment of competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."

A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting
in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article,
or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in
which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service.28 On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the
form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly
restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its,
production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory
authority.29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.30

Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this
constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of
combinations in restraint of
trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition
liable for damages.32
Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180.
They explain that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries.
They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum
and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing
is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have
entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% — 5% of the oil market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit
of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to
the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the
Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of
monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest.33 Thus too, our free enterprise system
is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-
off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and
unfair competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as
well as the private sector.34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the
goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods
and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the
key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition.
The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for
the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.
Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot
be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of
anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest
resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus
matches their desires with society's opportunity costs."35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced,
how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be
distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced,
and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it."

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition
that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of
competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market controlled by
one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where
honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful
scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with
suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of
R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers
to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be struck
down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive market. Contrariwise, if they
are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell
and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts
deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven
field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players
to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they
cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the
league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against
prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of
R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of
storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further
occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by
the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell
any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the
detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and
Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its
validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The
inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is
encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
Hovenkamp,36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly
profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is
flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which
discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A.
No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the
temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality.
Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.

Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since
deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs
to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of
these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these dominant oil
companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could have been more in number and
more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.

We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition
of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of
inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The question
is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire
R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo,37 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact
the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. . . .

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another,
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain
in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions
of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on
tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180.
Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.
Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory
pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of
market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these
vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had
no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing
and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain
unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their
pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where
competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.

The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of
our leading legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive
provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the
result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there
was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there
was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto
G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He
declared that the amendment ". . . would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will
be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming
public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B.
No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the
explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite
R.A. No. 8180, viz,:

xxx xxx xxx

Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight
(8) fuel price adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron
Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments
made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the
three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a
combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time
payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and
 refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than
identical prices.

The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests
collusion, amounting to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.

To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the
downstream oil industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like
activities ought to be severely penalized.

Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude
oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms
that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern over the way the three oil companies have
uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a
cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed to the
foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of new players in
the downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally
feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff
differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of
the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:

xxx xxx xxx

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil
refineries in the country and eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise economy.
Moreover, it created a disincentive for other players to engage even initially in the importation
and distribution of refined petroleum products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This
tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the existing three
 oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law
took effect, to the great disadvantage of the consuming public.

Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level
playing field in the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to
cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the country by
the three existing refineries.

Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil
companies by strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly its ability to subject
to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the explanatory
note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:

xxx xxx xxx

To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government,
particularly its ability to review the prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum
products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any
entity in the industry to submit any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In
cases where the Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade
practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public,
including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also
impose the fine and penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any
person or entity from the oil industry who is found guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue
where their grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by government.

Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more
transparent and making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as
collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade.

Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where
there is no agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil
products. Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No.
10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory note:

xxx xxx xxx

The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to
the definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill
at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing
resolves the questions. The definition reads, "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell
any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying
competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market."

The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with
the oil deregulation law are adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good
move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept
of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations.
Specifically, the government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or
predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it
may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such
violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered
damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.

To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given
additional powers to gather information and to require reports.

Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No.
8180. He wants it completely repealed. He explained:

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was
discussed and debated upon in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any
new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in
the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with
the deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in
 increasing the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from
the government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50¢) per liter by
subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months
from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum
products will be fully absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then.
Certainly, this would make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly
difficult and unbearable.

The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that
these prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil companies in the
country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they will
still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that
there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said
oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to be paid by
businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil
products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates.

So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase
in oil products due to deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996, or R.A.8180 be repealed completely.

Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive
review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574
was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to
Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax
Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary
Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The
Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions
And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing
the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's
Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power
Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend Appropriate Amendments
To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:
 xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has
imposed successive increases in oil prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power
rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the
detriment of our people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and
Petron-have not come in;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider
appropriate amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before
full deregulation in order to give the competitive market enough time to develop;

WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to
attract the entry of new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive market;

WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full
deregulation of the oil industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President
Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on
Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term
Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is
the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms
in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices will rise."

Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed
H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation,
Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation of Full
Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the Purpose of Determining In the
Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether
Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And
What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In
Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers
Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other
Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed
H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed
by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P.Arroyo urging the President
to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392.

In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional
deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price
affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in
its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas most impacted by the movement
of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water.38 At a time when our economy is
in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our
people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be
allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its defects.

The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining
order to enable them to adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the
plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy
Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the
former laws it repealed.39 The length of our return to the regime of regulation depends on Congress which
can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.

With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of
Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees
with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law
violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation
law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law
that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the
oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos
and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the
sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the
Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a
covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The
Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their
economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater
importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics
of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in
upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense
of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O.
No. 372 void.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 124360 December 3, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127867 December 3, 1997

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA,

FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION
(FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO
VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON
Corporation, and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP., SUBIC BAY

DISTRIBUTION, INC., TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL GAS, Movants-in-Intervention.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondents; and (2) the partial
motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and the intervenors.1

In their Motion for Reconsideration, the public respondents contend:

Executive Order No. 392 is not a misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180;

II

Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 do not contravene section 19, Article XII of
the Constitution; and

III
 Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do not permeate the essence of the said law; hence
their nullity will not vitiate the other parts thereof.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, the intervenors argue:

2.1.1 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the disproportionate advantage of
the three big oil firms — Caltex, Shell and Petron — over the small oil firms;

2.1.2 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the new entrants and seriously
cripples their capacity to compete and grow; and

2.1.3 Ultimately the total nullification of Republic Act. No. 8180 removes substantial, albeit
imperfect, barriers to monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade practices harmful
not only to movant-intervernors but also to the public in general.

In his Partial Motion for Reconsideration,2 petitioner Garcia prays that only the provisions of R.A. No.
8180 on the 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and minimum inventory be declared unconstitutional.
He cites the "pernicious effects" of a total declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. He avers
that "it is very problematic . . . if Congress can fastrack an entirely new law."

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration and partial motion for reconsideration.

We shall first resolve public respondents' motion for reconsideration. They insist that there was no
misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180 when the Executive considered the depletion of the OPSF in
advancing the date of full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. They urge that the consideration
of this factor did not violate the rule that the exercise of delegated power must be done strictly in accord
with the standard provided in the law. They contend that the rule prohibits the Executive from subtracting
but not from adding to the standard set by Congress. This hair splitting is a sterile attempt to make a
distinction when there is no difference. The choice and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of
delegated power is part of the lawmaking process and lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.
The standard cannot be altered in any way by the Executive for the Executive cannot modify the will of
the Legislature. To be sure, public respondents do not cite any authority to support its strange thesis for
there is none in our jurisprudence.
The public respondents next recycle their arguments that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do
not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution.3 They reiterate that the 4% tariff differential
would encourage the construction of new refineries which will benefit the country for they Filipino labor
and goods. We have rejected this submission for a reality check will reveal that this 4% tariff differential
gives a decisive edge to the existing oil companies even as it constitutes a substantial barrier to the entry
of prospective players. We do not agree with the public respondents that there is no empirical evidence
to support this ruling. In the recent hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy chaired by Senator
Freddie Webb, it was established that the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum
importation gives a 20-centavo per liter advantage to the three big oil companies over the new players.
It was also found that said tariff differential serves as a protective shield for the big oil companies.4 Nor
do we approve public respondents' submission that the entry of new players after deregulation is proof
that the 4% tariff differential is not a heavy disincentive. Acting as the mouthpiece of the new players,
public respondents even lament that "unfortunately, the opportunity to get the answer right from the
'horses' mouth' eluded this Honorable Court since none of the new players supposedly adversely affected
by the assailed provisions came forward to voice their position."5 They need not continue their
lamentation. The new players represented by Eastern Petroleum, Seasoil Petroleum Corporation, Subic
Bay Distribution, Inc., TWA Inc., and DubPhil Gas have intervened in the cases at bar and have spoken
for themselves. In their motion for intervention, they made it crystal clear that it is not their intention ". .
. to seek the reversal of the Court's nullification of the 4% differential in section 5(b) nor of the inventory
requirement of section 6, nor of the prohibition of predatory pricing in section 9(b)."6 They stressed that
they only protest the restoration of the 10% oil tariff differential under the Tariff Code.7 The horse's
mouth therefore authoritatively tells us that the new players themselves consider the 4% tariff differential
in R.A. No. 8180 as oppressive and should be nullified.

To give their argument a new spin, public respondents try to justify the 4% tariff differential on the
ground that there is a substantial difference between a refiner and an importer just as there is a difference
between raw material and finished product. Obviously, the effort is made to demonstrate that the unequal
tariff does not violate the unequal protection clause of the Constitution. The effort only proves that the
public respondents are still looking at the issue of tariff differential from the wrong end of the telescope.
Our Decision did not hold that the 4% tariff differential infringed the equal protection clause of the
Constitution even as this was contended by petitioner Tatad.8 Rather, we held that said tariff differential
substantially occluded the entry point of prospective players in the downstream oil industry. We further
held that its inevitable result is to exclude fair and effective competition and to enhance the monopolists'
ability to tamper with the mechanism of a free market. This consideration is basic in anti-trust suits and
cannot be eroded by belaboring the inapplicable principle in taxation that different things can be taxed
differently.

The public respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory requirement. They
aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during their first year of operation because
they do not have yet annual sales from which the required minimum inventory may be determined.
Compliance with such requirement on their second and succeeding years of operation will not be difficult
because the putting up of storage facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an
ordinary and necessary business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished products in other
industries."9 The contention is an old one although it is purveyed with a new lipstick. The contention
cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner Garcia, "the prohibitive cost of the required
minimum inventory will not be any less burdensome on the second, third, fourth, etc. years of operations.
Unlike most products which can be imported and stored with facility, oil imports require ocean receiving,
storage facilities. Ocean receiving terminals are already very expensive, and to require new players to
put up more than they need is to compound and aggravate their costs, and consequently their great dis-
advantage vis-a-vis the Big 3."10Again, the argument on whether the minimum inventory requirement
seriously hurts the new players is best settled by hearing the new players themselves. In their motion for
intervention, they implicitly confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory requirement has an
inhibiting effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of this Court striking it down as
unconstitutional.

Public respondents still maintain that the provision on predatory pricing does not offend the Constitution.
Again, their argument is not fresh though embellished with citations of cases in the United States
sustaining the validity of sales-below-costs statutes.11 A quick look at these American cases will show
that they are inapplicable. R.A. No. 8180 has a different cast. As discussed, its provisions on tariff
differential and minimum inventory erected high barriers to the entry of prospective players even as they
raised their new rivals' costs, thus creating the clear danger that the deregulated market in the downstream
oil industry will not operate under an atmosphere of free and fair competition. It is certain that lack of
real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists to dictate prices,12 and can entice them to engage
in predatory pricing to eliminate rivals. The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing will not
dissolve this clear danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to be real deterrent.
Thus, one of the law's principal authors, Congressman Dante O. Tinga filed H.B. No. 10057 where he
acknowledged in its explanatory note that "the definition of predatory pricing . . . needs to be tightened
up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent.
The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on
predatory pricing resolves the questions." Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test,
Congressman Tinga has proposed to redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or
offering to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying
competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market."13 In light
of its loose characterization in R.A. 8180 and the law's anti-competitive provisions, we held that the
provision on predatory pricing is constitutionally infirmed for it can be wielded more successfully by the
oil oligopolist. Its cumulative effect is to add to the arsenal of power of the dominant oil companies. For
as structured, it has no more than the strength of a spider web — it can catch the weak but cannot catch
the strong; it can stop the small oil players but cannot stop the big oil players from engaging in predatory
pricing.

Public respondents insist on their thesis that the cases at bar actually assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180
and that this Court should refrain from examining the wisdom of legislations. They contend that R.A.
No. 8180 involves an economic policy which this Court cannot review for lack of power and competence.
To start with, no school of scholars can claim any infallibility. Historians with undefiled learning have
chronicled14 over the years the disgrace of many economists and the fall of one economic dogma after
another. Be that as it may, the Court is aware that the principle of separation of powers prohibits the
judiciary from interferring with the policy setting function of the legislature.15 For this reason we
italicized in our Decision that the Court did not review the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180 but its compatibility
with the Constitution; the Court did not annul the economic policy of deregulation but vitiated its aspects
which offended the constitutional mandate on fair competition. It is beyond debate that the power of
Congress to enact laws does not include the right to pass unconstitutional laws. In fine, the Court did not
usurp the power of the Congress to enact laws but merely discharged its bounden duty to check the
constitutionality of laws when challenged in appropriate cases. Our Decision annulling R.A No. 8180 is
justified by the principle of check and balance.

We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of laws cannot be
defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck
down laws abridging the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other more
powerful branches of government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180
that violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within
reasonable bounds. In Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation16 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held:

2. Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the nullification of the challenged provision
on the ground of his being deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of law.

It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific constitutional provisions,
one of which is the due process clause. It is equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a
time of "surging unrest and dissatisfaction," when there was the fear expressed in many quarters
that a constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of property, would not
be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and misery that unfortunately afflict so
many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment that the government therein established
is impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The framers saw to that. The welfare state
concept is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution. It is implicit in quite a few of its
provisions. It suffices to mention two.

There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic
security of all the people, as well as the pledge of protection to labor with the specific authority
to regulate the relations between landowners and tenants and between labor and capital. This
particularized reference to the rights of working men whether in industry and agriculture certainly
cannot preclude attention to and concern for the rights of consumers, who are the objects of
solicitude in the legislation now complained of. The police power as an attribute to promote the
common weal would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that
the liberty to contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized as a
denial of due process. The right to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme.

It is understandable though why business enterprises, not unnaturally evincing lack of enthusiasm
for police power legislation that affect them adversely and restrict their profits could predicate
alleged violation of their rights on the due process clause, which as interpreted by them is a bar to
regulatory measures. Invariably, the response from this Court, from the time the Constitution was
enacted, has been far from sympathetic. Thus, during the Commonwealth, we sustained
 legislations providing for collective bargaining, security of tenure, minimum wages, compulsory
arbitration, and tenancy regulation. Neither did the objections as to the validity of measures
regulating the issuance of securities and public services prevail.

The Constitution gave this Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the Constitution.17 It
did not exempt from the reach of this authority laws with economic dimension. A 20-20 vision will show
that the grant by the Constitution to this Court of this all important power of review is written without
any fine print.

The next issue is whether the Court should only declare as unconstitutional the provisions of R.A. No.
8180 on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory pricing.

Positing the affirmative view, petitioner Garcia proffered the following arguments:

5. Begging the kind indulgence and benign patience of the Court, we humbly submit that the
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned provisions of R.A. No. 8180 implies that the other
provisions are constitutional. Thus, said constitutional provisions of R.A. No. 8180 may and can
very well be spared.

5.1 With the striking down of "ultimately full deregulation," we will simply go back
to the transition period under R.A. 8180 which will continue until Congress enacts
an amendatory law for the start of full oil deregulation in due time, when free market
forces are already in place. In turn, the monthly automatic price control mechanism
based on Singapore Posted Prices (SPP) will be revived. The energy Regulatory
Board (ERB), which still exist, would re-acquire jurisdiction and would easily
compute the monthly price ceiling, based on SPP, of each and every petroleum fuel
product, effective upon finality of this Court's favorable resolution on this motion
for partial reconsideration.

5.2 Best of all, the oil deregulation can continue uninterrupted without the three
other assailed provisions, namely, the 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and
minimum inventory.

6. We further humbly submit that a favorable resolution on this motion for partial
reconsideration would be consistent with public interest.
 6.1 In consequence, new players that have already come in can uninterruptedly
continue their operations more competitively and bullishly with an even playing
field.

6.2 Further, an even playing field will attract many more new players to come in in
a much shorter time.

6.3 Correspondingly, Congress does not anymore have to pass a new deregulation
law, thus it can immediately concentrate on just amending R.A. No. 8180 to abolish
the OPSF, on the government's assumption that it is necessary to do so.
Parenthetically, it is neither correct nor fair for high government officials to criticize
and blame the Honorable Court on the OPSF, considering that said OPSF is not
inherent in nor necessary to the transition period and may be removed at any time.

6.4 In as much as R.A. No. 8180 would continue to be in place (sans its
unconstitutional provisions), only the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package (CTRP)
would be needed for the country to exit from IMF by December 1997.

7. The Court, in declaring the entire R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional, was evidently expecting that
Congress "can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the
Constitution" (Decision p. 38) However, it is very problematic, to say the least, if Congress can
fasttrack an entirely new law.

7.1 There is already limited time for Congress to pass such a new law before it
adjourns for the 1998 elections.

7.2 At the very least, whether or not Congress will be able to fasttrack the enactment
of a new oil deregulation law consistent with the Honorable Court's ruling, would
depend on many unforseeable and uncontrollable factors. Already, several
statements from legislators, senators and congressmen alike, say that the new law
can wait because of other pending legislative matters, etc. Given the "realities" of
politics, especially with the 1998 presidential polls six months away, it is not far-
fetched that the general welfare could be sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus
further unduly delaying the enactment of a new oil deregulation law.
 8. Furthermore, if the entire R.A. No. 8180 remains nullified as unconstitutional, the
following pernicious effects will happen:

8.1 Until the new oil deregulation law is enacted, we would have to go back to the
old law. This means full regulation, i.e., higher tariff differential of 10%, higher
petroleum product price ceilings based on transfer prices of imported crude oil, and
restrictions on the importation of refined petroleum products that would be allowed
only if there are shortages, etc.

8.2 In consequence of the above, the existing new players, would have to totally
stop their operations.

8.3 The existing new players would find themselves in a bind on how to fulfill their
contractual obligations, especially on their delivery commitments of petroleum fuel
products. They will be in some sort of "limbo" upon the nullification of the entire
R.A. No. 8180.

8.4 The investments that existing new players have already made would become idle
and unproductive. All their planned additional investments would be put on hold.

8.5 Needless to say, all this would translate into tremendous losses for them.

8.6 And obviously, prospective new players cannot and will not come in.

8.7 On top of everything, public interest will suffer. Firstly, the oil deregulation
program will be delayed. Secondly, the prices of petroleum products will be higher
because of price ceilings based on transfer prices of imported crude.

9. When it passed R.A. No. 8180, Congress provided a safeguard against the possibility that any
of its provisions could be declared unconstitutional, thus the separability clause thereof, which
the Court noted (Decision, p. 29). We humbly submit that this is another reason to grant this
motion for partial reconsideration.

In his Supplement to Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner Garcia amplified his
contentions.
In a similar refrain, the public respondents contend that the "unmistakable intention of Congress" is to
make each and every provision of R.A. No. 8180 "independent and separable from one another." To
bolster this proposition, they cite the separability clause of the law and the pending bills in Congress
proposing to repeal said offensive provisions but not the entire law itself. They also recite the "inevitable
consequences of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180" as follows:

1. There will be bigger price adjustments in petroleum products due to (a) the reimposition of the
higher tariff rates for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products [10%-20%], (b)
the uncertainty regarding R.A. 8184, or the "Oil Tariff Law," which simplified tax administration
by lowering the tax rates for socially-sensitive products such as LPG, diesel, fuel oil and kerosene,
and increasing tax rates of gasoline products which are used mostly by consumers who belong to
the upper income group, and (c) the issue of wiping out the deficit of P2.6 billion and creating a
subsidy fund in the Oil Price Stabilization Fund;

2. Importers, traders, and industrial end-users like the National Power Corporation will be
constrained to source their oil requirement only from existing oil companies because of the higher
tariff on imported refined petroleum products and restrictions on such importation that would be
allowed only if there are shortages;

3. Government control and regulation of all the activities of the oil industry will discourage
prospective investors and drive away the existing new players;

4. All expansion and investment programs of the oil companies and new players will be shelved
indefinitely;

5. Petitions for price adjustments should be filed and approved by the ERB.

Joining the chorus, the intervenors contend that:

2.1.1 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the disproportionate advantage of
the three big oil firms — Caltex, Shell and Petron — over the small oil firms;

2.1.2 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the new entrants and seriously
cripples their capacity to compete and grow; and
 2.1.3 Ultimately, the total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 removes substantial, albeit
imperfect, barriers to monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade practices harmful
not only to movant-intervenors but also to the public in general.

The intervenors further aver that under a regime of regulation, (1) the big oil firms can block oil
importation by the small oil firms; (2) the big oil firms can block the expansion and growth of the small
oil firms. They likewise submit that the provisions on tariff differential, minimum inventory, and
predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180 because of its separability clause. They
also allege that their separability is further shown by the pending bills in Congress which only seek the
partial repeal of R.A. No. 8180.

We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia's linchpin contention that the full deregulation decreed by R.A.
No. 8180 to start at the end of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For prescinding from this premise,
petitioner suggests that "we simply go back to the transition period under R.A. No. 8180. Under the
transition period, price control will be revived through the automatic pricing mechanism based on
Singapore Posted Prices. The Energy Regulatory Board . . . would play a limited and ministerial role of
computing the monthly price ceiling of each and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic
pricing formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly price increases
in excess of P0.50 per liter."

We are not impressed by petitioner Garcia's submission. Petitioner has no basis in condemning as
unconstitutionalper se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive for factoring the depletion of OPSF
in advancing the date of full deregulation to February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is
now a non-issue for the full deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already
come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date, the transition period has ended and it
was expected that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in shaping the prices of
petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date of full deregulation is a judgment of
Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this Court.

We come to the submission that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and
predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180, and hence, should alone be declared as
unconstitutional. In taking this position, the movants rely heavily on the separability provision of R.A.
No. 8180. We cannot affirm the movants for the determine whether or not a particular provision is
separable, the courts should consider the intent of the legislature. It is true that the most of the time, such
intent is expressed in a separability clause stating that the invalidity or unconstitutionality of any
provision or section of the law will not affect the validity or constitutionality of the remainder.
Nonetheless, the separability clause only creates a presumption that the act is severable. It is merely an
aid in statutory construction. It is not an inexorable command. 18 A separability clause does not clothe
the valid parts with immunity from the invalidating effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the
bad with the good.The separability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result.19 In
sum, if the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature, separation will not take place
despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law.20

In the case of the Republic Act No. 8180, the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff differential,
minimum inventory and predatory pricing cannot but result in the unconstitutionality of the entire law
despite its separability clause. These provisions cannot be struck down alone for they were the ones
intended to carry out the policy of the law embodied in section 2 thereof which reads:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy — It shall be the policy of the State to deregulate the downstream
oil industry to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social policy
objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high-
quality petroleum products.

They actually set the stage for the regime of deregulation where government will no longer intervene in
fixing the price of oil and the operations of oil companies. It is conceded that the success of deregulation
lies in a truly competitive market and there can be no competitive market without the easy entry and exit
of competitors. No less than President Fidel V. Ramos recognized this matrix when he declared the need
is to ". . . recast our laws on trust, monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and combinations injurious to public
welfare — to restore competition where it has disappeared and to preserve it where it still exists. In a
word, we need to perpetuate competition as a system to regulate the economy and achieve global product
quality."21

We held in our Decision that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory
pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. No. 8180. Without these provisions
in place, Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry. Consider the 4% tariff
differential on crude oil and refined petroleum. Before R.A. No. 8180,22 there was a ten-point difference
between the tariff imposed on crude oil and that on refined petroleum. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
lowered the difference to four by imposing a 3% tariff on crude oil and a 7% tariff on refined petroleum.
We ruled, however, that this reduced tariff differential is unconstitutional for it still posed a substantial
barrier to the entry of new players and enhanced the monopolistic power of the three existing oil
companies. The ruling that the 4% differential is unconstitutional will unfortunately revive the 10% tariff
differential of the Tariff and Customs Code. The high 10% tariff differential will certainly give a bigger
edge to the three existing oil companies, will form an insuperable barrier to prospective players, and will
drive out of business the new players. Thus, there can be no question that Congress will not allow
deregulation if the tariff is 10% on crude oil and 20% on refined petroleum. To decree the partial
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 will bring about an absurdity — a fully deregulated downstream oil
industry where government is impotent to regulate run away prices, where the oil oligopolists can engage
in cartelization without competition, where prospective players cannot come in, and where new players
will close shop.

We also reject the argument that the bills pending in Congress merely seek to remedy the partial defects
of R.A No. 8180, and that this is proof that R.A. No. 8180 can be declared unconstitutional minus its
offensive provisions. We referred to the pending bills in Congress in our Decision only to show that
Congress itself is aware of the various defects of the law and not to prove the inseparability of the
offending provisions from the body of R.A. No. 8180. To be sure, movants even overlooked the fact that
resolutions have been filed in both House of Congress calling for a total review of R.A. No. 8180.

The movants warn that our Decision will throw us back to the undesirable regime of regulation. They
emphasize its pernicious consequences — the revival of the 10% tariff differential which will wipe out
the new players, the return of the OPSF which is too burdensome to government, the unsatisfactory
scheme of price regulation by the ERB, etc. To stress again, it is not the will of the Court to return even
temporarily to the regime of regulation. If we return to the regime of regulation, it is because it is the
inevitable consequence of the enactment by Congress of an unconstitutional law, R.A. No. 8180. It is
settled jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws that it has repealed.
Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status quo ante and this return is beyond the
power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of government, however, the remedy to prevent the revival
of an unwanted status quo ante or stop its continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial
legislation. We emphasize that in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of
deregulation as unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to the constitutional
provision calling for fair competition.23 Thus, there is no impediment in re-enacting R.A. No. 8180 minus
its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court agrees that our return to the regime of regulation
has pernicious consequences and it specially symphatizes with the intervenors. Be that as it may, the
Court is powerless to prevent this return just as it is powerless to repeal the 10% tariff differential of the
Tariff Code. It is Congress that can give all these remedies.24

Petitioner Garcia, however, injects a non-legal argument in his motion for partial reconsideration. He
avers that "given the 'realities' of politics, especially with the 1998 presidential polls six months away, it
is not far-fetched that the general welfare could be sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus further unduly
delaying the enactment of a new oil deregulation law." The short answer to petitioner Garcia's argument
is that when the Court reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of politics
nor does it delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan political theology for as an
institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse, politically agnostic. In any event, it should not take a long
time for Congress to enact a new oil deregulation law given its interest for the welfare of our people.
Petitioner Garcia himself has been quoted as saying that ". . . with the Court's decision, it would now be
easy for Congress to craft new law, considering that lawmakers will be guided by the Court's
points."25 Even before our Decision, bills amending the offensive provisions of R.A. No. 8180 have
already been filed in the Congress and under consideration by its committees. Speaker Jose de Venecia
has assured after a meeting of the Legislative-Executive Advisory Council (LEDAC) that: "I suppose
before Christmas, we should be able to pass a new oil deregulation
law.26 The Chief Executive himself has urged the immediate passage of a new and better oil deregulation
law.27

Finally, public respondents raise the scarecrow argument that our Decision will drive away foreign
investors. In response to this official repertoire, suffice to state that our Decision precisely levels the
playing field for foreign investors as against the three dominant oil oligopolists. No less than the
influential Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry whose motive is beyond question, stated thru
its Acting President Jaime Ladao that ". . . this Decision, in fact tells us that we are for honest-to-goodness
competition." Our Decision should be a confidence-booster to foreign investors for its assures them of
an effective judicial remedy against an unconstitutional law. There is need to attract foreign investment
but that policy has never been foreign investment at any cost. We cannot trade-in the Constitution for
foreign investment. It is not economic heresy to hold that trade-in is not a fair exchange.
To recapitulate, our Decision declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it gave more
power to an already powerful oil oligopoly; (2) it blocked the entry of effective competitors; and (3) it
will sire an even more powerful oligopoly whose unchecked power will prejudice the interest of the
consumers and compromise the general welfare.

A weak and developing country like the Philippines cannot risk a downstream oil industry controlled by
a foreign oligopoly that can run riot. Oil is our most socially sensitive commodity and for it to be under
the control of a foreign oligopoly without effective competitors is a clear and present danger. A foreign
oil oligopoly can undermine the security of the nation; it can exploit the economy if greed becomes its
creed; it will have the power to drive the Filipino to a prayerful pose. Under a deregulated regime, the
people's only hope to check the overwhelming power of the foreign oil oligopoly lies on a market where
there is fair competition. With prescience, the Constitution mandates the regulation of monopolies and
interdicts unfair competition. Thus, the Constitution provides a shield to the economic rights of our
people, especially the poor. It is the unyielding duty of this Court to uphold the supremacy of the
Constitution not with a mere wishbone but with a backbone that should neither bend nor break.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of the intervenors
as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique Garcia are DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Martinez, J., took no part.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Melo and Francisco, JJ., maintain their dissent.

 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List
Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker
of the House of Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel
B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF
SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:*

Prologue

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
 First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down
for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer
election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to
decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws --
not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second
Division, in Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution[3] of the Comelec en banc,
affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as
regular members.[4]In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman
and another for a party-list representative.[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,

which provides:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the
State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:

Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the
party-list system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated.On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives
from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor
were as follows:[6]

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees

Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec
en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled
to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the]
Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent
vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for
only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should
actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-
ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28,
1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-
vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of
the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors
of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
representative. It thus disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby
resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.

ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:

1. SENIOR CITIZENS 2. AKAP

 3. AKSYON 21. 4L
4. PINATUBO 22. AWATU
5. NUPA 23. PMP
6. PRP 24. ATUCP
7. AMIN 25. NCWP
8. PAG-ASA 26. ALU
9. MAHARLIKA 27. BIGAS
10. OCW-UNIFIL 28. COPRA
11. FCL 29. GREEN
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN 30. ANAKBAYAN
13. KAMPIL 31. ARBA
14. BANTAY BAYAN 32. MINFA
15. AFW 33. AYOS
16. ANG LAKAS OCW 34. ALL COOP
17. WOMENPOWER, INC. 35. PDP-LABAN
18. FEJODAP 36. KATIPUNAN
19. CUP 37. ONEWAY PRINT
20. VETERANS CARE 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution
No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System.
Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote,
a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed
the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified
parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed,
based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis
of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1)
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent
of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said
Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved
only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the
issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen
qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 -
herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent
vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions
and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent
this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with
three commissioners concurring[11] and two members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its
Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed
by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were
more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
 Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court
by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.[13] In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other
date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in
the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further
orders from this Court.

On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No.
136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and
Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP;
and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in
amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]

The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation
for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions
should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

 Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives

This formulation[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To
illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the
time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.

According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it
prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-
list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec
cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of
the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
 On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical
impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
percentage requirement rests in Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to
find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the
actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to
apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote
below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised
by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent
or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party
groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name
of the party-list system, Mr. President."[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as
the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is
a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:

MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20
million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If
we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will
be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000.In effect,
that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors,
the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not have
within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should
earn their seats within that system.[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient
number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might
even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22] to
ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.[23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a

multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of
a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x.[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged
in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we
now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes
they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast
have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat
limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes
obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.[25] Translated in figures, a party
that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets
four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat
only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however,
when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total
votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would
be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed
by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a
party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number
of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a
German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the
Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number
of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that
the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

No. of remaining seats

to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order
of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of
party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining
more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen
qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the
previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a
basic tenet of our party-list system.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us
and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out
by private respondents,[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More
important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small
parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the
promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula
completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in
toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

 Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to
be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which
the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending
on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the
formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present
set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional membership cannot
be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We
said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not
make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by
the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat.Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing
the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal
to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or
a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled
to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total
number of votes cast.According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount
of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate
the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes
will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:

No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
 Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as
follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats 321,646

for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:

Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total

Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
 Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in
a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional
seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other
qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the
use of a different formula and methodology.

In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more
no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will
also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it
glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and
the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety
of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements.By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,[30] cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing
body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the
strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the
statute permits.[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three
each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation
mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total
failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a
conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of
the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in
the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the
Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as
a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in
their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for
innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties -
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by
its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL
PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others
under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP);
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA;
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of
our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make
the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-
list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made
as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night
until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order
to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating
their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed
their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a
need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the
sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections'
and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast
for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed
Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in
the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting
and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner
therein, until further orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the
Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed
to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors
and organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in
the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified
in this Decision.

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are
other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification
or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No.
3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000.19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-
list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may
be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d),
Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation
of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not
act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from
this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before
it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding
the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest
and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court
must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when
the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in
the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part,
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA
No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system
is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that
the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban,
PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district
elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the
past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that
is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"
is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the
party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.

Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
 number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our
people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first
day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine
power to our people in the legislature." 35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of
the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and
"lack ofwell-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned
in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law
to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x
x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must
be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90)
days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in
the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association. 38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA
No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society."39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral
Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village
could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast,
and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a
group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives
of their respective sectors. 43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political
power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number
and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to
give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress
and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in
the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement – to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the
House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who
normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance
the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives
through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have
never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore
need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to
those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders"
who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-
list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza,
are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their
deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which
to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is
that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only
when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to
"enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no
need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event,
the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in
construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue
here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-
list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the
non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the
major political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under
Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major
political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of
getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election
of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers
under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is
not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that
they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right
to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate
to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties
admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party
must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. OPLE. x x x

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members
and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from
well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly
the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not,
of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community
sector to represent their group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration
of a religious sect as a political party."58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:
 "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or
an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must
be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is
not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the
House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely,
the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or
the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less
in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have
less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to
the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken
the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA
7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty
offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers
of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of
the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners
in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION,

COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and
ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August
2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s
resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS),
Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition
for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9
July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that
obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed
a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its
petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the
national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely:
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A
Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC),
and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings,
a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and
Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen
million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the
following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already 15,283,659

canvassed/tabulated

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% 102,430

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao
del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the
additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%)
votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely
canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),

against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations
and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the
party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the
Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC

Cooperatives

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment A TEACHER

Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may
later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the
Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby

deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot
and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the
COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of
party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and
maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum
total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
 Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190

9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number
of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party"
in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats
based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans, is:
 Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

 Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission
on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats,
to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later
on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list
system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them
to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007,
which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which
reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition
to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on
the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of
the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12
of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in
relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the
formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that
the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941
shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of
the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating
Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On
the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-
List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao
(AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations
have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3

1.2 Bayan Muna 2

1.3 CIBAC 2

1.4 Gabriela 2

1.5 APEC 2

1.6 A Teacher 1

1.7 Akbayan 1

1.8 Alagad 1

1.9 Butil 1

1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11 Anak Pawis 1

1.12 ARC 1

1.13 Abono 1

1.14 AGAP 1

1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against

which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list
Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First
Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;
 C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided
for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with
the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable
case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation
and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-
list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?18

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list;
 Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of
Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list
representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first
formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats
available to legislative districts Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220
x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-
List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering
at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally
all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of
the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No.
2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of
the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to
those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which
have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with
Section 12 of RA 7941.23

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A.
No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the
votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making
the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled
up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-
List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold.
After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a
qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified
party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There
will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number
of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats
are filled up.26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.27

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

 29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130

PILIPINO

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20
party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total
votes for the party-list.28

Votes Garnered
Votes over Total Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered for Party-List, in Seat
%

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number
of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are
the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of
seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of
the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50
seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives."30

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941,
the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats
in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
over Applying
Seat Seats (C), in
Votes Total the three
Rank Party (First (Second whole
Garnered Votes for seat cap
Round) Round) integers
Party (E)
(B) (C) (D)
List, in %
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

 33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled.
The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case
to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear
this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x
x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation
side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can
field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can
prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no
reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if
this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the
opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so
that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties
to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It
is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have
in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic
Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is
no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence
and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support
this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through
a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
 (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates in party-
list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election,
and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can
do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for
a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that
the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk,
or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However,
we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007
in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional
party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with
the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating
in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different
choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock
or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and
the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of
Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in
opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason
more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously,
then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration
with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs
are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters,
and outlined its platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
 x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual

attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did
change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men,
leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men
with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that
recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!
(7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the

Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).
 Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal
Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance
as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to

public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any
form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the
establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
 obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live
or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1)
glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend
to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public
order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment
that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and
writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the
youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that
it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent
its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a
tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes
when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of
individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of
race or religion or belief.

xxxx
 Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can
be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either
male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly
expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these
legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf
of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG
filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat
surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.[13]Thus, in order to give
COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The
COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January
12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial
of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was granted
on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that
the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as
a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and

Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in
the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
 Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it
had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does
not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned
or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of
petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First
Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents
theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around
the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
 Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)
Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings
are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal
place of business.
 Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation
of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition

for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the
dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious
beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will
 not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes
this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs
of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have
a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them;
the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same
time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for

Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:
 Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we
cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing
its own existence.[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this
censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or
distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has
not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have
not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the
OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed
or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights and the
gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission
into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladladsregistration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool
to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion
that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person
be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test,
coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is
a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public
opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular
minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval
of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.State
intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs
position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.[38]We are not
prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not
received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and
that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of
the case.

Freedom of Expression and Association

 Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society
of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and
these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public
deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the
beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the
very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of
religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large
but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do
what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country.
It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association
that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41]European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds,
citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent that there
is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is
certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech
doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant
human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party
may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic
means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that
political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be
afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.[44] A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward
policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their
supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are
morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.However,
as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that
this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court
and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most
liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to
affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to
freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial.
In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of
Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the
capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the
party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-
list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action,
from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners
fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
 In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world
order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international
human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so
that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated
by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right
to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part
in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to
public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires
States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have
an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective
office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the
right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable
criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because
 of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions
which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect
to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for
all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),[51]which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their
true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from
at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction
these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are
couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated
by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on
the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This
Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws
as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient
enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President
Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas
Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST,
represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
Commissioner,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its
Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known
as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary
General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH
(GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI),
represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C.
Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante
Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its
President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS
(AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its
Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY
AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER,
JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary
General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND
WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR
CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN
ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-
EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson
and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20
November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC

Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not

(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and

(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
 Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.

3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its

(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to

(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5 204367 12-104 Akbay - Failure of the group to show

(PL) Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a

(PP) (AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
 8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the

(PP), Party (AI) party represents a
12-165 marginalized and
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that the

(PL) Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and sectors; - The sectors of
Associations of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
 to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations

Resolution dated 7 November 201215

9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track

(PL) Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an

(PP) (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
 to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11 204394 12-145 Association of - Failure to prove

(PL) Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the

(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track
record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent
to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The
COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and

19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
 Foundation veterans and the youth, are
(UNIMAD) not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
 Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration

(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party’s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration

(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
 Magsasaka party;
(KAP) - Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration

(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration

(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration

(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
 and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
 guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
 - Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and

(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
 nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list
Progress system; and
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
 - There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are bona fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
 marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that
Dreamers, Inc. the
(ABROAD) party is actually able to
 represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
 actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

Resolution dated 3 December 201246

37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration

204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-
PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were
able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of
these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)

204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

(PLM)

203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(PLM) (APEC)

203960 12-260 1st

(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)

203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(PLM) (ANAD)

204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(PLM) (COCOFED)

204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(PLM) (ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

(PLM)

204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(PLM) (UNIMAD)

204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)

204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)

204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

(PLM) LINGKOD)

204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

(PLM)

204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

(PLM)

204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and

(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

(PLM)

204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

(PLM)

204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)

204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)

204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and

(PLM) Transparency (SMART)

204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

(PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor

(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

(PLM)

204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

(PLM)

204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

(PLM)

204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(PLM) (1AAAP)

204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

(PLM)
 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)

204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

(PLM) MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system,
and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed
in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the
party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on
the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of
which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean
that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had
in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors
or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting
the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration.
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers.
These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he
would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid
these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats
for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party
list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party
or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a
list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the
party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party
can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They
have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a
Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a
women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason
why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not
have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one
percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance
to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to
win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely,
they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would
not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and
party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x
x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties.
My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can
also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats
that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can
prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader
or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published
to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of
such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and
shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and
unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part,
but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the
bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held
in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent
seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be
open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by
allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would
garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was
voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved
seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in
the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the
entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that
could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers
of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-
list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-
half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or

platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain
of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
 It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from
a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties
in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse
or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
 (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2
on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on
the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who
fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win
seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-
party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members
in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties
under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be
elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second
guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal
to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the
prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-
list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth
wing, that can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political
party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that
"component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes
a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong
to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in
the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious

purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and
absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse
of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and
mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing
the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani.
In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion,
we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the
criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may
appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking

in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-
 defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors
they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not
belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which
have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots,
are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen."[1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate
nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become
a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly
acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire
the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that
natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]

 There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.[9]

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act
No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and
none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
 As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
 Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision,
the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as
follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were
not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were
not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because
they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority
age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a
sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's
jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a
petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31]There is no such showing
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved.
In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this
Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority,
for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however
becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided
the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

 THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; That
the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge.1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A.
Aquino2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113
and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in
Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l)
year and thirteen (13) days.3

On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case.4

On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified
and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between
petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April
28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES

to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO
AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the
Second Legislative District of Makati City.

SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995
resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the
congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty
seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine
hundred ten (35,910) votes.10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of
the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing
of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of
respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate

implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed
to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, PICC
Press Center, Pasay City.

SO ORDERED.11

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension
of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to
accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon
because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of
the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate
for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the
May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain
the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made
permanent.

Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be immediately
be proclaimed.

SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as
well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the
following errors for consideration, to wit:

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES
AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING
RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID

JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION
17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT

PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS
ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO
PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.

D
 THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO

APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY
CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS
THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS
IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF
YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF
THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR
PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND
CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15

In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections,
the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of
the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is
exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet
unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and
grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the
Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning
candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension
of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the
conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section
6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications
of candidates Section 6 states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him
when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to
suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of
Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section
7 states:

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

II

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice. 17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence"
has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions
but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of

residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the
same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
 Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time
to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially

considering that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol.
II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained
in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area
for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district,
if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose
could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given
period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be
imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually
was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District
of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data
furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it
is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his
intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or
Quezon City. 26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon,
the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated
domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing
a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement
as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a commencement date
of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish;
a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of
domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in
this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed
take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such
new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions
in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was
disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop
around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

III

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.
The answer must be in the negative.

To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates
in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private
respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their
vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner
been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The votes for
Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second
placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other. In
the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith
that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in
favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes cannot
be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his
unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered
in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a
result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.

In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible.
We held in Geronimo:

[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid
or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law,"
reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.

In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this
Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that
the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that
a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis
on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle
 the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner
of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should
not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo
was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he
was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case
of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of
Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered
as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor.Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated
by the electorate. . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an
elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes
is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of
the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position.
(Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to
depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by
the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78,
Omnibus Election Code).

And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He
cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then
(Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave
(Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more
logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in
 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . .
.

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v.
Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk
of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona
fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers
of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot
assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under
no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office.
Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471
votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo,
p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).

This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of
the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been
disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly
represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English
court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified,
could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it
is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances
where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters
preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates,
should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-
evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of
votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an
election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible"
candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of
respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate
the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of
the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will
of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining
respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief
at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof
for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which this
provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos
lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives
on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already
lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have
been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with
the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in
her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's
motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter
in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of
said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of
another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve
his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is
afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8,
1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-
009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31,
1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely,
the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the
Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of
origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded
"since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban
City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident
of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate
for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering
in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake."

Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her
Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa
is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus,
the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,

therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the
case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of
Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot
affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be
considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number
of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial
matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to
suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects
the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting
minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in
order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be
committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency
the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in
her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration
(Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer
of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents
show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last
week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that
it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be

admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent
has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294;
Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned
to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro
Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she
was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila.
She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of
fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of
voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared
that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained
how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the
old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with
her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is
a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent
her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention,
is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident
of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of
Leyte "since childhood."
 To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District
of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so,
she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since
it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a
resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to

DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination
of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections
in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the
canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the
canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying

petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification
cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive

jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it
were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.
It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless,
for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a

place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case
involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss
of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election
law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law,
it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly
are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident
thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given
to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter
of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
 may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be
by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law,
regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is
the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative
District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to
her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner
to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different
interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted
down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of
the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in
the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

 POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence
in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece
of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte,
the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except
for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that
petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where
she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as
a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship
to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute
loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became
a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena
vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he
lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning
it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in
the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes,
to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but
for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself
from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has
the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose
the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has
not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment
or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every
person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations
of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban
from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies
in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban
City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there
as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran
for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein
she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner
held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts
of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did
not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952,
she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile
in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one
is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought
his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed
to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince
this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred.
To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this
specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of
fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect
the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only
actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the
same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another
positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously
cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more
consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage
different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by
allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is
Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes
into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him
in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile"
and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr.
Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the
ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which
the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person
in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a
 city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently,
even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is
not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial
residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be
compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different
from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman
may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either
to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually
opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with
her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of
the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair
are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice
is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained
suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if
the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable
by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with
the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate
cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to
live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with
her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago,
and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an
order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition
of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue
to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11)
But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among
which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950,
into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and
the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making
the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the
Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and
only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to
the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed
in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family
to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or
"actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific
situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during
the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the
House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment
on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held
that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on

grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
 impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the
ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a
case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of
law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime.
We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law.
Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D.
ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of
representatives, respondent.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and
thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was
scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported
by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which
states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed
a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990.
The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX,
Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
 of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself – by
the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and,
therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls
of the House. ...

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed
to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken on this communication, but
it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for
such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.

In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his
office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other persons. In
effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights
and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim
Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto,
and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,
are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other hand, the grounds
by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
 a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election

contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention
of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means
by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to
incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional
Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of
Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents
acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of striking
out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an
interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may
interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of
candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be
recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:

A.
 IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?

B.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS
FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is
not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not
exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress,
among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification
to hold public office.

Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which
estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain
that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any
encroachment on judicial powers.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
 Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for
which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:

Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running
for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:

Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city,
municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or
within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure
to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new
office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various
sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered
on forced leave of absence from office.

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of
elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of
their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-President. The advocates
of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this
inclusion, thus:

MR. PALMARES:
 In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to
be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer

running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing
these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why
do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale
behind it?

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose
is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the
Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past where
members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that
spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people.
They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for
mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with
that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr.
Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds.
We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from
Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers.
Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.

Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only
means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people.
Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6
years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker,
we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member
who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be
allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or
abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow
a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office
other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to
service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the
Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers
or facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973
Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.

Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a
Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve,
otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact
therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing
his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position
which he feels he could be of better service.

As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the
basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the
Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which we were elected, but
because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the community
 which voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of
public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own
personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62
where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were
elected, should be considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate
of candidacy."

It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains
written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers"
is more emphatic in stating:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative
does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office
by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by
making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This
is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost
loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor
General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be
shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains
and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application
to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article
VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As
held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances
which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are
merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but
simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the
Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.

The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This
Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a
constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly
imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of legislature.
The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim expresses a
rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not
otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As
discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:

MR. MAAMBONG:

Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary renunciation'
does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.

MR. DAVIDE:

Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG:

It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us
exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE:

Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely

resigning at any given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment
and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE:

It is more general, more embracing.

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy
for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office
presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo
Tolentino and Jose Rono:
 MR. RONO:

My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in one
case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it
should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to relinquish his office.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes ...

MR. RONO:

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is
only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.

MR. RONO:

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with the
conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of
candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's already there.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore
the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs.
Gatuslao:

... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of
the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines,
that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is
actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section
67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of Members.
The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative
powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the
Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission
on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial
duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity
of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions
as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on
his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-

appellant.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of

Representatives" was filed on the grounds that

1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered

inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power of
the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without

representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal

and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
 5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed

to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free
people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative,
and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind
that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the
latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil
arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws
governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance
at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is
illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the
law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that
Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
 (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that
the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-
defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to
redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused
may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and evaded
capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions
and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially
spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced
because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a
mockery of the aims of the States penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex,
Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of
Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant

commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)

establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle
and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency
or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court
in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force
except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should
be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance
in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent
from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and
well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that
may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after
legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual,
would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of
course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and
every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the
latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of
temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of
Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing
Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement
of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly
stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-
appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to
perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."[6] This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being
a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to
be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her
infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the
lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into
a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.[9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class.[10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the
free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it
is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.[12] The term refers
to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place,
or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss
of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individuals status in
society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for
re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights.[17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that re-election to
public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE
ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL.
LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series
of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena
and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the
Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally
held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually
from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the
appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he
may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when
the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment
and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from
the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention
at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of
the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or
coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge
of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the
press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the
Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in
the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance
between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may
wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of
confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is
not in session; and
 (f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and
related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of
the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them
down to three.7 The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons
and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii)
direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to
attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the
maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons
and guests9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007,
been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-
over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named
military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against
those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not,
by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him;
and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY

INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT",
A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING

ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO
THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS
AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE

BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;
 III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR

SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT

OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out
that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending
appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption
of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of
Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances
which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.15

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in
a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally
to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners
and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which
was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow
accomplish legislative results.27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court
in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused
pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of
final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate ofpresumption of innocence prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation
by the Commission on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since
he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he
was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November
29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh
hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves
that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor
nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable
offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is
only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather
than face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were
non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces
a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37Petitioner’s petition for bail
having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing
him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he
interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-
at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon,
despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his
requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military
installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure
the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention
officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner
that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate,
after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus
Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation,
denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor."42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no
"prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
[and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison."44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
 members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have
also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor
Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial
of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of
the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed
under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest
to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails
to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for

five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This
motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if
not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the
Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within
the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this
provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein,
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the
trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of
Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present
circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious
study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The
first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the
sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense,
and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a
political campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez
of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel
Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major
Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners"
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in
Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief
of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was
relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon,
Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence
network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational
technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters
only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of
democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key
positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they
reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than
the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and
gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed
Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not
a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano
be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in
the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano",
and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8)
that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength
to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano
should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as
"planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely
no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be
merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs,
to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces,
that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners"
include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing
that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred,
contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere
conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it
being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said
communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to
stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned
passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup
d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G.

PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL
G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.

A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are being
given and made:

a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:

Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero

Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus,
the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14,
1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.

c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group
objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC
was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981
plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue
his appearance for respondent Acero.

d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto
A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero
to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.

(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.

e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the
said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero
(CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In
L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case originally filed
with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."

On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent
SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in
allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as
an Answer to the Petition.

The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI
may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as
amended, now reads:

SEC. 11.

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction.

before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,

or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office,

or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation,
during his term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called
to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before
SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared
as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively
in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him
eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case
would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional prohibition
against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a
corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A
resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to

intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, respondents.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere.

Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or
the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast
and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

The Case

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original
petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful
minority leader.

On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor
general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice. On
August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated
Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and
deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.

In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction[1] to hear
and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic
deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals.[2] However,
for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case,
this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine.[3]In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President[4] and the Speaker of the House[5] have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.

The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July
27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation,
the composition of the Senate was as follows:[6]

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the

Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)

1 member - Liberal Party (LP)

1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya

1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)

1 member - Gabay Bayan

2 members - Independent

----------

23 - total number of senators[7] (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as independent.)

On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position
of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same
position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,[8] Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.
 The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted forSenator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the minority.

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived
at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve
the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,[9] stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.

Issues

From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?

The Courts Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings[10] and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the
Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition
of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.

First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco[11] in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle
the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of majority and
minority involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof,
stating that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members.

Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue
of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of
the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not
provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to
provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an
interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are
there peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor
general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners theory that a senator
who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.

To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
 The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial review;
that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law,
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over
questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal
finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.[12]

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the
domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed
jurisdiction (1) in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session[13] and therein elect a Senate President.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with the majority that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.[14]

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly
explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be
expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an
effective settlement are pinned.[15]

x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
refuse to decide them.[16]

x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.[17]

In Taada v. Cuenco,[18] this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it refers
to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]
legality, of a particular measure.[19]

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senates full
discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.[20] Thus, the Court held
that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings,
but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,[21] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the
Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was made in
spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker[22] and Montenegro v. Castaeda[23] that the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege x x x) belongs
to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. But
the Chief Justice cautioned: the function of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant --- the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:[24]

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not
political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political
questions is the principle of separation of powers -- characteristic of the presidential system of
government -- the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3)
categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere -
- but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon theadvisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or
decision are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -- particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form
of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation -- made particularly more exacting and peremptory
by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution -- to
settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts
have a duty, rather than a power, to determine whether another branch of the government has kept within
constitutional limits.

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial
power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of
duty, viz.:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.[25]

This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza
v. Singson,[26] Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.[27] and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[28] similarly resolved issues
assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the
seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the
issue was justiciable, even if the question were political in nature, since it involved the legality, not the
wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article
VI of] the Constitution.

The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,[29] wherein the petitioners sought
to nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. The Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an
act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such
action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2)
grave abuse of discretion.

Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[30] (HRET), the Court refused to
reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, the returns,and the qualifications of their respective members. Such
jurisdiction is original and exclusive.[31] The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said
tribunals only if such decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion.[32]

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[33] was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine
and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which
was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners
claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They
averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the
Constitution itself.

The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal
procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated:[34]

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.

In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.

Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over
the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner
is entitled to the relief asserted.[35] In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this
Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate
President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?

Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all its members carries with
it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as who may elect a minority
leader. They argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a
result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted
for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan
and accepted committee chairmanships.

We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total.[36] The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal
does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there
is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.

The Comment[37] of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was
seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.[38] During the ninth regular session,
when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign
committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the minority.[39] This practice
continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee.[40] History would also show that the majority in either house of Congress has referred to the
political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the minority normally referred
to a party with a lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also refer to the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,[41] not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number
of votes or adherents than the majority.[42] Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one
of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different
political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.[43] To
our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of
its proceedings.[44] Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs.[45] Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:

Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro
Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.

Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICERS
SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there
be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections
shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner
of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do
its work.[46] Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene.[47]

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.[48] Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of
no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body[49] at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers
as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of thisprerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor
a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial

legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument
alone, the petition would easily fail.
 While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate
was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.[50] This is the plain implication of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the
duty not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but likewise to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:[51]

xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested
in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

 Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power[52] by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.[53] A quo warranto proceeding is the proper
legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment.[54] The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor[55] or any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.[56] The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is
unlawfully holding or exercising such office.[57]

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she
has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held by the respondent.[58] In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.

As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said
that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the
office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term grave
abuse of discretion.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.[59]
 By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs
to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions
and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
July 25, 2017
G.R. No. 227757
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO,Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by petitioners Representatives Teddy Brawner
Baguilat, Jr., (Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel
A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin, and Gary C. Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the
House of Representatives, essentially praying that respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker
Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep.
Suarez; collectively, respondents), also members of the House of Representatives, be compelled to
recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress of the House of
Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the Minority.

The Facts

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles
surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the
House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after
the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority partisans. The
petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority
coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the
Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader.2

On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-
Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning
Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to
the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority;
and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.3 Thereafter, the
Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)]
voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no
vote,"4 thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the 17th Congress.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who garnered
the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader -
Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous
follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such.5

On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon),
manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez
(including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.6 Thereafter,
on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as
the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that various
"irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was
a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was
irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's
election as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus,
irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and
consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the
candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority
Leader position.

For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House
of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion,
the Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the govemment.8 In the same
vein, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader
Farinas contends, inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the exclusive realm of the
House of Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers, as well as the political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the recognition of Rep.
Suarez as the House Minority Leader was not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.9

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ
of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;
and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw."10 In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the
Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in
extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12

After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs
sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other candidates
shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part
of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the
Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without any objection from
any member of Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House
is the essential and formative step conducted at the first regular session of the 17th Congress to determine
the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering that
the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those
who did not. The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1
dated July 25, 2016,14which, based on case law, is conclusive15 as to what transpired in Congress:

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA

Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House
of Representatives.

REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS

In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership to the Majority and
the Minority. He explained that the Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall
constitute the Majority and shall elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. while those who
voted against the winning Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter
elect their Minority Leader.

NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF

THE HOUSE

Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Members proceeded to the election
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary
General Adasa to call the Roll for nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and requested each
Member to state the name of the candidate he or she will vote for.

The result of the voting was as follows:

For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:

xxxx
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.

xxxx

For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez

xxxx

Abstained

xxxx

With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep.
Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as
the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives for the 17th Congress.

COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION

On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body constituted a committee composed of the
following Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to escort the Speaker-elect to the rostrum for his oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K.
Alvarez, Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco, Elenita
Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas, Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn
F. Garcia, Marlyn L. PrimiciasAgabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel
G. Noel.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at 12:43p.m.16

After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of office to all Members of the
House of the 17th Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House
(among others, the Majority Leader) were elected and all took their respective oaths of office.18

During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full day after all the above-
mentioned proceedings had already been commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman questioned Rep.
Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules.19 Aside from the belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez
aptly points out that the Journal for that session does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried
to correct the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016) pertinent to any recording error
that may have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or objection was raised.20

Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had
effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority,
as well as the process of determining who the Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this
demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the
reliefs sought before this Court, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically awarding the
Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the
rule21 that those who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as independent Members
of the House of Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the person
of Rep. Suarez.22 As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid
rules is not averse to the Constitution.

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of
its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is
something within its sole control.23 In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court
observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House
of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower
House]. All that the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26 of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives
the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact,
they 'are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House
of Representatives]. "27 Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it
is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts
of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives]."28

Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom,
merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.29 This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text
emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political
law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:30

[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.31

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."32
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned
proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case
concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil
this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers
doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch
in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself."34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Tañada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny
the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
the principal grounds for the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator Tañada and
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against
the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said
resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order.
Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States,
all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his
partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech.
The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but
this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the
above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who
would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his
follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime
the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At
about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by
petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition
to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session
hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those
senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when
the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded
it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting
President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.

By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial
points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection
of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority
of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the
temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves
to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial
deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where
two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said
Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit
be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate. The
petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the
same one Philippines Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes
it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of
similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate
a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21,
1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-
questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving
the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would
be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator
Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that
office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes
(actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents
Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee
was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the
Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling
of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,
Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of
his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the
session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee
report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval
of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday,
next week.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having
been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
 Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel
C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from
3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to
petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript
certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it
is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare
for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss
this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they
admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners
agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No.
7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art.
VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker
De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the
rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call
for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion
to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and
instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the
session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996
and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the
law had been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave
abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the
changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De
Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation
of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules
of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules
of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is
false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the
petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of
November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body
approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7] This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
 First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment
of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no
quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo
was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
each House may determine the rules of its proceedings[9] and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings was invoked by
parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection
to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal.
 In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of
its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination
of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The
provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of
the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also
by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance
with rules.

In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows:
The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have
all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings
are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the
House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may
think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.

In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an
act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the respective
branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications,
we decline to follow them.

Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma
provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature,
with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds
vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular
manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules,
or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives
its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is
shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be
no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch
of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187;
State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.[18]

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as
long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We
must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion [by
the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore,
to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such
as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
. . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.[21]

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely
of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction
so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion
approved.
 What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that .
. . Mr. Speaker?The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual
votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a
legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such
as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the
manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the
bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr.
Tolentino said:

Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter
of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been
the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.

....

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is
now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote
by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on
second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So,
if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and
the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.[22]

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate
and even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present
any matter for judicial consideration.[24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court
cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem
that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.[29] It would appear, however, that the
session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m.
on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved
for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep.
Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting
the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos
question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or
substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyos
question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to
any further consideration of the question.[31]

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII,
1 extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction.[32]

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum.[34]

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo,
appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did
not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.[37]

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is
devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To
be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused
to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution
had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts.[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made
them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to
do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of
popular government.[40]

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government.[41]

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be
allowed.[42]

In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified
by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving
the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.[45]

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases
and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say
that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an
open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin,
and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places
have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of
the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198,
which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke
of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent
character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its
due enactment has been duly proven.

___________________

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules
of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do
so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.

Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The information in this case reads:

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting
among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from
a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and
introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520
tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that,
then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did
receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt
and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had
been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a
foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet
been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both
appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.

The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied
by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in
the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in
denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding
that the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special
session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on
March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's
proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act
No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two
others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence
and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in
the reversed order.

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would
properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of
the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be
the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On page 793
of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine
Legislature, the following appears:

The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the
Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on
motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature,
adjourned sine die.

The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the
Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In
obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly
published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.

Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall
be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive
evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides that:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .

(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either
house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.

While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may
take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may
be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session
of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual
time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at
12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive
evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the
legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear
and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal
science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the
Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st,
and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other
hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of
adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and
character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves
"any matter in question or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which
establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p.
701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon
the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or
sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those
of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all
pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly
to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock
was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of
the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the
adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be
taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must
rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between
private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348),
decided in 1886, said:

Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question; and,
out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the
 proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in each of its
branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon
judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact
that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws
should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day
upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.

In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various
states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative
journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the
Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the
matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from
Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned
to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of
a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's
invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs
broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and
signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise
from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of
Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly
thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine"
had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants,
and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and
traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the
customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was
found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on
the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to
Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons
then left and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He
called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did
and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-
five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General
Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place designated.
Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's
bodega on that date before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in
the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the
other merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry
numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being
questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been
delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by
Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found the five missing barrels, which were
identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty,
the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in size
to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of
opium in one of these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some
clothing was discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to
ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were
delivered. The owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it
was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by
the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After
discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty barrels and
ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to contain
a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the
empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way
identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10,
Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest,
and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according to
Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however,
that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire importation. Pons,
being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels were opened and the customs officers
appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed the officers
how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle
stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels,
Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30
a. m. on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that the house
at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of
handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation of
opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in every way
similar to those found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse.
At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of
Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious
person. But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant
and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him
(Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter
arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because
he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing
wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered,
"Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent
to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of
wine."

The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as
shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this
huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance
with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known
as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959,
its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement
the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in
November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in
the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the
main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee
aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid
the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No.
2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor
of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt
by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and
for the exclusive use of end-users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed
as "urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and
the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted
that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner,
the view that:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture
of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
"urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of
the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect
the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games &
Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill —
which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias
vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in
his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO,
FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO,
LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO,
JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO
MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA
FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive
Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic
Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."

The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith
the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces
and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 11 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the
journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House
Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter
was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies
thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of
the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate
and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of
the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June
18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City
Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement
that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a
wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well
as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered
his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made
the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill
on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he
and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses
of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature
on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would
be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued
an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City
Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill
itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.

On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip,
this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-
Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-
Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court."

The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of
Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared
as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the
parties.

Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States
Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or
the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this
Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947),
78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it
cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a
binding precedent.

The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights
provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran,
Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was
not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our
government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional
question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect."

Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code
of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests.
It reads:

The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts
of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved
bill.2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication,3 to signify to the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his
approval or rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is
considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the
Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect
giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary6 There
is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not
even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a
bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that
the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution,
is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this
point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form,
the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in
the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
 duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the
attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be
resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not
require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to
its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that
the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when
the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a
bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has
"passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The
inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had
been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged
law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become
law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not
to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April
28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on
Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85,
Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of
the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President.
REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The
Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore
act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every
statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its
validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation,
and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject
of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
 a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the

unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing
needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the
overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as
well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions
as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute
to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane
to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction,
and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected
with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title
of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege
from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters
that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification
in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not
only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the
Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause
in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a
law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major
and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of
the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that
from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this
amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted
to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming
from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that
because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn
from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents)
but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems
to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it.
The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there
is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for
the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage
of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts
of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial
process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative
and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted
for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to
affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise
of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to
be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the
equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through
the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges,
we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial
Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices
the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO
C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number
of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS

CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
 Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion
sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of
which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de

este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in
the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented;
(b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation
of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
 (10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the
Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected
and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein
raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of
the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and
 in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules
and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the
fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said
act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not
and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal,
or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members
of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason
of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January
 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of
the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within
which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest
filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed
with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,

corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article
VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could
it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme
Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of
the united States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to
the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader
aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made
a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent
through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.
And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard
to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth
in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the
Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date
as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the
very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience
and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission
is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some
countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is
taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts
are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921,
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV).
The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are
silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and
South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary
laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter
to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were
left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which
may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition
and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the
National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue
hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified.
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on
August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole
nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided
over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside.
The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention
on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties
in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House
of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting
the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as
to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number
of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed
by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art.
121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of
the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead
of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads
as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first
four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from
Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall
also be judged by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be
judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about
the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there
is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm
also the election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House
of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the
assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has
been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes
of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not
authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same
case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first
clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be
elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence
of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been
elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is
to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to
be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from
Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate
from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate
from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are
already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse
to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted
to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election
and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even
if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law,
they cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question
the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
 Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power
and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even
though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in
response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar
and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate
Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada
por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision
Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados
y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos
el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los
jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta
contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following
interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

 El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la
minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el
asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma,
tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte
Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de
la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment
by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by
the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
 SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be
its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly
accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by
the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of
proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their
proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form
of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode
of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the
case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee.
The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that
is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to
be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if
they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year
1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere
party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for
Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his
office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of
the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and
justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious
matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and,
on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate
the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the
following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that
we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our
own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the
very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which
met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell
declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
 security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable,
that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the
common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James
Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of
the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the
King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act,
1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of
England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were
originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise,
in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house,
are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic
of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As
the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience
of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body
on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p.
25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But
it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede
the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to
the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle
would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance
of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever
and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly
in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed
by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the
tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is
not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In
the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned
to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to
be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created
by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired
in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not
follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over
which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of
equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear
that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon
the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National
Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and
6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members
of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral
Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature
at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation
alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election
no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to
dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is
not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact,
certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the
National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of
the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the
privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331.
332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases
of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same
upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require
(31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election,
return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each
house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of
member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests
had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members
against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested
(Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District,
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to
have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear
and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the
rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds,
to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election
of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES
and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V. MENDOZA and
JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M.
GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R.
BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES
and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its
Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and Members, namely: SENATORS
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE,
ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO
HONASAN, RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S.
ROCO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES
LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAADA, MANUEL M.
GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR.,
PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M.
PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR,
JR., respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET for brevity)[2] and the Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity).[3] Petitioners
pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the
HRET and the CA to include party-list representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined from exercising their functions until they
have been reorganized.

Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of
Representatives (House for brevity), as follows:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.

On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives, to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives.[4]

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which
included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose
nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives
from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also
elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
 Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent[6] by electing its representatives
to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA.[7] From available records,
it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any
of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties.

On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate
President Blas F. Ople,[8] as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A.
R. Melo (now retired),[9] as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list
representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer
Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.[10] On the same day,
HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement[11] of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.

On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman
and Members,[12] and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.[13] Petitioners contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in
the HRET,[14] and 2.4 seats in the CA.[15] Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8,
2000,[16]the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.

On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion[17] to amend their petitions to implead
then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended
petitions.

Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold
the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-
list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
 Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members,[18] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:

Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list. xxx[19]

According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment,[20] at the time petitioners filed the
instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting
6.3636% of the House. Of the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different political
parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal
Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and
PROMDI, and 1 representative was an independent.

In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,[21] petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor Generals
computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularly
assail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LP
representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.
The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
IN THE HRET.

2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.

3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE

THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally defective
and substantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:

It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the existence of a cause
of action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was elected by a
party or organization registered under the party-list system as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent
said party or organization under the party-list system of the House of Representatives.[22]

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the
following pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :[23]

Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions
acquire a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the public of the case
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure.
 Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The procedural questions that
petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters that are
specifically provided for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution[24] explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,[25] each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.

These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:

Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of
the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its
organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper. (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:

Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both Houses
of Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be
composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented herein.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply
with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and
the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature.

The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the CA.

The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in
the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear
that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups
in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with
the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the
courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual
controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial
interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable
opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final
determination of the controversy.[29]

The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they
are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they
claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As
such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus
standi. The party raising the constitutional issue must have such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[30]

We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response
to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On
May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House. The Court
cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the present
composition of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With
the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence
of a proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must
fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering
an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.[31]

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the
Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60
(1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the
Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some
as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too
willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in
the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter
involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination
by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance.
Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any
of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out
in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government
may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give
rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then,
it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and
the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into
the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is
brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this
case. It is —

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer
justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose
of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought
the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each
received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes

Difference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest
(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed
of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members
of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec.
17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas
LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's
protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-
three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount
of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the
decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to
107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief,"
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case
but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a
"gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the
appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the
LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the
Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30
P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco
informed Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said
political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also
a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12,
1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note
of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M.
Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which
are hereto attached.

Thank you.
 For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because —

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral
protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March
1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there
were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote
may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-
litigant which would have been defeated.

The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes
in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation
of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz
and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is
set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce
de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote,
for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of
his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to
continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and
credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating
of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal
should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have
nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation
in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to
provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three
(3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial
component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition
of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such
contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-
judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.

We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation
with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in
Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy
Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the
Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No.
91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc
vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without
Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by
Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion
that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly
adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their
relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a
member of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan
also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of
all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all
members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the
decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-
legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also
submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every
member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and
 may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and
Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the
intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators
in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral
Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative
term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-
members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura
should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and
judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in

place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and

discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated
to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the
issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura
as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise
ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being
the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political
parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the
Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them
whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;6 that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a member of the Tribunal
who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision
mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;8 and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP9 and the
decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-
of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial
review.10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause
of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the
HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party
for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership
in the HRET.12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the
HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What
he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed
had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that
decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to
the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would
have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the
relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had
announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers
of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935
constitutional provision reads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice
in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political
party to control the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians.
It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid
of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained in the legislature.
 The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special
tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted
to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative
interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though
not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members
of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may
not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the
following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal,
either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional
creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which
are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good
distinction?

MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the
electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to
know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration
and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate
branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule
is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and
qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes
care of this particular controversy.
 Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule
because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will
notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,
technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies
are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on
the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that
there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit
in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate
Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with
complete detachment from an political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record
how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition,
has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think
we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal,
Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or
the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's
candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership
in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of
the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to
show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are
not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal
were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who,
upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave
of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in
the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to
remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the
tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid
reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him
for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the
Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the
Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared
for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of
the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote
and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the
strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea
for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the
Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his
rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the
Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
(Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor,
the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13,
1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab
initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered
reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET
Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy
resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies
thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A.
Pineda.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal
Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting
of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. 3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission
on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same
day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.
Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real
party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission
on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it
required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as
amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days
of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of
all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has
the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act
of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion
explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which,
 under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly
nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as
the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the
minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and
Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as
provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court, contending that under Article
VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the
Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista
Party could nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the
minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the
petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument,
holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the
manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was
a justiciable and not a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate,
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-
behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the
 Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.

... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S.,
439; emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise
involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom
or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he
may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that
this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one
thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as
early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been
consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through
Chief Justice Fernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five
members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being
sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized
as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law
standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original
stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for
prohibition.

The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that
[its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional
character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being barely six months away,
reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate
invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional
statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are
invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a
quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista
Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber
in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4
from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over
the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied
Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the
House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen
originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration

Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent
Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that
the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly
constituted.

The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the
Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation
of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more
or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied
Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the
Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of
our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the
Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation
to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved
stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-
bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly
allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided
only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-
Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
representation therein. Thus, the Court held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members
of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of
proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN,"
necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If
by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another
political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary
number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House
belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies
in conformity with the Constitution.

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was
supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably simplify
the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of
the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP
itself, then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual,
because the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to
the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP
No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in
 determining the required proportional representation of political parties in
the House of Representatives. 9

xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is
to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political
parties who are duly registered with the Comelec. 10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the
Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated
August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken
the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in
the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The
Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction
of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of
the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only
four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on
Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers
of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among
its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in
structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone
similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of
such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for
that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
"history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen
members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now
opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than
half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be
said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not
only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is
justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of,
or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority
to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the
designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed
aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be
addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to
change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our
jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we
are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely
discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not
evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is
LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 72492 November 5, 1987
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and
ARTURO UMBAC, petitioners,
vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS
UYPITCHING, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

An attempt by the respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Dumaguete to punish non-members for legislative contempt was halted by this special civil action of
certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order questioning the very
existence of the power in that local legislative body or in any of its committees. On November 7, 1985,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order:

. . . enjoining respondents, their agents, representatives, and police and other peace officers
acting in their behalf, to refrain from compelling the attendance and testimony of
Petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac at any and all future investigations to be
conducted by aforesaid respondents, and from issuing any contempt order if one has not
been issued yet or from executing any such contempt order if one has already been issued.

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition) sent by the
respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of
Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative
NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's investigation on October 29,
1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the same Committee on the latter date, (Annex "D",
Petition) directing said petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative
contempt due to their failure to appear at said investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending legislation
related to the operations of public utilities" (Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II,
an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the
alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city
(Comment, Rollo, p. 50). Respondent Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on
Public Utilities and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the
subpoena and the Order complained of. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following
grounds:

a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power
lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration; and

b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants
(the Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient power
lines of NORECO II. (Annex "C", Petition)

The motion to quash was denied in the assailed Order of October 29, 1985 directing the petitioners Torres
and Umbac to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. Hence this Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order.

Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who
fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters
affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo pp. 7-8).

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with
it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also
the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied
from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents
assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power
consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and its committees.
1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative
power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law,
possess delegated legislative power.While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the
power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
[1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that courts wield an inherent power
to "enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness
of the administration of justice." (Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35
Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned
for the first time in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held
that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.

That case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called and examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a portion
of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate, investigation, Amault refused
to reveal the Identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant at
Arms and imprisoned "until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as wen as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith." (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 43 [1950]). Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

In upholding the power of Congress to punish Arnault for contumacy the Court began with a discussion
of the distribution of the three powers of government under the 1935 Constitution. Cognizant of the fact
that the Philippines system of government under the 1935 Constitution was patterned after the American
system, the Court proceeded to resolve the issue presented, partly by drawing from American precedents,
and partly by acknowledging the broader legislative power of the Philippine Congress as compared to
the U.S. Federal Congress which shares legislative power with the legislatures of the different states of
the American union (Id., pp. 44-45). The Court held:

xxx xxx xxx

 ... (T)he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others
who possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain
vs. Daugherty 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 ALR 1) The fact that the Constitution
expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour,
does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt by any person.
(Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204; 5 L. ed., 242)

But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)

The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine Congress
in a subsequent decision (Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]) arising from the same factual
antecedents:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and
complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority
and power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the
 affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July
30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).

The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what was then an
unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d' etre of this power of Congress
even in the absence of express constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for upholding the
existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the
power of contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present
controversy.

3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of
the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui
generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the
national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to
the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.

4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and
the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the
punishment of non-members for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied
in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power
partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they
exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did
not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as
one of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain
legislative functions to local legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter
and must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of
interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with
the subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights,
i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed
to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all
government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the
legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore
clearly appear in pertinent legislation.

There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod
of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc
Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.

5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee
had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for
being ultra vires.The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body
(Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, citing Kilbourn v. Thompson). As admitted by the respondents in their
Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look into the use by
NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of pre-war vintage" which the latter had acquired from the
Visayan Electric Com. company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners" (Comment, Rollo, p. 50). It
comes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II
and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committee.

There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating the installation
and maintenance of electric power lines or wires within its territorial jurisdiction. The power subsists
notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), to which body the
franchise powers of local government units were transferred by Presidential Decree No. 269. Section 42
of the Decree states:
 SEC. 42. Repeal of Franchise Powers of Municipal City and Provincial Governments.
— The powers of municipal, city and provincial governments to grant franchises, as
provided for in Title 34 of the Philippines Statutes or in any special law, are hereby
repealed; Provided, That this section shall not impair or invalidate any franchise heretofore
lawfully granted by such a government or repeal any other subsisting power of such
governments to require that electric facilities and related properties be so located,
constructed and operated and maintained as to be safe to the public and not to unduly
interfere with the primary use of streets, roads, alleys and other public ways, buildings and
grounds over, upon or under which they may be built. (This Section was not among those
amended by Pres. Dec. Nos. 1370 [May 2, 1978] and 1645 [October 8, 1979]).

This particular power of the city government is included in the enumeration of powers and duties of a
Sangguniang Panlungsod in Section 177 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
February 10, 1983), to wit:

SEC. 177. Powers and Duties. — The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) . . . regulate the digging and excavation for the laying of gas, water, power, and other
pipelines, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers and drains, and all structures
thereunder; the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas
mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires,conduits meters and other apparatus, and the
correction, condemnation of the same when dangerous or defective;

xxx xxx xxx

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the installation
and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in order to protect
the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this ordinance making power, said body or
any of its committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as, the legislative
investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the difference lies in the lack
of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies.
They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply information which may be relevant to
the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang
PanLungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric
cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.

The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the
franchising powers of the NEA under Sec. 43 of Pres. Dec. No. 269, i.e.:

(2) to repeal and cancel any franchise if the NEA finds that the holder thereof is not then
furnishing, and is unable to or unailling within reasonable time to furnish adequate and
dependable service on an area coverage within such area;

xxx xxx xxx

In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issle subpoenas and
invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269).
Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into an suspected failure of
NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and in its franchise. The
proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient basis
therefor.

WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the
petitioners at an investigation by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter
on October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for
legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra
vires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without
power to punish non- members for contempt. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on
November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their agents and representatives, and the police and other
peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is made permanent.
Petition is GRANTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS
JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO
CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA
SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and
through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners
to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et
al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the
allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as
party defendants.

The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:

14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter
Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves
at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:

(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D.
Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco
Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas
and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as
Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C.
Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the
Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial
schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of
government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin
Romualdez...

xxx xxx xxx

(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials
led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc.
led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others,
the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71
with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to
borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total
of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the
February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and
collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically
Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto
S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to
conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry
and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein
Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited
int he instant Complaint.

(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior
manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C.
Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i)
Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila
Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its
subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported
incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million
on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the
Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin
Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in
fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and
some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and
run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said
fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the
Government;

(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm
represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar
Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco
Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in
the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at
50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in
Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28
million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only
P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the
Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the
 total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of
the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed
to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of
the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by
Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law
declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling
"to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or
entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March
24, 1986);

(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and
managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B.
Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso,
Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents
of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez
including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans
Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to
surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in
getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm
Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied
as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila
Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the
said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

xxx xxx xxx

On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile,
from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez
corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported
that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG
officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily
reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA
February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG
approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's
brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase
of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair
value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the

Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First

Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,

particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon

Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify
on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents
Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who
are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners
to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a
resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the
Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales
dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the

Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,

the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for

intervention, 8
which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In
compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the
jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the
Congress or any its regular and special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making
inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our
present system of government.

The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains

not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government...

xxx xxx xxx

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several
 deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This
is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the
Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated
by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability
of the principle in appropriate cases." 13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of

the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative

purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is

beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14
Thus, Section
21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed

by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its

duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that

the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against

one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries

in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or

the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees
any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry
in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort
must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which
was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of
"having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote
a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the
FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically
stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has
been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his
(Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988,
to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate
his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa
that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are
"baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being
that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A.
Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First
Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.

xxx xxxx xxx

In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to
the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor,
now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for
Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that
when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the
management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that
relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing
SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr.
Ricardo A. Lopa.

I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:

"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by

management because they said another representation was being made to this
Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured us
that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we
attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently
turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact
it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on
doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any
untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more
categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential
represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work."

Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as
follows, and I quote Mr. President:

"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and
the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong
Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner
is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of the
President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we
know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and
management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will
 indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused
vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted
directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not
good for this Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve
respectability and stability of the government."

The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez
were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.

xxx xxxx xxx

Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August
11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez
Firms."

Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:

12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to
determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to
requires them have never been at issue.

Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless
and malicious statements.

Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the
law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of
the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
 Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption
of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing
with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction,
contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the
part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the
exercise of a profession.

Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body
to make its own conclusion.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he

merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives
of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned
inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was
introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth,
community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on
Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3)
stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution
No. 212 reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has
stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that
the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the
Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three
 stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its
nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental

organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of
the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-
gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such
as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and
employment generation for rural and urban workers;

WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public
and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our
youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government
which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now,
therefore, be it.

Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental

Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of

the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212

because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the

government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose

within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa
had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather

than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins

vs. United States, 20

it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our
social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them.
It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no
general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms
of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument
in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted
soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated
are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of
the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A
perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners,
as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the
issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its
influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be
discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held
that:

Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot
inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches
of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive
in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is
'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including
"'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22

In another case —

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the

exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot

simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected.

To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not

unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right constured as
the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit
may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al. 25thus —
 Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may
altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but
only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding.
In Galman vs. Pamaran,26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA
1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in
criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case,
Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right
against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will
incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been
held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment
is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled
by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase
we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of
government, ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the
circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry
before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby
enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence
at the said inquiry.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS,
Director of Prisons,respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Tañada, and Vicente
J. Francisco for respondents.

OZAETA, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New
Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May
15, 1950, which reads as follows:

Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean
L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special
committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special committee the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.

The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated
as follows:

In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean
L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000
was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development
Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong
Estate.

The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000
within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the
Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon
its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to
P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.

On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H.
Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the
remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make
any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the
Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other
payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.

The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the
Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000
down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive
installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of
P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or
afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of
the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504
of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of
purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within
the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration,
from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.1

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine
Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October,
1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:

RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE

BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.

WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of
five million pesos;

WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949,
the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a contract
entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;

WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the
Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the amount
of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of
Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court
sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during the occupation;

WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for
the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos,
and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the
estate; Now, therefore, be it.

RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members
to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate
deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was
honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties
responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said
Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces
 tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may
require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in
the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution.

The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among
the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the
committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the
two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought
to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.
Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to
determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:

Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of
funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and
that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from making answer which might later be used against me. I
have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain
that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the
justness of my position.

At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee,
interrogated him as follows:
 Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were
legal?

Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.

Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement,
did not violate any law?

Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were
violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to have
this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate
you?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other
people.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would
be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has
been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it.

But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the
petitioner, the latter testified as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is
payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that
amount?

Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which
you cashed on October 29, 1949?

Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.

The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a
Filipino?

Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you
delivered this big amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.

The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big
amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?

Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.

The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big
amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1-½ million paid to Burt?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these
P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?

Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here
in the Philippines?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you
the verbal instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these
P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain
person should receive these P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person
without receipt?

Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet
him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?

Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two
cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?

Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?

Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew
already that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.

The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is
Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?

Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Several times?

Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

 The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never
were able to find out what was his name?

Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course,
we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name, and
I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know their names.

The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?

Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.

The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?

Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his
complexion: light, dark or light brown?

Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks
very straight, with military bearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the
P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came
to know his residence?

Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.

The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.

On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him
the following resolution:
 Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:

That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of
contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special
Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates
deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to him the following
interrogatories:

1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you
gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not to
remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also
by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in
the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the last time
you saw him was in December 1949?

Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the
questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator
Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following
question:

Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not remember his name.
That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that
you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the
P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from
you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person,
and that your reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer
might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real reason for
refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not
remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?

xxx xxx xxx

 Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should
not be required to testify unless he so desires.

The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very
clear. It does not incriminate him.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the
first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950,
in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change
anything in those statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do , to the best
of my ability.

The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the
question.

Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during
the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not
the same reason that you are now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not
remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is
your real position?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second,
and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be
excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer,
if the detail of not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an oversight.

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or
not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .

 Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that
your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer the
question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?

Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer
those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of knowing
what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside.
How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am
completely ignorant.

xxx xxx xxx

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not
incriminate the witness.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from
making further answer, please.

Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the
Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable
for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might render yourself liable
for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements when you cannot even tell us
whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ?
We are giving you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that your
answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext
for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.

The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and explained.)
 Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all
I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter,
so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.

In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should
not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner
questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the
P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the
Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when
witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which questions
the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to
illicit the desired information from the witness, as follows:

The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver
the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.

The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.

The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that
person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.

The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and,
on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?

Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.

The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the
petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith."

The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:

That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to
continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949,
more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith.

The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.

The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration because it
is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For
the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person
not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an
important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.

Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general
principles of law which form the background of those issues.

Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three
independent but coordinate Departments — Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power
is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1,
Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10,
Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not
contain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers
for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared by
and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the
different States, on the other — the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people — in the Philippines,
the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the
Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States
or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American system — the
framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices — we can, in
this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry
— with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs.Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580;
50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any
other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that
House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).

Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either
the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of
inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the
subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that
it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.

In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no
doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted.
The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less
than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved
government agencies created by Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted
investigation, the investigating committee has recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1)
prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and
exercising powers other than those attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional
authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from
intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a
party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who
are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of
big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous
congressional confirmation.2

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his
contention that his commitment is unlawful.

First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating
committee has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative
measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the
information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to
Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be
dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop
pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer
the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman
of the Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only
purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigation had not
been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the
parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution
No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to
continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved
by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills
were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation
is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we
think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to
that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question
that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other
words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or
possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the
form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to
determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that
once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is
insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is
not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify
this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the
action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we
have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel.McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y.,
463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41
L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully
may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged immateriality of the information
sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty
bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to
make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power.

Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under
consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved
in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result
of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom
the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the
lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is
completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from
approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called
upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our
inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.

The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question
was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators
were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating
in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member
of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before
the committee in response to a subpoena and asked, among others, the following questions:

Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as
sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?

Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly
or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?

He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the
Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that
case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the
Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:

The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution
directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are
known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the
Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called
upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain
that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive
imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate
within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)

It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the
judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such
assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution
expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to
presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the
inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the
judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the
circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the
Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance
of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and
unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of
the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That
certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury
to investigate.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40
Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not
applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States
related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company
had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in
a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in
the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course
his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the
creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House
directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character
of said settlement, with the amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and
the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report
to this House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out
that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in respect
of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were
still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors were free to press
their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation
"the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power
which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in
its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of
Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the
power actually possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has
jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a
matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of
this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government
powers.

That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the
subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry,
which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of
public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor
of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court;
while here the interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we
have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are and
shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may
have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.

It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong
criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926],
74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor
Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the
Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character
of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the
House, attempting to override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill
not before the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted
against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was
seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of
"judicial power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay
Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the particular failure
was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the
facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration,
such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day
nature of the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise
was customary and familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary
judicial proceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal
and customary part of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made
the demand of the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may
be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract
speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship,
and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon
such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be
relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the
investigation."

The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The
question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for
contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written,
published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting
the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged
illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain
evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of
Representatives had implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action
in this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter,
while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings
or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that
case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case. There the contempt involved
consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious
letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to answer questions
pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in
that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not
a member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the
Petitioner's ) contention.

Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is
based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case
of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido
Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the
House of Representatives to attend the session which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault
said representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following
by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted
November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered
punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not
complied with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November
8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested,
whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied
the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm,
Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not
legally be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns,
Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for contempt
because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of a Constitution
adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avanceña, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate
opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent
power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only
be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.

Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement
was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of
Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:

And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the
moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate
with that adjournment.

as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:

And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two
limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power
even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such
imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt
occurred.

Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:

From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the
existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution.
The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so,
inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has
 to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative body.
Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue
to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which
contempt was committed.

If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body
exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until
the final adjournment and the election of its successor.

Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my
opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which the
contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against
the petitioner herein."

We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice
Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of
the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The
plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and
reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the
penalty was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the House of Representatives can
take cognizance of contempt committed against themselves, under any circumstances." The court there
held that the House of Representatives had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment
of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether
the House had the power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing
a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such
contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power because the
writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger the
preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and
not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from custody.

The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears
that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to
investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney
General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the
committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of
the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear
before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The witness
failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the
Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant
commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty
wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to
answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the
Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further
order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ
of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the
Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the
Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the
witness was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was
appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the
contention, the court said:

. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the
period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and amendatory
resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or
necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself in
any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the consent of the other two
branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose."
But the context shows that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by
prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the same with the House of
Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot
well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a
term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the
end of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may
occur through death or resignation.
 Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue
its committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the
above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body,
gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as
we are advised the select committee having this investigation in charge has neither made a final
report nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its
activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain
that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if, continued or
revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body,
the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably
like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-
516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot through
the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter
of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded
with from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas
corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done
in the case cited.

What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from
custody be reversed.

Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members
are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every
two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death
or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that
the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on
December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the
Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth
Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950.

Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be
enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound
reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and
not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise
of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say
that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate
has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is
within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the
petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has
empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the
questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the
Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru
restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which
is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it
may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would
be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential
and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish
for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness
until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be
avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume
that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this
assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.

Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would
incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that
person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private
individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.

The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety.
At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all
requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making answers "which
might later be used against me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he
refused to answer questions concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his
dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid
to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for the use of it." But after being
apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without
securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in
compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had
nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he
had seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since
then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the
person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the
witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was
a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."

We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the
Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew
the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt,
pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify
before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating
that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions,
claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this
particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at
another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled
"that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate
the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but,
half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the
conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:

In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they
declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well
illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after
he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception
of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to
determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle
him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is
at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert
 his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill.
App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an
answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
(Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)

As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a
citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right
to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.
The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges
but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under
the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or
uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life
is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates
his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in
Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it
is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and applying
that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment
by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were made
for his welfare.

From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L.
DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL
V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY,
INC., and WIGBERTO TAÑADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
 G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOK-SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.
Villaranza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedon From Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Reve A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.

MENDOZA, J.:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?

 C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

1. §1

2. § 4

3. § 5

4. § 10

B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of
these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing
and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with
the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The
following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act
No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not
thereby become a law:
 Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed
to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE
IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November
17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways
and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630,
entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV,
 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the
bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third
reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which,
after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was
thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2,
1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994,
signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in
two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation
was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have
been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4
of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.

First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point
out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in
two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word
"exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according
to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference
committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in
order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its
powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It
is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight
of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim
that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the
U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill
emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the
enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the
enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently
accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an
extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the
power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect
to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197]
into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving
H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause
(which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills
on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of
the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1,
1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received
H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral
to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on
February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of
filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first
filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the
Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.
Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630.
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day,
March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are
really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with
the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential
certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the
bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the
Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergency session. 11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House
of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent. 12

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the
requirement of three readings on separate days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994,
the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court,
especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third
readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of
a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197.
That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the
House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the
Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the
Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill
and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of
the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed
doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often
mark the proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in
executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind
closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court
is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis
solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks
of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are
probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize
conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of
the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions
with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted
requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close
the meetings. 14

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make
any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both
houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision
to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house
by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which
make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a
conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . . . 15

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate
bills. 16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives
a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and
that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills
submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:

Rules of the Senate

Rule XII:

§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with
subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by
the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with
the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.

(Emphasis added)

Rules of the House of Representatives

Rule XIV:

§ 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In the event that the House does not agree with
the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled
by conference committees of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when
the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any
question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report
 shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed
to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be
deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited
in the office of the Secretary General.

(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting

provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule
applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be
resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is
then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to

them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a
question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to
the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in
the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides
that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain
a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure."
The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-
drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that
it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not
approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result
would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three
readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was
passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House
bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House
bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate,
presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the
Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact
and in law.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that
"Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption
of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference
Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,

WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....
 (q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those
of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of
all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future," in consideration of the payment by it either
of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic
Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute
amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system,
and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.
To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in
which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of
its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform
the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at
bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect
in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some
event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any
more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of
its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
 AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not
unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title
expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus
expressed. 24

It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in view
of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:

This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify,
amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication
resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is
a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain
goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted
it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended
by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590)
by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No.
1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides
that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and

Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other
hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization
engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim
violations of their rights under § § 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT
Law.

The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press
under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative
regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the
possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary
of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption
for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested
in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's
duty is to execute the law.

§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously
granted exemption were:

(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and
sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.

Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject
to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of
the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated
June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The
exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the
Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation
revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the
imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition
of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been
granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.

To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom.
The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due
recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune
from general regulation by the State. It has been held:

The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He
has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for
libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable
and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled
out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates
against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this
argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its
transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only
because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption
is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have
been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that
granted to the press. But that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that
Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory
purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived
from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of
its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed
four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers
which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the
thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of
Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a
tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 29 The
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because
everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax
on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege
of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents'
incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star
Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature
amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The
law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax"
since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate
transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the
differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be
discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of
paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay
any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus
very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general
interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was
discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group
within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest
and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks
of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods
and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds
P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been
shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the
fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions
involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There
is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune
from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because
it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the
press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not
prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject
newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption
of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and
publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general
applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its
essential freedom. The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and
the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an
ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general
merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This
Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 39 in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount
and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually
being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason,
it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 40

But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a
privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits
because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one
not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the
free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the
same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R.
No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT
would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and
technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal

Protection, and Impairment
of Contracts

There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of
speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of
the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and
operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.

There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection
of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands
a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 41

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of
due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits
of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and
no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of
the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in
these suits.

Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation." 42 Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure,
Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT
payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than
payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that
as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income
bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities,
which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents
that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those
which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services.
It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-
income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business
establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to
respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other
hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that
the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure
for the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or
more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion
whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in society
harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No.
115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives,
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to
promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives
the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to
a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 44

Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in
G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more
concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner
in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits
from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the
financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by
evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.

Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just
like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and
the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the
right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised against
the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were
held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay
and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system
and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of
the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition
of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity
of the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46

In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. 47 Such is not the
case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a
specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because
of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that
public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet
the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a "special
function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not
have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication
the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say,
we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of
having done in these cases — to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on
this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline
to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in
support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to
justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 50

Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. 51

This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several

cases 52 of this Court following Angara.

It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context
of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases,"
and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave
abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential
limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining
our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according
to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.
 _______________________________

In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No.
7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum
up, we hold:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of
powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free
exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are
prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

Bidin, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued,
without costs.

On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action
for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof,
an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas — Gen. Araneta — Gen. Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen.
Segundo — Gen. Delgado — Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and approval
of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads,
not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the
tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the
intersection between the latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads "do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio
Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties
of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member
of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of
Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that
the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no
deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953,
respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act.
No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder
roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the
District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch
as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of
Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab
initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to
believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private
subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
aforementioned appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he was a
member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation — copy of which is annexed to the
petition — of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date,
accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation
partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental
law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any
contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase
the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the
burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless
restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement
the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only
to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."

Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void;
that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared unconstitutional and,
therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from
ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the
disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further payments
out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making
and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from
making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue",
and that the petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion, respondent Zulueta alleged
that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the Province of Rizal,
pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent is " not aware of any
law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvements of . . . private property";
and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question,
the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that
petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . . in
which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and petitioner "has not shown that
he has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause
him a direct injury."

Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision, dated
October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of
Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to
question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature is without
power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the instructions and
improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads where private property, would not be a public
purpose; that, being subject to the following condition:

The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for no
other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA.
(Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is "absolutely
forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector
purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be
contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby; and that,
accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed.

At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the aforementioned
motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the allegations of fact
made in the petition of appellant herein. According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of
several parcels of residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain
portions of which had been reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly,
were private property of said respondent when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress,
as well as when it was approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the
construction of said roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would
have the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or
roads at his own expenses, 1and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision" of said
respondent. The lower court held that under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was
"clearly for a private, not a public purpose."

Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-evident. 2However, respondent
Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:

A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress
is the source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any law which makes
illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may
assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)

The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature of the
Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the system of
checks and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this
Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle according
to Ruling Case Law, is this:

It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected
nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may
be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does
not justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Emphasis supplied.)

The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:

In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
discussed suprasec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and
not for the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)

Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:

Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used
only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its
right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.

xxx xxx xxx

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute
is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81 C.J.S.
pp. 1147; emphasis supplied.)

Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart from being patently
sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as such, exists primarily
for the promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in
the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and
jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.lawphil.net

This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question, upon the
ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to because the same
does not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises, namely:
(1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2)
that the latter may not be annulled without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no
exception. We do not agree with these premises.

The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not
upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation
infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when
the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was
approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see
section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and
hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of
legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions.
For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article
1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in
his person, including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract, even though such creditors
are not affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, 5upon the theory that "the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are
some decisions to the contrary, 7the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)

However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262
U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of
the U.S. to its Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its
government. Indeed, under the composite system of government existing in the U.S., the states of the
Union are integral part of the Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal
Constitution. In fact, the same was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people
of the U.S., except insofar as the former represented the people of the respective States, and the people
of each State has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other words, the
Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in
consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the respective states of the Union of which they are
citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal Government of the U.S.
is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by
electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2,
of the Federal Constitution).lawphi1.net

The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic
of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the
U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the
people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic
of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the
Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national government is not subject to limitations
analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed
upon the Federal Government in the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right
of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public funds —
which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) — has
greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United
States appropriating federal funds.

Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a land by the
Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting
the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of
the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not permitted to
question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in
Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs.Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45
Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations
of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such
position in said two (2) cases — the importance of the issues therein raised — is present in the case at
bar. Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a
taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most
populated political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of
taxation, in the Philippines.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify
petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not
have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against
respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN,
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents-appellees.
Emilio Purugganan for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and
Solicitor Eulogio Raquel-Santos for respondents-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466, entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon. Ernesto Mata (Juan
Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 16001 unconstitutional and therefore invalid and
inoperative.

We affirm the judgment a quo.

The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by both parties
to the lower court:

Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with
a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and
subsistence allowances;

On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total
of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines;

On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an
accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines;
 Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own
request, nor after court-martial proceedings;

From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as
such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;

As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions
with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the
President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP
Adjutant General.

On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of
Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines2 to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him
from the time of his reversion to inactive status. On December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed the
petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative."

The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service
in the AFP when Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955. Section I of this law provided:

Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who
are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted into
inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their own
request: Provided, That for purposes of computing the length of service, six months or
more of active service shall be considered one year. (emphasis supplied)

The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service
requirement prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.
On July 11, 1956,3 while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was enacted into
law. Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided as follows:

11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than
two years during any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two years on
the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and educational training,
experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be
reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act
shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial
proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer
reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned service shall be
entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the
rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned service;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the
provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be
called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of
active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the
Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary
and any unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949
regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this
paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National Defense shall
render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this
paragraph. ( pp. 892-893, RA 1600) (emphasis supplied)
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in
violation of the abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers
on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service.

On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore
proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 24 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it

relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.

A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph
11 itself, which reads,

After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two
years during any period of five consecutive years:

the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the
fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status
of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general
appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation
Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 15 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.
In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every
fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative
enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act,
as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus,
in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to
that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.6

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation
of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted
subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body
of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters
of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is
inoperative and of no effect.

To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:

It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of reserve officers
from reversion to inactive status, whereas the subject or title of the statute from which it
derives its existence refers to appropriations. Verily, it runs contrary to or is repugnant to
the above-quoted injunctive provision of the Constitution. Where a conflict arises between
a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails. It should be emphasized that a
Constitution is superior to a statute and is precisely called the "supreme law of the land"
because it is the fundamental or organic law which states the general principles and builds
the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government, and for that
reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void (Talabon vs.
Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599).1äwphï1.ñët If a law, therefore, happens to infringe
upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness
(Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1).
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being
unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it
has never been passed.7

Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the
petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or readjust
his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and allowances.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing the
complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Makasiar, Esquerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin,
JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC
June 18, 1987
G.R. No. L-75697
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf
of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree
No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was
promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers
and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association,
hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the
case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by the unregulated
proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in
Intervention.

The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among
others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to
tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters
throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the
shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;

4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the

Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business
industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate
the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and
500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for
the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes
a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the
mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-
being;

7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these
blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
 8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people
and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be
adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local
government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred
upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.

1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each
and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule
also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical
construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider
is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds
of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to
the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax
shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include
taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution
of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the
lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the
latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory,
and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the
realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user
tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the
30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the
government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden
on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to
impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the
implement of the state's police power.13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the
former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the
judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order
to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part
of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause
sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to
be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that
the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends
resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised at the proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance
of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or
personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation
of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion
as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority
might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional.
Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other
categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position
that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days
after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the
BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories
of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or
variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any
videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the
required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the
Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public
exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of
registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.

The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such
presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature
may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the
existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the
one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience". 16

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between the
fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE,
besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-
five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.

6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out
of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was
apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry,
there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with
brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance,
not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere
payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video
industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places
notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the
DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has
in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution
if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own.
If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be
sustained. 18

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on
Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85,
Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of
the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President.
REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The
Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore
act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every
statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its
validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation,
and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject
of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
 a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the

unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing
needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the
overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as
well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions
as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute
to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane
to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction,
and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected
with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title
of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section
35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege
from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters
that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents
of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification
in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not
only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the
Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause
in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a
law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major
and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of
the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that
from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this
amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted
to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming
from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that
because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn
from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents)
but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems
to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it.
The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there
is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for
the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage
of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts
of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial
process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative
and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted
for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to
affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise
of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to
be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the
equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through
the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct,
however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges,
we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial
Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices
the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno
and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23771 August 4, 1988
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC. and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
Angel Sanchez for Lingayen Electric Power Co., Inc.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision * of the Court of Tax Appeals (C.T.A., for brevity) dated September
15, 1964 in C.T.A. Cases Nos. 581 and 1302, which were jointly heard upon agreement of the parties,
absolving the respondent taxpayer from liability for the deficiency percentage, franchise, and fixed taxes
and surcharge assessed against it in the sums of P19,293.41 and P3,616.86 for the years 1946 to 1954
and 1959 to 1961, respectively.

The respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., operates an electric power plant
serving the adjoining municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan,
pursuant to the municipal franchise granted it by their respective municipal councils, under Resolution
Nos. 14 and 25 of June 29 and July 2, 1946, respectively. Section 10 of these franchises provide that:

...The said grantee in consideration of the franchise hereby granted, shall pay quarterly into the Provincial
Treasury of Pangasinan, one per centum of the gross earnings obtained thru this privilege during the first
twenty years and two per centum during the remaining fifteen years of the life of said franchise.

On February 24, 1948, the President of the Philippines approved the franchises granted to the private
respondent.

On November 21, 1955, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed against and demanded from the
private respondent the total amount of P19,293.41 representing deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges
for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross receipts from March 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1954 as prescribed in Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the
lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. On September 29, 1956, the private respondent
requested for a reinvestigation of the case on the ground that instead of incurring a deficiency liability,
it made an overpayment of the franchise tax. On April 30, 1957, the BIR through its regional director,
denied the private respondent's request for reinvestigation and reiterated the demand for payment of the
same. In its letters dated July 2, and August 9, 1958 to the petitioner Commissioner, the private
respondent protested the said assessment and requested for a conference with a view to settling the
liability amicably. In his letters dated July 25 and August 28, 1958, the Commissioner denied the request
of the private respondent. Thus, the appeal to the respondent Court of Tax Appeals on September 19,
1958, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 581.

In a letter dated August 21, 1962, the Commissioner demanded from the private respondent the payment
of P3,616.86 representing deficiency franchise tax and surcharges for the years 1959 to 1961 again
applying the franchise tax rate of 5% on gross receipts as prescribed in Section 259 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. In a letter dated October 5, 1962, the private respondent protested the assessment
and requested reconsideration thereof The same was denied on November 9, 1962. Thus, the appeal to
the respondent Court of Appeals on November 29, 1962, docketed as C.T.A. No. 1302.

Pending the hearing of the said cases, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3843 was passed on June 22, 1 963,
granting to the private respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of the electric light, heat, and
power system in the same municipalities of Pangasinan. Section 4 thereof provides that:

In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay into the Internal Revenue
office of each Municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the public under this franchise, a
tax equal to two per centum of the gross receipts from electric current sold or supplied under this
franchise. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes and/or
licenses of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or collected by any authority whatsoever,
municipal, provincial or national, now or in the future, on its poles, wires, insulator ... and on its franchise,
rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, from which taxes and/or licenses, the grantee is hereby
expressly exempted and effective further upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax
and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross receipts as provided for in the
original franchise shall be collected, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.

On September 15, 1964, the respondent court ruled that the provisions of R.A. No. 3843 should apply
and accordingly dismissed the claim of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The said ruling is now
the subject of the petition at bar.

The issues raised for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the 5% franchise tax prescribed in Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code
assessed against the private respondent on its gross receipts realized before the effectivity of R.A- No.
3843 is collectible.

2. Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the "uniformity
and equality of taxation" clause of the Constitution.

3. If the abovementioned Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is valid, whether or not it could be given retroactive
effect so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question which were assessed before its enactment.

4. Whether or not the respondent taxpayer is liable for the fixed and deficiency percentage taxes in the
amount of P3,025.96 for the period from January 1, 1946 to February 29, 1948, the period before the
approval of its municipal franchises.

The first issue raised by the petitioner before us is whether or not the five percent (5%) franchise tax
prescribed in Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended by R.A. No. 39) assessed against the private respondent on its gross receipts realized before the
effectivity of R.A- No. 3843 is collectible. It is the contention of the petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the private respondent should have been held liable for the 5% franchise tax on gross
receipts prescribed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, instead of the lower franchise tax rates provided in
the municipal franchises (1% of gross earnings for the first twenty years and 2% for the remaining fifteen
years of the life of the franchises) because Section 259 of the Tax Code, as amended by RA No. 39 of
October 1, 1946, applied to existing and future franchises. The franchises of the private respondent were
already in existence at the time of the adoption of the said amendment, since the franchises were accepted
on March 1, 1948 after approval by the President of the Philippines on February 24, 1948. The private
respondent's original franchises did not contain the proviso that the tax provided therein "shall be in lieu
of all taxes;" moreover, the franchises contained a reservation clause that they shag be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal, but even in the absence of such cause, the power of the Legislature to
alter, amend, or repeal any franchise is always deemed reserved. The franchise of the private respondent
have been modified or amended by Section 259 of the Tax Code, the petitioner submits.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention. R.A. No. 3843 granted the private respondent a legislative
franchise in June, 1963, amending, altering, or even repealing the original municipal franchises, and
providing that the private respondent should pay only a 2% franchise tax on its gross receipts, "in lieu of
any and all taxes and/or licenses of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or collected by
any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or national, now or in the future ... and effective further
upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise
tax of two per centum on the gross receipts ... shall be collected, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding." Thus, by virtue of R.A- No. 3843, the private respondent was liable to pay only the
2% franchise tax, effective from the date the original municipal franchise was granted.

On the question as to whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the "uniformity and equality of taxation" clause of the Constitution, and, if adjudged valid, whether or
not it should be given retroactive effect, the petitioner submits that the said law is unconstitutional insofar
as it provides for the payment by the private respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts,
while other taxpayers similarly situated were subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of
the Tax Code, thereby discriminatory and violative of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation.

A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike The Legislature
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions
have never been deemed violative of the equal protection clause. 1 It is true that the private respondents
municipal franchises were obtained under Act No. 667 2 of the Philippine Commission, but these original
franchises have been replaced by a new legislative franchise, i.e. R.A. No. 3843. As correctly held by the
respondent court, the latter was granted subject to the terms and conditions established in Act No.
3636, 3 as amended by C.A. No. 132. These conditions Identify the private respondent's power plant as
falling within that class of power plants created by Act No. 3636, as amended. The benefits of the tax
reduction provided by law (Act No. 3636 as amended by C.A. No. 132 and R.A. No. 3843) apply to the
respondent's power plant and others circumscribed within this class. R.A-No. 3843 merely transferred
the petitioner's power plant from that class provided for in Act No. 667, as amended, to which it belonged
until the approval of R.A- No. 3843, and placed it within the class falling under Act No. 3636, as
amended. Thus, it only effected the transfer of a taxable property from one class to another.

We do not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of such act. Furthermore, the 5% franchise tax
rate provided in Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. 4 We
note that the said Section 259 of the Tax Code expressly allows the payment of taxes at rates lower than
5% when the charter granting the franchise of a grantee, like the one granted to the private respondent
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843, precludes the imposition of a higher tax. R.A. No. 3843 did not only
fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it "in lieu of any and all taxes, all
laws to the contrary notwithstanding," thus, leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent.
"Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts.
They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. They are usually adopted after
careful consideration of the private rights in relation with resultant benefits to the State ... in passing a
special charter the attention of the Legislature is directed to the facts and circumstances which the act or
charter is intended to meet. The Legislature consider (sic) and make (sic) provision for all the
circumstances of a particular case." 5 In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the respondent
court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of the law in question.

Given its validity, should the said law be applied retroactively so as to render uncollectible the taxes in
question which were assessed before its enactment? The question of whether a statute operates
retrospectively or only prospectively depends on the legislative intent. In the instant case, Act No. 3843
provides that "effective ... upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses
other than the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross receipts ... shall be collected, any provision
to the contrary notwithstanding." Republic Act No. 3843 therefore specifically provided for the
retroactive effect of the law.

The last issue to be resolved is whether or not the private respondent is liable for the fixed and deficiency
percentage taxes in the amount of P3,025.96 (i.e. for the period from January 1, 1946 to February 29,
1948) before the approval of its municipal franchises. As aforestated, the franchises were approved by
the President only on February 24, 1948. Therefore, before the said date, the private respondent was
liable for the payment of percentage and fixed taxes as seller of light, heat, and power — which as the
petitioner claims, amounted to P3,025.96. The legislative franchise (R.A. No. 3843) exempted the
grantee from all kinds of taxes other than the 2% tax from the date the original franchise was granted.
The exemption, therefore, did not cover the period before the franchise was granted, i.e. before February
24, 1948. However, as pointed out by the respondent court in its findings, during the period covered by
the instant case, that is from January 1, 1946 to December 31, 1961, the private respondent paid the
amount of P34,184.36, which was very much more than the amount rightfully due from it. Hence, the
private respondent should no longer be made to pay for the deficiency tax in the amount of P3,025.98
for the period from January 1, 1946 to February 29, 1948.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 August 25, 1994
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 August 25, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L.
DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 August 25, 1994
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 August 25, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL
V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY,
INC., and WIGBERTO TAÑADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 August 25, 1994
 COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 August 25, 1994
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOK-SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners in G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.
Villaranza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedon From Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Reve A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.

MENDOZA, J.:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?

C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

1. §1

2. § 4

3. § 5

4. § 10

B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of
these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing
and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with
the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House
of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version
(S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The
following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act
No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not
thereby become a law:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
 Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed
to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE
IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November
17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways
and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630,
entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV,
112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the
bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third
reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which,
after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was
thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2,
1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994,
signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in
two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation
was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have
been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4
of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.

First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point
out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in
two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word
"exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according
to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference
committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in
order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its
powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of
Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It
is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight
of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim
that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the
U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill
emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the
enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the
enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently
accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an
extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the
power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect
to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197]
into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving
H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause
(which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills
on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of
the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1,
1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received
H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral
to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on
February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of
filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first
filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the
Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630.
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day,
March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are
really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with
the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential
certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the
bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the
Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergency session. 11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House
of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent. 12

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the
requirement of three readings on separate days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994,
the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court,
especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third
readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of
a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197.
That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the
House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the
Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the
Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill
and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of
the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed
doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often
mark the proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in
executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind
closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court
is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis
solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks
of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are
probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize
conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of
the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions
with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted
requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close
the meetings. 14

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make
any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both
houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision
to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house
by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which
make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a
conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . . . 15

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate
bills. 16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives
a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and
that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills
submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:

Rules of the Senate

Rule XII:

§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with
subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by
the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with
the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.

(Emphasis added)

Rules of the House of Representatives

Rule XIV:

§ 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In the event that the House does not agree with
the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled
by conference committees of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when
the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any
question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report
 shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed
to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be
deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited
in the office of the Secretary General.

(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting

provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule
applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be
resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is
then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to

them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a
question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to
the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in
the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides
that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain
a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure."
The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-
drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that
it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not
approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result
would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three
readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was
passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House
bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House
bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate,
presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the
Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact
and in law.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is
no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that
"Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption
of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference
Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,

WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR
THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....
 (q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those
of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of
all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future," in consideration of the payment by it either
of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic
Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute
amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system,
and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.
To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in
which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of
its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform
the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at
bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect
in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some
event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any
more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of
its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
 AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not
unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title
expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus
expressed. 24

It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in view
of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:

This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify,
amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication
resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is
a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain
goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted
it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended
by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590)
by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No.
1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides
that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and

Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other
hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization
engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim
violations of their rights under § § 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT
Law.

The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press
under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative
regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the
possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary
of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption
for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested
in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's
duty is to execute the law.

§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously
granted exemption were:

(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and
sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.

Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject
to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of
the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated
June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The
exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the
Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation
revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the
imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition
of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been
granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.

To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom.
The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due
recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune
from general regulation by the State. It has been held:

The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He
has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for
libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable
and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled
out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates
against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this
argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its
transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only
because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption
is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have
been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that
granted to the press. But that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that
Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory
purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived
from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of
its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed
four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers
which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the
thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of
Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a
tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 29 The
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because
everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax
on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege
of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents'
incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star
Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature
amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The
law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax"
since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate
transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the
differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be
discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of
paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay
any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus
very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general
interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was
discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group
within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest
and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks
of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods
and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds
P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been
shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this
limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the
fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions
involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There
is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune
from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because
it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the
press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not
prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject
newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption
of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and
publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general
applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its
essential freedom. The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and
the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an
ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general
merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This
Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 39 in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount
and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually
being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason,
it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 40

But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a
privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits
because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one
not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the
free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the
same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R.
No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT
would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and
technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal

Protection, and Impairment
of Contracts

There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of
speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of
the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and
operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.

There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection
of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands
a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 41

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of
due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits
of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and
no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of
the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in
these suits.

Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation." 42 Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure,
Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT
payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than
payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that
as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income
bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities,
which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents
that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those
which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services.
It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-
income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business
establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to
respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other
hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that
the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure
for the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or
more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion
whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in society
harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No.
115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives,
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to
promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives
the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to
a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation. 44

Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in
G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more
concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner
in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits
from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the
financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by
evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.

Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just
like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and
the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the
right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised against
the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were
held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay
and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system
and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of
the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition
of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity
of the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46

In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. 47 Such is not the
case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a
specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because
of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that
public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet
the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a "special
function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not
have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication
the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say,
we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of
having done in these cases — to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on
this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline
to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in
support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to
justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 50

Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. 51

This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several

cases 52 of this Court following Angara.

It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context
of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases,"
and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave
abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential
limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining
our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according
to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.
 _______________________________

In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No.
7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum
up, we hold:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those
prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of
powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free
exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are
prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

Bidin, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]
TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order"
issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the
motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter
alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G.
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was
the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which
he was administratively charged in the Officein the office of the Ombudsman.

Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the
FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in
his office.

Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges
referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral
conduct.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid
resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration,
respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close
associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus
F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997
Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.

II

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989)[1] pertinently provides that -

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly
submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner
provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the
power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she
claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can
"(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law."

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law.

xxx

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of
procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due process. x x x

xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:

xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-
avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely
prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy
under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly
pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.[5] was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came
Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule
65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by
Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was a special civil action
for certiorari.

Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein
which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised
by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of
appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently
or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter
statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely
observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted
to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.

III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does
appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could
fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus,
the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No.
6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in
administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18,
1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the
proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other
may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet
systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of
Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section
27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised
by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain.

Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook
or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the
authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not
the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the
pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court
from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to
enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court
has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.[14]

Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed.[16] The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be
further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on
May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)'
issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative
charges for grave misconduct, among other."

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled
that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing
that all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or
discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section
30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions
of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case,
and the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of
said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the
issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on
the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.

IV

The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement,
hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner
espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal
by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law
"increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section
5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said section 27 does not increase
this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this
Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments
over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of
cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate
court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the
courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies,
hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall
be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included
in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court.No such
provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial
system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.

Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:

SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth.
(Italics ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the
Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to
questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully
subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but
only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies .[21]

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial
agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no
reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby
disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of
the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court
of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just
like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better
prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered
by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under
Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is
not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have
already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we
have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under
Rule 65.

Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the
constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was
even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction
is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time
likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the
constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. [22]
 It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon;
the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must
reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating
him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid,
but that is precisely one of the issues here.The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this
administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the
validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues,
hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the
factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be
clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be
undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.

Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper
correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the
Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of
what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives.[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October
2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the
procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of
Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author
and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's
jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the
matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara
informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed
that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for
review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its
enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent .[28]

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck
down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction
which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power,
especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however,
where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a
proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In
fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that
what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not,
however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of
our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may
be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then
the rule deals merely with procedure.[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal
of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a
vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested
rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this
case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer
appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can
we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a
competent tribunal to administer that remedy.[35]

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to
another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at
the time the statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was
declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer
of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide
for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court,
are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition,
with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under
Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings
and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it institutionalized people power in
law-making. Learning from the bitter lesson of completely surrendering to Congress the sole authority
to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution concurrently vested such prerogatives in the
electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly
through the concepts and processes of initiative and of referendum.

In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses the practical and
legal implications of such differences. It also sets down some guidelines in the conduct and
implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular democracy, as well as settles some
relevant questions on jurisdiction -- all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the
people's exercise of direct democracy.

In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent Commission
on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27,
1996[1] denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition
to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

The Facts

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic
Zone, thus:

"Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong
and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter
referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a
proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval
of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein." (Underscoring supplied)

RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting
the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.[2] Petitioner was organized with an
authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of
the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof,
as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated,
conveyed, or transferred to another government agency.[3]

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly
the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American
navy.

In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang
10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition
prayed for the following:

"I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 Serye 1993 ng
Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang kundisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEFZ kung ang mga
sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng
Morong at Bataan:

(A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at punong-puno ng
malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.

(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping ipinagkaloob
ng pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment' (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.

(D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling 'special economic zones' ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa
at Dinalupihan.

(E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa
ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin
ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.

(I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa

kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.

(J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan."

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al.
by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines
to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items
(A), (B), (K), (E) and (G) of private respondents' petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also
informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and favorably acted upon by
the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development Authority and the
Office of the President.
 Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to
their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991,[4] Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which
provides as follows:

"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. -

xxxxxxxxx

(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their
duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof
to the sanggunian concerned.

x x x x x x x x x."

On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the
petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent
Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676) further directed its Provincial Election
Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents.

On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus[5] before
this Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set
aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as
it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the
required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures.

On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued
proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the
SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the
former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996,
Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for
"the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".

On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting
the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. x x x"

The Issues

The petition[6] presents the following "argument":

"Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in scheduling a local initiative which seeks the amendment of a national law."

In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has failed to show the existence
of an actual case or controversy; (2) x x x petitioner seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has
long become final and executory; (3) x x x public respondent has not abused its discretion and has in fact
acted within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) x x x the concurrence of local government units is required for the
establishment of the Subic Special Economic Zone."

Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his Reply (should be
Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's Chairman and
staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas discovered that the demands in the
petition for a local initiative/referendum were not legally feasible."[7]

The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues, as follows:

"1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local intiative proposing
to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the request of petitioner
SBMA to stop the local initiative."

On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which, it issued the following
resolution:
"The Court Resolved to (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attached Comment filed by counsel for
private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the: (a) Reply (should be
comment) to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunctiom, filed by counsel for respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated July 22, 1996;
(b) Separate Comments on the petition, filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor General for respondent Commission
on Elections dated July 19, 1996 and (b-2) counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July
22, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner dated July 22, 1996.

At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for petitioner Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for private respondent Enrique T.
Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for respondent Catalino Calimbas. Solicitor General Raul Goco,
Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Zenaida Hernandez-Perez appeared for
respondent Commission on Elections with Solicitor General Goco arguing.

Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM this Court by
Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on Elections would push through with the
initiative/referendum this Saturday, July 27, 1996.

Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

At 2:50 p.m. July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order dated also on July 23,
1996 from the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc inter alia 'to hold in abeyance the scheduled
referendum (initiative) on July 27, 1996 pending resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In view of this Order,
the petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction has
become moot and academic and will thus not be passed upon by this Court at this time. Puno, J., no part
due to relationship. Bellosillo, J., is on leave."

After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and arguments of the parties,
the Court believes that the issues may be restated as follows:

(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and
executory"; namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.;

(2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the referendum proposing to
annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan;" and

(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong
to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment

Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T. Garcia, et
al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.[8] on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or not there
can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject proposition -- the very same
proposition, it bears emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now
sought to be enjoined by petitioner x x x".

We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as
contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. We
quote from our said Decision:[9]

"In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper
subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on Section 120,
Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: 'Local Initiative
Defined. -- Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.'

We reject respondent's narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the
Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress, or local legislative body x x x'. An actincludes a resolution. Black defines an acts 'an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards and determination x x x.' It is
basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with
this postulates, we held in In Re Guarina that if there is doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
construction, that interpretations will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even
though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the
language used.' "

Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole issue presented
by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the
subjectof a valid initiative or referendum".[10]

In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as the form by
which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly exercised. What is at issue
here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and
substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly
and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.

Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848

The main issue in this case may be re-started thus: Did respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?

We answer the question in the affirmative.

To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution[11] as
reproduced in the footnote below the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is
not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was
entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting
the "Initiative and Referendum Act,[12] Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz[13] defines initiative as the "power of the
people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt
or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would
without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing definitions, which are based on
Black's[14] and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters
of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.

"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered
voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian.

The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days
in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case
of barangays.

The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum."

Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people
directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act
that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A.
6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If its refuses/neglects to
do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and
registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities
within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the
initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned x x x".

On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its
territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or
approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections.[15]

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and
consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum
consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than
in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
 [Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal
processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself
(in the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.]

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative
more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to
seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be
easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation
is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such
part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than
one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"[16] although "two or more propositions may be submitted
in an initiative".[17]

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his
designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition."

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In
the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate
guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra Vires?

Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite,

namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan to enact,[18] stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the
sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such ordinances or resolutions
as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact.[19] After the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
and the other municipalities concerned (Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of
concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and bounds had already
been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance with Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional
concurrence is no longer within the authority and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to
legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal
resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. Hence, such withdrawal can no longer be
enacted or conditionalities imposed by initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the creation of SSEZ
is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation. Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its
concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory
the creation by (national) law of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be
derived therefrom. Once created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern. It has become a national project.

On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is premature and
conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during the
referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.

Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal
resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then
there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it
has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.[20]

We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides[21] that "(n)othing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act x x x."

So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.[22] It passes upon errors of law (and sometimes
of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines
whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has
authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of
discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has
not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for
that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the
issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or
court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.

Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass
upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact
within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission -- to which then the herein basic questions ought to
have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other
words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A.
6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and
pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it
may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside
the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact."[23] Accordingly, the question of whether the subject
of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon
by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.

While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful for the parties and
the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether Grande Island and the "virgin
forests" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong to the national government and thus cannot be
segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of passing a municipal
resolution.We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of the full subscription and payment of the P20
billion authorized capital stock of the Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from cash and other
assets, the "... lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, ..." which includes said island
and forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that may be taken up in the proper forum -
- the Commission on Elections.

Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon remand of the initiative
is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to enact, may be
divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall, nullify and render
without effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of 1993. On
the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said resolution with another municipal
resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder would be granted, obeyed
and implemented (ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong and
Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want a total dismemberment of Morong from the
Authority -- but may not agree with any of the conditions set forth in Item II. Should the proposal then
be divided and be voted upon separately and independently?

All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present controversy
as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions involved here; (ii) the respondent
Commission should be given an opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its
Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said
Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question of
whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof
are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore
violative of law.

In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and processes,
are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper corrective measures,
as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the
actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions for initiative and
referendum are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise
by the voters of the rights granted thereby."[24] In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be used should the legislature show itself
indifferent to the needs of the people."[25] Impelled by a sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased initiative
and referendum into the workings of local governments by including a chapter on this subject in the local
Government Code of 1991.[26] And the Commission on Elections can do no less by seasonably and
judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local use, in implementation of these
laws. For its part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary import of reserving people
power in the process of law-making.[27]

Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect
and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound public policy to enable the electorate to express
their free and untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed lawmakers and executives, but
also in the formulation of the very rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and managed.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on
Elections for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing discussion. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
Puno, J., no part due to relationship.
 G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON

(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or
Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it
is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term
limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X
OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication
of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three
(3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b)
setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground
that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments
by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is
still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be
 considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of
initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not

to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds
for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would
entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition.
They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT
LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE

SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION"
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
 5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO
LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS

A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
"PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED
AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE

OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION"
OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF
THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION,
BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign
to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
 such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency
of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power;
and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on
the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
 (2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on
the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change
from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited
tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a
few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-
making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify
the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-
of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by
the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but
not as a premium for good performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a)
the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure
for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
 exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of
the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in
an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition
and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required
number of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only
by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and
the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in
the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of,
or an amendment to, the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia,
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
 5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time,
their separate memoranda. 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF

THE DELFIN PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
 28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for
judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and
the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold
on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
 certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE
TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action,
in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized
or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That
section reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section
___of the Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a
new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call

attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate
given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter
 of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10

percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will
not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this
matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until
after five years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution.
Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise
of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected
that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
 FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how
this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented
to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the
legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order
to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the
people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in
terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the
sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent
power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that
therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

 MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent
power we have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically
cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are

drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in
the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this
provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable
situations. 33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments
this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this

process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
 MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish

the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the

entire Section 2 with the following:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment

after taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself
and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los
Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed
Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
 THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment

is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee
Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that
it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible

for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. .
.?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the

implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the

proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate.
In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body
must diminish or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures

which I have discussed be legislated?
 MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed

amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should
be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only
relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what
is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution
would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being
that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing
the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely
based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a
proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads

as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE
BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9
July 1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed
to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph
of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through
the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment
by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out." 46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with
the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of
Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of
local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

 c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative
on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle
II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no
room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c)
of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
 Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. . . .

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions
for both national and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe
the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on
the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-
037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.