Wodak and Kovacs - National Identity in Times of Supra-National Challenges - The Debates On N PDF

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National identities in times of

supra-national challenges
The debates on NATO and neutrality
in Austria and Hungary
Ruth Wodak and András Kovács
After the end of the Cold War vigorous discussions developed about new
alternatives in security policy in almost all the countries of the former War-
saw Pact and in neutral and non-aligned states, including Austria and Hun-
gary. The comparison of the debates in Austria and Hungary over the last 50
years, focusing on presidential speeches on the one hand, on opinion polls
on the other (among many other data sources), shed light on the identity
policy aspect of these discourses. The argumentation strategies used by the
supporters and by the opponents of different security policies were analysed,
illustrating the fact that in Austria neutrality is still perceived as integral part
of national identity, whereas in Hungary, joining NATO is viewed as a possi-
bility of finally ‘belonging’ to the West.
Keywords: recontextualisation, political speeches, opinion polls, neutrality,

NATO, discourse strategies, construction of identities
1. Introduction
This paper appears to be concerned with a very specific and special theme:
namely, a comparison of the attitudes, opinions and discourses on NATO and
Neutrality in Austria and Hungary since 1945 or 1955. However, these discours-
es, in our opinion, should be looked upon as symptomatic for much more
general issues in a fundamentally broader context. The entry of Hungary into
NATO, which signifies for Hungary an institutional membership of the modern
western world, and the abandonment of neutrality in Austria — one of the
Journal of Language and Politics 3:2 (2004), 209–246.

issn 1569–2159 / e-issn 1569–9862© John Benjamins Publishing Company
210 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács
most important defining features of the Austrian identity — can only be really
interpreted and understood when many more global factors are considered.
Our investigations in the whole study had three objectives: firstly, the
deconstruction of elite discourse; secondly, the reconstruction of the reception of
elite discourse at semi-public and private levels of discourse; and thirdly,
measuring the scope of different opinion blocks among the general public. In the
deconstruction of elite discourses the relevant material and political speeches
are evaluated by discourse analytic methods. To reconstruct the reception of
elite discourses we organised focus discussion groups in both Hungary and
Austria, and the discussion material was analysed using qualitative methods. To
measure opinion blocks we evaluated a representative national sample taken
from demoscopic data. Public opinion surveys give a general overview of
attitudes, which permits a classification of qualitatively analysed texts. Newspa-
per analyses, TV discussions and political speeches are in dialectic interaction
with politics and the media. Finally, the focus groups give an impression of
reception phenomena, and also of group-specific co-construction of concepts
and opinions. The materials investigated, therefore, give insight into the
different public domains (media, ritualised, semi-public) and into different
genres. Finally, through the analysis of recontextualisation we discover the life
of particular set pieces of ideology, as well as of topoi and arguments. The
comparison between Austria and Hungary takes place, on the one hand, within
the same genre, and, on the other hand, over the whole range of results.
Interdisciplinarity in our investigation is not to be understood as merely
additive, but as an attempt to apply different disciplines, theories and methods
and to interpret these as a totality.
First, we wish to sketch the Austrian and Hungarian contexts only briefly
here to illustrate the relevance of our case-studies.1 After these first delibera-
tions, we will present our data, which elaborate and illustrate our theoretical
claims: a longitudinal analysis of Austrian presidential speeches since 1955 and
a survey of Hungarian opinions on Neutrality and NATO. Summarising, we
will come back to our introductory claims and assumptions on the construction
of national identities.
2. End of the brief 20th Century2
All the analysed debates show their true meaning if we regard them as search for
orientation at the end of an epoch. As such, they express considerations,
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National identities in times of supra-national challenges 211
judgements and prejudices, political concepts, ideologies and opinions about

future European developments after the Second World War and at the begin-
ning of the 21st century. At the first level, these discussions are concerned with
new socio-political certainties and security systems, with peace and with
defence mechanisms. In them, a search for new European values is manifest, for
coming to terms with past ‘unpleasantness’ and for new national and supra-
national identities.
1989–90 saw the collapse of a world political system that had largely
determined the post-war order and had long seemed to be unshakeable. As a
consequence of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, a number of states that
had been founded after the two World Wars collapsed. New states that had long
existed only in history books appeared on the map. ‘Eternal’ borders vanished
and huge populations began to look for new homes (see Matouschek, Wodak and
Januschek 1995). The brief 20th Century (Hobsbawm 1994) drew to an end.
Initially, these revolutionary changes were accompanied by general opti-
mism. This was not by chance: dictatorships collapsed, there was an increase in
the extent of freedom (Arendt 1963), the new players on the political stage
invoked western democratic values, the world spoke of the ultimate victory of
liberal democracy. After the first phase, however, the general mood changed.
The old-new ethnic conflicts, new types of political extremism, and ultimately
bloody wars in former Yugoslavia brought disquiet to all those who had earlier
believed in the ‘end of history’. Suddenly, we had to accept that the conse-
quences of the collapse of the Cold War order could not yet be predicted.
This is bound up with the search for new values: old meanings, concepts,
ideologies and narratives are no longer valid. The centre and the periphery,
friend and foe, Europe and ‘Beyond-Europe’, national identity and European
citizenship — all these concepts require new interpretations. What is clear is
that national identities in the old sense no longer exist, and moreover we are
confronted with contradictions, ideological dilemmas (Billig 1991) and frag-
mented identities (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999). How do the
approaches to new identity-constructing narratives appear now? What new
interpretations are available? Clearly we cannot answer all of these questions in
the present paper, but we will provide some new reflections of both a theoretical
and an empirical nature.
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3. Hungary and Austria at the end of an epoch
Austria and Hungary have both been profoundly affected by all these new develop-
ments, albeit in different ways. All the dramatic changes since 1918, after the fall of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, have shaken these two Central European
nations. Initially, both nations coped badly with the collapse of the empire, and
during the inter-war years had authoritarian and fascist regimes. Both countries
supported, in different ways, the Nazi regime. After 1945, Austria became a
democratic republic, but was occupied by the Allies, and Hungary by the Soviet
Union. In 1955, Austria, with its State Treaty and its decision for neutrality, was
able to become a free democracy, but Hungary remained under communist rule
until 1990. This year marked the beginning of a new era for Hungary: the possibili-
ty emerged of establishing a democratic political system and of joining the West. In
1998, Hungary became a member of NATO, in 2004 a member of the EU.
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War in 1989 also brought
about considerable changes in the role and function of Austria. Its function as a
bridge between East and West disappeared, together with its important role as a
mediator during Bruno Kreisky’s period of ‘active neutrality’ (cf. Pelinka and
Wodak 2001). In 1995, Austria joined the European Union and is still debating
possible NATO membership. As a result of the dramatic changes of the last 10
years, therefore, Hungary has become a constituent of the western world, and
Austria has lost its special role as the last bastion of the West. Thus, both
countries need to redefine their status. The violence of the debates on EU and
NATO in both countries, eastern enlargement, the EU ‘sanctions’ in Austria,
and on costs and benefits of joining the West in Hungary are a clear indication
of the emotionalising of this development (cf. Mitten 2000, Wodak 2000a, b).
All of the significant changes briefly listed here have severely shaken the
national identities of the two countries. For Austria, the abandonment of
neutrality is not a matter of any calculation based in realpolitik, but a decision
that concerns the strongest pillar of Austrian post-war identity. In Hungary, the
moves towards integration into the West set in motion furious debates about
the status of the country within Europe and about national identity, in which
historicising arguments about identity regularly occurred. At the centre of the
discussion was the question whether Hungary was historically an organic
component of the western world, or whether it can only realise and preserve its
identity via some special route such as neutrality.
We therefore expected that the question concerning ‘Neutrality or NATO’
would prove to be a relevant indicator in both countries of the search for new
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political and cultural identities. The use of many historical and historicising
topoi and arguments in the discussions shows that histories occupy a central
place, and that all the political forces are striving to find new discursive legitimi-
sations, justifications and narratives for the new decisions.
The present economic and political consequences of the changes had a
stimulating effect on the origin of the new discourses. The change of direction has
caused so many new hopes and fears, and it is no accident that right wing populism
has emerged in both countries. Political figures such as Haider, Orban or
Csurka should also be seen as symptomatic, (cf. Wodak and Pelinka (eds) 2002,
Wodak 2000c, Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak 2000, Weiss 2000, Reisigl 2004).
In a more complex world many people require simple answers: new right-
oriented populist parties seem to offer these. Globalisation at many levels is
handled in similar fashion. Numerous fears determine the thinking of the elites
and of “ordinary citizens”, and these are expressed in precisely that area that we
investigated.
The debate on the eastern enlargement of the EU and the so-called EU
‘sanctions’ on the Austrian FPÖ/ÖVP coalition since 4th February 2000 have had
multiple effects on current political discourses in Austria (cf. Report of the ‘Three
Wise Men’ and related debates in the mass media; Kopeinig and Kotanko 2000). A
new-old nationalism has appeared, and the division between ‘us’ and ‘the others’
has been reinforced. Official Austria felt itself to be a ‘victim’ of conspiracies, on
this occasion by the 14 EU partner states, as in the past it was a victim of ‘other
countries’ during the ‘Waldheim Affair’ (Mitten 1992, Wodak et al. 1990). In a
related way, fears of unemployment and ‘foreigners’ are heard, and old and new
prejudices and racist arguments go on the attack. (Sedlak-Arduç 1999, Terwal
2000, Wodak and Van Dijk 2000). This partly chauvinistic and xenophobic
discourse comes up against new realities, since for a number of years it has no
longer been possible for Austria to deny that it is both a country of immigration
and that it is also multicultural (cf. Reisigl and Wodak 2001).
In Hungary, similar noises are heard. After the disappointment that the
political turn-around did not immediately deliver a western standard of living,
but that the transition to the market economy resulted in new difficulties for
many people, there was an increase in the effect of anti-globalist, anti-western,
anti-liberal and état-collectivist opinions of the extreme right and left at certain
levels of society.
In our case-studies we pursue all of these topoi, semantic concepts, dis-
courses of justification and legitimation, and arguments, and seek to determine
their functions in identity-politics.
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4. Theoretical and methodological framework of the research3
Our basic assumption in the context of this paper is that there is not one
national identity in the essentialist sense, but rather different identities are
constructed linguistically according to audience, setting and topic. National
identities are therefore understood as variable, dynamic, brittle and ambivalent.
We believe that there is a process of reciprocal influence between the identity
designs provided by the political elites or the media and those of everyday
discourses. For this reason the study investigated a total of five different corpora
from the public, semi-public and quasi-private domains (opinion surveys,
political speeches on national holidays, newspaper reports, television discus-
sions and focus groups). The networking and interconnection of the different
publics were of particular interest and can be captured by the concept of recontext-
ualisation (Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak 2000). Topoi and arguments are transport-
ed, transformed and semantically altered, and take on a dynamic of their own in
the respective different genres and publics. This life of arguments symbolises
the power struggle within politics: particular meanings become more important
and suppress others within a new ideology or a new narrative. In analysing the
different discourses we wish to reconstruct this life of arguments.
In the texts which we dealt with, narratives about national history and
tradition played a particularly important role. According to Halbwachs
(1985: 85ff), the collective and historical memories of a nation differ in that the
historical memory seeks to create a ‘single’, unified and ‘valid’ national history,
whereas the collective memory, as part of the identity of a social group, is plura-
listic, like society itself. In times of radical social changes, the universalising
tendencies of the historical memory and the particularity of the group-specific
collective memory come into conflict: the shattering of paradigms that were
generally held to be valid increases the hunger and the need for new interpreta-
tions of events. Clifford Geertz (1973: 218ff) gives an apposite explanation of
the search for new narratives and ideologies as a consequence of general fears,
uncertainties and changes of paradigm:
“It is when neither a society’s most general cultural orientations nor its most
down-to-earth ‘pragmatic’ ones suffice any longer to provide an adequate
image of political process that ideologies begin to become crucial as sources of
sociopolitical meanings and attitudes”. (Geertz 1973: 219)
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He continues:
“Ideology is a response to strain. But now we are including cultural as well as
social and psychological strain. It is a loss of orientation that most frequently
gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to
comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds
oneself located”. (ibid.)
The hunger for new interpretations and new ideologies has two sources: in the
first place the need of the elites for legitimisation in the new, fundamentally
altered circumstances; and secondly the need of different groups in society for
orientation. Radical changes of direction bring new elite groups into being —
as in the case of Hungary after the change — or else they force the old elites to
find new legitimisations — as in the case of the debates on NATO membership
and on the abandonment of neutrality in Austria.
On the other hand, the increased needs for orientation in larger sectors of
society mobilise the contents of collective and particularistic memory, and
thereby break down the former ‘unified’ and ‘valid’ national histories. But this
moves legitimisation-seeking old and new elites to construct such new uni-
versalising historical narratives as are compatible with the largest possible
number of variations of the group-specific memory, or have the greatest
possible legitimisation and orientation potential. These new narratives have at
least three functions: they must guarantee autonomous ego-continuities; they
must satisfy group needs and permit a ‘we’-discourse; and at the social level
they must have an integrative and solidarising function.
Our most important goal in this paper is therefore to reconstruct what types
of narratives have arisen in the respective national elites, and to what extent
these narratives have been able to satisfy the ‘demand’ among other groups in
the population.
Our case studies proceed methodically at different levels. In general, we
base ourselves in the discourse-historical approach which — in the sense of
critical discourse analysis — favours a multiplicity of theories and methods, if
this leads to a rational solution of problems (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Wodak
and Meyer 2001). Hence, the discourse-analysis of the speeches of politicians on
the National Day in Austria over the decades illustrates the historical develop-
ment and change of the concept of neutrality and the political position of the
governing elites. The quantitative analysis of the survey data in Hungary, in
contrast, presents the responses of the ‘citizens’ to the elite discourses (it should
be emphasised at this point that, in our study, we have — of course — also
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analysed the political speeches of Hungarian politicians and the survey data in
Austria). Thus, the two methodologies complement each other; deconstruct
different attitudes and discourses in related and interdependent public spaces:
the elites propose certain policies on the one hand, but are also dependent on
survey data for their decision making. The citizens are influenced in complex
ways by political rhetoric; their responses, however, are important for the
transformation/continuation of such rhetoric. Other data, which we can not
present here due to space restrictions (media, focus group discussions, inter-
views; see Kovács and Wodak 2003) allow to reconstruct the development and
changes in the two countries even more comprehensively. The discourse-
analysis of some sequences of Austrian presidential speeches in this paper
focuses on the argumentation and legitimisation strategies used. Other linguis-
tic features linked to this argumentation analysis are listed in Benke and Wodak
(1999) and Benke (2003).
In our earlier study on the discursive construction of national identity, we
were able to distinguish four macro-strategies that characterised all discourses
of difference and similarity:
Depending on the social macro-function we distinguish four mutually
interconnected bundles of discursive macro-strategies: namely, constructive (a),
destructive or dismantling (b), preserving or justifying (c) and transformational
strategies (d).
Constructive strategies refer back to such discursive procedures that contrib-
ute to the development and establishment of a particular national identity.
Preservation strategies seek to uphold a threatened national identity, to support
and reproduce it. Examples of this are the talk of a threat to the “Austrian
person” through immigration (keyword: repopulation ‘Umvolkung’) or of the
danger of annihilation of traditional Hungarian values by secular western culture.
As a special form of preservation strategies we find Justification strategies. These
focus primarily on the defence and upholding of problematised narrative
versions of ‘national history’. Through applying these, an attempt is made, for
example, to justify Austria’s way of handling the crimes of National Socialism,
or to describe the adoption of anti-Semitic laws in Hungary in the 1930s as a
compromise necessitated by realpolitik to avoid brutal persecution of Jews.
Transformational strategies seek to move discursively from one relatively
well-established national identity to another, for which the speaker already has
approximate contours in mind. For instance, public political discourse in
Austria is partly concerned with promoting a new definition of Austrian
neutrality, which incorporates the changed geo-political circumstances, without
abandoning neutrality. The attempts of certain ideologists of the late Kádár era
to legitimise the system as no longer socialist but as representative of, and in
accordance with, national interests, can also serve as an example.
Our central hypothesis in the present paper is that in the thematic areas,
which are relevant to us, the elites mostly apply transformational strategies in
order to construct new narratives by discursive means. In what follows, we
therefore focus on specific aspects of such transformational discourses.
5. Case studies
5.1 Austrian presidential speeches4

5.1.1 Historical development
At the end of the Second World War, Austria was divided into four occupation-
al zones (French, English, ‘American’ (of the United States), and Russian). In
the aftermath of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, it
was not a matter of course that Austria would gain its statehood ever again.5
The negotiations took ten years, and led to their final success in 1955, only after
significant political and personal changes in the Soviet Union in 1953. That very
year, Austrian politicians seized the moment, and offered in a diplomatic
meeting in Moscow to proclaim a sovereign Austria a neutral country to further
the diplomatic negotiations. Two years later, the Austrian national assembly
voted for a constitutional law which declared Austria to be neutral and which
defined the extent of this neutrality.6 If one reads newspapers of that time, one
sees people struggling with the content of neutrality; to a lot of people it was not
clear at all what it meant to be neutral.7
Given the historical conditions which led to the declaration of Austria’s
neutrality, it was by no means a given that the public would embrace neutrality,
instead of treating it as a political sacrifice.
Right from the beginning (1956), the 26th October was celebrated, first (till
1964) as the ‘Day of the Flag’ (the day when the law about neutrality was
passed). This ‘Day of the Flag’, which became a state holiday in the fifties, was
meant first and foremost to celebrate Austria’s becoming independent again. In
1965, the 26th October was finally declared a ‘National Holiday’,8 i.e. a day
comparable to the Independence Day in the United States, that is a day in which
the people should celebrate Austria, i.e. ‘the nation’.
In the subsequent decades, Austria’s neutrality distinguished itself more and
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more from the older Swiss model. An important figure was the Austrian politician
Bruno Kreisky (Socialist Party), who used the ‘neutral’ position ‘between the
camps’ to offer himself, i.e. Austria, as non-partisan diplomat, who would
enable indirect communication between fighting camps setting peace processes
in motion. During that period, neutrality became more and more positively
evaluated, and an important piece in an Austrian self-construction.
Already during Kreisky’s Government, the economic unification of Europe
had been set on its path, with more and more international treaties and pacts
creating stronger and stronger economical ties between the powerful states of
Western Europe. In the perception of Austrian politicians and industrialists,
neutrality did not allow Austria to join in the most important economical pact,
the EWG, as it was too closely linked to the NATO. Thus, in the 80s, the
economic recession led to a change in the perception of neutrality in the heads
of a part of the political and economic elites. Austria’s neutrality now impeded
its economic progress. In 1987, an expert opinion on the compatibility of the
then EC and neutrality led to a surprising result — an expert in constitutional
law concluded that Austria might very well join the EC. Since then, the People’s
Party started to push for Austria joining the EC (and later the EU). After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Austria could also quite openly demonstrate its
intentions to join ‘the West’. Austria applied for membership in the EU in 1988,
and the Austrian people voted for this membership in 1994. Since then, some
Austrian politicians have started a public debate for Austria joining the NATO.
That this issue can be openly discussed means that Austria’s neutrality is no
longer a matter of course. Austria is still — by the Constitutional Law of 1955
— a neutral state. However, the ratification of the Treaties of Maastricht, which
state the intention for a common security policy, also calls Austria’s neutrality
into question. And last but not least, the traditional role of neutrality as
providing Austria a special mediating role between the East and the West is no
longer important since the collapse of the Eastern Block. In short, the rapid
changes in European politics in the 80s and early 90s led to a different evalua-
tion of neutrality as a political element.
So far, we have analysed all speeches from 1974 till 1993. Those speeches
were given by three different presidents.9 The text-length varies between
372–733 words, with a trend to longer and longer speeches in the recent decade.
The audience is the general public. In terms of the genre, the texts share the
characteristics of political speeches (see e.g. Wodak et al. 1999).10
5.1.2 Qualitative analysis

The speeches can be grouped in four distinct thematic configurations, following
each other in time. In the following we will discuss each of them in sequence,
drawing on the set of talks which show this configuration.
Acceptance of the unavoidable — 1974

In 1974, the then just elected President of Austria, Kirchschläger, struggled with
the content of the ‘nation’, to which he had to talk to on a ‘national’ holiday.
Obviously, he did not see Austria to be a ‘nation’ (Example (1a)), and repeat-
edly raised the question of the meaning of a ‘national’ holiday. In addition, it
took him five years until he first applied the lexeme ‘nation’ to Austria.
This hesitation to name Austria a nation goes along with an oscillation
between a state-conception of a nation (or an Austrian nation) and a cultural
conception of it. Both surface in his talks, frequently one right next to the other,
e.g. when he asks his addressees to think of the personal meaning of the
republic, i.e. the state, alongside with the meaning of being part of ‘the Austrian
people’ ((1b), (1c)).
(1) Kirchschläger’s nation
a. Kirchschläger (1974) talking about the Nationalfeiertag: “Manche
von uns haben das Gefühl, daß wir auch heute noch immer nicht ein
wirkliches Naheverhältnis zu diesem Festtag unserer Republik und
unseres Volkes gewonnen haben.”
Some of us feel that even today we have not entered into a happy rela-
tionship with this special day of our republic and our people.
b. “Er [der Nationalfeiertag] soll uns helfen, über unsere eigenen Inte-
ressen hinaus uns dessen bewußt zu werden, was die ganze Republik
Österreich und was die Zugehörigkeit zum österreichischen Volk für
uns bedeutet.”
The National Holiday should help us, to go beyond our own interests
and become conscious about what the whole republic of Austria and
what the membership to the Austrian people means to us.
c. (1977): “Aber es gibt etwas, das uns alles verbindet: und das ist, daß
wir alle Bürger unserer Republik Österreich, Teile unseren öster-
reichischen Volkes sind.”
And there is something, which unites all of us: It is this — that we are
all citizens of our Republic of Austria, members (lit: parts) of the Aus-
trian people.
This difficulty to come to terms with “one-self” is accompanied by a difficult

relationship to the foreign countries. The relation to the allies or other countries
is often described with negative connotations, “critics look at Austria and praise
it”, that means Austria has to prove itself (2a).
Neutrality appears already prominently in the context of foreign relations. The
difficult relationship to foreign countries is transfered to ‘Austria’s’ relation to the
neutrality which is — on a discursive level — not seen as an integral part of Austria
at that time, and frequently (i.e. if there is no adjective) referred to by “‘this’
neutrality” (2b). On the latent level, one can interpret an only unhappy acceptance
of the status quo (2a). Austria has to ‘fulfil tasks’. An outside demand is
complied with: Austria is realised in a passive voice, as object and not as agent.
(2) Neutrality 1974 and relationships to foreign countries
a. “Unsere Republik Österreich hat auch international ein gutes
Ansehen, weil wir in der Lage sind, jene Aufgaben, die uns durch die
immerwährende Neutralität in Europa und auch in der übrigen
Welt zugekommen sind, auch wirklich zu erfüllen. Wir können den
Vergleich mit anderen Staaten wagen und wir haben Grund, unseren
Nationalfeiertag zu feiern.”
Our Austrian Republic also has a high international reputation,
because we are able to do those tasks, which were put to us through the
perpetual neutrality in Europe and also in the rest of the world. We can
dare to compare ourselves with other states, and we have reason to
celebrate our national holiday.
b. “Am 26. Oktober 1955 hat der österreichische Nationalrat in einem
Bundesverfassungsgesetz die immerwährende Neutralität Öster-
reichs proklamiert. Er tat dies aus der richtigen Überzeugung, daß
diese Neutralität ein Mittel sein werde, das uns hilft, für alle Zukunft
und unter allen Umständen unsere Unabhängigkeit zu wahren. Die
Existenz Österreichs ist also mit dieser Neutralität eng verbunden
[und sie hat durch diese Neutralität eine Bedeutung auch für die
anderen Staaten Europas erhalten. Unsere Republik hat also eine
Funktion auf unserem Kontinent und über diesen Kontinent hinaus
übernommen, eine friedenserhaltende Aufgabe, die uns geschicht-
lich, geographisch und staatspolitisch angemessen ist, nämlich ruh-
ender Pol zu sein, Platz der Begegnung, Pflege und Ausstrahlung des
Humanen im Zentrum Europas.]”
On October, 26th 1955, the Austrian National Council proclaimed in a
national law the perpetual neutrality of Austria. It did so out of the
correct belief, that this neutrality would be a means to help us to pre-
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serve our independence for all future days and under all conditions.
Thus, the existence of Austria is closely bound to this neutrality. (1976)
Not every year, but every once in a while, the semantic connection of neutrality
to the ‘Nationalfeiertag’ is mentioned, and the relevant and necessary causal
relation to the independence of Austria made explicit (see Example (2b)). From
a semantic and functional perspective, ‘Austria’ is not yet viewed as an active
agent; ‘neutrality’ is negatively connotated, as a duty which had to be fulfilled to
regain freedom.
A welcome means in the fabrication of an heroic character, 1979

The semantic (and thus political) meanings and relationships which were
presented above change in the following years. A maybe prominent date is 1979,
when the generational conflict (see Pelinka 1999) surfaces.
Starting with 1979 (although the transition is more gradual) we can discern
another discursive configuration which is also marked by the first use of ‘(our)
nation’ applied to Austria in 1979. Thus, a ‘we’ group is discursively constructed;
the audience is expected to identify with the ‘nation’. The question of “what is the
meaning of a ‘national’ holiday” shifts now to the question of “how we should
properly celebrate such a day”. The usefulness and meaning of this day as most
important for Austria’s identity became unquestionable. Material verbs are
used; Austrians become active agents who are able to contribute to their fate.
At that point, Austria’s relation to the rest of the world had changed as well
— due to Kreisky’s active policy of neutrality. In the speeches of that time,
Austria is no longer looking for confirmation from outside, but presenting itself
as a proud and “healthy” member of Europe with an important international
mission (contrast (3a), (3b)). In addition, the rhetoric perspective has changed
from an outside one to an inside one. No longer does the President raise the
question of how other states may see ‘us’, no, now ‘we’ are comparing ‘us’ with
‘them’ and judge ‘ourselves’. (Compare (3c) with (3d).) Discursive strategies of
positive self- and negative other-presentation come into the fore (Reisigl and
Wodak 2001). The discursive construction and transformation of national
identity are in process.
(3) Austria’s foreign relations 1974 and 1983
a. “Wir sind kein krankes Kind in Europa mehr. Mit Genugtuung
können wir auf das schauen, was wir in Österreich seit 1945 geschaffen
haben.”
We are no longer the ‘sick child’ of Europe. With contention, we can
look upon what we have done (created) in Austria since 1945. (1974)
b. “Was einst das kranke Kind Europas war, ist heute ein Staat, der für
und auf diesem Kontinent eine Aufgabe zu erfüllen hat.”
What was once the sick child of Europe, is today a state which has to
fulfill a task on and for this continent. (1983)
c. “Auch unser politisches Leben haben wir in einer Weise gestaltet, die
uns selbst von kritischen Beobachtern des Auslandes das Urteil einer
gut funktionierenden parlamentarischen Demokratie brachte. Wir
werden bis (..) wieder erneut uns alle darum bemühen müssen, daß
dieses Urteil gerechtfertigt bleibe.” (1974)
We were able to organise our political life in a way, which made even
critical observers of foreign countries acclaim Austria to have a well-
working parliamentary democracy. We will all have to strive till (..)
that this judgement remains valid.
d. “aber wenn wir in der Welt herumschauen und wenn wir mit Aus-
ländern sprechen, machen wir doch die Erfahrung, dass wir als klei-
ner Staat in der politisch schwierigen Mitte Europas uns im inter-
nationalen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Kräftefeld sehr wohl zu
behaupten gewußt haben.” (1981)
But when we are looking around in the world, and when we talk to for-
eigners, we are experiencing that we were able to assert ourselves as this
small state in the politically difficult centre of Europe. And we were able
to assert ourselves very well in international economics and politics.
The important mission “Austria for the world” is given to it by neutrality,

which also became ‘our neutrality’ in (1979). Neutrality usually appears in
embedded arguments; it is more and more a (welcome) means to some end.
The thematic context is mostly foreign affairs, in which Austria’s mission can be
seen as the world’s peacemaker. The semantics of ‘neutrality’ have thus
changed: from negative to positive; and ‘neutrality’ has become an important,
‘active’ and integrated part of Austrian identity.
Before, the unhappy acceptance of the neutrality referred back to the condi-
tions under which the State Treaty was agreed to, and indirectly through this
period to Austria’s role in National-Socialism. Now, every reference to this time
drops out of the discourse. The only times, which are referred to as the Austrian
past, are the First and Second Republic. It seems as if the time in between is not
considered Austrian history. A metaphor is used: Austria was ‘sick’, now it is
mature, active and healthy. The semantic fields have changed significantly.
Finally, Kirchschläger also starts to use the state concept of the nation more
prominently, although to a lesser extent, a cultural conception can still be

found.
Neutrality is no longer associated with a particular history, but is seen as a
very important tool, which mediates the relation between the state and the rest
of the world. Thus, neutrality is now only discursively connected to the state
and the foreign affairs (of the state). Within a conception of the nation, it
therefore goes along with the state-definition of the nation, but not with the
cultural one.
Approaching Europe and the European Union, 1988

1986 a new president was elected, Kurt Waldheim. 1988, Austria decided to
approach the then European Community to petition for membership. While
Waldheim does not mention Austria’s neutrality in the first two years, (possibly
due to a lesser visibility, after Kreisky was no longer politically active), he takes
a very strong stance for Austria’s neutrality in 1988.
In the analysis of the conceptual and semantic network of Waldheim’s
speeches, we first turn to the analytically most complex one, namely the nation.
With respect to this element, the analysis of Waldheim’s discourse is more
intricate than the other presidents, as Waldheim’s discourse can be character-
ised by significant vagueness which is realised through a lack of agents, passivi-
sation, conditionals, and rhetorical questions. The avoidance of agents and
discursively affirmed facts makes it very difficult to categorise his discourse in
terms of the dichotomy of state and culture.
The vagueness of the discourse could be interpreted as deriving from the
particular circumstances of Waldheim’s election, in which his NS-past was a
highly disputed topic (see above), and by extension also his then present
attitudes towards Austria’s NS-past. Standing in the international limelight, he
had to be careful not to show himself as being in any way sympathetic to a
cultural conception of the nation — which could possibly have confirmed his
alleged German-national attitudes.
However, Waldheim does not make an effort to prevent such an interpreta-
tion. In addition, he uses — for some population groups — widely negatively
connotated vocabulary such as referring to Austria as ‘unser Land’11 or as ‘unsere
Heimat’.12 One year, he argues for an “unverkrampften Patriotismus”,13 giving
examples involving the typical cultural national emblems: the flag, the national
anthem, the ‘Land’ (Umwelt), and ‘the Heimat’. A ‘neo-patriotism’ can thus be
detected, due to the re-emergence of vocabulary which was tabooed for a long time
because of its abuse through the Nazis. We perceive a double recontextual-
isation: a new semantics related to ‘neutrality’ and a re-birth of old concepts.

Waldheim rarely mentions historical events. The only exception is a short
section in a review of Austrian history which was occasioned by “50 Years since
the ‘Anschluß’” (example (4b)). In this quote, he states that Austria has already
been a state in the hearts (he does not say of whom, which is another instance
of his vagueness) before it became a state in legal terms. This, of course, makes
neutrality superfluous in terms of Austria’s becoming a nation.
While neutrality and history become more and more discursively disassoci-
ated, neutrality continues to appear in the context of foreign affairs. In 1988,
when the application for EU membership was decided, Waldheim addresses
Austria and its relation to Europe. He also mentions Austria’s neutrality and
states in very strong terms that it is still important for Austria. However, his
‘argument’ for neutrality is not accompanied by specific warrants (see example
(4c)), and does not connect with anything else. Possibly, Waldheim’s discursive
pointing to himself (“Lassen Sie mich…”) should evoke his image as an interna-
tional diplomat, and thus as an expert, whose claims bear authority by way of
this expertise.
(4) Waldheim, 1988
a. “Im März dieses Jahres gedachten wir der Tragödie des Anschlusses
vor einem halben Jahrhundert. Sieben Jahre des Schreckens, der
Unterdrückung und unsäglichen Leidens konnten trotz allem nicht
die Hoffnung auf ein neues, ein besseres, ein gemeinsames Öster-
reich ersticken.”
In March, we remembered the tragedy of the “Anschluß” half a century
ago. Seven years of terror, suppression and incredible pain could not
extinguish the hope for a better, common Austria.
b. “Von vielen totgesagt, ist Österreich 1945 wiedererstanden. Im Her-
zen längst ein souveränes Vaterland, wurde es 1955 durch den
Staatsvertrag auch völkerrechtlich ein gleichberechtigtes Mitglied
der Staatengemeinschaft.”
Despite being declared dead, Austria rose again 1945. In the hearts
already a sovereign motherland, it also became legally an equal member
in the community of states 1955.
c. “Wenn die Bundesregierung nun — nach eingehenden Beratungen
— den Beitritt Österreichs zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft anstrebt,
so bleibt unsere Neutralität eine unverzichtbare Grundlage. Lassen
Sie mich in diesem Zusammenhang eines festhalten: Es ist aus-
schliesslich Sache Österreichs zu entscheiden, was mit unserem
Neutralitätsverständnis vereinbar ist und was nicht.”

If the government strives now — after intensively holding council — to
join the European Community, our neutrality nevertheless remains an
indisputable basis. Let me point out in this context: It is solely Austria’s
responsibility to decide what is in accordance with our understanding of
neutrality and what isn’t.
d. “Seit 33 Jahren geniesst unsere Neutralitätspolitik eine hohe Glaub-
würdigkeit. Wenn wir uns nun anschicken im nächsten Jahr Ver-
handlungen mit den EG einzuleiten, so kommen wir keineswegs als
Bittsteller. Unser Österreich verfügt über ein wirtschaftliches, geisti-
ges und kulturelles Kapital, das für die Zukunft eines geeinten
Europas wertvolle Impulse liefert.”
For 33 years, our policy of neutrality enjoys high credibility. When we
start the negotiations with the EU next year, we are not coming as
beggars for something. Our Austria has an economic, intellectual and
cultural capital, which will bring an important momentum to the fu-
ture of a united Europe.
(5) Waldheim, 1989
“Wir haben dies nicht als Bittsteller, sondern im Wissen um unseren
politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wert für Europa, um unsere Geschichte
und Kultur getan. Unverrückbares Fundament für alle unsere Bestre-
bungen wird freilich unsere immerwährende Neutralität sein. Diese
Neutralität ist sicher auch für den Reformprozeß östlich unserer Gren-
zen und für den Abbau des Eisernen Vorhanges hilfreich gewesen. Ge-
rade an unserem Nationalfeiertag sollten wir uns nochmals die Freude so
vieler Flüchtlinge vergegenwärtigen, …”
We didn’t do it as beggars, but fully aware of our political and economic
value for Europe, of our history and culture. An indisputable basis for all
these undertakings, however, will be our perpetual neutrality. This neutrali-
ty has certainly also been aiding the reform process in the east, and the
removal of the Iron Curtain. Especially on our “Nationalfeiertag” we should
remind ourselves of the joy of so many refugees…
In a EU-Austria neutrality loses its main instrumental function; at the same

time, it has — at least in the presidential speeches —, been separated from the
historical context, i.e. that which binds it to the cultural conception of the
nation. Consequently, neutrality has lost all its linguistic anchors in a discourse
of identity. When Waldheim continues to argue for it, his arguments remains
disconnected to any specific context ((4c), (4d)); another metaphor becomes
<LINK "wod-r9">
important, namely ‘bringing capital’ (and not begging anymore). The changing
use of metaphors manifests the transformation strategies very well: Austria has
not only become ‘healthy’, but also ‘rich’ and ‘relevant’.
Redefining history
We do not find anything about neutrality in the presidential speeches for some
years. When Klestil brings up the issue in 1993, it is only to dismiss the importance
of neutrality. He redefines the meaning of the date, and dissociates it from
‘neutrality’, thus recontextualising the term again. The details of Austria’s history
— the ‘Anschluß’ and National-Socialism in Austria, the war, the victory of the
Allies against the National-Socialist Army, Austria’s ‘liberation-defeat’14 and the
following occupational period with its complex political history, which finally
resulted in the state treaty and Austria becoming neutral — are all swept together
in an undistinguishable seventeen years period. The details of Austria’s becoming
neutral can no longer be discriminated. Neutrality is explicitly termed superflu-
ous — as it was in the discourse already years before ((6a), (6b)).
Summarising, it can be clearly illustrated how the concept of ‘neutrality’
changes its meaning and how these meanings are related to specific political
functions during the years. These linguistic changes of meaning also manifest
complex political changes in the discursive construction of Austria’s national
identity and of the ever new relationships of Austria to the outside world and to
its history. In this way, the changing meanings and recontextualisations of
‘neutrality’ also serve to discursively construct various historical narratives,
which serve every day political functions (see Heer et al. 2003).
(6) Klestil 1993, 1994 — redefinition of the “Nationalfeiertag”
a. Mein erstes Wort gilt dem Nationalfeiertag selbst. Gerade in den
vergangenen Tagen sind Stimmen laut geworden, der 26. Oktober
sei vielleicht ein überholtes Datum, weil die Neutralität ihre ur-
sprüngliche Bedeutung verloren habe. Ich sehe das nicht so. Denn
für mich ist und bleibt dieser Tag vor allem mit der Wiederer-
ringung der Freiheit verbunden. 17 Jahre der Diktatur, des Krieges
und der Besetzung mußten vergehen, ehe die Österreicher an jenem
26. Oktober 1955 wieder frei waren.
I will first address the issue of the “Nationalfeiertag” itself. In the last
couple of days the opinion was voiced that the 26th of October might be
outdated, because the neutrality has lost its original meaning. I don’t
think so. Because for me this day is foremost connected with regaining
freedom. 17 years of tyranny, war and occupation had to pass before
Austria was free again on this 26th of October 1955.

b. Vieles in unserer Gesellschaft muß jetzt neu überdacht und mit
neuen Ideen belebt werden.
Wichtige Sicherheitskonzepte von gestern — wie etwa unsere Neu-
tralität — halten den europäischen Veränderungen nicht mehr
stand und zwingen uns zu neuen Überlegungen.
Manche politischen Strukturen haben mit der notwendigen Weiter-
entwicklung der Demokratie nicht Schritt gehalten oder sind in
politischen Ritualen steckengeblieben.
A lot in our society has to be reconceived and revived with new ideas.
Important concepts concerning the national security of yesterday — for
instance our neutrality — do not measure up to the changes in Europe
and force us to find new ways. Many political structures have not kept
up with the necessary developments within a democracy or are stuck in
political rituals.
5.2 NATO membership and national identity in Hungary

5.2.1 Historical background
If we look back at the decades of Communist rule in Hungary, we are probably
right to conclude that, of all the consequences of the post-war Communist take-
over, it was Hungary’s political and military dependence on the Soviet Union
that the Hungarian public was least able to accept. Although from the mid-
1960s the administration’s efforts to pacify society did achieve some kind of
internal acceptance, the legitimacy of the whole system remained in doubt
throughout the period. This was because the Kádár system’s legitimacy was
rooted in the suppression of the 1956 Revolution, an event that the majority of
society had experienced as a struggle for national independence. The regime
was never able to free itself from this stigma despite the fact that, from the 1960s
on, it began gradually to abandon the Stalinist policies of total control of society
and constant interference in the everyday lives of the general public, and made
numerous concessions to individuals who wished to achieve a peaceful exis-
tence in the private sphere after the political frustration of the post-1956 period.
Over many years, this more moderate policy was rather successful, and there are
still numerous signs (as well as public opinion research evidence) indicating a
considerable amount of nostalgia on the part of contemporary Hungarian
society for the etatist paternalism of the latter years of the Kádár regime. For
sections of the society struggling with the difficulties of the transition and
finding it difficult to adapt to the capitalist system, the idealised image of the
wise, provident, but in the everyday life non-interfering state, continues to have
an effect on political sympathies, views, and party choices. Nevertheless, one of
the fundamental elements of the old system — a sine-qua-non of its existence —
is missing from this nostalgic and idealised impression: membership of a
military and political bloc dominated by the Soviet Union.
The majority of Hungarian society clearly experienced Hungary’s member-
ship of the Soviet system — including the Warsaw Pact and COMECON — as
a restriction of the country’s independence and its right to self-determination.
Hungarians tended to think that their ability to lead lives free of politics and the
relatively favourable economic situation had been established in spite of the
given framework of conditions. Indeed, much of society believed that the
country’s dependence on the Soviet Union was the only obstacle preventing the
continuation and extension of reforms. This resulted in many unfulfilled
expectations in the initial period of the transition: many people wrongly
thought that, freed from the yoke of the eastern alliance, Hungary would
immediately begin to enjoy western levels of affluence.
The fact that membership of the Soviet alliance was unable to achieve even
the limited degree of legitimacy of other policy areas of the system was due to a
number of factors. The first of these was undoubtedly the suppression of the 1956
Revolution and the circumstances that gave rise to the Kádár regime. Despite an
improvement in the internal political atmosphere, the feeling of being at the mercy
of the Soviet superpower was kept alive by such dramatic events as the Cuban
Crisis, the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the constant military threat
against the opposition movements in Poland during the years of the Solidarity
Movement. Moreover, the wars fought by the Soviet Union and its allies in the
Third World (Afghanistan, Angola) repeatedly raised the possibility of Hunga-
ry’s involvement in military conflicts in which it had no interest whatsoever.
Nevertheless, the fact that people were aware of the country’s lack of
national self-determination did not mean automatically the existence of a
widely accepted vision of Hungary’s place in the international system. There
was nothing that one might compare with the vision of German unity in both
halves of Germany. In general, public opinion tended to support the idea of
neutrality as against dependence on the Soviet Union. However, neutrality had
little political tradition in Hungary: the idea became popular for practical
considerations alone. In the first half of the 1950s, Hungarian public opinion
watched with great interest both the implementation of Communist Yugo-
slavia’s policy of self-determination and the development of Austria’s neutral
<LINK "wod-r12">
status. It saw in the former an example of a Communist government that was

able to renounce total dependence on the Soviet Union without losing political
control and, at the same time, enjoying the support of the West. In the latter,
meanwhile, it saw proof that it was indeed possible for a country occupied by
the Red Army at the end of the war to change its international status. In 1956 it
was probably these two examples that both Imre Nagy’s Government and the
leading revolutionaries had in mind when they decided upon neutrality as the
main aim of Hungarian foreign policy.
After the suppression of the Revolution, the symbolic significance of
neutrality continued to strengthen. This process was enhanced by the disap-
pointment felt by Hungarians after the Revolution, owing to the passivity of the
West and its failure to offer assistance during the Revolution. The idea of
neutrality became popular once again with the appearance of small political
opposition groups after 1976 who regarded a policy of neutrality or “Finlandi-
sation” as the most realistic aim of foreign policy in the long term. They hoped
to attain a status quo in a distant future in which in return for full domestic
autonomy, Hungary would voluntarily take into consideration and realise the
interests of the Soviet Union when formulating its foreign policy. Even after the
Soviet system had begun to collapse, Hungarians continued to regard the
possibility of membership of the Western alliance as highly unlikely and as a
most dangerous demand. Thus, even in the late 1980s, such ideas were still
absent from all the written manifestos of the opposition parties and move-
ments. The opposition hoped to achieve greater manoeuvrability in foreign
policy by avoiding security policy issues, and their policy was characterised by,
if anything, the idea of self-limiting independence.
We may conclude from the above that when, with the withdrawal of Soviet
troops and the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty, the earlier barriers were
removed, and it became clear that a crisis-ridden Russia would be unable to
prevent its former allies from co-operating with the western military alliance,
the only certainty in the eyes of Hungarian politicians was that the majority of
Hungarian society supported their efforts to lead Hungary out of the eastern
alliance. Nevertheless, they could not be sure how the population would react
to a policy of integration with the West (EU and NATO), once the illusion of a
rapid economic transition had been dispelled and under conditions of wide-
spread regional conflict and growing nationalism. Other parts of our project
(Kovács and Wodak 2003) have illustrated the strategies used by the politicians
to promote a general acceptance of NATO membership. In this paper, we
examine the other side of the issue, namely the reaction of public opinion to the
political offer of NATO membership. The analysis will be made from a special
point of view: our purpose is to investigate the (re)construction of national
identity in times of rapid political and social change.
5.2.2 NATO-membership and identity in the Hungarian public opinion

In February 1999 we carried out a survey on NATO membership. While
examining public opinion, our most important goal was to find out how far elite
narratives on the given political issue have been able to satisfy the “demand”
among other social groups, and how the latter reacted to these efforts. Firstly, of
course, we wanted to find out whether public opinion in the country really did
support the decision of the politicians to join NATO or whether by not partici-
pating in the referendum on NATO membership, the majority of voters were in
fact expressing their rejection of membership.15 We were also curious to
discover how many people who opposed NATO membership were supportive
of clear alternatives, that is, how many people wished the country to be neutral
and how many people belonged to some kind of anti-Western camp.
Apart from registering the respective sizes of these groups and defining
them in social and demographic terms, we sought also to answer two other
important questions: whether the positions held by respondents were based
mainly on current political considerations and factors, or whether they could be
explained by deep-rooted socio-political attitudes. In addition, we also investi-
gated whether, in public opinion, Hungary’s integration into the western
military structures was linked in some way to the identity debates about
Hungary’s place in the world.16
5.2.2.1 Public opinion on NATO membership. Since Hungary was already a

member of NATO at the time of the survey, in a retrospective manner respon-
dents were asked how they would vote if the referendum were held now. More
than two-thirds of the participants in the survey (69%) stated that they would
now vote for accession to NATO, 21% said they would vote against NATO
membership, while 10% were unable to decide how they might vote. These
results show that support for NATO membership among the adult population
had increased since the referendum.
As Figure 1 illustrates, during the five years before our survey, support for
NATO membership among the population increased steadily, although the
curve contains several significant fluctuations. (The arrival of the first NATO
troops in Hungary (at the beginning of 1996) resulted in a reduction in support,
while the Madrid Summit (1997), which was portrayed as a great triumph of
80
69
63
61
59
60 57
51 50 51
48 47 47
46 45 46
44
40 35
percent
32
28 29 29 28
26 27 27 26
24 23
20 20
20 15
0
. 5. 5. 6. 6. . . . . . . . . . .
94 99 99 99 99 996 996 996 997 997 997 97 97 98 99
. 19 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 19 19 19 19
07 10 1 2 0 2 0 5 06 11 12 03 06 09 1 0. 1 1. 0 8. 0 2.
Should Join
Do not know
Should not join
Figure 1. Support for Hungary's NATO membership among the adult population between 1994 and 1999
National identities in times of supra-national challenges
231
Hungarian foreign policy, was followed by a dramatic increase in support.)

There was little change in the relationship between majority and minority
opinion even when we posed the question in a different way, namely when we
offered the choice of neutrality as an alternative to NATO membership. When
we did this, 60% of respondents chose NATO membership and only 32% neutrali-
ty (the others took no position). If we consider the answers to the two questions
together, we find that in both cases 58% of those surveyed chose the pro-NATO
answer, while in both cases 18% rejected NATO. The proportion of inconsistent
respondents was also 18% (6% took no position on either question).
5.2.2.2 Supporters and opponents of NATO membership. If we seek to character-

ise the groups of supporters and opponents of NATO membership on the basis
of socio-demographic variables, we find that support for NATO is greater
among young people, males, the more educated, and inhabitants of larger towns
in country areas (county seats) than among members of other socio-demo-
graphic groups (Figures 2 and 3). However, these differences are statistically
significant in only a few cases — for instance, place of residence and level of
education. If we compare support for NATO membership with support for
neutrality, we receive the same results, but here there is also a significant
difference between the two genders in this case: 32% of men took a position
against NATO and for neutrality, while 38% of women chose neutrality.
As mentioned before, the most important purpose of our research was to
reconstruct the meanings of joining Western integration for public opinion.
Which were the most salient determining factors in forming public opinion:
economic, political and other pragmatic deliberations or value loaded proposals
about the status and role of Hungary in Europe?
The questionnaire contained sixteen statements in order to reconstruct the
opinion patterns of the respondents. Tables 1 and 2 show the extent of agree-
ment with, or rejection of, the three mostly accepted and mostly rejected
statements and the distribution of answers concerning the possible consequenc-
es of NATO membership.
The results show that Hungarian public opinion supports NATO member-
ship for pragmatic reasons, and accepts that membership will have certain
economic and political consequences, but is far less willing to accept the
responsibilities that go with membership in times of military conflict.
5.2.3 NATO and national identity

However, in the public discussion on NATO membership, not only pragmatic
44
Total population 69
AGE
52
18–24 72
56
25–29 72
43
30–39 73
44
40–49 68 Feb-96
41 Feb-99
50–59 71
38
60–69 63
32
above 70 63
GENDER
50
men 72
39
women 66
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
percent
Figure 2. Supporters of NATO membership by demographic data I.

44
Total population 69
SETTLEMENT
50
Budapest 67
46
Cities 75
41
Towns 64
Village 41 Feb-96
69
Feb-99
EDUCATION
28
Unfinished elementary 53
37
Elementary school 61
Vocational school 48
69
47
Secondary school 76
53
University 78
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
percent
Figure 3. Supporters of NATO membership by demographic data II.

Table 1.Opinions about joining NATO (Percentage; 5 = fully agree, 1 = fully disagree)
Accept Reject
(5–4) (1–2)
If Hungary joins NATO, this will increase Hungary’s security. 72 10
Hungary’s membership of NATO will strengthen confidence 67 12

among foreign investors and thus more western capital will flow
into the country.
NATO membership would mean protection if Russia once again 65 16

wanted to extend its influence over the country.
Instead of joining NATO, Hungary should stay neutral. 34 53

Instead of NATO membership, Hungary should co-operate 17 62
militarily with neighbouring countries.
Hungary’s security would be better served if the country were to 6 86
forge a closer alliance with Russia rather than joining NATO.
Table 2.Opinions on the consequences of NATO membership: “Please tell me to what

extent you accept…” (average scores; 5 = fully agree, 1 = fully disagree)
Average
…that NATO should be able to use military installations in Hungary. 3.51
…that NATO troops may be stationed in Hungary. 3.42
…that Hungary should contribute to the NATO budget. 3.38
…that the Hungarian army should only enter into action with NATO con- 2.99
sent.
…that Hungarian soldiers might be deployed in foreign countries. 2.78
but also identity issues have been playing an important role as well. How salient
were they in influencing public opinion? As we have seen, Hungarian public
opinion has accepted the decision to join NATO mainly on the basis of prag-
matic arguments. But this doesn’t mean that the identity options offered in the
elite discourse remained unheard. The questionnaire concerning Hungary’s
belonging to East or West and its associated interests contained some of the
typical identity-options that were formulated in the course of the political
debates on NATO membership. If we analyse the results, it becomes quite
obvious that, rather than evading the question, most of the survey-participants
Table 3.NATO membership and Hungary’s place in Europe: “From the statements
below, please select the one that is closest to your personal opinion” (Percentage)
Joining NATO manifests that Hungary is part of the West and belongs to the West 48
Hungary belongs neither to the West nor to the East, and has to defend its inter- 31
ests against both
Hungary’s roots lie in the East, and one of the great dangers threatening the coun- 10
try is that the West will annex it
Don’t know, no response 11
— almost 90% — were quick to select one of the alternative positions offered
by the questionnaire. This demonstrates that the respondents accepted what
was being suggested by the elite groups who were directing the discourse:
namely that there are dimensions of the debate about the country’s western
integration that are linked to national identity. However, the data collected in
the course of our survey give an interesting impression of the public’s interpre-
tation of these connections. Table 3 shows the breakdown of answers to the
questions about the acceptance of the different identity options formulated in
this discourse.
Thus, the relative majority of the adult population (48%) thinks that NATO
membership is an expression of belonging to the western world, but for many
Hungarians (41%) Hungary is not part of the West and must defend its
interests against both West and East. Tables 4 and 5, however, prove decisively
the existence of a close link between the positions taken by people on NATO
membership and whether they consider that Hungary belongs to the East or to
the West (or to neither).
The first noteworthy piece of data is that the indicator of the strength of
national sentiment correlates positively with both the indicators of support for
NATO membership and with the indicators of opposition to it. In addition, we
found no significant difference in terms of the strength of national sentiment
between groups formed on the basis of answers to the question of Hungary’s
belonging to the East or West. This all shows that both supporters and opponents
of NATO membership found a version of the national discourse that was suitable
for the expression of their political goals, and that both supporters and opponents
of membership succeeded in mobilising national sentiments with a view to promot-
ing their aims.
It is also obvious that many of the opponents of NATO membership could
be susceptible to isolationist, anti-Western national rhetoric, for many of them
Table 4.NATO membership and Hungary’s belonging (to East or West) (Percentage)
Hungary is part Hungary be- Hungary be- Don’t know, no
of the West longs neither to longs to the East response
the West nor to
the East
Supports NATO 59 28 5 8
membership
Does not sup- 24 42 26 8

port NATO
membership
Don’t know, no 19 29 9 43
response
Table 5.Neutrality and Hungary’s belonging (to East or West) (Percentage)

Hungary is part Hungary be- Hungary be- Don’t know, no
of the West longs neither to longs to the East response
the West nor to
the East
supports NATO 61 27 4 8
membership
supports neu- 31 40 22 8
trality
don’t know, no 13 24 9 54
response
may have suffered from the consequences of the transition and have drifted
towards the extremes of the political spectrum. But it is also quite understand-
able if national sentiments are used to mobilise support for the pro-NATO
camp. On the one hand, support for NATO membership may have a content
that sees the realisation of the country’s national interests through integration
into the institutional system of the West. Support for membership, however,
may also be motivated by the experiences of the past, and above all by anti-
Communist national sentiments. The presence of this ambivalence is suggested
by the existence of a group of NATO supporters whose support for membership
is not accompanied by strong national sentiments. This is the group that not
only agrees with most of the opinions expressing support for NATO member-
ship, but also accepts the consequences of NATO membership. Another group
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of respondents were those who supported NATO membership but refused to

accept the consequences of membership. This group had many old supporters
(over 60) living outside Budapest and people with strong national sentiments
— which could mean that their opinions had been greatly influenced by
historical experiences. (Support for NATO membership does not always mean
support for western integration in general, and this is shown by the fact that six
percent of the representative sample supported NATO membership while
rejecting membership of the EU.)
Summarising the findings of our research, we may state that public opin-
ions on NATO membership are influenced on the one hand by political factors.
On the other hand, the impact of the attempts of politicians, writers, and other
‘opinion-makers’ to link attitudes towards NATO with more deep-rooted
attitudes with historical dimensions has been considerable. Some opinions were
indeed responsive to the arguments that raised the issue of NATO membership
from the level of everyday politics and made it part of the discourse on con-
structing national identities. Evoking national sentiments rooting in totally
different historical memories unified the political camps in supporting NATO
membership and giving historical pathos to a pragmatic decision. However, the
arguments about the relationship of the NATO decision and the historical place
and role of Hungary in Europe were not effective on the level of decision
making but in the sphere of legitimisation. In this sphere, the elites could
successfully unify the different forms of collective memory.
6. Summary
6.1 Austria
We proceeded from the claim that in Austria neutrality is a factor that has been
essential in the formation of national identity. We relied on the study on the
Discursive Construction of National Identity (Wodak et al. 1999), where both in
the media analysis, and in interviews and focus groups, emotional and affective
meanings related to neutrality were found. This frequently happened without
any clear definition of the semantics of the concept. It was also evident at the
beginning of our large study (see above) that the debates were carried out in a
strongly ideological fashion and that they had multiple political functions. The
precise history and recontextualisations of the ideological concept of ‘neutrali-
ty’, the meaning shifts and redefinitions were therefore at the centre of our
<LINK "wod-r12">
investigations. By means of a detailed linguistic analysis of recontextualisations,

the following were the most important results we obtained, and we consider
these as indicative of a general political tendency. The detailed linguistic
analyses and interpretations may be found in our book (Kovács and Wodak
2003). After enumerating some general results of our study, we will elaborate
the specific results of our case studies, which are of course difficult to compare
because they relate to very different data samples and different methodologies.
Thus, the specific results from the two case-studies have to be viewed in the
framework of the overall study.
– Austria is confronted with a decision for or against neutrality. In the course
of electoral campaigns over recent years, it is this decision that has become
a major theme, and it has been a decisive factor in voting either for the
Socialist Party or the Green Party (for neutrality) or for the People’s Party
or Freedom Party (for NATO).
– Neutrality is one of the most important factors in the definition of identity,
and during recent decades it has been recontextualised several times as an
ideological concept: from being an imposition, neutrality has transformed
itself into a popular characteristic of Austria. This was particularly evident
in the analysis of the speeches on the National Holiday. Ultimately, this
status has permitted a process of waiting, watching and withdrawal, but also
one of supporting refugees from different countries and continents.
Moreover, the role of Austria as mediator between East and West was of
central importance, particularly during Bruno Kreisky’s period of ‘active
neutrality’.
– It is not clear what will replace neutrality. In all the interviews, focus groups
and media, we found that people are afraid of a ‘vacuum’. A range of other
ideological concepts (with multiple and vague meanings), such as ‘solidari-
ty’, are possible contenders.
– The debate for and against neutrality is partly a party-political battle and,
therefore, is massively symbolic from a political point of view. We saw this
most clearly in the focus groups and in the TV talk-shows. The functions of
neutrality have changed greatly in the last few decades, the new functions
since 1989 and Austria’s EU entry are no longer clearly defined, and old
functions have become obsolete.
– Neutrality has a strong affective dimension without being clearly defined se-
mantically. This fuzziness shows up most markedly in focus groups and inter-
views: many of those questioned have very dogmatic views, but are unaware
either of the legally defined functions of neutrality or of any alternatives.
– All in all, the discourses for and against neutrality and for and against
NATO are representative of the important demarcation from Germany
since 1945, and have thereby become part of Austria’s ‘coming to terms
with its past’. This debate is therefore to be related to the attempt to create
a new identity narrative for Austria for the time during the Nazi period and
since 1945.
The speeches of Austrian presidents, specifically, allow insight into the change
(recontextualisation) over time of the semantic, ideological concept of ‘neutral-
ity’. One can observe a transformation from passive constructions to active
constructions and strategies, and finally to destructive strategies, because the
concept of neutrality is viewed as obsolete. These transformations manifest
themselves on the syntactic and semantic levels of grammar, as well as in the
rhetoric of politicians. They interact with the socio-political changes in Austria
and reproduce each other. The meanings and readings of ‘neutrality’ have
changed and are transformed and substituted with other meanings. If we
consider the four macro-strategies enumerated in our theoretical approach, it
becomes obvious that transformative and destructive discursive strategies are
the most salient for this (discursive) political element of Austrian identity.
6.2 Hungary
Both our opinion survey and the discussions in the focus groups show unequiv-
ocally that the majority of people in Hungary supports the country’s member-
ship of NATO. Summarising the findings of our research, we may state that
public opinion on NATO membership is mostly influenced by political factors
and formed by pragmatic political arguments. The effect of the political
developments and pragmatic considerations is proven by the clear link between
fluctuations in public support for NATO and concrete political events. But this
support is much less frequently justified by identity discourses than by discours-
es of interest. For the majority of Hungarians, NATO membership is a rational
choice, corresponding to the security and foreign policy interests of the country,
associated with ideological values and positive emotions of particular groups in
the population. However, the attitudes of these groups prove that the attempts
of politicians, writers, and other ‘opinion-makers’ to link attitudes towards
NATO with more deep-rooted attitudes with historical dimensions, have not
been fully negligible.
Our results indicate that some of the public opinions were indeed responsive
to the arguments that raised the issue of NATO membership from the level of
everyday politics and rendered it part of the discourses on constructing national
identities. It is clear that those for whom western integration also means entry
or return to a community of values are more determined in their support for
NATO entry than those who attach no such values to NATO membership.
Nevertheless, even in this latter group the rate of support is high.
The picture we were able to draw on the basis of the survey results corre-
sponds to the picture set up on the basis of the analysis of the discourses of the
elites (carried out in the framework of our research project but presented
elsewhere). In the mainstream elite discourse, historicising arguments about
NATO entry occur relatively rarely. The arguments in favour of NATO member-
ship are principally pragmatic-political. Of course, different but clearly pro-
NATO discourses of interest appear in both main camps in Hungarian politics:
for the left, left-liberal and liberal block, all levels of integration imply further
advantages for the modernisation of the country and further guarantees against
the return of any type of authoritarian political system, whereas for the conser-
vatives, who are concerned about the loss of sovereignty and the fate of Hungar-
ian minorities, dependency on the West seems to be merely the lesser of two
evils. The historicising anti-NATO discourse appeared only at the margins of the
political spectrum: the extreme right and the ideologues and adherents of the
left-wing splinter party (‘Workers’ Party’, Munkaspart). The extreme right-wing
ideology viewing Hungarians as the ‘people of the East’ who have always
suffered under the yoke of Western Christian civilisation, who were always
isolated and alien in the western world, and who were always betrayed by the
West, did appear in both extreme and more moderate forms in the discourse.
The moderate form, which has dispensed with the mythology of origin, was in
full agreement with the argumentation of the extreme left about the danger of
western colonisation of the country. Interestingly, the neutrality argument and
the positive appeal to the 1956 tradition occupied a central position only in the
discourse of this group, and although it is undoubtedly still present as an
alternative in public and semi-public opinions, it is otherwise treated as unrealistic
and counterproductive. These anti-NATO discourses — like the green-pacifist
discourse of small groups of intellectuals — remained weak and peripheral, on
the one hand because of the unity of the political centre, and on the other,
because of the stable and massive support for the entry option in the media.
Discourses on NATO, however, are often kept separate from discourses on
Europe. As the analyses of the elite discourse have illustrated, historicising
arguments are much more frequent in the discussions on Europe. ‘Europe’ in
<LINK "wod-r3">
"wod-r20">
"wod-r12">
Hungarian historical discourses has a very high value in constructive strategies.

Both in liberal and left-oriented texts and in that of conservative voices,
‘Europe’ represents positive values: the modern, liberal, democratic political or
Christian community of values. In these discourses, Hungary’s ‘joining’ or
‘return to’ Europe is portrayed as the positive outcome of a long history of
suffering — but in the discourses of the extreme right and left as the ultimate
abandonment of a distinct national path.
Notes
1. The full study is published in Kovács and Wodak (2003). For the most relevant literature
on NATO and neutrality see the essay of Karin Liebhart in the same volume.
2. The collaboration between the Hungarian team under the leadership of András Kovács
(Central European University, Budapest and Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and the
Austrian team under the leadership of Ruth Wodak (Research Unit Discourse, Politics,
Identity, University Vienna) was made possible by the award of the Wittgenstein Prize to the
latter. We wish to thank the Fonds für Wissenschaft und Forschung for this support. We also
wish to express our thanks to the Hungarian National Fund for Scientific Research (OTKA
Project no: TO25643), the Soros Foundation Research Scheme in Prague, and the Austrian-
Hungarian Action Fund for financial assistance. This comparative study is based on two
previous investigations. One was a project, supported by the IFK, on the discursive construc-
tion of national identity (cf. Wodak et al. 1998, 1999) and the other was a project in the
context of the above-mentioned research area (“Discourses of Neutrality”; cf. Pelinka,
Bischoff and Wodak (Eds.) 2001; Benke and Wodak 1999).
The collaborators in this research are, in alphabetical order: Gertraud Benke, Györgyi
Bindorffer, Zsuzsanna Dákay, Mária Heller, Borbála Juhász, András Kovács, Karin Liebhart,
Dénes Némedi, Anton Pelinka, Christoph Reinprecht, Ágnes Rényi, István Siklaki, Ruth Wodak.
Further information concerning the research unit at the Department of Linguistics, University
of Vienna may be obtained from http://www.univie.ac.at/discourse-politics-identity.
3. Of course, we are not able to elaborate our concepts in detail and refer the readers to
Wodak et al. (1999) and Kovács and Wodak (2003).
4. This summary of the linguistic analysis of presidential speeches is based on the innovative
research of Gertraud Benke, published in Gertraud Benke (2003), and on joint research
published by Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak (1999). See also Pelinka and Wodak (Eds.)
(2001).
5. For instance, PISA (1985) stresses that Austria was the only country, which was occupied
by the Russians, which did not eventually become part of the Eastern block and strongly
politically influenced by the Soviet Union.
6. Austria’s neutrality is a military neutrality and states that Austria may not join any
military pact.
<LINK "wod-r8">
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"wod-r3">
7. This can be demonstrated by the following episode: a few days after the declaration of
Austria’s neutrality, an Austrian reporter in Switzerland wrote a story, which criticised the
communists. This was interpreted as a breach of Austria’s neutrality by someone within the
Austrian broadcasting service, and the reporter’s stories were discontinued. (Die Presse,
29.10.1955, page 2: “Wien, neutraler als neutral?”).
8. In Austria there are many “state holidays”, e.g. Labour Day, etc., but there is only one
“National Holiday” (Nationalfeiertag). Before 1965, Austria did not have an official national
holiday.
9. These are (1) Rudolf Kirchschläger, (2) Kurt Waldheim, and (3) Thomas Klestil.
Kirchschläger was not affiliated with any party, and was Austrian president from 1974–1985
(two periods).
Waldheim was the candidate of the People’s Party (ÖVP). He was a much esteemed
general secretary of the United Nations, so that when during his election campaign in March
1986 it became known that he had lied about his involvement with the Nazi Regime, this
created an international outcry. (Since Waldheim was not particularly forthcoming with his
actual dealings, it took a long time until it was established that he was not — in a legal sense
— accountable for mass murder and deportations which had happened in his vicinity during
the Nazi-time.) Nevertheless, he, i.e. the People’s Party, was able to gain substantial support
for his election to president (1986–1992). He was disfavoured by many other states, by
appealing to nationalistic sentiments (“We Austrians vote whom we want”) (See Wodak et
al. 1990). Subsequently, the President suffered international isolation. Waldheim did not run
for presidency again.
The next (and current) President, Thomas Klestil, was also put forward by the People’s
Party. He was elected in 1992, and re-elected in 1998.
10. In our longer and more elaborate study, we also made a quantitative investigation of
concepts used in the speeches and their semantic coherence and dependencies. Due to
reasons of space, we refer our readers to Benke and Wodak (1999) and Benke (2003).
11. This phrase was never used by Kirchschläger; it is used occasionally by Klestil, the present
President.
12. Kirchschläger used the noun as well, but without the “unser” (our) and always following
up “die Republik Österreich” (the Austrian Republic), which redefines this usually culturally
connotated concept as being constituted by the state.
13. Literally: “a patriotism which is not tense”, meaning that in Austria expression of
patriotism creates tensions, because it is reminiscent of National Socialist sentiments.
14. Some historians (Hanisch 1988) coined the quite fitting notion “befreisiegt” (liberated-
defeated) to express the ambivalent public stance towards the end of the Nazi regime and the
beginning of the occupational period in Austria.
15. 49.24% of eligible voters took part in the referendum on 16 November 1997, and 85.33%
of those who took part voted for NATO membership.
16. In the course of a public opinion research in February 1999, staff at Gallup/Hungary
personally interviewed 1000 persons, who formed a representative sample of Hungary’s adult
population in terms of gender, age, domicile, and education. We are indebted to György
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"wod-r1">
"wod-r2">
"wod-r3">
"wod-r4">
"wod-r5">
"wod-r6">
"wod-r7">
"wod-r8">
"wod-r9">
"wod-r10">
"wod-r11">
Fischer and Róbert Manchin for providing us with the data of the earlier Gallup surveys on
NATO membership. Funding for this research was provided by: Országos Tudományos
Kutatási Alap (TO25643 projekt), Wittgenstein Forschungsschwerpunkt “Diskurs, Politik,
Identität”, Vienna, and the Soros-Foundation Research Scheme, Prague.
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</TARGET "wod">
Authors’ addresses
Ruth Wodak András Kovács
Department of Linguistics CEU Nationalism Studies Program
University of Vienna H-1052 Budapest
Berggasse 11/1 Nador u. 9–11
1090 Vienna Hungary
Austria
e-mail: kovacsan@ceu.hu
e-mail: Ruth.Wodak@univie.ac.at
About the authors

Ruth Wodak is Professor of Applied Linguistics and Discourse Analysis at the University of
Vienna. Besides various other prizes, she was awarded the Wittgenstein Prize for Elite
Researchers in 1996 and is head of the Wittgenstein Research Centre “Discourse, Politics,
Identity” at the University of Vienna. Her current research agenda include amongst others:
Communication in institutions (research on EU organisations), Research on European
Identities, Political language, Aspects of Discrimination. She is member of the editorial board
of a range of linguistic journals and co-editor of the journals Discourse and Society and
Journal Language and Politics. She has held visiting professorships in Uppsala, Stanford
University, University Minnesota, Georgetown University and the University of East Anglia
(Leverhulme Fellow). Starting with September 1st, 2004, she has accepted a personal chair in
Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, UK.
András Kovács Ph.D. Dr. hab. is a Sociologist and Professor at the Central European
University, Budapest (Nationalism Studies Program/Jewish Studies Program). He is also
senior researcher in the Institute for Ethnic and Minority Research at the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.
Previous appointments and research stays at Paderborn University, École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), New York University(New York), TH Twente (The
Netherlands), Salomon Steinheim Institut für Deutsch-Jüdische Geschichte, Duisburg,
Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum für
Jüdische Studien, Potsdam, Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissenschaften,
Vienna.
Research agenda: Jewish identity and anti-Semitism in post-war Hungary; memory and
identity; socio-economic attitudes and political choice.

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<TARGET "wod" DOCINFO AUTHOR "Ruth Wodak and András Kovács"TITLE "National identities in times of supra-national challenges"SUBJECT "JLP,

National identities in times of

Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

Keywords: recontextualisation, political speeches, opinion polls, neutrality,

Journal of Language and Politics 3:2 (2004), 209–246.

2. End of the brief 20th Century2

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 211

judgements and prejudices, political concepts, ideologies and opinions about

212 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

3. Hungary and Austria at the end of an epoch

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 213

214 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

4. Theoretical and methodological framework of the research3

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 215

216 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

5.1 Austrian presidential speeches4

218 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

5.1.2 Qualitative analysis

Acceptance of the unavoidable — 1974

This diﬃculty to come to terms with “one-self” is accompanied by a diﬃcult

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 221

A welcome means in the fabrication of an heroic character, 1979

The important mission “Austria for the world” is given to it by neutrality,

prominently, although to a lesser extent, a cultural conception can still be

Approaching Europe and the European Union, 1988

isation: a new semantics related to ‘neutrality’ and a re-birth of old concepts.

Neutralitätsverständnis vereinbar ist und was nicht.”

In a EU-Austria neutrality loses its main instrumental function; at the same

226 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

Austria was free again on this 26th of October 1955.

5.2 NATO membership and national identity in Hungary

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 229

status. It saw in the former an example of a Communist government that was

5.2.2 NATO-membership and identity in the Hungarian public opinion

5.2.2.1 Public opinion on NATO membership. Since Hungary was already a

Hungarian foreign policy, was followed by a dramatic increase in support.)

5.2.2.2 Supporters and opponents of NATO membership. If we seek to character-

5.2.3 NATO and national identity

Figure 2. Supporters of NATO membership by demographic data I.

Figure 3. Supporters of NATO membership by demographic data II.

If Hungary joins NATO, this will increase Hungary’s security. 72 10

Hungary’s membership of NATO will strengthen conﬁdence 67 12

NATO membership would mean protection if Russia once again 65 16

Instead of joining NATO, Hungary should stay neutral. 34 53

Table 2.Opinions on the consequences of NATO membership: “Please tell me to what

…that NATO should be able to use military installations in Hungary. 3.51

…that NATO troops may be stationed in Hungary. 3.42

…that Hungary should contribute to the NATO budget. 3.38

Don’t know, no response 11

Does not sup- 24 42 26 8

Table 5.Neutrality and Hungary’s belonging (to East or West) (Percentage)

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of respondents were those who supported NATO membership but refused to

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 239

investigations. By means of a detailed linguistic analysis of recontextualisations,

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Hungarian historical discourses has a very high value in constructive strategies.

National identities in times of supra-national challenges 243

244 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

Arduç-Sedlak, Maria. 2000. Einfach menschlich? Eine diskursanalytische Analyse xenophober

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246 Ruth Wodak and András Kovács

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