SECTION 20.

WITNESSES; THEIR QUALIFICATIONS

AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM VS. REPUBLIC

Issue: Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner's
application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case because
of lack of authority on the part of Ms. Aban to testify on its behalf.

Held: Yes. A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to
testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and
being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above (Rule 130 Sec. 19, 20, 21).

PEOPLE VS. HAMTO Y CODERAS

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Mary Grace that she was raped can be given probative weight
when it was found out by the National Center for Mental Health that she has a mental age of 7 and can
perceive things but not interpret them.

Held: Yes. Although Mary Grace was mentally retarded, her testimony cannot be discredited. All persons
who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Mere
intellectual weakness of a witness is not a ground to disqualify, or at the very least discredit, a witness.

The intellectual weakness of Mary Grace does not make her incompetent as a witness if, at the time she
testified, she had the mental capacity to (1) distinguish between right and wrong, (2) understand the
nature and obligation of an oath, and (3) give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters
about which she testifies.

PEOPLE VS. GLORIA UMALI

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Francisco Manalo regarding the buy-bust operation against Umali
can be given probative weight when he testified while he was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act and other crimes against property.

Held: Yes. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" under Sec. 20 of Rule
130 takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification
of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will.” Manalo has
not been convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness. The fact that
Manalo is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

Page 1 of 11
 PEOPLE VS. EDWIN ALEMAN (2013)

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Mark Almodovar, 14 years of age, regarding the killing and
robbery of a fat amn can be given probative weight when he testified as a deaf-mute uneducated in sign
language.

Held: Yes. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The
rule is that “all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.”

A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of sight,
remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and experiences.
The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but
he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case,
sketches.

Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through
a qualified interpreter.

PEOPLE VS. RICHARD DEAUNA

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Josephine Deauna that her legitimate father Richard Deauna
raped her can be given probative weight when she is alleged to be emotionally maladjusted or mentally
derailed as testified by 3 doctors presented by the defense.

Held: Yes. It appears that she manifested in her demeanor, some form of insanity or mental derailment
thereafter or during the course of the proceedings, when she again testified in court, this time as a
defense witness. Even assuming that the victim was already insane during her earlier testimony, this will
not negate her testimony incredible and inadmissible. Her mental imbalance would not automatically
affect her mental credibility.

All persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. One may be insane but may be capable in law giving credible testimony.

In this case, it is quite evident that the victim was not only competent to testify, but turned out to be a
credible and convincing witness for the prosecution. Verily, sufficient in itself to establish appellant’s
criminal liability were her detailed accounts of the two (2) rape incidents establishing the fact of rape and
identifying her father as her ravisher, as indicated in the transcripts of stenographic notes. The
longstanding rule is that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted solely on that basis.

Page 2 of 11
 PEOPLE VS. JOCELYN ACBANGIN

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Sweet Acbangin regarding her alleged kidnapping and detention
by Jocelyn Acbangin can be given probative weight when she testified as a minor.

Held: Yes. A witness' young age will not deter him from being competent and credible witness. To be a
competent's child witness, the following must be regarded, (1) capacity of observation; (2) capacity of
recollection; and (3) capacity of communication. All these were met by Sweet. Hence, Sweet's testimony
should be upheld since her testimony is not tainted with arbitrariness.

PEOPLE VS. ALVIN ESUGON

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Carl Castro (“Muymoy”), a 5 year old boy, that Alvin Esugon (their
neighbor) killed his mom, Josephine Castro can be given probative weight when he testified as a minor.

Held: That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with
which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness, every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio
or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

SECTION 21. DISQUALIFICATIONS BY REASON OF MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY

PEOPLE VS. JERRY OBOGNE

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Virac erred when it did not admit the testimony of AAA, a 12 year old
mentally retarded person regarding her being allegedly raped by Jerry Obogne.

Held: Yes. Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxxx
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

Page 3 of 11
In this case, the trial court found “AAA” a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary
to defense counsel’s objection that “AAA” was not capable of intelligently making known her perception
to others, “AAA” managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused,
though in a soft voice and halting manner. “AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity
and truthfulness.

“AAA” also provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused–appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found by the trial court, the
testimony of “AAA” was replete with consistent details, negating the probability of fabrication.

SECTION 22. DISQUALIFICATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

ALVAREZ VS. RAMIREZ (2005)

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it reversed the RTC’s decision of deleting Esperanza Alvarez’
testimony regarding her husband committing arson against the house of Susan Ramirez his sister-in law.

Held: No. Sec. 22 provides: "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates
all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

PEOPLE VS. QUIDATO (1998)

Issue: Whether or not the court erred when it used against Reynaldo and Eddie the testimony given by
Gina Quidato regarding how she overheard the plans of Bernardo Jr. (her husband) and his two siblings,
Reynaldo and Eddie to kill their father.

Held: Yes. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife,
the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina
Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with
accused-appellant's case.
This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused appellant directly or through the guise of taking
judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule.
"What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students. Thus,
with regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having
timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule.

Page 4 of 11
 PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO PASENSOY

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Analie Pasensoy regarding the alleged killing of Hilario by Robert
Pasensoy may be given probative weight when the testimony she had given was against her husband,
Robert.

Held: Yes. The Court held that Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely
objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against
the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency
of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness.

In his case, the incompetency was waived by appellant’s failure to make a timely objection to the
admission of Analies testimony.

SECTION 23. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH OR INSANITY OF ADVERSE PARTY

TAN VS. CA

Issue:

Held:

BABAO VS. PEREZ

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the testimony of Bernardo Babao, regarding Celestina
Perez’ act of depriving Santiago Babao part of her estate, on the ground of fraud when Bernardo testified
on facts which happened prior to his appointment as administrator of Santiago’s estate/

Held: Yes. The Court held that Analie’s testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely
objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against
the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency
of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness.

In his case, the incompetency was waived by appellant’s failure to make a timely objection to the
admission of Analies testimony.

Page 5 of 11
 HKO AH PAO VS. TING

Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred when it did not consider the testimony of Angel Sembrano
(personal accountant of Teng Ching Lay) that Teng Ching Lay was the one who bought the subject
property and only named it under Arsenio Ting to escape citizenship requirements.

Held: No. Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties
or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.

While Sembrano is not a party, he is practically a surrogate of petitioners since he was the personal
accountant of their predecessor-in-interest and the corporate accountant of the corporation he controlled.

CEQUENA VS. BOLANTE

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the affidavit allegedly signed by Sinforoso and
respondent (his wife) transferring the tax declaration of the subject property to Margarito Mendoza
(Sinforoso’s brother) is inadmissible as there was no presentation of witness to the execution of affidavit;
and no competent witness attested to the genuineness of signature.

Held: No. General rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on
the witness stand. And affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are available as
witnesses. This is totally contrary to petitioner's contention that it was unnecessary for them to present
the witness to establish the authenticity of the document since the affidavit was a declaration against
respondent's interest and therefore as a declaration against interest, it was an exception to the hearsay
rule.

Before document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under Dead Man's Statute, the offeror
must show (1) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (2) that the declaration concerns a
fact cognizable by the declarant; (3) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the
same was contrary to his interest; and (4) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any
motive to falsify.

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be Respondent Bolante, who is still alive and who testified
that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. Notably, A declaration against interest is not admissible
if the declarant is available to testify as a witness.

Page 6 of 11
 SANSON VS. CA

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ruled that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to
the testimony given by the petitioners (the deceased’s creditors) regarding their transactions with Juan
Bon Fing Sy (the deceased).

Held: No. The rule renders incompetent, the parties to a case, their assignors, persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication
so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an
assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted.

The testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are
not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case
without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be
disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a case.
Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is
a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s
claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.

SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA

Issue: Whether or not the court erred when it admitted the testimonies of respondent and his witness,
Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto’s death when despite the Dead
Man’s Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No. Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Man’s Statute to this case. First, petitioners
filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the
filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the
Dead Man’s Statute.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Man’s Statute for the simple reason that
she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor
because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

TERESITA BORDALBA VS. CA

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on
matters regarding the disposition and distribution of the subject lots occurring prior to the death of her
mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, when the same violated the dead man’s statute.

Held: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness
as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based,
on the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

Page 7 of 11
 LONDRES VS. CA
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave more credence to the explanation given by the
private respondent, Consolacion (to whom the subject property was allegedly sold by the deceased) as
to the alteration that it was Filomena (the deceased) who erased Lot 2034 (owned by Paulina, deceased’s
mother) in the deed of sale and changed it to lot 13333 (owned by Filomena), both lots found in Roxas
City.

Held: No. The Dead Man’s Statute applies to a case against the administrator or representative of an
estate upon a claim againstthe estate of the deceased person. The present case was not filed against
administrator, nor against the estate since it was the heirs of Filomena who filed the complaint against
private respondents.

Furthermore, the petitioners cannot invoke the rule as it waived the evidence admissible due to objection
that was belatedly made. The waiver was more evident when the counsel of petitioners cross-examined
Consolacion. Petitioners cannot now invoke the rule they knowingly waived. In addition the complaint
was only filed by the petitioner four years after the death of Filomena, it is unthinkable for Filomena to
have allowed the private respondents to enjoy ownership if she never really intended to sell the property
to private respondents.

SECTION 24. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON GRANVILLE

Issue: Whether or not the SC erred when it set aside the CA’s decision and ordered Cameron Granville
to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) between it and Eagleridge.

Held: No. The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types
of privileged communication. These are communication between or involving the following: (a) between
husband and wife; (b) between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest
and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest.

Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a
trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the
foregoing categories.

AIR PHIL. CORP. VS. PENNSWELL

Issue: Whether or not RTC erred when it reversed its order asking Pennswell to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the products contested by Air Philippines to have been used
to defraud it by merely changing its labels to make it like a new product.

Held: Yes. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to
its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The chemical composition,
formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation
of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. To compel
its disclosure is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage.

Section24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit:
(a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)

Page 8 of 11
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned
by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.

That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords
to trade secrets is evident in our laws.

A. HUSBAND AND WIFE

ZULUETA VS. CA

Issue: Whether or not the 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs are admissible as evidence when they are forcibly taken by his wife Cecilia Zulueta in his
clinic, without his consent to use in a case of legal separation to which they are parties.

Held: No. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

LACUROM VS. JACOBA

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Olivia Jacoba is admissible when she testified against her
husband, alleging that it was her husband, Atty. Ellis Jacoba who prepared the subject motion containing
words in contempt of court and that he only asked her to sign because he was the suspended.

Held: Yes. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant
to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. His Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly
admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."

US VS. ANTIPOLO

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it refused to admit the testimony of Susana Ezpeta (the
widow of Dinal, the deceased) that it was the dying declaration of her husband that it his injury that
caused his death was from a fall, and not respondent Dalmaceo, on the ground that the law
requires the consent of her husband before she may testify and that may not happen because
his dead.

Page 9 of 11
Held: Yes. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: "Except with the consent of
both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be
a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall
be parties."

This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of
section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the
marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might
have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously,
when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding
the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential.
On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated
after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.

PEOPLE VS. CARLOS

Issue: Whether or not the letter between Carlos and his wife containing the former’s intentions to harm
Dr. Sityar is admissible as evidence when it is to be used by the prosecution to establish pre-meditation
by Carlos to murder Dr. Sityar, contrary to Carlos’contention of self-defense.

Held: No. The letter was held to be inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that generally where a
privileged communication of spouse-to-spouse comes either legally or not into the hands of a third party,
if without collusion and there is voluntary foreclosure on either spouse, then the privilege is extinguished
and the communication becomes admissible. But in this case however, the letter in question was
obtained through search and seizure where no warrant was issued. And documents obtained by illegal
searches are not admissible in a criminal case.

Furthermore, the letter was held to be hearsay evidence. The letter was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that
purpose.

B. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT

HILADO VS. DAVID

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Francisco (counsel of Assad) should be disqualified in the case on the ground
that prior to his acceptance of the said case, Blandina Hilado asked him for additional legal opinion
regarding her case and for which he gave a legal opinion letter, without payment.

Held: Yes. There is already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco.
Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Page 10 of 11
 REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Francisco (counsel of Assad) should be disqualified in the case on the ground
that prior to his acceptance of the said case, Blandina Hilado asked him for additional legal opinion
regarding her case and for which he gave a legal opinion letter, without payment.

Held: Yes. There is already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco.
Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Page 11 of 11