SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CASES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:

Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution.
As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the
mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle
where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his
sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require
otherwise.
 (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as
evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be
temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner. 4

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge
or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must
refer to only one specific offense. 7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in
the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding
provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then
already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it
was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:

SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them
to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the
above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the
complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that
the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for
a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two
(2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented
to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator
assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application
was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on
 the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application
was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any
questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any
case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit.
He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the
affidavit presented to him.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
wifl be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing
and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition
taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided
by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be
false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not
of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application. 15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their
allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put
to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they
were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the
forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on
guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight
men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida
said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the
weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be
so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was
on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related
were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against
the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the
declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued
forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically
coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later
to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the
military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit.
This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for
authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not
resist.

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from
the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even
without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was
not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the
rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for
the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact
that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a
warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be
made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to
use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the
interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of
their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive
objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that
these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the
rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's
pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution.
While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because
"the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was
nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The
decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the
said articles must remain incustodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is
made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO
LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO,
JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro
A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to
order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects
seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by
petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the
return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for therein.

The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent
Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still
unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not
yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge
asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s
application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then
sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant
petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers
protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay
petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru
the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the
meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
Petitioners came to this Court.

The petition should be granted for the following reasons: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)

"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him."
(Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)

The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by
the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said
constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by
the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings
of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening: jgc: chan robles .com. ph

"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.

En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia
mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria que causaria cierta
demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o
si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los
derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.

"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por la siguiente
razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en
la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona
que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento
de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se
atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin
examiner a los testigos.

"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre
requeriria algun tiempo?.

"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las
vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males
debemos escoger. el menor.

x x x

"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our
constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he
must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness,
the witnesses that he may produce . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it
requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls
for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s
application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly
be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the
participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before
respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The
transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of
this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales,
Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that
stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala
hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer
Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the
Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to
him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them,
requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and
without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether
he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.

"Q And thereafter?

"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.

"Q Who is this he?

"A The Honorable Judge.

"Q The deposition or the affidavit?

"A The affidavit, Your Honor." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This
cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his
witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the
rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in
examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted
above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance
with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-
up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These
were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was
probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code
in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question
is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule
126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to
above. Thus we find the following: chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.

Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent
returns.

Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information
required under the Tax Code.

Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article
subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct
of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .,"
and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee who
caused the violation shall be responsible.

Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is
the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated.
The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of
Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to
make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles:
Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not
applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation
of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because
it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of
Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the
phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill: jg c:chan rob les.com. ph

"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense.’"

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970." cralaw virtua1aw l ib rary

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’

"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general
warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.

In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:jgc: chan roble s. com.ph

". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made, —
that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in
this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained
in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals,
records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first
place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can
be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the
second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ
of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances.
(Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax
assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against
petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute
v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court
below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is
charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we
do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body
it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to
a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been
achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385,
64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw l ib rary

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and
effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the
seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score,
petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners — at
least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months
after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized
served as basis for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said
search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to
petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are
permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as
well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant
herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.

Castro, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw li brary

I concur.

I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question violates the specific injunction of Section 3, Rule
126 that "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." There is no question in my mind
that, as very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Villamor, the phrase "for violation of Section 46 (a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53,
72, 73, 208 and 209" refers to more than one specific offense, considering that the violation of Section 53
which refers to withholding of income taxes at the sources, Section 208 which punishes pursuit of business
or occupation without payment of the corresponding specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209 which
penalizes failure to make a return of receipts sales, business or gross value output actually removed or to
pay the taxes thereon in connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on Business and Occupation can hardly
be absorbed in a charge of alleged violation of Section 46(a), which merely requires the filing of income tax
returns by corporations, so as to constitute with it a single offense. I perceive here the danger that the
result of the search applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of violating Section 46(a) but also
and separately of Section 53, 208 and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73, also
mentioned in the application, are really directly related to Section 46(a) because Section 72 provides for
surcharges for failure to render, returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns and Section 73 refers
to the penalty for failure to file returns or to pay the corresponding tax. Taken together, they constitute one
single offense penalized under Section 73. I am not and cannot be in favor of any scheme which amounts to
an indirect means of achieving that which not allowed to be done directly. By merely saying that a party is
being charged with violation of one section of the code in relation to a number of other sections thereof
which in truth have no clear or direct bearing with the first is to me condemnable because it is no less than a
shotgun device which trenches on the basic liberties intended to be protected by the unequivocal limitations
imposed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to secure a search warrant with the
aggravating circumstance of being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom the
application for its issuance is presented.

I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my vehement disapproval of the action taken by
respondent internal revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured during the search, the
legality of which was pending resolution by the court, as basis of an assessment, no matter how highly
motivated such action might have been. This smacks of lack of respect, if not contempt for the court and is
certainly intolerable. At the very least, it appears as an attempt to render the court proceedings moot and
academic, and dealing as this case does with constitutionally protected rights which are part and parcel of
the basic concepts of individual liberty and democracy, the government agents should have been the first
ones to refrain from trying to make a farce of these court proceedings. Indeed, it is to be regretted that the
government agents and the court have acted irregularly, for it is highly doubtful if it would be consistent
with the sacredness of the rights herein found to have been violated to permit the filing of another
application which complies with the constitutional requirements above discussed and the making of another
search upon the return of the papers and documents now in their illegal possession. This could be an
instance wherein taxes properly due the State will probably remain unassessed and unpaid only because the
ones in charge of the execution of the laws did not know how to respect basic constitutional rights and
liberties.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
— issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to

the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äw phï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution13 provides:
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
 the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
 1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners

are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude
that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in
the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored,
he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to

suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN
ORGANIZATION, INC.,respondents.

Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Mariano Abaya for petitioner.

Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction, against
an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction bond in the amount of P3,000.00, let a
writ of preliminary preventive and/or mandatory injunction issue, restraining the respondents,
their agents or representatives, from further searching the premises and properties and from
taking custody of the various documents and papers of the petitioner corporation, whether in
its main office or in any of its branches; and ordering the respondent Central Bank and/or its
co-respondents to return to the petitioner within five (5) days from service on respondents of
the writ of preventive and/or mandatory injunction, all the books, documents, and papers so
far seized from the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid search warrant. 1äwphï1.ñët

Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the requisite bond, we issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining and prohibiting respondents herein from enforcing the order
above quoted.
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. —
hereinafter referred to as the Organization — is a registered non-stock corporation, the main
purpose of which, according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961, is "to
encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its members, and to extend financial
assistance in the form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of
"members,"1 namely: (a) founder members — who originally joined the organization and have signed
the pre-incorporation papers — with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating
members — with "noright to vote or be voted for" — to which category all other members belong;
except (c) honorary members, so made by the board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion"
thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the propagation" of the objectives
of the Organization — without any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary members.

On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Bank of the Philippines — hereinafter
referred to as the Bank — rendered an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of
similar nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on
April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the following:

ANNOUNCEMENT

To correct any wrong impression which recent newspaper reports on "savings and loan
associations" may have created in the minds of the public and other interested parties, as well as to
answer numerous inquiries from the public, the Central Bank of the Philippines wishes to announce
that all "savings and loan associations" now in operation and other organizations using different
corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER
BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE
BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE
PHILIPPINES.

Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they
engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the sale
of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without authority from the Monetary Board. Their
activities and operations are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing
with such institutions do so at their risk.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the coordination of "the investigation
and gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating
contrary to law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member of the intelligence division of the
Bank filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a verified application for a search warrant against the
Organization, alleging that "after close observation and personal investigation, the premises at No.
2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" — in which the offices of the Organization were housed — "are being
used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in banking activities, "by receiving
deposits of money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of
a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan association . . . without having first complied
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 337" and that the articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a
list attached to said application, as Annex A thereof.3 are kept in said premises, and "being used or
intended to be used in the commission of a felony, to wit: violation of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic
Act No. 337."4 Said articles, papers or effects are described in the aforementioned Annex A, as
follows:
I. BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRY

(1) General Journal

(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book

(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book

(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement Book

II. BOOKS OF FINAL ENTRY

(1) General Ledger

(2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers

(3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers

III. OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS

(1) Application for Membership

(2) Signature Card

(3) Deposit Slip

(4) Passbook Slip

(5) Withdrawal Slip

(6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report

(7) Application for Loan Credit Statement

(8) Credit Report

(9) Solicitor's Report

(10) Promissory Note

(11) I n d o r s e m e n t

(12) Co-makers' Statements

(13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts

(14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts

(15) Trial Balance

 (16) Minutes Book — Board of Directors

IV. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

(1) Income and Expenses Statements

(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and Liabilities

V. OTHERS

(1) Articles of Incorporation

(2) By-Laws

(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.

(4) And other documents and articles which are being used or intended to be used in
unauthorized banking activities and operations contrary to law.

Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said
municipal court, issued the warrant above referred to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being
"good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon examination, under oath, of a detective of the Manila
Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank — that the Organization has under its
control, in the address given, the aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense
adverted to above or intended to be used as means for the commission of said off offense.

Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila,
the Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the
ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted "with grave abuse of discretion,
without jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving
commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . .
permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to
any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal
case against a corporation . . ."

The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending hearing of the case on the merits, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, or, in
the alternative, if the acts complained of have been partially performed, that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte, ordering the preservation of the status quo of the
parties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the documents and papers so far
seized under, the search warrant in question. After due hearing, on the petition for said injunction,
respondent, Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila to which said Case No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on July 2, 1962, the order
complained of.

Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was
denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the present
action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question.

At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned
search to be made and the articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that
the Organization was illegally engaged in banking — by receiving money for deposit, disbursement,
safekeeping or otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and mortgage bank and/or
building and loan association, — without first complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and that
the order complained of assumes that the Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said
Act.6 Yet respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to be unreasonable,
through the following process of reasoning: the deposition given in support of the application for a
search warrant states that the deponent personally knows that the premises of the Organization, at
No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,7 were being used unlawfully for banking and purposes. Respondent
judge deduce, from this premise, that the deponent " knows specific banking transactions of the
petitioner with specific persons," and, then concluded that said deponent ". . . could have, if he really
knew of actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to search and seize only books" or records:

covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the petitioner with specific
persons who are the supposed victims of said illegal banking transactions according to his
knowledge. To authorize and seizeall the records listed in Annex A to said application for
search warrant, without reference to specific alleged victims of the purported illegal banking
transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and its officers with a roving commission or
fishing expedition for evidence which could be discovered by normal intelligence operations
or inspections (not seizure) of books and records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No
337 . . ."

The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the civil liberty involved is, certainly, in line with the
function of courts, as ramparts of justice and liberty and deserves the greatest encouragement and
warmest commendation. It lives up to the highest traditions of the Philippine Bench, which underlies
the people's faith in and adherence to the Rule of Law and the democratic principle in this part of the
World.

At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete
ones. Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations.

Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order complained of whether
respondent Judge opined that the above mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that
the Organization was engaged in the transactions mentioned in his deposition — deserved of
credence or not. Obviously, however, a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the
warrant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municipal
Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, the failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not
necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the
Organization, for the witness might be acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the
individuals concerned were unknown to him.

Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the
kind contemplated in the contested action of the officers of the Bank, must always connote the
existence of a "victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose interests have been actually
injured, then the assumption is not necessarily justified. The law requiring compliance with certain
requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to protect the public against
actual, as well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of warrants
to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise.

The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the
Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of business in
which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary to specify or identify the parties
involved in said isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the records
pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest clearly that
the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the
Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial
assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them.

It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws — as their
"savings." and that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursory
examination of said documents will readily show that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a
"participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit
accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so
dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and
"participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their "privileges and
benefits," if any, being limited to those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine
from time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the "participating members" is purely
nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic
Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of said Act, before the
transactions in question could be undertaken.

It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon
which the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated
upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to "
banking," as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and
6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line
with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not
been proven to be unreasonable.

Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2, 1962, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued in compliance therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on August 14, 1962, accordingly, made permanent, with costs against
respondent First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose
Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252
of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor,
with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as
appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the
illegality of the John Doe search warrant.

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the
House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.

The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad,
had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo
of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge
Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a
little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises
closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a
telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke
in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of
them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed
him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and
not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso
was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was
consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on
searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only
to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another
part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of
Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper,
of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for
the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three
policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling.
All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole
exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the
appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )

The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except
that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously
indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the
search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist
the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating
particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.

There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and
the search warrant. The application reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.

APPLICATION FOR (G)

SEARCH WARRANT

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo,

No. 47 Revellin, detective.

Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of
W. C., City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.

Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According

to the best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has
been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said
 premises there are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such
as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in
prohibited games kept. It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling conducted in
said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as gambling house. I have
watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house and
a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as
cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited
games are kept.

I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing
questions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant
alone. This document reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN DOE, Defendant.

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he
has good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in
the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands,
certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money,
cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection
with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and
conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them
in violation of the Gambling Law.
 Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within
ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe
and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same
or any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided
for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court

Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the
person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized."

In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although
naturally entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant
shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized." (Section 97.) After the
judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce,
and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the
following form:

. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of

............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other
place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for the following
property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a crime may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the crime. (Section 105).

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to
the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however,
going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.;
Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72
Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)

The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are
material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe
search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant,
thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of
the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's
Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is
found the following:

Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and
where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will
enable the officer to identify him when found.

xxx xxx xxx

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be
apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the
essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about
blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended,
and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in
addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or
persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other
hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.

The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there
appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe
or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," had committed an
assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or
Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing
complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of
identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant
was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:

We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of
the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain
the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he could be known
and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a general warrant,
upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as being included in the
description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary principles,
 and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of
Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more
suspected persons or to seize their property be not accompanied with a special designation
of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an
ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give some
description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in
blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C.
577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow.,
332, and cases cited.)

This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party
whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be
arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is
to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place
of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law,
39, 40.)

The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person
on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The
defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than was
necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .

The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in
question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an
unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be
convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.

Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional
and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly"
describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the
search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be
forcibly resisted.

For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the
law was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings
forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make
mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands."
This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing
rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme
Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were accordingly
authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called
Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged
in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been
held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime,
or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or
which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi
[1909], 12 Phil., 439.)

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search
warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic
Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus,
and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by
the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party
is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club
purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully
protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged
club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious
practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying
occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the
police.

It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his
dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less
so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more
force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents
of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a
proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of
a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42
Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)

The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently
identified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or
information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the
true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest
without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this
contention.

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it
is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult
enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far
fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the
search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.

The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member
of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the
facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt,
however, that advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the
officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a
means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted
the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls
within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.

Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the
trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results
that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the
defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto
mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment
into effect issue.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN

PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN,
MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN
PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P.
ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P. DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA
OPAOpetitioners,
vs.
DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO,
TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:

The petitioners ask this Court:

1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar of the
Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, in Criminal Case No. 1748 entitled People vs. Hadji
Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman et al.;

2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case No. 1748; and

3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No. 1748 to the Provincial
Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for proper disposition. 1

Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest was issued by the
respondent Judge without a proper preliminary investigation. 2 The Solicitor General agrees and
recommends that their petition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided. 3

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least
five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one
version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders
suffering casualties. 4 Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place, Lalabuan,
also in Masiu, had been ambushed. 5

On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the
victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast
preliminary investigation" of the incident. 6 The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons
being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified — and
promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a
"1st indorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all
cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be
forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases." 7

No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday,
August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt.
Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748. 8 On that same day, the respondent Judge
"examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru .. (his) closed and
direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's
answers. 9 Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest"
against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." 10

An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by
Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough
investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly
haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. 11 The respondent Judge denied
the motion for "lack of basis;" 12 hence the present petition.

While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary investigation of
the offenses involved, which are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, the petitioners and the
Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court ; 13 and that
that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest. 14 It is further contended that August 10, 1985 was a
Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only, ..." and "... it
would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause
against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of
hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day;"15 and that there was undue haste and an omission
to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were
obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator." 16

The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of
the charges "... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had
already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own
investigation of the same; 17 and that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does"
transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the
persons or things to be seized. 18

There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a pre investigation of any crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or
the chartered cities, where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such
officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the Rule actually
consists of two phases or stages.

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits
and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge
either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the
complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the
provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents.
At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses
questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the
Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for
trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate
action.

The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or information is filed in the
Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result in a denial of due process. 19

Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court. There is no pretense that
the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar as the respondent Judge is concerned,
and that he does not intend to undertake the second phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he
has failed to observe the prescribed procedure. What has happened is simply that after receiving the
complaint and examining the complainant's witnesses, and having come to believe, on the basis
thereof, that the offenses charged had been committed, the respondent Judge issued the warrant
now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now petitioners) named and Identified by
the witnesses as the perpetrators of the killings and injuries, as well as against 50 "John Does."

The real question, therefore, is whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to issue the
warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation.
Stated otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine
qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed
before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule 20 provides is that no complaint or information
for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But
nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest may issue.
Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the
municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase of the
investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a
warrant of arrest. 21

This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly
denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary
investigation proper. Thus, the former Section 6 of Rule 112 provided:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the
preliminary e petition conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

In Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 22 this Court found occasion to dwell in some detail on the process of
preliminary investigation and, incidentally, to affirm the power of a justice of the peace or municipal judge
conducting a preliminary investigation to order the arrest of the accused after the first stage (preliminary
examination), saying:

Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary investigation such as was conducted
by the Justice of the Peace has for its purpose only the determination of whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the
accused guilty thereof, and if so, the issuance of a warrant of arrest. And it should
not be forgotten that a preliminary investigation has two stages: First, a preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused;
and, second, the reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or
information filed against him, and his being informed of the substance of the
evidence against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor, if he
so desires. Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of preliminary investigation,
depends on the discretion of the judge or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant
of arrest. It suffices that facts are presented to him to convince him, not that a person
has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause to believe that such person
committed the crime charged. The proceeding is generally ex parte unless the
defendant desires to be present and while under the old Rules the Justice of the
Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the complainant and the
latter's witnesses under oath, only the testimony of the complainant shall be in writing
and only an abstract of the testimony of the other is required. Regarding preliminary
 investigation, it has thus been ruled that 'the occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. ... 23

The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has, of course, been modified somewhat since the
occurrence of the facts upon which Mayuga was decided, but not to abrogate the authority of the
investigating judge to order such arrest, and only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do
so, he must examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced
to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was introduced by
Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amending Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
the "searching questions and answers" requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule
112 already quoted.

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary
investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that
such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire
procedure of preliminary investigation .

Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there was scarcely time to
determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within
a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00
p.m. That argument founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he had
personally and closely examined under oath the three witnesses to the complaint 24 and that he had
issued the warrant of arrest "believing that the offense thus filed had been committed." 25 Nothing in the
record before this Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the
legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. 26 The contention that the witnesses to
the complaint had merely sworn before the respondent Judge to statements prepared beforehand and
submitted by a military investigator 27 must, in view of the foregoing considerations and for lack of any
support in the record, be dismissed as mere speculation.

The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge limited the proceedings
on preliminary examination to the usual Saturday office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in addition to
not making any persuasive showing that such proceedings could not have been completed within
that time-frame. For all that appears, said respondent could have put off the 1:00 p.m. adjournment
until he had finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction. And there is really nothing
unusual in completing within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary
examination to determine the existence of probable cause.

The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an accurate chronicle of the
questioned proceedings, shows prima facie that the respondent Judge had personally examined the
witnesses to the complaint, and a consideration of the latter's sworn answers to his questions
satisfies this Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners was neither arbitrary nor
unfounded.

The three witnesses to the complaint, Misandoning Monasprang, a student, Lawandato Ripors, an
engineering graduate, and Sanny Monib a farmer gave mutually corroborative accounts of the
incident. Under separate questioning, they declared that they were members of a party that was
passing by Pantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, Lanao del Sur, at about
10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which
included the petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons; that five of the party had been
killed and two (the witnesses Lawandato Ripors and Sanny Monib) wounded; that even after they
had killed their victims, the ambushers had continued to fire at the dead bodies; that the witnesses
managed to escape their attackers and return to Talaguian, where they informed their relatives
about what had happened, and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the authorities;
that the dead victims were recovered only late in the afternoon of that day because the authorities
could not "penetrate" the area and the ambushers refused to release the bodies; and that the
ambush was an offshoot of a grudge between the families of the ambushers and those of the
victims. 28

The witnesses named and Identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang, Macacrao Guiling
Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman Ripors and Malabato Diator. All of them also Identified by name each
of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush group. The respondent Judge can hardly be
faulted for finding enough cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of three
eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad daylight.

In Luna vs. Plaza, 29 this Court ruled that the term "searching questions and answers" means —

...only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is
to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest
may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to
show the commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof. What would be
searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the
nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible
motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and
social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes,
opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities,
financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the
subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore must to a
great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. ...

Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above, this Court is not prepared
to question the propriety of the respondent Judge's finding of probable cause or substitute its
judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put to the witnesses during the preliminary
examination.

Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly issued against the
petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after proceedings, to which no irregularity has been
shown to attach, in which the respondent Judge found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to
answer for the crime complained of.

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a
class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of
the liberty of the subject." 30 Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should
31
particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified
subjects, be voided.

The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of investigating the incident
himself did not, in the view of the Court, legally inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own
inquiry into the matter if, as is made to appear here, it was regularly brought before him and no
formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that in those circumstances
he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and simply endorse to the latter the complaint filed with him;
duty did not, and if he nonetheless chose to conduct his own investigation, nothing in the rules states
or implies that he could not do so.

Be that as it may, since the action and final resolution of the respondent Judge after completing the
second stage of the preliminary investigation are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal, practical
considerations of expediency and the avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the latter official
be permitted to take over the investigation even in its present stage.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest
of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does."
The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of
the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further
appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor

FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN,
MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and
MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of
the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the People’s
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80
of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28,
1996 denying the People’s motion for reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed down
in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives after the accused
had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the
Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I.
Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December
15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant,
and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five
(5) days “to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that
said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, “culled from the records” by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set
out.
1. “On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search
warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who
had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store,
Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte
Bulacan.”
2. “The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95)
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and
effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts,
sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00
and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned
in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents
upon order of the court on respondent’s motion or request. Included allegedly
are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and
one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search
warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c)
blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f)
assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.”
3. “On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return
was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects
including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that
lawful occupants were made to witness the search.”
4. “On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged; **” and on the same date, submitted their
“Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence
Obtained Inadmissible),” dated January 15, 1996;
 5. “** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated
comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection
of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following
facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30, 1996** to
wit:
“1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is
adjacent to the Abigail’s Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building as it is
correspondingly called only ‘Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;’
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail’s Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail’s
Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail’s Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own
respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let
the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.” ”
6. “On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly granting the
motion to quash search warrant **;”[5]
7. “On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to
dismiss **;”
8. “On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a
motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the
search warrant**;”
9. “On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration **:”
10. “On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the motion
for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed
extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.”
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova’s quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred
to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the
Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11,
1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:[6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge
through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the
People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place
searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing,
was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way
connected with, albeit and adjacent to, Abigail’s Variety Store, the place stated
in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor’s claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla
relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular
place to be searched -- was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who
pointed out that said “SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who
made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable
Judge (Bacalla, who) instead ** directed them to search Abigail Variety Store
Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December 15, 1995” -- this, too, being
the address given “in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14,
1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader.” The
untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People’s admission, during
the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch
was in truth “not attached to the application for search warrant **(but) merely
attached to the motion for reconsideration.”[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of
Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:[8]
“(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the
place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even
P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4
Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT
to their tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN
BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in
TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the
words ‘KATABI’, or ‘KADIKIT’ or ‘KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY
STORE ang papasukin namin” or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to
WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS ‘RESIDE’ or ‘ADJACENT’ or
‘BEHIND’ or ‘NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are
going to raid.’**.”
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of
the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said
occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The
search was thus done in violation of the law.[9]
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required
by the warrant itself; “(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from
service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.”[10]
5. Judge Casanova “correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search
warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Paño (139
SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court
 in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that
whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof and
a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the
search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the
criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than
the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case
has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light
of “Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.”
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the
Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning “the lower Court’s precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings
before the issuing Court and overturning the latter’s determination of probable
cause and particularity of the place to be searched;”
2) sanctioning “the lower Court’s conclusion that the sketch was not attached to
the application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to the contrary;”
3) ignoring “the very issues raised in the petition before it:”
4) “holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by
the tardiness by which the return is made;”
5) hastly applying “the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute
for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall
within the exceptions to that rule;” and
6) depriving petitioner of “the opportunity to present evidence to prove the
validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without
informing petitioner thereof.”
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant
was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been
specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC
for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. It claims tha tone of said officers, infact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of
four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the
same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a
sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of “Abigail Variety Store” -- was not what the Judge who issued the
warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers’ own faulty depiction of
the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto
appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly
what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: “premises located at Abigail Variety
Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan.” And the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive
-- by the Judge’s admonition in the warrant that the search be “limited only to the premises
herein described.”
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5)
distinct places in the area involved: the store known as “Abigail’s Variety Store,” and four
(4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single
structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors
through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of
the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its
individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5)
places, but only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail’s Variety Store: that
immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration
of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge
Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant -- which directs that the search be “limited only to the
premises herein described,” “Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207” -- thus literally excluding the
apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to correct said
description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place
to be searched -- clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization
of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v.
Chief of Staff, AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officer’s prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity
in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon
perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said
case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at
“No. 19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City;” and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and
No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at “784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City” because both search warrants
apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the
place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course
but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to
suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one
place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2)
distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, “784 Units C&D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City” appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court
concluded that evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when
he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by
the “obviously typographical error,” the officer executing the warrant could consult the
records in the official court file.[12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an “obvious
typographical erro” involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in
Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity
identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was
immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there
is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising
from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that specified in the warrant
-- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated
in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers’ theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment
units at the rear of Abigail’s Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced
in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed
from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacalla’s finding of probable cause, “as if he were an appellate court.” A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out
inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla'’ Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant
itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. [13] In
Judge Casanova’s view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in
doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was
founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable
cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be
conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant -- which,
of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -- was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that
what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that
stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly
issued as regards Abigail’s Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 -- the first
of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which
the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:[14]
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be serched, and the
things to be seized.”,
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that
a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that “(a)ny evidence
obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points
sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch
of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be
searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was
diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals
had improperly refused to receive “evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied
opportunity to present before the trial court;” or (5) the remedy of the special civil action
of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of
these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and
seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different
from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that
anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge,
and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General’s Office opines that
where a search warrant has been “issued by the court other than the one trying the main
criminal case,” the “proper recourse” of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail
it before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the
subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5) “policy
guidelines” laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning “possible
conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the
criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court
for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal
case.” Said second guideline reads:[19]
“2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main
criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution
of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or
known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant, other they shall be deemed waived.”
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced
in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed
for the first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal
action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first
taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings
thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-
shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what
properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
“3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case
is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two
separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are
alternative and not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping,
a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appopriate higher court.”
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other
hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed
in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash
the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was
ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC
that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case
thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court
must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the People’s petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996
and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the
foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)

Wilson v. Layne considered whether the presence of media during the execution of a search
warrant violated the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. Also at issue was whether the
police officers had qualified immunity.

In this case, the petitioner’s son was the target of a national fugitive apprehension program
in which U.S. Marshals worked alongside state and local police. Marshals invited two
members of the media to accompany them as part of their ride-along policy, although the
warrants did not mention media presence. While executing the warrant at the petitioner’s
home, a confrontation ensued between police and petitioner, while the photographer took
numerous pictures. When the police learned that the son was not present, they departed.
The petitioner sued.

The standard for bringing third parties along in executing search warrants is whether their
presence was in aid of the warrant’s execution. The Fourth Amendment requires that police
actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion
(Arizona v. Hicks [1987]).

Although the Court did not dispute the respondents’ argument that bringing members of the
media along served a legitimate law enforcement purpose, the standard is whether the
presence of third parties furthers the purpose of the search. Because there was no such
purpose, the Court held that the petitioner’s rights were violated.

The Court then turned to whether the police officers were immune from liability. Whether
an official with qualified immunity may be held personally liable ‘‘turns on the objective
reasonableness of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’
at the time it was taken’’ (Anderson v. Creighton [1987]). Because there was no controlling
authority on this issue and the officers reasonably relied on the Marshal’s ride-along policy,
the legal rules were not ‘‘clearly established’’ and police were therefore entitled qualified
immunity.

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

Syllabus

WILSON ET AL. v. LAYNE, DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT

No. 98-83. Argued March 24, 1999-Decided May 24,1999

While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners' son in their home, respondents, deputy
federal marshals and local sheriff's deputies, invited a newspaper reporter and a
photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention of such a "media ride-
along." The officers' early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with
petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the house. The
reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not involved in the
execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of
the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money
damages underBivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (the
federal marshals), and 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (the sheriff's deputies), contending that the
officers' actions in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of
the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied
respondents' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In
reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the officers' actions violated
the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the
search that media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted such a
violation, the right allegedly violated was not "clearly established" and thus respondents
were entitled to qualified immunity.
Held: A "media ride-along" in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the
state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in this case took place,
respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Pp. 609-618.

(a) The qualified immunity analysis is identical in suits under § 1983 and Bivens. See, e.
g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394, n. 9. A court evaluating a qualified immunity
claim must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a
constitutional right, and, if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the violation. Conn v. Gabbert, ante, at 290. P.609.

604

Syllabus

(b) It violates the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring members
of the media or other third parties into their home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the warrant's
execution. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy
of the home, which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an
arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the
warrant, Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 602-604. It does not necessarily follow
from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter petitioners' home that they were
entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth Amendment
requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. See, e. g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 325. Certainly the
presence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist
the police in their task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the
apprehension of petitioners' son. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by
respondents to support the reporters' presence-publicizing the government's efforts to
combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing
police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers-fall short of justifying media
ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant
may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third
parties was not. Pp. 609-614.
(c) Petitioners' Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of the
search. "Clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes means that the contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right. His very action need not previously have been held
unlawful, but in the light of pre-existing law its unlawfulness must be apparent. E. g.,
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640. It was not unreasonable for a police officer
at the time at issue to have believed that bringing media observers along during the
execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful. First, the constitutional
question presented by this case is by no means open and shut. Accurate media
coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious
from the Fourth Amendment's general principles that the officers' conduct in this case
violated the Amendment. Second, petitioners have not cited any cases of controlling
authority in their jurisdiction at the time in question which clearly established the rule on
which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of cases of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were
lawful. Finally, the federal marshals in this case relied

605

on a Marshals Service ride-along policy which explicitly contemplated media entry into
private homes, and the sheriff's deputies had a ridealong program that did not expressly
prohibit such entries. The state of the law was at best undeveloped at the relevant time,
and the officers cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional
law. E. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561. Pp. 614-618.

141 F.3d 111, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I
and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which O'CONNOR,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 618.

Richard K. Willard argued the cause for petitioners.

With him on the briefs were David H. Coburn, James S. Felt, Richard Seligman, Steven
R. Shapiro, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Dwight H. Sullivan.

Lawrence P. Fletcher-Hill, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for
the state respondents. With him on the brief were J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney
General, Carmen M. Shepard, Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew H.
Baida and John B. Howard, Jr.,Assistant Attorneys General. Richard A. Cordray filed a
brief for the federal respondents. *

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

While executing an arrest warrant in a private home, police officers invited

representatives of the media to accompany them. We hold that such a "media ride-
along" does violate the Fourth Amendment, but that because the state

* A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for ABC, Inc., et al. by Lee Levine,
James E. Grossberg, Jay Ward Brown, Henry S. Hoberman, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.,
Susanna M. Lowy, Harold W Fuson, Jr., Barbara Wartelle Wall, Ralph E. Goldberg,
Karlene W Goller, Jerry S. Birenz, Slade R. Metcalf, Jack N. Goodman, David S. J.
Brown, Rene P. Milam, George Freeman, and Jane E. Kirtley.

606

of the law was not clearly established at the time the search in this case took place, the
officers are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

In early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved "Operation
Gunsmoke," a special national fugitive apprehension program in which United States
Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend dangerous criminals. The
"Operation Gunsmoke" policy statement explained that the operation was to
concentrate on "armed individuals wanted on federal and/or state and local warrants for
serious drug and other violent felonies." App. 15. This effective program ultimately
resulted in over 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan areas. Brief for Federal Respondents
Layne et al. 2.

One of the dangerous fugitives identified as a target of "Operation Gunsmoke" was

Dominic Wilson, the son of petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic Wilson
had violated his probation on previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with
intent to rob, and the police computer listed "caution indicators" that he was likely to be
armed, to resist arrest, and to "assaul[t] police." App. 40. The computer also listed his
address as 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville, Maryland. Unknown to the
police, this was actually the home of petitioners, Dominic Wilson's parents. Thus, in
April 1992, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants for
Dominic Wilson, one for each of his probation violations. The warrants were each
addressed to "any duly authorized peace officer," and commanded such officers to
arrest him and bring him "immediately" before the Circuit Court to answer an indictment
as to his probation violation. The warrants made no mention of media presence or
assistance.1

1 The warrants were identical in all relevant respects. By way of example, one of them
read as follows:

607

In the early morning hours of April 16, 1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States
Marshals and Montgomery County Police officers assembled to execute the Dominic
Wilson warrants. The team was accompanied by a reporter and a photographer from
the Washington Post, who had been invited by the Marshals to accompany them on
their mission as part of a Marshals Service ride-along policy.

At around 6:45 a.m., the officers, with media representatives in tow, entered the
dwelling at 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of
Rockville. Petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson were still in bed when they heard
the officers enter the home. Petitioner Charles Wilson, dressed only in a pair of briefs,
ran into the living room to investigate. Discovering at least five men in street clothes with
guns in his living room, he angrily demanded that they state their business, and
repeatedly cursed the officers. Believing him to be an angry Dominic Wilson, the officers
quickly subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson next entered the living room to
investigate, wearing only a nightgown. She observed her husband being restrained by
the armed officers.

When their protective sweep was completed, the officers learned that Dominic Wilson
was not in the house, and they departed. During the time that the officers were in the
home, the Washington Post photographer took numerous pictures. The print reporter
was also apparently in the living room observing the confrontation between the police
and

"The State of Maryland, to any duly authorized peace officer, greeting: you are hereby
commanded to take Dominic Jerome Wilson if he/she shall be found in your bailiwick,
and have him immediately before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, now in
session, at the Judicial Center, in Rockville, to answer an indictment, or information, or
criminal appeals unto the State of Maryland, of and concerning a certain charge of
Robbery [Violation of Probation] by him committed, as hath been presented, and so
forth. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you then and there this writ. Witness." App.
36-37.

608

Charles Wilson. At no time, however, were the reporters involved in the execution of the
arrest warrant. Brief for Federal Respondents Layne et al. 4. The Washington Post
never published its photographs of the incident.

Petitioners sued the law enforcement officials in their personal capacities for money
damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)
(the U. S. Marshals Service respondents), and Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983
(the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department respondents). They contended that the
officers' actions in bringing members of the media to observe and record the attempted
execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District
Court denied respondents' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity.
On interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a divided panel reversed and held that
respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was twice reheard en banc,
where a divided Court of Appeals again upheld the defense of qualified immunity. The
Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the actions of the police violated the Fourth
Amendment. It concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time of the
search) that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the Fourth
Amendment, the right allegedly violated by respondents was not "clearly established"
and thus qualified immunity was proper. 141 F.3d 111 (CA4 1998). Five judges
dissented, arguing that the officers' actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, and that
the clearly established protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated in this
case. Id., at 119 (opinion of Murnaghan, J.)

Recognizing a split among the Circuits on this issue, we granted certiorari in this case
and another raising the same question, Hanlon v.Berger, 525 U. S. 981 (1998), and now
affirm the Court of Appeals, although by different reasoning.

609

II

Petitioners sued the federal officials under Bivens and the state officials under § 1983.
Both Bivens and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages from government
officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See § 1983; Bivens, supra, at
397. But government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a
qualified immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982).

Although this case involves suits under both § 1983 and Bivens, the qualified immunity
analysis is identical under either cause of action. See, e. g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.
S. 386, 394, n. 9 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 340, n. 2 (1986). A court
evaluating a claim of qualified immunity "must first determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to
determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation." Conn v. Gabbert, ante, at 290. This order of procedure is designed to "spare
a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily
imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S.
226, 232 (1991). Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified
immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the
benefit of both the officers and the general public. See County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 840-842, n. 5 (1998). We now turn to the Fourth
Amendment question.

In 1604, an English court made the now-famous observation that "the house of every
one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose." Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77

610

Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B.). In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William
Blackstone noted that

"the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's
house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity:
agreeing herein with the sentiments of antient Rome .... For this reason no doors can in
general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in criminal causes, the
public safety supersedes the private." 4 Commentaries 223 (1765-1769).

The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy
of the home: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U. S. Const., Arndt. 4 (emphasis added). See also United States v. United
States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed").
Our decisions have applied these basic principles of the Fourth Amendment to
situations, like the one in this case, in which police enter a home under the authority of
an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 602 (1980), we noted that although clear in its
protection of the home, the common-law tradition at the time of the drafting of the Fourth
Amendment was ambivalent on the question whether police could enter a home without
a warrant. We were ultimately persuaded that the "overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic"
meant that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police could not

611

enter a home to make an arrest. Id., at 601, 603-604. We decided that "an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter
a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is
within." Id., at 603.

Here, of course, the officers had such a warrant, and they were undoubtedly entitled to
enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. But it
does not necessarily follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them. In Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 140 (1990), we held "[i]f
the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant
or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent
seizure is unconstitutional without more." While this does not mean that every police
action while inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the warrant,
see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 705 (1981) (Fourth Amendment allows
temporary detainer of homeowner while police search the home pursuant to warrant),
the Fourth Amendment does require that police actions in execution of a warrant be
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321,
325 (1987). See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 87 (1987) ("[T]he purposes
justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of the search").

Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to the objectives of
the authorized intrusion. Respondents concede that the reporters did not engage in the
execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police in their task. The reporters
therefore were not present for any reason related to the justification for police entry into
the home-the apprehension of Dominic Wilson.

This is not a case in which the presence of the third parties directly aided in the
execution of the warrant. Where the police enter a home under the authority of a
warrant to

612

search for stolen property, the presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the
stolen property has long been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition.
See, e. g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (K. B. 1765) (in search for
stolen goods case, "'[t]he owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place.
He must attend at the execution of the warrant to shew them to the officer, who must
see that they answer the description") (quoted with approval in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616, 628 (1886)).

Respondents argue that the presence of the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons'
home nonetheless served a number of legitimate law enforcement purposes. They first
assert that officers should be able to exercise reasonable discretion about when it would
"further their law enforcement mission to permit members of the news media to
accompany them in executing a warrant." Brief for Federal Respondents Layne et al.
15. But this claim ignores the importance of the right of residential privacy at the core of
the Fourth Amendment. It may well be that media ride-alongs further the law
enforcement objectives of the police in a general sense, but that is not the same as
furthering the purposes of the search. Were such generalized "law enforcement
objectives" themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment, the protections
guaranteed by that Amendment's text would be significantly watered down.

Respondents next argue that the presence of third parties could serve the law
enforcement purpose of publicizing the government's efforts to combat crime, and
facilitate accurate reporting on law enforcement activities. There is certainly language in
our opinions interpreting the First Amendment which points to the importance of "the
press" in informing the general public about the administration of criminal justice. InCox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 491492 (1975), for example, we said "in a
society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to

613

observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations." See
also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 572-573 (1980). No one
could gainsay the truth of these observations, or the importance of the First Amendment
in protecting press freedom from abridgment by the government. But the Fourth
Amendment also protects a very important right, and in the present case it is in terms of
that right that the media ridealongs must be judged.

Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not enough,
standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home. And even the need
for accurate reporting on police issues in general bears no direct relation to the
constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a home in order to execute a felony
arrest warrant.

Finally, respondents argue that the presence of third parties could serve in some
situations to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and also to protect the safety
of the officers. While it might be reasonable for police officers to themselves videotape
home entries as part of a "quality control" effort to ensure that the rights of homeowners
are being respected, or even to preserve evidence, cf. Ohio v. Robinette,519 U. S. 33,
35 (1996) (noting the use of a "mounted video camera" to record the details of a routine
traffic stop), such a situation is significantly different from the media presence in this
case. The Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons' home were working on a story for
their own purposes. They were not present for the purpose of protecting the officers,
much less the Wilsons. A private photographer was acting for private purposes, as
evidenced in part by the fact that the newspaper and not the police retained the
photographs. Thus, although the presence of third parties during the execution of a
warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, see supra, at 611-
612, the presence of these third parties was not.
614

The reasons advanced by respondents, taken in their entirety, fall short of justifying the
presence of media inside a home. We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home
during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home
was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.2

III

Since the police action in this case violated petitioners' Fourth Amendment right, we
now must decide whether this right was clearly established at the time of the search.
See Siegert, 500 U. S., at 232-233. As noted above, Part II, supra, government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are
"shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U. S., at 818. What this means in practice is that
"whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an
allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness'
of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the
time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) (citing Harlow,
supra, at 819); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 397.

In Anderson, we explained that what "clearly established" means in this context

depends largely "upon the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be
identified." 483 U. S., at 639. "[C]learly established" for purposes of

2 Even though such actions might violate the Fourth Amendment, if the police are
lawfully present, the violation of the Fourth Amendment is the presence of the media
and not the presence of the police in the home. We have no occasion here to decide
whether the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by
the media representatives.
615

qualified immunity means that "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not
to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting
law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id., at 640 (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 270 (1997).

It could plausibly be asserted that any violation of the Fourth Amendment is "clearly
established," since it is clearly established that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
apply to the actions of police. Some variation of this theory of qualified immunity is
urged upon us by petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 37, and seems to have been at the
core of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, see 141 F. 3d, at 123. However,
as we explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the
appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.
483 U. S., at 641. In this case, the appropriate question is the objective inquiry whether
a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a
home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information the officers possessed. Cf. ibid.

We hold that it was not unreasonable for a police officer in April 1992 to have believed
that bringing media observers along during the execution of an arrest warrant (even in a
home) was lawful. First, the constitutional question presented by this case is by no
means open and shut. The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of homeowners from
entry without a warrant, but there was a warrant here. The question is whether the
invitation to the media exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant.
Accurate media coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose, and it
is not obvious from the general principles

616

of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the
Amendment.
Second, although media ride-alongs of one sort or another had apparently become a
common police practice,3 in 1992 there were no judicial opinions holding that this
practice became unlawful when it entered a home. The only published decision directly
on point was a state intermediate court decision which, though it did not engage in an
extensive Fourth Amendment analysis, nonetheless held that such conduct was not
unreasonable. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 154155, 295 N. W. 2d 768, 782 (App.
1980). From the federal courts, the parties have only identified two unpublished District
Court decisions dealing with media entry into homes, each of which upheld the search
on unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right to privacy theories. Moncriefv. Hanton, 10
Media L. Rptr. 1620 (ND Ohio 1984); Higbeev. TimesAdvocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372
(SD Cal. 1980). These cases, of course, cannot "clearly establish" that media entry into
homes during a police ride-along violates the Fourth Amendment.

At a slightly higher level of generality, petitioners point to Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d
697(CA6 1992), in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that there were
material issues of fact precluding summary judgment on the question whether police
exceeded the scope of a search warrant by allowing a private security guard to
participate in the search to identify stolen property other than that described in the
warrant. Id., at 709. Bills, which was decided a mere five weeks before the events of this
case, did anticipate to day's holding that police may not bring along third parties during
an entry into a private home pursuant

3 See, e. g., Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 919 (1976) (it" 'is a
widespread practice of long-standing'" for media to accompany officers into homes),
cert. denied, 431 U. S. 930 (1977); Zoglin, Live on the Vice Beat, Time, Dec. 22, 1986,
p. 60 (noting "the increasingly common practice of letting TV crews tag along on drug
raids").

617

to a warrant for purposes unrelated to those justifying the warrant. Id., at 706. However,
we cannot say that even in light of Bills, the law on third-party entry into homes was
clearly established in April 1992. Petitioners have not brought to our attention any cases
of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly
established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of
cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed
that his actions were lawful.

Finally, important to our conclusion was the reliance by the United States marshals in
this case on a Marshals Service ride-along policy that explicitly contemplated that media
who engaged in ride-alongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part of
fugitive apprehension arrests.4 The Montgomery County Sheriff's Department also at
this time had a ride-along program that did not expressly prohibit media entry into
private homes. Deposition of Sheriff Raymond M. Kight, in No. PJM-94-1718, p. 8. Such
a policy, of course, could not make reasonable a belief that was contrary to a decided
body of case law. But here the state of the law as to third parties accompanying police
on home entries was at best undeveloped, and it was not unreasonable for law
enforcement officers to look and rely on their formal ridealong policies.

Given such an undeveloped state of the law, the officers in this case cannot have been
"expected to predict the future course of constitutional law." Procunier v. Navarette, 434

4 A booklet distributed to marshals recommended that "fugitive apprehension cases ...

normally offer the best possibilities for ride-alongs." App. 4-5. In its discussion of the
best way to make ride-alongs useful to the media and portray the Marshals Service in a
favorable light, the booklet noted that reporters were likely to want to be able to shoot
"good action footage, not just a mop-up scene." It advised agents that "[i]f the arrest is
planned to take place inside a house or building, agree ahead of time on when the
camera can enter and who will give the signal." Id., at 7.

618

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

u. S. 555, 562 (1978). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 321
(1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 557 (1967). Between the time of the events of
this case and today's decision, a split among the Federal Circuits in fact developed on
the question whether media ride-alongs that enter homes subject the police to money
damages. See 141 F. 3d, at 118119; Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680(CA2 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U. S. 1062 (1995); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445(CA8 1996), cert. denied,
519 U. S. 1148 (1997); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (CA9 1997), cert. granted, 525
U. S. 981 (1998). If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to
subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Like every other federal appellate judge who has addressed the question, I share the
Court's opinion that it violates the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the
media or other third parties into a private dwelling during the execution of a warrant
unless the homeowner has consented or the presence of the third parties is in aid of the
execution of the warrant. I therefore join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion.

In my view, however, the homeowner's right to protection against this type of trespass
was clearly established long before April 16, 1992. My sincere respect for the
competence of the typical member of the law enforcement profession precludes my
assent to the suggestion that "a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing
members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant was
lawful." Ante, at 615. I therefore disagree with the Court's

619

resolution of the conflict in the Circuits on the qualified immunity issue.1 The clarity of
the constitutional rule, a federal statute (18 U. S. C. § 3105), common-law decisions,
and the testimony of the senior law enforcement officer all support my position that it
has long been clearly established that officers may not bring third parties into private
homes to witness the execution of a warrant. By contrast, the Court's opposing view
finds support in the following sources: its bare assertion that the constitutional question
"is by no means open and shut,"ante, at 615; three judicial opinions that did not directly
address the constitutional question, ante, at 616; and a public relations booklet
prepared by someone in the United States Marshals Service that never mentions
allowing representatives of the media to enter private property without the owner's
consent, ante, at 617.

In its decision today the Court has not announced a new rule of constitutional law.
Rather, it has refused to recognize an entirely unprecedented request for an exception
to a well-established principle. Police action in the execution of a warrant must be
strictly limited to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. That principle, like the
broader protection provided by the Fourth Amendment itself, represents the confluence
of two important sources: our English forefathers' traditional respect for the sanctity of
the private

1 It is important to emphasize that there is no split in Circuit authority on the merits of

the constitutional issue. Nor, as I explain infra, at 622-624, do I believe that any District
Court had reached a conclusion at odds with the Court's Fourth Amendment holding.
Any conflict was limited to the qualified immunity issue. Three Circuits rejected the
defense whereas the Fourth and the Eighth accepted it. See Ayeni v.Mottola, 35 F.3d
680, 686 (CA2 1994); Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697(CA6 1992); Berger v. Hanlon, 129
F.3d 505(CA9 1997); 141 F.3d 111(CA4 1998) (en bane); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d
445(CA8 1996).

620

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

home and the American colonists' hatred of the general warrant.

The contours of the rule are fairly described by the Court, ante, at 609-611 of its
opinion, and in the cases that it cites on those pages. All of those cases were decided
before 1992. None of those cases-nor, indeed, any other of which I am aware-identified
any exception to the rule of law that the Court repeats today. In fact, the Court's opinion
fails to identify a colorable rationale for any such exception. Respondents' position on
the merits consisted entirely of their unpersuasive factual submission that the presence
of representatives of the news media served various legitimatealbeit nebulous-law
enforcement purposes. The Court's cogent rejection of those post hoc rationalizations
cannot be characterized as the announcement of a new rule of law.

During my service on the Court, I have heard lawyers argue scores of cases raising
Fourth Amendment issues. Generally speaking, the Members of the Court have been
sensitive to the needs of the law enforcement community. In virtually all of them at least
one Justice thought that the police conduct was reasonable. In fact, in only a handful did
the Court unanimously find a Fourth Amendment violation. That the Court today speaks
with a single voice on the merits of the constitutional question is unusual and certainly
lends support to the notion that the question is indeed "open and shut." Ante, at 615.

But the more important basis for my opinion is that it should have been perfectly
obvious to the officers that their "invitation to the media exceeded the scope of the
search authorized by the warrant." Ibid. Despite reaffirming that clear rule, the Court
nonetheless finds that the mere presence of a warrant rendered the officers' conduct
reasonable. The Court fails to cite a single case that even arguably supports the
proposition that using official power to enable news photographers and reporters to
enter a private home for purposes unrelated to the execution of a warrant could

621

be regarded as a "reasonable" invasion of either property or privacy.

II

The absence of judicial opinions expressly holding that police violate the Fourth
Amendment if they bring media representatives into private homes provides scant
support for the conclusion that in 1992 a competent officer could reasonably believe that
it would be lawful to do so. Prior to our decision in United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S.
259 (1997), no judicial opinion specifically held that it was unconstitutional for a state
judge to use his official power to extort sexual favors from a potential litigant. Yet, we
unanimously concluded that the defendant had fair warning that he was violating his
victim's constitutional rights. I d., at 271 ("The easiest cases don't even arise" (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nor am I persuaded that the absence of rulings on the precise Fourth Amendment issue
presented in this case can plausibly be explained by the assumption that the police
practice was common. I assume that the practice of allowing media personnel to "ride
along" with police officers was common, but that does not mean that the officers
routinely allowed the media to enter homes without the consent of the owners. As the
Florida Supreme Court noted in Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918
(1976), there has long been a widespread practice for firefighters to allow
photographers to enter disaster areas to take pictures, for example, of the interior of
buildings severely damaged by fire. But its conclusion that such media personnel were
not trespassers rested on a doctrine of implied consent 2_a the-

2 The Florida Supreme Court held:

"The trial court properly determined from the record before it that there was no genuine
issue of material fact insofar as the entry into respondent's home by petitioner's
employees became lawful and non-actionable pursu-

622

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

ory wholly inapplicable to forcible entries in connection with the execution of a warrant.
3

In addition to this case, the Court points to three lower court opinions-none of which
addresses the Fourth Amendment-as the ostensible basis for a reasonable officer's
belief that the rule in Semayne's Case4 was ripe for reevaluation.5 See ante, at 616.
Two of the cases were decided in 1980 and the third in 1984. In view of the clear
restatement of the rule in the later opinions of this Court, cited ante, at 611, those three
earlier decisions could not possibly provide a

ant to the doctrine of common custom, usage, and practice and since it had been shown
that it was common usage, custom and practice for news media to enter private
premises and homes under the circumstances present here.
"'The fire was a disaster of great public interest .... [I]t has been a longstanding custom
and practice throughout the country for representatives of the news media to enter upon
private property where disaster of great public interest has occurred.''' 340 So. 2d, at
917-918.

The Court's reference to this case, ante, at 616, n. 3, misleadingly suggests that the
"widespread practice" referred to in the Florida court's opinion was police practice; it
was not.

3 Indeed, the Wisconsin state-court decision, cited by the Court as contrary authority,
took pains to distinguish this case:

"We will not imply a consent as a matter of law. It is of course well known that news
representatives want to enter a private building after or even during a newsworthy event
within the building. That knowledge is no basis for an implied consent by the possessor
of the building to the entry .... We conclude that custom and usage have not been
shown in fact or law to confer an implied consent upon news representatives to enter a
building under the circumstances presented by this case." Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d
130, 149-150,295 N. W. 2d 768, 780 (App. 1980).

45 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K. B. 1604).

5 As the Court notes, the only Federal Court of Appeals authority on the
subject, Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697(CA6 1992), "anticipate[d] today's holding that
police may not bring along third parties during an entry into a private home pursuant to
a warrant for purposes unrelated to those justifying the warrant." Ante, at 616-617.

623

basis for a claim by the police that they reasonably relied on judicial recognition of an
exception to the basic rule that the purposes of the police intrusion strictly limit its
scope.

That the two federal decisions were not officially reported makes such theoretical
reliance especially anomalous.6 Moreover, as the Court acknowledges, the claim
rejected in each of those cases was predicated on the media's alleged violation of the
plaintiffs' "unorthodox non-Fourth Amendment right to privacy theories," ante, at 616,
rather than a claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the
press to observe the execution of the warrant. Moncriefv. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr.
1620 (ND Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate,5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (SD Cal. 1980).
As for the other case, Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N. W. 2d 768 (App.
1980)-cited by the Court, ante, at 616, for the proposition that the officer's conduct was
"not unreasonable"-it actually held that the defendants' motion to dismiss should have
been denied because the allegations supported the conclusion that the officer
committed a trespass when he allowed a third party to enter the plaintiff's property. 7
Since that conclusion was fully consistent with a

6 In the Fourth Circuit, unreported opinions may not be considered in the course of
determining qualified immunity. Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (1996).

7 Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d, at 154-155, 295 N. W. 2d, at 782 ("A new trial must be
had with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for trespass against Lieutenant Kuenning and
Dane Country .... Lieutenant Kuenning had no authority to extend a consent to [the
press] to enter the land of another. Although entry by Lieutenant Kuenning was
privileged, he committed a trespass by participating in the trespass by [the press]").

The Court is correct that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of the
plaintiff's 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim against the newscasterbecause he was not acting
under color of state law. As the basis for rejecting the § 1983 action "for invasion of
privacy based on disclosure of the incident," the court further held that "[w]e are
unwilling to accept the proposition that the filming and television broadcast of a
reasonable search and seizure, without more, result in unreasonableness." 98 Wis. 2d,
at

624

Opinion of STEVENS, J.
number of common-law cases holding that similar conduct constituted a trespass,8 it
surely does not provide any support for an officer's assumption that a similar trespass
would be lawful.

Far better evidence of an officer's reasonable understanding of the relevant law is

provided by the testimony of the Sheriff of Montgomery County, the commanding officer
of three of the respondents: " 'We would never let a civilian into a home .... That's just
not allowed.'" Brief for Petitioners 41.

III

The most disturbing aspect of the Court's ruling on the qualified immunity issue is its
reliance on a document discussing "ride-alongs" apparently prepared by an employee in
the public relations office of the United States Marshals Service. The text of the
document, portions of which are set out in an appendix, makes it quite clear that its
author was not a lawyer, but rather a person concerned with developing the proper
public image of the Service, with a special interest in creating a favorable impression
with the Congress. Although the document occupies 14 pages in the joint

138,295 N. W. 2d, at 774. Important to its conclusion was its observation that, unlike the
unnecessary male participation in body searches of schoolgirls in Doe v. Duter, 407 F.
Supp. 922 (WD Wis. 1976), "[n]either the search of Dr. Prahl and his premises nor the
film or its broadcast has been shown to include intimate, offensive or vulgar aspects."
98 Wis. 2d, at 138,295 N. W. 2d, at 774. The reporter in question was stationed in the
entryway of the building and was able to film into the plaintiff's office during the police
interview.

8See, e. g., Daingerfield v. Thompson, 74 Va. 136, 151 (1880) ("There seems, indeed,
to be no principle of law better settled, and for which numerous authorities may be cited
if necessary, than this: that all persons who wrongfully contribute in any manner to the
commission of a trespass, are responsible as principals, and each one is liable to the
extent of the injury done"); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 13, p. 72 (5th ed. 1984).

625
appendix and suggests handing out free Marshals Service T-shirts and caps to "grease
the skids," it contains no discussion of the conditions which must be satisfied before a
newsperson may be authorized to enter private property during the execution of a
warrant. App. 12. There are guidelines about how officers should act and speak in front
of the camera, and the document does indicate that "the camera" should not enter a
private home until a "signal" is given. Id., at 7. It does not, however, purport to give any
guidance to the marshals regarding when such a signal should be given, whether it
should ever be given without the consent of the homeowner, or indeed on how to carry
out any part of their law enforcement mission. The notion that any member of that well-
trained cadre of professionals would rely on such a document for guidance in the
performance of dangerous law enforcement assignments is too farfetched to merit
serious consideration.

***

The defense of qualified immunity exists to protect reasonable officers from personal
liability for official actions later found to be in violation of constitutional rights that were
not clearly established. The conduct in this case, as the Court itself reminds us,
contravened the Fourth Amendment's core protection of the home. In shielding this
conduct as if it implicated only the unsettled margins of our jurisprudence, the Court
today authorizes one free violation of the wellestablished rule it reaffirms.

I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF STEVENS, J.

"MEDIA RIDE-ALONGS

"The U. S. Marshals Service, like all federal agencies, ultimately serves the needs and
interests of the American public

626

Appendix to opinion of STEVENS, J.

when it accomplishes its designated duties. Keeping the public adequately informed of
what the Service does can be viewed as a duty in its own right, and we depend on the
news media to accomplish that.

"Media 'ride-alongs' are one effective method to promote an accurate picture of Deputy
Marshals at work. Ride-alongs, as the name implies, are simply opportunities for
reporters and camera crews to go along with Deputies on operational missions so they
can see, and record, what actually happens. The result is usually a very graphic and
dynamic look at the operational activities of the Marshals Service, which is subsequently
aired on TV or printed in a newspaper, magazine, or book.

"However, successful ride-alongs don't just 'happen' in a spontaneous fashion. They

require careful planning and attention to detail to ensure that all goes smoothly and that
the media receive an accurate picture of how the Marshals Service operates. This
booklet describes considerations that are important in nearly every ride-along." App. 4.

"Establish Ground Rules

"Another good idea-actually, it's an essential one-is to establish ground rules at the start
and convey them to the reporter and camera person. Address such things as what can
be covered with cameras and when, any privacy restrictions that may be encountered,
and interview guidelines. "Emphasize the need for safety considerations and explain
any dangers that might be involved. Make the ground rules realistic but balanced-
remember, the media will want good action footage, not just a mop-up scene. If the
arrest is planned to take place inside a house or building, agree ahead of time on when
the camera can enter and who will give the signal." Id., at 7.

"The very best planning won't result in a good ride-along if the Marshals Service
personnel involved do not do their part. It's a case of actions speaking as loudly as
words, and both

627

are important in getting the best media exposure possible." Id., at 9.

" 'Waving the Flag'

"One action of special consequence is 'waving the flag' of the Marshals Service. This is
accomplished when Deputies can easily be recognized as USMS Deputies because
they are wearing raid jackets, prominently displaying their badges, or exhibiting other
easily identifiable marks of the Service. We want the public to know who you are and
what kind of job you do. That is one of the goals of the ride-along. So having Deputy
Marshals easily identified as such on camera is not just a whim-it's important to the
overall success of the ride-along.

"Of course, how the Deputies act and what they say is also crucial. During the ride-
along virtually any statement made by Deputies just might end up as a quote, attributed
to the person who made it. Sometimes that could prove embarrassing. A Deputy must
try to visualize what his or her words will look like in a newspaper or sound like on TV.
Being pleasant and professional at all times is key, and that includes not being drawn
into statements of personal opinion or inappropriate comments. U sing common sense
is the rule." Id., at 9-10.

"You also need to find out when the coverage will air or end up in print. Ask the reporter
if he or she can keep you informed on that matter. You might 'grease the skids' for this
by offering the reporter, camera person, or other media representatives involved a
memento of the Marshals Service. Marshals Service caps, mugs, T-shirts, and the like
can help establish a rapport with a reporter that can benefit you in the future." Id., at 12.

"Getting to the Final Product

"N aturally, it's important to see the final product of the ridealong when it airs on TV or
appears in the newspaper. You

628

Appendix to opinion of STEVENS, J.

should arrange to videotape any TV news coverage or clip the resulting newspaper
stories and send a copy of the videotape or news clipping to the Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs." Id., at 13.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON.
ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City:
HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN.
FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for
petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly
stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-
ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was
one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose
that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents.
In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the
same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the
leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the
premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long
wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE).
Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt.
Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were
examined under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us.
The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched
records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching
party presumably without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the
search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2)
Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and
documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were
charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by
the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent
Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that
AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on
November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles,
in connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon
City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended
Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that
the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on
January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December
13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying
petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents
or their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search
Warrant.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure,
and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General,
contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition
without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing
Judge.

We find merit in the Petition.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the

Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to
the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is
thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were
described as 'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly provided a
definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized
thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the description
found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
declared null and void for being too general. 7

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the
seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable. 8

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the
applicant for Search Warrant.

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed

by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you
affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?

(The deposition instead)—

A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.

Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?

A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.

 Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the
application for search warrant?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?

A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were
so many suspicious persons with documents.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New

People's Army.

Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National

Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?

A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings,

Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available
to the public and support money from foreign and local sources. 9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the
issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th
pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant
is with the Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records
show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their
Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence
obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And
in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984
claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore,
while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Warrant.

Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by
one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result
of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search
Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on
petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles
seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the
case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:

Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant,
of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this
latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some
confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
13
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals."

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against
public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time;
that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling
was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No.
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results
in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as
evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to
ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by
the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-
1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-
Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant
documents and articles.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.

Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.

Aquino, J.; took no part.

Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The
questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a
general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of
Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in
violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience
to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive
on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the
Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be
used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs.
Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has held that "in issuing a search
warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)

The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her
dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a
warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law
and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of his separate
opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed
a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12
which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his
person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made
in a placeother than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30
a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her
dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable
violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

I vote to grant the petition in toto.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued by
Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera. In addition
I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military. In either case his
action can only be described as deplorable.

I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1
pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice Cuevas. for the reasons
stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas, statement that not all the things
seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the
government agents." What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a
conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not
competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of
Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized
from a physician who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.

CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting

I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84
issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not specify with requisite particularity the
things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant,
it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized, 'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)

I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of
Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the
aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by,
the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only
with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to
"dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
Hence—

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or
which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago
Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)

With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the
suspect was arrested,
 The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully
arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other things to effect an
escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122. 158. ... But
the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks
distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and
searched, the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in
custody elsewhere. That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the
arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S.,
269 U.S. 20,30)

The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general
rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.

The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to
the arrest.AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said
that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the
arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an
arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search is
not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F
2d 160, 163)

In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at
11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that
was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their
"COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B May•n St., Quezon City.
How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not
appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place
other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot
be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an
incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A
VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent.
The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE
in evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the things so seized can be ordered
returned to their owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot
be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized by
the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the law can and must
be retained by the government.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112659. January 24, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUCHINDA

LEANGSIRI (at large), accused, FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,
 YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-
appellants.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,[1] YAMBA LISASI

BHOLA,[2] and ZARIATU AMIDU[3] pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section
4, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425[4] embodied in an Information, dated April 2,
1993, as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx

“That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and
other parts of Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport 8,225.31 grams of
heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act as brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions
with or without consideration.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay
City Jail before the arraignment. He remains at large.[5]
The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993,
accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of
heroin[6] hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase.[7] He informed the authorities
that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people[8] at the Las Palmas Hotel
in Manila.[9]
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at
the Old MIA for further investigation.[10] The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO
SABLAYAN, formed a team, headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA,[11] to conduct
follow-up operations in the case.[12] The team and agents of the Bureau of Customs
proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel,[13] where they allowed Leangsiri to check into
Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.[14]
At around eight o’clock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri received
a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would be
picked up at aboutten o’clock that night.[15] He relayed the information to his escorts,
NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO[16] and SPO4 ELPIDIO
BALNEG.[17] Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside the
washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual access to the rest of the
hotel room.[18]
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and
other NARCOM and Bureau of Customs agents were watching for unusual and
suspicious events.[19] From where he sat at the hotel’s coffee shop, Samala noticed
appellant Amidu paced around the lobby for nearly an hour.[20] At about ten p.m., Amidu’s
co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel. [21] As Amidu flashed a
“thumbs up” sign to them, they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of
the hotel.[22]
They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he
sat,[23] opened the door, and let the three appellants in. [24] Leangsiri took the black
suitcase[25] and brought it to the dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view
of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed
its contents to his visitors.[26]
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags
which contained the heroin.[27] After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and
handed it over to appellants.[28] Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the
contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.[29]
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four
foreigners in Room 504.[30] Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by
presenting their respective passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said
she was staying in Room 413 of the same hotel.[31] Further questioning of appellants
revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the Royal Palm Hotel, also located
in Manila.[32]
Accompanied by the hotel’s owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant
Amidu’s room. Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece
of paper with the name “SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI” written on it.[33] The paper and Amidu’s
other possessions were confiscated.[34]
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where
appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the
security officers of the hotel, who stood as witnesses when the former entered and
searched said appellants’ room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with false
bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri. [35] Masking tape and an
empty transparent bag were also found in the room.[36]
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told
a different tale.[37]
Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that fateful
night of March 31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu
and an American named David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as
they made their way to Room 413 (Amidu’s room), they were accosted by some people
who forcibly brought them to Room 504. They explained that they were at the hotel to
meet Amidu. Some of those who intercepted them left the room and returned with
Amidu. Appellants’ money and jewelry were taken from them. Those who dispossesed
them turned out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered
its premises as appellants and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants
were brought to NARCOM headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were presented
to the media as members of an international drug syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of
conspiring to transport heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
“xxx xxx xxx

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the

accused (herein appellants) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI
BHOLA and ZARIATU AMIDU, ‘guilty’ beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
described in the Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of ‘life
imprisonment’ plus a fine of P30,000 for each of (them).

“The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.

“The ‘Heroin’ of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner
provided by law.

“SO ORDERED.”

On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the
following –

”I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED

DURING THE TRIAL PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN APPELLANTS);

“II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED

WHICH THE ACCUSED (APPELLANTS) COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE
DILIGENCE HAVE DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND
WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE
THE JUDGMENT.”

The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita
Thach Camerino, a Thai citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:
“1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid
Prison Compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila;

“2. That on or about 11:00 o’clock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed
the arrival of inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still
crying;

“3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the
concrete wall, but after a few attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another
woman;

“4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was
behaving that way, and found out that she and the two other male detainees were just
sentenced by the Court of very severe penalty of life imprisonment;

“5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience
rebelled and started tormenting (her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the
crime charged against them of transporting heroin into the country;

“6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered
(her) help, if it is still possible under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could
extend to let justice prevail and reveal the truth out of that incident on the evening of
31 March 1993, at Las Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA,
acting as an interpreter between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the former
was being interrogated at the NARCOM Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) in the afternoon of 31 March 1993, and into the evening
of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;

“7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them)
that he was going to deliver his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did
not identify the person whom he was going to meet at the hotel nor mention the
name/s of the same;

“8. That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda
Leangsiri, and the police team arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and
Leangsiri were instructed to proceed to the desk counter and check-in, and got
Room 504 to occupy;

“9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went
to Room 504 to await for someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin
but the claim or testimony that SPO3 Gapiangao and SPO4 Balneg were also inside
Room 504 together with Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;
“10.That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black
males whom (she) later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;

“11 . That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati
Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting and complaining to the police why they were brought
inside Room 504;

“12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady
friend billeted at Room 413 of the same hotel;

“13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to
go with him, and (they) immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought
Zariatu Amidu to Room 504 to join with the two male black nationals already inside;

“14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel,
where (they) search the room of the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;

“15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at
NAIA, where (she) divested the three black nationals of their cash and pieces of
jewelry, and turn them over to Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping;

“16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in
court during my testimony in the trial of the case against (appellants);

“xxx xxx xxx”[38]

The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
“xxx xxx xxx

“The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and
the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the
findings and conclusions regarding the guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well
as the sufficiency of the evidence against them, are amply supported by the evidence,
and the present motion did not ventilate any new matter as to warrant the said findings
to be disturbed and/or set aside.

“With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the
stance taken by the accused (appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach
Camerino could not be considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to
the premises of the Court for identification during the trial of this case. Besides, her
testimony, summarized in the undated Affidavit submitted by the accused (appellants)
onSeptember 24, 1993, does not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was
convicted by this Court for violation of the dangerous drugs law, as amended.
 “xxx xxx xxx”[39]
Appellants now impugn the trial court’s decision and its denial of their motion for new
trial, and raise the following assignments of error:
“I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;
“II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT AND/OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
“III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES AND OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
THREE ACCUSED.
“IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE
TO THE ACCUSED;
“V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED’S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL.”[40]
We affirm appellants’ conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.
One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with
Leangsiri to transport eight-and-a-half kilos of heroin.
Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The
first prong urges that there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the
transport of heroin by Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiri’s testimony
can prove their alleged conspiracy. The running fault in appellants’ line of reasoning is
obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[41] It is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. [42] Proof of previous
agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during, and after
the commission of the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld
the finding of conspiracy where it is shown that the accused acted in concert to attain the
same objective.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Gapiangao,
Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants aimed at carrying out
the unlawful design of transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. When
Leangsiri was interrogated after his arrest, he revealed to the authorities that he
was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel. Later,
while in Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri received a telephone call in the presence
of Gapiangao and Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin would be
picked up from him at ten o’clock in the evening. Shortly before the designated
pick-up time, Samala saw appellant Amidu (who had been waiting in the lobby of
the hotel for almost an hour) flash a “thumbs up” sign to appellants Omogbolahan
and Bhola when they arrived at the hotel. The three (3) appellants then took the
elevator and went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room 504, and
Leangsiri let them into the room. In full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants
examined Leangsiri’s heroin, and took it and the suitcase with the false bottom in
which it was hidden. Appellants were on their way out of the room with the suitcase
and heroin when they were arrested by Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show
beyond doubt that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A. 6425,
from Leangsiri to appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the
control of the NARCOM on the evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the fringes
of reason is appellants’ argument that since the NARCOM agents had already taken
Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody and control, it is the NARCOM agents who
should be liable for transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:

“The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx” (Emphasis supplied)

The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri
and the heroin to Las Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act
in furtherance of their follow-up operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend
appellants to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to be made.
Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in
possession of the heroin, they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because
they were neither delivering nor transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision
does not penalize the recipient of the delivered contraband.[43]
The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho
Wing.[44] In Lo Hong Wing, the authorities gathered from their intelligence and surveillance
activities that the accused were going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the country. The
accused were arrested while on-board a taxi cab which they hailed and boarded at the
NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that there was no delivery, transporting or
dispatching of shabu made by the accused therein, we held:
“xxx xxx xxx

“The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-

six (56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction ‘or’
was used, thereby implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified
acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of ‘delivery’
because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the
facts of the case. It is also argued that ‘dispatching’ cannot apply either since
appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for ‘transporting,’ appellant
contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non-existent under the given
facts.

“The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of
which appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the
case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in
flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term ‘transport’ is defined as
‘to carry or convey from one place to another.’ The operative words in the definition
are ‘to carry or convey.’ The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a
finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the
place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to
the illogical conclusion that he and his co-accused did not intend to bring the
metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no place of destination.

“The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was
interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that
an act had already been commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.

“xxx xxx xxx”

In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel
carrying the suitcase with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were
arrested by the NARCOM agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying the
heroin to an unknown destination. Their act was part of the process of transporting the
heroin. They were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the
heroin is appellants’ act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from Leangsiri,
for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. “C” and its sub-exhibits) and the suitcase
with false bottom (Exh. “F”) are admissible against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally
offered only against Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted
by the Solicitor General in his Brief:
“xxx xxx xxx

“The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio
Zuño and State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits “A” to “Q” and
their submarkings against Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original
Records, pp. 67-71). xxx” [45]
 Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in
Amidu’s hotel room, with the name “SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI” written on it,[46] should not
have been admitted by the trial court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that “(a) person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”[47] We interpreted this provision
in Nolasco vs. Paño,[48] thus:
“xxx xxx xxx
“The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided xxx
that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his
or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to ‘dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.’ Such
warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of
arrest.”
We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accused’s
apartment which was located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal
for being “an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we
validated warrantless searches made not only on the person of the suspect but also
in a permissible area within his reach.[49] We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless
search goes beyond the person of the one arrested and includes the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.[50] The immediate control test was
enunciated in the American case of Chimel vs. State of California.[51] In that case,
defendant was arrested in his home for burglary of a coin shop. Afterwards, the arresting
officers conducted a search of his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the
garage, a small workshop, and drawers. Various items -primarily coins - were found
through the search, and were admitted in evidence against him by the trial court, which
convicted him of burglary. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction as
it struck down the warrantless search on the ground that the search of the accused’s
home went far beyond his person and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence
against him.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspect’s person and the premises under his immediate control admits
of an exception. The exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as
explained in People vs. Musa,[52] in this wise:

“xxx Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.”

“In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having
information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment,
obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendant’s apartment, and entered
it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife
emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed
through the open doorway of the kitchen, as small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon
which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he
recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in
prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the
package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing
that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent
kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that ‘the discovery of the
brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was
placed before him in full view.’ x x x The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the ‘plain view’ doctrine
and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution’s evidence.

“The ‘plain view’ doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to
find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. x x x Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine.

‘What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”

In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas
Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name was obtained through a warrantless
search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant
Amidu’s telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the
piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate
appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution’s case against
appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a
quo. The trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
first-hand, and his findings are entitled to great weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangao’s, Balneg’s, and Samala’s testimonies alluded to
by appellants hardly relate to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently
proved the elements of the crime at bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that
corroborative testimonies, in order to be credible, need not coincide on all aspects. Given
the natural limitations of the human senses, the immaterial and slight discrepancies in the
testimonies of witnesses, far from weakening their probative value, serve to strengthen
their credibility. Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect testimonies. [53]
Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the
testimonies of some prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally
reflected in their Joint Affidavit, dated April 1, 1993.[54] We have held before that:

“The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the
affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because they are
oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired. xxx” [55]

In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The
story proffered by appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic
and incredible to be believed. His story begins in February, 1992, with his wife and two
children being killed in a civil war in his native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to
migrate to the United States of America.[56] He first flew to Thailand, where he stayed for
six months without managing to learn a single Thai word.[57] Despite his language
inadequacy, he was able to land a job in a cargo company in that country. He did not
befriend any Thai national. Neither did he apply for an American visa in Thailand.[58]
He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to
obtain an American visa from the United States embassy in the Philippines.
Omogbolahan flew fromThailand to our country. He stepped on Philippine soil on March
16, 1993, only to learn that Jabar and Samsi had long left the country. [59] Instead of going
to the United States embassy at Roxas Boulevard or any of the many travel agencies
doing business in the country, he spent his first two weeks here making the rounds of
bars and clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow Africans and American citizens
who could help him obtain an American visa. In this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-
appellant Bhola[60] and an American named David whom he was supposed to meet on the
fateful night of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved in with Bhola at the Royal
Palm Hotel, and David promised to help him obtain his American passport. [61]
Omogbolahan’s story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a
convenient defense and to elicit sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-
appellants are equally incredulous. They are also tattered with inconsistencies. As
observed by the Solicitor General, they could not even get their occupations straight, viz.:
 “xxx xxx xxx

“Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she
testified, a widow and as shown in her passport, a seamstress by occupation.
However, in her testimony, she stated that she is a plain housewife. (tsn July 21, 1993,
pp. 4 and 27)

“On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native

of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central Africa, 37 years old at the time he testified, married and a
high school graduate xxx. In his testimony, he stated that he is a trader xxx. Later on,
he stated that he was working for the New Star Investment in Thailand as marketing
officer.” (tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)
[62]

“Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an
elementary graduate and plumber according to his passport. In his testimony,
however, he claimed to be a technician.” (tsn July 13, 1993p. 4).
[63]

Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
appellants’ motion for new trial.
We find appellants’ first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As discussed
above, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against
the substantive rights of appellants do not exist.
Appellants’ second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise
unmeritorious. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved
party the right to move for new trial on the ground, among others, of “(n)ewly discovered
evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced
at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result (thereof).” [64] Newly
discovered evidence, in order to warrant a new trial, must meet three
requirements, viz: (1) it must have been discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if presented, it
would probably alter the results of the action.[65]
In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of
reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained Camerino’s testimony during the
trial. On the contrary, as correctly noted by the trial court, Camerino was identified in
open court by appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerino’s prospective testimony would acquit
appellants. Firstly, her affidavit embodies a narration of events almost identical to that
presented by appellants. As has been discussed earlier, the defense version of what
occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and difficult to believe. Secondly,
Camerino’s claim that she was a member of the team that arrested appellants is belied
by the testimony of prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
 “STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused through
counsel claim she was a member of the team which arrested the three Africans now the
accused in this case. What can you say to that?
“A: I don’t know that person, sir.
“Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when you met
this Julita Camerino?
“A: I don’t know, sir.
“Q: You don’t recall any?
“A: I don’t recall any, sir.”
“xxx xxx xxx
“Court:
Cross?
“ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your interpreter during
the custodial investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the person of Suchinda
Leangsiri?
“A: No, sir.
“ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the police
headquarters or at the Las Palmas Hotel?
“A: I don’t know that person, sir.”[66]
Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been
previously convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order,
dated October 11, 1993, of the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-
118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Johnson v. United States

No. 329

Argued December 18, 1947

Decided February 2, 1948

333 U.S. 10

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

1. Where officers detected the odor of burning opium emanating from a hotel room,
entered without a search warrant and without knowing who was there, arrested the only
occupant, searched the room and found opium and smoking apparatus, the search
violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and a conviction for a
violation of the federal narcotic laws based on the evidence based on the evidence thus
obtained cannot be sustained. Pp. 333 U. S. 11-17.

2. As a general rule, the question when the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search must be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent. Pp. 333 U. S. 13-14.

3. There were no exceptional circumstances in this case sufficient to justify the failure of
the officer to obtain a search warrant. Pp. 333 U. S. 14-15.

Page 333 U. S. 11

4. It being conceded that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until
he entered the room and found her to be the sole occupant, the search cannot be
sustained as being incident to a valid arrest. Pp. 333 U. S. 15-16.

5. The Government cannot at the same time justify an arrest by a search and justify the
search by the arrest. Pp. 333 U. S. 16-19.

6. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the
law must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. P. 333 U. S. 17.

162 F.2d 562, reversed.

Petitioner was convicted in a Federal District Court on evidence obtained by a search
made without a warrant. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 162 F.2d 562. This
Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 807. Reversed, p. 333 U. S. 17.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was convicted on four counts charging violation of federal narcotic laws.
[Footnote 1] The only question which brings the case here is whether it was lawful,
without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner and to search her living quarters.

Page 333 U. S. 12

Taking the Government's version of disputed events, decision would rest on these facts:

At about 7:30 p.m. Detective Lieutenant Belland, an officer of the Seattle police force
narcotic detail, received information from a confidential informer, who was also a known
narcotic user, that unknown persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. The
informer was taken back to the hotel to interview the manager, but he returned at once
saying he could smell burning opium in the hallway. Belland communicated with federal
narcotic agents, and between 8:30 and 9 o'clock, went back to the hotel with four such
agents. All were experienced in narcotic work and recognized at once a strong odor of
burning opium, which to them was distinctive and unmistakable. The odor led to Room
1. The officers did not know who was occupying that room. They knocked and a voice
inside asked who was there. "Lieutenant Belland," was the reply. There was a slight
delay, some "shuffling or noise" in the room and then the defendant opened the door.
The officer said, "I want to talk to you a little bit." She then, as he describes it, "stepped
back acquiescently and admitted us." He said, "I want to talk to you about the opium
smell in the room here." She denied that there was such a smell. Then he said, "I want
you to consider yourself under arrest, because we are going to search the room." The
search turned up incriminating opium and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm,
apparently from recent use. This evidence the District Court refused to suppress before
trial and admitted over defendant's objection at the trial. Conviction resulted and the
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. [Footnote 2]

The defendant challenged the search of her home as a violation of the rights secured to
her in common with others, by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

Page 333 U. S. 13
The Government defends the search as legally justifiable, more particularly as incident
to what it urges was a lawful arrest of the person.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of the search, was
demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to authority, rather than as
an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. Cf. Amos v. United
States,255 U. S. 313.

At the time entry was demanded, the officers were possessed of evidence which a
magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant. We
cannot sustain defendant's contention, erroneously made on the strength of Taylor v.
United States,286 U. S. 1, that odors cannot be evidence sufficient to constitute
probable grounds for any search. That decision held only that odors alone do not
authorize a search without warrant. If the presence of odors is testified to before a
magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently
distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis
insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be found to
be evidence of most persuasive character.

The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped by zealous officers is not
that it denies law enforcement

Page 333 U. S. 14

the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [Footnote 3] Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate"s disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people"s homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers. [Footnote 4] Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of
course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent.

There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law
enforcement against the

Page 333 U. S. 15

right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered for not obtaining a
search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay
necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never
very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to
bypass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight.
The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes
which we suppose in time will disappear. But they were not capable at any time of being
reduced to possession for presentation to court. The evidence of their existence before
the search was adequate and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish
from the delay of getting a warrant.

If the officers in this case were excused from the constitutional duty of presenting their
evidence to a magistrate, it is difficult to think of a case in which it should be required.

II

The Government contends, however, that this search without warrant must be held valid
because incident to an arrest. This alleged ground of validity requires examination of the
facts to determine whether the arrest itself was lawful. Since it was without warrant, it
could be valid only if for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officer or for
a felony of which he had reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty. [Footnote 5]

Page 333 U. S. 16

The Government, in effect, concedes that the arresting officer did not have probable
cause to arrest petitioner until he had entered her room and found her to be the sole
occupant. [Footnote 6] It points out specifically, referring to the time just before entry,

"For at that time the agents did not know whether there was one or several persons in
the room. It was reasonable to believe that the room might have been an opium
smoking den."

And it says,

". . . that when the agents were admitted to the room and found only the petitioner
present, they had a reasonable basis for believing that she had been smoking opium,
and thus illicitly possessed the narcotic."

Thus, the Government quite properly stakes the right to arrest, not on the informer's tip
and the smell the officers recognized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was
alone in the room, gained only after, and wholly by reason of, their entry of her home. It
was therefore their observations inside of her quarters, after they had obtained
admission under color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest. [Footnote
7]

Thus, the Government is obliged to justify the arrest by the search and at the same time
to justify the search by}

Page 333 U. S. 17

the arrest. This will not do. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under
color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis
in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects," [Footnote 8] and would obliterate
one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where
officers are under the law, and the police state where they are the law.

Reversed.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE
BURTON dissent.

[Footnote 1]

Two counts charged violation of § 2553(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §
2553(a), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 2553(a), and two counts charged violation of the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174.

[Footnote 2]

9 Cir., 162 F.2d 562.

[Footnote 3]

In United States v. Lefkowitz,285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S. 464, this Court said:

". . . the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue

warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to
be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make
arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to
search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while
acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime. . . ."

[Footnote 4]

"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches
are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause."

Agnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33

[Footnote 5]

This is the Washington law. State v. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 P. 626; State v.
Lindsey, 192 Wash. 356, 73 P.2d 738; State v. Krantz, 24 Wash.2d 350, 164 P.2d
453; State v. Robbins, 25 Wash.2d 110, 169 P.2d 246. State law determines the validity
of arrests without warrant.United States v. Di Re,332 U. S. 581.

[Footnote 6]
The Government brief states that the question presented is

"whether there was probable cause for the arrest of petitioner for possessing opium
prepared for smoking and the search of her room in a hotel incident thereto for
contraband opium where experienced narcotic agents unmistakably detected and
traced the pungent, identifiable odor of burning opium emanating from her room and
knew, before they arrested her, that she was the only person in the room."

[Footnote 7]

The Government also suggests that, "In a sense, the arrest was made in hot pursuit.'" . .
.

However, we find no element of "hot pursuit" in the arrest of one who was not in flight,
was completely surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence, who claims
without denial that she was in bed at the time, and who made no attempt to escape. Nor
would these facts seem to meet the requirements of the Washington "Uniform Law on
Fresh Pursuit." Session Laws 1943, ch. 261.

[Footnote 8]

In Gouled v. United States,255 U. S. 298, 255 U. S. 302, 255 U. S. 303, this Court said:

"It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the framers of our
Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. 616, in Weeks v. United
States,232 U. S. 383, and in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,251 U. S. 385)
have declared the importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the
due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by these two (Fourth
and Fifth) Amendments. The effect of the decisions cited is: that such rights are
declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property'; that they are to be regarded as of the very essence of
constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as
are the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen -- the right to
trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus, and to due process of law. It has been
repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive a liberal construction so as
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by
them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well intentioned, but mistakenly
overzealous, executive officers."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31,
1990, 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling
marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:

That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing
dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command
of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena
Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of
Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court
as follows:

Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian,
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on
a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So
Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with
a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian
informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and
turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga
inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.

The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt.
Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given
P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh.
"L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A
pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after
he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the
target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga,
team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to
100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between
Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who
came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some
more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the
money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and
inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked
back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams,
riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and
returned to the house.

At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his
house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later
came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team
returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's
wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find
the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00
was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had
slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana
inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and
brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the
two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C"
& "D").

In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on,
Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the
two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-
wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more
marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to
the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover
of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-
 request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by
the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.

Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All
submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry
Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and
"J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana
bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen
written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the
one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989,
through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry
Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through
his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M."
(written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked
money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature
thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to
the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the
stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4

For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and
(2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:

[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house
at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara,
his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa.
About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was
inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM
agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not
ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM
agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked
them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The
NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not
know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who
was living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-
length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the
NARCOM agents told him for clarification.

Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at
Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated
by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or
document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari
Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said
he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself
told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
 Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand
and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed
him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his
wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-
examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the
Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was
owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to
the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by
the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's
office.

Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given
to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law
and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a
wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for
selling marijuana before. 5

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed
without subsidiary imprisonment. 6

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1)
prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally
known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two
wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.

Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he
conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for
P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same
day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the
following day. 9

On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt.
Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's
house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of
T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked
P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.

Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani
approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked
him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside
the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt.
Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged
signal of raising his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the
house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money,
they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16

The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-
bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the
appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the
material points, it deserves credence.

The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know
each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of
marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the
buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.17

The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the
appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the
commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the
presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of
the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the
commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house
are known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to
the authorities.

The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga.
The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from
Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant
invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish
between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And
since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated
testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.

People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his
companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer
based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:

This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.

Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different
from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).

It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on
those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of
more or less 10 to 15 meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand
over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between
the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22

Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the
house of Mari Musa?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please tell us?

A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego,
Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house
near the road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari
Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that
Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa
and went inside the house and came back later and handed
something to Sgt. Ani.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen,
from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to
give to the former "something."

Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received
from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated
the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the
following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-
buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that
same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt.
Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents
who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which
was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville,
Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the
vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an
exchange of articles took place. 29

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani.
Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-
buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their
distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence,
direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the
consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug

The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani
gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the
appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon
being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its
contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the
appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court
issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33

Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 35

While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest." 37

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, thus:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting
officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has
ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in
a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the
marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in
his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and
seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the
defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a
passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living
room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself,
observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a
brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package
of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The
admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing
that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search,
since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. 43The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the
admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the
doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. 46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine
will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent
from the "plain view" of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that
the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain
view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move
from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs.
California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and
from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room
with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could
not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it.
Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it
was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the
plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging
effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by
the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime
charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA

y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @
"NENETH," accused-appellants.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y

Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The information reads:

"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and
without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags
of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the
above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members
of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command
(Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged
in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest
"Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom
agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team
Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3
Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as
perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP
Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit
set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for
the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3
Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills
worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard
and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared
at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took
out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house
of his associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang
Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the
woman as his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth."[8] The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the
box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It
was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is
Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus
the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta
Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in
the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and
asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men
questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took
accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When
accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point
out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter,
he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later
identified as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked
around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door.
The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well.
He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and
kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were
already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that
they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was
open and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house
and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of
his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at
the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5,
1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband
and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged
5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan
de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan
five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at
6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson
remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left
wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about
a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied
with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she
did not know anything about the box and its contents.
 Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a
friend of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for
Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were
found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants.
The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both
accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"

and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.

According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of
Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person
who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons

collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.'

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO

DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to
DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the
Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for
accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for
mandatory review.
SO ORDERED."[13]

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

"I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR
TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES
AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY
TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE
POSEUR-BUYER.
II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE
WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT
COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

"I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE

THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE
ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.
II

THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY

CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS
WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND

SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE
AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE
EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT
BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in
the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces
of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation
is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal
in the act of the commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century
American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the
detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the
doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards
in the enforcement of criminal law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against
using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might
otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because
it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere
purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21] The classic definition of entrapment
is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court
decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense
by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a)
acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce
a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the
government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product
of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of
entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an
otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the
mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged
in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however,
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the
fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an
opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the
crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the
accused must be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a
criminal.
 Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes
of the nature of a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the
burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense.
Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is
raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or
"origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. [32] All
relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his
eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind
before the crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have
been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense
will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.[36] Some states, however,
have adopted the "objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case
of Grossman v. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers
the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. [39] The inquiry is
focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and
his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct.[40] The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely
to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the
offense;[41] for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist
the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but
overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,[43] or appeals to sentiments such
as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not.[44] Proponents of this test believe
that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the
legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods employed on
behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this
reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement
improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the
gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in
judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is
claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that
an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or
other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and
predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the
accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general
disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted
with inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates
entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least
if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct
of the police and their agents was proper.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous
and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the
time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the
United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the
Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined.
If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to
commit the crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's
entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged,
or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid approaches
combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending
the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused
from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel,
actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified
that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking
opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the
fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium
den where both of them could smoke this drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned
as "most reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling
explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be
a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused
to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by
the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the
accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61] we convicted the accused after finding that
there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after
the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by
pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the
seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
Juris,[64] we held:

"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to
be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often
been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal
or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act
was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a
kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course
of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The
fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense
to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed
independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his
confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them
to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless
committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale
of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but
there are cases holding the contrary."[65]

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People
v. Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the
peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his
criminal plan.[67] In People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment
is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court
in People v. Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is
instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory
cause.[72] To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined
the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the
crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series
of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from
likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining
the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's
membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered
accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and
membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the
evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record
was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-
narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers
and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending
drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are
rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and
their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal
law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in seor those
inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior
directed, not against particular individuals, but against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong
against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite
person.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and
subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he
condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary,
therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the
voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means
that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover
capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential
informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the
police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons
who deceive the police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other
petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly
mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not
an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and
exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are
legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to
their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of
cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey
on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady
underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in
the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably
shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug
cases.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the
arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession
and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]

"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures,
wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for
skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the
end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the
employment of illegal means."[88]

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied
restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity
of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and
injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.[91]
 We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal
drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of
the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime.
If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity,
then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition
of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the
defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially
contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied
by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money
to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant
Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and
his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3
Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up
security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution.
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve
their invaluable service to the police.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently
denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers,[94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify
falsely against the appellant,[95] or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually
witnessed the entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will
merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need
to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by
prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police
officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution
evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at
bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After
appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from
appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is
why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court.
The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were
identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that
box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of
marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing
with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the
box showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to
what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite
reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the
court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be
marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this
plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-
394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of
record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping
with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked
as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by
whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of
Neneth, sir.
 x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect
Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white
plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine
hundred seventy (970) grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited
for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he
"paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money
and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan"
system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from
the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was
caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him
even without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest;[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;[108](3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
 The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was
made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows
otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of
Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was
there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the
house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily
chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached
her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place,
you were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you
your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
 ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the
amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who
retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what
you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113
must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion."[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.[116] A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made
by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant
Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the
marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the
drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing
drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,[119] with or without her knowledge,
with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had
no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing
that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence.[121] The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand[125] and its
discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside
a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized.[127] In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as
follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa
iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already
retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was
in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua
already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
 ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be
big or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I
withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And
according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the
prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there
by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao
until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's
house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was
the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed
something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box
were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the
records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its
contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually
wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in
color.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box
could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that
he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent to
PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain
view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the
Constitution.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of
accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.[138] Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:

"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would
inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself."[140]

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section
13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs.-- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.

x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof
that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the
drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the
fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and
delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-
buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired
with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City
acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO

SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
§16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December
28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or
use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug,
without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under
his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The
prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y
Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua,
who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-
appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant’s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was
taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing
a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the
other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were
found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to
leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly,
about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs
on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where
accused-appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellant’s mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano
testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and
other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional;
and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of

marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to
law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances
over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH

WARRANT VALID

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-
CHLORIDE (SHABU)

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)

BRICKS OF MARIJUANA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN

USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of

the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the “plain view” doctrine. Third, the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
 In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160

For: Violation of RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR.
INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M.
BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT
has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City
as shown in Annex “A”, the properties to wit:

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-
stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite,
Philippines.

(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL

Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient
particularity.

Existence of Probable Cause

 The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search
warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug
paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on
anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the
former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where
the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I
saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert is genuine shabu?
 A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our
office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams
of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result
for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-
95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish
to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void
only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as
to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene
books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid
as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper
if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect
to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating
to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for
and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning
other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will
be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be
obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellant’s house for an undetermined quantity ofshabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Specificity of the Offense Charged

 Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection
with “Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,”
it is clearly recited in the text thereof that “There is probable cause to believe that
Adolfo Olaes alias ‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.” Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the “place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.” [28]

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for “Violation of R.A. 6425,”
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and
seizure of “dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic).” This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:

Appellant’s contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than
(1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In
short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for
the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]

Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: “For Violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.).” The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized
under §1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover
the violations under the various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:

. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City,” the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.
160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to
wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be
searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon
City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as “a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of
the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided
appellant’s house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar
could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood
in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar’s place is at the end of
appellant’s place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar’s team is
undeniably appellant’s house and it was really appellant who was the target. The
raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside
his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For
example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant
Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement
and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3
on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused “Morris Ferrante of 83
Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass.”[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellant’s house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant’s residence,
Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
 Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the “plain view” of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing
the marijuana in this case.

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the
valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:

What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification  whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused  and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellant’s lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident
to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate
control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from
obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellant’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

 The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify
their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag
which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of
the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the
bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer’s eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their “plain view,” what may be said to be the object in their
“plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature
of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the “plain view”
of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer.[40]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he

undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner
these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure
of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the “plain view doctrine,”
we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search.  The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

Accused-appellant’s claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent
proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or
neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
 In contrast, Aguilar and Duano’s claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the
door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the
agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances
justified the searching party’s forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension
that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession
of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO BARROS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bartolome F. Macliing for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information which read as follows:

That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain

Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in a
Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful
authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as part
of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the
accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said
marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a] prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 1

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.

Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine —

Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:

(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of
the accused;

(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation
conducted by four (4) soldiers one after the other under intimidating circumstances;
and

(3) misappreciation of facts. 3

The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing
Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as
and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board
the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and
S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando]
Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who]
the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao
alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein
accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner of
the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw
accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at
Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the
 presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the
carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. That when accused denied ownership
of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who
pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. That during
the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit
"B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1",
"B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan
General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical examination and a Medico
Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered
no physical injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana.
That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio Barros if he smoked
marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That after accused was
medically examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C.
detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit
"B") was also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a
certification (Exhibit "C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was
signed by the accused (Exhibit "C-1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P.
Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in connection with the confiscation of the marijuana
subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the
P.C. officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and
C2C Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A",
"A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").

. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked
Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in four separate envelopes,
following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer
Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt.
Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the four
samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his
report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4

The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession
of the carton box containing the four (4) kilos of marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of
the accused in the following manner:

That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco
Pad, Baguio City. That on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager,
Engineer Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from
one Billy Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving
at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, accused looked for the residence of
Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a house where someone was tending a store.
That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man answered that
he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room
the tapes and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter, accused asked
the man to stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the
instruction of his manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking
breakfast, accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6,
1987, accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province bound for Baguio City. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the
P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus and checked the baggages. That a
 soldier fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and shouted who owns the
carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the soldier went down with the carton and
moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused
took his baggage which consisted of a pasiking and went down the bus. That
accused was led by the soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his
clothes removed and his wallet taken. Accused was made to accept ownership of the
carton of marijuana but he refused.

. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted
accused to the hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded to the Municipality of
Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the
P.C. Camp and there he saw someone typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented
to accused some papers which he was asked to sign but accused refused. That
accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that something will
happen to him. That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who]
pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the paper and because of fear, he had to
sign the document marked Exhibit "C." Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened
again accused and asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the
carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X" for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution.
That after staying at Tadian for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan
and later transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5

Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police
authorities had impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation,
"under intimidating circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The accused complains
that he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his
rights as an accused person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without the
assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is inadmissible as evidence
against him.

We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. For
the trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements
which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted by the police officers.
The trial court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits "C", "E"
and "B-5," the alleged uncounselled confessions. The trial court made very clear the bases of its
conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged; those
bases did not include the alleged confessions:

First — M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the
accused carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the
checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain Province. That accused is the owner of the carton
(Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four packages of dried
marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4") was fished out from under
the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself.

Second — That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio
Barros and that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that the accused
was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and this fact was also admitted
by accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police nor the soldiers.
Dra. Aleta also found that the accused was under the influence of drug[s] and that
 the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked marijuana. This is clear
evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said
prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN — Page 24 — Orpecio).

Third — The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the
court for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of
marijuana per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos
Figueroa, forensical expert.

Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks
the ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this
respect said:

The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear,
positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs.
Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)." 6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros — i.e., that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police
authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted
constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 8

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which
relates to the search of moving vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving
vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a
judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. 10 In carrying out warrantless searches of moving
vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles
being limited to visual inspection. InValmonte vs. De Villa, 11 the Court stated:
 [N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a
light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. 12

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; 13(2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; 14(3) Narcom agents were informed or
"tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country
on a particular airline flight on a given date; 15 (4) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when
the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline,
he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; 16 and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. 17

In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance
which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by appellant
onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan either that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the
subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common
practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute
the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received
any information or "tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers
before or during the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they had detected the odor of
dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and
taking a seat during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the
carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law
enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not
suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause.

M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987?

A: I went to Sabangan, sir.

Q: What transportation did you use?

A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.

Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?

A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.

Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which
started for Baguio City from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it
stopped at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, was there
anything that happened?

xxx xxx xxx

A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person

carrying a baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat,
seat No. 18.

Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?

A: A carton.

Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?

A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.

Q: You mean inside the bus?

A: Yes.

Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and
holding a carton and placed it in front of seat No. 18, what happened
to the bus afterwards?

A: It proceeded to Sabangan.

Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?

A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.

Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?

Atty. Sokoken:
He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.

Fiscal Ayochok:

We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the

objection of counsel.

Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?

A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect

the baggage of the suspect and when C2C .

Atty. Sokoken:

We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies

[to] not in the narrative way.

Fiscal Ayochok:

He is answering the question.

Court:

Let the witness finish.

A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he

found out that it contained MJ.

Q: What do you mean MJ?

A: Marijuana.

xxx xxx xxx 18

For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:

Direct Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you

were particularly in the afternoon?

A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus

[with Plate] No. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan.

Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?

A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.

Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, what did you see?

A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.

Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were
riding on place that carton?

A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.

Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?

A: Inside the bus, sir.

Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the
carton baggage, where did he go?

A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.

Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who
brought the carton, where was the carton exactly located?

A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.

Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying
the carton luggage you saw reached Sabangan what happened
there?

A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was

stopped for routinary inspection.

Q: What happened next?

A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just

seen at Chackchakan.

Q: Did he inspect the baggage?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?

A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.

Q: You mean marijuana?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Cross Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at

Sabangan, Mt. Province for purposes of military check-up, is that
correct?

A: Routinary inspection, sir.

Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary
check-up?

A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao
to come.

Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to

see that person carrying this carton which is marked Exhibit "B"?

A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and

that is why I called one of my men, sir.

Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc,

going to Sabangan, there is already marijuana being carried inside
that bus?

A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.

Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not
inspected it when you arrived at Alab? Why have you waited to reach
Sabangan to inspect it?

A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.

Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect
the baggage here in Bontoc?

A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.

Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in
Sabangan?

A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.

Fiscal Ayochok:

Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper
checkpoint.

Court:
 Sustained.

xxx xxx xxx 19

The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally uninformative:

Direct Examination:

Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having

reported for duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there

anything unusual that happened that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that Mr. witness?

A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate

No. ABZ-242.

Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?

A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and

Ayan called for me, sir, and they told me that a carton was placed
under seat No. 18, sir.

Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18,
did you inspect that carton?

A: I inspected it, sir.

Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting
that carton?

A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a

stuff of marijuana, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 20

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no circumstance
which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same
bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the
box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be
carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show
that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a
crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the two (2) police
officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the
bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in
Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no "personable knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in brief, no
basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
non-permissible and invalid. 22 The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4) kilos of
marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant Barros.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which
may have attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros
has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four (4) packages of
dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of

appellant, still the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the
doctrine laid down in the case ofCallanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later
reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that
"posting of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a
person and estops him from questioning its validity." Here, appellant had in fact
posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his application was
subsequently denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 65). Consistent with jurisprudence,
therefore, he should be deemed to have waived any irregularity attending his arrest,
if any there be, and cannot now be heard to assail the same. 23

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a
priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a
defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty,
so as to estop as accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the
failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter
(by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the
former — an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-
admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is
not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to
retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly
objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of
marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. 24 We consider that
appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under
the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his
conduct before or during during the trial.

In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had
waived his rights by his "stoic deportment" consisting of failure to object to the search by the police
authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box:

. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and
asked accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership
of the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3, Decision).
His demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search
inasmuch as the objection thereto is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People
vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1 Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . . 25

It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it
is People vs. Burgos, 26 promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable. In Burgos,
this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on
the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
(Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to
object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the
case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S. 458). 27 (Emphasis
supplied) .

Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found that
there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a Chinese merchant
was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture
and proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman.
Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim was found, still alive, and upon being
asked who had attacked him, laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui
Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from the
accused. Before the body search of the accused was carried out, the accused voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and
when asked if he had anything else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative.
The police thereupon conducted a body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the
search resulted in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim.
Under these circumstances, the Court ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person
or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful
warrantless search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel during
trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when objections
to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by
appellant Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be lightly
taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by the Court in Burgos, 28 and as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4)
kilos of marijuana. His guilt must, however, be established by constitutional means. The non-
admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for
disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the
police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which this Court has no choice
but to apply in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being
sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., dissents.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated September
15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft, and the resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed
as follows:

"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable
 Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said
owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.

The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:

"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while
on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.

With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45.
Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came
from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,
appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was
driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to
transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait
until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa
Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt.
Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed
with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the
vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.

After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with
kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in
his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the
cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty
Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters
where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up
in jail for a week."4

On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worthP55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from
 TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant
National Power Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed,
to wit:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to
Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No
civil indemnity and no costs."6

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:

"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;

(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and

(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."

The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:

"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court
cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017,
January 21, 1991, it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of
practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R.
No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989),
it was ruled that 'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant
upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no
criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836,
 the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a warrant where the
accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not only
authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant."7

Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the
trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof, which reads:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits
of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;8 (2) seizure of evidence
in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search;11 (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.14

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar
was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 1âwphi1.nêt

I. Search of moving vehicle

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.15 Thus, the rules governing search
and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by
the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also
allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of
the State.17

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.19 The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula
but is resolved according to the facts of each case.20

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or
police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted
by the exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.23 A checkpoint
may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.29

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.

In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the
body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:

"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion
allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . .
In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from
outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area
 protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the
open window of a home."

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.31

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his
possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential
information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana;32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that
said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.33

In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.

Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:

"ATTY. SANTOS

Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?

A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in
the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.

Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?

A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?

A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir."35

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to
be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of
a search without a warrant.

In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police
authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:

"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x,
CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with
immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited
drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has
become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none
exists in this case.

II. Plain view doctrine

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.38

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they
were placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath
the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his
vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified
mere seizure of the articles without further search.40

III. Consented search

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the
consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that
there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the
specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an
implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.42 The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked
on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;45 (7) the nature of
the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given.47

In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted
in this wise:

"WITNESS

Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?

A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

 Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is that incident?

A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes

driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati
leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged
him, sir.

Q Did the vehicle stop?

A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and
by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.

Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

Q What was the answer of Caballes?

A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.

Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you
do?

A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the
Cavinti area, sir."48

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner
to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said
search. In People vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In
upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was
"urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he
allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,52 the accused
admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of
their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it
was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening
the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a
clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they
could see the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are
only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you
can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search. 1âw phi 1.nêt

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.55

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's
vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by
uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his
consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful
whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked
during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that
he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a
clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind,
this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct
examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they
searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.56

Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the

warrantless search. InPeople vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed
to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that
the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because
he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional
right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
is herebyACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988

September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

 Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of
public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms
and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported
in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and
a peaceful community.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S

RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional
and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association
whose members are all members of the IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other
rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege
that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not
constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions —
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and
a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan
Police Director. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it
would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that
individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights
was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped
and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility
or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a
routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining
and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure.
And we are not even under martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and
the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed
of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed
that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence,
repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST.,
art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime
of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional
inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit —
to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the
light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY
TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by
General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO.
66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-
4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA
and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right
personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had
been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore,
have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",
have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case
reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been
issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What
we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to
involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a
policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death
over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot
you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be
anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail.
(Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious
mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the
"showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court
anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK
FORCE, respondents.

Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following
resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being
unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated
23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.

The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on
11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution
No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards,
on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. 1 Subsequently, on 26 December 1991
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged
in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. 2

On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House
of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan
requesting the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon
being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver,
Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to
Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan
Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen
manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They
searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the
trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by
petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the
House of Representatives.

Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The
referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January
1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious. 4

On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances
mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was
petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5

On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed. 6

Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation
of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to
Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running
for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of
R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8

On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative
proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus
Election Code provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from running for or holding a
public office, i.e., any person who has either been declared by competent authority as insane or
incompetent or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the
Code; that the resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of
certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified
from office in situations (a) where the criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending
criminal case, and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite
quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the Omnibus
Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No.
2327 violates the fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress
in the elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge
against him on his qualification to run for public office.

However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the
warrantless search of his car.

Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According
to him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of
Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car.
Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of
Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11

Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet.
Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his constitutional
right to due process.

Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate
for public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the
services of security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or
bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives.
Specifically, petitioner further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the
firearms in compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no
law was in fact violated. 12

On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the

petition 13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC and
14
prayed instead to be excused from filing the required comment.

COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec.
263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in
the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon
petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence,
submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to
explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a
sworn written explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15

Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No.
2327 since this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as
well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se,
and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and
that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which
the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention
either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the
car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the
PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction.

An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search
is determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in
situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21

We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of
prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g.,
where a confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs
at the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country; 23 where the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was
strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his
passport and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the
description given in the confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the
accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about its
contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier was already established by police authorities who
received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the vessels
arriving in Dumaguete City. 27

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to
the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing
special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or
behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not
be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms
obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding.

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the
seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall
be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created
under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five
o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later.
It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the
reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result,
motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have
any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would
raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an
extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, 29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,
could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty.

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by
the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which
requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. 30

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that
petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy
the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the
observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals, 33 we held
that —

While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of
due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it
is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to
corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party
respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner
was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he
was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.

Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with
COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for
himself. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's
protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even
after COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the
prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year
nor more than six (6) years without probation and with disqualification from holding public office, and
deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his
right to a preliminary investigation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the
Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the
warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner. Consequently,
COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET
ASIDE.

The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent

in the case ofValmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:

The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the

checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The
bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of
the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that
the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even
without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable
excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial defense,
 maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these
purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time
simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.

xxx xxx xxx

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own
complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on
checkpoints and finally dismantle them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.

VITUG, J., concurring:

The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to
accept and subordinate themselves to authority.

When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but,
to the contrary, reserved for themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.

One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole
conceded proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is lawfully issued.
There are, to be sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons,
when warrantless searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio
decidendi of the Court in Valmonte vs. De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the
installation of checkpoints, the Court clearly has based its decision on the existence at the time of
what has been so described as an "abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did
not have the intention to have its ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than
previously obtaining.

The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the
one hand, and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should
be held to prevail? There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is, in
the first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are they
necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength
of the other.

There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of
constitutional mandates or an abuse on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might
pay to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our
rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the
Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."

It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the
Court has expressed:
 This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized
even during the days of the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong.
On this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the
humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from
intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.

The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is
"heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of
the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for
they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.

While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo, in hisponencia, I would express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above
constitutional aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.

REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with
respect to petitioner Aniag, Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside,
not because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not
actually charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.

With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner
in the present recourse, the nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him
and redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that the majority opinion thereby reinstate the
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I concur in that
result.

However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the
rationale submitted therefor, that is, that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a
warrant. The pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent
on the part of Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage
compartment where the firearms were discovered. As held inPeople vs. Excela, et al., 1 consent to a
search may be given expressly or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui,2 the settled rule is that
a search may be validly conducted without a warrant if the person searched consented thereto.

I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he
was acting in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the
instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was himself acting upon and in compliance with
Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of
the House of Representatives.

The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can
be given suppletory effect to special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10
of the same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation
to R.A. No. 7166, nor is there anylegal impossibility for such suppletory application whether by
express provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be
considered as illegal, Arellano acted thereon in good faith 3 and under a mistake of fact as to its
legality, hence his exculpation is ineludibly dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.
It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no
error was committed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto
Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well founded belief that a crime had been
committed and that he was probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 92-0829.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.

Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the
majority opinion, are whether (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is
unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999,
dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific disposition
declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13
January 1992, (b) inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless
search, and (c) unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.

1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution

No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first
paragraph, page 10, Ponencia), this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot
checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And whether the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been,
provided there existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this
case is either procedurally premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve
considering the obvious paucity of the facts before it. The most the majority opinion can state is that
"[t]here was no evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a confidential
report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished
by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike
forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano
that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more could be expected at this
stage since the records of the proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the
COMELEC are not before this Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the
inadmissibility in evidence of the firearms seized would thus be premature.

It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms
involved were licensed and were duly issued to the petitioner by the House of Representatives, but
for the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC pursuant to its
constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution),
its statutory authority to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections
(Section 52, Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is
required to enforce and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms
outside the residence or place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by
the COMELEC, and Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying,
or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street,
park, private vehicle, or public conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the
same during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC.

In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that
on 13 January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his
(petitioner's) house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day was
already within the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2314 (In The Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the
Elections of National and Local Officials on May 11, 1992), promulgated on 20 November 1991.
Considering then that the offense for which he was to be charged was for the violation of paragraph
(q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in
view of his aforesaid admissions, renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I
fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling on the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of
unconstitutionality. It simply directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano
for the violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No.
7166, and directed the petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for
an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and
35 of R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Insofar as
Arellano is concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was
nothing more than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to
dismiss the complaint against him. As against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process
because the petitioner was later heard on his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the right of an
accused to a preliminary investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory
(Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa,
Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 [1992]).

The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the
petitioner despite the fact that he was never formally charged before the Office of the City
Prosecutor. There was only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him. The COMELEC then acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.

I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.

Melo, J., concurs.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 129756-58. January 28, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN DEEN

ESCAñO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN
LOPEZ, accused.
VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-
appellants.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D.

Escaño, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended. Escaño and Usana were also charged in Criminal Case No. 95-
[1]

937 and No. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866.

The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-936 reads as
follows:

That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms of
"HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law. [2]

The charge against accused Julian D. Escaño in Criminal Case No. 95-937 reads as
follows:

That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) pc.
of cal. .45 pistol, government model with Serial No. 990255, with
magazine containing 7 live ammos and two (2) more magazines for cal.
.45 pistol containing 7 live ammos each, without first securing the
necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities and
which firearm and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence. [3]

The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case
No. 95-938 reads:
 That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control One (1) pc.
of rifle carbine with Serial No. 7176644 with a banana type magazine
loaded with 28 live ammunitions without first securing the necessary
license or permit from the proper government authorities and which
firearms and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence. 
[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial
[5]

court convicted Escaño and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. 95-936, Escaño in
Criminal Case No. 95-937, and appellant Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938.

Escaño filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a
Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial court in its
[6]

Order of 17 July 1997. [7]

Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that
[8]

they were appealing to this Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the
penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-936 was appealed to this
Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal Case
No. 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due course to the
[9]

appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case No. 95-936 to this
Court and the record of Criminal Case No. 95-938 to the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-936 that
is now before this Court.

Due to the differing versions of the parties, there is a need to narrate each of the
testimonies of the key players in this case.

The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and during a
COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo
P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto
Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the
[10]

South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City,
[11]

stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the
others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH
493. PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger
[12]

seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as
Escaño, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine,
from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat
Ave., the other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45
caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño. [13]

The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia
Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the
[14]

key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he
requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk
[15]

himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño
[16] [17]

to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
[18]

National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found

positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. 
[19]

A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escaño was not a licensed/registered
firearms holder of any kind and caliber. Usana, however, according to the same
certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt .45 caliber with license
issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. Usana also has an application
for a pistol Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of the two guns seized were licensed/registered
with the NAPOLCOM. [20]

For his part, Escaño (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995, between 11:00
and 11:30 in the morning, he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel, at Pioneer St.,
Mandaluyong City, to meet with his business partners, including Usana and Lopez.
He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at Philippine Airlines, Ramon Cabrera,
who had borrowed his wife’s car. Since it was his wife’s birthday the following day,
he asked Cabrera if he could get back the car. Cabrera readily gave him the keys of
the car.
[21]

He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Using his
wife’s car, they cruised southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and
turned right at Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. They stopped before crossing SLEX because
the traffic light turned red. From the other side of SLEX, he could see a group of
policemen. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down by one of the policemen, so
he slowed down and stopped. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down the window and
demanded to see his license. He asked if he had committed any violation, but PO3
Nonato accused him of being drunk, which he denied. The policemen persisted in
asking for his license, but he did not budge and instead reiterated that there was no
reason for him to surrender his license for he had not committed any violation. A
verbal tussle ensued resulting in the drawing of firearms by the policemen which
prompted Usana to suggest that they go to the police station because the policemen
were carrying guns and they have not done anything wrong. 
[22]

He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian St.
with his companions. He parked the car then they were brought to the office of the
Deputy Station Commander, Lieutenant Eco. The policemen asked if they could
[23]

search his car. He then inquired if he was not entitled to a lawyer and why they
needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he had violated.
Apparently, he thought they were there only for verification purposes. Lt. Eco
explained that that was the reason why they were going to search his car, to see if he
had done anything illegal. Although the police were insistent in asking for the keys to
his car, he continuously refused. Lt. Eco asked his men to usher the trio into the
detention cell.
[24]

After two hours, he was brought back to Lt. Eco’s office. Lt. Eco pointed to a bag, a
rifle, a pistol and a package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his desk, and
said these items constituted evidence of illegal possession of firearms and transporting
of drugs. He was surprised that they found those items from his car because his key
had been with him all the time. He was handcuffed, brought to his car, and again was
surprised to see its trunk open.
[25]

On the other hand, Lopez had a different story. He claimed he was the mechanic of
Usana and they lived in the same subdivision. On 4 April 1995, he was working on
[26]

Usana’s pick-up truck at the latter’s house when Escaño dropped by at around 4:30 in
the afternoon looking for Usana who was then working in Forbes Park. At around
[27]

5:30 p.m., they left Usana’s house in Escaño’s metallic gray Kia Pride. Inside the car,
he saw a .45 caliber pistol and two spare magazines tucked in the right side and left
side of Escaño’s waist. He also saw a carbine under the right passenger seat. When he
inquired about the guns, Escaño replied that such did not pose any problem since they
were licensed. Before going to Usana, they went to Pasay City to see a certain
Jerry. They met Usana at the Sen. Gil Puyat Station of the LRT at around 9:00 p.m.
[28]

He gave his seat to Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed the rifle beneath the
seat. 
[29]

They went home via Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint after
crossing SLEX. The policemen directed their flashlights at them and one opened the
front passenger door. The latter saw the rifle under Usana’s seat. Usana and Escaño
[30]

were ordered to get out of the car. PO3 Nonato immediately saw the gun tucked in
Escaño’s waist and asked if he was a policeman. Escaño replied that everything would
be explained at the police station. He was also asked to step out. No firearm was,
however, found in his possession. [31]
When confronted about the guns, Escaño tried to intercede for his two companions
and said that "... these two don’t know anything about it, I just took them for a drive."
They subsequently went to police station Block 5. A certain Toto, a policeman, drove
the Kia Pride to Block 5.[32]

Upon reaching the police station, Escaño was immediately brought to the office of Lt.
Eco while he and Usana were asked to sit on the bench. After a few minutes, PO3 de
los Santos came out of the office of Lt. Eco to talk to him. He told him that all he
knew about Escaño is that he was a wealthy flight attendant with military connections.
After returning to Lt. Eco’s office, PO3 de los Santos went out of the police station
with Lt. Eco and Escaño. The three came back with a blue bag which he had never
seen before. The bag was opened before the three suspects. Escaño reiterated that his
two companions had nothing to do with the bag. [33]

He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escaño in the morning of
April 5. At around 4:00 p.m., they were transferred to the CID and stayed in the office
of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escaño admitted he owned the bag/case. [34]

For his part, Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was gainfully
employed by Rolando de Asis and Taytay Management Corporation. He admitted
[35]

owning a licensed .45 caliber pistol. In March 1995, he hired as mechanic Lopez,
[36]

who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II where he also lives. Escaño on the other
hand, was introduced to him by a certain Roberto Samparado, a neighbor of Lopez.
Escaño, an international flight attendant of Philippine Airlines and a businessman who
owns Verge Enterprises, also supplied materials to the Philippine Army and planned
to engage in a construction business. [37]

On 4 April 1995, at around 7:30 p.m., he paged Escaño to talk about the materials for
the five prototype gunship helicopters they were supposed to supply. They talked on
the phone, agreeing to meet between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave.
Station of the Light Rail Transit, and met at around a quarter past nine. Escaño was
[38]

on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the passenger seat. Lopez vacated the
seat for him. They went to Magallanes Village to meet a certain Norman Garcia and
talk about the documents relating to the helicopter gunship of the Air Force. They
[39]

arrived there at 11:30 p.m. While they were talking with Garcia, he noticed a gun and
magazines tucked in Escaño’s waist. Upon inquiry, Escaño said it was not a problem
and only for his protection. On their way to Roxas Boulevard, they were stopped at a
[40]

checkpoint along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Policemen knocked on the car windows so he
and Escaño rolled down their windows. A person in civilian clothes suddenly opened
the right door, took something from the side of his seat and shouted, "There’s a gun."
He was surprised because he did not carry anything when he boarded the car; neither
did he see anything inside the car because it was dark and he was not wearing his
eyeglasses. The person who took the gun asked if he was a policeman, and he said
[41]

he was an architect. He was then asked to alight from the car, then frisked. Escaño
was also asked to alight from a car. They saw a gun tucked in his waist, so they asked
if he was a policeman, and Escaño answered in the negative. Lopez was then ordered
to get out of the car by the person in civilian clothes and was also searched. They rode
the Anfra service vehicle of the police. One of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff
him and Escaño. The policeman who asked Escaño to get out of the car drove the
Anfra van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the morning of 5 April. 
[42]

He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco while Escaño was inside with the
arresting officers. Lt. Eco came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth. He
heard Lopez say that they were both just with Escaño and that they knew nothing
about the guns; neither do they own any. SPO4 de los Santos entered the office of Lt.
Eco and came out five minutes later with Escaño, Lt. Eco, and the other arresting
officers, Nonato, Suba and Erwin Eco, the person in civilian clothes. All six went out
to the parking area and returned after about five minutes. Lt. Eco was carrying a bag
which he placed on top his desk. Lopez and Escaño were asked about the contents of
the bag. The two replied it was the first time they saw that bag. Lt. Eco opened the
bag before them. They all saw something in brown paper. He and Lopez
simultaneously exclaimed that they knew nothing about the contents of the bag, and
they implored Escaño to tell the police that they had nothing to do with it. [43]

The trial court found the prosecution’s version more credible than that of any one of
the accused, and ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
convict the accused as charged. It decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 95-936, accused JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN,

VIRGILIO USANA y TOME and JERRY LOPEZ y CASABAAN are
GUILTY as charged and are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous

Drugs Board the 3.314 kilograms of Hashish (marijuana) for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with law; and

2. In criminal Cases Nos. 95-937 and 95-938, accused JULIAN

ESCAÑO y DEEN and VIRGILIO USANA y TOME are GUILTY as
charged in the two separate informations respectively filed against them
and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term from TEN (10)
 YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum, as minimum to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL maximum as maximum.  [44]

The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are
still with the City Prosecutor’s Office are forfeited in favor of the
Government are directed to be turned over to the Firearms and Explosive
Unit, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for its appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED. [45]

Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following arguments:

1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized

without search warrant when the police officers already had the
opportunity to secure a search warrant before searching the bag found at
the baggage compartment at the back of the car;

2. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence, the trial court

erred in finding appellants to have conspired with Escaño in transporting
the hashish when the evidence clearly shows that the hashish was owned
and possessed solely by Escaño;

3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of

hashish despite the fact that they were neither in actual nor constructive
possession of the illegal drug; and

4. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of

Julian Escaño in favor of appellants.

Before going any further, some words are in order regarding the establishment of
checkpoints.

Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was

conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati
Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun
[46]

ban during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section
26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and
local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the month. The
incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the election
period.

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by
the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
[47]

motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as
a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. [48]

The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose
for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period
would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were
merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening
the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not
only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the
ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their
fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. [49]

Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting
the three accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as aboveboard the search
done by the Makati Police of the trunk of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes six
generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an
arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs
searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.
[50] [51]
Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot
invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on
the car of Escaño was consented to by him. Both Lopez and Usana testified that
Escaño was with the police officers when they searched the car. There was no
[52]

apparent objection made by Escaño as he seemed to have freely accompanied the

police officers to the car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escaño readily
agreed to open the trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos. But according to
[53]

Escaño, he refused the request of the police officers to search his car. We must give
[54]

credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Not only is it buttressed by the testimony of
Usana and Lopez that Escaño freely accompanied the police officers to the car, it is
also deemed admitted by Escaño in failing to appeal the decision. The findings of fact
of the trial court are thus deemed final as against him.

Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and
Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate
against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car
was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for
firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped
until the police station; (4) the car’s trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño,
without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and
until the opening of the car’s trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the
police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found
in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the latter’s car before the
"finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without
their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling,
distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that
Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they
saw the same before it was seized.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of

the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is
concerned with regard to accused-appellants VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C.
LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No 6425, as
amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their
immediate release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, unless their further
detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said accused-appellants within
five (5) days from notice of this decision.

SO ORDERED. Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

No. 71-6278

Argued March 19 and 28, 1973

Decided June 21, 1973

413 U.S. 266

Syllabus

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit, challenges the
constitutionality of the Border Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles
north of the Mexican border. The search, made without probable cause or consent,
uncovered marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a federal crime. The
Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other
conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States," as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The
Attorney General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles
from any external boundary of the United States." The Court of Appeals upheld the
search on the basis of the Act and regulation.

Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without probable cause
or consent, violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-275.

(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to
automobile searches, as probable cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by analogy
with administrative inspections, as the officers had no warrant or reason to believe that
petitioner had crossed the border or committed an offense, and there was no consent
by petitioner. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-272.

(b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof. Pp. 413 U.
S. 272-275.

452 F.2d 459, reversed.

STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 413 U. S. 275. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 285.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Juan T. David for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis,
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police
Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967,
which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners
in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any
manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing
and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said
case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1
at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau
of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their
cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the
trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo
Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods
contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally
assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and
supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been
misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge
that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police
Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and
that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer
irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their
favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex

parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case
before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of
the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order
was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the
Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case
No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed,
on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks
and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case,
the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been
paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the
seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and
Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein
petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios
Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were
subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of
Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not
suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining
order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the
case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center
of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a
"Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her
posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods
in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental
opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January
30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges
due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios
Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the
goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March
13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to
hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they
had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the
present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their
petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in
ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons:
(1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the
case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking
judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its
agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release
of the goods was grossly insufficient.
 In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in
this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue
the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long
before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were
instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in
question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those
goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods
was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and
detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of
Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers
have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited
importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed
before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods
under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that
the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess
and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4

The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject
of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a
comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and
receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H
(the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens
and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch
bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320
dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief
were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2,
120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200
dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is
subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said
goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been
formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same
according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of
the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496,
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been
issued by the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-
24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De
Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of
Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported
and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an
inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on
October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the
goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the
goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was
involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came
from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had
no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was
not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the
goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had
been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of
seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs
and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to
dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their
motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered
them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy
Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this
Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In
resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
 This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of
First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs
authorities to release the goods?

Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance
was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure
and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of
the said court.

The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the
seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were
paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales
thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port
(Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code
(RA 1957).

The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues
from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on
customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).

The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they
be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are
subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.

Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act
1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the
Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia,supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In
the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4,
1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January
12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was
only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when
the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot
be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,11 and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and
examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause
to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods
in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer
to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This
was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search
and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle.
He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799,
wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .

Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it
was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own
and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the
 person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast
as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap.
100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815,
above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted
in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter
embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in
Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .

In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition,
and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege
that there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,

That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were
detained.

But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would
be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as

recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence
in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative,
urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:

. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure
without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .

. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the

Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure
is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the
slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed
rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
 silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is
a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways.
Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which
it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the
goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal
and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this
decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any
manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and 1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët