UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

COLLEGE OF LAW

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

CASE
DIGESTS
Submitted to:

Atty. Yusoph Abbas

Submitted by:

Donna Mae P. Pagdalian

Sec. A; Thurs. 9:00 PM – 10:00 PM
 Contents
[G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996.] ...................................................................................... 4
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO,
accused-appellant. ............................................................................................................. 4
[G.R. No. 80914, April 6, 1995.] .............................................................................................. 5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMABLE FLORES Y
SOGUILON, accused-appellant. .......................................................................................... 5
[G.R. No. 68997. April 27, 1990] ............................................................................................. 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO LIBAG Y
CABADING, accused-appellant ........................................................................................... 6
[G.R. No.177580: October 17, 2008] ....................................................................................... 7
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIANO N. MEDRANO, respondent. .... 7
[A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002]......................................................................................... 8
ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant, vs. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, Presiding Judge,
Court of Tax Appeals, respondent ....................................................................................... 8
[A.M. No. P-03-1697. October 1, 2003] ................................................................................... 1
JOCELYN S. PAISTE, complainant, vs. APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of Court II,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan, respondent. ........................ 1
[G.R. NO. 149937 : June 21, 2007] .......................................................................................... 2
ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. ......................... 2
[G.R. NO. 166810 : June 26, 2008] .......................................................................................... 3
JUDE JOBY LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. ....................... 3
[G.R. NO. 172573, June 19, 2008] ........................................................................................... 4
RICARDO SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and A.H. SHOPPERS' MART,
INC., Respondents. ............................................................................................................. 4
[G.R. No. 139323. June 6, 2001] .............................................................................................. 5
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLO ELLASOS y MAURICIO ALIAS
ROMMEL and SONNY OBILLO Y GANAYO, accused. .......................................................... 5
[G.R. No. 130594. July 5, 2000] ............................................................................................... 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AKMAD SIRAD, ORLIE SULTAN y
MASDAL and SALIK AMINO y LUGEOMAN, accused, .......................................................... 6
ORLIE SULTAN y MASDAL and SALIK AMINO y LUGEOMAN, accused-appellants. .............. 6
G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012 .............................................................................................. 7
P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner, vs. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman;BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial
 Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt.,
Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents. .......................................................................... 7
[G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005] ............................................................................................. 8
VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ............................ 8
G.R. Nos: 108135-36 August 14, 2000 ..................................................................................... 9
POTENCIANA EVANGELISTA, plaintiff, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent ..................................................................... 9
G.R. No. 174629 |February 14, 2008 .................................................................................... 10
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC),petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents. .. 10
G.R. No. 176944 March 6, 2013 ............................................................................................ 12
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y. LIGOT,
and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Respondent. ........................................................ 12
G.R. NOS. 142369-70 APRIL 2007 ......................................................................................... 14
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent ........... 14
 [G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO,
accused-appellant.
FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of 2
offenses, which were separately filed:

1. Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866

Par. 2 of Sec. 1 of PD 1866 states that, “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.”

ISSUE: 1. W/ON THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE V. TAC-AN, PEOPLE V. TIOZON, PEOPLE V. CALING, ETC. OR TO MODIFY
THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICT THE APPELLANT ONLY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM INTIS
AGGRAVATED FORM PURSUANT TO PEOPLE V. BARROS.

2. W/ON THE 2ND PAR. OF SEC. 1 OF PD 1866 INTEGRATED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND THE
RESULTANT KILLING INTO A SINGLE INTEGRATED OFFENSE.

HELD: 1. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed

In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an,and reiterated in People vs.
Tiozon,People vs. Caling,People vs. Deunida,People vs. Tiongco,People vs. Fernandez,and
People vs. Somooc, that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits
two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866,
we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of
murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding
the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of
aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179. Although Tac-an and
Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for
aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these
are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second
under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply.|||
(People v. Quijada y Circulado, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, [July 24, 1996], 328 PHIL 505-606)

2. 2nd par. of Sec 1 of PD 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two
offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. It
does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of “to evince an intention to create a
single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”.
 [G.R. No. 80914, April 6, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMABLE FLORES Y
SOGUILON, accused-appellant.
 [G.R. No. 68997. April 27, 1990]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO LIBAG Y
CABADING, accused-appellant
FACTS: Roberto Libag y Cabading, found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) by the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for life, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs, now seeks a reversal of
the said decision and prays for his acquittal on the ground that the trial court erred in finding
him guilty for the following reasons: 1. The trial court disregarded the inherently hearsay
testimony of the two arresting officers, the alleged “buyer” not having been presented as
witness; 2. The police officers instigated the commission of the offense;

ISSUES:

RULING
 [G.R. No.177580: October 17, 2008]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIANO N. MEDRANO, respondent.
FACTS: Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher, filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman
a sworn letter-complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for
violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and
grave misconduct (administrative case). While the administrative case was pending
investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was
granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six months
without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension
order.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found
Medrano guilty of grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and
assailed not only the factual findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time,
challenged its jurisdiction over the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its
Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in theadministrative case.

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing
Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s
decision in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of
the CA‘s decision but was denied.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST MEDRANO EVEN IF AN AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE HAS
ALREADY BEEN FILED BY DUMALAOG

HELD: With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint, Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors of the people,” the Ombudsman and his Deputies
are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to act on
complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against
Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded
the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing
Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the
administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked
Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint
allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s
acts belatedly.
 [A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002]
ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant, vs. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, Presiding
Judge, Court of Tax Appeals, respondent
FACTS: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing
gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day,
he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards
him and kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by
phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room,
shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed
her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could
see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there,
respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA, while complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to
his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her.

Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left. The last incident happened
the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in
his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her.
The latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by accident in respondents
office. Ruby then approached the secretary’s table which was separated from respondent’s
office by a transparent glass.

For her part, complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to
know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at
Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent
approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When he
returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached
complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab
her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her
arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a
chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his hands.
Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that
incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it won’t happen again.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ACOSTA IS GUILTY OF SEXUALLY HARASSMENT.

HELD: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the charges
against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment.
“A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favour and does not
fall within the purview of sexual harassment under RA 7877.”
 [A.M. No. P-03-1697. October 1, 2003]
JOCELYN S. PAISTE, complainant, vs. APRONIANO V. MAMENTA, JR., Clerk of Court II, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Tayug-San Nicolas, Pangasinan, respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer. She testified that on August 7, 2000, at about
3:00 p.m., a representative from the Plaridel Insurance Co. came to their office seeking
clearance. She immediately prepared the necessary form and, together with the
representative, went to see respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. When she
asked him to sign the document, respondent, who was at that time playing tong-its (a card
game) at the lawyers’ table with unnamed individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He
shouted at her: “Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the
Supreme Court?”

Goltiao declared that her working relationship with the respondent is “sometimes good
and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. He easily gets mad at her even for small, trivial
mistakes. This situation started, according to her, when she told him to stop courting and
sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She related an incident which
happened early one morning when he asked her to see him inside the judge’s chamber. At
that time, the designated judge was not around. Once inside, she was told to sit in one of the
chairs in front of the judge’s table.

Furthermore, respondent sent her love notes. He wrote his love messages on pieces of
paper in front of her and handed them to her.[9] She knew that they were intended for her as
there was nobody else present when he gave the notes to her. He would also call her at her
mother’s house. She did not respond affirmatively to his display of affection as both of them are
married. Finally, she explained that she filed a complaint against him only on August 10, 2001
because of the August 7, 2001 incident, when she got fed up at the way he treated her.

ISSUE: WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES FILED AGAINST HIM.

RULING: Under the circumstances, we find respondent guilty of sexual harassment. His
severely outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, constitute sexual harassment because
they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment for his
female subordinates.[35] He abused the power and authority he exercises over them, which is
the gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment.[36] Sexual harassment in the workplace
is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire – it is about
power being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates
from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances.
 [G.R. NO. 149937 : June 21, 2007]
ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: The trial court found that petitioner issued the check as guarantee for his loan obtained
from Bernardo. At the time he issued the check, he knew that his account with the PNB had
been closed. When Bernardo deposited the check, it was dishonored by the PNB, the drawee
bank, for the reason "account closed." Petitioner was duly notified of such dishonor. In fact, he
admitted having received Bernardo's demand letter urging him to make good the check within
five (5) banking days from notice. But petitioner failed to heed such demand.

Eventually, Bernardo caused the filing with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Pasig
City an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 against petitioner. When arraigned, with
the assistance of his counsel, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued
thereafter. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondent, and finds
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of BP22, and sentenced
to pay a fine ₱50,000.00. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the trial
court’s decision with a modification of deleting the award of attorney’s fees since no evidence
was adduced to prove such fact. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner however
it was denied.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22

RULING: Issuing a check merely as guarantee is not a defense in the crime of BP22, as
compared to that of estafa. Also, the argument that the subject check was issued without
consideration is inconsequential. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a worthless
check. As stated in the case:

“The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner.

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check.4 The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking
communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum. “
 [G.R. NO. 166810 : June 26, 2008]
JUDE JOBY LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner prosecuted for estafa.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of private complainant Efren R. Ables and
Valentin Luzuriaga, a bank teller of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The
prosecution presented Exhibits "A" to "E" with submarkings consisting of the check issued by
the petitioner, the demand letter sent by private complainant to petitioner and bank records
to show that the said check was dishonored as the account was closed even before the said
check was issued.

Petitioner contends first that there was absence of deceit as the complainant knew that
there was no funds at the time of the issuance of the check. But it was settled that it is criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and not the nonpayment of a debt.

Afterwards, Petitioner contends that no presumption or prima facie evidence of guilt

would arise if there is no proof as to the date of receipt by the drawer of the said notice
"since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 3-day period" from receipt of
notice of dishonor of the check within which the amount necessary to cover the check may be
done as provided by paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA

RULING: The absence of proof as to receipt of the written notice of dishonor notwithstanding,
the evidence shows that petitioner had actual notice of the dishonor of the check because
he was verbally notified by the respondent and notice whether written or verbal was a
surplusage and totally unnecessary considering that almost two (2) months before the issuance
of the check, petitioner's current account was already closed. Under these circumstances, the
notice of dishonor would have served no useful purpose as no deposit could be made in a
closed bank account.

Further it is settled that it is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is
made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the nonpayment of a debt. Deceit is
the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading
allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Concealment which
the law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party
ought to have. The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent act

Therefore, it may be gleaned from the fact that notice of written dishonour is not a
defense in estafa, however, as may be seen in the next case, there should be explicit, actual
and written notice to the drawer of the check.
 [G.R. NO. 172573, June 19, 2008]
RICARDO SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and A.H. SHOPPERS'
MART, INC., Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner prosecuted for BP 22 for issuing a check and its subsequent
dishonour due to the fact of a closed account. Upon notification, petitioner still has not paid
complainant. The evidence shows that the prosecution proved that a notice of dishonor was
sent to petitioner through registered mail. The prosecution presented a copy of the demand
letter and properly authenticated the registry return receipt. Issue: WON there was sufficient
notice to the petitioner to convict him of BP 22?

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT HE HAD BEEN
SENT AND RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISHONOR

RULING: It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to show "that the drawer of the check
received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from
receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check."

A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the petitioner
received the notice of dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof
of receipt of letters sent through registered mail.

The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet
the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner received such notice,
especially considering that he denied receiving it. As there is insufficient proof that the
petitioner received notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency
of funds cannot arise.
 [G.R. No. 139323. June 6, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLO ELLASOS y MAURICIO
ALIAS ROMMEL and SONNY OBILLO Y GANAYO, accused.
FACTS: Miguel de Belen, who is the registered owner of the tricycle subject of this carnapping
case, was last seen by his brother Fernando at the Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992,
he (Miguel) was seated beside the accused Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his tricycle which
was being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos.

Three (3) hours later, Fernando again saw the two accused with the tricycle, but this
time without his brother. When Fernando finally asked the accused about the whereabouts of
his brother, Ellasos answered that Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos') father in
Malasin.
The following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de Belen, with a gunshot wound on
the head, was found in Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were found sleeping at
the gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muñoz, and in possession of a gun and the wheel of
Miguel's tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered in a culvert.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED.

RULING: The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the tricycle
was unlawfully taken by the two accused from its owner, Miguel de Belen, and the latter was
killed on the occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen with the two accused; three hours later,
the two were again spotted riding the tricycle without Miguel. The following morning, the two
accused were found in possession of a wheel of the tricycle. Such possession, which remained
without any satisfactory explanation, raises the presumption that the two accused authored the
carnapping. This presumption remains unrebutted.

That only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and was intended to be
appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The unlawful taking of the tricycle from the owner
was already completed. Besides, the accused may be held liable for the unlawful taking of the
whole vehicle even if only a part thereof is ultimately taken and/or appropriated while the rest
of it is abandoned.
The crime was committed before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. Therefore, we have to
apply the original provision prescribing the penalty of "life imprisonment to death" where the
"owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping".

“Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of

carnapping, is an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful
taking of the vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking
of the vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same.”
 [G.R. No. 130594. July 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AKMAD SIRAD, ORLIE SULTAN y
MASDAL and SALIK AMINO y LUGEOMAN, accused,
ORLIE SULTAN y MASDAL and SALIK AMINO y LUGEOMAN, accused-appellants.
FACTS: George Lozano, the victim in this case, made a living by delivering bread around
General Santos City using a red Kawasaki motorcycle owned by his employer Aniceto Dela.
In the morning of February 4, 1992, he left his house early at around 5:00 a.m. to get bread from
the bakery of Aniceto Dela. He returned to his house two hours later and after taking his
breakfast, left again at past 7:00 A.M. proceeding towards Barangay Sinawal. At about 9:00 a.m.
Martillano Lozano was picking cotton at a cotton farm in Sitio Cabuay (Cabuway), Barangay
Sinawal, General Santos City when he saw his cousin George Lozano pass by riding his red
Kawasaki motorcycle with the bread box attached at its side. At around 12:00 noon he again
saw the red motorcycle pass by, but this time it was not George who was riding the motorcycle
but three men and the bread box was no longer attached to the motorcycle. Rita Pino, a co-
worker of Martillano Lozano at the cotton farm also saw the red Kawasaki motorcycle pass by
the cotton farm at around noon of February 4, 1992, driven by accused-appellant Akmad Sirad
with the other accused-appellants Orlie Sultan and Salik Amino riding at the back.
At around 1:00 in the afternoon, Martillano Lozano reported to Nenita Lozano, wife of
the victim George Lozano, that he saw the motorcycle of George Lozano ridden by another
person and that the bread box was no longer attached to the motorcycle. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, Nenita Lozano was worried because George Lozano who usually arrived at that time
had not arrived. She then went to the wake of Bernardino Lozano where she could ask the
people there about her husband's whereabouts.
A search party was organized and they looked for George Lozano by tracing the usual
routes he would take in delivering bread. On February 7,1992, an informant provided
information that a motorcycle was hidden in Purok Islam, General Santos City and that it would
soon be transferred to Cotabato. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, a motorcycle with two men
on board approached the police roadblock. The motorcycle sped up when its driver Akmad
Sirad recognized police officer Domantay. The police officers gave chase on board their
motorcycles and were able to overtake and apprehend Akmad Sirad and his companion Orlie
Sultan. When Akmad Sirad was asked to explain why they have the motorcycle of the deceased
George Lozano, accused told Domantay that he was instructed by Salik Amino to deliver the
vehicle to Sultan Kudarat.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES AT A

POLICE LINE-UP IS ILLEGAL OR NOT

HELD: We disagree with accused-appellants. When they were apprehended, they were riding
the motorcycle of the deceased George Lozano, and to make things worse, they fled when they
were asked by the police to stop. Possession of a stolen property creates the presumption that
the possessor stole it. Adding the fact that they fled when asked by the police to stop, it is just
normal and more likely that they would be considered primary suspects
During the commission of the crime, which was on February 4, 1992, there was no crime
denominated as carnapping with homicide. The proper denomination for the crime is
carnapping as defined and penalized under of Republic Act No. 6539, Sections 2 and 14. Under
Republic Act No. 6539, Section 14, the penalty for carnapping in case the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that at the time of the commission
of the crime the death penalty was suspended, accused are hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
 G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012
P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner, vs. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman;BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial
Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt.,
Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.
FACTS: On 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the municipal station received
information that successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Thus,
petitioner, together with Police Inspector Idel Hermoso (Hermoso), and Senior Police Officer
(SPO1) Arial Lanaque (Lanaque), immediately went to the area to investigate.
Upon arriving, they saw Aguillon, wobbling and drunk, openly carrying a rifle.
According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was able to present his Firearm
License Card, he was not able to present a PTCFOR.
For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully
arrested and detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had every
right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon
further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his firearm within his barangay.
According to petitioner, he never received a copy of the Counter-Affidavit Aguillon had filed
and was thus unable to give the necessary reply.
On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February
2009 Resolution, but it was denied through an Order dated 23 July 2009. Thus, on 8 December
2009, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. According to
petitioner, he was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s
Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February
2009 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner also argues that public
respondents’ act of dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon, based solely on
insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR). He thus claims that the assailed Resolutions were issued "contrary
to law, and/or jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction."
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT AGUILLON IS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM.

RULING: Respondent Aguillon is not guilty of the crime charged. The authority of Aguillon to
carry his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866
but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government Code (LGC).
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban’s standpoint on this matter is correct. All the guidelines
and rules cited in the instant Petition "refers to civilian agents, private security guards,
company guard forces and government guard forces." These rules and guidelines should not
be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. As barangay captain, he is the
head of a local government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities are properly outlined
in the LGC. This law specifically gives him, by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the
necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not deny that when he found
Aguillon "openly carrying a rifle," the latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain
of the barangay.
 [G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005]
VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban) for having in
possession one (1) .38 cal. Rev. with four (4) live bullets in a public place during the election
period without having secured the necessary license and authority from the COMELEC. During
the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 8294 was approved into law. Eventually, the trial
court rendered judgment of conviction in both cases wherein separate penalties were imposed
respectively. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, claiming that the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 had already been reduced by the subsequent
enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which the trial court subsequently denied. He then filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, but was
likewise dismissed.

ISSUES: 1) WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294 SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.

2) WHETHER OR NOT SUCH USE OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A

SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

HELD: 1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms depending on the class of firearm possessed. The lighter penalty may be imposed to
a person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition, “unless no other crime was
committed”. Moreover, the Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals that said
law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner
at the same time, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of
firearm.

2) No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess
any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. It
further provides that such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered only as an
aggravating circumstance in cases of homicide or murder. Since the crime committed was in
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance
 G.R. Nos: 108135-36 August 14, 2000
POTENCIANA EVANGELISTA, plaintiff, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent

FACTS: Tanduay Distillery, Inc, filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an application
for tax credits for allegedly erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes (taxes based on value of
property). Tanduay claimed that a previous BIR ruling only made Tanduay liable to pay
specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes.

Thus, Tanduay requested the BIR to check and verify whether Tanduay previously paid
ad valorem taxes. After making necessary verification, a certification was issued, stating that
Tanduay was a rectifier not liable ad valorem tax with a recommendation that the application
for tax credit be given due course.

Sometime thereafter, BIR received a complaint, alleging that the grant of tax credit was
irregular and anomalous. Due to this, petitioner, along with three other officers of BIR, was
charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the NIRC and RA 3019. They were
convicted, except for one officer, of crimes pursuant to said violations.

In a consolidated petition for review, the two officers were acquitted, except for
Evangelista, who was found guilty of gross negligence in the exercise of his duty; thus, this
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

RULING: “Motion for Reconsideration is well-taken.”

The certification issued by petitioner did not endorse approval of said application for
tax credit but actually showed that Tanduay was not entitled to such.

Contrary to allegations, petitioner did not cause any undue injury to the Government,
give unwarranted benefits or preference to Tanduay, display manifest partiality to Tanduay,
and act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Furthermore, the acts from which her conviction was based on were different from
those described in the Information under which she was charged with. It is a well-settled rule
that an accused cannot be convicted of an offence unless it is clearly charged in the complaint
of information.

Finally, petitioner’s act of issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt practices
as defined in Section 3(e) of RA 3019; thus, the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege
(there is no crime where there is no law punishing it) is applicable.

“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s Decision

dated September 30, 1999 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
charge against her.”
 G.R. No. 174629 |February 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC),petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.

FACTS: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire
into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong
before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard
David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July
2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC
the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson
and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe
that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the
Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now
the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-
Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the
accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The
letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the
commission of unlawful activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases then
pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases
before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC
promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005, [19] which authorized the
executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter,
including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of
Cheng Yong with Metrobank.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BANK ACCOUNTS OF RESPONDENTS CAN BE EXAMINED.

HELD: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated.
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts
may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon
written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the
AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 thereof. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to
the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a
provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-
blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle
established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that
nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
 G.R. No. 176944 March 6, 2013
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y.
LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Respondent.

FACTS: On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by
the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the
issuance of a freeze order with the CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of
the petitioners. This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of the
Ombudsman to the AMLC,... recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen.
Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA No. 9160.

Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that
as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight Hundred
Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos (P3,848,003.00).[11] In... contrast, his declared assets
in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P105,000.00).

The Ombudsman's investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family had other
properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN,... Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot's
main source of income was his salary as an officer of the AFP,[17] and given his wife and
children's lack of any other substantial sources of income,[18] the Ombudsman declared the
assets... registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot's name, as well as those in his wife's and children's names,
to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An
Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor).

Ligots filed the present petition. Lt. Gen. Ligot... maintains that the freeze order issued
against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders
provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The Republic claims that the CA can issue a
freeze order upon a determination that probable cause exists, showing that the monetary
instruments or properties subject of the freeze order are related to the unlawful activity CA's
September 20, 2005 resolution, granting the Republic's motion to extend the effectivity of the
freeze order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be challenged.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION 10 OF RA NO. 9160,

AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 53(B) OF THE RULE IN CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES,

RULING: Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the
Republic nonetheless asserts that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does not apply to the
present case because the CA had already resolved the issues regarding the extension of the
freeze order before... the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect.

As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order
refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or
cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about
to be, is... being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offense.

As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary

effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedy - which means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action
of asking... for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where the petition is
filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a preservatory and
preemptive remedy.

In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it
took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was filed
in court, despite the clear tenor of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension...
of a freeze order for only a period of six months. All the Republic could proffer is its temporal
argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases; in effect, it glossed over
the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these circumstances, we cannot but...
conclude that the continued ext... ension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period
violated the Ligots' right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.
 G.R. NOS. 142369-70 APRIL 2007
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
FACTS: Petitioner Juanito Merencillo, Group Supervising Examiner of the Buereau of Interna
Revenue (BIR) of Tagbiliran City, was charged in two separate Informations for violation of
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) and for direct bribery. The
charges were filed by Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar.

On 13 September 1995, Cesar’s agent asked the BIR office of Tagbilaran City for the
computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc., and
applied for a certificate authorizing registration (CAR). Merencillo approved the computation.
On the same day, Cesar received a call from Merencillo, asking her to go to his office. When
she as at his office, Merencillo allegedly demanded P20,000 in exchange for the approval of
the CAR. She went to the Revenue District Officer (RDO) and complained about Merencillo’s
refusal to release the CAR unless his demand was met. The RDO assured her that he would look
into her complaint. Subsequently, she received a call from Merecnillo informing her that she
could get the CAR but reminded her of his demand. She ought the help of the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol, Senior Superintendent Dionaid
Baraguer. Merencillo was apprehended in an entrapment set up by the PNP of Bohol.

During the trial, Merencillo’s evidence consisted of nothing more than a general denial
of the charges against him. The trial court found him guilty of the charges, which was affirmed
by the Sandiganbayan where he appealed the case. In his appeal to the Court, Merencillo
maintained that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of
Section 3 (b) of R.A. 3019 and for direct bribery.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MERENCILLO WAS PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN HE

WAS PROSECUTED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AND FOR DIRECT
BRIBERY

RULING: The petition is denied.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy for
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identitcal with the other or
is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Moreover, section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 provides that in addition to the acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law they may still be punished if found guilty of
the corrupt practices enumerated in this section. One may therefore be charged with violation
of R.A. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act,
that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the revised
Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively
for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.