G.R. No.
115381 December 23, 1994 March 19, 1997
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the
PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to
LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to allow provincial bus to
change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or
below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line
with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector which
the government intends to implement and to make progress
towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the
Public Service Act requires publication and notice to
concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial
Bus Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an
application for across the board fare rate increase, which was
granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a
memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of
procedures to implement the Department Order & to lay down
deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP,
w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate
increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and
filed a petition before LTFRB w/c was denied. Hence the
instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c
was readily granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to
set a fare range above existing authorized fare range is
unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is
unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas delegate non
delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is
applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru
instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is
a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the
delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give
provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result
to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave the riding public
at the mercy of transport operators who can increase their
rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it
necessary.
-------
Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the
COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have
the petition published. After the hearing the arguments
between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following
arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s
initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to
which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on
people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the
Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as
worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a
revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction
over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were
intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for
a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in
implementing initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and
orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition .
TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
-----------
US VS ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122 43 Phil 1 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed
and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act
under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this
Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing
the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation
of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged
and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an
undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional
limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote
of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here
involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in
the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing
must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at
any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what
was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at
which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so,
when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how
long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was
“any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the
Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades
or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale
“of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No.
53.”
-------
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT,
petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos
in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed
by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The
executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the
instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying due process.
--------
Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)
Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as
parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including
examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the
sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an
Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied
therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-
equal branches. They relied heavily on the case of National
Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court
held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the
orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly
apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of
First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was
that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said
cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the
contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The
respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the
same category. There is no law providing for the next course of
action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to
the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that
even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by
the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from
enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution
has a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity
and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and
review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is
more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from
taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it
also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are
lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it
violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC
cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools
and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass
the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction
are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with
corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped
from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done
by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages
and stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

---------