G.R. No.
L-37878 November 25, 1932 falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo
Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company,
requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms
upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the
Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by
such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal
right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition.
Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to
construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an
electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to
the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any
franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said
other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the
grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the
petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies
affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the
proceedings, and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On
the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to
be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the
Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila
Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between
the parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission
to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of
jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in
articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it
should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held
that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred
to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros
Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of
Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far.
Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the
parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive
a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate
to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true
that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a
public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts
for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs.
Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature
authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be
charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the
courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there
has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the
legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of
arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to
fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before
the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as
arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature,
that would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not
lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration
of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members
of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court.
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering
of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be
prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting
as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme
Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court"
in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being
defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress
cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of
every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the
legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be
inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon
 the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and
pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial
power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the
whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And
while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully
abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which
is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2
Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11
of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final,
to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme
Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and
Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968
ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, Petitioner,
vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as
Executive Secretary, Respondents.
Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary
of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary
pending investigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed,
confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by
Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner
is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those
of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642,
4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following
expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge
- P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter
requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary
action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval
of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and
apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments
and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the
Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R.
A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that
a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to
the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending
investigation of the above charges."chanrobles virtual law library
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions
advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and
abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents
admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner,
exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that
the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or
executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-
judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land
Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary
Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites
that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of
the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme
Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of
Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at
all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First
Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme
Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily
result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom
the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured
officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary
Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila
(R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050,
s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme
Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are
plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the
Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative
officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed
under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec.
10[i]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor
General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since
the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the
Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par.
2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the
Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges
of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that
in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of
Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by
Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from
office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First
Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of
Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for
Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made
in plain and unequivocal language.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the
Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank
and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by
the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of
that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with
the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401,
160 N. E. 655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary
with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General
Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972, -
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for
purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of
the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction
other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that
article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or
administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed.
736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut
Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep.
282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281
U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of
judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes
between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials
by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial
functions. The section invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. - When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of
the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner,
after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case
of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such
cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That, when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by
a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process.
It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land
Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau
director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not
administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should
constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers
and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151,
sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion
of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the
latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should
be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the
Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the
Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to
demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would
be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation
and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of
the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess
of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the
petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of
Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as
judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such
incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly reports
containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved,
the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:
three months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court
session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon.
Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of
the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form
No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2
thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his
official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has
collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from
January to February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the
cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex
"C" and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph thereof,
aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in
flagrant violation of action 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which
provides as follows:
... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal
Judges shall certify on their application for leave, and
upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment,
or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid,
that all special proceedings, applications, petitions,
motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have
been under submission for decision or determination for
a period of ninety days or more have been determined
and decided on or before the date of making the
certificate and ... no salary shall be paid without such
certificate' (Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to
December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein
the number of hours of session that the Court holds daily, the
accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55
and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has
manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or
discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable
Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon the
performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon
the performance of the duties of the office of Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates
his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the highest degree
of honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining to holding the
position of Judge in the administration of justice.
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court,
being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from
scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the
municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided
to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the
space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial
assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase
of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national
government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of
the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the
provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed
the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba
assured the respondent that the court could be accommodated in the west
wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the
municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location.
When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to
be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The
municipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over some of the
office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal
government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first
choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but
the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce the
rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was
the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's
negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the
owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal
government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to
convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall without partitions,
into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the
assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations,
the provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the
purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in
December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary
equipment with the Property Officer of the Department of Justice but,
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance
was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the
 equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see
enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice
marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of
Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in
his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by
the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and
instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave
incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned
above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyer who gets his first
appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of
being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him
from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside
from the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the
Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo
S. Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to
organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge
without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of
P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the
Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he
was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial
duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial
lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a
month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, to perform
their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions and circular (please
see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex
'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge
who has not entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking
Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all
special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have
been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have
been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate.' And bow could
such a judge hold court in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the
hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required
by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5,
55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective
complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or
less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further
proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be
dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations for the
respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has
attempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as
judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of
the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may
be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of,
however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent
had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not
perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good
reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary
of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible
which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as
in this case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place
and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him
therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work
for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time,
made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast
experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit.
In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the
government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as
judge without any fault on, his part. As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the
independence of the judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a
judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be
discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of
dishonesty cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments
and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well
as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not
yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all
of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions
and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for
he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself
available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in
the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of
providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to
have it read. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could
have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but that is something within
the initiative control of the Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the
practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to
assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation
of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the
public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and
balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the
serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of
grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no
judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his
actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other
than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this
Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this
resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988.
In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine
copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial
Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by
the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as
assume and discharge the powers and duties attached
to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as
neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary
nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the
second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of
the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
abandonment of my present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as
part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final
or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of
his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that—
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be
under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment
reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial
in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can
pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue
involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government
and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management
actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to
make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our
common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy
away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his
office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic
intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the
Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned
with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained
interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency
to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The
familiar quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to
such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-
time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge
of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular
functions.
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It
is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench
in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326 amending
E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work
and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.).
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue
involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government
and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management
actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to
make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary. )
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary
joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those
involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals,
Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one
another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical
barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and
unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically
insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our
common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public or
private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees
on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers?
Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it
participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot become members, why should they be
allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees The line drawn by the majority is vague
and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which
may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy
away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his
office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic
intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the
Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned
with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained
interpretation of their functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other dependents of
government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency
to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The
familiar quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,
JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO,
MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are
being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were
elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not
properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent
SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ...
any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition
being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased
from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon
request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
 (ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was
sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in
the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership
of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel
for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as
counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court
would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the
latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider
the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any
court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where
he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to
be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is
joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not
for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact"
that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-
51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within
the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-
corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave
to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
Today
 Republic of the Philippines We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision and hence, the filing o
SUPREME COURT
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of substance in a way probab
Manila
this Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied d
EN BANC issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the P
case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and
jurisdiction to try the administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the prevent
G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992 and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner, Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a preventive suspens
vs. Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications;
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint a
COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Action
Board, DOTC, respondents. Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA General Manager
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension" a
administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged with
ROMERO, J.:
of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its Administrative
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may pre
Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency
his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or em
attached to the said Department.
or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that th
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer removal from
in 1976 thePort
and service.
Operations
Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in its
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88who is charged
against mayBeja
petitioner be separated, for obvious
and Hernando reasons,
G. Villaluz from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the
for grave
distinct
dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial frombest
to the the interest
administrative penalty of
of the service. Bejaremoval from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D
and Villaluz
during the investigation
allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, of the charges
they were preventively against for
suspended him,thethecharges.
latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon h
disposition
After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 wasof"considered
the case. closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against The PPABejageneral
by the manager
PPA General is theManager
disciplining
alsoauthority who may, by himself and without the approval of the
for dishonesty,
administrative
grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the servicecase
andtoforpreventive suspension.
being notoriously His disciplinary
undesirable. The powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of
charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPAgranting heads
in the total of agencies
amount the "jurisdiction
of P218,000.00. Beja wasto investigate
also placed and decide matters involving disciplinary actions a
under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authori
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general ninety-day period from
manager indorsed it to the effectivity of the preventive
AAB for "appropriate suspension
action." At the has been exhausted. The employee conc
scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges against period may
him. ThebeAAB
interrupted.
proceededSection 42 of
to hear theP.D.
case No.
and807 alsoBeja
gave mandates that any fault, negligence or petition o
computation
an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary of the said
injunction period.
before the Thus, when
Regional a suspended
Trial Court of employee obtains from a court of justice a restrain
Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearinganofadministrative
Administrativecase,
Casethe No.lifespan of such court on
PPA-AAB-1-049-89 order shouldofbe excluded in the reckoning of the permissib
account
the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case.
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear admin
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before this CourtAssistant
a petitionGeneral Manager,
for certiorari the Court qualifiedly
with preliminary injunctionrules in favor of petitioner.
and/or
temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon. Reinerio 0. Reyes, etc., et al." In the en banc resolution of
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of t
March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for "appropriate action." 3 G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No.
as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power "to appoin
17270.
the technical staff of the Authority and other personnel."
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive portion reads:
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philipp
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely: Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated Jan
Communications was issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status. 10 Even Executive Order No. 292 or the
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are exonerated from the
agency charge to
"attached" against them;
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, T
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service; agencies attached to the DOTC "shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective ch
this Code."
c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in Book
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government service; two being supervision and control and administrative supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled. (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the Depa
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989. corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordinatio
4
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, eit
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing theispetition
if this for by
permitted certiorari for having the attached corporation or agency c
the charter;
lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order."
 the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies(b) through
The heads
its representative
of departments,
in agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, citie
the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees u
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amo
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the discretion or judgment of the
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the sa
executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the head of the board or the attached agency or
the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except wh
corporation strongly disagree on the interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement, he
executory only after confirmation by the department head.
shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned their audited financial
statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal year; and (Emphasis supplied.)
(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation Itshall is, therefore,
continue to clear
operate
that the
on the
transmittal
basis ofofthethepreceding
complaintyear's
by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was prem
budget until the financial statements shall have been submitted. Should any government-owned
conducted an investigation, or controlled
madecorporation
the proper incur
recommendation
an for the imposable penalty and sought its app
operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative
the part
supervision
of the herein
of thepetitioner
department;to elevate
and the thecorporation's
case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the
operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department's examination, review, modification and approval. (emphasis supplied.)
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated Ju
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than himone "all
which
casesis of
under
administrative
departmentalmalfeasance,
supervisionirregularities,
and control or grafts and acts of corruption in the Department."
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attachedcame into agency.
being pursuant
The attachment
to Administrative
is merely for Order
"policy 25 issued by the President on May 25, 1987. 15 Its sp
No.and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from notwithstanding,
Departmental controlthe AAB andis not
supervision
exempt from
is further reinforced of due process in its proceedings. 16 We are no
the observance
by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental protestation
interference that withpetitioner
respect towaived
appointments
his rightand
to beother
heardpersonnel
notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitione
11
actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. sought Moreover,
judicial recourse.
the Administrative Code explicitly provides
12
that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of the PP
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency suspension
is, to a certain
and REVERSED
extent, free from
insofar
Departmental
as it validatesinterference
the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on Ad
and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides: process has been accorded the petitioner.
Sec. 8. Management and Staff. — a) The President shall, upon the recommendation
The AABofdecision
the Board,
in said
appoint
casethe
is hereby
Generaldeclared
Manager NULL
and the
and VOID and the case in REMANDED to the PPA
Assistant General Managers. reinvestigation.
(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed
The preventive
on the basis
suspension
of meritofand
petitioner
fitnessshall
basedcontinue
on a unless after a determination of its duration, it is found
comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the Authority he shall
immediately
be reinstated
upon immediately.
its organization and consistent with Civil
Service rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including temporary
SO ORDERED.
workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Da
(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel of the
Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments.
Padilla and For professional
Bellosillo, and
JJ., took notechnical
part. positions, the
General Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in other government-owned
Feliciano,
corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and position J., is on leave
classification notwithstanding.
(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager.
xxx xxx xxx G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
(emphasis supplied.) AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs. of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation
CIVIL
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants SERVICE
said COMMISSION,
officials the HON. TEOFISTO
power to investigate T. GUINGONA,
its personnel below JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ,
the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, JR., respondents.
the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject
the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only
after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors. 14 PUNO, J.:
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned The power
may of the
elevate theCivil Service
matter to theCommission
DepartmenttoHead
abolish
or the Career Executive Service Board is
Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the challenged
Departmentin this petition for
Secretary certiorari and
is sanctioned by prohibition.
the Civil Service
Law (P.D. No. 807) under the following provisions:
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission shall decide upon appealappliedall
foradministrative
a Career Executive Service
disciplinary (CES)
cases Eligibility
involving theand a CESO rank on August 2, 1993,
she wasexceeding
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount given a CES eligibility.
thirty On September
days salary, demotion in15, 1993,
rank or she was recommended to the
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed President forthe
directly with a CESO rank byby
Commission thea Career
private Executive Service
citizen against a Board. 1
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission 2
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation
passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
 WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the government, is mandated to establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progresiveness and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 grants the Commission the power, among others, to
administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the
merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 Provides, among others, that The Career Service shall be
characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined
as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions;
and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative
Code of 1987 provides that "The third level shall cover Positions in the
Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate,
integrate and unify the administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil
Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary
implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service
Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in
its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the
Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now
form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC
Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service Commission
has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these
issues remain unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from
considering appointments of career service eligibles to career executive
ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the
legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC
Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A
VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT
HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS
SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK
OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS
NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE
POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD
ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND
MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED
PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB
WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:
 Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-
selected and development oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the
Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive
Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members
from the private sector and/or the academic community who are familiar
with the principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the
selection, classification, compensation and career development of members
of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization
and operation of the service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative
power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is
necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the
discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or
whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the
power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and
the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall
be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have
such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the
following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director,
with a Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies, standards, rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs
of the offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on their
operations, and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the
Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two
(2) members shall have the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice
and assistance; render counselling services; undertake legal studies and
researches; prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application
of the Civil Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such
law, rules and regulations; and represent the Commission before any court
or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development
plans, programs and projects; undertake research and studies on the
different aspects of public personnel management; administer management
improvement programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with
personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records
maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension
services; and provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate
and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations relative to the
administration of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide
leadership and assistance in developing and implementing the overall
Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement,
and formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership
and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and
standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee
incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership
and assistance in the development and retention of qualified and efficient
work force in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff
development; administer service-wide scholarship programs; develop
training literature and materials; coordinate and integrate all training
activities and evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies,
standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and
audit personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service
Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their
personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and
assistance in the development and implementation of policies, standards,
rules and regulations in the accreditation of employee associations or
organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of employee grievances
and management of employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career
development, merit and awards systems, position classification and
 compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit,
discipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of
comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the
enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to
retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the
retirement of government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall have not less
than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and
such field offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at
least the rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power
to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra.
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by
its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to
another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be
accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board
of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the
attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting
which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service
Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause
of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,
ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting
and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial
reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the
judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of
at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited
petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners
on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only
petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and
thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the
legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange
of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion
and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in
People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of
the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial
interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as
vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals.
This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on
keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a
well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests
are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.'
Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing
to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach
followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People
v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we
are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American
Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess
'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That
is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice
Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should
have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was
later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly
specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization
of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to
provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall
embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City
and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October
17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with
this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following
Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways
and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the
judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures.
The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step
be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the
disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the
poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive
manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all
members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise
of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans
submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior
courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved
court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice.
I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it
will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went
to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are likely to be
attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are
pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically
underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored.
Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be
quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is
well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable
and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To
be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly
so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as
simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained
increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its
implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more
appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the
true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards
reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more
regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the
Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures
deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of
validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their
interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack
of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay
in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital
concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity.
Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the
leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the
trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the
accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus
confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang
Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the
essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its
coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report
as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major
reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of
1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of
course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge
and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc,
but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and
the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of
First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be
forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29
Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next
came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of
two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were
established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges
as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above
narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed
legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular
attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in
disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to
the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in
the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to
increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme
Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In
accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines
for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the
options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not
availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary
leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public
hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals,
suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of
such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of
cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected
as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes
introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the
volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590
pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981.
With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of
the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here
involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts
to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits
of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the
offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more
apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any
clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction
known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such
branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial
District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of
then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position
This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to
repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the
abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I
am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising
Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows
from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the
same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be
coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National
Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision
guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view
of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on
the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual
and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I
do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional
provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of
reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that
kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am
satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what
was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular
judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department
under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent
upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there
was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the
case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government,
including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were
replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no
question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No.
145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was
pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court
is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The
challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan
trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial
courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even
less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the
grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of
opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for
this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v.
Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta
v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado
extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs.
State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the
situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former
justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not,
abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority. vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa 77
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal
judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why
two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior
1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle
preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral
forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president,
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other
under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As
Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he
of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate
Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The
of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the
powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It
1973 Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition,
commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The
power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was
Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a
established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers
province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82
system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The
Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and 9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested
more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to
enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have
stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice
over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution
judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
the executive and the legislative branches." 74 legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover
buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation
of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke,
or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we
cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight
compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from
Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or
balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are
recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same
way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right,
there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the
provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus
clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative
body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test
being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed
out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth
noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of
delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive
approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point
from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore,
party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the
absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally
bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to
be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President
is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the
meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof
shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is
equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain
cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents
deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is
pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that
courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown
by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the
unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to
have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in
the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible
objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection
of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on
Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting
proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an
article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the
United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of
explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public
officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise
not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language
of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a
legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to
perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that
the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their
welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal,
lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded
in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought
and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice
Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence
than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be
guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows
them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one
litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an
empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to
reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do
what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the
independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There is
no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that
the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to
discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor
should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing
power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to
fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as
well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence
to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic
postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.
.R. No. L-54554 March 30, 1981
EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXIII and
HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General
Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for "Certiorari, mandamus and Prohibition", seeking the dismissal of Civil Case
No. C-7770 below, we have, as factual background, the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General
Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent,, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident
Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital
became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A.
Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator private
respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr.,
protested Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as
Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles,
who succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement
dated September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment stating:
... as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to
Assistant Hospital Administrator from his previous position of Resident
Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by reason of his
having completed all academic requirements for the Certificate in Hospital
Administration ... contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his
letter of May 2, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On
December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining
Medalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. The
pertinent portion of the aforestated Resolution reads:
A perusal of the records shows that appellant Medalla is the Chief of Clinics
of the Caloocan City General Hospital; he is a holder of the Degree of
Doctor of Medicine; he has completed the requirements in Hospital
Administration and is recommended for the title of Certificate in Hospital
Administration; he is also a candidate of a Masters degree in Hospital
Administration He possesses the First Grade eligibility (BA 1080) and had
undergone relevant training in Hospital Administration. His performance
rating is 'Very Satisfactory'.
On the other hand, appellee Mackay had been a Resident Physician, the
position he held prior to his promotion to the contested position. He is a
holder of the degree of Doctor of Medicine and is a First Grade eligible (BA
1080-Medical Board). He is a graduate student in Hospital Administration
and as completed all academic requirements for a certificate in Hospital
Administration. His performance rating is "Very Satisfactory".
A perusal of the organizational chart of the Ospital ng Caloocan approved
by the Hospital Administrator would show that the Chief of Clinics is the next
lower position to the Assistant Hospital Administrator. The Resident
Physician is not a next lower position to the Assistant Hospital
Administrator. Therefore, Medalla and not Mackay is the person next in rank
who may be promoted to the position involved.
Moreover, even on the basis of competence and qualifications to perform
the duties of the position, the records show that Dr. Medalla is more
competent and qualified than Dr. Mackay. The qualification relied upon by
the Acting City Mayor in justifying the appointment of Dr. Mackay which is
his having completed the academic requirements for the Certificate in
Hospital Administration does not give Dr. Mackay the advantage inasmuch
as Dr. Medalla has also completed the academic requirements for a
certificate in Hospital Administration and is recommended for a title of
Certificate in Hospital Administration apart from being also a candidate for a
Masters degree in Hospital Administration. 1
xxx xxx xxx
Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, pursuant to section 19(6), PD No. 807,
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave rendered a Decision on April 24, 1979
declaring that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by Civil Service
Commission, the appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant
 Hospital Administrator in the Caloocan City General Hospital is hereby
revoked and the position awarded in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M.
Medalla. 2
The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for reconsideration.
On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the President, the same Acting
City Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco
as his Assistant, thereby again completely bypassing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on
May 7, 1979.
On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on Medalla's protest, and
besides calling attention to the penal provision of P.D. No. 807, disapproved Mackay's
appointment as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered and finding the protest of Dr. Medalla in
order, the appointment of Dr. Mackay as hospital Administrator at P26,388
per annum effective May 7, 1979 is hereby disapproved. it is hereby ordered
that Dr. Medalla be appointed to the position of Hospital Administrator of the
Caloocan City General Hospital. 3
On July 20, 1979, Mackay moved for reconsideration asserting 1) denial of due process of law
inasmuch as the contested Resolution/Decisions were issued ex-parte, and 2) that the Civil
Service Commission can not ignore nor overrule an appointment made by a City Executive.
Without awaiting the resolution of his Motion for Consideration- Mackay filed, on July 23, 1979,
before tile Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, presided by respondent, Judge, a
Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Damages" civil
Case No. C7770) against Hon. Jacobo Clave, the Civil Service Commission, the Acting City
Mayor, the City Treasurer, and Medalla, praying that said respondents be restrained from
implementing the Decision of Hon. Jacobo Clave of April 24, 1979, the Resolution No. 49 of the
Merit Systems Board dated December 29, 1978, and the Decision of the Civil Service
Commission of June 27, 1979. The Court a quo issued the Restraining Order prayed for on July
25, 1979 enjoining implementation of the aforestated Resolution/Decisions.
On August 2, 1979, Medalla moved to dissolve the Restraining Order and to dismiss the Petition
alleging mainly that Mackay had not exhausted his administrative remedies and that the latter's
right to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not only dubious or debatable but was clearly non-
existent. Hon. Jacobo Clave and the Civil Service Commission likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the same ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On August 13, 1979, Mackay moved to suspend proceedings pending final resolution by the
Civil Service Commission of his Motion for the reconsideration of the Decision of said
Commission dated June 27, 1979.
On September 24, 1979, the Trial Court denied both Motions to Dismiss filed by Medalla, on the
one hand, and Hon. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, on the other, holding that
Mackay's failure to await resolution of his Motions for Reconsideration pending before the Office
of the President and the Civil Service Commission did not deprive him of a cause of action
besides the fact that according to the respective Manifestations of the said Offices, the Motions
for Reconsideration had already been resolved adversely against Mackay.
Acting on Medalla's Motion for Reconsideration thereof as well as his Motion to Lift Restraining
Order, the Court a quo, in its Order of July 15, 1980, denied reconsideration but lifted the
Restraining Order "there being no showing that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. " Respondent Judge then set the case for hearing.
At this juncture, Medalla instituted this Petition before us praying that the Court a quo be
restrained from proceeding with the hearing and that judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the Honorable Marcelino N. Sayo, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII,
Caloocan City, to dismiss respondent Mackay's
petitions, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
non- exhaustion of administrative remedies resulting to
a lack of cause of action;
2. Declaring the decision of the Office of the President
(Annex "C") and the Merit Systems Board (Annex "E")
as valid and enforceable. 4
We issued a Restraining Order on August 27, 1980 enjoining respondents from proceeding with
the case below.
On November 7, 1980, we required petitioner Medalla to implead the Mayor of Caloocan City as
party-respondent, and the latter to comment on the Petition and to state whether he is ready to
issue an appointment to Medalla as Hospital Administrator, Medalla's rights thereto having been
upheld by the Civil Service Merit Systems Board and by the Office of the President.
In his Compliance, Medalla included an additional prayer that the City Mayor of Caloocan be
ordered to immediately appoint him as Hospital Administrator and to pay him salary differentials.
In his Comment, the City Mayor of Caloocan invoked the privilege of an appointing authority to
determine who can best fulfill the functions of an office citing the case of Aguilar vs. Nieva, Jr. 5
to that effect. And as to the matter of his readiness to issue an appointment to Medalla, he
manifested his preference to withhold action pending Mackay's unresolved Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of June 27, 1979 of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board.
Petitioner Medalla submits that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Mackay's Petition before it,
there being a clear showing of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that said Court
was devoid of jurisdiction in reviewing on certiorari decisions of the Office of the President and of
the Civil service Commission rendered in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.
Private respondent Mackay takes the contrary view and prays, instead, that the contested
Decisions/Resolution be declared null and void and respondent Judge ordered to proceed with
the hearing of the case below.
Although Mackay's Motions for Reconsideration were, in fact, still pending resolution by Hon.
Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, respectively, at the time private respondent
Mackay filed the Petition below, dismissal of said Petition can no longer be anchored on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla prays, considering that
Manifestations dated August 17 and 23, 1979 filed by the said parties before the Court a quo
show that they had resolved the incidents adversely against Mackay. 6 That issue, therefore, has
become moot and academic.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there
should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following
rulings buttress this conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three coequal departments, the executive, the
legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers
and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of
justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made
subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under
judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but
because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek
only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case
to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the
judicial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 7
The courts may always examine into the exercise of power by a ministerial
officer to the extent of determining whether the particular power has been
 granted to the officer, whether it is a legal power that could have been
granted to him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. This
jurisdiction does not depend upon an act of the legislature authorizing it, but
inheres in the courts of general jurisdiction as an essential function of the
judicial department (State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agri. Asso. 123
SW 68 1). 8 (emphasis supplied).
For the speedy determination of the controversy, however, and considering that the position
involved is infused with public interest, rather than remand the case to the Court below for
further proceedings, we hold that grave abuse of discretion on the part of Hon. Jacobo C. Clave
and the Civil Service Merit Systems Board is absent.
To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA No. 5502), it is clear that the
power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is
subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations (ibid., section 19). The Caloocan City General
Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital
Administrator is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B). The Hospital Administrator is
the head of the City General Hospital empowered to administer, direct, and coordinate all
activities of the hospital to carry out its objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured (ibid.).
Under section 19 (3) of the Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807, effective on October 6, 1975), the
recruitment or selection of employees for promotions is drawn from the next-in-rank.
SEC. 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the Career
Service as defined in Section 7, the employees in the government service
who occupy the next lower positions i the occupational group under which
the vacant position is classified and in other functionally related
occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for promotion.
Section 19 (6) of the same Decree provides for the administrative procedure by an aggrieved
employee in case of non-observance by the appointing authority of the next-in-rank rule, thus:
Sec. 19(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal
initially, to the department head and finally to the Office of the President an
appointment made ... (2. in favor of one who is not next-in-rank, ... if the
employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the written special reason
or reasons given by the appointing authority for such appointment: ... Before
deciding a contested appointment the Office of the President shall consult
the Civil Service Commission. For purposes of this Section, .qualified next-
in-rank' refers to an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position
previously determined to be next-in- rank to the vacancy proposed to be
filled and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously
determined by the appointing authority and approved by the Commission.
The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla He had appealed to the
department head and from thence, in view of the latter's unfavorable action, to the Civil Service
Commission and thereafter to the Office of the President. Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service
Merit Systems Board its Decision of June 27, 1979, and the Decision of the presidential
Executive Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla's favor. The special
reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment, which is, that lie had
completed all academic requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not
tenable, since Medalla himself was found to be in possession of the same qualification. But while
the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is
clear that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital Administrator
under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackays
appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator and subsequently hospital Administrator,
Medalla outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in
rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator.
Respondent Mackay's urging that he was denied due process deserves scant consideration
considering that subsequent developsments in the case establish that he was heardon his
Motions for Reconsideration by both the Civil Service Commission and the office of the
President.
It is true that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the
choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and elligible, who in his best
estimation are possesses of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and
judgement. 9 However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit
Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the
qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay for the contested
position, revealing a careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be
ignored. The revocation of Mackay's appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, 1) the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C. Mackay, as
Hospital Administrator is hereby declared null and void; 2) respondent City Mayor of Caloocan
City is hereby ordered to extend an appointment to petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, as
Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital immediately upon notice of this
Decision; 3) petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, shall receive all compensation and
emoluments appertaining to said position thenceforth, but without entitlement to salary
differentials; and 4) respondent Judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. 7770.
This Decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur,
G.R. No. L-30637 July 16, 1987
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the
Court of First, Instance of Agusan, and AGO TIMBER CORPORATION, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the
decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry,
secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of
the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the
contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an
administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will
not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard
to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each
other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located in the
municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting
of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is
located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000
hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang
under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-'52.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a
common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary of
respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. The western boundary of
petitioner Lianga is described as "... Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao
Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial
boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters
to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao
Creek ..." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is described as "... point 4, along
the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao boundary in a general
southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-
Lianga Road; ..." 1
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the
Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their
respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the
common boundary as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging Company at Km. 10.2 instead of Km. 9.7
on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N900E, 21,000 meters; N12 W, 21,150 meters; N40 W, 3,000
meters; N31 W, 2,800 meters; N50 W, 1,700 meters" which respondent Ago protested claiming
that "its eastern boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as described
in Section 1 of Art. 1693 of the Philippine Commission as indicated in the green pencil in the
attached sketch" of the areas as prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. 2 The Director of Forestry,
after considering the evidence, found:
That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation portrays a line (green line) far different
in alignment with the line (red) as indicated in the original License Control Map of this
Office;
That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation (green line does not conform to the
distance of 6,800 meters from point 3 to point 4 of the original description of the area
of Narciso Lansang but would project said line to a distance of approximately 13,800
meters;
That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would increase the area of
Narciso Lansang from 9,000 to 12,360 hectares;
That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would reduce the area of the
Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. to 107,046 hectares instead of the area granted which
is 110,406 hectares.
and ruled that "the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of this Office
is granting the license of Mr. Narciso Lansang; and further, that it also runs counter to the
intentions of this Office in granting the Timber License Agreement to the Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. The intentions of this Office in granting the two licenses (Lansang and Lianga Bay Logging
Co., Inc.) are patently manifest in that distances and bearings are the controlling factors. If mention
was ever made of the Agusan-Surigao boundary, as the common boundary line of both licensees,
this Office could not have meant the Agusan-Surigao boundary as described under Section 1 of
Act 1693 of the Philippine Commission for were it so it could have been so easy for this Office to
mention the distance from point 3 to point 4 of Narciso Lansang as approximately 13,800 meters.
This cannot be considered a mistake considering that the percentage of error which is more or
less 103% is too high an error to be committed by an Office manned by competent technical men.
The Agusan-Surigao boundary as mentioned in the technical descriptions of both licensees, is,
therefore, patently an imaginary line based on B.F. License Control Map. Such being the case, it
is reiterated that distance and bearings control the description where an imaginary line exists. 3
The decision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation
and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the
decision.
In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed decision
of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of
the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the
green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision." 4
Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,
1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. 5 On motion for reconsideration, the
Office of the President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant
Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision,
dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. 6
Respondent Ago filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated August 9, 1968 of the
Office of the President but after written opposition of petitioner Lianga, the same was denied in an
order dated October 2, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. 7
On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago Timber Corporation, as plaintiff, in
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 1253, against
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., Assistant Executive Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M.
Duavit and Director of Forestry, as defendants, for "Determination of Correct Boundary Line of
License Timber Areas and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same
question raised and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268 and insisting that "a judicial review of
such divergent administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary
fine of the licensed areas in question." 8
As prayed for, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order on October 28, 1968, on a
bond of P20,000, enjoining the defendants from carrying out the decision of the Office of the
President. The corresponding writ was issued the next day, or on October 29, 1968. 9
On November 10, 1968, defendant Lianga (herein petitioner) moved for dismissal of the complaint
and for dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent public officials
and respondent corporation. It also submitted its opposition to plaintiff's (herein respondent prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 10 A supplemental motion was filed on December
6, 1968. 11
On December 19, 1968, the lower court issued an order denying petitioner Lianga's motion to
dismiss and granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent Ago. 12 Lianga's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied on May 9, 1969. 13 Hence, this petition praying
of the Court (a) to declare that the Director of Forestry has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioners and respondents and that the decision
of the Office of the President dated August 9, 1968 is final and executory; (b) to order the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 1253 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan; (c) to declare that respondent
Judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the temporary restraining order dated October 28, 1968
and granting the preliminary injunction per its Order dated December 19, 1968; and (d) to annul
the aforementioned orders.
After respondent's comments on the petition and petitioner's reply thereto, this Court on June 30,
1969 issued a restraining order enjoining in turn the enforcement of the preliminary injunction and
related orders issued by the respondent court in Civil Case No. 1253. 14
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking
for the determination anew of the correct boundary fine of its licensed timber area, for the same
issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose
jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests
in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest
reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products,
including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
department head, may repeal or in the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the
public interests, 15 whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the President. 16
In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to
assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, 17 which
is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again
the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute
its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same
in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be
entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with
purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. 18
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such
office shall prevail over the courts. 19
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former
have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 20 As recently stressed by the Court, "in this
era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse
of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." 21
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are similar to the earlier case of Pajo, et al. v.
Ago, et al. 22 (where therein respondent Pastor Ago is the president of herein respondent Ago
Timber Corporation). In the said case, therein respondent Pastor Ago, after an adverse decision
of the Director of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive
Secretary in connection with his application for renewal of his expired timber licenses, filed with
the Court of First instance of Agusan a petition for certiorari, prohibition and damages with
preliminary injunction alleging that the rejection of his application for renewal by the Director of
Forestry and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and its affirmance by the Executive
Secretary constituted an abuse of discretion and was therefore illegal. The Court held that "there
can be no question that petitioner Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over the grant or renewal of
respondent Ago's timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code); that petitioner Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as department head, is empowered by law to affirm, modify or
reject said grant or renewal of respondent Ago's timber license by petitioner Director of Forestry
(Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code); and that petitioner Executive Secretary, acting for and in behalf and
by authority of the President has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm, modify or reverse the orders
regarding the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two aforementioned officials." The
Court went on to say that, "(I)n the case of Espinosa, et al. v. Makalintal, et al. (79 Phil. 134; 45
Off. Gaz. 712), we held that the powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
(Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting of licenses,
permits, leases, and contracts or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling applications or
deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-
recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered
with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions
of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of act. Findings of fact by an
administrative board, agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will
not be disturbed except where the board, agency or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And we have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of
discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (Abad Santos v. Province
of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil. 609)"
Respondent Ago contends that the motion filed by petitioner Lianga for reconsideration of the
decision of the Office of the President was denied in an alleged "decision" dated August 15, 1966,
allegedly signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. that, "however, for some
mysterious, unknown if not anomalous reasons and/or illegal considerations, the "decision"
allegedly dated August 15, 1966(Annex "D") was never released" and instead a decision was
released on August 9, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit,
which reversed the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in its first decision dated
June 16, 1966 and signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Leido.
It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same
is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be
considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation. 23 Respondent should be aware of this
rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals, 24 (where herein respondent Ago was the
petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was dictated in
open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same is
being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing and
signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it is stin subject to amendment or
change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the
clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject
to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court."
Respondent alleges "that in view of the hopelessly conflicting decisions of the administrative
bodies and/or offices of the Philippine government, and the important questions of law and fact
involved therein, as well as the well-grounded fear and suspicion that some anomalous, illicit and
unlawful considerations had intervened in the concealment of the decision of August 15, 1966
(Annex "D") of Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit, a judicial review of such divergent
administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line of the
licensed areas in question and restore the faith and confidence of the people in the actuations of
our public officials and in our system of administration of justice."
The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido
"decision" allegedly denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof by
the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions
and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of official actions. 25 It
is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties regularly. 26 It should be
noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case history in the Office of the
President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated August 9, 1968 was
denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Leido
himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision dated June 16, 1966 and
signed by himself).
The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60[New] which approved the transfer to respondent Ago
of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain
conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry
as to the exact location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision
that may be rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago
Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to expire at an earlier date.
Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, upon granting
any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions, and limitations, not
inconsistent with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest. The license operates
as a contract between the government and respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from
questioning the terms and stipulation thereof.
Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide
that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places, 27 if the petition filed relates
to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, within
their jurisdiction. 28
The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of
the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces or districts 29 except where the sole issue is the legality of
the decision of the administrative officials. 30
In the leading case of Palanan Lumber Plywood Co., Inc. v. Arranz 31 which involved a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the same respondent
public officials as here and where the administrative proceedings taken were similar to the case
at bar, the Court laid down the rule that: "We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Court
acted without jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the petitioners Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry, who have
their official residences in Manila and Quezon City, outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela. Both the statutory provisions and the settled
jurisdiction of this Court unanimously affirm that the extraordinary writs issued by the Court of First
Instance are limited to and operative only within their respective provinces and districts."
A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a determination of a
question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally correct
or not. 32 We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz. 33 "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co.,
Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive
writs in order to control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went further and said that
when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions the legal correctness of
the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the said
decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the officials sought to be
restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its territory.1avvphi1
"To recapitulate, insofar as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still stands that
courts of first instance have the power to issue writs limited to and operative only within their
respective provinces or districts. "
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void, since it appears
that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not licensed to respondent Ago.
The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area originally licensed to
Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 58452. Only a portion of this area
was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-
'60[New].
It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the common
boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by
respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made.
Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9,
1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The restraining order
heretofore issued by the Court against enforcement of the preliminary injunction and related orders
issued by respondent judge is the case below is made permanent and the respondent judge or
whoever has taken his place is hereby ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1253.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.