Poy 002

The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 193–235
doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy002
Advance Access Publication Date: 2 March 2018
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Escape both the ‘Thucydides Trap’ and
the ‘Churchill Trap’: Finding a Third Type
of Great Power Relations under the
Bipolar System
Yang Yuan*
Yang Yuan is an Associate Research Fellow in the Institute of World Economy and Politics at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
*Corresponding author. Email: yyir@163.com
Abstract
The ‘Thucydides trap’ exaggerates the risk of war breaking out between the rising
power and the ruling power in the contemporary age. The greater challenge facing
China and the United States is to avoid falling into the ‘Churchill trap’. That is, falling
into a long-term confrontation by repeating the mistakes of the Cold War between
the US and the USSR. Both the ‘old’ history of the ancient East Asian bipolar system
and the current experience of Sino-US interaction in East Asia suggest that, in addi-
tion to hegemonic war and cold war, there is a third type of great power relationship
between the two poles, which I call ‘co-ruling’, whereby rather than being geograph-
ically demarcated according to their respective ‘spheres of influence’, the two super-
powers jointly lead all or most of the small and medium-sized countries in the
system. The theoretical and case studies examined in the article imply that the
‘co-ruling’ mode will appear and be sustained at a time when the two superpowers’
foreign functions are differentiated (i.e. each of the two poles can only meet one of the
indispensable needs of small countries, and the two needs that the two poles can
respectively meet are different ones), when inter-great-power war is no longer a viable
strategic option. The antagonistic and geopolitical colours of the Cold War ‘divided-
ruling’ mode of power politics will be less strident in the ‘co-ruling’ mode, so offering
an illuminating escape from both the ‘Thucydides trap’ and the ‘Churchill trap’.
China’s rapid rise has prompted a new round of power transition in the international
system. Two of the most frequently asked questions are what will be the outcome of
this transition? Does it boil down to peace or war? These are issues of world concern.
Realists perceive rising powers and hegemonic powers as natural rivals whose
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194 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, Vol. 11, No. 2
interactions invariably end in war,1 and hence fear a looming ‘Thucydides trap’—the
risk of a major war erupting between a rising power and a ruling power in the power
transition process. In Graham Allison’s view, the ‘Thucydides trap’ is the best lens for
an understanding of Sino-US relations in the 21st century, but it also constitutes a
risk that China and the United States must do their utmost to circumvent.2 Chinese

president Xi Jinping personally cited the concept in declaring, ‘We must all cooperate
to avoid the “Thucydides Trap”’. To meet that challenge, Xi proposes ‘a new type of
great power relations’.3 There has accordingly been extensive Chinese scholarly
research and theorizing in recent years on avoiding the ‘Thucydides trap’ and build-
ing a new type of great power relations.4 Meanwhile, the prospect of Sino-US secur-
ity relations, along with the respective security strategies of both countries, is
becoming core themes in the international security studies domain.5
1 For example, A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2014).
2 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).
3 Xi Jinping, ‘Understanding China’, Conference, Berggruen Institute on Governance, Beijing, 4
November, 2013.
4 For a review of related debates, see Qi Hao, ‘China Debates the “New Type of Great Power
Relations”’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2015), pp. 349–70.
5 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012); Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in
U.S.-China Relations’, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 49–89; Adam P. Liff and
G. John Ikenberry, ‘Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia
Pacific, and the Security Dilemma’, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2014), pp. 52–91;
Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific China’s Rise and the
Future of U.S. Power Projection’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2014), pp. 115–49;
Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Next Great War? The Roots of World
War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2014); Peter Harris,
‘The Imminent US Strategic Adjustment to China’, Chinese Journal of International Politics,
Vol. 8, No. 3 (2015), pp. 219–50; Deborah Welch Larson, ‘Will China be a New Type of Great
Power?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2015), pp. 323–48; Charles L.
Glaser, ‘A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?: The Hard Choice between Military Competition and
Accommodation’, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), pp. 49–90; Stephen G. Brooks,
and William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century:
China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position’, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3
(2015/2016), pp. 7–53; Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western
Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons
in East Asia’, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2016), pp. 7–48; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would
China Go Nuclear?: Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War
with the United States’, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2017), pp. 50–92; Robert Ayson
and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Asia’s Diplomacy of Violence: China-US Coercion and Regional
Order’, Survival, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017), pp. 85–124.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, Vol. 11, No. 2 195
Although the ‘Thucydides trap’ has attracted wide attention in both academic
and political circles, my article argues that the ‘Thucydides trap’ overstates the
risk of war between China and the United States. In the era of great power peace,
the common desire to avoid war, especially all-out war, between superpowers
prevails in great power politics. A greater challenge facing China and the United

States is the risk that power rivalry and security competition may nudge the two
superpowers towards a long-term confrontation in which they become irreducibly
mired, which I call the ‘Churchill trap’. This would amount to a reprise of mis-
takes made during the Cold War between the US and the USSR when, in the
absence of destructive warfare between the two powers, the international system
took on the bipolar structure. The foremost task of my article is to find an escape
route from the ‘Churchill trap’ and examine its ramifications.
Modern history and the experiences of the Cold War imply just two out-
comes of any interaction between the two strongest actors in the interna-
tional system. One is a hegemonic transition through hegemonic war; the
other is a long-term confrontation and fierce strategic rivalry reminiscent of
the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. If this is the case, then
China and the US’s successful escape from the ‘Thucydides trap’ will swiftly
be followed by a fatal fall into the ‘Churchill trap.’ Fortunately, both the
‘old’ history of the ancient East Asian bipolar systems and the recent situa-
tion of Sino-US interaction in East Asia suggest that there is, in addition to
hegemonic war and cold war, a third type of great power relationship
between the two poles, one I call ‘co-ruling’, whereby they jointly lead all
or most of the small and medium-sized countries in the system, rather than
demarcate their ‘spheres of influence’ geographically. The antagonistic and
geopolitical colours of the ‘co-ruling’ mode of power politics are less strident
than under the ‘divided-ruling’ mode.
The theoretical and case studies examined in the article imply that the ‘co-rul-
ing’ mode will appear and be sustained at a time when the two superpowers’ for-
eign functions are differentiated (i.e. each of the two poles can only meet one of
the indispensable needs of small countries, and the two needs that the two poles
can respectively meet are different ones), and when inter-great-power war is no
longer a viable strategic option.
The next section analyses why the ‘Churchill trap’ is a more present
risk to China and the US than the ‘Thucydides trap’, and consequently one
to which both should pay due heed and take precautions to avoid. The
third section theoretically classifies the domination–subordination relations
between great powers and small states under the bipolar structure, on
which basis it reveals the formation mechanism of the co-ruling mode. The
fourth section conducts process tracing of four instances of bipolar systems
in ancient East Asian and contemporary history, to demonstrate how such
a mechanism operates. The concluding section summarizes the article’s theo-
retical findings and makes a projection of future trends in Sino-US
relations.
The ‘Thucydides Trap’ or the ‘Churchill Trap’?

The ‘Thucydides trap’ is in a large part an induction of historical experiences on
great power politics. In the contemporary era, however, there is small risk of all-
out war between a rising power and a hegemonic power. By contrast, the
‘Churchill trap’, whereby the superpowers fall into a long-term confrontation

reminiscent of that between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
presents a genuine risk and one that should be taken far more seriously.
Why is the ‘Thucydides Trap’ Less Relevant?

The main reason why the ‘Thucydides trap’ is the less relevant one is that it is an
anachronism, that is to say, a warning that is inconsistent with the characteristics of
the current era. The most prominent change in international politics over recent dec-
ades is that of the relative rarity since 1945 of wars between great powers. A statisti-
cal study shows that during the period 1816–1945 the probability of escalation from
a conflict to a war between great powers was 0.346, while from 1946 to 1992 such
probability plummeted to 0.077. The probability of war among all countries from
1816 to 1945 was 0.296, while from 1946 to 1992 it fell to 0.089.6 These results
highlight the diminution of wars between great powers since 1945. Not just from
history but also in light of the foreseeable future, we see scant possibility of full-scale
war between great powers, to the extent that many experts now argue that wars
between great powers are a thing of the past.7
There has been extensive in-depth scholarly research into the reasons why the great
powers have not fought since World War II (WWII). The evolution of international
politics is one essential reason. Recurrent and persistent conquests among countries
over history have led to a steady increase of war costs, and the catastrophic repercus-
sions of two world wars, moreover, changed the erstwhile ever-positive view estima-
tion of warfare. In addition, the industrial revolution contributed to a fundamental
transformation of the socio-political and economic structure. All of these developments
were instrumental in bringing about the gradual demise of major wars after 1945.8
6 Marie T. Henehan and John Vasquez, ‘The Changing Probability of Interstate War, 1986-1992’, in
Raimo Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 288.
7 For example, see John Mueller, ‘War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment’, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 2 (2009), p. 298; Martin van Creveld, ‘The Waning of Major War’,
in Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War, p. 110; Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a
New Era (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 12–13; Robert Jervis, ‘Theories of War in
an Era of Leading-Power Peace’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 1 (2002), p. 1;
Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free
Markets in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), pp. 121–22; Michael
Mandelbaum, ‘Is Major War Obsolete?’, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1998/1999), p. 20; John Keegan, A
History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 59; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War
(New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 2; Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1991), p. 176.
8 John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic
Books, 1989); John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004);
Deepened economic interdependence is another feasible factor. The interconnectedness

and interdependence of the global economy since 1945 has significantly diminished
the relative utility of war as a tool for grabbing profits. In addition, due to the exorbi-
tant costs that would be entailed in great powers going to war against one another, the
slightest intimation in any one of their signals of the use of force would set alarm bells

ringing for all concerned, a factor that considerably lowers the probability of a war
triggered by asymmetric information.9 The ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD)
nuclear deterrent mechanism is, of course, the most widely accepted reason.10 The
focus of controversy is whether nuclear deterrence is an adequate,11 or just a necessary
condition for great power peace;12 and whether possession of nuclear weapons can
only prevent nuclear wars and escalations of large-scale conventional wars to nuclear
wars,13 or even stop small-scale wars.14
Carl Kaysen, ‘Is War Obsolete: A Review Essay’, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1990),
pp. 42–69; Robert Jervis, ‘The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past’,
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1991/1992), pp. 39–78; Shiping Tang, ‘Social Evolution of
International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis’, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2010), pp. 31–55; Shiping Tang, Social Evolution of International
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
9 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chapter 4; Alfred Tovias, ‘The Economic
Aspects of Stable Peace-Making’, in Arie. M. Kacowicz, et al, eds., Stable Peace among
Nations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 150–64; Philippe Martin,
Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig, ‘Make Trade Not War?’, Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 75, No. 3 (2008), pp. 865–900; Solomon Polachek and Jun Xiang, ‘How Opportunity Costs
Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game’, International
Organization, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2010), pp. 133–44; Eric Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer,
‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict’,
International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 391–438; Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, ‘War,
Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2003), pp. 561–86.
10 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy’, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (1964), pp. 23–35; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear
Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myths and
Political Realities’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1990), pp. 731–45.
11 Philippe Delmas, The Rosy Future of War (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 146; Martin van
Creveld, ‘The Waning of Major War’, in Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War, pp. 97–98.
12 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 232–33.
13 Li Bin and Xiao Tiefeng, ‘Chongshen hewuqi de zuoyong’ (‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons
Revisited’), Waijiao pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review), No. 3 (2010), pp. 4–5. For empirical test
studies, see Robert Rauchhaus, ‘Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative
Approach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 258–77.
14 Martin van Creveld, ‘The Future of War’, in Robert G. Patman, ed., Security in a Post-Cold
War World (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), p. 31; Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of
There are undoubtedly various reasons for the dearth of wars between great
powers since WWII, and the most fundamental reason is, unsurprisingly, still con-
troversial. However, how scholars explain the phenomenon is one thing, while
how they anticipate the prospect of it is another. That war among great powers
will be increasingly rare has been becoming a mainstream consensus in academic

circles.15 In this era of no war among great powers, both the rising power and the
ruling power lack the subjective motivation to launch a war against the other,
and both sides have to be subject to various objective conditions that inhibit
wars. We cannot be 100% confident that there is zero risk of future war between
China and the US, just as we cannot be 100% sure we won’t die in a car accident
tomorrow, but the risk is not sufficiently high to merit formulating a strategy. In
short, the risk of falling into the ‘Thucydides trap’ is much smaller than what
Allison and others appear to imagine, and should not be the main preventative
focus of either China or the United States.
The second reason why the ‘Thucydides trap’ is problematic is that it is a false
dichotomy. It simply divides the possible outcomes of great power politics into
‘either/or’ categories, namely, war or peace. As a warning, the principal content
of the ‘Thucydides trap’ is the avoidance of major wars between rising powers
and ruling powers. Having benefited from the lessons of modern European
history, traditional International Relations (IR) theories do not recognize the fea-
sibility of coexistence of the two poles that the two most powerful countries in
the international system constitute. In their view, when the rising power rises and
threatens the hegemonic position of the ruling power, the outcome is either war
waged by the rising power with a view to territorial expansion, or pre-emptive
war that the ruling power launches to defend its hegemony. In short, power tran-
sition through a hegemonic war is the most likely outcome for the two super-
powers.16 Owing to the vast and unbearable cost and negative externalities of
wars, especially hegemonic wars, avoiding wars and maintaining peace are
the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 344; Robert Jervis, ‘The Political
Effects of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1988), p. 84.
15 For recent researches on great power peace and its reasons, see Christopher J. Fettweis,
‘Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace’, Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2017), pp. 423–
51. Joshua Baron, Great Power Peace and American Primacy: The Origins and Future of a
New International Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Christopher J. Fettweis,
Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2010); Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War. For discus-
sions on the demise of general warfare and violence, see Steven Pinker, The Better Angels
of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011); Joshua S. Goldstein,
Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Dutton,
2011); Mueller, ‘War Has Almost Ceased to Exist’, pp. 297–321.
16 Organski, World Politics; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000).
naturally people’s primary goals when talking about and anticipating the prospect
of the relationship between rising powers and hegemonic powers.
Nevertheless, the history of the US–USSR confrontation brings us to the third
mode of great power interaction besides war and peace—that of ‘Cold War’—
where the two superpowers do not necessarily fight to the death, but live under a

dangerous peace that grows progressively uneasy due to long-term confrontation
and rivalry between the Eastern and Western camps, to the costly and escalating
arms race, to proxy wars in succession in the Third World, and to the pervasive
fear of the shadow of nuclear war. Such ‘Cold War’ is no less harmful to human
beings than any ‘hegemonic war’ such as the Peloponnesian War.
In fact, academics have taken note of this intermediate state between war and
peace. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars proposed the concept of
‘cold peace’ as an analogy of ‘cold war’, to describe the interim between war and
peace in a region or between two countries which often features security rivalry
and inter-balancing, and fierce strategic competition in non-military fields
through non-war means. Although ‘cold peace’ means no war, the relationships
among the states display mutual suspicion, rivalry and also feature hostilities, and
even violent skirmishes.17 Some scholar called the intermediate state between war
and peace ‘non-war and non-peace’, pointing out that it would be possible in
such a situation for countries to enact military disputes that involve violence but
not at a level qualifying as warfare.18 Owing to the existence of a state of ‘non-
war and non-peace’, what we now need to pursue is a ‘stable peace’ or ‘positive
peace’ free from the hazards of violence, not solely the avoidance of warfare.19
In short, the war and peace dichotomy is mistaken because of the existence of
‘cold war’ as the intermediate state between them. The ‘Thucydides trap’ and its
blind stress on avoiding hegemonic war could obscure the tragic outcomes of
great power interactions other than warfare. Given the low risk of hegemonic
war in the current era of great power peace, excessive emphasis on the
‘Thucydides trap’ could make policy makers and advisers neglect the major risks
and accordingly overlook the more realistic and urgent challenges of the contem-
porary era.
17 Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy
(New York: Times Books, 1992); Alpo M. Rusi, Dangerous Peace: New Rivalry in World
Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); Peter J. Schraeder, ‘Cold War to Cold Peace:
Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
115, No. 3 (2000), pp. 395–419; Tomohiko Taniguchi, ‘A Cold Peace: The Changing Security
Equation in Northeast Asia’, Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), pp. 445–57.
18 Yan Xuetong, ‘Heping de xingzhi’ (‘The Nature of Peace’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World
Economy and Politics), No. 8 (2002), pp. 4–9.
19 Arie M. Kacowicz and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework’, in
Kacowicz, et al, eds., Stable Peace among Nations, pp. 11–35; Charles A. Kupchan, How
Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2010); Paul F. Diehl, ‘Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2016), pp. 1–10.
Why Does the ‘Churchill Trap’ Matter?

After the end of WWII, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union, the two superpowers that survived the war, quickly degenerated from
one of allies to that of enemies locked in constant strife. In March 1946, British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill made the famous ‘iron curtain’ speech at

Westminster College in Missouri, USA. The Cold War, which the United States
and the Soviet Union fought for hegemony through utilizing all means other than
world war, thereafter swept the globe for almost half a century. The world thus
became divided into two mutually-isolated camps that fought against each other
for decades. If we can use the ‘Thucydides trap’ to refer to the risk of hegemonic
war between the rising power and the hegemonic power, then we can also raise
the term ‘Churchill trap’ to conceptualize the risk whereby the world’s two stron-
gest countries engage in long-term confrontation and eventually become
embroiled in a ‘Cold War’.
The first reason why the ‘Churchill trap’ indeed matters is that such ‘trap’
seems real. We call a system bipolar if it consists in two superpowers over the
entire international system that have not, for some reason, been involved in a
hegemonic war, and thus stand a chance of co-existence. The question that
remains is whether the so-called ‘Churchill trap’ does exist when a bipolar system
emerges. In other words, is the risk that a bipolar structure might cause a cold
war sufficient to trigger precautionary measures?
In fact, most people associate the bipolar system with the Cold War between
the US and USSR. Some scholars even argue that the term ‘bipolarity’ closely
relates to the concept of the ‘Cold War’, and is used to identify the essential char-
acteristics of post-WWII international politics.20 The most prominent feature of
international politics during the Cold War was its combination of confrontation
and peace. On the one hand, the Cold War system was divided into two hostile
spheres of influence that experienced the most violent and prolonged confronta-
tion, other than war, in modern history. Each side regarded the other as a major
threat to its survival, to the extent that both ploughed huge resources into devel-
oping and producing weapons of mass-destruction sufficient to destroy the entire
planet. One of the immediate consequences of the Cold War was the loss of
millions of lives in many parts of the Third World due to superpower confronta-
tions.21 On the other hand, however, the rare ‘long peace’ between the two
first-ranking powers is another striking feature of the Cold War. Although the
antagonism between the two was intense, neither engaged in direct war against
20 R. Harrison Wagner, ‘What Was Bipolarity?’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993),
p. 79.
21 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System’, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1986), p. 100; Walter Lafeber, Meiguo, Eguo
he lengzhan (1945-2006)(America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2006), trans. Niu Ke, Zhai
Tao and Zhang Jing (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2011), p. 1.
the other.22 In fact, both countries had a strong desire to prevent any crisis from
escalating into a direct and full-scale military conflict.23
In brief, therefore, we can generalize the characteristics of the Cold War as
‘antagonism’ plus ‘no war’. ‘Antagonism’ refers to the conflict and rivalry
between two first-ranking powers and their respective camps,24 while ‘no war’

refers to the absence of direct war between the two powers.25 ‘Antagonism’ deter-
mines why the Cold War is a ‘war’, while ‘no war’ determines why it is ‘cold’.
The very reason why the concept of ‘bipolarity’ is widely perceived as synonymous
with the Cold War is that the existing IR theories on bipolar systems seem coinciden-
tally able to simultaneously account for the antagonism of war and the absence of
war—the two features which are generally pinpointed as defining the Cold War.26
On the one hand, this bipolarity appears able to explain why the two super-
powers, although in sharp opposition to each other, maintain peace. The classic
explanation of the theory of bipolar stability is: Firstly, which of the two poles
has greater potential to become the hegemonic power and is hence more likely to
become a threat to other members of the system are far more evident under the
bipolar structure than the multipolar structure. Under a bipolar structure great
powers have no place to hide their capacities and behaviours, and it is difficult for
them to lay blame on other countries. Secondly, which actor should take major
responsibility for balancing potential hegemony is also much less ambiguous, and
so inhibits buck-passing. Last but not least, because of the hierarchical gap
between the superpowers and other countries, the significance of any particular
ally to either of the two superpowers is negligible. Superpowers under the bipolar
structure are thus far less likely to be entrapped into a war than if they were under
the multipolar structure where they are unable to ignore the will of their allies.27
22 Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace’, pp. 99–142; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Looking Back: The Long Peace’,
Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1989), pp. 42–65; Xu Tianxin and Shen Zhihua, eds.,
Lengzhan qianqi de daguo guanxi: MeiSu zhengba yu Yazhou daguo de waijiao quxiao
(1945-1972)[The Great Powers Relations in the Early Period of the Cold War: The US-Soviet
Hegemonic Rivalry and the Diplomatic Orientation of the Asian Powers (1945-1972)](Beijing:
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2011), p. 1.
23 Ken Aldred and Martin A. Smith, Superpowers in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 46–49.
24 Therefore, some Chinese scholars believe that once China makes allies, the world will
return to the Cold War. See Zhu Feng, ‘Daguo buyuan yu Zhongguo jiemeng, xin lengzhan
shu zhanluexing yuchun’ (‘Major Powers do not Want to Ally with China, and the New Cold
War is a Strategic Folly’), Global Times, 15 January, 2012.
25 The ‘first-ranking power’ here refers to a great power that can serve as a ‘pole’. In this sense,
the text below will indiscriminately mix ‘first-ranking power ‘, ‘superpower’ and ‘pole’.
26 Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?”, p. 77.
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1979), chapter 8; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus,
Vol. 93, No. 3 (1964), pp. 881–909. Some formal and empirical studies seem to support this
theory, see Alvin M. Saperstein, ‘The “Long Peace”: Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?’,
Some historians also attribute to bipolarity the ‘long peace’ of the Cold War as a
vital factor.28
On the other hand, bipolarity also seems able to explain why the two super-
powers fight against each other and form antagonistic camps.29 According to
Kenneth N. Waltz, there is no periphery under the bipolar system, and either of

the two superpowers is alert to events occurring even in remote areas. There is lit-
tle chance, therefore, of any moves and changes by either of the two powers to
escape from the other’s calculations, according to the principle of balance of
power, and both powers have the incentive to take the lead in power and security
competition. Therefore, maintenance of tension and recurrence of crises are
prominent features of the bipolar system,30 and also strikingly reminiscent of the
Cold War.31
At the same time, many scholars believe that the emergence of two confronta-
tional alliance camps is a natural—even inevitable—consequence of bipolarity,
to the extent of perceiving it as an inherent feature of the bipolar system.32
Raymond Aron defined a bipolar system as one wherein two principal agents
have such a dominant influence on other actors that they constitute the core of
their respective camps and all other members of the system have to decide to join
one of them unless they have an opportunity to stay neutral.33 Under the bipolar
system, both groups try to woo new members in order to broaden their spheres of
influence unless such efforts may force an otherwise non-aligned country to align
with the other camp.34 This theory implies that great power struggles for fol-
lowers and influence under the bipolar structure are exclusive, because any given
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1991), pp. 68–79; Manus I. Midlarsky, ‘Polarity
and International Stability’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (1993),
pp. 174–80.
28 Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace’, pp. 99–142.
29 Louis René Beres, ‘Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments’,
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No .4 (1972), pp. 702–10; Frank Whelon Wayman,
‘Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among
Major Powers, 1816-1965’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1984), pp. 61–78.
30 Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, pp. 882–83.
31 Michael Brecher and Wilkenfeld Jonathan, Crises in the Twentieth Century, Vol.1,
Handbook of International Crises (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), quoted from Thomas J.
Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle, ‘Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World
Order’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1995), p. 826.
32 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ‘Measuring Systemic Polarity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (1975), pp. 87–216; Volgy and Imwalle, ‘Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives
on the New World Order’, pp. 819–834; Morton A. Kaplan, ‘Balance of Power, Bipolarity and
Other Models of International Systems’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 3
(1957), pp. 691–93; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ‘The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1965), pp. 303–04.
33 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday,
1966), p. 128.
34 Kaplan, ‘Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems’, p. 693.
country is either an ally of a superpower or of its opponent, or a non-aligned

country. That is to say, it would be implausible for small countries to ‘ride the
wall’, i.e. to hedge their bets by allying with both superpowers simultaneously.
Since the existing theories on bipolar systems at least appear able to explain
the emergence of the Cold War, the ‘Churchill trap’ risk has theoretical grounds.

As mentioned earlier, due to nuclear weapons and other factors, the absence of
wars between great powers is becoming a feature of our era wherein, irrespective
of the current international structure, the probability of direct war between great
powers is extremely low. Therefore, the question that now arises is whether or
not these two poles will lead to a system of division and confrontation. If the new
bipolar structure indeed emerges, will the result be two discrete clusters of distinct
and rigidly demarcated camps, as occurred during the Cold War, thus once again
splitting the world into two mutually antagonistic factions?
The second reason why the ‘Churchill trap’ matters is that such ‘trap’ seems
real. A newly emerged bipolar structure is a precondition for the ‘Churchill trap’,
and such precondition is now fast becoming a reality. Since the beginning of the
second decade of the 21st century it has been increasingly perceived that China
has or is about to become the second superpower since the end of the Cold War,
that China and the United States are now the two most important countries in the
current global system, and that China is the country most likely to threaten or
even replace US hegemony in the near future.35 There is a high degree of
35 Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order
in an Era of U.S. Decline’, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), p. 52; Rosemary Foot
and Andrew Walter, ‘Global Norms and Major State Behaviour: the Cases of China and the
United States’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2011), p. 329;
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery
in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), p. 35; Nuno P. Monteiro, ‘Unrest
Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful’, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2011/2012),
p. 9; Christopher Layne, ‘This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2012), p. 206; James Dobbins, ‘War with
China’, Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2012), p. 7; Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers,
Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012),
pp. 171–88; Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United
States Is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 95; Yuan
Peng, ‘ZhongMei: xin liangji duili?’ (‘China and U.S.: Confrontation between the New
Bipolars?’), Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), No. 2 (2012), p. 48; Yan Xeutong, ‘Quanli zhong-
xin zhuanyi yu guoji tixi zhuanbian’ (‘Transition of Power Center and Transformation of
International System’), Dangdai yatai (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific), No. 6 (2012),
p. 9; Campbell Craig, et al., ‘Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future
of U.S. Grand Strategy’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2013), p. 182; White, The China
Choice, chapter 1; Charles A. Kupchan, ‘The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the
Coming Challenge to Pax Americana’, Security Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2014), p. 253; David A.
Lake, ‘The Challenge: The Domestic Determinants of International Rivalry Between the
United States and China’, International Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2014), pp. 442–43;
consensus not only in the academic community, but also evident in public opin-
ion, that China is now the most important country in the world after the United
States. The results of a poll taken in 22 countries showed that respondents in 15
of them considered China to have surpassed, or about to overtake the United
States as the world’s leading superpower.36 A later Pew poll revealed that most of

the respondents in 36 of the 44 countries surveyed were of the same opinion. As
to the economy, 49% of respondents to a poll held in 2008 believed that the
United States was the leading global economic power, and only 19% thought it
was China. By 2014, the data changed to 40% and 31%, respectively.37 These
observations among academics and ordinary people seem to portend a fresh
‘bipolar structure.’
Subjective judgment, however, is insufficient to convince us of the significant
change in international structure that is taking place; we need more objective
standards and data.38 One of the prevailing operational criteria for judging the
type of the international structure is that it becomes unipolar when the capacity
of one great power exceeds 50% of the sum capacity of all the great powers; bipo-
lar if it consists in two great powers whose combined capacity exceeds 50% of
the sum, when the capacity of each is not less than 25%; and multipolar if the
respective power proportions of three or more great powers is greater than 5%,
less than 25%, and whose combined capacity is not less than 50%.39 The general
measurement method to calculate the relative capacity of a country is (E þ M)/2,
where E represents the relative economic capacity of the country, equal to the
ratio of its GDP to the sum of that of all the great powers; and M represents the
David A. Lake, ‘Status, Authority, and the End of the American Century’, in T. V. Paul,
Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 263; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, chapter 10; Steven E. Miller, ‘Introduction: the Sarajevo Centenary-1914 and the
Rise of China’, in Rosecrance and Miller, eds., The Next Great War, p. x.
36 Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American’ World”’,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2012), p. 215.
37 ‘Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image’,
Pew Research Center, 14 July, 2014, chapter 3, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chap
ter-3-balance-of-power-u-s-vs-china/.
38 A recent research argues that the international community’s common perception of states’
power positions is equally important to the distribution of material capacities when judging
international structure. See Benjamin Zala, ‘Polarity Analysis and Collective Perceptions of
Power: The Need for a New Approach’, Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1
(2017), pp. 2–17.
39 George Modelski, World Power Concentrations: Typology, Data, Explanatory Framework
(Morristown: General Learning Press, 1974), p. 2; David P. Rapkin, William R. Thompson and
Jon A. Christopherson, ‘Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era: Conceptualization,
Measurement, and Validation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1979), pp. 261–
95; William R. Thompson, ‘Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1986), pp. 587–615.
relative military capability, which is equal to the ratio of the power’s military
expenditure to the sum of that of all the great powers’.40
According to this method, I have obtained the relative capability trends of
eight recognized major countries since the turn of the 21st century, as shown in
Figure 1, which includes the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France,

Germany, India, and Japan. It highlights the trends’ three obvious features:
Firstly, that although the advantage of the United States’ national capacity rela-
tive to that of other major powers has been constantly enormous, overall it has
been declining, from 55.5% in 2001 to 46.7% in 2016. Secondly, China’s capa-
bility advantage over countries other than the United States has been clear since
2008, when it became the only country in addition to the United States with a rel-
ative capability of more than 10%. Having reached 21.7% in 2016, it is now
approaching the 25% threshold of the bipolar structure. Thirdly, none of the
other six major powers’ relative capacity has displayed a palpable upward trend
over the past 16 years, rather in 2016 crowding around a narrow 4% –7% inter-
val. It is on account of these three trends that the unipolar system, which arose
after the collapse of the USSR, indeed appears now to be transitioning towards a
(US–China) bipolar system, rather than a multipolar one.41 This would suggest
that the projections of scholars and observations of public opinion cited above
are neither speculative nor exaggerated.
40 To measure the relative capability of a country and its power position in the international
system according to the ratio of its own capability to that of all major powers is the most
common approach to quantifying a country’s capability. Some scholars select military capa-
bility as the single indicator. For example, Rapkin, Thompson, and Christopherson,
‘Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era’, pp. 261–295; Volgy and Imwalle,
‘Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order’, pp. 819–34. Some others
just select economic capability as the indicator. For example, Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics, p. 67. There are of course also ones who choose a variety of indica-
tors. For example, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance:
International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2008). Obviously, economic and military capabilities are the two
fundamental elements of a country’s capability, and which form the basis for other types of
elements. For the literature using the same quantification method, see Qin Yaqing, Baquan
tixi yu guoji chongtu (Hegemonic System and International Conflicts)(Shanghai: Shanghai
renmin chubanshe, 1999), pp. 233–34; Sun Xuefeng, Zhanlue xuanze yu jueqi chengbai
(1816-1991)[Choice of Strategies and the Consequence of Rise (1816-1991)], PhD disserta-
tion, Tsinghua University, 2005, p. 32.
41 One scholar pointed out that it is a situation ‘that is plausible at some mid-point in the tran-
sition from unipolarity to bipolarity or multipolarity’ if there is a state whose relative capabil-
ity is between 45% and 50% while no other state controls more than 25%. See Thompson,
‘Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare’, p. 599. According to the trend shown
in data above, the possibility of the current international system changing into a bipolar
structure in the near future is far greater than the possibility its becoming a multipolar one.
60%
50%
USA
40% China

Russia
30%
UK
France
20%
Germany
10% Japan
India
0%
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Fig. 1. The Trends of World Major Powers’ Relative Capabilities (2001–2016).
Source: Annual GDP data is from the International Monetary Fund’s ‘World Economic Outlook
Database’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx; the annual military
expenditure data is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, http://www.
sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.
In order to obtain a more explicit understanding of the current position in

regard to China’s relative capability, I compare it with the Soviet Union’s in the
late 1980s. Using the same method, I calculate that the Soviet Union’s relative
capability from 1988 to 1990 was 24.9% in 1988, 14.1% in 1989, and 13.9% in
1990.42 This means that in 2011 China’s relative capability overtook what the
Soviet Union’s was in 1989.43 Although for various reasons the Soviet Union’s
capability became seriously impaired by the late 1980s, the international system
at that time remained roughly bipolar, and the USSR still enjoyed superpower
status. In a similar vein, today’s international system can be seen as at least a
‘quasi-bipolar’ one, and China as a ‘quasi-superpower’ or ‘sub-superpower’. In
fact, if calculated according to these countries’ average annual GDP growth rate
and military expenditure during 2001–2016, China’s relative capability should
42 In order to keep pace with the 2001–2016 data, I chose the eight major powers (i.e. the
United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, India, and Japan). The annual GDP
and military expenditure data for the eight countries from 1988 to 1990 are taken from the
United Nations Statistics Division database (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.
asp) and ‘The Correlates of War ’ database (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets). The
relative capability of the United States in that three years was 39.1%, 47.7%, and 45.7%,
respectively.
43 According to the previous calculations, the relative capability of China in 2011–2015 was
14.4%, 16.2%, 18.3%, 19.8%, and 21.7%, respectively.
surpass 25% in 2018 to reach 25.2%. It would thus appear that a new bipolar
system is close at hand.
Should bipolarization between China and the US eventuate, we must be pre-
pared to deal with the major problem of what the forthcoming ‘Sino-US bipolar
system’ looks like. Will it repeat the mistakes of the Soviet-American bipolar sys-

tem, and drag the world back to the Cold War? In fact, there are valid grounds
for this concern.44 There has been much debate in the international community
about China’s ‘new assertiveness’ over the past few years.45 Certain scholars have
expressed uncertainty about China’s maintenance of strategic self-restraint in the
future, and also fears that it may offensively transform its wealth into military
power and political influence as it competes with the United States for regional
hegemony over East Asia.46
Since the 18th Communist Party of China National Congress, the country has
focused on the ‘Chinese Dream’ as a way to realize China’s great rejuvenation.47
China’s diplomatic strategy has accordingly changed from ‘Keeping a Low
Profile’ (tao guang yang hui), to which it held for more than 20 years, to ‘Striving
for Achievement’ (fen fa you wei).48 In 2013, China successively put forward the
‘Silk Road Economic Zone’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ initiative.
In the same year, China set up the East China Sea Air Defence Identification
Zone. In 2015, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded on China’s ini-
tiative, was formally established. All these aggressive diplomatic moves undoubt-
edly reflect the rise in China’s international status and the resultant changes in the
country’s strategic mentality. As a consequence, the Trump administration listed
China as a ‘revisionist power’ and a ‘strategic competitor’ in the United States’
latest national security strategy report.49 The question that remains is whether
China’s rise can avoid the ‘Churchill trap’, and whether the country builds a ‘new
type of great power relations’ that transcends the Cold War ambience between
the US and the Soviet Union.
44 For similar worries, see Steven E. Miller, ‘Introduction’, in Rosecrance and Miller, eds., The
Next Great War, pp. xxi–xxii.
45 For a review of related discussion, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is
China’s New Assertiveness?’, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 7–48.
46 Layne, ‘This Time It’s Real’, p. 205; Amitav Acharya, ‘Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s
Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1
(2014), p. 168.
47 Xi Jinping, ‘Shixian Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing shi Zhonghua minzu jindai yilai zuiweida
de mengxiang’ (‘The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation is the Greatest Dream of the
Chinese Nation in Modern Times’), in Xi Jinping tan zhiguolizheng (Xi Jinping’s Thought on
the Governance of China (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 2014), pp. 35–36.
48 Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’, Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014), pp. 153–184.
49 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the White House, December
2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-
2.pdf.
The Co-ruling Mechanism under the Bipolar Structure

This section first theoretically classifies the possible domination–subordination
relations between great powers and small states under the bipolar structure, and
analyses the reasons why the ‘Co-ruling Mode’ is rare. On this basis, I then
explore the co-ruling mechanism as applicable to superpowers and its implica-

tions. I find that two crucial conditions determine the realization and mainte-
nance of co-ruling: (i) the foreign functions of the two superpowers are
differentiated, and (ii) neither of the two powers desires to wage war against the
other for exclusive dominance over small countries.
The Four Modes of Domination–Subordination Relationship

According to Waltz, countries in the international system fall into the two catego-
ries. One is the ‘pole’, which determines the type of structure of a certain interna-
tional system, and that Waltz called ‘great power’,50 while the other comprises
the remaining countries in the system that could sweepingly be referred to as
‘small states’ relative to ‘great powers’. Countries that become great powers are
obviously those who are eligible to vie for dominant power in the international
system. Power as a relational concept51 refers to the ability to make others do
what they otherwise would not do,52 which is reflected in the relationship
between domination and subordination. If there were only one person in the
world, then s/he would have no so-called power at all. Similarly, the power of the
superpowers must be materialized through their control of and impact on small
states. Here the ‘control’ or ‘influence’ is also called ‘rule’/‘lead’ in political sci-
ence. In theory, the domination–subordination relationship between great powers
and small states in the bipolar structure includes four modes (as shown in
Figure 2).
The first mode is ‘isolation’, referring to a situation where a superpower leads
or dominates no or few small states. The second mode is ‘monopoly’, which
means that a superpower owns the leadership and domination of all or most of
the small states in the system. Under the bipolar structure, a superpower’s isola-
tion generally reflects its rival’s monopoly of power, so Mode 1 and Mode 2 are
essentially the same under the bipolar structure. It is unusual in the real world for
a superpower voluntarily to give up the contest and hand over hegemony of the
entire system to its rival. But this odd-looking situation whereby hegemony of the
50 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 162.

51 There are two approaches to understanding ‘power’ in academia: one is the power-as-
resources approach, and the other is the relational power approach. The former approach
actually equates power with capability, while ‘power’ mentioned here, in the narrower
sense, follows the latter one. See David A. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, in
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., Handbook of International
Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 178.
52 Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1957), pp. 202–03;
Dennis H. Wrong, Quanli lun (Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses), trans. Lu Zhenlun and
Zheng Mingzhe (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), p. 3.
Superpower A Superpower B Superpower A Superpower B
A group of Another group A group of Another group

small states of small states small states of small states

Mode 1: Isolation Mode 2: Monopoly
Superpower A Superpower B Superpower A Superpower B
A group of Another group A group of Another group

small states of small states small states of small states
Mode 3: Divided-governance Mode 4: Co-governance
Fig. 2. Four Modes of Domination-subordination Relationship under the Bipolar System.
whole world belongs almost exclusively to a single country can indeed happen,
due to certain domestic reasons over particular periods. For instance, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the international system briefly entered a period where
there were two superpowers but only one polarized camp—a result of the collapse
of the socialist camp in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’s ‘deregulation’ policy.
The third type is ‘divided-ruling’, which refers to the circumstance wherein the
two superpowers respectively lead and dominate a group of small countries, thus
forging two antagonistic camps. This process is called ‘bipolarisation’. From the
perspective of the Balance of Power Theory, this is an inevitable outcome of the
bipolar structure.53 Therefore, as mentioned earlier, many scholars regard bipo-
larity and bipolarization as symbiotic phenomena.54 But as one scholar pointed
out, ‘bipolarisation’, as a manifestation form of ‘divided-ruling’ under the bipolar
system, is at best an empirical phenomenon with high occurrence probability,
rather than the only necessary outcome.55
A possible alternative is the fourth type, ‘co-ruling’, as shown in Figure 2,
which refers to the two superpowers jointly exercising leadership and domination
over all or most of the small countries in the system.
53 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 8.

54 For the distinction between bipolarity and bipolarization, see Rapkin, Thompson and
Christopherson, ‘Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era’, pp. 261–95; William D.
Jackson, ‘Polarity in International Systems: A Conceptual Note’, International Interactions,
Vol. 4, No. 1 (1978), pp. 87–95; Joseph L. Nogee, ‘Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept’, Orbis,
Vol. 18, No. 4 (1974), pp. 1193–224.
55 Rapkin, Thompson and Christopherson, ‘Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era’,
p. 263.
According to the Divided-ruling Mode, if a small country is an ally of a pole,

then it is necessarily not the ally of the other pole. Similarly, a region belonging to
the sphere of influence of one superpower means that it does not belong to the
sphere of influence of the other. Both superpowers’ power ranges are demarcated
in accordance with states’ geographical boundaries, and divided precisely and

transparently. In the state of ‘Co-ruling’, by contrast, the power spheres of the
two superpowers largely overlap, and most small countries accept the leadership
and domination of both poles. In a nutshell, it may be supposed that most small
countries are simultaneously the allies of both superpowers.56 For current main-
stream international security theories, this state of co-ruling, if not impossible, is
unimaginable. Recently, however, a scholar pointed out that the inference
whereby the two superpowers necessarily balance each other cannot be theoreti-
cally deducted from Structural Realism.57
The reasoning of structural realism relies heavily on analogies with microeco-
nomic models.58 Nevertheless, according to microeconomic theory, oligarchic
enterprises do not necessarily choose to battle in their interactions. In fact, their
gains through collusion are generally higher than the profits of vicious competi-
tion. It is precisely because the collusion of oligarchic enterprises is so ‘dangerous’
for consumers that domestic societies usually introduce laws to prevent such
cooperation. Provided that the bipolar system of international politics can be
analogous to the duopoly market, the behaviour of the two poles of a bipolar sys-
tem is not necessarily the same as what Neo-realism claims that they balance each
other, and accordingly different from Cold War history. It is reasonable for them
to collude strategically with each other for the sake of greater gains. This being
the case, co-ruling emerges.59 In fact, as the case study in next section details,
there indeed existed the phenomenon of co-ruling during the bipolar structure
period of the Spring and Autumn system in ancient China, wherein almost all the
small states in that system paid tribute simultaneously to Jin and Chu, the two
most powerful states.
56 See Cao Wei and Yang Yuan, ‘Mengguo de diren haishi mengguo?– Gudai chaoxian bandao
guojia “liangmian jiemeng zhimi”’ (‘Is the Enemy of My Ally also My Ally? The Mystery
of “Two Sided Alliances” of Ancient Korean Peninsula Countries’), Dangdai yatai
(Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 5 (2015), pp. 49–87.
57 Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist
Alternative’, World Politics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2015), p. 158.
58 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 88–99; Richard Little, ‘International Relations
and the Methodological Turn’, Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1991), p. 473; Barry Buzan,
Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993), pp. 178–80; Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought in
International Relations Since Machiavelli (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2002), p. 238.
59 See Kirshner, ‘The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist
Alternative’, pp. 158–160; Ye Ze, Guatou longduan qiye jingzheng celue (Competition
Strategy of Oligopolistic Enterprises)(Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2012), chapter 6.
Why was the Mode of Co-ruling So Rare in History?

Among the four modes of domination–subordination relationship, the most
common one is undoubtedly the third, which explains why so many believe that
divided-ruling under bipolarity is an inevitable law. By contrast, the Mode of
Co-ruling is so rare that there are almost no existing theories accounting for it.

Since this mode is theoretically feasible and not unprecedented, however, why is
it so rare?
This is explained by the fact that the state of co-ruling is in most cases unsta-
ble. There are three main reasons for this: Firstly, both great power A and great
power B have the opportunistic motivation to monopolize all small states. This
motive stems from the desire for power and accompanying status. Offensive
Realism argues that states are sensitive to their relative power, always maximizing
their power and constantly seeking the chance to weaken their opponents.60
Nevertheless, such argument is still based on the assumption that survival is the
overriding mission of all states in anarchy, yet states’ pursuit of power and status
per se may actually be a more important motivation for great powers to weaken
another great power.61 Status is reflected in inequality and difference, so even if
the two poles were to achieve co-ruling temporarily by some occasional factors,
such a state is not a Nash equilibrium as long as one of the two poles is confident
of defeating the other militarily. If so, that pole will decide to wage war against
its rival to gain higher status.62 The co-ruling will thus cease to exist in this ‘win-
ner takes all’ scenario.
Secondly, the broadening of geographical distances will significantly weaken
great powers’ control over remote small states. IR scholars have noted the nega-
tive impact of geographical distance on military projection capability.63 Small
countries adjacent to great powers, therefore, are more likely to choose to band-
wagon the great powers, because the latter can easily coerce and control the for-
mer.64 Especially in the contemporary global system wherein large bodies of
water possess a very noticeable deterrent effect on states’ power projection, spa-
tial distance plays a vital role in preventing the emergence of global hegemony.65
In the tributary system of ancient East Asia, the influence of Central Plains
Dynasties on the surrounding regimes also progressively diminished due to the
60 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

61 Richard Ned Lebow, A Culture Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical
Realism and the Rise of China’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1
(2010), pp. 53–75.
62 In fact, this is the main reason for the outbreak of most international wars since 1648. See
Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
63 Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1962), pp. 229–31.
64 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 24.
65 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40–41, 114–19.
distances between them.66 The weakening effect of control of distance still exists,
even in today’s high-tech society.67 Relative distance has also narrowed the cur-
rent military capability gap between China and the United States in East Asia.68
In the bipolar system, therefore, those small countries that are geographically
distant from a pole and closer to the other will be more easily controlled by

the nearer pole, thus allowing the mode to transition from ‘divided-ruling’ to
‘co-ruling’.
Last but not least, small states are motivated to escape the state of co-ruling
because the cost of surrendering to one power rather than two great powers is sig-
nificantly lower. In the final analysis there are two ways a great power may gain
control over and make a small country obey it: one is coercion, that is, ‘I’ll kill
you if you don’t obey me’; the other is interest exchange, that is, ‘I’ll give you ben-
efit if you obey me’. According to the latter way, the reason why small countries
are willing to accept the domination of a great power is that by doing so they can
acquire certain assurances from the great power—either negative assurances such
as ‘I promise not to violate you’ or positive guarantees such as ‘I promise to give
you some benefit’. In the case of positive guarantees, ones to do with security
guarantees are most common, and also those most needed for small states. They
are the ‘carrots’ superpowers use for attracting small states in the anarchic world.
As to negative assurance, this is generally also a kind of security guarantee. But
the problem is that small states’ demands for security are inelastic, which means
that, given there has already been a great power able to provide a small state with
guarantees and meet their security needs, obtaining another great power’s guaran-
tee won’t appreciably improve the small state’s security.69
66 The tribute system was accordingly divided from the inside out into several circles such as
‘Chinese characters circle’, ‘inner circle’ and ‘outer circle’, or various areas such as inner
vassal area, outer vassal area, and temporary non-vassal area. See J. K. Fairbank, ed.,
Zhongguo de shijie zhixu: chuantong zhongguo de duiwai guanxi (The Chinese World Order:
Traditional China’s Foreign Relations), trans. Du Jidong (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue
chubanshe, 2010), p. 2. Gao Mingshi, Dongya gudai de zhengzhi yu jiaoyu (The Politics and
Education in Ancient East Asia)(Taipei: Himalaya Foundation, 2003), quoted from Zhang
Feng, ‘Rethinking the “Tribute System”: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical
East Asian Politics’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2009), p. 555.
67 Daisaku Sakaguchi, ‘Distance and Military Operations: Theoretical Background toward
Strengthening the Defense of Offshore Islands’, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security,
No.12 (2011), pp. 83–105.
68 Montgomery, ‘Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific’, pp. 115–149. Some scholar even
believed that, influenced by the geographic distance, a regional bipolarity between US and
China in East Asia emerged in 1990s. See Robert S. Ross, ‘The Geography of the Peace-East
Asia in the Twenty-First Century’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), pp. 81–118.
69 In anarchy, it is difficult for small countries to rely solely on themselves to ensure their own
safety. Therefore, the ‘commodity’ of the ‘external security guarantee’ has low substitutabil-
ity. The low substitutability of goods determines the lack of elasticity of demand for the
commodity. The elasticity of commodity demand measures the sensitivity of commodity
On the other hand, obtaining the guarantee of another new great power would
double the burden of submission on small states. In the tributary system of
ancient East Asia, this means that small countries must simultaneously pay tribute
to the two great powers. In the modern international system, this amounts to
small states militarily assuming the alliance obligations for the two great powers

while politically supporting and subordinating to both of them. This would
undoubtedly increase the burden on small countries. In addition, simultaneous
surrender to the two major powers also increases the difficulty of implementa-
tion. A basic principle of structural balance theory in social psychology is that
treating a friend’s enemy as an enemy makes the triangle relationship stable, while
treating the friend’s enemy as a friend will weaken the relationship between the
three.70 Since under the bipolar system the identity of the two superpowers as
each other’s rival is unambiguous, it is difficult for small countries to maintain
good relations with the both at the same time. In short, when the two poles can
only provide one sort of benefits for small countries, namely, the security guaran-
tee, the increment of small countries’ gains by simultaneously surrendering to the
two poles is meager, while the costs and difficulties of doing so significantly
increase. Consequently, small countries tend to choose a ‘one-sided policy’ or
‘non-alignment policy’, rather than accept ‘co-ruling’ by the two great powers.
Great Powers’ Functional Differentiation and Differential Competition

Exploring the reasons for the rarity of co-ruling is conducive to seeking the condi-
tions and mechanisms of its emergence. As noted above, a critical factor among
the difficulties imbued in the emergence and maintenance of co-ruling is that the
costs to small states of accepting co-ruling far outweigh the benefits. Why would
a small country willingly accept the leadership of two great powers at the same
time? This would depend on whether or not the two poles are functionally
differentiated.
That nations are functionally undifferentiated is a bedrock assumption of
Structural Realism. Waltz argued that, under anarchy, each country must defend
its own security while coordinating the governance of its domestic affairs. In this
sense, he believed that all states are ‘like units’.71 However, certain scholars hold
that ignoring the differentiations of national functions is a significant theoretical
demand to price change (i.e. supply change). The more inelastic the demand, the less sig-
nificant the effect of increasing supply on stimulating demand. See Robin Bade and
Michael Parkin, Weiguan jingjixue yuanli (Foundations of Microeconomics), trans. Zhang
Wei (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2010), pp. 130–32.
70 Fritz Heider, ‘Attitudes and Cognitive Organization’, Journal of Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 1
(1946), pp. 107–12; Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958).
71 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 96–97. See also Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius
Elman, and Paul Schroeder, ‘Correspondence: History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look’,
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), p.189; Chen Xiaoding, ‘Shixi guoji guanxi lilun de
hecheng: yizhong kexue zhexue de fenxi shijiao’ (‘An Analysis of the Synthesis of
defect72 inconsistent with empirical data. They argue that there were indeed
countries in international systems that had distinct functions.73 As I have pointed
out in other places, the key flaw in Waltz’s assumption of undifferentiated state
functions is that he fails to realize the difference between states’ domestic and for-
eign functions. The domestic function of all countries is to defend their own

security, yet this does not mean that all countries in the international community
play the same roles relative to others. As far as foreign function is concerned, that
of each country is obviously different.74
The foreign function of a state refers to ‘services provided by a country that
can meet the needs of other countries’.75 Countries in the international system,
like consumers in the market, have their own demands, and some countries (espe-
cially great powers), can, like companies in the market, provide other countries
with ‘commodities’ or ‘services’. If a country can provide something that meets
the urgent need of another country who is unable to provide it for itself, the latter
will come to depend on the former, and the former’s power over the latter will
grow.76 As earlier mentioned, great powers have two ways of acquiring small
countries’ subordination and support: coercion and interest exchange. The logic
of the former is: ‘I obey you because I am afraid of you.’; and of the latter: ‘I obey
you because I need you’.77 The significance to great powers of their foreign func-
tions is that they can meet the needs of small states, who accordingly become
dependent on the great powers.
Obviously, performing its foreign functions thoroughly enough to meet most
countries’ key needs will generate high respect for a great power and wield huge
influence.78 As historian Paul Schroeder observed, in the first half of the 19th
International Relations Theory: An Analytical Perspective of Philosophy of Science’), Guoji
zhengzhi yanjiu (International Politics Studies), No. 4 (2006), p. 167.
72 Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert, ‘Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International
Relations Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010),
pp. 315–37.
73 Buzan, Jones and Little, The Logic of Anarchy, pp. 121–31, 146; George Sørensen, ‘States
Are Not “Like Units”: Types of State and Forms of Anarchy in the Present International
System’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1998), pp. 79–98.
74 Yang Yuan, ‘Tixi cengci de guojia gongneng lilun: jiyu dui jiegou xianshi zhuyi guojia gong-
neng jiading de pipan’ (‘State Functional Theory on the System Level: Based upon A
Critique of the State Function Assumption of Structural Realism’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi
(World Economy and Politics), No. 11 (2010), pp. 129–53.
75 Ibid., p. 138.
76 For the classic argument on power originating in dependence, see Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977), chapter 1.
77 Yang Yuan, ‘Wuli xiepo haishi liyi jiaohuan: daguo wuzhanzheng shidai daguo tigao guoji
yingxiangli de hexin lujing’ (‘Compellence or Interest Exchange? The Core Means for Great
Powers to Enhance Their International Influence in an Era without Major Wars among
Great Powers), Waijiao pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review), No. 4 (2011), pp. 106–07.
78 Yang, ‘State Functional Theory on the System Level’, p. 147.
century Britain, Russia and other powers in the European system played different
but significant roles in it. Functions included maintaining the balance of power in
Europe, and protecting small countries from the threat of others. They thus dem-
onstrated and expanded their international influence and authorities.79 In addi-
tion, a central point of hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemonic system

can be stable because hegemonic power can provide the system with security
guarantees, development order, and other various public goods.80 The core logic
of the hierarchy theory is similar to that of the hegemonic stability theory, that is,
whether a great power can make the countries under its rule accept some kind of
‘unequal’ relationship largely depends on whether the great power can effectively
provide these countries with security guarantees, economic and developmental
order, and fair arbitration over disputes.81 These theories confirm the existence of
states’ foreign functions, and their significance to the great powers.
As earlier mentioned, the main reason why small states are reluctant to surren-
der to two great powers at the same time is that doing so doubles their obligations
but does not significantly improve their utility compared with subordinating to a
single great power. If, however, the two great powers’ foreign functions are differ-
entiated and each can only meet one of the different indispensable needs of certain
small countries, then the willingness of small countries to simultaneously accept
the leadership of the two great powers grows. From the supply and demand per-
spective, there are two conditions for great power functional differentiation under
the bipolar system:
Condition I: Small countries, as the demand side, generally have other fundamental needs in
addition to that of survival.
Condition II: Each of the two great powers as the supply side can only meet one of the needs of
small countries, and the types of needs the two great powers can respectively satisfy are different
from each other.
Once the two conditions are simultaneously met, the two poles enact different
roles over small countries which carry considerable importance. At this time,
small states may accept the leadership of the related great powers in each specific
79 Paul Schroeder, ‘Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory’, International Security, Vol. 19, No.
1 (1994), p. 126.
80 Charles P. Kindleberger, ‘Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy:
Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2
(1981), pp. 242–54; Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics; Robert Gilpin, The
Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987);
Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical
Assessment’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1989), pp. 183–98.
81 David A. Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics’,
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), pp. 47–79; David A. Lake, Hierarchy in
International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009); Ahsan I. Butt,
‘Anarchy and Hierarchy in International Relations: Examining South America’s War-Prone
Decade, 1932-41’, International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), pp. 575–607.
fields, in order to ensure both of their different needs are met. The expectation of
gaining greater influence over small countries will motivate each superpower to
enhance the quantity and quality of its supplies sufficiently to satisfy the certain
demand of small countries which it is able to meet, thus forming a ‘differential
competition’ by fulfilling the two poles’ respective comparative advantages.82

The China–US economic-security dual leadership configuration that is emerging
in contemporary East Asia is an example of this differential competition. It is
because China and the United States have been playing their own comparative
advantages in the economic and security fields respectively that other East Asian
countries are willing to accept the leadership of China and the United States in
these two areas at the same time.83
The Mechanism of Co-ruling and Its Implications

Assuming satisfaction of the two conditions mentioned above, i.e. each of the two
powers can meet only one of the needs of small states, and the two superpowers’
foreign functions are indeed differentiated, the state of co-ruling is still not always
possible to form or maintain. Driven by the desire for power, the two superpowers
still have the incentive to wage and win wars against their opponent and bring all
small states under its exclusive rule. In such a case, the domination–subordination
mode of relationship will transform from co-ruling into monopoly or divided-
ruling. Therefore, another necessary condition for the emergence and maintenance
of co-ruling is that the two great powers are bound by the cost of war or normative
factors, and do not try to compel the other power to withdraw from hegemonic
competition or deprive it of competitive capability through war and violence.
In an anarchic world without a central authority, this condition is generally
difficult to meet. Fortunately, as mentioned in the second section, since 1945 the
international system has entered the era of ‘no war among great powers’. The
potential cost of a war between the superpowers has risen beyond the pale
because of some important factors such as nuclear deterrence and economic inter-
dependence. Additionally, since the deepening of the sovereignty norm, territorial
annexation has already been an unacceptable policy option, which makes the ‘no
war among great powers’ era also one of ‘sovereignty zero-death’.84 From the
82 If there is no functional differentiation between the great powers because not all of the two
conditions listed above are available, then the power competition between the two great
powers to win over small countries can be called ‘homogenous competition’, meaning that
the functions of the two great powers and the reasons for winning small countries’ support
are ‘homogeneous’.
83 Zhang Chun, ‘Guoji gonggong chanpin de gongying jingzheng jiqi chulu: Yatai diqu eryuan
geju yu zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi jiangou’ (‘Competition over Provision of
International Public Goods and Paths Forward: Polarizating Dynamics in the Asia Pacific
Region and the Building of a New Type of Great Power Relationship between China and the
U.S.’), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 6 (2014), pp. 52–72.
84 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in
International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), chapter 7; Tanisha M. Fazal,
Small states generally

have more than one
indispensable need Foreign functions of
the two superpowers
are differentiated Differential
The two superpowers can
competition and
only meet one type of

co-governance
small states' needs No war between the
superpowers
Fig. 3. The mechanism of great powers’ co-governance under the bipolar system.
perspective of social evolution, this situation of little violence between great

powers is unlikely to be reversed.85 In this sense, the post-1945 international sys-
tem has favourable conditions for the emergence of co-ruling.
Based on the above analysis, I draw the mechanism through which the super-
powers in the bipolar structure achieve differential competition and conduct co-
ruling over small countries. As shown in Figure 3: Upon satisfaction of the two
conditions, ‘small states generally have more than one indispensable need’ and
‘the two superpowers can only meet one type of small states’ needs’, differentia-
tion of the two superpowers’ foreign functions occurs. It not only affords small
countries the motivation to surrender simultaneously to both poles, but also dif-
ferentiates the two powers’ approach to competing for power. If the great powers
are constrained from committing direct acts of war against one another, neither
one can monopolize leadership of small countries through violence and subjuga-
tion, and the differential competition as a consequence of the great power’s func-
tional differentiation will be maintained, thus leading to the state of co-ruling by
the two poles.
Compared with the divided-ruling of the Cold War, co-ruling through differ-
ential competition has obvious positive implications. Firstly, a lesser degree of
conflict and antagonism will be entailed in differential competition than in homo-
geneity competition. Compare the competition between two businessmen in a
market, one who sells vegetables and the other fruits. The intensity of competition
between them is bound to be less than that between two sellers of vegetables.
Secondly, as the two great powers jointly govern most small countries, their
respective ‘spheres of influence’ are no longer strictly delimited by space, but
demarcated more in relation to function (e.g. one superpower dominates security
matters while the other leads the economic field). This contributes to abating the
‘State Death in the International System’, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004),
pp. 311–344; Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest,
Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jiang Peng:
Guifan bianqian yu shenfen zaizao: zhuquan lingsiwang shidai daguo jueqi zhanlue zhi lujing
chonggou (Normative Change and Identity Reconstruction: The Path Reconstruction of
Great Powers’ Rising Strategy in an Era of Sovereign Zero Death)(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui
kexue chubanshe, 2015).
85 Tang, ‘Social Evolution of International Politics’, pp. 31–55.
geopolitical colour of great power politics.86 Finally, a prerequisite for the main-
tenance of co-ruling is that the two poles fully meet the indispensable needs of
small countries, which means that such kind of power competition has some posi-
tive externality. That is, small countries may benefit from the competition
between the two poles. Differential competition will force the two great powers

optimally to exert their comparative advantages, and give small countries greater
access to the two superpowers’ ‘high-quality services’.
The three implications above show that the situations of both the great powers
and the small countries will improve due to co-ruling; the realization of co-ruling
is hence a kind of Pareto improvement on the divided-ruling mode. The mode of
co-ruling, therefore, presents a promising alternative, makes avoidance of the
‘Churchill trap’ possible, and is what the world would like to see as the future of
US-Sino relations.
Four Cases of Bipolar Systems

This section analyses four cases of great power competition under the bipolar sys-
tem to test the conditions and mechanism of co-ruling as proposed in the third
section. The case studies demonstrate that the co-ruling mode will be stably main-
tained only when the foreign functions of the two superpowers are differentiated,
and inter-great-power war is no longer a viable strategic option.
Cessation of War between Jin and Chu in the Spring and Autumn System
In the spring and autumn system that spanned more than 300 years, competition
between the Jin and Chu states was a focal theme of great powers’ contention for
supremacy. Relations between the two great powers constitutes the backbone of
Spring and Autumn history.87 During the 80-or-more year period between the
War of Chengpu in 632 BC and the Xiangxu Cessation of War Conference in 546
BC, the international system was more or less under a bipolar structure domi-
nated by Jin and Chu.88 Competing for the allegiance of small countries was the
86 Geopolitical factors can only weaken and not be completely eliminated. Due to the weaken-
ing effect of geographical space on the scope of influence of power, the influence of a
great power on a small country closer to it is always greater than that of another great
power more distant from that small country. Therefore, the geographical sphere of influ-
ence’ and the struggle for it will persist.
87 Gu Derong and Zhu Shunlong, Chunqiu shi (History of Spring and Autumn)(Shanghai:
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003), p. 162.
88 The resolution of the War-Ceasing Conference in 546 BC provided that all of the states
except Qi and Qin must pay tribute both to Jin and Chu, which was itself a good expression
of the power status of Jin, Chu, Qi, Qin, and other states at that time. No participant state
objected to this resolution, which reflected the consensus among states that Jin and Chu
enjoyed a significantly higher power status than other states, the so-called ‘Jin and Chu
have dominated and led the union of the leuds for quite a long time’. See Zuozhuan,
Luxianggong 27 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 27th Year of Duke Xiang of Lu).
medium through which the two poles struggled for hegemony. Almost all the
major wars during this period, including the War of Chengpu, the War of Bi, and
the War of Yanling, were triggered by the rivalry between Jin and Chu for suzer-
ainty over Central Plains states such as Song and Zheng. As the two superpowers
of the system, Jin and Chu wanted as many countries as possible in their respec-

tive hierarchical camps. This was the core contradiction between the two powers.
Continuing and recurrent conflicts over hegemony placed enormous pressure
on all countries. Statistics show that more than 20 wars involving the Jin and Chu
broke out in the interim between the War of Chengpu and the Xiangxu War-
ceasing Conference.89 Zheng, Song and other small and medium-sized countries
were the two superpowers’ main target, and hence long suffered the scourge of
war. ‘People could not enjoy the produce of the land; men and women were hard
and thin; there was no place to tell.’90 ‘The people who died and fled were fathers,
brothers or children. Everyone was sad, and no one knew where to turn for pro-
tection.’91 Under this circumstance, cessation of war became the prevailing trend
of social thought. For example, Han Xuanzi, a minister of Jin, argued, ‘Wars are
disasters that harm people and are the vermin of finance, and are catastrophes for
small countries. Some propose to eliminate it. Although it is impossible, we must
agree. Otherwise Chu can call upon vassal states to agree to this proposal, and we
will lose our status as a leader.’ Chen Wenzi, a minister of Qi, also pointed out, ‘if
we do not agree to the proposal of ceasing warfare, we will lose popular sup-
port’.92 It can thus be seen that whether choosing the proposal of ceasing warfare
already had a bearing on public attitudes for or against the (potential) hegemons.
At the same time, both poles had to cope with their own problems. The
authority of the regime of the Duke of Jin was declining, the power of bureaucrats
expanding, thus exacerbating the domestic power struggle. Consequently, Jin had
to concentrate the bulk of its energy on domestic issues. Meanwhile, the southern
great power of Chu faced the looming threat posed by the rising state of Wu.93 In
this case, both states accepted the proposal of Xiangxu, the praetor of Song, and
determined formally to cease warfare.94
89 Wang Qingcheng, ‘Chunqiu shidai de yici “mibinghui”’ (‘A Ceasing-War Conference in the
Spring and Autumn Period’), Jianghan xuebao (Jianghan Journal), No. 11 (1963), p. 41.
90 Zuozhuan, Luxianggong 9 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 9th Year of Duke Xiang of Lu).
93 Huang Pumin, Mengcan gange: chunqiu junshi lishi yanjiu (A Study on the Military History
of the Spring and Autumn Period)(Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2013), p. 345.
94 According to Zuo Zhuan, before this, Jin and Chu also held another ‘War-Ceasing
Conference’ in 579 BC. See Zuozhuan, Luchenggong 12 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 12th year of
Duke Cheng of Lu). But this conference was evidently unsuccessful, because just four
years later, in 575 BC, Jin and Chu fought the Battle of Yanling. In fact, there is controversy
over whether the conference of 575 BC actually happened; see Yang Shengnan, ‘Chunqiu
shiqi de diyici “mibing menghui” kao’ (‘Textual Research on the First “War-Ceasing
In the summer of 546 BC, fourteen states, including Jin, Chu, Qi, Qin, Lu,
Song, Zheng, Wei, Cai, Xu, Cao, Zhu, and Teng, held an unprecedented confer-
ence in Song, in which all agreed to cease wars and maintain peace. Known as the
‘Cessation of War Conference’ (Mi bing zhi hui), it was here that Chu proposed
that, ‘the vassal states of Jin and of Chu appear before the suzerain of the opposite

side’. This amounted to a provision whereby the vassal states of Jin pay tribute to
Chu, and the vassal states of Chu pay tribute to Jin. Jin pointed out that the
power statuses of Qi and Qin were far superior to that of other states. ‘The status
of Jin, Chu, Qi, and Qin state is equal, and Jin cannot command Qi, as Chu can-
not command Qin. If the king of Chu can let the king of Qin visit our city, how
dare I not ask the king of Qi to visit Chu?’ In the end, the two great powers
agreed that all states other than Qi and Qin should pay tribute to both Jin and
Chu. Before using their blood to seal this oath, the two superpowers had a dispute
over who should be the first to sign. Jin asserted: ‘Jin is always the leader of the
feudal lords, and no state has ever taken the blood oath before Jin’, while Chu
argued: ‘You admit that the status of Jin and Chu is equal. If Jin were always in
front, this would mean that Chu is weaker than Jin. Moreover, Jin and Chu have
alternately been leaders of the states for extended periods. Is this an exclusively
Jin domain?’ Eventually Jin agreed to let Chu make the first blood imprint.95
It can be noted from both the process and the resolution of this conference that
other states, as well as Jin and Chu reciprocally, acknowledged the two as twin
superpowers in the international community. The main significance of this con-
ference lay in the acknowledgement of the two powers and of the international
community as a whole of the strategic balance between Jin and Chu, and, more
importantly, its stipulation that the two superpowers shared hegemony,96 which
was undoubtedly the most prominent feature of this conference. During the Cold
War, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the balance of power
between each other, but in no way shared one another’s ‘spheres of influence’,
instead implementing the divided-ruling mode. The two superpowers of Jin and
Chu nevertheless agreed at this Cessation of War Conference to let their respec-
tive vassal states also become allies of their opponent. Among them, Chen, Cai,
Xu, and others were originally the vassal states of Chu, while Lu, Song, Wei,
Zheng and others the vassal states of Jin.97 This constitutes the two poles having
reached agreement on co-ruling.
However, although Jin and Chu temporarily formed a state of co-ruling,
the foreign functions of the two poles were still highly homogeneous. The goal
the two powers proposed at the Cessation of War Conference was, ‘It will be
in the interests of small countries.’98 The so-called ‘benefit’ for small countries
Conference” in the Spring and Autumn Period’), Shixue yuekan (Historiography Monthly),
No. 6 (1981), p. 1.
95 Zuo Tradition, the 27th Year of Duke Xiang of Lu.
96 Huang, A Study on the Military History of the Spring and Autumn Period, p. 348.
97 Tong Shuye, Chunqiu shi (A History of the Spring and Autumn Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 2012), p. 240.
here referred to a peaceful and stable external environment by virtue of the

Cessation of War resolution. In 541 BC, Liu Dinggong, a minister of King Jing of
Zhou, who was ordered to comfort Zhao Wu, the praetor of Jin, also said, ‘If
there had been no Dayu, we all would have been about to become fish! . . . Why
don’t you inherit the achievements of Dayu to protect the people?’99 He hoped

that under the leadership of Zhao Wu, Jin could carry forward the achievements
of Dayu, and take on responsibility for protecting people in all countries. It can
be inferred that the main function expected of Jin and Chu at that time by the
international community was that of a security guarantee. In fact, the two coun-
tries had long provided small states with guarantees through both positive and
negative assurances.100
In addition to the fact that the benefits provided by Jin and Chu were the same
ones, the co-ruling by Jin and Chu also doubled the burden on these small states.
In fact, even the tribute-paying load to just one suzerain state was already exorbi-
tant at that time. As hegemon, Jin ordered its tributaries, ‘to make a diplomatic
visit every three years, pay tribute every five years; Jin will hold a meeting if nec-
essary, and organize a coalition against the disloyal’.101 In practice, the demands
of the hegemon on tributaries were often more extreme. For example, Zheng, as a
vassal state of Jin, once ‘made diplomatic visit every year and followed Jin’s
orders at all times during periods it was not paying tribute’.102 Lu, Another tribu-
tary of Jin, also ‘always delivered tributes on time and sent a steady stream of
envoys’.103 The resolution the Cessation of War Conference reached, whereby
‘the vassal states of Jin and of Chu appear before the suzerain of the opposite
side’ effectively doubled the small countries’ already heavy burden, since they
now had to simultaneously pay tribute to both hegemons.104 Moreover, the
co-ruling resolution mainly resulted from international and domestic anti-war
pressure, that emanating from popular sentiment in favour of maintaining peace,
rather than from the unbearably huge cost of war itself, which has the directive
effect of deterring states’ impulse to wage wars. In fact, military conflicts, and
even wars, still occurred between major powers such as Jin and Qi, Wu and Chu,
and Wu and Yue. This implies that great powers in that system still had oppor-
tunistic incentives to profit through warfare.
Under the conditions of undifferentiated great power functions and the still
existent possibility of war between great powers, the state of co-ruling ensuing
from the agreed Cessation of War between Jin and Chu was inevitably volatile.
99 Zuozhuan, Luzhaogong yuan nian (Zuo Tradition, the 1st Year of Duke Zhao of Lu).
100 Positive assurance refers to the commitment of assisting small states in resisting aggres-
sion from other states, while negative assurance refers to the promise not committing
aggression against the small states.
101 Zuozhuan, Luzhaogong 3 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 3rd Year of Duke Zhao of Lu).
102 Zuozhuan, Luxianggong 22 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 22nd Year of Duke Xiang of Lu).
104 Gao Rui, Zhongguo shanggu junshishi (Military History of Ancient China)(Beijng: Junshi
kexue chubanshe, 1995), p. 256.
Great power aspirations to exercise exclusive domination over small countries

steadily grew as time went by. In 535 BC, the Tower of Zhanghua in Chu was
inaugurated, and countries were requested to send congratulatory envoys. Duke
Zhao of Lu was thus forced to go to Chu. This did not sit well with Jin, which
accordingly ordered Lu to return all its lands previously under Chu occupa-

tion.105 Ji Sun, the prime minister of Lu, who had no choice but to obey the order,
unhappily recorded, ‘That Our Duke visited Chu has already offended Jin. If we
do not obey its order this time, we will further offend it and necessarily incur Jin’s
attack, which we cannot resist. Therefore, we’d better follow its order.’106 This
event well demonstrates that the determination of small countries under the dou-
ble coercion of two great powers will inevitably waver as they try to curry favour
with both the two powers. In 531 BC, Chu ignored Jin’s dissuasion and invaded
Cai, eventually annexing it.107 The relations between the great powers and the
small states thereafter returned to the state of divided-ruling wherein Jin and Chu
respectively compelled a group of small states to exclusively surrender to them.
Song and Liao Fighting for Koryo

The Northern Song Dynasty, founded in 960 AD, did not achieve unification of
the system, and China’s northernmost and entire northeast were under Liao
rule.108 Therefore, during the long period of the Northern Song Dynasty, East
Asia actually displayed a pattern of confrontation between Song and Liao. Both
countries wanted to be the centre of the tributary system, and Koryo, as a core
member of the tributary system at that time, naturally became the focal target of
the two countries’ scramble. In the process of fighting for Koryo, Song undoubt-
edly had a congenital advantage. This is because Koryo, although only a small
border country, had a strong need beyond that of mere survival for cultural iden-
tification and regime legitimacy, which could only be afforded by Song, as a Han
Central Plains dynasty.
Wang Jian, the founder of Koryo, said in Xun Yao Shitiao (Ten Precepts of the
Training for Future Generations), ‘We have always admired the Han culture. Our
rites and music all follow the system of the Central Plains dynasties. The culture
of nomadic peoples in other remote areas is distinct from ours, and there is no
need for uniformity. The Khitan is a barbaric country, its language and customs
are entirely different from ours. My country should not imitate its system and
etiquette.’ ‘Because our country is adjacent to Liao which is powerful and
vicious, we cannot ignore this threat and should increase armaments to guard
105 Chao Fulin, Chunqiu zhanguo de shehui bianqian (Social Changes in the Spring and
Autumn Period and Warring States Period)(Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2011), p. 121.
106 Zuozhuan, Luzhaogong 7 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 7th Year of Duke Zhao of Lu).
107 Zuozhuan, Luzhaogong 11 nian (Zuo Tradition, the 11th Year of Duke Zhao of Lu); Chao,
Social Changes in the Spring and Autumn Period and Warring States Period, pp. 119–20.
108 Yang Zhaoquan and He Tongmei, Zhongguo–chaoxian Hanguo guanxishi (The History of
China-Korea Relations)(Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2001), p. 218.
against it.’109 This signified that Koryo had established a national motto at its pri-
mary stage to respect and admire the Han culture and pay no heed to Khitan.
This had a profound impact on both the legitimacy of the Korean regime and the
relationship between Koryo and the Song Dynasty.110 After the establishment of
the Northern Song Dynasty in 960, Koryo became the first country to pay tribute

to it. In 962, the king of Koryo, Wang Zhao, sent an assistant minister, Li
Xingyou, to Song to pay tribute,111 and in 963 Wang Zhao assumed use of the
reign title ‘Qiande’ of Song Emperor Taizu.112 It was then that the two countries
formally established the tributary relationship.
During the 30 years following 963, Koryo sent 26 missions to Song, and Song
sent 10 missions to Koryo. This was frequent by any standards, bearing in mind
the absence of modern means of transport at the time. The Korean dynasty also
hoped to learn and absorb the advanced culture of the Han nationality through
political contacts with the Song Dynasty. In 976, Koryo sent overseas students to
Song to learn Chinese culture.113 This frequent tribute primarily reflected the sig-
nificance of the Song Dynasty to the legitimacy of the Korean regime. In 981, the
king of Koryo Zhou fell seriously ill and abdicated. He handed the crown to his
cousin Zhi. King Zhi then sent messengers to Song informing them of these
events, and requesting that Song confer title on him. Prior to receiving the Song
bestowal, he had only dared to consider himself as an interrex, having claimed to
be a ‘Zhi guo shi’ (interrex).114 The Northern Song Dynasty was also aware of
Koryo’s high dependence on it to legitimize and enrich the country with Han cul-
ture. Xu Jing, a former Song Dynasty attaché, observed that ‘Koryo is far from
Song but close to Liao. Its submission to the Liao was often the result of its weak
military capabilities. Once Liao allows a little slack in its military control, Koryo
will immediately refuse to pay homage to Liao. By contrast, the loyalty of Koryo
to Song has never changed. Even though sometimes blocked by Liao in its
attempts to pay tribute to Song, its loyalty is always stone solid.’115
The competitive advantage of Liao relative to Song lay in its geographical
proximity to Koryo, so making greater military and security control over Koryo
possible. Liao was contiguous to Koryo on land,116 yet Koryo and the Central
109 Gaoli shi, Juan 2, Taizu 26 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 2, the 26th Year of Taizu).
110 Yang and He, The History of China-Korea Relations, p. 352.
111 Gaoli shi jieyao, Juan 2, Guangzong 13 nian (Summary of History of Koryo, Vol. 2, the 13th
Year of Guangzong).
112 Gaoli shi jieyao, Juan 2, Guangzong 14 nian (Summary of History of Koryo, Vol. 2, the 14th
Year of Guangzong).
113 Chen Shangsheng, Zhonghan jiaoliu sanqiannian (Three Thousand Years of
Communication between China and Korea)(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), p. 25.
114 Jiang Feifei, et al., Zhonghan guanxishi (Gudai Juan)[History of Sino-Korean Relations
(Ancient Volumes)](Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1998), p. 159.
115 Xuanhe fengshi gaoli tujing, Juan 40 (An Illustrated Account of the Embassy to Koryo in
the Xuanhe Reign Period, Vol. 40).
116 Jiang, et al, History of Sino-Korean Relations (Ancient Volumes), p. 156.
Plains dynasties had not bordered on land since the Later Jin Dynasty ceded terri-
tory in Yan and Yun.117 Song and Koryo could only maintain their relations
through maritime transportation.118 Under this circumstance, the advantages and
disadvantages of the Liao and Song in their military competition for Koryo were
respectively highlighted. In 985, Emperor Taizong of Song decided to attack

Liao, and dispatched Han Guohua, a senior Song official, to Koryo to declare an
imperial edict ordering Koryo to send armies to join Song troops in attacking
Liao.119 However, having anticipated that Song would combine with Koryo
against it, two years earlier (in October 983), Emperor Shengzong of Liao had
personally inspected the troops stationed in Dongjing (Liaoyang), and ordered
high-ranking general officers Xiao Puling and Xiao Hengde to formulate a plan
for a crusade against Koryo.120 In July 985, Emperor Shengzong of Liao issued
edicts ordering the repair of military equipments in preparation for the Koryo
conquest.121
Although by 985 AD, Liao and Koryo had not yet experienced a head-on con-
flict, Liao swept the territory of Jurchen in the lower reaches of the Yalu river,
clearing away obstacles to an invasion of Koryo, and thus exerting strong deter-
rence on it. Under pressure from the security imposed by Liao, the king of Koryo
put off responding to the order for troops from the Northern Song Dynasty.122 It
was only after the Song envoy, Han Guohua, explicitly ordered the king of Koryo
to send out troops that he agreed to.123 But although Koryo sent 250 000 troops,
there was no evidence that the Korean army fought the Khitan army, which
reflects the effectiveness of Khitan deterrence and diplomatic initiatives.124 In the
spring of 986, Liao sent Envoy Juelie to Koryo to negotiate peace.125 In the situa-
tion of antagonism between Song and Liao, and where Koryo itself was under
severe threat from Liao, Koryo accepted the Liao proposal and resumed Liao–
Koryo relations, whereby Koryo paid due respect to Liao as the ‘upper
kingdom’.126
The Northern Song Dynasty, constrained by its relatively weak military power
and disadvantageous geographic position, could not interfere but just sit by and
watch Liao’s military domination of Koryo. Thus, there actually appeared a state
117 Ibid.
119 Gaoli shi, Juan 3, Chengzong 4 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 3, the 4th Year of Chengzong).
120 Liao shi, Juan 10, Shengzong 1 nian (History of Liao, Vol. 10, the first part of Shengzong).
121 Liao shi, Juan 115, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Liao, Vol. 115, the Biography of Koryo).
123 Ibid.
124 Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1988), p. 80.
126 Gaoli shi jieyao, Juan 2, Chengzong 12 nian (Summary of History of Koryo, Vol. 2, the 12th
Year of Chengzong); Gaoli shi, Juan 94, Xu Xi Zhuan (History of Koryo, Vol. 94, the
Biography of Xu Xi).
of co-ruling between Song and Liao in the East Asian international system: Song
wielded influence over Koryo in the field of cultural identity and regime legiti-
macy, while Liao controlled Koryo in the domain of security issue. The reason
this co-ruling appeared was that neither of the two great powers could simultane-
ously meet Koryo’s two indispensable needs of assured survival and regime

security.
On the one hand, Liao, as a nomadic regime, was hampered by the cultural
congenital disadvantage of being unable to meet Koryo’s demand that the Central
Plain Kingdom acknowledge its cultural identity and the legitimacy of its rule
under the Hans. This made it difficult for Koryo to sever the tributary relation-
ship with the Song, in spite of Liao’s repeated urgings to do so. It was in 993 that
Liao first attacked Koryo, and in February 994, Koryo was forced to declare itself
a Liao vassal. According to the peace agreement, Koryo would sever its relations
with Song, but in June of the same year, Koryo nonetheless sent emissaries to the
Northern Song dynasty requesting troops to exact revenge.127 In 997, Wang Zhi,
the king of Koryo, died, and his brother Wang Song succeeded to the throne. At
that time, Koryo regarded Liao as its suzerain state, in ‘being handicapped by
Khitan’, but it still sent envoys to Song requesting aid.128 Even after the second
Liao attack on Koryo in 1010, Korea nevertheless sent tributes to Song in
1014.129 In 1016, Koryo went so far as to resurrect the Song reign title Dazhong
Xiangfu.130
On the other hand, the Song’s weak military capability precluded its constitut-
ing a sufficient security guarantee for Koryo. Song often refused or responded
negatively to Koryo’s frequent requests for help, on the grounds that, ‘the north-
ern border has just calmed down, and we should not provoke another conflict’.131
Therefore, differentiation of the Song and Liao’s ‘function’ with respect to Koryo
was due to inequilibrium of the two powers’ respective elements of national capa-
bility. Under the scenario where Koryo was neither willing to relinquish its right
to assured survival nor abandon its cultural identity and the legitimacy of the
regime, it could choose only to accept simultaneous leadership from both poles.
However, the system at that time was one wherein major war was an optional
strategic choice for great powers, and the two poles (especially Liao, as the milita-
rily stronger of the two) had incentives to monopolize suzerainty over Koryo by
force. In such a case, the state of co-ruling of the two great powers will inevitably
be unstable and transient. Eventually, Koryo, intimidated by Liao and fearing its
invasion, not only dared not to send troops to assist Song, but also was forced to
127 Gaoli shi, Juan 3, Chengzong 13 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 3, the 13th Year of Chengzong);
Song shi, Juan 487, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Song, Vol. 487, the Biography of Koryo).
128 Song shi, Juan 487, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Song, Vol. 487, the Biography of Koryo).
129 Gaoli shi, Juan 4, Xianzong 5 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 4, the 5th Year of Xianzong); Song
shi, Juan 487, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Song, Vol. 487, the Biography of Koryo).
130 Gaoli shi, Juan 4, Xianzong 7 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 4, the 7th Year of Xianzong).
131 Gaoli shi, Juan 3, Chengzong 13 nian (History of Koryo, Vol. 3, the 13th Year of Chengzong);
Song shi, Juan 487, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Song, Vol. 487, the Biography of Koryo).
pay tribute to Liao, so cutting off Koryo’s diplomatic relations with Song in order
to protect itself.132 Thereafter, ‘Koryo and Song did not have diplomatic relations
for another 40 years.’133
US–USSR Cold War

The Cold War constituted the first international system that did not feature a
major war among the great powers. The ‘no war among great powers’ mentioned
here was not only the summary of objective history whereby first-ranking powers
had not waged wars against each other, but, more importantly, constituted the
fact that neither of the great powers ever had the subjective intention of militarily
attacking the other, but rather feared great power warfare, which was an unpre-
cedented situation never seen in history. The invention of nuclear weapons was
the core factor leading to this transformation. The completion of the atomic revo-
lution in 1945 and the ‘thermonuclear revolution’ of the mid-1950s, along with
the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles, made all leaders acknowledge
that the world in which they lived had radically changed, and that the spectre of
mutual destruction meant that no participant in such a war could possibly
survive.134
It was the MAD mechanism that allowed the United States and the Soviet
Union, despite major disputes on many strategic issues, to be always consistent
on one issue, namely, to avoid World War III, or any large-scale conventional or
nuclear wars between them.135 To this end, the two superpowers tried their best
to limit their conflicts to within a certain range. Such cooperation was rooted in
the emergence of nuclear weapons.136 In fact, the most striking difference
between the Cold War system and those before 1945 was that of the extreme pru-
dence the superpowers exercised over wars during the Cold War. If waging wars
might trigger direct military conflicts between the US and USSR, the two powers,
for fear of thermonuclear war, would choose to give up war, even if doing so
would reverse the power contrast between them against themselves. This was
undoubtedly unprecedented in the previous international system.137
The two foregoing cases show that the absence of war between great powers is
a necessary condition for the stabiliszation of great powers’ co-ruling under the
bipolar system. But it is not a sufficient condition. Even in the Cold War period,
when there was no war between US and USSR, the state of co-ruling was still

133 Song shi, Juan 487, Gaoli Zhuan (History of Song, Vol. 487, the Biography of Koryo).
134 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Conclusion’, in John Lewis Gaddis, et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen
Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
pp. 261–64.
135 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of
Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 105.
136 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After
Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 66, 72.
137 Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 107.
difficult to achieve given that the two powers had undifferentiated foreign func-
tions. After the end of WWII, the war-inflicted destruction and fear of it provoked
the desire in small and medium-sized countries for peace and economic recovery,
and hence their urgent demand for assistance from the great power. Moreover,
due to the opposition between the capitalist and communist ideologies, Eastern

and Western countries operating different political systems had the same urgent
need for the ontological security of ideology.138 Ordinarily, that small states have
more than one vital demand is a key factor contributing to the differentiation of
great powers’ functions. Nevertheless, both the US and USSR’s national capabil-
ities in each field (e.g. economy, military, ideology, etc.) were strong and balanced
enough for each to meet independently the different needs of their respective
allies. This made the foreign functions of the United States and the Soviet Union
very similar, as both played the roles of security guarantor, provider of economic
aid, and even of ideological supporters of small countries.
In the absence of functional differentiation, it was difficult for the power com-
petition between US and USSR to transform into the state of co-ruling. The core
interests of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the
focus of the struggle lay in Europe. ‘The Germany Issue’ was hence the core con-
tradiction in Europe. In a sense, the struggle for Germany between the United
States and the Soviet Union echoed in miniature the rivalry of the two super-
powers.139 This article takes this as a case study to observe how competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the divided-ruling rather
than the co-ruling mode over small states.
After the end of WWII, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted
the division of Germany to go ahead. This intention did not spring entirely from
respect for Germany’s sovereignty, but rather derived from the two nations’ par-
ticular strategic considerations. The Soviet Union did not want the United States
to use the division of Germany as an excuse to strengthen its military presence in
Western Europe, while the United States hoped to introduce a democratic system
in a unified Germany that would reduce the threat that Germany posed to
regional security.140 But neither superpower wanted Germany to be united in the
same way as its opponent did. As the two sides were well-matched in strength,
the division of Germany continued. Berlin, former capital of the Germany occu-
pied by the Soviet Union, naturally became the focus of the rivalry between the
138 The demand for ontological security is a basic need rooted in human nature. See
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, trans. Qin Yaqing (Shanghai:
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp. 162–64. For the meaning of ontology security and
its implications on states’ behaviour, see Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in
International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State (London: Routledge, 2008).
139 Yu Zhenqi, Lengzhan suoying: zhanhou deguo wenti (The Microcosm of the Cold War: the
Post-war Germany Issues)(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2010).
140 Wilfried Loth, ‘Germany in the Cold War: Strategies and Decisions’, in Odd Arne Westad,
ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2000), pp. 242–44.
two poles. In 1947, the United States’ aligning with Britain in implementing mon-
etary reform in occupied territories of Western Germany triggered the Soviet
Union’s wrath. The Soviets accordingly decided to block traffic connecting the
Western-occupied area and Berlin. This led to an anti-blockade imposed by the
United States and Britain on the Eastern camp, cutting off the traffic from

Western Europe to Soviet-occupied Germany. This resulted in the First Berlin
Crisis which led directly to the fragmentation of Berlin and establishment of two
Germanies.141
However, the splitting of Berlin and division of Germany did not resolve the
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in Germany. On the con-
trary, their disputes accumulated, and eventually triggered the first severe military
confrontation between the two Cold War camps. This was the Second Berlin
Crisis in the late 1950s, when the United States began to acquiesce in the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany. The American
commander of NATO made it clear that ‘defensive nuclear weapons are abso-
lutely essential to strengthen the defence forces of West Germany’.142 On
October 27, 1958, Walter Ulbricht, the leader of Democratic Germany,
announced that Western countries no longer had the right to remain in Berlin.
This marked the prelude to the Second Berlin Crisis. On 10 November of the
same year, Khrushchev declared publicly that ‘the countries that signed the
Potsdam Agreement should abandon the occupation of Berlin’, and later pro-
posed the demilitarization and liberalization of West Berlin.143 The United States
reacted instantly with Dulles’ warning that the West would use force to guarantee
a clear channel of access to Berlin if necessary. Khrushchev’ s reply was that this
would mean the outbreak of the World War III.144
Over the next three years, the Soviet Union and the West protracted bargains
and repeated negotiations on the Berlin Issue, but failed to reach a compromise.
To resolve the Berlin Crisis, the leaders of the two superpowers held a summit in
Vienna on June 4, 1961. During their talks, Kennedy said that Berlin was ‘the
greatest concern of the United States’, and hoped that the Soviet Union would not
place it in a situation which deeply threatened its national interests. Khrushchev
nevertheless insisted that the Soviet Union’s decision to conclude a peace treaty
with Democratic Germany at the end of 1961 would not be changed.145 On June
141 Fang Lianqing, Wang Bingyuan, and Liu Jinzhi, eds., Guoji guanxishi-Zhanhou juan (History
of International Relations-Volume of Postwar)(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006),
pp. 20–23.
142 Warren Cohen, ed., Jianqiao meiguo duiwai guanxishi-Xiace (The Cambridge History of
American Foreign Relations-Volume II), trans. Wang Chen, etc. (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe,
2004), p. 344.
143 Wang Shengzu, ed., Guoji guanxishi-Diba juan (History of International Relations-Volume 8)
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1995), pp. 440–41.
144 Cohen, ed., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relation-Volume II, pp. 345–46.
145 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2003), pp. 499–500.
15 and July 25, 1961, Khrushchev and Kennedy respectively made televised
speeches, stating once more their respective firm positions on the Berlin Issue.
Both countries then announced increases in their defence budgets, and the United
States ordered the transferral of federal reserve forces to active status. 146 In the
standoff between the two sides, the Soviet Union made another risky move in

efforts to prevent citizens of East Berlin citizens from fleeing whereby. Starting on
August 13, it built a cement wall on the East–West Berlin boundary line to sepa-
rate East and West Berlin.147 This chancy move to change the status quo led
directly to the confrontation between American and Soviet tanks on the border
between East and West Berlin on October 27, 1961.
It should be admitted that US–Soviet rivalry in Germany was a principal rea-
son for the split between Germany and of Berlin.148 Firstly, the leader of
Democratic Germany dared to push the West out of Berlin because he was confi-
dent that the Soviet Union could guarantee all Democratic Germany’s needs.
Secondly, the United States and the Soviet Union did not, for the sake of power
competition, compromise on the issue of Germany and of Berlin, but at the same
time neither wanted to seek the monopoly of Germany and Berlin through use of
direct force and war. However, neither of the two powers was able to achieve this
purpose through intimidation alone, which left both the country and the city div-
ided. The split of Berlin and Germany epitomized the division of the world due to
the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Competition between China and US in East Asia

Since the turn of the 21st century, and especially after the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, China’s comparative capability in East Asia has been increas-
ingly prominent, leading to the formation of two power centres in this region,149
and gradually highlighting a regional bipolar structure.150 The emergence of
regional bipolarity made competition between China and the United States seem
146 Fang Lianqing, Wang Bingyuan, and Liu Jinzhi, eds., History of International Relations-
Volume of Postwar, pp. 282–83; Lafeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, p.
174; Aleksandr A. Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story
of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), pp. 368, 371–72.
147 Cohen, ed., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations-Volume II, p. 355.
148 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to
Corbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 62.
149 Qi Huaigao, ‘Zhongmei zhidu junshi yu dongya liangzhong tixi de jianrong bingcun’ (‘Sino-
US Institutional Balance of Power and the Compatibility of Two systems in East Asia’),
Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 6 (2011), pp. 56–74; Cai Penghong,
‘Yatai liangqiang jingzhengxing hezuo geju qushi yu zhongguo waijiao’ (‘The Trend of Sino-
US Competitive Cooperation Pattern in Asia-Pacific and China’s Diplomacy’), Guoji guan-
cha (International Observation), No. 1 (2013), pp. 9–16.
150 Some scholars believe that this bipolar balance of power in the East Asia was formed at
an earlier time, see Ross, ‘The Geography of the Peace-East Asia in the Twenty-First
Century’, pp. 81–118; Robert S. Ross, ‘Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia’, in T. V. Paul,
inevitable. At the same time, owing to the spread of the financial crisis, implemen-
tation of the US pivot strategy, and intensification of the trend of China’s rise, the
demand of Asia-Pacific countries for public goods in both the economic and
security domains has appreciably increased since 2009. This, coupled with factors
contributing to the absence of war since WWII, such as nuclear deterrence and

economic interdependence, has led to the differentiation of China and the United
States’ foreign functions, and the emergence of China–US co-ruling.
This differentiation is reflected in that China becomes regional countries’ prin-
cipal provider of economic aid and of opportunities for development cooperation,
while the United States provides them with positive and negative regional security
assurance. This dual configuration in East Asia of ‘depending on China in eco-
nomic fields while on the United States in security fields’ has become a consensus
in political and academic circles.151
In the field of economy, the stagnation of Japan’s economic growth and rela-
tive decline of the American economy have highlighted the importance to East
Asian countries of China’s economy since the end of the Cold War. After the
Asian financial crisis in 1997, China did not shirk responsibility to its neighbours
by depreciating the RMB, but instead purposefully increased its imports from
other Asian countries to help tide them over their difficulties. After the outbreak
of the international financial crisis in 2008, China, having further consolidated its
economic strength, demonstrated a greater capacity and willingness to afford eco-
nomic public goods to the region and even the world, and promoted recovery of
the regional economy through the stable growth of its own economy.152 In
September and October 2013, China’s president Xi Jinping proposed during his
visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and
‘Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century’ initiative. Establishment of the Silk
Road Fund followed in 2014, and the inauguration of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank took place in 2015, all of which reflected China’s willingness to
James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the
21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 267–304.
151 Liu Feng , ‘Anquan yuqi, jingji shouyi yu dongya anquan zhixu’ (‘Security Expectations,
Economic Benefits and East Asian Security Order’), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-
Pacific Studies), No. 3 (2011), pp. 6–25; Zhou Fangyin, ‘Dongya eryuan geju yu diqu zhixu
de weilai’ (‘The Dual Configuration of East Asia and the Future of the Regional Order’),
Guoji jingji pinglun (International Economics Review), No. 6 (2013), pp. 106–19; Jiang
Ruiping, ‘Gongjian shiji haishang sichou zhilu: Zouchu dongya geju zhong de eryuan kunj-
ing’ (‘Jointly Build the Century Maritime Silk Road: Going out of the Dualistic Dilemma of
East Asian Configuration’), Dongnanya zongheng (Southeast Asia Analysis), No. 10 (2014),
pp. 11–15; Zhang Chun, ‘Guoji gonggong chanpin de gongying jingzheng jiqi chulu: Yatai
diqu eryuan geju yu zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi goujian’ (‘Supply Competition of
International Public Goods and Its Solutions: the Dual Configuration of Asia-Pacific Region
and the Construction of Sino-US New Type of Great Power Relations’), Dangdai yatai
(Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 6 (2014), pp. 52–72.
152 Zhang, ‘Supply Competition of International Public Goods and Its Solutions’, p. 61.
make greater contributions to regional economic cooperation and infrastructure

construction.
China is now the largest trading partner of all the Northeast Asian countries
(including Japan, Russia, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, and Mongolia), and also of most Southeast Asian countries, such as

Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Myanmar, and many pan Asia-
Pacific countries such as Pakistan, India, Australia, and also those of ASEAN.
Notably, China is the largest trading partner of four of the five Asia-Pacific allies
of the United States—Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and Thailand. In
2010, China replaced the United States as the largest export market in East
Asia.153 In the same year, the China–ASEAN Free Trade Zone was completed,
wherein China and the six ASEAN member countries (Brunei, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore) levied zero tariffs on more than
90% of products in the zone, and the average tariff on China-to-ASEAN goods
plummeted from 9.8% to 0.1%.154 The economic dependence of Asia-Pacific
countries on China is now an indisputable fact.
At the same time, however, the Chinese government repeatedly reiterates the
‘non-aligned’ policy of developing state-to-state relationships based on partner-
ship rather than alliance.155 Establishing formal alliances is a necessary way of
providing security guarantees to other countries in the modern international com-
munity.156 Therefore, ‘non-alignment’ means that China does not formally pro-
vide stable positive security assurances to other Asian-Pacific countries, partly
because China’s military capability does not equal its economic strength, and
partly due to the United States’ ‘first-mover advantage’ in supplying security
goods in the region. Having been the world’s sole superpower for an extended
period of time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had ample
time to consolidate and expand its camp of allies, so as to curtail the number of
the potential clients of rising powers as many as possible at a time when the latter
153 For the related data, see Zhou Fangyin, ‘Zhongguo jueqi, Dongya geju bianqian yu Dongya
zhixu de fazhan fangxiang’ (‘The Rise of China, the Change of the Pattern of East Asia and
the Development Direction of the East Asian Order’), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-
Pacific Studies), No. 5 (2012), pp. 8–9; Zhou, ‘The Dual Configuration of East Asia and the
Future of the Regional Order’, pp. 109–10; Jiang, ‘Building the Maritime Silk Road of the
21st Century together’, p. 12.
154 Liu, ‘Security Expectations, Economic Benefits and East Asian Security Order’, p. 20.
155 ‘Jieban bu jiemeng, Zhongguo “huoban” bian quanqiu’ (‘Making Partners not Allies,
China’s Partners all over the World), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-12/23/c_1113752345.
htm.
156 James D. Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation
Model for Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1991), pp. 904–
33; James D. Morrow, ‘Alliance: Why Write Them Down’, Annual Review of Political
Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2000), pp. 63–83.
had not yet acquired the competitive edge.157 The United States’ efforts in this
regard objectively strengthened its security guarantee function in East Asia.
Since proposing the ‘Pivot Strategy’ and ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy’ in
2009, the United States has strengthened and consolidated relations with its five
traditional allies: Japan, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and

Australia, and expanded forms and areas of security cooperation. On the other
hand, the United States has made efforts actively to develop quasi-alliance rela-
tions or partnerships with non-aligned countries such as India, Vietnam, and
Singapore. The US National Security Strategy Report 2010 clearly states that its
Asia-Pacific allies constitute the foundation for Asian security and prosperity in
the Asia-Pacific region. The United States will continue to deepen and strengthen
these alliances in response to the dynamics of change in the region and the strate-
gic trends of the 21st century.158 All of this highlights the willingness of the
United States actively to play its regional security functions and to continue to
maintain leadership in East Asia.
The security function of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region are mainly
reflected in three aspects: Firstly, the United States restricted Japan from playing a
leading role as an economic power within the region for a long period after the
end of the Cold War, so allaying other countries’ security concerns about Japan
becoming a political and military power. Secondly, it has eased the worries of
other East Asian countries about the rise of China. Finally, it has prevented crisis
escalation and conflict proliferation in the region.159 Presently, no other country
in East Asia has the capacity to replace the United States completely in all three
aspects. Consequently most small and medium-sized countries in the region are
supportive of the United States’ continuing in its role of security guarantor. A sur-
vey conducted in 2008 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East
Asia Institute of South Korea on six countries in the Asia-Pacific region showed
that 72% of respondents in the Republic of Korea and 68% in Japan believed
that the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region contributes to the region’s
stability.160 Many ASEAN members are also prepared to rely on both formal and
157 For the ‘first-mover advantage’ of the United States in power competition after the Cold
War, see Yang Yuan, ‘Daguo wuzhanzheng shidai baquanguo yu jueqiguo quanli jingzheng
de zhuyao jizhi’ (The Key Mechanisms of Competition between Hegemonic Powers and
Rising Powers in the Era of Great Power Peace), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-
Pacific Studies), No. 6 (2011), pp. 20–27.
158 ‘National Security Strategy’, May 2010, p. 42, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
159 Liu, ‘Security Expectations, Economic Benefits and East Asian Security Order’, pp. 16–18.
160 Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008
Multinational Survey of Public Opinion, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East
Asia Institute of South Korea, 2008, p. 11.
informal alliances with the United States to ensure their own security, and balance
China’s growing regional influence.161
The above facts lead to a unique phenomenon in East Asia: the major eco-
nomic partners and major security patron of most countries in the region are con-
stituted by two different countries.162 More and more East Asian countries want

to be tied economically to China while still depending on the United States for
security issues.163 The very reason for this is that the capacity and willingness of
the two great powers’ supply are distinct, and neither of the two great powers is
able to simultaneously meet the demands of East Asia in the economic and secur-
ity fields.164 Considering the difference between China and the United States’ for-
eign functions will be difficult to change in the near future, it could be projected
that the dual configuration of ‘relying on China economically while on the United
States in security areas’ in East Asia will not be a temporary transitional stage
that may disappear in the short term, but rather one that carries on for a long
time.165
Conclusion
In the era of no war among great powers, the proposition to avoid wars between
great powers, especially all-out wars, does not signify a major contradiction in
great power politics. Rather than worry about the ‘Thucydides trap’, China and
the United States should rather be more mindful of falling into the ‘Churchill
trap’, that is, where the two superpowers plunge into a long-term confrontation,
fuelled by great power rivalry and security precautions, which drags the world
back into another ‘Cold War’, and the international system enters a bipolar con-
figuration as a result of the long-term coexistence of its two most powerful coun-
tries. Existing understanding of the bipolar system is overwhelmingly derived
from the unique case of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union. It therefore gives the false impression that bipolarity inevitably leads to
cold war. However, as my article suggests, at the theoretical level, great powers in
the bipolar system do not necessarily balance and contain each other. At the
empirical level, certain bipolar systems drawn from ancient and contemporary
161 Ralf Emmers, ‘Regional Hegemonies and the Exercises of Power in Southeast Asia: A
Study of Indonesia and Vietnam’, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2005), pp. 664–65.
162 Zhou, ‘The Rise of China, the Change of the Pattern of East Asia and the Development
Direction of the East Asian Order’, pp. 9–10.
163 G. John Ikenberry, ‘American Hegemony and East Asia Order’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2004), p. 354.
164 Gao Cheng, ‘Quyu gonggong chanpin gongqiu guanxi yu diqu zhixu jiqi bianqian’ (‘The
Relationship between Supply and Demand of Regional Public Goods and the Regional
Order and Its Change’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), No. 11
(2012), pp. 27–28.
165 Zhou, ‘The Rise of China, the Change of the Pattern of East Asia and the Development
Direction of the East Asian Order’, p. 10.
Table 1. Summary of Case Studies
War as a viable option for great No war between great powers

powers against each other
No differentiation Case 1: War-ceasing between Case 3: US-USSR Cold War

of great powers’ Jin and Chu (Divided-governance)
foreign (Unstable co-governance)
functions
Differentiation of Case 2: Song and Liao fighting Case 4: Competition between
great powers’ for Koryo China and US in East Asia
foreign (Unstable co-governance) (Co-governance)
functions
history did not always breed two antagonistic hierarchical camps as occurred in
the US–USSR Cold War, but rather demonstrated the possibility of a relatively
benign interaction between the two poles, so providing the US and China a feasi-
ble escape route from both the ‘Thucydides trap’ and the ‘Churchill trap’.
According to the theory my article proposes, if the small states have more than
one indispensable demand and neither of the two superpowers can simultane-
ously meet all of them, then the two poles’ foreign functions will be differentiated,
which affords small countries with a motive to simultaneously accept the two
superpowers’ leaderships. The two superpowers have to take differential
approaches and exert their own advantageous function so as to efficiently win the
submission of small countries. If the cost of war between the great powers is so
high that it is (almost) impossible for any of them to win, then all that is left to
the two powers, albeit in the earnest hope of monopolizing hegemony over all
small countries, is to accept the state of co-ruling and share the power with their
rival. Results of the case studies are summarized in Table 1. Case 1 and Case 3
together illustrate that the differentiation of great powers’ foreign functions is an
essential prerequisite for the emergence of co-ruling. Case 1 and Case 2 together
prove that no war between the poles is the other necessary condition through
which to ensure differential co-ruling. Case 4 shows that the two factors together
constitute sufficient conditions that lead to a stable bipolar co-ruling.
An important implication of my theory is that a rising power in the era of no
war among great powers must have specific comparative advantages, to an extent
that enables them competent to compete with the ruling power for international
influence and leadership. Especially when facing an omnipotence-type unipolar
hegemon like the United States that has reigned supreme for an extended period
of time in almost all the domains, including politics, economy, military affairs,
culture, and science and technology, the rising power must proactively promote
its particular speciality rather than unrealistically aim to achieve a simultaneous
catch-up in all areas, and so make it possible to get ‘a slice of the pie’ in the
domain wherein it has the competitive edge.
China seems now to be on this path of rise. In March 2015, 57 countries
on five continents applied to be founding members of the China-led Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, 20 of whom were from outside the region, and
some of whom were old allies of the United States.166 This example reflects how
China’s economic influence is expanding beyond the region to the world as a
whole, and also demonstrates that China and the US’s differential competition
and co-ruling are taking on a global dimension. According to the theory raised in

this article, it is not difficult to predict that, as long as the following three factors
remain unchanged, the tendency towards Sino-US co-ruling will continue. They
are: (i) the Chinese economy continues to maintain a driving development trend
relative to other countries; (ii) China’s military capability does not reach the level
of the United States in the short or medium term; and (iii) China continues to
adhere to the ‘non-alignment policy’.167
As to whether the continuation and expansion of Sino-US co-ruling is a good
or a bad thing, debates in this vein carry on in academic circles.168 But from the
perspective of this article, the co-ruling mode is undoubtedly superior to that of
divided-ruling. Firstly, as the goods that the two poles offer to small countries in
exchange for these countries’ submission to them are distinct from each other,
there is likely to be a lesser degree of antagonism between China and the US than
featured during the US–USSR Cold War. Secondly, since the two superpowers’
‘spheres of influence’ are demarcated according to specific issue domains, namely,
economy and security, both in effect lead the same group of small and medium-
sized countries. Therefore, the geopolitical colour of their competition is bound
to be lighter than that of the Cold War.
Acknowledgment
This article is supported by the National Social Science Fund of China—“Research on Alliance
Politics and Conflict Management of the New Type of Great Power Relations between China and
the U.S.” (Grant No. 15CGJ028).
166 ‘Yatouhang shoufa zhenrong queding, 57 guo yiqi “liguiju”’ (‘The AIIB’s Initial Lineup is
Determined, 57 Countries Make Rules Together’), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-
04/15/c_127688319.htm.
167 It should be noted that the formation of the Sino-US co-governance would certainly not be
the consequence of the United States’ subjective compromise. In fact, no hegemonic
power is willing to do so when its strength has yet to decline in absolute terms. The con-
figuration of China–US economic-security dual leadership in East Asia and beyond is
rooted in the fact that China’s economic rise objectively constricts the US’s power space
in the economic field.
168 Some believe it is good, see Liu, ‘Security Expectations, Economic Gains and East Asian
Security Order’, pp. 6–25; Zhang, ‘Supply Competition of International Public Goods and Its
Solutions’, pp. 52–72. Some others argue that it is bad, see Zhou, ‘The Dual Configuration
in East Asia and the Future of the Regional Order’, pp. 106–119; Jiang, ‘Jointly Build the
Century Maritime Silk Road’, pp. 11–15.

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The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 193–235

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*Corresponding author. Email: yyir@163.com

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The ‘Thucydides Trap’ or the ‘Churchill Trap’?

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Why is the ‘Thucydides Trap’ Less Relevant?

Deepened economic interdependence is another feasible factor. The interconnectedness

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Why Does the ‘Churchill Trap’ Matter?

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country is either an ally of a superpower or of its opponent, or a non-aligned

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Fig. 1. The Trends of World Major Powers’ Relative Capabilities (2001–2016).

In order to obtain a more explicit understanding of the current position in

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The Co-ruling Mechanism under the Bipolar Structure

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The Four Modes of Domination–Subordination Relationship

50 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 162.

Superpower A Superpower B Superpower A Superpower B

A group of Another group A group of Another group

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Superpower A Superpower B Superpower A Superpower B

A group of Another group A group of Another group

Mode 3: Divided-governance Mode 4: Co-governance

Fig. 2. Four Modes of Domination-subordination Relationship under the Bipolar System.

53 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 8.

According to the Divided-ruling Mode, if a small country is an ally of a pole,

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Why was the Mode of Co-ruling So Rare in History?

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60 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

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Great Powers’ Functional Differentiation and Differential Competition

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The Mechanism of Co-ruling and Its Implications

Small states generally

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perspective of social evolution, this situation of little violence between great

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Four Cases of Bipolar Systems

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here referred to a peaceful and stable external environment by virtue of the

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Great power aspirations to exercise exclusive domination over small countries

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Song and Liao Fighting for Koryo

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US–USSR Cold War

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132 Yang and He, The History of China-Korea Relations, p. 219.