Reyes, Nichali C.

85. LEXBER INC. V. DALMAN, G.R No. 183587, April 20, 2015

(Topic: Transfer of jurisdiction from SEC to the RTC, acting as special commercial court)

FACTS:

Lexber is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of housing, construction and

real estate development. Among those who availes of Lexber’s housing projects are respondent-
spouses Caesar and Conchita Dalman (Sps. Dalman) who boght a house and lot under a contract
to sell. Due to financial crisis, Lexber’s financial condition deteriotated and it was forced to
discontinue some of its housing projects including Sps. Dalman’s purchased property is located.
It also filed a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for the suspension of payments on its loan
obligations.

The trial court gave due course to Lexber’s rehabilitation petition. However, the Sps.
Dalman filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that consistent with Rule 4, Section 11 of
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, the trial court should have dismissed
outright the rehabilitation petition because it failed to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180
days from the date of the initial hearing and there should be a prior request for the appointment
of the rehabilitation receiver from HLURB. The trial court denied SPS. Dalman’s MR,
prompting them to seek relief from the CA through a Rule 65 petition. The CA granted the
petition for certiorari.

However, Lexber disclosed in his petition that in an order dated May 23, 2008, the trial
court eventually dismissed the rehabilitation petition because of the disapproval of Lexber’s
proposed rehabilitation plan. The CA is currently reviewing this subsequent order in a separate
proceeding, docketed as CA G.R. No. 103917. Notwithstanding this supervening dismissal,
Lexber argues that the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s initial finding of merit in the
rehabilitation petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part
when it gave due course to the rehabilitation petition despite: a. the absence of the HLURB’s
prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver; b. the lapse of the 180-day perod
for the approval of a rehabilitation plan.

RULING:

The SC resolved to deny the petition due to the pendency of CA G.R. No. 103917,
pending with the CA after the trial court dismissed Lexber’s rehabilitation petition in its May 23,
2008. Because of this supervening event, the Court is also compelled to deny the present petition.
 In relation to the transfer of jurisdiction from SEC to the RTC, acting as special
commercial court, the HLURB’s prior request is a condition precedent that must be complied
with before the trial court can give due course to a rehabilitation petition of a real estate company
like Lexber, the CA invoked Section 6(c) of PD-902-A as basis. It provides that, “The SEC may
appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations supervised or
regulated by other government agencies such as banks and insurance companies upon request of
the government agency concerned.” Notably, the SEC’s jurisdiction over rehabilitation cases
had already been transferred to the RTCs acting as commercial courts by virtues of RA 8799
or the Securities Regulation Code. Despite this jurisdictional transfer, the substantive provisions
of PD 902-A, particularly those powers which the SEC may exercise in rehabilitation cases,
remain.

86. PANGANDAG V. ABINAL, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1877, June 13, 2016

(Topic: The MeTC/MTC/MCTC under RA 7691 (Expanded Jurisdiction Act)

FACTS:

Complainant Moamar Pangandag was criminally charged with grave threats for allegedly
threatening to commit the crime of murder against a certain “Nahara” and her companions. The
information was filed before the sala of Presiding Judge Abinal of the MCTC in Lanao del Sur.
Upon finding the existence of probable cause, he issued a warrant of arrest against Pangandag
and two others. However, 15 days later, Judge Abinal voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing
the case because Nahara was his niece. The case was eventually transferred to the presiding
judge of MTCC of Marawi City. The criminal complaint was later on dismissed in light of the
prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information based on the Affidavit of Desistance executed by
the private complainant.

Pangandag filed an administrative complaint against MCTC Judge Abinal for gross
ignorance of the law, abuse and usurpation of jurisdiction, conduct prejudicial to the interest of
public service and bias. The complaint alleged that Judge Abinal had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a criminal complaint for grave threats since the offense carried the penalty of
reclusion temporal. It also alleged that he issued a warrant of arrest despite knowing that the
private complainant therein ws his niece.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Abinal is administratively liable for taking cognizance of the
criminal complaint for grave threats against Pangandag even if the MCTC has limited
jurisdiction over criminal offenses

RULING:
 NO. Judge Abinal merely relied on the words of the Information which do not appear to
accuse Pangandag of committing grave threats accompanied by a demand for money or an
imposition of any other condition.

The absence of an allegation pertaining to a demand for money or an imposition of

any other condition would be relevant to jurisdiction of the MCTC. Art. 282 of the RPC clearly
provides that the penalty for grave threats without a condition shall be arresto menor
(imprisonment for the maximum of six months). Since Seec. 32(2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act expressly grants MCTC’s exclusive original jurisdiction “over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years,” Hence, Judge Abinal cannot be faulted
that the MCTC could take cognizance of the criminal case.

However, Judge Abinal indeed violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to
the Rules of Court by acting on the criminal complaint and issuing a warrant of arrest despite his
relationship to the private complainant.

89. CABLING V. DANGCALAN, G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016

(Topic: The MeTC/MTC/MCTC under RA 7691 (Expanded Jurisdiction Act)

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the Complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by
Cabling (petitioner) against Dangcalan (respondent) over respondent’s alleged encroachment on
petitioner’s property.

In her complaint, petitioner alleged that she owned a 125 sq.m parcel of land and had an
assessed value of P2,100. Adjoining her property was a parcel of land that respondent had
bought from her brother. Despite knowing the boundaries of their respective properties, however,
respondent constructed a perimeter fence that encroached on petitioner’s land. After several
unheeded demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a failed conference before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed the Complaint before the MCTC.

Respondent denied any encroachment on petitioner’s property and raised prescription as

an affirmative defense because petitioner filed her complaint only in 2011 which was beyond the
10-year period for acquisitive prescription under Civil Code.

The MCTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. It ruled that respondent’s
perimeter fence had indeed encroached on some 13 sq.m. of petitioner’s property. Upon appeal
by respondent, the RTC reversed the MCTC’s decision contending that MCTC should have first
ruled on the issue of prescription because respondent had raised it in a timely manner.
 Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA but the CA
denied the petition and annulled BOTH the RTC and MCTC decision for lack of jurisdiction.
The CA ruled that the MCTC had no jurisdiction because the complaint was clearly an accion
publiciana. As such, it was a plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession which
properly fell under the RTC’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, all proceedings in petitioner’s complaint
including her appeal before the RTC were invalid.

On April 1, 2009, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and MCTC decisions on the ground
that MCTC had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint for accion publiciana

RULING:

YES. As early as 2001, the SC had already declared that all cases involving title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000, if outside Metro
Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest
therein, as set forth in Secs. 19 (2) and 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, is as follows:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)