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This article presents a collaboration among critical scholars of color grappling with the
challenges of reimagining global university rankings (GURs) in an effort to rethink the
field of comparative education from a decolonial perspective. We start with an empathetic
review of scholarship on rankings. This effort evidenced that rankings are embedded and
sustained within a broader dominant imaginary of higher education, circumscribed by
what is deemed possible and desirable within modern institutions. Seeking inspiration to
explore beyond the current limits of our modern imagination, we turned to the teachings
of the Dagara as a mirror that cast a different light on our investments in the very onto-
epistemic structures that sustain the GURs. Being taught by Dagara’s teachings led us to
realize that rankings are symptomatic of a much broader crisis shaking the ontological
securities of modern institutions and that it is only through the loss of our satisfaction with
these securities that we can start to imagine otherwise.
Introduction
We would like to thank Annabelle Estera and Sharon Stein for her helpful support in the prep-
aration and revision of this article. We are also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers and the
special issue editors for their constructive feedback and support with this manuscript.
1
See Cheng (2011), Altbach (2012), Jöns and Hoyler (2013), Hazelkorn et al. (2014), and Stack
(2016).
Received October 14, 2015; revised May 16, 2016, and September 19, 2016; accepted November 30,
2016; electronically published March 23, 2017
Comparative Education Review, vol. 61, no. S1.
q 2017 by the Comparative and International Education Society. All rights reserved.
0010-4086/2017/61S1-0004$10.00
1. What questions have already been asked? How have rankings been al-
ready problematized? What is normalized in these problematizations?
2. Given the dominance of certain onto-epistemic grammars, how can we
delink and introduce decolonial perspectives to the GURs debate and
rankings themselves in academia?
3. How can decolonial perspectives help us to imagine otherwise?
Critiques of GURs
able? (2) What are the consequences and adverse effects of GURs on higher
education? (3) Whom do GURs serve? (4) Why do we participate in them?
(5) What do rankings do to us as scholars? (6) What are some alternatives?
How do we resist them? In the following literature review we will illuminate
how these rankings’ debates reproduce key aspects of the geopolitics and
body politics of knowledge production that are constitutive of modernity
(Mignolo 2011) and the questions that are left out as a result.
What Are the Consequences and Adverse Effects of GURs on Higher Education?
A growing body of scholarship problematizes the general politics of
knowledge production of GURs for perpetuating a monoculture of the mind
(i.e., a singular imaginary of higher-education purpose and knowledge;
Marginson and van der Wende 2007; Kaba 2012; Lynch 2014). Many have
noted that GURs privilege particular institutions (via discourse of world-class
excellence), disciplines, language, and overall mission of HEIs. As such, Mar-
ginson and van der Wende found ARWU and THE problematic because of
their exclusive focus on research tailored to science-strong and English-
speaking universities. Such GURs ignore teaching, and global comparisons
are possible only when in relation to a single model—the comprehensive re-
search institution in the United States. Furthermore, Ordorika and Lloyd
(2014) argue that GURs (e.g., ARWU, THE, and the QS) privilege the Anglo-
Saxon model of HEIs (particularly the US model; see also Kaba 2012) and
are “fundamental elements in the contest for cultural hegemony on a global
scale” (3).
Many problematize rankings for perpetuating stratification among
nation-states, within the national container,2 and/or their adverse effects on
HEIs and administrators (Ackers 2008; Hazelkorn 2015). For instance, Alt-
bach (2012) notes that GURs create centers and peripheries, whereby “the
major English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United King-
dom, Canada, and Australia . . . have significant head starts provided by their
histories, wealth, ability to attract top scholars and students worldwide, strong
traditions of academic freedom, and academic cultures based on competition
and meritocracy” (29). Similarly, Kehm (2014) and Lo (2014) point to the
ways in which vertical stratification of HEIs is linked to resource allocation in
some countries.
Beyond the global and national levels, Ordorika and Lloyd (2014) note
that HEIs face pressures to conform to a largely arbitrary and Anglocentric
set of performance indicators, and institutions are being forced to compete
in an increasingly “costly and high-stakes ‘academic arms race’ to the detri-
ment of more pressing local or national development priorities” (1). As
Enders (2012) put it, “some rankings use indicators that invite universities
to actively engage in influencing their image in the eyes of relevant others”
(2). In short, GURs exacerbate a competitive system in which already well-
positioned institutions are at an advantage. While these critiques illuminate
how GURs perpetuate various forms of monocultures of the mind, they rarely
raise questions about the consequences of GURs on our ways of being (on-
tological effects). Such critiques assume and unconsciously reproduce en-
lightenment narratives of general progress and educational development vis-
à-vis higher education.
gional bodies (e.g., European Commission) to justify their reform, HEIs for
gaining global competitive advantage, families and students for deciding on
institutional choice, and even some faculty to garner reputation. Others have
noted that rankings serve media companies and popular media in that they
help garner circulation and readership (Chang and Osborn 2005; Stack
2016). Some scholars have nuanced this “who benefits?” discussion further
by noting that GURs are part of a global hegemonic discourse that serves the
transnational elite and intentionally enacted/neoimperial project (Amsler
and Bolsmann 2012; Pusser and Marginson 2013). For instance, Amsler and
Bolsmann (2012) suggest that rankings are part of a “politico-ideological
technology” that serves a transnational elite class (284). They caution us from
accepting GURs as “inevitable” or “permanent” and suggest that such rank-
ing discourses are instead politicized speech that perpetuates the status quo.
While these critiques are indeed relevant, they do not raise questions about
the psychological and ontological underpinnings of GURs that seduce vari-
ous stakeholders to participate in them in an effort to secure prestige and
affluence through higher education.
be its other” (2). Those on “this side of the line” have a vested interest in their
epistemic blindness as they feel the need to protect the privilege to define
social realities in ways that also conveniently define the distribution of labor,
resources, and the merit of what is considered good and desirable.
If we are to follow the second interpretation of the quote above, we re-
alize that the burden of translation falls on those on the other side of the line
who need to inscribe or graph their own knowledges and forms of being into
something that is legible and credible to those on the upper side (see also
Ahenakew 2016), for instance, in our case, incorporating a decolonial Da-
gara perspective in reimagining the GURs debate and rankings themselves.
This work is fraught with difficulties as it prompts different kinds of resis-
tance on both sides. We highlight another caveat: trying to “explain” what
things would look like using a language built on other referents needs to be
characterized as an act of “translation” that will never capture the lived ex-
perience and logic of what we are trying to translate (Bassnett and Trivedi
1999). As Somé (1994) eloquently put it, “there is usually a significant vio-
lence done to anything being translated from one culture to another” (2).
Acknowledging these tensions, we aim to offer a “translation” in which
this radical difference is defined against a specific structure of being can-
onized by modern institutions, and now expanded exponentially through the
GURs to the point where already precarious, but insisting, academic spaces
for dissent and contestation face a higher risk of elimination. We looked at
different possibilities for presenting a glimpse of forms of existence that lie
beyond the abyss. Drawing on the writings of Somé (1994, 1997), we settled
on the example of the Dagara indigenous community (located in what is to-
day Burkina Faso and Ghana).3
Drawing on Sousa Santos’s (2007) call for an alternative way to think
about alternatives, we propose that what the Dagara can teach us about GURs
is something very different from what our existing referents tend to expect to
learn from alternative knowledges. Their teachings can teach us that Sousa
Santos’s abyss is not about what we do not imagine (from this side of the line)
as a lack of knowledge, but what we cannot imagine as a result of the limits of
our realms of intelligibility and experience, and the constitutive foreclosures
happening as a result of what has been normalized as real, ideal, knowable,
and desirable. As the upcoming section will discuss, by turning to the Dagara
teachings and decentering our own project, we encountered teachings that
were, at least initially, unintelligible to us.
3
In a previous version of this article we considered three different decolonial perspectives as
exemplars of critiques that could take us to the edges of the dominant global university imaginary: Da-
gara teachings expressed by Malidoma Somé, Gloria Anzaldua’s Nepantla, and DaSilva’s po-ethic. How-
ever, it was the Dagara’s teaching that offered us a sharper mirror to interrogate our own conceptuali-
zation of decoloniality further. By drawing attention to distractions and foreclosures, the Dagara gifted
us indigenous psychoanalytic tools that prompted us to delve deeper into the circularities of our own
investments.
4
While we could provide more socio-cultural-political context for the body of “Dagara thought” to
avoid the unintended presentation of this body of thought as context-free (universal), we are concerned
about “grafting” Dagara thought in a dominant onto-epistemic grammar to be perceived “relevant” or to
be “heard.” Our interpretation of decolonizing knowledge is such that, while we do not want to re-
produce the obfuscation of politics/inequality in our theoretical mobilizations, overlocalizing Dagara
knowledge would force us in a position whereby knowledges beyond the abyss are perceived as either
too different to be considered of relevance or too similar (when grafted) to make any difference. We
attempted to mobilize Dagara knowledge to shed light on our own paradoxes and contradictions and to
inspire us to sit at the edge of our comfort zones of righteous critique, prestige, and securities. In short,
we strove to hear the call of “othered” knowledge systems for us to imagine something genuinely dif-
ferent without again grafting it into what is desirable within the dominant grammar we, as critical ac-
ademics, are also oversocialized into.
tuals, their name invokes people in “revolt” (Lentz 1994, 70). For European
colonizers and for other African peoples, the name refers to “stammerers,
those who cannot be understood” (Lentz 2000, 112). Moreover, the Dagara
people’s location, in contemporary Burkina Faso and Ghana, illustrates the
ways in which European colonialism fractured the geographic landscape
through artificial national boundaries. Finally, as Plange (1979) has explained,
modernistic perspectives have attributed the inhabitants of this region a so-
called “intellectual incapacity” and blamed this as the reason for a supposed
lack of development (5).
While Dagara culture cannot be reduced to a narrow set of customs and
characteristics, the prominence of elders is a shared trait. For this reason, we
turn to a Dagara shaman healer and elder, Malidoma Somé, for Dagara
teachings that derive from the above historical/social contexts. According
to Somé (1994, 1997), for the Dagara, human beings are not individuals
represented by bodies, but a collective spirit who has taken a body form.
Human subjectivity is thus embedded in sacred subjectivity and not simply
constituted in social material realms. As Somé (1997) puts it, the clear split
between the spiritual and material in modernity is “alien to the Dagara. . . . To
a Dagara man or woman, the material is just the spiritual taking on form” (8).
This negation and absence of the sacred subjectivity are prevalent in modern
thought and institutions.
Tied to this spiritual ontology, Dagara notions and criteria of knowledge
are intimately connected to ancestral knowledge. According to Somé (1994),
“the ancestors are the real school of the living” (20) and “are always avail-
able to guide, to teach, and to nurture” (9). The Dagara believe that “contact
with the otherworld is always deeply transformational” (19). Modern sub-
jectivity, for Somé, is embedded in psychological “restlessness” because of
a dysfunctional relationship with one’s ancestors and loss of one’s roots. As
Somé puts it, “When a person from my culture looks at the descendents of
the Westerners who invaded their culture, they see a people who are ashamed
of their ancestors because they were killers and marauders masquerading as
artisans of progress. Dagara believe that, if such an imbalance exists, it is the
duty of the living to heal their ancestors” (9).
Tied to ancestral knowledge is the notion of limits of knowing. Somé
(1994) introduces the Dagara notion of Yielbongura: “the thing that knowl-
edge can’t eat.” In his words, this concept “suggests that the life and power of
certain things depend upon their resistance to the kind of categorizing knowl-
edge that human beings apply to everything” (8). This notion of categorical
fallacies or limitation of conceptual knowing fundamentally contradicts West-
ern epistemologies’ emphasis on rational knowing or “to know.” From a Da-
gara perspective, we could argue that knowledge production, or the concept
of learning, cannot be categorized, and it is such a “being” that is simply re-
sistant to being categorized or “tamed” by institutions because of the “spiritual
nature” of the endeavor, which is being stripped, caged, and turned into a
“secular material thing” in modern forms of knowledge production.
The realm of imagination is also very important among the Dagara.
There is no distinction between reality and imagination. According to Somé
(1994), “To us, there is a close connection between thought and reality, to
imagine something, to closely focus on one’s thoughts upon it, has the po-
tential to bring that something into being” (8). This ties with the absence
of the concept of time in the Dagara worldview, which “generates a mode of
life whose focus is on the state of one’s spirit” (Somé 1997, 16). For Dagara,
notions of time usage are embedded not so much in outcomes but actually
in attention: “The elder who noticed that moderns don’t have to run toward
something that isn’t moving was pointing to the idea that to move is also to
keep oneself distracted. . . . And so the elder sees those in constant motion
(going places, doing things, making noise) as moving away from something
they do not want to look at or moving away from something that others do
not want them to look at” (16–17). Somé’s notion of restlessness is particularly
striking in that it illustrates a larger (non-Western) psychoanalytical perspec-
tive that seems to be missing in the larger higher-education imaginary.
The question of the symbolic and nonphysical world is also central in
Dagara ontology and epistemology. Tied to the question of restlessness ar-
ticulated earlier, according to Somé (1997), problems in the visible realm
cannot be addressed simply in the empirical material world. Instead, Somé
suggests that “to correct a dysfunctional state of affairs effectively, one must
first locate its hidden area, its symbolic dimension, work with it first, and then
assist in the restoration of the physical (visible) extension of it” (25). Somé
argues that to address these dysfunctional states one has to begin to address
the world of spirit. As such, Somé’s point here raises questions missing in
current higher-education imaginaries: What are some of the symbolic di-
mensions missing in these dominant framings of the dysfunctional state of
global higher education that suggest rankings as the solution? Such a sym-
bolic dimension is hardly part of the discussion in modernity or postmodern
critiques and reforms of HEIs.
Related to the question of symbolic world, according to Somé, moder-
nity is stuck in future utopias and linear progress. As Somé (1994) put it,
“Westerners look to the future as a place of hope, a better world where every
person has dignity and value, where wealth is not unequally distributed,
where the wonders of technology make miracles possible” (9). As such, the
Dagara problematize modernity progress narratives that are tied to the fu-
ture. In summary, Dagara teachings emphasize the central importance of
sacred subjectivity, ancestral connections, limits of knowing, and uncovering
the invisible that have been concealed by modern onto-epistemic grammars.
Borrowing from Alexander (2005), this shift “necessitates a different exis-
tential positioning in which to know” and “living a purpose that exceeds the
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the nature of GURs is not simply tied to market-
based economic or political rationalities. Similar to other global spaces of
equivalence in education, GURs also operate under onto-epistemological
and metaphysical dimensions interlinked with historically conditioned un-
even and competitive economies of prestige and historical processes affect-
ing international relations. We have pointed to the racialized/racializing and
colonial politics of GURs where these violences are typically silenced even
in “critical” literature. We also highlighted the epistemic silencing that is ac-
complished through ranking practices (including journal scholarly prac-
tices) that are perceived to matter only for university “reputation.” Decolo-
nial perspectives can help us better understand these severe limitations and
implications of the GURs (and other global spaces of equivalence) and invite
us to imagine beyond them.
Reminiscent of the comparative and international education field (Ta-
kayama 2011; Takayama et al. 2015), the GURs debate continues to privilege
and valorize knowledge systems that derive from historically epistemically
privileged positions (i.e., Global North). As such, decolonial perspectives
raise questions about ontological and epistemological assumptions under-
pinning GURs and the historical foundations of higher education. These
questions include: What kind of academic subjectivities are imagined through
GURs? What forms and political economies of knowledge production are
enabled or disabled through the GURs? What kinds of “ethics” are made
possible through GURs? Exploring the limits of these questions can open up
possibilities for new questions for higher education, such as: How can higher
education resist the overwhelming imperatives of global capitalism when it
is funded by a state that is dependent on it? How can we move beyond con-
ceptual entrapments grounded on nation-states and methodological nation-
alism to defend higher education (Shahjahan and Kezar 2013)? How can we
imagine education and research in international education beyond the con-
fines of modernity and its violences?
Like others (e.g., Amsler 2014), we propose that an important purpose of
HEIs is to serve as a critic and conscience of society and that the legitimacy
of this purpose is being lost in the GURs debate. GURs mobilize higher ed-
ucation to advance a single story of progress, development, and human evo-
lution based on situated and limited—but allegedly universal—epistemolog-
ical and ontological referents. In the current context of global crises and
social-economic and ecological unsustainability, higher education should be
about “pluraliz[ing] the future by pluralizing knowledge in the present [in
order to produce] a better, more honest and wider range of options—mate-
rial, ideational and normative—for human beings and societies to choose
from” (Nandy 2000, 122). In order to resist current tendencies and plural-
ize our possibilities, higher education should secure spaces for critically in-
formed, socially accountable, and multivoiced conversations about global jus-
tice and alternative futures.
Finally, how does our “reimagination” of GURs serve as a “model” for
challenging other norms/metrics/tools for comparison/commensurability
that are used in the field of comparative and international education? First,
our intellectual journey with GURs suggests that we cannot purport to pro-
vide “model” exemplars of decolonial interventions in the commensurability
debate in comparative education, as it would reinscribe modernity’s grammar.
Instead, we need to be wary and careful of decolonial intellectual endeavors
as they are fraught with tensions and contradictions within academia, as we
need to be self-reflexive of universalizing “alternatives” and reproducing the
violences of grafting, recoding, appropriation, and commodification of in-
digenous knowledge systems (Ahenakew 2016). Second, our analysis suggests
that existential questions regarding global spaces of equivalence and their
outcomes are rendered invisible because of the narrow parameters of intel-
ligibility of enduring modern/colonial global imaginaries and can be fore-
grounded only if we take ourselves to the limits of these imaginaries, inter-
rupting the securities and satisfactions these imaginaries afford us. Third, the
comparative and educational field needs to challenge and complicate its own
complicity in the onto-epistemic grammar of modernity, by not only unpack-
ing the geopolitics/body politics of its own canonical thought but also when
speaking of and using alternative and “Southern” perspectives.
This amplification of possibilities requires, as Sousa Santos (2007) states,
an alternative way to think about alternatives, in the field of comparative
and international education, that welcome us first to the edge and then invite
us beyond the abyss. In the last section of the paper, we explored the intel-
lectual accountabilities involved in such an endeavor through our reflections
on teachings offered by the Dagara people. We proposed that, rather than
representing their worldview as a Southern alternative to dominant forms of
knowledge production, the Dagara can teach us something much deeper
about the need for different forms of existence animated by an ecology of
(limited and situated) interknowledges that can take us beyond the mono-
culture of the mind that grounds the ontological securities of the GURs and
of modern institutions and subjectivities in general. In short, our normative
stance is that, in the debates about the GURS and other global spaces of
equivalences, further work is needed in terms of enabling more uncomfort-
able analyses and the formulation of deeper existential questions, so that we
can change the modes of engagement, the questions perceived worth asking,
and the terms of the conversation in relation to the implications of global
metrics and the purposes and roles of education.
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