The Dreamer and The Yoghin

Bulletin of SOAS, 73, 3 (2010), 437–478. © School of Oriental and African Studies, 2010.
doi:10.1017/S0041977X10000406
The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationship

between Buddhist and Śaiva idealisms1
Isabelle Ratié
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna
isabelle.ratie@assoc.oeaw.ac.at
Abstract
The Pratyabhijñā system, elaborated in the tenth and eleventh centuries by
the Kashmiri philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, presents a
rational justification of the metaphysical principles contained in the
Śaiva nondualistic scriptures. However, contrary to what one might expect,
many arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort when
defending their idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources.
This article examines the profound influence, in this respect, of the
Buddhist “logico-epistemological school” on the Pratyabhijñā system.
But it also shows that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are not unknowingly
or unwittingly influenced by their Buddhist opponents: they systematically
emphasize this influence, thus taking full responsibility for appropriating
their rivals’ concepts. Moreover, they highlight their fundamental diver-
gence regarding the way consciousness manifests a seemingly external
and diverse universe, most notably by replacing the Vijñānavādins’ tra-
ditional analogy: according to the Śaivas, perceived objects should not
be compared to dreamt objects, but to yogins’ creations.
Introduction
Is perception the awareness of objects that have an independent existence and
that consciousness simply reveals, just as a lamp lights objects that were already
present in the dark? Or are perceived objects mere appearances that do not
belong to any reality outside of consciousness, just as dreamt or imagined
objects? This question pervades the whole of Indian philosophy, dividing it
into externalist2 doctrines (according to which perceived objects exist outside
of the consciousness that perceives them) and idealistic doctrines (according
to which consciousness, when perceiving, is aware of objects that are in fact
1 I would like to thank Ulrich Pagel and the Circle of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies for
inviting me to give a lecture at SOAS on the subject “Buddhist arguments in a Śaiva dem-
onstration: the influence of Dharmakīrti’s School on the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism” (the pre-
sent article is an expanded version of this talk, given on 11 March 2009); Alexis
Sanderson, with whose generous help I read many passages of the ĪPV quoted below;
Vincent Eltschinger, for sharing his forthcoming articles and for engaging in friendly dis-
cussions that led to several improvements in this paper; Harunaga Isaacson, for kindly
reading a draft and correcting several mistakes; Lyne Bansat-Boudon, for bringing several
relevant passages of the PS and PSV to my attention; and the anonymous reviewer,
whose elegant suggestions also led to important improvements.
2 On my use of this term, see Ratié (forthcoming, n. 4).
438 ISABELLE RATIÉ
mere aspects of itself). The Pratyabhijñā philosophy expounded by the Śaivas

Utpaladeva3 and Abhinavagupta4 belongs to the second category. This position
is of course in keeping with the religious background on which this philosophi-
cal system was elaborated: according to Śaiva nondualistic scriptures, the world
and the subjects within it are in fact nothing but a single, all-encompassing and
omnipotent consciousness. However, contrary to what one might expect, many
of the arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort when justifying
their idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources.
This article seeks to evaluate the extent of the influence, in this regard, of
a Buddhist school often designated by modern scholars as the
“logico-epistemological school” of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The crucial role
that it has played in the formation of the Pratyabhijñā system in general has
already been outlined,5 but I would like to examine here more particularly its
impact on Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s idealism6 – as well as the way
the two Śaivas deal with this influence: in what measure are they aware of it?
When conceptually elaborating their idealism, do they knowingly exploit
Buddhist concepts, or are they passively affected by them? And do they end
up sharing with their Buddhist rivals a common understanding of the relation
between consciousness and its objects?
3 Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975 AD) has written the ĪPK and two commentaries on his own
verses: the short Vr̥ tti, and a much more detailed Vivr̥ ti or T īkā, of which only fragments
are known to date. ˙
4 Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) has left a particularly imposing body of work that
includes two commentaries on Utpaladeva’s ĪPK, Vr̥ tti and Vivr̥ ti: the brilliant synthesis
of the ĪPV, and the fascinating but very long and difficult ĪPVV. Towards the end of the
seventeenth century, Bhāskarakantha wrote a commentary on the ĪPV that has come
˙ ˙ see Sanderson 2007, 422). Unless otherwise stated,
down to us (see Bhāskarī; on its date,
the text of the ĪPV quoted here is that of the Kashmir Series of Text and Studies (KSTS)
edition. Wherever I have proposed an emendation, I have indicated within brackets the
manuscript(s) and/or edition(s) bearing the adopted reading, followed (after a colon)
by alternative readings.
5 See e.g. J. Naudou’s cursory remarks (Naudou 1968, 102–03) and the pioneering article
that R. Torella (1992) has devoted to this question; more detailed analyses can be found
in Torella’s remarkable edition and annotated translation of the ĪPK and Vr̥ tti (Torella
1994).
6 One could question my use of the term “idealism” here; “internalism” might seem less
ambiguous and more appropriate, especially since Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta them-
selves call the rival theory a bāhyārthavāda – literally, a “theory [according to which] the
object [of consciousness] is external”, which I will translate as “externalism” in the fol-
lowing pages. However, using the term “internalism” to designate Utpaladeva’s position
might be misleading, since it may give the impression that the Pratyabhijñā philosophers,
while considering that objects of consciousness exist only inside consciousness, do not
pass any judgement on what might exist outside of it. But Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta are not internalists in this sense: they explicitly state that there is nothing
outside of consciousness, and for them, leaving open the question whether or not there
are things outside of consciousness would still amount to admitting that there is some
kind of space, whether empty or full of things so to speak, outside of consciousness. I
therefore prefer to use the term idealism, by which I mean any doctrine according to
which the very distinction between externality and internality is irrevlevant with respect
to consciousness since nothing exists outside of it.
THE DREAMER AND THE YOGIN 439
The main argument from the Vijñānavāda: the necessity

of being simultaneously aware of the object and its cognition
The echoes of two distinct types of Buddhist argument justifying idealism can
be detected in the Pratyabhijñā texts. The first of these arguments borrowed
from the Vijñānavāda7 belongs to the great Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti.8
Thus, in chapter I, 5, Utpaladeva states:
bhinne prakāśe cābhinne samkaro visayasya tat /

˙
prakāśātmā prakāśyo’rtho nāprakāśaś ˙ ca siddhyati // 9
If the manifesting consciousness ( prakāśa)10 were different (bhinna)
[from the object that it manifests] and if it were undifferentiated (abhinna)
[in itself], [there would follow] the confusion of [whatever is] an object; as
a consequence, the object that is made manifest ( prakāśya) has as its
essence the manifesting consciousness; and that which is not the manifest-
ing consciousness cannot be established.
Abhinavagupta interprets the first hemistich of the verse as meaning that any
externalist has to be a proponent of the theory according to which consciousness
is devoid of aspects (nirākāratāvāda). If consciousness is different (bhinna)
from the objects that it manifests, it must be undifferentiated (abhinna), or
devoid of various aspects (ākāra), because if consciousness is similar to a
lamp lighting things from outside, it remains unaffected by the various objects
that it manifests: it must be a pure light ( prakāśamātra) devoid of the
7 Literally, “the doctrine of consciousness”, i.e. the doctrine according to which everything
is consciousness. I use the term Vijñānavāda (rather than Yogācāra) because Utpaladeva
and Abhinavagupta themselves favour it (see e.g. ĪPV I, 78; and for the term
Vijñānavādin, ĪPV, I, 167; ĪPV, II, 164; ĪPVV, II, 92; ĪPVV, II, 122; ĪPVV, II, 144; etc.).
8 Admittedly, modern scholars are struck by the fact that many of Dharmakīrti’s works can
be read both from the point of view of the Vijñānavādins and from that of another
Buddhist school defending a kind of externalism, that of the Sautrāntikas; and it is
now widely believed that this ambiguity was deliberately maintained by Dharmakīrti.
Examining this ambiguity and its various interpretations is of course beyond the scope
of this article (for such examinations see e.g. Dreyfus 1997, 98–105, Franco 1997,
74–93, Dunne 2004, 53–79 or Arnold 2008). However, it is equally important to keep
in mind that for Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (as for many other Indian philosophers,
Buddhist or not), there is no such ambiguity: the two Śaivas obviously consider
Dharmakīrti not only as a Vijñānavādin, but as the Vijñānavādin par excellence; they
consistently quote passages of his works that clearly defend idealism and they immedi-
ately interpret any passage that could bear several meanings in the strongest possible
idealistic sense.
9 ĪPK I, 5, 3.
10 The word literally means “light”; however, Pratyabhijñā philosophers clearly distinguish
the “light” of consciousness from material light (āloka), hence my tentative translation
here as “manifesting consciousness”, for consciousness is prakāśa in so far as it mani-
fests ( prakāśayati) things, and it manifests them while manifesting itself: just like
light, consciousness illuminates objects while being self-illuminating (svaprakāśa). On
the exploitation by the Pratyabhijñā philosophers of this notion of self-manifestation bor-
rowed from Buddhist epistemology, see Torella 1988; 2007; Ratié 2006, 60–65; 2007,
321–2.
440 ISABELLE RATIÉ
differences belonging to the objects.11 However, as he shows in the

Vivr̥ tivimarśinī, such a view is highly problematic:
prakāśabalāc ca nīlapītayor bhedo’bhyupagantavyah. sa ca prakāśa

ubhayatrāpy abhinnas tulyah. tadanugrahād yadi nīlam ˙ tat, pītam na
˙
kasmāt? na vā nīlam, nāpi pītam. 12 ˙ ˙
˙
And the difference (bheda) between blue and yellow must be admitted to
be due to the manifesting consciousness ( prakāśa); and this manifesting
consciousness, [if it is] undifferentiated (abhinna), must be the same in
the two cases [of blue and yellow]. [But] if this is blue thanks to this
[undifferentiated manifestation], why is it not yellow [as well]? Or [rather,
one should say that this object] is neither blue nor yellow!
How could an entity that is perfectly devoid of difference make differences

manifest? If consciousness manifested external objects while remaining purely
11 See ĪPV, I, 160–61: yady arthād anya eva jñānātmā prakāśo’ta eva bhinno’rthatas tarhi
svātmani tasya prakāśamātrarūpatvād abheda eva. tathā hi nīlasya prakāśah, pītasya
prakāśa iti yo nīlāmśah pītāmśaś ca, *sa tāvaj jñānasya na svarūpam [P, ˙ D, S1,
˙ ˙ svarūpam
SOAS: sa tāvaj jñānasya ˙ KSTS, J, L, S2: sa na tāvaj jñānasya˙ svarūpam
˙
Bhāskarī (conj. Pandey)] bhedavādatyāgāpatteh . “If the manifesting consciousness ˙
( prakāśa) which consists in a cognition is radically ˙ other (anya) than the object, [and
if] for this very reason, it is ‘different’ from the object, then in itself, it is absolutely
devoid of differentiation (bheda), since it consists in nothing but a manifesting con-
sciousness ( prakāśamātra). To explain: obviously, in the ‘manifesting consciousness
of blue’ [or] in the ‘manifestating consciousness of yellow’, the aspect (amśa) ‘blue’
and the aspect ‘yellow’ are not the nature of cognition – [otherwise] one should ˙ abandon
the doctrine of difference (bhedavāda).” Bhāskarakantha identifies the externalists to
whom Abhinavagupta is referring here to the Vaiśes ˙ ˙ ikas (see Bhāskarī, I, 205:
bhedavādatyāgāpatter iti – vaiśesikā hi bhedanisthā˙ eva, jñānārthayoś ca tair
ekasvarūpatve’ngīkr̥ te svābhīstasya˙ bhedavādasya˙˙ tesām tyāga eva syāt, tathā
.
cāpasiddhāntāpattis tesām syād ˙˙ iti bhāvah. “‘[Otherwise] ˙ one
˙ should abandon the doc-
˙ ˙ is the meaning [of
trine of difference’ – this ˙ this passage]: for the Vaiśesikas rely exclu-
sively on difference, and if they admitted that cognition and its object have˙ one and the
same nature, they would necessarily abandon the doctrine of difference which they pre-
cisely want [to establish], and thus there would follow a conclusion opposed to their doc-
trine”). However, Abhinavagupta seems to be targeting a much more important group of
opponents (both Buddhist and Brahmanical) who consider that there is a difference
between consciousness and its objects as well as between the various objects appre-
hended by consciousness (see ĪPV, I, 162, quoted below, where this bhedavāda is
ascribed to a Buddhist Sautrāntika); and he is arguing that such a position entails (or
should entail) the acceptance of the “doctrine according to which [consciousness] is
devoid of aspects” (nirākāratāvāda) rather than the “doctrine according to which [con-
sciousness] has aspects” (sākāratāvāda). According to him, an externalist, because he
considers that consciousness is different (bhinna) from the various objects that it mani-
fests, must hold that consciousness is in itself undifferentiated (abhinna), i.e. devoid of
(various) aspects (nirākāra), since differences pertain to the objects themselves (cf. e.g.
ĪPVV ad loc., II, 79: nirākāratve ca. . . , “And if [consciousness] is devoid of aspects. . .”,
or ibid., p. 80: nirākāratāpakse. . ., “In the doctrine according to which [consciousness] is
devoid of aspects. . .”). On the˙ opposition between nirākāratāvāda and sākāratāvāda, see
e.g. Mimaki 1976, 38–40, 71–3 and n. 329.
12 ĪPVV, II, 77.
undifferentiated, we would never become aware of the differences distinguishing

objects from one another. We must therefore admit that cognitions are not simi-
lar to a perfectly homogeneous light that would illuminate these objects while
remaining profoundly different from them and alien to their diversity – other-
wise the awareness of this diversity could never occur. On the contrary, we
must assume that this diversity does not exist independently of consciousness;
rather, it is an appearance taken on by consciousness itself, as Abhinavagupta
concludes in the same passage of the Vivr̥ tivimarśinī:
tataś ca sākāratākr̥ ta eva niyamah. yathāha: tatrānubhavamātrena

˙
jñānasya sadr̥ śātmanah / bhāvyam tenātmanā ˙
yena pratikarma vibhajyate
˙ ˙
// iti; tasmān nīlākāro’pr̥ thagbhūto bodhāt. 13
And as a consequence, the restriction (niyama) [of a cognition to a particu-

lar object which is distinct from the other objects] must be due to the fact
that [the cognition] takes on the aspect [of this object] (sākāratā). As
[Dharmakīrti] has said: “Because [otherwise], the nature of cognition
would remain the same with respect to any [object], since it would be a
pure experience (anubhavamātra), it must be [cognition] itself thanks to
which [the cognition] is differentiated according to each object”.14
Therefore the aspect (ākāra) which is blue is not distinct from the cogni-
tion (bodha).
Consciousness takes on various aspects, and these aspects are what we call
“external objects”; if it were not the case, we could never be aware of any diver-
sity.15 Abhinavagupta himself is emphasizing the origin of this reasoning by
quoting Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavārttika.
˙
13 ĪPVV, II, 79.

14 PV, Pratyaksapariccheda, 302. Cf. PVV: anyathānubhavamātratayā sarvatra visaye
˙
sadr̥ śam jñānam prativisayam katham bhedena vyavasthāpayitum śakyeta? “If it ˙were
not the˙ case, this
˙ cognition
˙ (which
˙ ˙
would be similar with respect˙to any object, because
it would consist in nothing but experience), how could we establish that it is different
according to each object?”
15 Including diversity in the way we perceive things, and not only in the objective content
of our cognitions. See ĪPVV, II, 79–80: nirākāratve ca samvedanam nīle yat patu, tan
mandatvenānubhavo yasyety evam abhimatasya mandena ˙ vānubhavenābhimatasya
˙ ˙
pītasyāpi sambandhitayā patīyastvenaivābhimatam syāt, nīlasyāpi vā sambandhitayā
mandatvena,˙ yadi vā dvaye’py ˙ apatumandatvena. na hi nirākāratāpakse sam ˙ vedanasya
ko’pi viśesah. sa eva patumandatādinā˙ samkara uktah. “And if [the˙ cognition]
˙ were
devoid of˙ any
˙ [particular]˙ aspect (nirākāra),
˙ the cognition
˙ [which has as its object
both blue and yellow, and] which is vivid as regards blue [and indistinct as regards yel-
low], should be considered as relating [vividly] to yellow as well, [whereas yellow] is, [as
Utpaladeva says in the Vivr̥ ti, mandānubhavābhimata-, i.e.] ‘considered as that which is
experienced indistinctly’ – or, [if the compound is analysed differently,] ‘considered as
that which is [produced] by an indistinct experience’. [But] it is in a particularly vivid
manner [that this vivid cognition of blue should relate to yellow, although yellow is
only indistinct in it]; or [this cognition should be considered] as relating to blue too in
an indistinct manner, [since yellow is indistinctly manifested in it]; or [it should be con-
sidered] as being neither vivid nor indistinct as regards both [yellow and blue]! For in the
doctrine according to which [the cognition] is devoid of any [particular] aspect
(nirākāratāpaksa), the cognition has no particularity whatsoever. [Utpaladeva] is here
˙
442 ISABELLE RATIÉ
Of course, an obvious objection could be raised against this reasoning: it is

perfectly possible that consciousness takes on the various aspects (ākāra) of
objects without admitting that there are no objects at all outside of conscious-
ness. Thus for instance, one may suppose, as the Buddhist Sautrāntikas do,16
denouncing the same confusion [that he had already mentioned regarding differences
inherent in the objects, but this time] insofar as [the very manifestation of these differ-
ences] must be both vivid and indistinct, etc.” Cf. ĪPV, I, 162–3 (the following conjec-
ture rests both on the context and on the parallel passage of the ĪPVV just quoted): tathā
*nirākāratāvāde [conj.: kāranatādivāde KSTS, J, L, P, D, S1, S2, SOAS: karanatādivāde
Bhāskarī] śikharasthajñānam ˙ bahutaranīlādijanyam ekatra patv anyatra mandam ˙ iti
˙
katham bhedah? prakāśaśarīrasyābhedāt. “In the same way, in˙ the doctrine according
˙ [consciousness]
to which ˙ is devoid of aspects (nirākāratāvāde), how [could one explain]
this difference (bheda): the cognition of [someone] standing at the top [of a mountain],
caused by a multiplicity of [objects] such as blue, etc., is vivid as regards some [objects,
and] indistinct as regards others? For there is [supposedly] no difference in the form of
the manifesting consciousness!” The same reasoning applies in the case of memory: if
consciousness is undifferentiated, one cannot understand how we can remember only
one particular element of a past perception. See ĪPVV, II, 80: samakālam eva yo nīle pīte
cānubhavas tena dattah samskāro yadā nīlamātradarśanena prabodhyate, tadā sa
prācyo’nubhavo nirviśes˙ah prabuddho
˙ nīlasyaiva, na pītasyeti niyamābhāvāt pītaprakāś-
ātmāpi bhaved iti pīte’pi˙ ˙ smr̥ tih sā syāt. na ca śikharasthajñānaparidr̥ stabhāvavaiś-
˙
varūpyasya punar ekatamabhāvadarśanaprabuddhasam ˙˙
skārasya samastapūrvānubh
ūtavisayā smr̥ tir. “When a residual trace (samskāra) left by˙ a [past] experience of blue and
˙ which were simultaneously [perceived]
yellow ˙ is awakened by the sight of [something]
that is only blue, the past experience, which is [supposedly] devoid of distinctions, is awa-
kened as [the experience] of the blue only, and not [as the experience] of yellow. [And
yet,] because there is no restriction [of consciousness to a particular aspect, this remembered
experience] should concern the yellow as well; but on the contrary, there is no memory aiming
at the whole past experience in [someone] who has seen a multiplicity of objects in a [single]
cognition while standing on a peak, when a residual trace has been awakened in him by the
sight of only one of these objects.”
16 Although the term “Sautrāntika” is often used by late doxographers and modern scholars
to refer to one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism, little is known
about the Sautrāntikas’ identity and beliefs. See Kritzer (2003a, 2003b and 2005, pp.
xxvi–xxx): the term seems to appear first in the Abhidharmakośabhāsya, and
Vasubandhu seems to be “inserting Yogācāra ideas into the Abhidharmakośabhās ˙ ya
under the guise of the Sautrāntika” (Kritzer 2005, p. xxviii): having shown ˙that
“there is a close relation between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika ideas and the Yogā
cārabhūmi” (ibid., p. xxviii–xxix), Kritzer concludes (ibid., p. xxx) that “in the
Abhidharmakośabhāsya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrāntika to designate positions
in the Yogācārabhūmi ˙ that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvāstivāda. . . .
Vasubandhu . . . adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin abhidharma so that it no longer con-
flicts with the central theories of Yogācāra . . . . Attributing an opinion to a Sautrāntika
may simply be Vasubandhu’s way of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpret-
ation of sūtra than its Sarvāstivādin counterpart”. The evolution of the meaning of the
term between Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti (and his commentators) is still obscure; how-
ever, by the time the Pratyabhijñā philosophers were writing, the Sautrāntikas were
thought to hold a philosophical system of their own, a system opposed to the
Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. The reader should therefore bear in mind that the Sautrāntikas
dealt with here are only, so to speak, those of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (although
their depiction of the Sautrāntika doctrine had already become standardized among ear-
lier Brahmanical philosophers: see below, n. 18 and 23; for a Buddhist description of this
doctrine written shortly after Abhinavagupta’s, see e.g. Kajiyama 1998, 139–40; for a
that consciousness bears different aspects, but that it bears them precisely
because of the existence of objects outside of consciousness, just as a mirror,
while being in itself undifferentiated, takes on a variety of aspects caused by
some objects existing outside of the mirror:17 according to the Sautrāntikas,
by definition, we can never have any direct access to external objects (since
what is external to consciousness cannot become conscious without ceasing to
be external), and yet we must infer their existence in order to account for our
awareness of phenomenal diversity.18 Dharmakīrti had anticipated this objection
in his Pramānavārttika:
˙
yadi buddhis tadākārā sā’sty ākāraviśesinī /
sā bāhyād anyato veti vicāram idam arhati˙ ˙ //19
If the cognition has the aspect (ākāra) of the [object], it is particularized by
this aspect. [Now] this deserves examination: is it [thus particularized]
because of an external object (bāhya), or because of something else?
Should we assume that consciousness takes on a blue aspect because, some-

where beyond consciousness, there is some external blue object causing it to
appear thus? Or is this particular aspect of consciousness caused by something
else? Here is Dharmakīrti’s answer:
darśanopādhirahitasyāgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt /

darśanam nīlanirbhāsam nārtho bāhyo’sti kevalam // 20
˙ ˙
classical account of Sautrāntika presuppositions in Vasubandhu’s idealistic works, see

Schmithausen 1967).
17 On this theory, ascribed to the Sautrāntikas, according to which the various aspects borne
by consciousness are similar to the reflections of external objects in a mirror, see e.g.
ĪPVV, I, 170: nanu sautrāntikāh samvidi nīlādipratibimbam upayanti. “But the
Sautrāntikas consider that there is ˙a reflection
˙ ( pratibimba) of [external objects] such
as blue, etc., in consciousness!”
18 See e.g. Utpaladeva’s description of the Sautrāntikas’ position in ĪPK I, 5, 4:
tattadākasmikābhāso bāhyam ced anumāpayet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya
˙
vicitrābhāsahetutā // “If [a Sautrāntika objected that] the manifestation of this or that
[particular object], [inasmuch as it is apparently] devoid of any cause, must lead us to
infer (anumāpayet) an external [reality], because consciousness, which is [in itself]
undifferentiated (abhinna), cannot be the cause of the various phenomena . . .”. Cf.
the summary of the Sautrāntika’s inference of the external object by Jayanta Bhatta
(NM, II, 492): jñānasya svatah svacchasvabhāvatvena nīlapītādyavabhāsah parop ˙˙
ādhir eva bhavitum arhati, sphat ˙ ikasyeva lāksādinārunimādyanuvedhah. atah ˙ pr̥ tha
gananubhūyamāno’pi bāhyo’rthah ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
sākārajñānāvabhāsānyathānupapattyā’numīyate.˙
“Because the nature of cognition is ˙in itself pure (svaccha), the manifestation of [various
objects] such as blue, yellow and so on must be a particularity due to some other [entity],
just as, thanks to lacquer for instance, a crystal, [although colourless,] is pervaded by red-
ness [when placed next to some red substance]. For this reason, although the external
object is never experienced separately [from consciousness], it is inferred (anumīyate)
because of the impossibility, if [it did] not [exist], of [accounting for] the fact that a cog-
nition is manifest while having a [particular] aspect (ākāra).”
19 PV, Pratyaksapariccheda, 334.
20 PV, Pratyaks ˙ apariccheda, 335.
˙
444 ISABELLE RATIÉ
Because there is no apprehension of an [object that would be] devoid of

the particularity that is perception; and because there is an apprehension
[of an object] when there is an apprehension of its [perception, one
must conclude that] it is perception that bears the aspect “blue”; there is
no external object that would exist independently [of its cognition].
Consciousness does not manifest the world as a mirror reflects things that are
external to it. For we can see the things that the mirror reflects directly, without
looking at their reflection in the mirror – and we can compare these things with
their reflections in the mirror. But we cannot step outside of consciousness so as
to meet some external reality that would be “the blue in itself”, the noumenon of
blue devoid of the consciousness of blue, and then come back to consciousness.
Thus Abhinavagupta explains in the following way why the Sautrāntika’s under-
standing of the relation between consciousness and its objects is invalid:
atha nīlākāro’sau tad yadi pratibimbabalāt taddvitīyabimbānavabhāsād

ayuktam. athābhedah, tarhi tyakto bhedavādah.21
˙ ˙
But if [a Sautrāntika answered] that this [manifesting consciousness con-
sisting in a cognition] has as its aspect the blue, [we would answer in
turn that] it is impossible if, [as the Sautrāntika contends, the cognition
takes on the aspect “blue”] due to a reflection ( pratibimba) [of the external
object onto the cognition] – because the reflected object (bimba) of which
this [reflection] is [supposedly] a double is not manifest! Alternatively, if
[the Sautrāntika answered] that there is no difference [between the aspect
“blue” of the cognition and the blue object,] he would thereby renounce
his doctrine of the difference [between cognitions and their objects].
The Sautrāntika agrees with the Vijñānavādin that the objects of our awareness
are only aspects taken on by consciousness,22 but he considers that these aspects
are caused by an external reality of which they are reflections. However, as
Abhinavagupta explains here, such a theory is absurd, because we consider that
an object is reflected by another when we can see it independently of its reflection,
whereas we cannot even think about an external reality without making it an object
of consciousness – that is, an internal aspect of consciousness.23 Therefore there is
21 ĪPV, I, 162.
22 This is why, as Arnold has noted (2008, 5), we should consider that the expression “episte-
mic idealism”, sometimes employed to describe Dharmakīrti’s Vijñānavāda, also applies to
the Sautrāntikas: the real difference between the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin theories
lies rather in the extra assertion that they make (i.e. according to the Vijñānavādins, we
should consider not only that the objects of our awareness are aspects of consciousness,
but also that there is no external reality beyond consciousness; whereas according to the
Sautrāntikas, we should consider not only that the objects of our awareness are aspects of
consciousness, but also that these aspects reflect an external reality).
23 Cf. NM, where a Sautrāntika has just expounded his theory according to which the exist-
ence of external objects must be inferred as the cause of phenomenal variety (see n. 18); a
Vijñānavādin then replies that any relation of cause and effect is established through “a
positive and negative concomitance” (anvayavyatireka) – that is, if we experience that
an entity exists when another is present (anvaya) and does not exist when the other is
absent (vyatireka); but such a concomitance cannot be determined in the case of the
no such thing as an external object existing independently of consciousness: con-

sciousness and its object are not ultimately two distinct realities, because the object
is nothing but an internal aspect of consciousness.24
This reasoning is summed up in a famous passage of Dharmakīrti’s
Pramānaviniścaya that Abhinavagupta quotes while again insisting that here,
˙
Utpaladeva wants to reach the conclusion already drawn by the Buddhist logician:
etad dhi sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyor iti vijñānākāramā-

tram nīlādi prasādhayitum nirūpitam.25
˙ ˙
For all of this has been explained in order to make it clear that [the various
objects] such as blue are nothing but aspects (ākāra) of consciousness, accord-
ing to [the principle stated by Dharmakīrti]: “because of the necessity [for blue
and the cognition of blue] to be perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama),
there is no difference (abheda) between blue and the cognition of [blue]”.26
external object. See vol. II, p. 492: arthe hi sati sākāram nirākāram tadatyaye /
nityānumeyabāhyārthavādī jñānam kva dr̥ stavān // “For where ˙ has the˙ proponent of
the thesis according to which˙ the external ˙˙ object must always be inferred
(nityānumeyabāhyārthavādin) ever seen a cognition having a [particular] aspect
(sākāra) when an object is present, [and] devoid of aspect (nirākāra) when the object
has disappeared?” The Vijñānavādin portrayed by Jayanta Bhatta adds a further verse
(ibid.): arthena rajyamānam hi nirākāram nisargatah / jñānam ˙˙ na khalu paśyāmah
lāksayā sphatikam yathā // ˙“For indeed, we ˙ do not see˙ a cognition
˙ being coloured by˙
an ˙object, [and
˙ then]
˙ devoid of aspect when [the object] disappears, as [we can see] a
crystal [coloured] by lacquer, [and then colourless when the lacquer disappears].” Cf.
the way the Vijñānavādin presented by Kumārila Bhatta refutes the inference of external
objects (ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 37–8): niścandre’bimbarūpam ˙˙ hi dr̥ stam yena divā jalam / sa
rātrau khe ca tam dr̥ stvā jānāti pratibimbatām //˙ vijñāne ˙˙ ˙ na kadācit tu prān.-
nirākāradarśanam ˙/ bāhye ˙˙ vākāravattādhīr yenaivam kalpanā bhavet // “For someone
who has seen, during the day, an [expanse of] water ˙ devoid of the form of the lunar
disc (bimba) when [the sky] is moonless, [and then], during the night, the [expanse of
water] and [the moon] in the sky, knows that [the moon visible in the water] is a reflec-
tion ( pratibimba); but as regards consciousness (vijñāna), there is never any perception
[of it as] devoid of any [particular] aspect (nirākāra) before [the perception of conscious-
ness as endowed with a particular objective aspect]; and as regards the external object,
there is never any cognition of the fact that it possesses a [particular] aspect [indepen-
dently of consciousness], thanks to which one could make such a supposition
(kalpanā) [of the existence of the external object].”
24 The Sautrāntika’s inference is therefore invalid, because it requires that one has previous
experience of the external object devoid of any cognition, which is impossible (cf. the
beginning of ĪPK I, 5, 8: anumānam anābhātapūrve naivestam . . . , “One can absolutely
not accept an inference regarding [something] that has never ˙˙ been manifested before. . .”).
However, the Sautrāntika could reply that some inferences concern objects that can never
be directly perceived. Such is the inference of the indriyas, the imperceptible parts of the
sense organs which act as intermediaries between the body and the perceived objects: we
have to infer their existence, otherwise we could not account for the fact of perception,
and yet we can never perceive them. For an examination of this argument and
Utpaladeva’s response, see Ratié forthcoming.
25 ĪPVV, II, 78.
26 PVin I, 54ab. Discussing the exact meaning of this famous half-verse is of course beyond
the scope of this article. However, one may question whether Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta are overinterpreting it. Thus the sahopalambhaniyama argument only
446 ISABELLE RATIÉ
Additional arguments from the Vijñānavāda: the contradictory

nature of the external object
The Pratyabhijñā philosophers borrow a second set of idealistic arguments from
the Buddhist conceptual arsenal, but they mention them in a more allusive man-
ner. In the Vivr̥ tivimarśinī, Abhinavagupta explains why Utpaladeva does not
bother explaining these arguments in detail:
.
etad upasamharati vijñānavādibhir iti. ālambanaparīksādau dainnāge,
˙ ˙
*vijñaptimātratāsiddhau vāsubandhvām [corr.: vijñaptimātrādisiddhāvās-
abandhanyām KSTS], prajñālamkārādis ˙ u bhāttadarśanesu, tatra tatra
˙ ˙
cānyatra vitatyāyam artha ukta iti. 27 ˙ ˙˙ ˙
This is what [Utpaladeva] sums up [in his Vivr̥ ti, in the passage beginning
with] “by the Vijñānavādins”. That is to say: this point has [already] been
explained in detail in various places – in the Ālambanaparīksā and other
works by Dignāga, in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi by Vasubandhu, ˙ in the
Prajñālamkāra and other teachings of the Master; and elsewhere too.
˙
Here again, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers themselves insist that they are merely
borrowing Buddhist arguments; and the passage is particularly interesting,
since Abhinavagupta hardly ever gives Utpaladeva’s sources with such
precision. The presence of Dignāga and Vasubandhu among the Vijñānavādins
to whom he refers is not surprising, but the end of the passage is worthy of
proves that the cognized object is in fact an aspect of the cognition, but not that there is
no such thing as a reality external to consciousness or that objects are nothing but the
objective aspects of consciousness: the Sautrāntikas, for instance, agree that perceived
objects are nothing but aspects of consciousness, and yet they consider that these aspects
are causally determined by an external reality that exists independently of consciousness.
Thus S. Matsumoto notices that although “the inference seems to have been regarded
exclusively as the inference presented by the Vijñānavādins in order to prove their theory
of vijñaptimātratā”, the argument is formulated so as to be acceptable both to
Vijñānavādins and Sautrāntikas (Matsumoto 1980, 290), and indeed, Dharmakīrti stipu-
lates that “because of this [necessity of being simultaneously perceived], even if there is
an external object, there is no difference between the manifested object and its cognition”
(PVin I, 58ab: bāhye’py arthe tato’bhedo bhāsamānārthatadvidoh / ). However, that
Dharmakīrti formulates his argument so as to be acceptable to both ˙ parties may also
be understood as a strategic choice that forces the Sautrāntikas to accept an idea
which ultimately leads to the Vijñānavāda, insofar as the impossibility of perceiving
any object independently of consciousness renders impossible the establishment of
any causal relation (which implies the previous experience of both the cause and its
effect) between an imperceptible object and consciousness; and the Sautrāntikas cannot
even argue that an external reality must be postulated as the cause of phenomenal variety,
which would otherwise remain unexplained, since phenomenal variety can be accounted
for just as well through the Vijñānavādins’ theory of impregnations (vāsanā), as
Dharmakīrti explains in the same passage (in PVin I, 58d and auto-commentary ad
loc., see Ratié forthcoming, n. 29). In any case, here as elsewhere, Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta interpret the argument in its strongest idealistic sense.
27 ĪPVV, II, 144.
attention, for Abhinavagupta also mentions the author of the Prajñālamkāra, the
. ˙ perfectly
Kashmirian Śankaranandana28 – and this rather mysterious character29 is
representative of the very close and somewhat ambiguous relations between Śaiva
and Buddhist philosophical circles in medieval Kashmir.30
As for the idealistic arguments to which Utpaladeva was alluding in his
Vivr̥ ti, Abhinavagupta sums them up in the following way in his Vimarśinī:
abhyuccayabādhakās tv avayavino vr̥ ttyanupapattih samavāyāsiddhih

˙
kampākampāvaranānāvaranaraktāraktadigbhāgabhedādiviruddhadhar- ˙
mayogah. 31 ˙ ˙
˙
As for the additional arguments against [the existence of objects outside
of consciousness], they are: the impossibility of the existence of a whole
(avayavin); the fact that the inherence (samavāya) [of the whole in its
parts] is not established; the fact that the [external object must] possess
some contradictory properties, such as movement and the absence of
movement, being covered and being uncovered, being coloured and
28 Here, as often, Abhinavagupta only refers to him as “the Master” (bhatta), but in the cor-
responding passage of the ĪPV (I, 181, quoted below in n. 32), he˙˙designates him as
.
ācāryaśankaranandana.
29 For a list of his works see Bühnemann 1980, Steinkellner and Much 1995, 80–84,
Krasser 2001 and Eltschinger forthcoming A.
30 Thus his possible conversion from Buddhism to Śaivism or from Śaivism to Buddhism
has been the object of scholarly debate. According to the Tibetan historian Tāranātha, he
converted from Śaivism to Buddhism (see Naudou 1968, 107; Naudou does not give his
opinion on this “conversion hypothétique”). According to Raniero Gnoli (1960, p. xxvi)
he rather converted from Buddhism to Śaivism; more recently, Funayama (1994, 372)
.
has expressed the opinion that Śankaranandana wrote his works “as a Hindu” and “com-
posed his Buddhist texts without conversion”, whereas Krasser has defended the hypoth-
esis of his conversion from Śaivism to Buddhism, arguing that, while finding some
appeal in Buddhism early on, “it was only after the completion of Abhinavagupta’s
ĪPVV [. . .] that he must have made the break with Śaivism and written a number of
works setting out his Buddhist point of view” (2001, 500). This hypothesis would
explain why Abhinavagupta mentions him as a Buddhist (saugata) in his TĀ (3, 55)
and yet speaks “very highly” of him in his later ĪPVV (ibid., 504; cf. Krasser 2002,
144–5). However, even if we admit the historical reality of this conversion, the hypoth-
esis according to which it would have taken place only after Abhinavagupta wrote
his ĪPVV does not seem to be grounded on sufficient evidence: Abhinavagupta indeed
refers to him with great respect in this work – but Abhinavagupta refers with such
great respect to Dharmakīrti, who is not to be suspected of Śaivism. Besides, as
Eltschinger notes (forthcoming A), in the passage of the ĪPVV quoted above,
.
Abhinavagupta presents Śankaranandana’s Prajñālamkāra as dogmatically equivalent
˙
to Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīksā or Vasubandhu’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Finally, on
the basis of an examination of˙ the opening and/or final verses in Śankaranandana’s pre-
.
served works, Eltschinger demonstrates (ibid.) that these works are all unambiguously
Buddhist. It therefore seems that one should not conclude from the fact that
. .
Abhinavagupta refers to Śankaranandana as a “master” that Śankaranandana had to be
a Śaiva at that time – but rather, that the Śaiva philosophers had sufficient admiration
for their Buddhist counterparts openly to consider them as masters. (For a tentative expla-
.
nation of the fact that Śankaranandana bears a Śaiva name and is frequently designated as
a bhatta, see Eltschinger 2008, n. 11).
31 ĪPV, ˙I,˙ 178–9.
448 ISABELLE RATIÉ
being colourless, a difference between parts according to [the six] direc-

tions (digbhāgabheda), etc.
The passage lacks clarity because Abhinavagupta is assuming that the reader
is familiar with the ideas to which he alludes.32 The line of argument, typically
Buddhist, shows that however one tries to understand the external object, it
remains perfectly absurd because it cannot be accounted for rationally33 –
and because of this absurdity, one should conclude that it has no existence of
its own, but is, rather, a mental product.
The absurdity of the external object is first put forward by targeting the
Nyāya-Vaiśesika conception34 of the external object as a whole (avayavin)
different from˙ its parts (avayava). The Vaiśesikas consider that perceived objects
exist independently of consciousness. But ˙these objects can be analysed into
different elements: a cloth is made of threads, and these threads are made of
fibres, which can in turn be analysed into particles so tiny they cannot be per-
ceived. So saying that the external object is in fact nothing but the parts of
the totality we call, for instance, “cloth”, would amount to stating that in fact,
we do not perceive the cloth, but the parts of the cloth that we do not perceive!
The Vaiśesikas and Naiyāyikas therefore consider that the whole is distinct from
˙ just as real; and this whole is the object of perception.35 However, a
its parts and
32 Cf. ĪPV, I, 181: abhyuccayabādhakam cedam iti nātrāsmābhir bharah kr̥ tah. vistarena
ca prajñālankāre darśitam ācāryaśan˙karanandanena. “And we did not ˙ take˙ the trouble˙
. .
[to explain] here this [series of] additional arguments; and [these arguments] have been
.
expounded in detail by the master Śankaranandana in his Prajñālamkāra.”
33 Thus these arguments are mentioned in the commentaries on the ˙end of ĪPK I, 5, 6,
which asks: . . . kim anyena bāhyenānupapattinā // “. . . What could be the point of [pos-
tulating the existence of] another [entity], [namely] the external [object], which is not
[even] logically possible (anupapatti)?”
34 Cf. the end of the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 140), which explicitely mentions the
doctrine of the author of the Vaiśesikasūtra: evam kānādasammatam bāhyam dūsayitvā
. . . “Having thus refuted the external˙ [object as˙ it ˙is] conceived
˙ ˙ ˙
˙by the followers of
Kanāda . . .”.
35 See˙ e.g. NS II, 1, 34 (quoted by Abhinavagupta in ĪPVV, II, 130): sarvāgrahanam
avayavyasiddheh. “Nothing would be grasped, if the whole (avayavin) did ˙ not
exist”, and NBh ˙ ad loc., 75: yady avayavī nāsti sarvasya grahanam nopapadyate.
kim tat sarvam? dravyagunakarmasāmānyaviśesasamavāyāh. ˙ katham ˙ kr̥ tvā?
˙
paramān usamavasthānam tāvad˙ darśanavisayo na ˙ bhavaty atīndriyatvād ˙ ˙ anūnām.
˙
dravyāntaram ˙
cāvayavibhūtam darśanavis ˙ ayo nāsti. darśanavisayasthāś˙ ceme
˙
gunādayo dharmā gr̥ hyante. te˙ tu niradhisthānā˙ na gr̥ hyeran. gr̥ hyante ˙ tu kumbho’yam
˙
śyāma eko mahān samyuktah spandate’sti˙˙mr̥ nmayaś ceti. santi ceme gunādayo dharmā ˙
˙ āt paśyāmo’sti
iti tena sarvasya grahan ˙ dravyāntarabhūto’vayavīti. “If there˙ is no whole
(avayavin), [then] nothing˙ can be grasped. What are all [these things that cannot be
grasped]? They are: substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
With respect to what [are these things impossible to grasp if the whole does not
exist]? First of all, the state of atoms ( paramānu) cannot be the object of perception,
because atoms are beyond the scope of sense˙ organs. And [if no whole exists, the
whole being in fact nothing but its atomic parts, then] no other substance which
would consist in a whole (avayavin) can be the object of perception. And [we] grasp
these properties that are quality and so on as residing in the objects of our perceptions;
but they could not be grasped while being devoid of a substrate; and they are grasped [in
such a form] as ‘this is a pot, which is black, one, big, in contact [with something else]; it
Buddhist would immediately reply to such a contention that one can never find
such a thing as a whole existing over and above the parts that constitute it (if one
takes away all the trees of a forest, what remains of the forest?)36 – hence the
“impossibility of the existence of a whole” alluded to by Abhinavagupta.
The Vaiśesikas usually answer this kind of argument by saying that although
˙
the whole cannot be separated from its parts, it does have an existence of its
own, by virtue of a relation of inherence (samavāya) linking together entities
that are distinct and nonetheless cannot be separated from each other.37 The
Vijñānavādins in turn point out the absurd consequences to which this theory
leads: as a result, the external object must possess contradictory properties.
Abhinavagupta explains why:
avayavadharmena yady avayavī na samāviśyate, na kadācid avayavini

calatīty āvriyata˙ iti rajyata iti vā buddhir bhavet. na hy avayavasparśam
avadhūya sāksād avayavini kaścit kampāvaranarāgādīn upadadhyāt.
˙
atha samāviśyate, tad ekāvayave kampādimati yathā˙ taddharmasamāve-
śād avayavī kampādimān, tathā kampādyanāvistāvayavadharmasamāve-
śād akampādimān.38 ˙˙
If the whole were not pervaded by the property [belonging to this or that]
part [because of its inherence in the parts], the cognition “[this] is mov-
ing”, “[this] is hidden” or “[this] is coloured” could never occur. For
nobody can ascribe movement (kampa), being covered (āvarana), or col-
our (rāga), etc., to a whole directly, without taking into account˙ the contact
is moving; it exists; and it is made of clay’. And since we grasp ‘all’ [these properties],
since these properties – quality, etc. – exist, we see that the whole exists as a substance
that is distinct [from its parts].”
36 Cf. e.g. Vasubandhu’s remark in the Vr̥ tti ad Vimśatikā 11: na tāvad ekam visayo bha-
vaty avayavebhyo’nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy ˙ agrahanāt. “First of all,
˙ the˙ object is
not a unitary [entity], because one never perceives in any˙ circumstance the form of a
whole (avayavin) that would be different (anya) from [its] parts (avayava).”
37 See PDhS, p. 14: ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yah sambandha ihapratyaya-
hetuh sa samavāyah. “Inherence (samavāya) is the relation ˙ ˙between
˙ [entities] that are
˙
inseparable ˙
(ayutasiddha) [and] are [respectively] supported and supporting – [a relation]
which is the cause of the cognition [of something as being] in this [other thing].” Cf.
NBhV, p. 475: vr̥ ttir asyāvayavesv āśrayāśrayibhāvah samavāyākhyah sambandhah.
˙
sa katham bhavatīti yasya yato’nyātrātmalābhānupapattih ˙ NBvH sa ˙tatraiva
˙ vartata ˙
˙ kāranadravyebhyo’nyatra kāryadravyam ātmānam
iti. na khalu ˙ labhata iti. “The mode
of existence of this˙ [whole] in the parts is the relation between˙ [entities that are respect-
ively] supported and supporting – [i.e.], the relation called inherence (samavāya). How
does this [relation] occur? It occurs in that which cannot exist anywhere but in some [par-
ticular other entity]. [For] surely, a substance that is an effect does not exist anywhere but
in the substances that are [its] causes.” It is therefore the whole that inheres in its parts,
and not the contrary, since the whole is considered as the effect (kārya) of its parts
(cf. ibid., 474: yat tāvad avayavā avayavini vartanta iti tan na, anabhyupagamāt. na
hi kāranam kārye vartate’pi tu kārane kāryam iti. “As for the [statement that our
opponent˙ ˙ascribes to us], according to˙ which the parts exist in the whole – this is not
[true]; for [we] don’t admit [this]. For [we] do not [consider] that the cause exists in
its effect, but rather, that the effect exists in its cause”).
38 ĪPVV, II, 138–9.
450 ISABELLE RATIÉ
with the parts. But if [the Vaiśesika answers that the whole] is indeed pervaded
[by the parts’ properties], then ˙if one part only possesses [a property] such as
movement, [or being covered, or being coloured], a whole, while possessing
movement or [the other properties just mentioned] because it is pervaded
by the properties of this [particular part], nonetheless does not possess
movement, etc., because it is also pervaded by some properties belonging
to some parts to which movement and so on do not extend!
If only one part of a whole is moving, covered or coloured, the whole,

supposedly inherent in each and every part, must be both mobile and immobile,
covered and uncovered, coloured and colourless – here again, Abhinavagupta’s
explanations echo some Buddhist texts.39
Finally, when talking about “contradictory properties” necessarily belonging
to the external object, Abhinavagupta mentions “the difference between the parts
according to the [six] directions” (digbhāgabheda). His target has just shifted
from the Vaiśesikas to some Buddhists whom Abhinavagupta designates as
˙
Vaibhāsikas.40 According to them, the external objects are ultimate particles
˙
that cannot be divided, that is to say, atoms (anu, paramānu); and these
atoms, by definition partless (niravayava), are not ˙parts of a whole
˙ (avayavin)
which would have any kind of distinct independent existence. 41
In his Vimarśinī, Abhinavagupta criticizes this theory in the following way:
anusamcayabāhyavāde’pi samcayasyānyasyābhāve’nava eva, te ca yadi

˙ yujyante
sam ˙ nirantaratayā ˙tad avaśyam digbhāgabhedah
˙ ; *anyathā
˙ ˙ ˙ S2, SOAS;
devanākse [conj.: devanākse KSTS, Bhāskarī, J, L, P, S1,
˙ 42 satsu diksu ˙samcīyamānesv satsv anusu, madhyamasya
p.n.p. D]
˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
39 For instance Dharmakīrti’s PV, Pramānasiddhipariccheda, 86–7 (the passage was prob-
.
ably rephrased in Śankaranandana’s Prajñālam ˙ kāra, see above, n. 32): pānyādikampe
sarvasya kampaprāpter virodhinah / ekasmin ˙ karmano’yogāt syāt pr̥ thak˙ siddhir
anyathā // ekasya cāvr̥ tau sarvasyāvr̥ ˙ ˙ / dr̥ śyeta rakte caikasmin
tih syād anāvr̥ tau
rāgo’raktasya vā gatih // “When there is˙ a movement (kampa) of a hand for instance,
since it is contradictory ˙ that the whole [i.e. the body] may obtain movement [whereas
the other members remain immobile], there must be a separate existence [of the whole
and its parts, and not a relation of inherence between them], because otherwise, action
could not concern one [part only]. And when one [part only of the body] is covered
(āvr̥ ti), [if the whole is inherent in every part], the whole should be covered, even though
[some parts] are uncovered; and when one [part only] is coloured, one should see colour
(rāga) [everywhere in the whole], or there would be a perception [of the whole] as being
[entirely] colourless.”
40 See the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 140): evam kānādasammatam bāhyam
dūsayitvā vaibhāsikaparibhāsitam api dūsayati. “Having thus ˙ refuted
˙ ˙ external
the ˙ [object˙
as˙ it is] conceived ˙ by the followers
˙ ˙ āda, [Utpaladeva] also refutes [the external
of Kan
object as it is] expounded by the Vaibhāsikas.” ˙
41 The ĪPVV thus distinguishes the Vaiśesikas’ ˙ thesis from the Vaibhāsikas’ by saying that
according to the latter, external objects ˙are partless. See ĪPVV, II, 140,˙ immediately after
the sentence explaining the shift from the first opponents to the second (see above, n. 40):
atheti niravayavā iti. “[Utpaladeva writes:] ‘But if [the opponent considers rather that
. . .]’ – [i.e. if objects] are partless (niravayava).”
42 Here, given the meaning of the compound digbhāgabheda for Vasubandhu and the con-
sequence that, according to Abhinavagupta, follows from the supposition which he is
paramānor yatraiva dhāmny eko lagnas tatraiva yady aparas tad

˙
ekaparamān umātratā. athānyatraiko’nyatrāparas tad avaśyam
˙
bhāgabhedāpattir iti bhāga eva paramārthasan, tasyāpy esaiva saran˙ir
iti na kimcid avaśisyate bāhyam tattvatah.43 ˙ ˙
˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
And in the doctrine according to which external [objects] are aggregates
(samcaya) of atoms (anu), since there is no aggregate that would be other
than˙ [the atoms themselves],
˙ only atoms exist. And if these [atoms] are in
contact without any interval, then necessarily there must be a difference
between parts according to the [six] directions (digbhāgabheda); otherwise,
since the six atoms which are aggregated according to the six directions
form a cube, at the very place of the central atom where a second [atom]
is in contact [with this central atom], if there is a third [atom], then [they
all] have the size of a single atom! If, on the other hand, [the opponent con-
siders that] one atom is in one [place, and] another [atom], in another
[place], then necessarily there must follow a difference between the parts
[of each atom] (bhāgabheda); therefore only that part [of the so-called
atom] exists in the ultimate sense ( paramārtha), and one can make the
same reasoning as regards this [part] as well, so that no external [entity]
whatsoever remains [that would] really [exist]!
Once more, the Śaivas’ reasoning is extremely close to that developed in the
Vimśatikā, where Vasubandhu shows that the Vaibhāsikas’ conception of the exter-
nal˙ object is just as absurd as that of the Vaiśesikas.˙ In order to understand the
˙
argument, one has to imagine an atom in contact with other atoms situated accord-
ing to the six spatial directions (diś): north, south, east, west, up and down. This
means that only a part of the central atom is in contact with the atom above;
that another part of the central atom is in contact with the atom below; that a
third part is in contact with the atom in the north, etc. Vasubandhu explains that
the central atom must thus be considered to have six different “parts” (amśa) cor-
responding to the six directions; otherwise, if all the surrounding atoms˙ were in
contact with the same part of the central atom, they would all exist in the same
locus and together would be the size of a single atom – so that one could not under-
stand how aggregates of atoms could ever become perceptible, nor how the atoms
could ever be in contact with each other.44 But an atom is partless by definition,
now making (i.e. the fact that all atoms must have the size of one atom), the passage
seems to require an anyathā (“otherwise”). Bhāskarakantha thus notes that the sentence
beginning after digbhāgabhedah supposes the refusal of ˙the
˙ consequence just mentioned.
˙
See Bhāskarī, I, 224: nanu paramān ave digbhāgabhedena na tisthanti, kintv ekasya
madhyagasya sthāne lagantīty ata āha ˙ satsv iti. “[– An objector:] ˙˙ But atoms do not
exist while being differentiated into˙ ˙ parts according to the [six] directions
(digbhāgabheda)! Rather, they are in contact where the central atom is. It is because
of this [objection] that [Abhinavagupta] says: ‘the six atoms . . .’.” K. C. Pandey under-
stands the sentence in the same way, since he inserts “for, otherwise” in his translation
(without indicating that nothing in the edited Sanskrit text corresponds to these words).
43 ĪPV, I, 179–80.
44 Cf. Vimśatikā 12ab (satkena yugapadyogāt paramānoh sadamśatā / “Because of [its]
˙
simultaneous contact˙with
˙ six [other atoms], an atom ˙ must ˙ six parts (amśa)”, and
˙ ˙ ˙have
˙
452 ISABELLE RATIÉ
and the Buddhist Vaibhāsika has adopted the atomic theory so as to avoid the con-
tradictions that inevitably˙ arise when one postulates the reality of a whole made of
parts. He must, however, acknowledge that what he considers as an “ultimate
element” ( paramānu) is in fact made of parts as soon as he considers that
atoms have a spatial ˙ extension (vaitatya), for as Abhinavagupta says in his
Vivr̥ tivimarśinī, “extension is [nothing but] having a difference between parts
according to the [six] directions” (vaitatyam digbhāgabhedavattvam)45 – here
too, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are˙ only paraphrasing Vasubandhu’s
argument.46
If the Vaibhāsika admits that atoms possess different parts, since he considers
that wholes do not ˙ exist as entities distinct from their parts, he must concede that
the so-called atoms do not have any real existence insofar as they are made of
parts. It means that the central atom described by Abhinavagupta does not
exist: the only existent entities are the parts of it which are connected to other
parts of the atom. But one can repeat this reasoning as regards the parts them-
selves:47 the part of the central atom that is connected with the part of the
atom above is also extended, so that it also has parts according to the spatial
directions, and therefore it cannot be considered the ultimate element; and its
parts too can be divided, etc. In this perpetually dissolving universe, there is
nothing left to which the Vaibhāsika (who has admitted that only that which
is not made of parts exists) could ˙cling as being a genuine external entity.
the Vr̥ tti ad loc.: sadbhyo digbhyah sadbhih paramānubhir yugapadyoge sati paramānoh
sadamśatā prāpnoty ˙ ˙ ekasya yo deśas
˙ ˙ ˙ tatrānyasyāsam
˙ ˙ bhavāt. “Since there is a simul- ˙ ˙
˙taneous
˙ ˙ contact with six atoms according to the six ˙ directions (diś), the atom must
have six parts, because of the impossibility of another [atom existing] at the place of
the first [atom].” Vimśatikā 12cd emphasizes the absurd consequence that follows if
one refuses to admit˙ that the so-called atom has six parts: sannām samānadeśatvāt
pindah syād anumātrakah // “If six [atoms] have the same place, ˙ ˙ ˙ their
˙ aggregate must
˙ ˙ ˙the size ˙of a [single]
have ˙ atom”). Cf. Vr̥ tti ad loc.: atha ya evaikasya paramānor
deśah sa eva sannām. tena sarvesām samānadeśatvāt sarvah pindah paramānumātrah ˙
syāt ˙parasparāvyatirekād
˙ ˙˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ pindo dr̥ śyah syāt. naiva
iti na kaścit ˙ hi˙ ˙paramān
˙ ˙ samyu-
avah ˙
jyante niravayavatvāt. “But if [the opponent˙ ˙ replies˙ that] the same place which
˙ belongs
˙ to
one atom also belongs to the six [other atoms], then, since they all have the same place,
the whole aggregate must have the size of an atom, since they are not distinct from each
other. Therefore no aggregate should be perceptible; for atoms are not at all in contact,
since they are partless.”
45 ĪPVV, II, 140.
46 See Vimśatikā 14ab: digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvam na yujyate / “That which pos-
sesses ˙a difference between parts according to the [six] directions
˙ (digbhāgabheda) can-
not have a unity.” Cf. the Vr̥ tti ad loc.: anyo hi paramānoh pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad
adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhede sati katham tadātmakasya ˙ ˙ paramānor ekatvam
yoksyate? “To explain: since there is a difference ˙ ˙
between the part according to the
˙ directions (digbhāgabheda) – that is to say, since an atom has a part in the direc-
spatial
tion of the east, [and other parts in the directions of the south, west, north, up] and finally
down, how could the atom, which consists in these [parts], have any unity?”
47 Cf. the parallel passage in ĪPVV, II, 141: bhāga evānur iti cet, tatrāpy esaiva vārtā. “If
[the opponent answers] that it is this part [of the atom] ˙ which is the [real]˙ atom, the same
reasoning applies to this [part] as well!”
The Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ strategy to distance

their idealism from the Vijñānavāda
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus make extensive use of arguments devel-
oped by Vijñānavādins to justify their own idealism – and they make no secret
of it. But they also endeavour to distance themselves from the Vijñānavāda.
The most conspicuous difference between the two systems lies in a disagree-
ment regarding the unity of consciousness: according to the Vijñānavādins, con-
sciousness is a series (santāna) of momentary conscious events or cognitions
that remain irreducibly multiple, whereas the Pratyabhijñā philosophers agree
with the Brahmanical philosophers that consciousness has a profound unity
and continuity and that its existence transcends that of momentary cognitions.
The structure of Utpaladeva’s treatise emphasizes this difference: following an
introductory chapter, chapters I, 2 to I, 4 are devoted to the refutation of the
Buddhist conception of consciousness as a mere series of cognitions.48
However, up to that point, Utpaladeva’s criticism of Buddhism remains general
enough to concern not only the Vijñānavādins, but also a variety of externalist
Buddhist schools.
Divergence regarding the cause of phenomenal variety –

criticizing the theory of impregnations and the dream model
It is only in chapter I, 5 that Utpaladeva, after exploiting some Vijñānavādin
arguments in order to establish his idealism, endeavours to criticize the
Vijñānavāda: what he targets specifically is the Vijñānavāda’s explanation of
the fact that we are aware of an external world made of an infinite variety of
different objects, although supposedly there is no such external world.
The Vijñānavādins account for this phenomenal variety by comparing the
waking state to that of a dreamer. For according to the traditional Indian expla-
nation of dreams (svapna), the objects we perceive in our sleep are the outcome
of residual traces or impregnations (vāsanā) that have been left in the cognitive
series by previous experiences.49 Accordingly, most Indian philosophical
schools consider that when we dream, the various elements of our dreams are
in fact entities that have been experienced during some previous waking state:
dream perceptions are thus understood as memories that are not recognized as
such when occurring. In the same way, according to the Vijñānavādins, our
perceptions are nothing but the product of such a mechanism of residual traces:50
dreams become the model through which any conscious state can be
48 For an analysis of these chapters see Ratié 2006.

49 On the role played by these residual traces in memory and the disagreement between the
Buddhists and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers in this respect, see Ratié 2006, 49–56 and
59–60. On their role in dreams (and imagination), see e.g. Ratié 2010.
50 See e.g. Vimśatikā 17cd: svapne dr̥ gvisayābhāvam nāprabuddho’vagacchati // “In
˙
a dream (svapna), ˙
someone who has not awakened yet˙ does not understand the non-exist-
ence of objects of perception.” Cf. the Vr̥ tti ad loc.: evam
vitathavikalpābhyāsavāsanānidrayā prasupto lokah svapna ivābhūtam artham paśyann ˙
aprabuddhas tadabhāvam yathāvan nāvagacchati.˙ “Thus people, overcome ˙by a sleep
˙
due to impregnations (vāsanā) [in turn due to] the repetition of conceptual constructions
454 ISABELLE RATIÉ
explained.51 Accordingly, the Vijñānavāda’s explanation of phenomenal variety

is thus summarized in the Vivr̥ tivimarśinī:
vāsanānām anādikālopanatānām abhinavanīlādyābhāsotthāpanaśaktīn-

ām yo vicitrah prabodhah, sa evātra kramikābhāsavaicitrye hetutām eti
˙
prathamatah ;˙ caramam tu˙ samskārātmanām prabodho vikalpanasmaran-
ādyābhāsanāhetutām ˙etīti sam˙ bhāvayate vijñānavādī.
˙ ˙ 52 ˙
˙
There is a varied (vicitra) awakening ( prabodha) of impregnations
(vāsanā) that are [beginningless (anādi), i.e. that] do not occur for the
first time [at a particular moment], [and] that are powers (śakti)53 of bring-
ing to existence phenomena (ābhāsa) – such as blue and so on – that are
new (abhinava) [and not remembered]. It is this [varied awakening of
impregnations] that initially constitutes the cause of the variety (vaicitrya)
of phenomena that occur consecutively; and then [only], the awakening of
these [impregnations] which consist of residual traces (samskāra) becomes
˙ memories and
the cause of manifestation [in such cognitions as] concepts,
so on. Such is the hypothesis formulated by the Vijñānavādin.
that are erroneous, perceiving, as in a dream (svapna), an object that [in fact] does not
exist, do not understand as they should the non-existence of this [object] as long as
.
they have not awakened.” Cf. e.g. PV, Pratyaksapariccheda, 336 (kasyacit kincid
˙
evāntarvāsanāyāh prabodhakam / tato dhiyām viniyamo na bāhyārthavyapeksayā // “It
˙
is only a certain [cognition] ˙
that awakens a certain impregnation (vāsanā) inside˙ [the cog-
nitive series]; there is a restriction (viniyama) of cognitions [to their particular respective
object] thanks to this, and not with respect to any external object”), and PVV ad loc.,
331: tatra vāsanāyāh sāmartham svapnādāv upalabdham, na tu bāhyasya
˙
nityaparoksatvāt. “As regards ˙
the [question: ‘what determines the particular objective
˙
aspect affecting a given cognition?’, we answer that] it is the power of impregnation
that [we] experience in such [states] as dreams (svapna) – and not the external [object],
because it is forever imperceptible.”
51 Brahmanical texts also insist on the importance of this dream model in the
Vijñānavādins’ discourse. See NS IV, 2, 31: svapnavisayābhimānavad ayam
pramānaprameyābhimānah. “[– A Vijñānavādin:] This belief ˙in the means and object ˙
˙
of knowledge ˙
( pramānaprameya) [of the waking state] is just as the belief in the objects
of dreams (svapna).” ˙Cf. NSBh, p. 273: yathā svapne na visayāh santy atha cābhimāno
bhavati, evam na pramānāni prameyāni ca santy atha ca pramān ˙ ˙aprameyābhimāno bha-
vati. “Just as,˙ in a dream,˙ objects do ˙not exist, and yet, there is˙ a belief (abhimāna) [in
them], in the same way, means and objects of knowledge do not exist, and yet, there is a
belief in these means of knowledge and objects of knowledge.” Cf. ŚV,
Nirālambanavāda, 23: stambhādipratyayo mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yah / pratyayah
sa mr̥ sā dr̥ stah svapnādipratyayo yathā // “[– A Vijñānavādin:] The cognition ˙ ˙
of [any
object]˙ such˙˙ as
˙ a pole is false, because it is a cognition; for [we] see that cognition is
illusory – for instance, the cognition of dream (svapna), etc.” As J. Taber has observed,
the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāmsakas thus tend to present this dr̥ stānta not as an analogy
illustrating a hypothesis that ˙ the Vijñānavādins would then endeavour
˙˙ to demonstrate
(for instance through the arguments mentioned in the first part of the present article),
but as a mere example illegitimately used as an inferential reason, which enables them
to consider that in the Vijñānavādin’s reasoning, “there is no demonstration, due to
the absence of reason” (hetvabhāvād asiddhih, NS, III, 2, 33; cf. Taber 1994, 28–31).
52 ĪPVV, II, 92. ˙
53 On this definition of impregnations as śaktis in Buddhist texts, see e.g. Eltschinger forth-
coming B, I, n. 53. Cf. ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 17, and NR ad loc., p. 194, quoted below, n. 55.
Even an externalist admits that memory (smr̥ ti) does not require the presence
of an external object corresponding to the cognition’s object; for according to a
widely accepted theory among Indian philosophical schools, a memory occurs
simply because a past experience has left a residual trace (samskāra) that,
when stimulated (literally, when “awakened”, prabodhita) by some˙ external fac-
tor, triggers the return to consciousness of the past manifestation. One can there-
fore assume that perception in general happens in the same way: since residual
traces can account for the objects of memories, they can also account for objects
of experiences that appear to us as new. And this mechanism is “beginningless”
(anādi)54 – it would therefore be useless to look for some original object that
would not be a mere aspect of consciousness determined by an impregnation.
Thus there is no need to assume the existence of an external object to explain
the variety of aspects taken on by cognitions: cognitions and impregnations
are mutually causes, and this circular causality is not a logical defect, precisely
because the process is beginningless.55
In order to refute this theory, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adopt a strategy
often used by Indian philosophers when they want to get rid of two opponents
at the same time: they have these two opponents refute each other. The
Pratyabhijñā texts therefore show, quite amusingly, two Buddhists arguing
against each other – a Vijñānavādin and a Sautrāntika. The Vijñānavādin refutes
54 For another Śaiva description of this theory, see PSV, 27, 59: vijñānam iti bodhamātram
eva kevalam anupādhi, nāmarūparahitam apy anādivāsanāprabodhavaicitryasā-
marthyān nīlasukhādirūpam bāhyarūpatayā nānā prakāśata iti vijñānavādinah. “The
Vijñānavādins [consider] ˙that ‘consciousness’ (vijñāna), [i.e.] a pure consciousness˙
(bodhamātra) with no relation [to anything else] (kevala) [and] devoid of particularities
(upādhi), appears in various ways (nānā) in the form of external [objects], because
although it is devoid of names-and-forms (nāmarūpa), it takes the [diverse] forms [of
various objects] such as ‘blue’, ‘pleasure’, etc., thanks to the power [inherent in] the var-
iety of the awakening of impregnations that are beginningless (anādivāsanāprabodha).”
55 Cf. the Vijñānavādin’s speech in ŚV, Śūnyavāda, 15–17: matpakse yady api svaccho
jñānātmā paramārthatah / tathāpy anādau samsāre pūrvajñānaprasūtibhih ˙ // citrābhiś
citrahetutvād vāsanābhir ˙ upaplavāt / svānurūpyen˙ a nīlādi grāhyagrāhakarūs ˙ itam // pra-
vibhaktam ivotpannam nānyam artham apeksate ˙ / anyonyahetutā caiva jñānaśaktyor
˙
anādikā // “According ˙ to my doctrine, although
˙ the essence of cognition is in fact
pure, nonetheless, in the endless (anādi) cycle of rebirths, because of a confusion due
to the impregnations (vāsanā) that were born from previous cognitions [and] that are var-
ied (citra), because they have causes that are [themselves] varied, the blue or [any other
objective aspect taken on by the cognition,] stained by [the distinction between] the
apprehended [object] and the apprehending [subject], arises while being seemingly dif-
ferentiated in conformity [with its cause]; it does not require any other object [that would
be external to the cognition]. And this relation of mutual causality (anyonyahetutā)
between the cognition and the power (śakti) [that constitutes the impregnation] is
beginningless (anādika).” Cf. NR ad loc., p. 194: śaktir iti vāsanocyata iti. ekayā
vāsanayaikam jñānam janyate, tenāpy anyā vāsanā, tayāpy anyaj jñānam iti
˙
netaretarāśrayam. na˙ ca sarvādyasya katham siddhir iti vaktavyam, anāditvāt
samsārasyeti. “‘Power’ means ‘impregnation (vāsanā)’ ˙ [here]. A cognition arises from
an˙ impregnation; from this [cognition] arises another impregnation, [and] from this
[other impregnation,] another cognition, [etc.]; therefore there is no logical circle
(itaretarāśraya). And one does not have to ask how the very first (sarvādya) [element
of this series] arises, because the ‘cycle of rebirths’ is ‘endless’ (anādi).”
456 ISABELLE RATIÉ
the Sautrāntika’s externalism (with the arguments already mentioned),56 but the
Sautrāntika refutes the Vijñānavādin’s way of accounting for the appearance of
an external world.
Thus in his verses, Utpaladeva presents the Sautrāntika’s criticism of the
Vijñānavādin’s theory of impregnations in the following way:
na vāsanāprabodho’tra vicitro hetutām iyāt /

tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kim nibandhanam // 57
˙
The varied (vicitra) awakening of impregnations (vāsanā) cannot be the
cause of this [phenomenal variety; for] what would be the cause, in
turn, of the variety of these [impregnations’] awakening?
Abhinavagupta, while explaining the verse, has the Sautrāntika begin by noti-
cing that in the case under investigation, it is not memory that must be explained,
but perception:
smr̥ tijanakah samskāro vāsaneti tāvat prasiddham, iha tv anubhavavaici-

˙ ˙ anīyo vartate.58
trye hetuh paryes
˙ ˙ ˙
First of all, it is well known that the residual trace (samskāra), which is an
impregnation (vāsanā), produces memories; but in the ˙case at hand, it is the
cause of the variety of experience that is the object of [our] investigation!
Residual traces may account for memory; however, the Vijñānavādin’s

assumption of an impregnation that would also explain experience is perfectly
gratuitous, because residual traces are indeed generally considered as the
cause of memory, but not of all experiences.59
The Sautrāntika goes on, and this time, he strikes harder:
astu vā nīlādyābhāsasampādanasāmarthyarūpā jñānasya yogyatātmikā

śaktir vāsanā, tasyāś ca ˙ svakāryasampādanaunmukhyam prabodhah,
tato bodhesv ābhāsavaicitryam iti. ˙ tatrāpi tu brūmah ˙ : yady apy ˙
ābhāsānām ˙ jñānāntarvartinām apāramārthikam ˙
samvr̥ tisattvam
˙
ucyetāpi, tathāpi
.
yad esām kāranam tad vastusad evāngīkāryam ˙ avastunas
˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
sarvasāmarthyavirahitālaksanasya kāryasampādanaprānitasāmarthyātm-
akasvabhāvānupapatteh. evam ˙ ˙ sthite yā etā˙ vāsanā ābhāsakāran
˙ atvenes-
˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
56 In fact the Pratyabhijñā philosophers claim to refute the Sautrāntikas’ view even better
than the Vijñānavādins do, but examining this long passage is beyond the scope of
this article (see Ratié forthcoming).
57 ĪPK I, 5, 5.
58 ĪPV, I, 167.
59 Cf. ĪPVV, II, 93: *vāsanā smr̥ tijanakah [corr.: vāsanāsmr̥ tijanakah KSTS] samskārah
prasiddho na tv apūrvānubhavaprasādhaka ˙ iti. “The residual trace˙ (samskāra),
˙ which˙
is an impregnation (vāsanā), is well known as that which produces memories, ˙ but not
as that which produces a new experience.” This criticism is formulated in various
Brahmanical sources (see e.g. ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 181ab: samvittyā jāyamānā hi
smr̥ timātram karoty asau // “For this [impregnation (vāsanā)] which˙ arises from a cogni-
˙ only a memory!”).
tion produces
yante, tāsām bodhād yadi bhinnam rūpam, tac ca paramārthasat, tad

˙
ayam śabdāntarapracchanno ˙
bāhyārthavādaprakāra eva. atha samvr̥ tisat,
˙
tarhi tena rūpena kāranatānupapattih.60 ˙
˙ ˙ ˙
But let us admit [for a moment, as the Vijñānavādin does,] that the impreg-
nation is [indeed] a śakti, that is to say, a power consisting in a capacity of
consciousness to bring about [various] phenomena such as the blue; and
that the “awakening” ( prabodha) of this [impregnation] is the fact that
it undertakes to bring about its effect; and that the phenomenal variety
in cognitions comes from it. But even if it is so, we [externalists] answer:
even if the [Vijñānavādin] also explains that phenomena, which occur
[only] inside cognitions, have a reality only in a relative sense (samvr̥ ti-
sattva), and not in an absolute sense ( pāramārthika), [he] still has ˙ to
admit that their cause necessarily exists as a real entity (vastu), because
it is impossible that that which is not a real entity – and is [therefore]
characterized by the absence of any power – may have a nature consisting
in a power the essence of which would be to produce an effect! Since it is
so, if these impregnations that [the Vijñānavādin] considers as the cause of
phenomena have a nature distinct from consciousness, and [if as a conse-
quence,] this [nature of impregnations] exists in the absolute sense
( paramārthasat), then [the Vijñānavāda] is nothing but a variety of extern-
alism (bāhyārthavāda) disguised under a different name. But [if the
Vijñānavādin had rather consider that the nature of impregnations] exists
only in a relative sense (samvr̥ ttisat), then [impregnations] cannot be
˙
causes in this form [which exists only in a relative sense].
According to the Vijñānavādin, the objects of our perceptions are not entities
that would exist independently of consciousness but aspects of it, so that they
only have an “existence in a relative sense” (samvr̥ tisattva). But then how should
we apply this distinction between relative and ˙ absolute reality to the impreg-
nation itself? Whether phenomena exist in an absolute sense or not, they must
have a real cause. Therefore impregnations, insofar as they must cause the
phenomenal variety, must exist in an absolute sense – that is, independently
of consciousness. But then the Vijñānavāda is nothing but a “disguised” ( prac-
channa) externalism, since in order to explain phenomena, it must acknowledge
the existence of entities outside of consciousness. If, on the other hand, the
Vijñānavādin considers that these impregnations only have a relative reality,
he cannot maintain that they are causes, for only a real entity can produce
any effect;61 and even if he contends that while having no independent
60 ĪPV, I, 167–8.
61 Admittedly, the Vijñānavādin could reply that unreal causes sometimes have a real effect.
Thus Vasubandhu shows, in his Vimśatikā, that even dream objects have an efficiency
(see the beginning of Vimśatikā 4:˙ svapnopaghātavat kr̥ tyakriyā. “The efficiency [of
˙ outside of consciousness is established], as in the case of
an object that does not exist
the [sperm] emission [caused by] a dream”, and the Vr̥ tti ad loc.: siddheti veditavyam.
yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim antarena śukravisargalaksanah svapnopaghātah. “One
must understand [the verse by supplying:˙ ˙ ˙ ‘is˙ established’. Thus,
the efficiency] ˙ for
instance, in a dream, [although] there is no union of a couple [outside of consciousness],
458 ISABELLE RATIÉ
existence, these impregnations are indeed real insofar as they are ultimately
nothing but consciousness, then they are real only insofar as they are absolutely
undifferentiated, since this is the nature of consciousness according to the
Vijñānavādin. Therefore their variety cannot be real, so that they cannot be
the causes of phenomenal variety:
atha yena rūpenāsām pāramārthikatā tena kāranatā, tat tarhi

jñānamātram tac ˙cābhinnam
˙ ˙
iti nīlādyābhāsarūpasya kāryabhedasyāsid-
˙
dhih. evam vāsanānām avicitratve tatprabodho vicitra iti kā pratyāśā?62
˙ ˙
But if [the Vijñānavādin answers that] the form in which the [impregnations]
are real in the absolute sense is [precisely] the [form] in which they are
causes, then this form is nothing but consciousness ( jñānamātra) – and
this [pure consciousness] is undifferentiated (abhinna). Therefore [the
impregnations] cannot justify the existence of the differentiation which
they [supposedly] produce in the form of phenomena such as blue, etc.
Since thus, there is no variety of the impregnations [themselves], how
could we expect their awakening [too] to be varied?
So what does the Vijñānavādin mean when he says that the cause of phenom-
enal variety is the “varied awakening” of impregnations? If he means the awa-
kening of varied impregnations, such an awakening is impossible, because
impregnations are nothing but consciousness, which is undifferentiated. But if
he means that the impregnations are awakened by various causes, he must con-
front yet another highly problematic consequence:
bhavantu vā vāsanā bhinnāh; *tathāpi tu [J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: tathāpi

KSTS, Bhāskarī, L; p.n.p. ˙D] bodhamātrātiriktasya deśakālabhāvādeh
prabodhakābhimatasya vicitrasya kāranasyābhāvāt prabodho’vicitra ity ˙
˙
eka eva prabodha iti samam eva nīlādivaicitryam bhāseta. atha
svasantānavartīni bodhāntarāni vicitrāni prabodhakāran ˙ ānīti, tad asat,
˙ ˙ ˙
sukhaduhkhanīlapītādipūrvāparādideśakālabhedasya vijñānamātrarūpatve
˙
vijñānasya ca prakāśamātraparamārthatāyām svarūpabhedāsambhave
bodhavailaksanyānupapatteh.63 ˙ ˙
˙ ˙ ˙
But let us admit [for a moment] that there are indeed differentiated impreg-
nations. However, even if it is the case, since there is no varied cause that
would be something over and above pure consciousness (bodhamātra),
that would exist in a [particular] place and time, etc., [and] that could
be considered as that which awakens [these impregnations], the awakening
( prabodha) [of these impregnations must be] devoid of variety. Therefore
there is nonetheless an ‘emission [caused by the] dream’ – that is, a sperm emission”).
However, this kind of argument would hardly be of any use here, since in
Vasubandhu’s example, the dreamt union, although unreal in the ultimate sense, has
an effect insofar as the dreamer is conscious of it; whereas residual traces supposedly
have an effect on the cognitive series while remaining unconscious.
62 ĪPV, I, 168.
63 ĪPV, I, 168–9.
there must be a single awakening [of all these impregnations]; so the variety of
blue and [all the other phenomena] should be manifest only simultaneously,
[and not according to a particular spatial and temporal order]. And if [the
Vijñānavādin were to explain] that the varied causes that awaken [the impreg-
nations] are other cognitions that occur in the same series [of cognitions, we
would answer:] this is not the case, because there cannot be any difference
between the cognitions, since this difference – [such as] a place and a time
that are anterior or posterior, etc., or pleasure and pain, blue and yellow, etc.
– must consist of nothing but consciousness vijñānamātra), and since con-
sciousness cannot bear differences in its nature, insofar as its reality in the absol-
ute sense amounts to a pure manifestation ( prakāśamātra).
Even if we admit the existence of various impregnations, since nothing exists

apart from them and an undifferentiated consciousness, the cause of their awa-
kening cannot be diverse, which means that all impregnations should be awa-
kened by one and the same cognition. But if it is so, this single cognition
should stimulate all impregnations simultaneously, so that all phenomena should
arise simultaneously: one single cognition should be followed by an infinite
number of different cognitions arising at the same time.
The Vijñānavādin could answer that the impregnations are awakened by
the various causes constituted by the different cognitions – but since consciousness
is undifferentiated, one does not see how cognitions could differ from each other,
unless they have been differentiated by the impregnations. Of course, for the
Vijñānavādin, this is not a problem, because according to him, the mechanism
of impregnations is “beginningless” (anādi): the present cognition of blue (C1)
is the outcome of the impregnation of blue (I1) which is the outcome of a past cog-
nition of blue (C2) which is the outcome of an impregnation of blue (I2) – and so
on, ad infinitum. However, for this explanation to be valid, the variety of impreg-
nations must be real: the awakening of impregnations can have varied causes only
if the impregnations themselves are varied. But the externalist has already shown
that the Vijñānavādin has retreated into an impossible alternative: either the
impregnations do not exist independently of consciousness – and then they must
be undifferentiated; or they do exist independently of consciousness – but then
the Vijñānavādin is just another externalist, because he acknowledges the existence
of external objects which he calls impregnations.
The Sautrāntika thus undermines the Vijñānavādins’ explanation of our
awareness of the universe by showing that these mysterious impregnations
have a particularly ambiguous status: they are nothing but consciousness –
and yet we are not conscious of them; and they are nothing but consciousness –
and yet they are more than consciousness, since they comprise a variety that
remains alien to consciousness. He concludes that “thus, the varied impreg-
nations [invoked by the Vijñānavādins as the causes of phenomenal variety],
as well as the varied causes of their awakening, are strictly impossible”,64 and the
64 ĪPV, I, 175: evam vāsanānām tadudbodhahetūnām ca vicitrānām anupapattir eva.

˙
Between the last passage ˙ ĪPV quoted above and
of the ˙ this conclusion,
˙ Abhinavagupta
develops a long discussion on the problem of the other subjects’ existence in the
Vijñānavāda (see Ratié 2007).
460 ISABELLE RATIÉ
strategy he has adopted to achieve this conclusion is similar to that of Brahmanical

externalists belonging to the Mīmāmsā65 or the Nyāya66 – having exploited
Buddhist idealistic arguments in order ˙ to establish their own idealism, the
Pratyabhijñā philosophers exploit just as conspicuously some externalist arguments,
whether Buddhist or Brahmanical, in order to refute the Vijñānavāda.
Putting forward another model: the yogin’s creation

But Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are not contented just with rejecting the
vāsanā-theory (and therefore the dream model that it entails) in the guise of a
Sautrāntika; they also suggest another model for their own idealism.
Utpaladeva presents it as follows:
cidātmaiva hi devo’ntahsthitam icchāvaśād bahih /

˙
yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet // 67 ˙
˙
For the Lord (deva), who consists of nothing but consciousness, must
manifest externally the totality of objects which is [actually] internal [to
him] by virtue of his free will (icchā), without any material cause
(nirupādāna), just as a yogin.
65 Thus Kumārila too insists that in the Vijñānavāda, there can be no cause of the universe’s
variety. See ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, 178–9: na cāsti vāsanābhedo nimittāsambhavāt tava
/ jñānabhedo nimittam cet, tasya bhedah katham punah // vāsanābhedataś cet syāt,
prāptam anyonyasam˙śrayam / svacchasya ˙ jñānarūpasya
˙ ˙ na hi bhedah svato’sti te //
˙
“And there is no difference ˙
between impregnations, because for you [Vijñānavādins],
there can be no cause [of this difference]. If [you answer] that the cause [of this differ-
ence] is the difference between cognitions, how is this difference itself possible? If [you
answer] that it must come from the difference between impregnations, you will obtain a
logical circle; for according to you, the form of cognition, which is pure (svaccha), does
not have any difference in itself.” Kumārila also notes that if nothing exists outside of
consciousness, the impregnations too must have only a “reality in a relative sense”
(samvr̥ tisatya), but that no effect can arise from an unreal cause. See ibid., 198cd–
˙
199ab: tasmāt samvr̥ tisatyaisā kalpitā nāsti tattvatah // na cedr̥ śena bhāvena kāryam
utpadyate kvacit /˙ “Therefore ˙ this [impregnation] has ˙ a reality only in a relative sense
(samvr̥ tisatya), it is mentally constructed (kalpita) – it does not exist in reality. But no
˙ is ever produced by such a [non-existent] entity!”
effect
66 See e.g. Jayanta Bhatta’s criticism (that Abhinavagupta sometimes seems to be para-
phrasing) in NM (II, ˙˙ 511): yac coktam vāsanābheda eva jñānavaicitryakāranam
itaretarakāryakāranabhāvaprabandhaś ˙ca bījānkuravad anādir *jñānavāsanayor ˙
.
˙
[corr.: jñānayāsanayor] iti tad apy aghatamānam. keyam vāsanā nāma? jñānād
˙
avyatiriktā cet sāpi svaccharūpatvān na jñānakālus yakāran˙am bhavet. jñānavyatiriktā
ced vāsanā tadvaicitryahetuś ca so’rtha eva paryāyāntaren˙ ˙ oktah
˙ syāt. “And what [the
Vijñānavādin] says, namely: ‘it is the difference (bheda) ˙ ˙
between impregnations
(vāsanā) which is the cause of cognitions’ diversity (vaicitrya), and this series [which
consists of] a mutual relation of cause and effect (itaretarakāryakāranabhāva) of the
cognition and impregnation is beginningless (anādi), as [that] of the seed ˙ and sprout’
– that too is inconsistent. [For] what is this so-called impregnation? If [the
Vijñānavādin considers] that it is not distinct (avyatirikta) of the cognition, because its
nature is pure (svaccha), it cannot be the cause of the cognition’s stain either. [But] if
[the Vijñānavādin prefers to consider] that the impregnation is distinct (vyatirikta)
from the cognition, and that it is the cause of the [cognition’s] variety, it must be the
[external] object itself that he is referring to under a different name!”
67 ĪPK I, 5, 7.
According to a belief shared by many Indian philosophical schools, some

accomplished yogins are capable of creating at will a variety of objects that,
while being the mere product of their consciousness, become perceptible to ordin-
ary people: their imaginary creations instantly materialize, so that they are able to
show entire cities or armies to an audience without using any material trick.68
Whether or not the Vijñānavādins themselves have used such an image to give
an idea of their idealism, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta present this model of
the creating yogin as their own, in contrast to the Vijñānavādins’ dream model.69
Abhinavagupta explains thus this new analogy:
tatra yogisamvida eva sā tādr̥ śī śaktir yad ābhāsavaicitryarūpam

˙
arthajātam prakāśayatīti. tad asti sambhavah: yat samvid evābhyupaga-
˙ ˙
tasvātantryāpratīghātalaksanād icchāviśes ˙
avaśāt ˙ vido’nadhikātmat-
sam
˙ ˙ ˙
āyā anapāyād antahsthitam eva sad bhāvajātam idam ˙ ity evam prāna-
˙ ˙
buddhidehāder vitīrnakiyanmātrasamvidrūpād bāhyatvena ābhāsayatīti. ˙
˙ ˙
tad iha viśvarūpābhāsavaicitrye cidātmana eva svātantryam kim nābhyu-
pagamyate? svasamvedanasiddham; kim iti hetvantaraparyes ˙ anāprayāsena
˙
˙ ˙ ˙
khidyate? evakārenedam āha: sarvena tāvad vādinā visayavyavasthā-
˙ ˙ ˙
68 Cf. ĪPV, I, 182–3: iha tāvat svapnasmaranamanorājyasamkalpādisu

nīlādyābhāsavaicitryam bāhyasamarpakahetuvyatirekenaiva nirbhāsata ˙ ˙ apy asti
iti yady ˙
sambhavas tathāpi˙ tadābhāsavaicitryam asthairyāt ˙ sarvapramātrasādhāranyāt
˙
pūrvānubhavasam
.
skārajatvasambhāvanād avastv iti śankyeta; yat punar idam yoginām ˙
˙ ˙
icchāmātrena purasenādivaicitryanirmān am dr̥ stam, tatropādānam prasiddhamr̥˙ -
˙
tkāsthaśukraśon itādivaicitryamayam na sam ˙ bhavaty
˙ ˙˙ eva. “In this world,˙ indeed, although
one˙˙can assume˙ that in a dream (svapna),
˙ in a˙ memory (smr̥ ti) or in an imaginary construction
(manorājyasamkalpa), etc., the variety of phenomena such as blue, etc., is manifest
whereas there˙ is no external cause responsible [for this manifestation], nonetheless,
one might object that the variety of these phenomena is not real (avastu), because it
does not last, because it is not shared by all subjects, [and] because one could assume
that it arises from a residual trace (samskāra) [left] by a previous experience. But in
the case of the yogins’ creation of a ˙variety such as a city, an army, etc., which is
seen [by everybody and] is due to the yogins’ sole will (icchā), there is absolutely no
room for the supposition that [there might be] a material cause (upādāna) [of this variety]
which would [itself] consist of a variety, such as clay, wood, sperm, blood and so on,
which are well known [material causes].”
69 At least in the Pratyabhijñā texts. Elsewhere, Abhinavagupta occasionally makes use of the
dream model; see e.g. PS, 48: mayy eva bhāti viśvam darpana iva nirmale ghatādīni /
mattah prasarati sarvam svapnavicitratvam iva suptāt ˙ // “It ˙is in me that the universe
˙
˙ just as [objects]
appears, ˙ such as a pot [appear] in a stainless mirror; it is from me that
the universe springs, just as the variety (vicitratva) of dreams (svapna) [springs] from
sleep.” Cf. Yogarāja’s gloss, PSV, 99: yathā nidritāt pramātuh svapnāvasthāyām
˙
bāhyapadārthābhāve’pi puraprākāradevagr̥ hādi nānāścaryam svapnapadārthavaicitryam ˙
avidyādiparikalpitakāranāntarābhāvāt svasamvidupādānam˙ eva prasarati, tathaiva
tīrthāntaraniyamitakāran ˙ āntarānupapatter anavacchinnacidānandaikaghanād
˙ aham iti
rūpād viśvam iti. “Just as ˙ in the dreaming state, although there is no external object, the var-
iety of the dream objects – [i.e.] a variegated wonder comprising cities, walls, temples and so
on – springs from the sleeping subject while having as its only material cause (upādāna)
self-consciousness, because no other cause – such as nescience (avidyā) for instance –
can be imagined [for this varied manifestation]; in exactly the same way, the universe
[springs] from the ‘I’ (aham) form which is an undivided mass of unlimited consciousness
and bliss, because the other causes [of the universe] determined by other schools of thought
are impossible.”
462 ISABELLE RATIÉ
panam70 samvidrūpam anapahnavanīyam ādisiddham hi tad iti uktam.

tasya˙ ca svātantryam
˙ ˙
eva devaśabdanirdistam cidrūpatvam, iti kim
aparakāranānvesanavyasanitayā? 71 ˙ ˙ ˙
˙ ˙ ˙
In this case [of the yogin’s creation], the power (śakti) of the sole conscious-
ness of the yogin is such that it manifests a group of objects consisting of a
variety of phenomena. Therefore here is the hypothesis [that one might for-
mulate by analogy]: it is consciousness alone, provided that its freedom
(svātantrya) is acknowledged, that manifests the totality of objects by virtue
of a particular will (icchā) characterized by a [total] lack of hindrance – [and
these objects] exist only [insofar as] they reside within [consciousness],
because [they] do not lose their absolute identity (anadhikātmatā) with con-
sciousness [even when they are thus manifested. Consciousness manifests
them] in the form “this” (idam) – [i.e.] as being external to the vital breath,
the intellect, the body and [the void with which the limited subjects identify,
and] which [therefore] consist of a consciousness limited to its particular
[object] (vitīrnakiyanmātra).72 This freedom of that which is “nothing but
consciousness” ˙ with respect to the variety of phenomena forming the uni-
verse, why don’t [you] admit it? [For] it is established through [mere] self-
consciousness; what is the point of getting exhausted in an effort to seek
another cause [of this phenomenal variety]? This is what [Utpaladeva]
expresses with the particle eva [in “the Lord, who consists of nothing but con-
sciousness”]; for [we] have [already] said that obviously, no protagonist in a
philosophical dialog (vādin) can deny that the act establishing the object’s
existence (visayavyavasthāpana) is consciousness, since it is always already
˙
established (ādisiddha). And consisting in consciousness is nothing but the
freedom of this [act – a freedom] indicated by the word “Lord” (deva); so
what is the point of this evil passion (vyasanitā) for seeking another cause
[of phenomenal variety]?
According to the dream model, the diversity of appearances that constitute the
world can be attributed to a mechanism of residual traces over which conscious-
ness has no control. By way of contrast, for the Pratyabhijñā philosophers, the
variety of the universe is not the outcome of an unconscious and impersonal
70 It seems to me that given the context, one should keep the KSTS reading (also found in
the Bhāskarī edition and in the consulted manuscripts J, L, P and S1) in spite of the fact
that the parallel passage in the ĪPVV (II, 144–5) and two consulted manuscripts (P and
S2) have the reading visayavyavasthāsthānam. This latter reading could be the result of
the omission of -pa- (cf.˙ the SOAS manuscript ˙ reading: visayavyavasthānam) and of a
dittography of -sthā. ˙ ˙
71 ĪPV, I, 184–5.
72 vitīrnakiyanmātra- literally means “extended to that much only”, so that one may under-
stand˙ that the subjects identifying with these objective entities (vital breath, intellect and
so on) are strictly limited to these objects; but it also designates a trifle, a quasi non-
existent entity. Bhāskarakantha considers that one must understand both meanings
here; cf. Bhāskarī, I, 228: ˙˙ kiyanmātram – svavisayagrahanamātrasamartham
leśarūpam, samvidrūpam yasya tādr̥ śāt. “‘[Which consist ˙ of a consciousness
˙ ˙
limited]
to that only’, ˙[i.e.] which
˙ consists of a consciousness that takes the form of a trifle
(leśa), capable only of apprehending its own object.”
mechanism – the sovereign freedom (svātantrya) of consciousness or its free

will (icchā) is the only cause for this diversity, just as a yogin supposedly creates
by virtue of his free will and without depending on any external cause. Thus
according to Abhinavagupta, the choice of the term “Lord” (deva) to designate
consciousness, combined with the particle eva, expresses consciousness’s essen-
tial and self-evident freedom. Using that particle enables Utpaladeva to insist
that the Lord is “nothing but” consciousness, and according to a semantic analy-
sis traditional in the Trika,73 the term deva, since it means he who “plays”
(krīdati)74 as well as he who “wants to dominate” (vijigīsate),75 expresses first
and˙ foremost freedom.76 So Abhinagupta considers that ˙ saying “the Lord,
who consists of nothing but consciousness” is the same as arguing that freedom
and consciousness are one and the same thing. And by alluding thus to this
semantic analysis of the term deva, he reminds us in passing of Utpaladeva’s
understanding of freedom as the power to create without being determined to
do so by any external cause – nor even by any internal lack or need still directed
towards some external reality – in a perfectly autonomous way; for playing
(krīdā) is this perfectly autonomous activity that has no goal beside itself.77
˙
73 See Kahrs 1998, 70.

74 See TĀV, I, 144: krīdeti dīvyati [corr. Isaacson, cf. Kahrs 1998, 70, n. 43: devyati KSTS]
˙
krīdatīti devah. “[Abhinavagupta mentions his] ‘play’ (krīdā) because the Lord (deva) is
he˙who ‘plays’ ˙ (dīvyati = krīdati).” The word deva is thus analysed
˙ as a transformation of
the root ‑div, “to play”. Cf. ˙ Bhāskarī, I, 229: devo hi krīdāśīla ucyate krīdaiva ca
svātantryam. “For he who has playing (krīdā) as his natural ˙ activity is called˙ deva,
and freedom is nothing but playing.” ˙
75 See TĀV, I, 145: dīvyati vijigīsata iti devah. “The Lord (deva) is he who ‘wants to dom-
inate’ (dīvyati = vijigīsate).” ˙ ˙
76 Cf. the famous semantic ˙ analysis (nirvacana) of the term deva in TĀ 1, 101:
heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanam / krīdā sarvotkarsena vartanecchā
tathā svatantratvam // “[Because the deva ‘plays’, his activity] ˙ ˙ ˙
is an outpouring, in the
absence of all the fictions regarding what must [supposedly] be avoided or sought, as an undi-
vided mass of one’s own bliss – [i.e.], a play (krīdā); [and because he ‘wants to dominate’,
˙
dīvyati = vijigīsate, he has] a will (icchā) to exist while exerting his domination on everything
˙
– and thus, freedom (svatantratva).”
77 Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 229: ata eva yadi kaścid bruyāt kim artham bhāvanirmāna īśvarah
pravr̥ tta iti tasyānenaiva mukhamudrā jāyate. na hi krīdāśīlasya ˙ ˙
paryanuyogyogo ˙
yuktah. “For this reason, if someone asked: ‘why does the˙ Lord undertake to create
˙
objective entities?’, he would be reduced to silence by this very [statement]; for [his]
question does not apply as regards someone whose natural activity is playing (krīdā).”
Jayaratha, while commenting on TĀ 1, 101 (see n. 76), explains (TĀV, 144) that ˙ the
deva is an outpouring, “in the absence of all the fictions regarding what must [suppo-
sedly] be avoided or sought” (heyopādeyakathāvirahe) because “his playing (krīdā) is
nothing but [an outpouring, i.e.] the act of shining forth as taking the form of the ˙entire
universe from [the ontological category of] Śiva down to [that of] the earth”
(śivādiksityantāśesaviśvātmanollāsanam evāsya krīdā), but also because “as far as he
˙
is concerned, the˙ motive (nimitta) is not something ˙ over and above playing (krīdā);
this is what [Abhinavagupta] expresses with the [passage] beginning with heya.˙ . .”
(na cātra krīdātiriktam nimittam ity āha heyetyādinā). The creation of consciousness
˙ product
is thus the mere ˙ of consciousness’s blissful awareness of its own fullness. Cf.
ibid., 144–5: na hi kimcid upādātum hātum vā jagatsargādāv īśvarah pravartate, ata
eva svānandaghanatvam ˙ evātra hetur ˙ upāttah˙ , ata eva cāsya svatantratvam
˙ eva. “In
the emission of the universe as in [the other cosmic ˙ activities of maintaining and destroy-
ing the world, concealing reality and bestowing grace], the Lord does not undertake to
464 ISABELLE RATIÉ
This freedom constitutes the crux of the divergence between the Vijñānavāda
and the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism, as Abhinavagupta had already pointed out in
the Vivr̥ tivimarśinī while commenting on some previous verse:
etac ca sākāraksanikajñānasantānanaye vaksyamānanītyā vāsanāsamar-

thanānirvahanād ˙ ˙ anupapannam sarvānubhavāntarmukhaikasvatantra-
˙ ˙
˙
samviddarśane tūpapannam. 78 ˙
˙
And in the doctrine according to which a series of momentary cognitions
takes on various aspects, according to a reasoning which [we] are going to
explain, this [phenomenal diversity] is not rationally possible, because of
the impossibility of impregnations exerting any power; whereas it is poss-
ible in the doctrine [according to which] consciousness is turned inwards
in all experiences,79 one, and free (svatantra).
Perception or the freedom to be passive

Of course, this is a highly paradoxical statement; because when we perceive,
we do not experience freedom. In perception – as opposed to imagination for
instance – we are not creators: we do not get to choose what we perceive, we
are rather affected by something that we experience as being alien to us and
that imposes its presence. So how can Abhinavagupta present conscious-
ness’s free creation of the perceived universe as the most immediate of
experiences – that which is established through mere self-awareness
(svasamvedana)?
The˙ reason for this lies in the Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ understanding of
freedom and passivity: they believe that we experience passivity only insofar
as we agree to be passive. Thus, the spectators of a theatre play know that what
they see is only a fiction, since they do not jump on the stage in order to rescue
someone about to be murdered there; and yet they go through all the emotions
of the main character, tasting his sadness when the hero supposedly experi-
ences sadness, or being relieved when he overcomes all the obstacles, etc.
So the spectators are fooled by the play – but only because they are willing
to be fooled, and because they take pleasure in it. According to Utpaladeva
and Abhinavagupta, in the same way, we are bound to our existence in
samsāra for the simple reason that we agree to be bound – and we believe
˙ there is an external world of objects to be sought and avoided because
that
in us, the infinite and omnipotent consciousness chooses to believe that it is
bound.80
seek or avoid anything; this is why [with the compound svānandaghanatayā,

Abhinavagupta] gives the reason for this: he is an undivided mass with his own bliss,
and precisely for this reason, he is absolutely free (svatantra).”
78 ĪPVV, II, 80–81.
79 i.e., it only appears to be turned outwards, towards an external object.
80 On the idea, crucial in the Pratyabhijñā, that consciousness only playfully pretends to be
fooled by its own fiction in some sort of cosmic theatre play (nātya), see e.g. ĪPVV, III,
244, quoted and translated in Ratié 2009, n. 42. ˙
The Pratyabhijñā philosophers therefore endeavour to show that in fact perception

is not a passive experience. Thus in a famous verse (kārikā I, 5, 11), Utpaladeva states
that any consciousness – including that of perceived objects – has as its essence an
active “grasp” or a “realization” (vimarśa) that distinguishes it from inert entities
( jada) capable of reflecting other entities.81 A mirror manifesting a blue patch
˙
remains irremediably unconscious of this manifestation, whereas as soon as a con-
scious subject sees the blue patch, he is immediately aware of being aware of the
blue patch. Consciousness thus differs from the mirror insofar as it does not passively
reflect things but actively becomes aware of itself as manifesting them.82
This means that consciousness is in essence an action, which seems to contradict
our familiar experience of perception as a passive encounter with some external
entity. Abhinavagupta therefore adds to his explanation of kārikā I, 5, 11:
sarvam tu vastuto vimarśātmakapramātr̥ svabhāvatādātmyāhamparāma-

˙
rśaviśrānter ajadam eva pūrvāparakotyoh. yad uktam: idam˙ ity asya
vicchinnavimarśasya˙ kr̥ tārthatā / yā˙ svasvarūpe
˙ viśrāntir vimarśah
so’ham ity ayam // iti. madhyāvasthaiva tv idantāvimr̥ śyamānapūrvāpara- ˙
kotir vimūdhānām māyāpadam samsāra iti vimarśa eva pradhānam bhaga-
˙ iti sthitam.
vata ˙ ˙
83 ˙ ˙ ˙
But in reality, everything is perfectly spontaneous (ajada)84 at the very
˙
beginning and end ( pūrvāparakoti) [of a perception], because [everything
˙
then] rests in the grasp ( parāmarśa) in the form “I” – [i.e. in the grasp] of
the identity (tādātmya) [of the object with] the nature of the knowing sub-
ject, who [precisely] exists in a grasp (vimarśa). This is what [Utpaladeva]
has stated [in Ajadapramātr̥ siddhi, 15]: “The accomplished state
˙
(kr̥ tārthatā) of the grasp [of an object] in the form ‘this’ distinct [from
the subject] – [an acomplished state] that is a rest in one’s own nature –
is the grasp [of subjectivity] in the form ‘this is me’.” But it is the
81 svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam vidur anyathā / prakāśo’rthoparakto’pi

sphatikādijadopamah // “[The wise] ˙know that the nature of manifestation is a grasp
˙
(vimarśa); ˙
otherwise,˙ the manifesting consciousness ( prakāśa), while being coloured
by objects, would be similar to an inert entity ( jada) such as a crystal or [any other
reflective object].” See e.g. Alper 1987, Torella ˙ 1994, xxiv–xxv, Ratié 2006, 87,
n. 138, and Ratié 2007, 339–40, n. 59.
82 Cf. ĪPV, I, 198–9: aham evam prakāśātmā prakāśa iti hi vimarśodaye svasamvid eva
pramātr̥ prameyapramānādi ˙caritārtham abhimanyate na tv atiriktam ˙kānksati,
.
˙ ˙
sphatikādi hi gr̥ hītapratibimbam api tathābhāvena siddhau pramātrantaram apeks ˙ ata
˙
iti nirvimarśatvāj jadam. “For when the grasp (vimarśa) arises [in the form] ‘I, who ˙con-
sist of a manifesting˙ consciousness ( prakāśa), am manifest thus’, it is a mere self-
consciousness (svasamvit) which considers that the knowing subject ( pramātr̥ ), the
object of knowledge ˙( prameya), the means of knowledge ( pramāna) and the [result
of knowledge ( pramiti)] have achieved their goal; and it does not ˙ require anything
else. For although a crystal for instance receives a reflection ( pratibimba), it requires
another knowing subject so that it may be established to exist thus, [as a crystal reflecting
something else] – therefore it is inert ( jada) because it is devoid of any grasp.”
83 ĪPV, I, 199. ˙
84 The word jada means both “insentient” and “inert”, and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers
˙ ambiguity so as to emphasize that sentiency involves an act of becoming
play with this
aware.
466 ISABELLE RATIÉ
intermediary state (madhyāvasthā), [which constitutes] objectivity, [and] in

which one does not grasp the very beginning and end ( pūrvāparakoti), that
[forms] the domain of māyā – [i.e.] the cycle of rebirths (samsāra) ˙ – for
˙
those who are confused (vimūdha). It is therefore established that the
essence of the Lord is precisely˙ that grasp.
According to Abhinavagupta, any perception, at its very beginning and end –

literally, at its “edges”–, is perfectly spontaneous (ajada), for we usually pay
attention only to the intermediary state (madhyāvasthā)˙ between these two van-
ishing moments. In this intermediary state, we apprehend the manifested object
as “this” and not as “I” – as an entity external to the subject, distinct from him,
and inert ( jada); and we also apprehend ourselves as inert insofar as conscious-
˙ itself as passive in front of the object that affects it. This state is
ness then grasps
nonetheless preceded by a state of desire (icchā) to know, and ends in the aware-
ness of one’s own knowledge.85 These three stages of the knowledge process
succeed one another so quickly – and so continuously, for they constitute the
development of a single reality86 – that we usually remain unaware of the initial
and final edges. However, in these initial and final stages, consciousness rests
entirely on the awareness of itself as an absolute freedom: the object is grasped
as an aspect of the subject, and the subject as a limitless creative will. Thus the
reason why we are not aware of our freedom of perception is that we choose to
sink into a fascination for the intermediary, completely objectified state of cog-
nitions, disregarding the two other states and forgetting that the distinction
between the subject and the object, far from being the essence of perception,
is only a stage or a stopping place “comparable to the foot of a tree [where a
traveller stops] on his way to the village”.87 However, someone who manages
85 Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 243: pūrvāparakotyoh – grahanecchāsamaye grahanānantaram ca,

˙ ˙ and end’ (˙ pūrvāparakoti) – [i.e.]
ajadatvam eva. “‘At the very beginning ˙ at the moment
˙
˙ desire (icchā) to apprehend, and at the moment that immediately
of the ˙ follows the appre-
hension, there is perfect spontaneity (ajadatva).”
86 Such a representation of the cognitive ˙ act is of course incompatible with the
Vijñānavāda’s principle of the absolute momentariness (ksanikatva) of each cognition,
and involves a different conception of time. ˙ ˙
87 See ĪPV, I, 221–2 (where Abhinavagupta alludes again to APS, 15): etad uktam bhavati:
parāmarśo nāma viśrāntisthānam tac ca pāryantikam eva pāramārthikam tac˙ cāham ity
˙
evamrūpam eva. madhyaviśrāntipadam tu yad vr̥ ksamūlasthānīyam˙ grāmagamane
˙
tadapeks ayā sr̥ statvam ucyata iti ko˙ virodhah? anena˙ ˙
nīlāder apīdam nīlam iti
˙ ˙˙
madhyaparāmarśe’pi mūlaparāmarśe’ham ˙ity eva viśrānter ātmamayatvam ˙
upapāditam eva. nīlam idam vedmīty api hy aham prakāśa itīyat tattvam, yathoktam
idam ity asyety ādi. mūdhas tu nīlādivimarśād ˙ evārthakriyādiparitosābhimānīti
˙
nīlādeh svātantryanirmuktatvam uktam. “Here is what [Utpaladeva] means. ˙ What we
call a ˙grasp ( parāmarśa) is a place of rest; and it is only the final [place of rest] that
is real in the absolute sense ( pāramārthika); and this [grasp] has as its only form ‘I’.
On the contrary, [something] is said to be ‘created’ [i.e. objective] with respect to the
intermediary (madhya) resting place, which is comparable to the foot of a tree [where
a traveller stops] on his way to the village. Therefore what contradiction could there
be? Thus it is demonstrated that [objects] such as blue too, even in the intermediary
grasp (madhyaparāmarśa) ‘this is blue’, are nothing but the Self, because [they] rest
on the original grasp (mūlaparāmarśa) that has as its only form ‘I’. For even the real
nature of [the experience] ‘I know the blue’ consists of this only: ‘I am manifesting
to concentrate on these edges can achieve a full identity with absolute conscious-
ness. Here, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s sources are no longer Buddhist:
they are obviously Śaiva. Thus this analysis of the edges of cognition can be
found in Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ sti (and Utpaladeva’s commentary on it),88 and
it clearly belongs to the Krama˙˙ tradition.89
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus establish their idealism not only by
exploiting some Vijñānavādin arguments, but also by having recourse to some
myself ( prakāśe) [as blue]’, as [Utpaladeva] has said [in APS, 15] which begins with
idam ity asya. However, because someone who is confused (mūdha) considers himself
satisfied, from the point of view of efficiency (arthakriyā) for ˙instance, with the sole
grasp of [the object] such as blue and so on, [we] say that [objects] are devoid of freedom
(svātantrya).” The empirical subject wrongly identifies with a particular object (his body
for instance) and therefore acquires an individuality only insofar as he believes that he is
a particular entity limited by time and space. Some needs arise from this limitation, and
the individual does not pay attention (nādriyate) to the initial and final edges of cogition
because the intermediary stage is enough to satisfy those needs. Cf. ĪPVV, II, 216:
pramātā ghatādyarthakriyām arthayamānas tām bhinnaparāmarśasampādyām
evābhimanyata˙ iti pāryantikam ahantāparāmarśam adasīyam ˙ nādriyate. “The˙ subject,
desiring the efficiency (arthakriyā) [of an object] such as a pot, ˙ considers that this [effi-
ciency] can be accomplished only thanks to the grasp ( parāmarśa) of that which is
distinct [from the subject]; therefore he does not pay attention to the final grasp as I
(ahantāparāmarśa).”
88 See ŚD, I, 5–6ab: na param tadavasthāyām vyavasthaisā vyavasthitā / yāvat
samagrajñānāgrajñātr̥ sparśadaśāsv ˙ ˙
api // sthitaiva laksyate ˙sā ca tadviśrāntyā tathā
phale // “The existence [of absolute consciousness] is not ˙ only established in that state
of [transcendence of ordinary existence]; rather, even in these states of contact with
the knowing subject, at the initial moment (agra) of any cognition, it is experienced
as being indeed present; and just as well, in the result ( phala) [of the cognitive act], it
is [experienced] thanks to the rest in it.” Cf. ŚDV, p. 8, where Utpaladeva emphasizes
that he has integrated this aspect of the ŚD in his ĪPK: sarvavikalpādijñānānām agrata
utpitsāvasthāyām jñānajñeyānāvilajñātr̥ svarūpasamsparśo’ vaśyambhāvīti tadavasthāsv
˙
api paravyavavasthā. “The Supreme exists even˙ in these states˙ of [contact with the
knowing subject], because at the very beginning (agratah) of all cognitions – [i.e.] con-
˙
cepts, etc. – in that state which is the desire to arise (utpitsā), the contact with the nature
of the subject who has not been stained by knowledge and its object necessarily occurs.”
In the same way, consciousness becomes conscious of itself as absolutely free at the
moment of completion of a cognition. See ibid., 8–9: athavā yathā samagrajñānānām
ārambhe, tathā phale parisamāptau tatraiva viśrāntyā. tadviśrāntim vinārtho jñāta
eva na bhavati. samagratvam anekaprakāratvena jñānānām madhyadaśāyām ˙ eva
pratyagātmatvena. pūrvāparakotyos tv ekaviśuddhaśivataiva ˙ sarvesām. etac
ceśvarapratyabhijñāyām parīksyam. ˙ “Or just as, at the initial moment of all˙ cognitions,
[one experiences absolute ˙ freedom,]
˙ in the same way, in the “result” ( phala), [i.e.] at the
very moment of completion ( parisamāpti) [of knowledge, it is experienced] thanks to the
rest (viśrānti) [in it]; without this rest, the object could not be known at all. All cognitions
exist in the form of individual subjects ( pratyagātman) in many [different] ways, [but]
only in the intermediary state (madhyadaśā); on the contrary, in the initial and final
edges ( pūrvāparakoti) [of the cognitive act], all these [cognitions] are nothing but
Śiva, one and absolutely˙ pure. And this has been examined in [my] Īśvarapratyabhijñā.”
89 On the importance of this doctrine of the edges (koti) in the Krama, see e.g. Sanderson
2007, who gives a complete description of the Krama ˙ exegesis (pp. 260–370) and
remarks for instance (p. 277) that the goal of the Svabodhodayamañjarī is to bring
about liberation “by observing the process of the arising and dying away of cognition”
(cf. ibid., 279).
468 ISABELLE RATIÉ
methods, developed in Śaiva circles, which aim to expose the absolute freedom
that we constantly experience and that we nonetheless constantly discard. They
invite us to pay attention to this freedom in all these situations where the empiri-
cal subject, brutally confronted with an unexpected or intensely emotional event,
momentarily loses consciousness of the oppositions (subject/object, I/the others,
etc.) that usually frame his world: in an intense joy, in terror, in orgasm, or
simply when we are all of a sudden “struck” by the idea that we have forgotten
to accomplish some urgent task, these oppositions dissolve, and one experi-
ences, as Somānanda puts it, “a subtle vibration of all powers”.90
But this experience of freedom is revealed also through another argument
thus formulated by Utpaladeva:
90 See ŚD, I, 9–11ab (quoted in ĪPVV, II, 170): sā ca dr̥ śyā hr̥ duddeśe
kāryasmaranakālatah / praharsāvedasamaye darasamdarśanaksane // anālocanato
˙ ˙
dr̥ ste visargaprasarāspade ˙
/ visargoktiprasan
. ˙
ge ca vācane ˙ ˙ tathā // etesv eva
dhāvane
˙˙ .gesu sarvaśaktivilolatā / “And this [unity of the subject and the object] ˙can be
prasan
experienced˙ in the area of the heart, when one [suddenly] remembers some task, when
being told some news [that causes] a great joy, when seeing [something that causes] ter-
ror, when one sees something unexpected, when one discharges sperm, and when one
pronounces the visarga; and also when one recites or when one runs – in all of these
cases there is a subtle vibration of all powers (sarvaśaktivilolatā).” In ĪPVV, II, 169–
70, Abhinavagupta sums up Utpaladeva’s explanation of these verses in his lost Vivr̥ ti
while insisting that at these moments, we experience the fundamental identity of objects
with consciousness, even though this experience vanishes so quickly that, para-
doxically, most of the time we must infer that it has occurred: abhinnasya
pramātr̥ prameyarūpasyānunmisitavibhāgasyāpi yadi vastutah prakāśo na syāt, tat tvar-
˙
itam lipipāthe vegasarane tvaritābhidhāne ˙
ca rekhāto rekhāntaram deśād deśāntaram
˙
sthānakaran ˙ ādeh sthānakaran
˙ āntaram ca gacchatas tāms˙ tāms tyaktavyān ˙
grahītavyām ˙ ś ˙ca bhāgānn ˙aparāmr̥˙ śatas tayoś ca tyāgopādānayoh˙ ˙ kartāram
avimr̥ śatas˙ tāni vicitrāni tyāgopādānāni katham bhaveyuh parāmarśapūrva- ˙
katvenaisām dr̥ statvāt? tad ˙ imāni bhavanti svakāran˙ am parāmarśam ˙ anumāpayanti.
na cāsau ˙ bhedenaiva
˙ ˙˙ parāmarśa esām iti. bhedena ˙hi ˙ parāmarśe vācikamānasapari-
spandaparamparāto’bhilāpasamketasmaran ˙ aprabandhasadbhāve tvaritataiva na nirva-
het. “If there were not in fact˙ a manifesting ˙ consciousness ( prakāśa) of that which
consists [both] of a knowing subject ( pramātr̥ ) and an object of knowledge ( prameya)
while not being differentiated – [i.e. if there were not a manifestation] of that in which the
distinction [between the subject and the object] has not developed yet, then when hastily
reading a text, when frantically running [or] when quickly pronouncing [phonemes], for
someone who goes from one letter to the other, from one place to the other, or from one
point of articulation to the other while not grasping (aparāmr̥ śatah) [the existence of]
these various elements that constitute the [successive] objects of ˙[all these] actions of
leaving and appropriating, and for someone who does not grasp (avimr̥ śatah) [the exist-
ence of] the agent (kartr̥ ) of these actions of leaving and appropriating, how˙ could these
various actions of leaving and appropriating take place, since we see that [actions] occur
only if they are preceded by a grasp ( parāmarśa)? Therefore, since these [various
actions] take place, they make us infer (anumāpayanti) a grasp ( parāmarśa) as their
cause. And this grasp of these [different actions] does not occur in a differentiated
way; because when a grasp occurs in a differentiated way, the speed (tvaritatā) [involved
in these actions] is not possible, because of the series of [various] verbal and mental
movements [necessarily occurring] when there is a succession [made of] speech and
the memory of the [semantic] convention [that speech implies].” The passage bears
some striking resemblances to Abhinavagupta’s commentary on ĪPK I, 5, 19 (ĪPV, I,
229; see Ratié 2006, 75–6).
ātmānam ata evāyam jñeyīkuryāt pr̥ thaksthiti /

˙
jñeyam na tu tadaunmukhyāt khandyetāsya svatantratā // 91
˙ ˙˙
For this very reason, [consciousness] must make itself an object of knowl-
edge (ātmānam. . . jñeyīkuryāt); nonetheless, the object of knowledge has
no separate existence – [otherwise, consciousness]’s freedom (svatantratā)
would be ruined, because of [consciousness’s] intentionality (aunmukhya)
as regards this [object].
This verse states the fundamental principle of the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism. It

does not only say, as the Vijñānavādins do, that the object of knowledge ( jñeya)
is an aspect of consciousness, or that there is nothing outside of consciousness,
but rather, that consciousness makes itself an object of knowledge:92 our aware-
ness of objects is nothing but consciousness freely acting on itself so as to
appear as an object.93 And according to Abhinavagupta, this verse constitutes
“an additional argument” for idealism94 – an argument that does not pertain
to the Vijñānavāda, precisely because it involves consciousness’s freedom.
This new argument rests on a feature of consciousness that Western phenom-
enology calls intentionality – that is, the fact that consciousness is not purely and
simply consciousness, but is the consciousness of something.95 This way of
being turned towards or directed upon something that characterizes conscious-
ness is designated by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta with the word aunmu-
khya.96 But the experience of this intentionality – which, as Abhinavagupta
notes, is self-evident, for it is known through mere self-consciousness (svasam-
vedana)97 – is first and foremost the experience of the fact that consciousness˙ is
91 ĪPK I, 5, 15.
92 The cvi formation ( jñeyīkr̥ -) is particularly meaningful here, for it precisely expresses the
dynamism of consciousness.
93 Which is the reason why, while making itself an object, consciousness remains “a non-
object” (ajñeya): it only plays at being an object. Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 268: jñeyīkaroti –
ajñeyam sat svayam svaśaktyāsvādānarūpakrīdārtham jñeyatayā bhāsayati.
˙
“‘[Consciousness] makes˙ itself an object of knowledge’ ˙ ( jñeyīkaroti)
˙ – [i.e.] it manifests
itself as being an object while not being an object, for the [fun] of playing (krīdārtham) –
[a playful activity] that involves relishing (āsvādāna) one’s own powers (śakti).” ˙
94 ĪPV, I, 214–5: nanv esaiva kutah sambhāvanātmānam jñeyīkarotīti? āha: pr̥ thak
prakāśād bahirbhūtā sthitir˙ yasya ˙tādr̥ g˙ jñeyam naiva bhavati.
˙ tur avadhārane. tatra
coktā yuktayah. abhyuccayayuktim apy āha. “But ˙ where does this hypothesis according
˙
˙
to which [consciousness] makes itself an object of knowledge come from? [Utpaladeva]
answers [in the verse]: there is absolutely no object of knowledge ( jñeya) such that it
would possess a ‘separate existence’ – [i.e. an existence] external to the manifesting con-
sciousness. The word ‘nonetheless’ has the meaning of a restriction. And [Utpaladeva]
has [already] stated the arguments showing this point; but he is giving here an additional
argument (abhyuccayayukti).”
95 Cf. its definition in Husserl 1913, § 84.
96 Dreyfus (2007, 96), while discussing intentionality in Dharmakīrti’s thought, notices that
“this term is of Western origin and has no direct translation in the Indian context”. While
agreeing that we should bear in mind the cultural and historical abyss separating the con-
texts in which the concepts of intentionality and aunmukhya were coined, I believe that
aunmukhya as used by the Pratyabhijñā philosophers has enough in common with the
Western concept of intentionality to be translated as such.
97 See ĪPV, I, 215, quoted below.
470 ISABELLE RATIÉ
always confronting some kind of otherness: because consciousness is inten-

tional, it is not self-contained, but wide open and constantly turned towards
some Other that transcends it.98 The Sanskrit word aunmukhya perfectly
expresses this transcendence of the object experienced in intentionality: the
abstract substantive is formed on the adjective unmukha which means, literally,
“whose face is turned upwards”. To be unmukha, for consciousness, is to be
turned towards an object that is above it or transcends it. From this point of
view, intentionality seems to betray the fundamental heteronomy of conscious-
ness – the fact that it depends on this Other towards which it is constantly
turned.99 Thus Sartre for example has given it the status of an “ontological
proof” insofar as intentionality immediately reveals the object as an entity exist-
ing independently of the subject.100
However, Abhinavagupta explains that according to kārikā I, 5, 15, the fact of
intentionality does not constitute a proof of consciousness’s heteronomy with
respect to the object, but rather, of its perfect autonomy with respect to this object:
yadi vyatiriktam jñeyam syāt taj jñātr̥ rūpasyātmano yad etaj jñeya-
˙
visayam aunmukhyam ˙svasamvedanasiddham dr̥ śyate, tan nāsya syāt.
˙ ˙ ˙
tena vyatiriktavisayaunmukhyenānyādhīnatvam ˙ nāma pāratantryam
*asyānīyeta [J: asyānīyate KSTS, Bhāskarī, L,˙ P, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p.
˙
D]. pāratantryam ca svātantryasya viruddham. svātantryam eva
cānanyamukhapreks ˙ itvalaksanam ātmanah svarūpam iti vyatiriktonmukha
ātmānātmaiva syāt.˙ anātmā ˙ ca
˙ jado jñeyam ˙ prati nonmukhībhavatīti pra-
. . ˙
sangah. tatah prasangaviparyayād idam āyātam: ˙ avyatiriktonmukhah sva-
˙ ˙
tantrah sann ātmānam eva jñeyīkarotīti. 101 ˙
˙
If the object of knowledge were distinct [from consciousness], then the
intentionality (aunmukhya) of the Self who is the knowing subject,
which aims at the object of knowledge [and] which we experience [as
being] established through [mere] self-consciousness, could not belong
to this [Self]. [For] this intentionality aiming at something distinct [from
the Self] would entail for the [Self] what is called “dependence on the
Other” (anyādhīnatva) – [i.e.] heteronomy ( pāratantrya). But heteronomy
is contradictory to autonomy (svātantrya); and it is autonomy, character-
ized by an absence of expectation from the Other (ananyamukhapre-
ksitva), which is the nature of the Self; therefore a Self that would be
˙
98 On this meaning of intentionality, see e.g. Sartre 1947, “Une Idée fondamentale de la
phénoménologie de Husserl: l’intentionnalité”, where Sartre contrasts a “digestive phil-
osophy” (“philosophie digestive”) according to which objects are contents of conscious-
ness that consciousness assimilates, with Husserl’s phenomenology, which shows
consciousness as a fundamental opening towards the Other.
99 Thus aunmukhya is frequently translated as expectancy.
100 See Sartre 1943, 28. However, Sartre acknowledges that the concept of intentionality
can be exploited in order to substantiate a diametrically opposed theory (even though
he immediately discards this possibility, ibid., 27), which can be found in Husserl’s
“transcendental idealism” and in the correlative concept of a foundational intentionality
(see Husserl 1913, §41). The Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ position is, mutatis mutandis,
much closer to this latter position.
101 ĪPV, I, 215.
turned towards (unmukha) an [entity] distinct from it would not be a Self at

all. And that which is not a Self, [i.e.] which is inert ( jada), does not turn
towards (nonmukhībhavati) an object of knowledge – such ˙ is the conse-
quence [if the object of knowledge is distinct from consciousness]. So
this is what follows if one reverses this [unwanted] consequence: [the
Self] makes itself an object while being free (svatantra), [i.e.] while not
being turned towards (unmukha) an [entity] distinct [from it].
If the object were independent of consciousness, the very fact of intentional-

ity, which cannot be denied, would remain inexplicable. For a Self turned
towards a real Other – a distinct and independent entity – would be dependent
on this Other: it would not be free or autonomous (svatantra) but heteronomous
( paratantra).
Here, one could suspect that the argument begs the question insofar as it presup-
poses the autonomy of consciousness that it aims to demonstrate. But
Abhinavagupta does not content himself with stating that a consciousness
turned towards an external object would be heteronomous – he adds that such a
heteronomous entity would be incapable of intentionality: that which is inert
( jada) “does not turn towards” or “does not become [object-]oriented”
˙
(nonmukhībhavati), because aiming at an object presupposes a subjective sponta-
neity. Here Abhinavagupta does not mean only that a consciousness turned
towards an object really distinct from it would be forever trapped in it – so that
if the blue patch were an entity independent of consciousness, the consciousness
of blue would be forever stuck in the blue, incapable of struggling out of it in
order to aim at something else. He means, more importantly, that a consciousness
that is free or spontaneous would not be a consciousness at all, because it would be
incapable of any extroversion towards any Other: it would remain riveted to a self-
contained identity, incapable of being anything besides itself – incapable therefore
of entering into any relationship with anything. Intentionality entails absolute free-
dom – that is, the freedom not to remain confined to one’s own nature,102 the
freedom which exists in not “being merely oneself (ātmamātratā)”.103 But this
102 Cf. Abhinavagupta’s commentary on ĪPK II, 4, 19 in ĪPV, II, 176–8 (see Ratié 2007,
352–3 n. 79, and 353–4 n. 82): the object, to which the principle of non-contradiction
fully applies, is “confined” ( parinisthita) to its definition, and therefore incapable of
diverging from its nature without ˙ceasing
˙ to exist, whereas consciousness is free to
manifest itself as what it is not without ceasing to be what it is: whatever objective
appearance it manifests (whether in imagination or in perception), it remains
consciousness.
103 Cf. ĪPV (I, 202) ad ĪPK I, 5, 12, where Abhinavagupta defines the freedom of the Self
(ātman) as consisting precisely of not being only onself (ātman): citikriyā ca citau
kartr̥ tā, svātantryam samyojanaviyojanānusamdhānādirūpam ātmamātratāyām eva
jadavad aviśrāntatvam˙ ˙aparicchinnaprakāśasāratvam
˙ ananyamukhapreksitvam iti.
˙ evānātmarūpāj jadāt samyojanaviyojanādisvātantryavikalād vailaks˙anyādāyīti.
tad
“And the action [which˙ is] consciousness
˙ ˙ ˙ to con-
(citikriyā) is the agency with regard
sciousness. That is to say, it is the freedom (svātantrya) which exists in associating, dis-
sociating, synthesizing, etc.; it is the fact not just of resting in one’s self-confined
identity (ātmamātratāyām eva . . . aviśrāntatvam), contrary to an inert [entity] ( jada);
the fact of having as one’s essence an unlimited manifesting consciousness ˙
( prakāśa); the absence of any expectation from the Other (ananyamukhapreksitva). It
˙
472 ISABELLE RATIÉ
freedom in turn implies a perfect independence as regards the object: conscious-

ness’s freedom as regards its own nature is conceivable only if it is not really trans-
cended by an object existing independently of it. This means that there is an
intentionality insofar as consciousness chooses to manifest itself as intentional,
and the intentional aim is thus possible only if consciousness takes the form of
the object aimed at while aiming at it.104 Here again, the argument seems to be
grounded in the Śivadr̥ sti’s descriptions of consciousness, for although it is not for-
mulated as such there, ˙Somānanda
˙ describes the very beginning of consciousness’s
desire to be aware of various phenomena as an “intentionality” (unmukhitā) that
still entails the awareness of the object’s fundamental identity with
consciousness.105
is precisely this [characteristic] that leads to the distinction between [the Self] and an
inert [entity], which, being devoid of the freedom to associate, dissociate, etc., does
not consist in a Self.”
104 Cf. ĪPVV, II, 207–08: yadi pr̥ thaksthiti jñeyam tadā tadaumukhye paratantro’yam ity
asvatantro’yam ity asvatantro jado jadasya ca ˙ katham jñeyavisayam svātantryam iti
.
prasangah. svasamvitsiddham cedam ˙ ˙asya. tato’yam ˙svātantryān˙ na˙ paronmukha ity
ātmānam˙ eva viśvam ˙ ˙ ˙
.
jñeyīkarotīti prasangaviparyayād istasiddhih. “If the object of
˙
knowledge has an existence ˙˙
distinct [from the subject], then, ˙
if there is intentionality
(aunmukhya) [of consciousness aiming at] this [object], the [subject] must be ‘heter-
onomous’ ( paratantra), that is to say, it is not autonomous (svatantra); but that
which is not autonomous is inert ( jada), and how could an inert [entity] have any free-
dom (svātantrya) as regards the object? ˙ This is the consequence [that follows if the
object of knowledge has an independent existence]. And this [freedom] of the [Self
regarding the object] is established by [mere] self-consciousness (svasamvit).
Therefore, since the [Self], due to its freedom (svātantrya), is not turned towards ˙ any
Other ( paronmukha), it makes itself – [i.e.] the totality [of being] – an object of knowl-
edge. [Utpaladeva] has thus demonstrated his thesis by reversing the [unwanted] con-
.
sequence ( prasangaviparyaya).”
105 See ŚD, I, 7cd–8 (quoted in ĪPVV, II, 170): yadā tu tasya ciddharma-
vibhavāmodajr̥ mbhayā // vicitraracanānānākāryasr̥ stipravartane / bhavaty unmukhitā
cittā secchāyāh prathamā tutih // “But when, due to˙˙the unfolding of the joy as regards
˙
this [consciousness]’s ˙ ˙ power – [a sovereign power] which is the [very] nature
sovereign
of consciousness –, at the beginning ( pravartana) of the creation of the various (nānā)
effects that compose a variety (vicitraracanā), there is an intentionality (unmukhitā) that
is [still] an identity with consciousness (cittā) – that is the first moment (tuti) of will
(icchā).” In his commentary, Utpaladeva insists on the elusive character of this ˙ experi-
ence (see ŚDV, p. 10: sā tutih sūksmakālaparicchinna icchāprathamabhāgah. “It is
˙˙
tuti, [i.e.], the first part of desire, ˙
confined to a subtle moment (sūksmakāla)”). ˙ In it,
˙
consciousness ˙ is only a play-
is already intentional, but still aware that this extroversion
ful way of manifesting itself, since while presenting itself as turned towards an external
entity, it remains fundamentally introverted (antarmukha). See ŚDV, p. 10: yadonmu-
khitonmukhavad ācaritā vastuto dvitīyābhāvān nairapeksyenāntarmukhitvāc cittā cai-
tanyam eva. “At that [moment] there is an ‘intentionality’ ˙ ˙(unmukhitā), which is the
fact of behaving as someone ‘whose face is turned upwards’ (unmukha), [but] in reality,
independently (nairapeksyena) [of any other entity], since there is no second [entity
towards which consciousness ˙ could really turn], because of [consciousness’s] introver-
sion (antarmukhitva). [This intentionality is] ‘an identity with consciousness’ (cittā) –
[i.e.] it is nothing but consciousness (caitanyam eva).”
Conclusion
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are undoubtedly influenced by the Vijñānavāda:
they make extensive use of arguments borrowed from it in order to establish
their own idealism. However, they never try to hide it: on the contrary, they system-
atically emphasize the importance of the Vijñānavādins’ arguments in their own
system by designating and quoting their sources in an unusually explicit manner.
This is probably a way of appropriating the prestige of their illustrious
Buddhist opponents;106 but in doing so they also show a will to take full respon-
sibility for appropriating their rivals’ concepts instead of appearing to be
unknowingly or unwittingly influenced by them.107 Last but not least, this atti-
tude also enables them to highlight the real boundary between their system and
its metaphysical twin, the Vijñānavāda: although the two systems share the idea
that objects do not exist outside of consciousness, they profoundly disagree
about the cause of phenomenal variety – a disagreement embodied in the oppo-
sition between the two analogies (the dreamer versus the creative yogin) chosen
to illustrate the two idealisms. In the Vijñānavāda, this diversity is attributable to
the fact that consciousness is determined to appear thus by an impersonal mech-
anism of unconscious residual traces; in the Pratyabhijñā, it is due to the playful
and absolutely free will of consciousness – a free will that Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta endeavour to disclose at the heart of any perception. One
might argue that this rather subtle difference can be disregarded in light of the
two systems’ deep idealistic affinities. But according to the Pratyabhijñā philo-
sophers, this difference, however subtle, is crucial, because it has considerable
consequences from soteriological, ethical and ontological points of view.
106 See Torella 1994, p. xxii: the absorption of Buddhist doctrines and terminology “may
have been a deliberate choice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming the
ways and forms of a philosophical school that was perhaps the most respected and
feared, even by the many who did not agree with it.”
107 In this respect it might be worth adding a few remarks to Torella 1992, 329: “Through
this subtle play of declared basic disagreement with the doctrines of Buddhist logicians,
a limited acceptance and purely instrumental (or thought to be so) use of them, the mas-
ters of the Pratyabhijñā end up being somehow drawn into their orbit. The architecture
of the Pratyabhijñā feels the effect of this. That many problems are posed, more or less
unwittingly, in Buddhist terms to a certain extent prefigures their development and
reduces the number of possible solutions.” It seems to me (and R. Torella made it
clear during the viva of my thesis that his remarks are in no way incompatible with
the following points, with which he agrees) that all philosophical systems can be
seen as responses to previous systems that they set out to surpass, and that they are
necessarily determined by the systems against which they were built, since the solutions
that they propose are to a great extent determined by the way in which the problems to
be solved were formulated before them. However, the very fact that Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta declare so explicitly and repeatedly their “limited acceptance” (as
much as their “basic disagreement”) with respect to Dharmakīrti’s thought also indi-
cates how acutely aware of this determination they are. And this (acknowledged) deter-
mination should not be taken as a sign that the Pratyabhijñā system lacks originality: the
ĪPKs are a perfect illustration of the fact that the originality of a philosophical system
does not lie so much in the rarity of its borrowings from other systems as in its ability to
transform various alien concepts so as to integrate them into a unitary thought in which
they acquire a new meaning.
474 ISABELLE RATIÉ
Thus, if samsāra, far from being the result of an uncontrolled and uncon-
scious mechanism ˙ of residual traces, arises from consciousness’s free will to
fool itself, then consciousness is always just playing at being bound. The
Śaivas can therefore claim that liberation is easier in their system108 – because
the only condition for obtaining absolute freedom is the recognition
( pratyabhijñā) that one is already absolutely free.
The Śaivas can similarly claim that in their system, it still makes sense to
endeavour to save the others out of compassion, because ultimately the others
too are this free consciousness playfully pretending that it is bound; whereas
according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, in the Vijñānavāda, since the
others cannot be anything beyond their status of objects in my cognitive series,
they do not have any existence as subjects in the ultimate sense.109
Finally, if the world is the outcome of consciousness’s essential creativity, it can-
not be discarded as an unreal appearance110 because it is indeed an appearance, but
this appearance is a manifestation of the absolute. Provided that one knows that the
world is nothing but a way for consciousness to manifest itself freely, its enjoyment
is no longer what binds human beings, on the contrary:111 according to Utpaladeva
108 See Utpaladeva’s claim that “the new path” of the Pratyabhijñā is “easy” (ĪPK IV, 16ab:
sughata esa mārgo navo. . .).
109 On the˙ divide
˙ between Dharmakīrti and the Pratyabhijñā philosophers as regards other-
ness and compassion, see Ratié 2007 and 2009.
110 From this point of view too, the shift from the model of the dreamer to that of the yogin
is meaningful, as is obvious in ĪPV, I, 182–3 (quoted above, n. 68): not only does it
require that consciousness’s production of the universe is devoid of material cause
(upādāna), whereas the Śaiva Saiddhāntikas for instance claim that consciousness
merely informs this material cause (see Sanderson 1992: 282); it also means that the
result of this production is real – whereas its comparison to a dream might be inter-
preted as the affirmation that it is unreal (avastu). Cf. ĪPVV, II, 145, where
Abhinavagupta states that contrary to dreamt or imagined objects, the reality of
which can be doubted, the yogin’s creation is an established (siddha) fact: icchayā
ca nirmānam svapnasamkalpādau dr̥ stam eva ghatāder mr̥ dādiprasiddha
˙ ˙
kāranaparamparāparākaran ˙ ena. tad atrāsaty
˙ aghatādir iti˙ ced astu tāvad evam.
˙ yogī purasenādinirmān
tathāpi ˙ ˙
am icchāvaśād eva karotīti siddham. “And indeed, it
˙ the creation [occurring] at will in dreams, in imagin-
is a fact of experience (dr̥ sta) that
˙˙
ary constructions, etc., [occurs] without the series of well-known causes of the pot for
instance (such as clay, etc.). Therefore, if [someone objected that] since this [series of
causes] does not exist, the pot [or any other object manifested while dreaming or ima-
gining] does not exist, [we would answer]: very well, let us admit that it is the case [as
regards dreamt or imagined objects]; however, it is established (siddha) that the yogin
produces thanks to his sole will a creation of cities, armies and so on.”
111 See e.g. ĪPV, I, 313–5: anubhūyate ca sopadeśair avadhānadhanair yenaisām yaiva
*samsārasammatā [J, L, S1, S2: samsāradaśāsammatā KSTS, Bhāskarī, ˙ P,˙ SOAS;
˙ D] vyavahāradaśā
p.n.p. ˙ ˙ tattvaprakhyātmikā
saiva pramātr̥ ˙ śivabhūmih. yad uktam
sambandhe sāvadhānatety apratyabhijñātātmaparamārthānām samalo˙ vyavahārah;
˙ ām sa eva nirmalah. “And those who focus their attention
anyes ˙ ˙
[on the Self and]
have˙ been
˙ ˙
initiated experience [the whole mundane existence (vyavahāra) as resting
on the Lord,] so that for them, this very condition of mundane existence, generally con-
sidered as the cycle of rebirths (samsāra), is nothing but the ontological level of Śiva
(śivabhūmi), which consists of the˙full manifestation of the true nature of the subject.
This is what is said [in the VBh]: ‘[they] focus their attention on relation’. The mundane
existence is impure (samala) for those who have not recognized (apratyabhijñāta) the
true nature of their Self – for the others, this same [mundane existence] is pure
and Abhinavagupta, one can be fully liberated and still enjoy the beauty of the uni-
verse, since being aware of beauty is nothing but recognizing one’s own free crea-
tivity while contemplating the universe,112 and this enjoyment constitutes a
privileged opportunity to become aware of consciousness’s freedom: if the
Vijñānavāda’s ultimate goal is to awaken from the ordinary constructed world,
the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism aims to become fully aware of its aesthetic nature.
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˙ tavighnakāritvān na vitatah. “I have explained this
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Whoever is curious [to know more about] this should examine that [work], but in
this [treatise], this [subject] has not been dealt with in detail, because it would have
impeded understanding of the subject at hand”).
476 ISABELLE RATIÉ
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˙
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Bulletin of SOAS, 73, 3 (2010), 437–478. © School of Oriental and African Studies, 2010.

The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationship

mere aspects of itself). The Pratyabhijñā philosophy expounded by the Śaivas

The main argument from the Vijñānavāda: the necessity

bhinne prakāśe cābhinne samkaro visayasya tat /

differences belonging to the objects.11 However, as he shows in the

prakāśabalāc ca nīlapītayor bhedo’bhyupagantavyah. sa ca prakāśa

How could an entity that is perfectly devoid of difference make differences

undifferentiated, we would never become aware of the differences distinguishing

tataś ca sākāratākr̥ ta eva niyamah. yathāha: tatrānubhavamātrena

And as a consequence, the restriction (niyama) [of a cognition to a particu-

13 ĪPVV, II, 79.

Of course, an obvious objection could be raised against this reasoning: it is

Should we assume that consciousness takes on a blue aspect because, some-

darśanopādhirahitasyāgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt /

classical account of Sautrāntika presuppositions in Vasubandhu’s idealistic works, see

Because there is no apprehension of an [object that would be] devoid of

atha nīlākāro’sau tad yadi pratibimbabalāt taddvitīyabimbānavabhāsād

no such thing as an external object existing independently of consciousness: con-

etad dhi sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyor iti vijñānākāramā-

Additional arguments from the Vijñānavāda: the contradictory

abhyuccayabādhakās tv avayavino vr̥ ttyanupapattih samavāyāsiddhih

being colourless, a difference between parts according to [the six] direc-

avayavadharmena yady avayavī na samāviśyate, na kadācid avayavini

If only one part of a whole is moving, covered or coloured, the whole,

In his Vimarśinī, Abhinavagupta criticizes this theory in the following way:

anusamcayabāhyavāde’pi samcayasyānyasyābhāve’nava eva, te ca yadi

paramānor yatraiva dhāmny eko lagnas tatraiva yady aparas tad

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ strategy to distance

Divergence regarding the cause of phenomenal variety –

48 For an analysis of these chapters see Ratié 2006.

explained.51 Accordingly, the Vijñānavāda’s explanation of phenomenal variety

vāsanānām anādikālopanatānām abhinavanīlādyābhāsotthāpanaśaktīn-

na vāsanāprabodho’tra vicitro hetutām iyāt /

smr̥ tijanakah samskāro vāsaneti tāvat prasiddham, iha tv anubhavavaici-

Residual traces may account for memory; however, the Vijñānavādin’s

astu vā nīlādyābhāsasampādanasāmarthyarūpā jñānasya yogyatātmikā

yante, tāsām bodhād yadi bhinnam rūpam, tac ca paramārthasat, tad

atha yena rūpenāsām pāramārthikatā tena kāranatā, tat tarhi

bhavantu vā vāsanā bhinnāh; *tathāpi tu [J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: tathāpi

Even if we admit the existence of various impregnations, since nothing exists

64 ĪPV, I, 175: evam vāsanānām tadudbodhahetūnām ca vicitrānām anupapattir eva.

strategy he has adopted to achieve this conclusion is similar to that of Brahmanical

Putting forward another model: the yogin’s creation

cidātmaiva hi devo’ntahsthitam icchāvaśād bahih /

According to a belief shared by many Indian philosophical schools, some

tatra yogisamvida eva sā tādr̥ śī śaktir yad ābhāsavaicitryarūpam

68 Cf. ĪPV, I, 182–3: iha tāvat svapnasmaranamanorājyasamkalpādisu

panam70 samvidrūpam anapahnavanīyam ādisiddham hi tad iti uktam.

mechanism – the sovereign freedom (svātantrya) of consciousness or its free

73 See Kahrs 1998, 70.

etac ca sākāraksanikajñānasantānanaye vaksyamānanītyā vāsanāsamar-

Perception or the freedom to be passive

seek or avoid anything; this is why [with the compound svānandaghanatayā,

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers therefore endeavour to show that in fact perception

sarvam tu vastuto vimarśātmakapramātr̥ svabhāvatādātmyāhamparāma-

81 svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśam vidur anyathā / prakāśo’rthoparakto’pi

intermediary state (madhyāvasthā), [which constitutes] objectivity, [and] in

According to Abhinavagupta, any perception, at its very beginning and end –

85 Cf. Bhāskarī, I, 243: pūrvāparakotyoh – grahanecchāsamaye grahanānantaram ca,

ātmānam ata evāyam jñeyīkuryāt pr̥ thaksthiti /

This verse states the fundamental principle of the Pratyabhijñā’s idealism. It

always confronting some kind of otherness: because consciousness is inten-