CASE NO.

13
People of the Philippines vs. Floremar Retubado
GR No. L-58585, June 20, 1988
Medialdea, J:
FACTS:
The accused-appelant, Floremar Retubado , was legally married to his wife, Arcadia, and had two
children, Floremar Jr. and Raul. They were residing in a small hut built on the farm owned by Nicanora
Codeniera in Tagobon, Cebu in which Vicentica Robleca, the mother of the Arcadia, was the tenant.
On January 8, 1981, Vicentica and Nicanora harvested corn from the farm land. In the afternoon after
harvesting, Vicentica called Floremar, who was then sleeping under the hammock inside the hut, and asked
him to help bring Nicanora’s share of the corn harvest to the road. The accused refused unless he was paid
P1.00 per sack he would carry. Later, Vicentica sought the aid of her daughter, who was then breastfeeding
her 5-month old son, Raul. Thereafter, Arcadia placed Raul inside the hammock as she is about to leave to
assist Vicentica. She swing the hammock as Raul began to cry and asked her husband, who was squatting,
smoking, and picking his teeth under the hammock, to swing it instead. Arcadia and Vicentica were barely out
of the door of the hut when the accused immediately stood up and boxed Raul who was inside the hammock
twice with his clenched fists. They immediately went to rescue Raul who stopped crying and became
unconscious. Arcadia took Raul into her arms and afterwards handed him to Vicentica. Nicanora who was a
few meters away, rushed to the hut after hearing Arcadia’s call for help. She took Raul from Vicentica and
massaged him thinking that he just fainted. When Arcadia and Vicentica left leaving only her, Raul and
Floremar in the hut, she asked the accused of what he did to the child which he said he boxed him. Nicanora
noticed the bluish discoloration on the left side of the head and behind the left ear of Raul. Afraid that the
accused might leave the hut, she told the accused to carry the dead child. The accused was still holding the
dead child Raul when Vicentica arrived with the chief of police of Tabogon and two policemen. Shortly, Arcadia
also arrived with two PC soldiers. The same afternoon, the accused was brought to the Municipal building of
Tabogon where he was detained.
The following day, the body of Raul was buried without first being medically examined. On June 22,
1981, Raul’s body was exhumed and autopsied by a NBI Medico-Legal. Report stating his finding that the child
had fracture on the parietal bone at the left side of the skull which is said to be the cause of death of Raul.
The Circuit Criminal Court rendered a decision convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide due to aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, relationship
and disregard of tender age having been proven yet not having been offset by any mitigating circumstance.
The accused was sentenced to suffer extreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
baby, Raul Retubado, in the sum of P12,000, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, the court committed errors in convicting the accused on the following:
I. In convicting appellant of parricide without taking due regard of his testimony that he was sleeping
at the time of alleged commission of the crime
II. In not taking due regard of the temporary insanity or absence of discernment of appellant,
assuming his claim to being asleep was weak
III. Not appreciating in appellant’s favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack
of intent to commit so grave an offense, as well as in not finding that no aggravating circumstance
in fact was proven nor do they exist.
RULING:
The accused’s defense was that he was asleep at the time of the death of the child and that the latter
may have died of colic or by holding his breath. However, no clear evidence show that child suffered from this
disease before, thus the defense is untenable. The testimonials of the three prosecution witnesses, Arcadia,
Vicentica and Nicanora, categorically and positively declared that they actually saw the accused deliver fistic
blow on the child inside the hammock and/or the resulting injuries inflicted on the latter, in which the NBI
Medico-Legal confirmed in his findings that the cause of the child’s death was “skull fracture, traumatic” and
testified that the injury could have been caused by a fistic blow applied with tremendous force. The accused
points out that Arcadia could have not actually seen the delivery of the fist blow as she was already on her way
down the stairs. However, the witness explained that she had already looked back at the accused prior to the
delivery of the first blow. The hut is also small and had stairs with two steps only that Arcadia could have
actually seen what the accused did. Also, the admissions made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense tend to show that he was wide awake and in full possession of his normal senses
when he killed his child. The claim of the accused for the benefit of exempting circumstances of temporary
insanity or total absence of discernment assuming that he was awake when he killed his child since he has no
motive to commit the crime is untenable. The accused did not invoke the said defense during trial, much less
present evidence in support thereof.
The accused did not escape and instead remained after killing his child cannot be considered as
voluntary surrender to the authorities since the police arrived to the crime scene not upon his behest but
because they were called by Arcadia and Vicentica. Also, he cannot be credited with the mitigating
citcumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. He ought have known that boxing a 5-month old
child twice will full force would result to great physical harm or even death.
The court a quo considered four aggraviating circumstances in the commission of the offense, namely:
treachery, use of superior strength, relationship and disregard of tender age. However, use of superior strength
and disregard of age cannot be appreciated as additional aggravating circmstances, but as included in that of
treachery, which is the the killing of the 5-month old Raul.
Under Article 26 of Revised Penal Code, one guilty of parricide shall be punished by penalty rangibg from
reclusion perpetua to death. Since death penalty was abolished in the 1987 Constitution, tge proper penalty for
the offense is only reclusion perpetua.
On the decision of the Supreme Court, the crime commited with one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance. The proper penalty to be imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid by the accused yo the heirs of the deceased, Raul, was increased from P12,000.00 to
P30,000.00. The judgement appealed from is affirmed in allrespects, with costs.
CASE NO. 15
People of the Philippines vs. Sofronio Amoto
GR No. L-282873, January 18, 1982
Fernandez, J:

FACTS:
On October 11, 1965 in Agusan Pequeno,Butuan City, about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, while Carmelita
Dangculos was listening to the radio, she felt the house shaking a little. A few moments later she heard
someone shouting for help. The voice was ascertained to that of Milagros by Carmelita and her sister
Venturada who was then washing clothes. Carmelita is living in an extension of the house (separated only by a
wooden partition) of the accused Sofronio Amoto where the latter lived with his common-law wife Amalia
Florendo, and the latter's two (2) children, Arsenic Pagalan and Milagros Pagalan. Upon looking out of the
window, Carmelita and Venturada saw Milagros covering her breasts with her left arm and her mouth was
oozing with blood. She was going towards the house of Ildefonso Goldemaro,their neighbor, only about five to
six meters away. Later they saw Milagros coming down from the house of Ildefonso Goldemaro with the latter
assisting her as she walked toward the street.

Wilfredo Aparre, a member of the City Police Department of Butuan City was then about 25 meters from the
scene of the aforementioned incident. When he saw that Milagros was wounded, he asked her what happened
to her and Milagros replied that she was raped and stabbed by her Daddy. About 12:00 o'clock noon of that
same day, he arrested the accused.

Milagros Pagalan died as she reached the hospital where she had been taken by Ildefonso Goldemaro. In an
autopsy report, findings show that the body of Milagros is in a state of rigor mortis with multiple stab wounds
mostly on the anterior chest walls. Deceased wore a straight cut dress with no underwear (panty). She got
abrasions on her right elbow and knuckle, several stab wounds on the different parts of her body, lacerated
wound on her left hand, and that the cause of death is shock, severe internal hemorrhage secondary to stab
wounds of the chest.

In the afternoon of the same day, a statement in question-and-answer form was given by the accused in which
he admitted that he had killed Milagros in the reason being that when he advised her to behave as a woman,
she replied demurely and therefore he stabbed her with a pair of scissors about six (6) times after he had first
gone down from the house and drank intoxicating liquor. He signed the statement under oath before a special
counsel. However, on October 14, another statement was signed and subscribed by the accused before a
Special Counsel, in which he denied the truth of the reasons why he had killed Milagros Pagalan as given by
him in his previous affidavit of October 11, 1965. On his statement, he said that he had sexual intercourse with
Milagros in the house when they were left alone when his wife would leave for work. While in the act of sexual
intercourse, Milagros noticed that there was somebody in the other room and she shouted for help; he told her
to keep quite but she shouted again, whereupon he forgot himself and stabbed her repeatedly with a pair of
scissors he found near the table; because Milagros was held tight in his arms, she was not able to escape, and
he kept on stabbing her until they both fell on the floor where he continued to stab her; afterwards she
managed to escape and run towards the house of Ildefonso Goldemar.

The Court of First instance of Agusan, Branch II renders judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. That accused is sentenced to maximum penalty of death by
electrocution, to indemnify heirs of the deceased Milagros the sum of P12,000.00 and pay the costs.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, the trial court committed errors on judgment
RULING:

The accused contends that he should have been convicted of homicide with two mitigating circumstances in
his favor: 1) lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed; and 2) voluntary surrender. The
trial court correctly convicted him of murder. However, the court’s reasoning is that there is present qualifying
circumstance of premeditation or treachery in the commission of the crime and the crime herein committed by
the accused is murder for the accused insure its due execution and the deceased could not have defended
herself because of unexpected attack. Contrary to the finding of the court that in the commission of the crime,
the accused took advantage of his superior strength that qualifies the killing as murder. The attack made by the
accused, a man of 33 years, with a deadly weapon such as the pair of scissors in the instant case, upon an
unarmed and defenseless young woman of 15 years, constitutes the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. It was likewise error for the trial court to consider abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating
circumstance after holding that there was treachery, since the latter, had there been one, absorbs the former.

The contention of the accused that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong is equally without merit.
Intention, being an internal state must be judged by external acts, that is, by considering the weapon used, the
part of the body injured, the injury inflicted, the manner it is inflicted, and the attitude of the mind when the
accused attacked the deceased. The evidence shows that the accused repeatedly stabbed Milagros on the
chest, left side of the neck and inflicted two lacerated wounds on her left hand, with a pair of scissors, while
holding her in tight embrace. It is clear that the accused intended to do exactly what he did and must be held
responsible for the consequences of his act. He cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong.

The accused further claims that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he
was on his way to the police station to surrender when he was arrested by Patrolman Aparre. This claim is not
substantiated, for evidence shows that when Patrolman Aparre was asked why the accused was then going to
the police station, he replied that 'according to him he will deliver a certain note coming from the deceased'.
The accused himself never testified that he was on his way to the police station in order to surrender. It
becomes harder to believe that the accused ever thought of voluntarily surrendering to the police authorities in
the light of the statement of Ildefonso Goldemaro to the effect that he asked the accused to help him carry
Milagros (who died before reaching the hospital) but he declined to do so.

The crime committed by the accused is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength, punishable under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed should be that in its medium
period, reclusion perpetua.

Therefore, the Court affirmed with the sole modification that the accused is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs.
CASE NO. 16
People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Castro
GR No. L-38989, October 29, 1982
Escolin, J:
FACTS:

In the afternoon of November 17, 1971, one Ferdinand Recoco, was boxed in the middle of the street
by then the barrio captain of San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur. The appellant said that he boxed Ferdinand
because he was angered when he saw Ferdinand box his 4-year old son, Ely. That evening, Ferdinand
developed a fever; and the following morning, a doctor treated Ferdinand for fever and inflammation of the right
eye. When the boy's condition showed no sign of improvement after four days of treatment, the family was
advised that the boy be taken to an eye specialist. On November 25, 1971, Ferdinand was brought to the
provincial hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur, where he was treated. On December 5, 1971, 13 days after the
incident, he died. Autopsy report shows that Septicemia secondary to pan-opthalmitis due to trauma is the
cause of death.

According to the prosecution, Ferdinand, appellant boxed him with his left fist, hitting him on the right
eye, followed by another fist blow on the left temple and a "karate chop" below the right ear. While according to
the accused, he hit Ferdinand on the face and pushed him aside. Thereafter Ferdinand ran away.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, the conviction for the crime of murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed
upon the accused is due?

Whether or not, trial court failed to appreciate the extenuating circumstances of defense of his son and
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong?

RULING:

For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be established that the means,
method or manner of execution of the offense was deliberately and consciously adopted in order to make it
impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Appellant had neither the opportunity nor
the reason to plan or deliberate on the mode of execution of the crime because he undoubtedly acted at the
impulse of the moment. Instinctively, he lifted a hand when he saw his 4-year old son being boxed by a bigger
boy. Clearly, the method of attack he adopted was not consciously chosen to facilitate the execution of the
crime without risk to himself. The appellant vehemently denied having delivered several fist blows and a
"Karate chop" on Ferdinand, claiming that he hit the latter only once on the face after which he pushed him
which was corroborated by Teofilo Caser, one of the witnesses. Treachery must therefore be ruled out.

Moreover, no basis in the physical evidence adduced at the trial that the deceased suffered several fist
blows. Doctors could not find any other lesion, abrasion or contusion on the body of the deceased aside from
the fever and inflammation of the right eye. The testimonies of these doctors strongly corroborate the defense
version that appellant merely gave one fist blow on the deceased. The findings of doctors strongly sustain the
conclusion that these subsequent blows were not sufficiently forceful as to produce even the slightest
contusion in the areas where the deceased was allegedly hit.
Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the appellant's act was executed, as well as the
marked disproportion between the means employed and the ultimate consequence thereof, the appellant's
claim that he merely intended to chastise Ferdinand, and not to do away with him, deserves the fullest
credence. On this premise, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be
appreciated in his favor.

But in passing judgment upon his criminal liability, it behooves the Court to consider the cause or motive that
impelled him to act as did. As aptly put by Cresencia herself, appellant committed the offense because he was
"carried away by the impetus of the moment." She further declared that, as proof of appellant's remorse, he
accompanied her to the hospital and volunteered to give his share on the medical and hospital expenses; and
that when the eye specialist gave a prescription for Ferdinand's medication, appellant voluntarily bought the
medicine.

Under the circumstances aforementioned, appellant is guilty only of the crime of homicide, mitigated by two
mitigating circumstances, to wit: (1) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; and (2) passion and
obfuscation.

Wherefore, the judgment was modified in the sense that appellant Romeo Castro was declared guilty of the
crime of homicide; and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased Ferdinand
Recoco in the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs.