REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS

(JUDGE DEBALUCOS)

accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that We

do not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with
Remedial-Law-Revie concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply
w-2-Evidence.docx the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance
of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the
I. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
other. The Military Commission is without power or authority
to hear and determine the particular offense charged against
1. PEOPLE VS MARIANO respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction
between it and respondent court to speak of. Estafa as
Principle:
described in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. SM-
649 falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
 It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The conferment of
jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived
exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the 2. HONRALES VS HONRALES (G.R.182651
forum. 8/25/2010)
Facts: Principle :

The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an  Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
Information accusing private respondent herein Hermogenes Information is filed, it is there retained.
Mariano, Liaison Officer of incumbent Municipal Mayor, Facts:
Constantino Nolasco, of estafa for misappropriating and
Respondent Jonathan Honorales was charged of parricide when
converting to his own personal use and benefit items valued at
she shot her wife, Jane Honorales. Assistant City Prosecutor
$717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to USAID/NEC, to the damage
Rebagay then issued a recommendation of withdrawing the
and prejudice of the said owner in the said sum of $717,50 or
parricide and instead respondent be charged only of reckless
P4,797.35. In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the
imprudence resulting to parricide.
items which were the subject matter of the Information against
him were the same items for which Mayor Constantino A.
While the motion to withdraw the information was still
Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, was
pending, a new information for reckless imprudence was filed
indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of
with the MTC against respondent. The heirs meanwhile filed for
malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco
a petition for review with the Office of the President for the
had been found guilty. He argued that inasmuch as the case
downgrading of the offense. While the motion to withdraw was
against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by the Military
still pending, respondent pleaded guilty and was found guilty
Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had lost
with the MTC for reckless imprudence. He also filed a motion to
jurisdiction over the case against him.
dismiss his parricide case with the RTC citing that his
ISSUE: Whether or not civil courts and military commissions arraignment and judgment as grounds for dismissal.
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of
goods valued at not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly Heirs then filed a certiorari with the CA as the RTC judge
committed by a civilian granted respondent's motion to withdraw arguing that an
appeal was still pending. CA denied the certiorari and cited that
HELD: double jeopardy would attach.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it Petitioner argues that MTC did not acquire jurisdiction and it
lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent remained in the RTC.
Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against
Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and
malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the
Issue : Whether MeTC or RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
case now before us the accused in one is different from the

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Held:
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal
case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino
v. Cruz, Jr., we held that once jurisdiction is acquired by the
court in which the Information is filed, it is there
retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional
parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no
jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC
having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of
all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in
contemplation of law and can never become executory.
3. SERNA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Principle :
 P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
Facts:
Serana is a government scholar and a student regent of the
University of the Phillipines charged with Estafa . While in the
performance of her official functions, she represented to former
President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the
UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested
the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a
public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a
member in representation of the student body since she merely
represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and
did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she
does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the
BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines
reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
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belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university. It is
well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act
only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the
case of non-stock corporations.
Issue: Whether a government scholar and UP student regent
is a public officer.
Held:
Yes.
First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of
P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.
4. PEOPLE VS MONTEJO (108 SCRA 652)
Principle:
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 It is apparent from these allegations that, although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder
in abstract, as committed by the main respondents
herein, according to the amended information, the
offense therein charged is intimately connected with
their respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent
Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he
was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
In this case, the crime of murder was in relation to public office
because the killing of Teban was under the command of Mayor
Brown along with his order to establish a sub-camp in Tipotipo
Basilan. It is by his position wherein he order the arrest of
Teban, torture and killing him eventually. And to justify such
killing, Mayor Brown ordered for a simulation military
encounter to justify that Teban was killed due to a legitimate
police operation.
5. BARRIGA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(4/26/2005)

Facts:
Principle:

Respondent Montejo is a Court of First Instance Judge of

 Rep. Act No. 8249,[13] which amended Section 4 of
Zamboanga City. The other respondents which are accused in
Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that
this case are public officer. Mayo Leroy Brown is the City Mayor
the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
of Basilan City, while the others are police officers. Accused
crimes and felonies committed by public officers and
were charged in the information of a crime of murder. The
employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the
Judge in this case, allowed Senator Roseller Lim to be the
five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of
counsel for the accused. The prosecution filed a certiorari and
the commission of such crimes.[14] There are two
prohibition to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
classes of public office-related crimes under
Respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to
subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249:
lack of jurisdiction when he allowed a Senator to be the counsel
first, those crimes or felonies in which the public office
of the accused and excluding relevant evidence for the
is a constituent element as defined by statute and the
prosecution. Under the 1935 Constitution, a senator is
relation between the crime and the offense is such
prohibited to appear in court as counsel for the accused
that, in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot
wherein a government official is tried for a crime in relation to
exist without the office;[15] second, such offenses or
his office.
felonies which are intimately connected with the
public office and are perpetrated by the public officer
Issue: Is the crime of murder has a semblance of relation to the or employee while in the performance of his official
public office of a public officer? functions, through improper or irregular conduct.[16]

Ruling:  The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over

Yes.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-
defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City.
criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the
first classification. Considering that the public office of
the accused is by statute a constituent element of the
crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to
state in the Information specific factual allegations of
the intimacy between the office and the crime charged,
or that the accused committed the crime in the
performance of his duties. However, the
Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed
by the public officers and employees enumerated in
Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second classification if
the Information contains specific factual allegations
showing the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the public office of the accused, and the
discharge of his official duties or functions - whether
improper or irregular.[17] The requirement is not
complied with if the Information merely alleges that

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the accused committed the crime charged in relation
to his office because such allegation is merely a
conclusion of law.[18]
Facts:
Petitioner is in this case is one of the accused pending with the
Sandiganbayan for a crime of malversation of public funds and
technical malversation. Petitioner is a Municipal Accountant of
Carmen, Cebu while his co accused is the Mayor of Carmen Cebu
were conspiring with each other to commit the crime. The
Office of the Ombudsman filed an information and later on filed
a motion to amend the information which the SB allowed.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction because his
salary is only Salary Grade 24. Furthermore, he cannot be
charged as liable to malversation because he is not an
accountable officer. The motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan and thus petitioner resorted to Rule 65 to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction
over the case?
Ruling:
Yes.
The municipal mayor is SG 27 and being an accountant
conspiring with the mayor, it is immaterial that petitioner is
only SG 24 and not an accountable officer.
Rep. Act No. 8249,[13] which amended Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan
has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by
public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to
any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of
the commission of such crimes.[14] There are two classes of
public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section
4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which
the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute
and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that,
in a legal sense, the offense committed cannot exist without the
office;[15] second, such offenses or felonies which are
intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated
by the public officer or employee while in the performance of
his official functions, through improper or irregular
conduct.[16]
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving crimes and felonies under the first classification.
Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a
constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for
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the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual
allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime
charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the
performance of his duties. However, the Sandiganbayan
likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and
employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the
second classification if the Information contains specific factual
allegations showing the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the
discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper
or irregular.[17] The requirement is not complied with if the
Information merely alleges that the accused committed the
crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is
merely a conclusion of law.[18]
6. LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (301
SCRA 298)
Principle:
 The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.
Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information,[61] and not by the evidence presented
by the parties at the trial.
 As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in
relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal
cases committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law. This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction
as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Another principle:
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While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories
after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is
alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing
that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden
mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the
amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph
of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places
far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accuseds
official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential
element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.
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Facts:
Petitioner in this case was charged as an accessory of the crime
murder of Kuratong Baleleng. Petitioners and other accused
were charged for the crime of multiple murder before the
Sandiganbayan on the alleged shoot out that killed 25 members
of the Kuratong Baleleng. At the time the information was filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, the
rank of PNP Chief Superentendent (the rank of the petitioner)
was not included in the nomenclature of officers wherein
Sandiganbayan have exclusive original jurisdiction of crimes
committed in relation to his office.
The information was amended with the following wordings:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL
L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA,
PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of
the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Codecommitted as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of their public
and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and
using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused
his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said victim.
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That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT.
ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG
committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein
as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein
above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The accused filed a motion to quash information on the ground
that SB have no jurisdiction over them. SB issued a resolution
transferring the case of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Before the trial at the RTC commenced, a law was passed by
Congress and signed by the President amending the
Sandiganbayan Law which includes the rank of Chief
Superintendent in the nomenclature of public officers triable
with the SB. Furthermore, in its transitory provision, it states
that those cases which are cognizable with the SB but pending
before the RTC and the trial in the RTC have not yet started, the
Sandiganbayan will have the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to try the case.
The Sandiganbayan took cognizance with the case. Hence the
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court for
certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
NO.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories
after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is
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alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing
that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden
mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the
amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph
of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places
far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accuseds
official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential
element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan was ordered by the Supreme Court
to transfer the case to the RTC Quezon City.
7. PEOPLE VS YADAO (265 SCRA 204)
Facts:
A number of high ranking police officers (including Panfilo
Lacson) were implicated in the murder of 11 alleged members
of the Kuratong-baleleng gang.
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The case was filed with the regular court. However, evidence
were submitted showing that two of the deceased victims are
minors. This prompted the prosecution to amend the
information and file motion for re-raffle of the case with the
family court. The motion was denied on the ground that the
minor-victims were already dead.
Issue: WON the family court has jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5
of R.A. 8369, that vest in family court’s jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases
where the victim is a minor. Thus:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases: a) Criminal cases where one or more of the
accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine
(9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor
at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if
the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and
ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have
incurred.
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law
but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For
this reason, when the need for such protection is not
compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people
wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As
respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the
murder cases that require the special attention and protection
of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in
those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented
by their parents who had become the real private offended
parties.
8. GARCIA VS DRILON (VAWC CASE)
Facts:
Ms. Garcia filed an application for TRO against her husband,
pursuant to R.A. 9262 (VAWC). She claimed to be a victim of
violence. The RTC (acting as family court) granted the
application.
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Thus, Mr. Garcia filed before the CA a petition for prohibition
and assails the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the
due process and equal protection clauses. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity, i.e., at the trial in the family court. The petitioner,
on the other hand avers that it could not raise the issue of
constitutionality before the family court as it would constitute
a collateral attack on the statute and that the family court acting
as a special court has no authority to determine issue of
constitutionality.
Issue: Does the family court, acting on special jurisdiction have
the authority to pass on the constitutionality of VAWC?
Ruling:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A.
8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what the valid and binding laws are by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in
this Court, but in all RTCs.
II. RULE 110 (PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES)
9. PANAGUITON VS DOJ (11/25/2008)
Facts:
Cawili and Tongson borrowed money from Panaguiton and
later issued checks as payment. But checks were dishonored.
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After the 1995 demand to pay failed, Panaguiton filed a

complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22
before the Prosecutor's Office on June 1995.
The DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions took the case 9 years on
preliminary investigation stage until it finally settle the issue
holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act.
No. 3326 (which gives the BP22 a prescription of 4 years).
It states that in this case the 4 year period started on the date
the checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in
the prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period as the law (RA 3326) contemplates judicial
and not administrative proceedings.
Issue: Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for violation
of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately
entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws
which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. Thus;
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22.
An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by
a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or,
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the
filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
prescriptive period.
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings"
in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-
up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers
to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any
kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be
sufficient to toll prescription.
10. SEC VS INTERPORT (10/6/2008)
PRICIPLE:
 It is well settled that every law has in its favor the
presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and
unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all
intents and purposes.
 It is an established doctrine that a preliminary
investigation interrupts the prescription period.
FACTS:
Securities and Exchange Commission ordered an Omnibus
order which aims to create a special investigation panel to
investigate an insider trading.
Respondents then filed a petition before the CA questioning the
Omnibus Order. CA granted their motion and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, which effectively enjoined the SEC from
filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against the
respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the absence of implementing rules of
Revised Securities Act violates due process and equal
protection of the respondents. (NO)
2. Whether the instant case has already prescribed. (NO,
PI interrupts the prescriptive period)
RULING:
1. In the absence of any constitutional or statutory
infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these
provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that
every law has in its favor the presumption of
validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law
is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is
valid and binding for all intents and purposes. The
mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively
invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power
to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability
of lawmakers providing general regulations for various and

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varying details of management. To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress,
such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying
the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob
the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. It
is well established that administrative authorities have the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules
and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed
by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general
policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive
prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the
statute. Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation.
The Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled
that no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be
had against the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of
implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and
complete by themselves. Their requirements are specifically
set out, and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In
particular, Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the
registration of securities and the particular matters which need
to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to
exempt the respondent IRC from such requirements. The lack
of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these
provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to
prevent the SEC from exercising its authority to investigate
respondents for violation of Section 8 of the Revised Securities
Act.
2. Respondents have taken the position that this case is
moot and academic, since any criminal complaint that
may be filed against them resulting from the SECs
investigation of this case has already prescribed. They
point out that the prescription period applicable to
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offenses punished under special laws, such as
violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years
under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Act. Since the offense
was committed in 1994, they reasoned that
prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this
case moot. Such position, however, is incongruent with
the factual circumstances of this case, as well as the
applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation
interrupts the prescription period. A preliminary investigation
is essentially a determination whether an offense has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause for the
accused to have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime,
to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed or whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is
entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of
Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the
authority to make such investigations as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated or is about to
violate any provision of this Act XXX. After a finding that a
person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may
refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and
entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply
be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan, this Court enunciated
that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC, which
determines the existence of probable cause, before a
preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In
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the aforecited case, the complaint filed directly with the DOJ
was dismissed on the ground that it should have been filed first
with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of the
Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for
criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the
Revised Securities Act.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by
commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the
preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses
punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with
the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the
SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is
made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by
the SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts
of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription
period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such
investigation would surely interrupt the prescription
period.
11. JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM VS LIDUA,
SR. (G.R. 169588 10/7/2013) CITY
ORDINANCE
PRICIPLE:
 Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary
Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not
on any date before that.
FACTS:
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were
filed with the MTC Baguio City.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused filed a
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation which sought the
quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds:
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on
respondents with more than one offense.
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Respondent Judge Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the MTC of
Baguio City, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed MR but was denied.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with
the RTC of Baguio City. Petitioners argued that the respondent
judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for
the offenses charged against the private respondents was
halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and
not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
RTC of Baguio dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It held that,
since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced
by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription
period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations
against the respondents in court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of the
commission of the offense charged against respondents. (NO)
RULING:
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the
substantive law and the procedural rules governing the
prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides
any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as
amended does not apply.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription
for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without
question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.
12. REODICA VS CA  PUNISHED BY RPC BUT
COVERED BY SUMMARY PROCEDURE
PRICIPLE:
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 The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended
to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter
of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code,
the latter prevails.
FACTS:
An information was filed before the RTC of Makati charging
petitioner (Reodica) with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial then ensued.
RTC rendered a decision convicting petitioner of the quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
with slight physical injuries, and sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
complainant, Norberto Bonsol, the sum of P13,542 without
subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the CA. After her
motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and
to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants
Brief. However, respondent CA denied this motion and directed
petitioner to file her brief.
CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
questioned for the first time on appeal. (NO)
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the offenses in question. (NO, MTC-BP 129)
3. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already
prescribed. (NO)
RULING:
1.
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Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that
the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer
question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one
information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of
them
2.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless
the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment.
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law
in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section 32(2) thereof
provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then
determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The
question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries.
3.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light
felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
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imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five
years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have
already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the
filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the
incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive
period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by
any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the
complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation
only or for an action on the merits. Thus, in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals and People v. Cuaresma, this Court held that the filing of
the complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running
of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the
instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a
complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and
Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean
that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a
complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a
matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule
on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the
Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be
recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended,
entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
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Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under
Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only
when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period
was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a
judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in the proper
court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the
Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings
in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period
for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing
of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the
vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination
of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of
prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this
case.
13. PEOPLE VS MANABA
PRINCIPLE:
 Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the
second time or not when he was tried in the present
case depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid
complaint in the first case.
 The first complaint filed against the defendant was
signed and sworn to by the chief of police. As it was not
the complaint of the offended party, it was not a valid
complaint in accordance with the law. The judgment of
the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and the defendant was never
in jeopardy.
FACTS:
On May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete subscribed
and swore to a criminal complaint charging Pedro Manaba with
the crime of rape, committed against Celestina Adapon before
the justice of the peace of Dumaguete and in due course, the
case reached the CFI. The accused was tried and convicted, but
on motion of the defendant’s attorney, the judgment was set
aside and the case dismissed on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject
matter of the action, because the complaint had not been filed
by the offended party, but by the chief of police (Criminal case
No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to
a complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This
was filed in the CFI (Criminal case No. 1872), but was referred
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to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary
investigation. The defendant waived his right to the
preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that he had previously been placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was denied by the
justice of the peace, and the case was remanded to the CFI
where the provincial fiscal in an information charged the
defendant with having committed the crime of rape.
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on
the ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and
upon the termination of the trial, the defendant was found
guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory penalties of
the law, to indemnify the offended party, in the amount of P500,
to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until said
offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can invoke double jeopardy.
RULING:
No. Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the
second time or not when he was tried in the present case
depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in
the first case. The offense in question was committed on May 9,
1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised Penal Code
became effective.
The third paragraph of the article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, which relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads
as follows:
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not found in the
Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of
the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and
sworn to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the
complaint of the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with the law. The judgment of the court was
therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was
set aside and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's
attorney, who subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy
in the present case.
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14. PEOPLE VS FLORES (12/7/2002)
PRINCIPLE:
 It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent
which must be set forth in the complaint or
information with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In other words, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged, the accused being presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
FACTS:
Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong was charged for two
counts of rape of his then 11 year old daughter. The criminal
complaint read as follows: “That xxxxxxxxx the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse
the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11
years old, all against her will.”
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.
After trial, the court found him guilty of Statutory Rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death in each case. In
view of the penalty of death imposed by the trial court, the case
reached before the SC on automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was denied of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
RULING:
Yes. It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted
complaints, that accused-appellant was denied the
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. This right has the following
objectives:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against further prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had.
The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence,
it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against
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the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged
or necessarily included in the complaint or information.
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory
Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R. A. No. 7659 (which restored the death penalty for heinous
crimes effective December 31, 1993) which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.--- Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman under the
circumstances enumerated in the penal code. Thus, to sustain a
conviction, the complaint or information must allege that the
accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with the
private complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar,
however, no such allegation was made.
The allegation that accused-appellant did sexually abuse
Filipina does not suffice. In the recent case of People v. Lito
Egan alias Akiao, this Court ruled that although the
prosecution has proved that [the therein private complainant]
Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is
inadequate to establish carnal knowledge. Hence, sexual abuse
cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse. The allegation in the instant criminal complaints
that accused-appellant sexually abuse[d] the private
complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the
private complainant.
This Court is not unaware of the rule in case there is a variance
between allegation and proof as etched in Section 4 of Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof.When there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between
allegation and proof. The recital of facts in the criminal
complaints simply does not properly charge rape, sexual abuse
not being an essential element or ingredient thereof.
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Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter under our penal
laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. For every crime
is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in
the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances.
In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation
of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act),accused-appellant cannot be held
liable.
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, issued pursuant to Section
32 of Republic Act No. 7610, defines sexual abuse by inclusion
as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion,
enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or 2) the molestation, 3) prostitution, or
4) incest with children. (Underscoring supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that
the phrase sexually abuse in the criminal complaints at bar does
not comply with the requirement that the complaint must
contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime. Notably, the phrase sexual abuse is not used under
R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate
offense. Section 5 of said law enumerates the punishable acts
that must be alleged in the complaint or information to hold an
accused liable, none of which is reflected in the complaints at
bar charging accused-appellant.
15. PEOPLE VS VALDESANCHO (1/30/2001)
PRINCIPLE:
 The Court has many times declared that the date of
commission of the rape is not an essential element of
the crime. While this is true in the cases at bar, the
dates when the rapes were committed are nonetheless
essential to the accused defense of alibi.
 In all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict an accused for an
offense not alleged in the complaint or information
violates such right.
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FACTS:
Vicente Valdesancho y Delmo is the husband of Elvie's sister,
Erlinda. Elvie and her two younger brothers, Erick and Eddie,
lived with their brother. In 1994, however, Elvie's mother,
Leonida Basco, requested the spouses Valdesancho to let Elvie,
Erick and Eddie live in their house. The three were going to
study in Barangay San Antonio. They resided with the accused
from 24 June 1994 to June 1995. Elvie was then 14 years old
and in Grade 1.
The first incident of rape happened in the early morning of 15
August 1994. Elvie was in the house of Valdesancho while
Erlinda was then in Manila. Valdesancho succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Elvie, subsequent to Valdesancho's order
to powder his back. Valdesancho warned her not to reveal the
dastardly act to anybody, otherwise he would kill her and her
family. All this time, Elvie's brothers were sleeping in the other
room.
The second incident of rape happened in the evening of 16
August 1994. Elvie was in the house of Valdesancho studying.
He called Elvie to his room and ordered her to look under the
bed for a chick. Valdesancho again had carnal knowledge of her
against her will. Again, Valdesancho threatened Elvie not to
report the incident to anybody, otherwise he would kill her and
her family. Elvie kept her harrowing experience to herself for
fear that Valdesancho would carry out his threat.
In September 1995, however, when Elvie was already residing
with her brother and mother, she reported the rape incidents
to her Tiya Soling. She was fearful that Valdesancho might rape
her again. Tiya Soling reported the rape incidents to Elvie's
mother who verified the story from Elvie herself. On 15 January
1996, Elvie executed a sworn statement at the Mabitac Police
Station narrating the rape incidents. On 27 March 1996, two
informations were filed against Valdesancho. The accused
denied the rape charges leveled against him. He contends that
Elvie, with the assistance of her mother Leonida, filed the
instant cases against him because of the serious quarrel
between his wife, Erlinda, and Leonida spurred by Leonida's
relationship with a lesbian named Melita Flores. The trial court
upheld the prosecution's story. The court found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "rape" and
sentenced him to 2 Reclusion Perpetua. Valdesancho appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valdesancho was denied of due process
when he was convicted for rape allegedly committed on August
15 and 16, 1993, when the information alleged such rapes were
committed on August 15 and 16, 1994.
RULING:
Yes. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates
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that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without
due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took effect on 1
December 2000, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it
is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. To convict an accused
for an offense not alleged in the complaint or information
violates such right.
The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of the
charges against him was explained by this Court as early as
1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen, viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place,
names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the
crime charged."
In the cases at bar, the informations in Criminal Case No. S-1964
and Criminal Case No. S-1965 charged the accused with rape
committed against Elvie Basco on August 15, 1994 and August
16, 1994, respectively. All evidence of the prosecution tried to
prove that the victim was raped by the accused on these dates.
The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He proved that on
these dates he was in the town of Sta. Maria helping a friend
butcher a pig for the town fiesta. He also proved that on said
dates, the victim, Elvie, was no longer living with them in
Mabitac, Laguna. She already transferred to Minayutan, Famy,
Laguna where she was in Grade 2. Despite the parties evidence,
the trial court convicted the accused for allegedly raping Elvie
on August 15 and 16, 1993. Without doubt, the accused was not
given any chance to prove where he was on August 15 and 16,
1993. What he did was to prove where he was on August 15 and
16, 1994 for the informations charged him with rapes on those
specific dates. He had no opportunity to defend himself on the
rapes allegedly committed on the earlier dates. This is plain
denial of due process.
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16. PEOPLE VS MENDEZ (G.R. 179962
6/11/2014)
PRINCIPLE:
 Amendments that do not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original one; or do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume are considered merely
as formal amendments.
 The jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment of an information
pertains to the availability of the same defense and
evidence that the accused previously had under the
original information. This test, however, must be read
together with the characteristic thread of formal
amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the
crime or the essence of the offense charged.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Mendez has been operating as a single proprietor
under the trade names Mendez Body and Face Salon and Spa,
Mendez Body and Face Skin Clinic, Weigh Less Center and
Mendez Weigh Less Center. BIR filed a complaint against
petitioner for failure to file his income tax returns for taxable
years 2001 to 2003. In his defense, he admitted that he has been
operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in
Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he
countered that he did not file his income tax returns in these
places because his business establishments were registered
only in 2003, thus, were not yet in existence at the time of his
alleged failure to file his income tax return.
An Information was filed against him with the CTA for violation
of Section 255 of RA No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997) which
reads:
“That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City,
and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named
accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of
"Weigh Less Center" with principal office at No. 31 Roces
Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon
City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income
Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08,
exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest.”
The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on March 5,
2007. On May 4, 2007, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Amend
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Information with Leave of Court."The amended information
reads:
“That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City,
and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named
accused, doing business under the name and style of "Weigh
Less Center"/Mendez Medical Group", with several
branches in Quezon City, Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong
City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for income earned for the
taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08,
exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring
and boldfacing in the original)”
Petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the
required period; thus, the CTA First Division granted the
prosecution’s motion. He then assails the validity of the
amended information contending that the prosecution’s
amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not prosecution’s amendments made after
the arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be
denied.
RULING:
No.
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial
amendment. According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in
the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. Under Section 14 Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, the prosecution
is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the
nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought
before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification
under the second paragraph of Section 14.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however,
Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial
amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice
the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life
during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against
him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins
to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the
recitals in the information read to him during arraignment,
then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the
same information.
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Amendments that do not charge another offense different from
that charged in the original one; or do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are
considered merely as formal amendments.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution
pertains to (i) the alleged change in the date in the commission
of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase
"doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical
Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of
petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for
income earned." We cannot see how these amendments would
adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as
accused.
I. The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002
and the addition of the phrase "for income
earned"
At the outset we note that the actual year of the commission of
the offense has escaped both the petitioner and prosecution. In
its Motion to Amend the Information, the prosecution
mistakenly stated that the information it originally filed alleged
the commission of the offense as "on or about the 15th day of
April, 2001" – even if the record is clear that that the actual year
of commission alleged is 2002. The petitioner makes a similar
erroneous allegation in its petition before the Court.
Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007 resolution, denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA implicitly
ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in the
information by correctly citing what the original information
alleges. This, notwithstanding, the petitioner still baselessly
belaboured the point in its present petition by citing the
erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion to amend
instead of the original information itself. This kind of legal
advocacy obviously added nothing but confusion to what is
otherwise a simple case and another docket to the High Court’s
overwhelming caseload.
That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains
to the year 2002 is only consistent with the allegation in the
information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable
year 2001. Since the information alleges that petitioner failed
to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the
offense could only possibly be committed when petitioner
failed to file his income tax return before the due date of filing,
which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002. Accordingly, the
addition of the phrase "for the income earned" before the
phrase "for the taxable year 2001" cannot but be a mere formal
amendment since the added phrase merely states with
additional precision something that is already contained in the
original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be
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filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable
year.
II. The addition of the phrase "doing business
under the name and style of Mendez Medical
Group and the change and/or addition of the
branches of petitioner’s operation
Under the National Internal Revenue Code, a resident citizen
who is engaged in the practice of a profession within the
Philippines is obligated to file in duplicate an income tax return
on his income from all sources, regardless of the amount of
his gross income.
Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable
years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should have filed a
consolidated return in his principal place of business,
regardless of the number and location of his other branches.
Consequently, we cannot but agree with the CTA that the
change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s
operation in the information does not constitute substantial
amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s
theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.
As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an
amendment made after he had pleaded to the original
information, Montenegro ruled that prejudice exists when
a defense under the original information would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to
the Information as amended.
Here, the prosecution’s theory of the case, i.e., that petitioner
failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001 did
not change. The prosecution’s cause for filing an information
remained the same as the cause in the original and in the
amended information. For emphasis, the prosecution’s
evidence during the preliminary investigation of the case shows
that petitioner did not file his income tax return in his place of
legal residence or principal place of business in Quezon City or
with the Commissioner. In short, the amendment sought did not
alter the crime charged.
At first, a change in the location of branches alleged in the
information may appear to deprive the petitioner of his defense
in the original information, i.e., the petitioner’s branches in
Dagupan and San Fernando were registered only in 2003 and
were therefore "in existent" in 2001. However, this is not the
kind of defense contemplated under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and broadly under the due process of law.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the opportunity given to the
accused to present his defense evidence during the preliminary
investigation is not exhaustive. In the same manner that the
complainant’s evidence during preliminary investigation is
only required to establish the minimal evidentiary threshold of
probable cause, the evidence that the respondent may present
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during trial is not limited to what he had presented during the
preliminary investigation, so long as the evidence for both
parties supports or negates the elements of the offense charged.
To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment of an information pertains to the
availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused
previously had under the original information. This test,
however, must be read together with the characteristic thread
of formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the
crime or the essence of the offense charged.
In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the
amended information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his
return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes.
Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
We also reject for lack of merit petitioner’s claim that the
inclusion of the phrase "doing business under the name and
style of Mendez Medical Group" after his preliminary
investigation and arraignment deprives him of the right to
question the existence of this "entity."
The petitioner however has not drawn our attention to any of
his related operations that actually possesses its own juridical
personality. In the original information, petitioner is described
as "sole proprietor of Weigh Less Center." A sole proprietorship
is a form of business organization conducted for profit by a
single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof,
like the petitioner-accused, to secure licenses and permits,
register the business name, and pay taxes to the national
government without acquiring juridical or legal personality of
its own.
In the amended information, the prosecution additionally
alleged that petitioner is "doing business under the name and
style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’" Given the
nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of the phrase
"doing business under the name and style" is merely
descriptive of the nature of the business organization
established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice
of his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole
proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
"entity" "Mendez Medical Group" because this entity is nothing
more than the shadow of its business owner - petitioner
himself.
17. ALMEDA VS VILLALUZ (160 PHIL 750)
PRINCIPLE:
 The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and
recidivism do not have the effect of charging another
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offense different or distinct from the charge of
qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the
information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect
in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-
matter of the case. They do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case nor possibly prejudice the form of
defense the accused has or will assume.
FACTS:
Petitioner Almeda was charged with the crime of qualified theft
in the court presided by respondent Judge Villaluz and was
recommended P15,000 bond for his provisional release to be
posted entirely in cash. In the scheduled hearing, he asked the
court toto allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash
bond. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information
imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of
Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal reiterated his
oral motion for amendment of the information so as to
include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency.
Almeda objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was
premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be
presented in court, (b) the motion to amend should have been
made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and
(c) the proposed amendment would place him in double
jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to
the information. The court nevertheless granted the
respondent fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for
reconsideration was denied. The petitioner forthwith moved
for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double
jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration
were denied in open court.
ISSUE: Whether OR NOT the amendment to the information,
after a plea of not guilty thereto, was properly allowed in both
substance and procedure.
HELD:
YES. The amendment of the information to include allegations
of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea
thereto by the accused, is valid and in no way violates his
right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against
him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
has discretion to allow amendments to the information on all
matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and during the
trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
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of the defendant. What are prohibited at this stage of the
proceedings are amendments in substance. And the substantial
matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and
recidivism do not have the effect of charging another
offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified
theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the information.
Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the
case. The said new allegations relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction.
They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor
possibly prejudice the form of defense the accused has or
will assume. Consequently, in authorizing the amendments,
the respondent judge acted with due consideration of the
petitioner's rights and did not abuse his discretion.
18. AREVALO VS NEPOMUCENO (63 PHIL
657)
PRINCIPLE:
 An amendment of form does not substantially alter the
information nor affect the rights of the accused
FACTS:
In the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, an information for
the crime of murder was filed against Bruno Arevalo and Cecilio
Arevalo, alleging that Bruno was armed with a knife and Cecilio
with a revolver. After the accused had pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment, and upon proceeding with the trial of the case on
the day fixed therefor, a witness was presented who testified
that it was Bruno who carried the revolver and Cecilio, the
knife. Alleging that according to the information it was Bruno
who carried the knife and Cecilio the revolver, the attorney for
the defense filed an objection to said testimony. The court
stated that if the fiscal did not amend the information, it would
sustain the objection. The fiscal filed an amended information
alleging that it was Bruno who carried the revolver and Cecilio
the knife. The court admitted said amendment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution so rendered be declared
null and void on the ground that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction and abused its discretion in permitting the
amendment to the information.
HELD:
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No. The court did not abuse its discretion.
The amendment to the information was merely a matter of
form. It neither affects nor alters the nature of the crime
because, whether it be Bruno or Cecilio who inflicted the mortal
wound, the crime would be the same. Neither does it affect the
extent of the liability of the appellants because, it being alleged
in the information that both accused conspired and helped each
other to commit the crime, they would be liable to the same
extent, whoever inflicted the wound which resulted in the death
of the deceased. Therefore, it is purely an amendment of form
which does not substantially alter the information nor affect the
rights of the accused.
19. US VS DELA CRUZ (3 PHIL 657)
PRINCIPLE:
 The amendment to the complaint made before the
presentation of the evidence for the defense has not
prejudiced, nor could it have prejudiced, any essential
rights of the defendants as well because it did not
affect the essence of the crime charged, but merely an
accidental detail of the same, as because it did not
deprive the accused of an opportunity to produce
evidence for their defense.
FACTS:
The defendants were prosecuted on an information for the
crime of brigandage. After the prosecution rested but before the
presentation of the evidence of the defense, the trial court
permitted the prosecuting officer to amend the information
eliminating the words "led by one Silverio" and substituting
therefor the words "under the command of Luciano San
Miguel."
The defendants were sentenced in the Court of First Instance to
the penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment for the crime of
brigandage, punished by section 1 of Act No. 518 of the
Commission. The merits of the case demonstrate sufficiently
the guilt of the said defendants and justify the sentence for the
aforementioned crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment was valid.
HELD:
Yes. It is valid.
The amendment to the complaint made before the presentation
of the evidence for the defense has not prejudiced, nor could it
have prejudiced, any essential rights of the defendants as well
because it did not affect the essence of the crime charged, but
merely an accidental detail of the same, as because it did not
deprive the accused of an opportunity to produce evidence for
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their defense, if they had desired, in relation to the said
amendment; its allowance was not, therefore, a fatal error, as
the defense contends, relying upon section 10 of General
Orders, No. 58.
20. VEGA VS PANIS
FACTS:
Felicitas Vargas filed a complaint for Attempted Rape against
Leopoldo Lazo with the CFI of Zambales. After the preliminary
investigation, the judge found that only the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness has been proven to have been committed.
Accordingly, an information charging Lazo with the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness was filed. Upon arraignment, Lazo
pleaded ‘Not Guilty.’ However, the prosecutor filed a motion to
admit an Amended Information to include an allegation that the
offense was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
“dwelling” and “night time,” which was accepted by the court.
ISSUE: WON the court had jurisdiction to allow the amendment
of the original information to Acts of Lasciviousness.
RULING:
No. Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be amended even after arraignment at the
sound discretion of the court and when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the accused. If it appears at
any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original
complaint or information and order the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not
be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
21. PEOPLE VS SOBERANO (472 SCRA 125)
FACTS:
The prominent Public relations practitioner, Salvador Dacer,
together with his driver was abducted along Zobel Roxas St.
Manila. They were killed by strangulation and their charred
remains were later found in Cavite.An information was filed by
the prosecutors charging a number of accused some of whom
are public officers of double murder. The prosecution filed a
motion to admit amended information which was granted and
admitted by the trial court.The Amended information read:xxx
“,abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL
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CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South
Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later
brought them to Indang, Cavite” Meanwhile, Villanueva filed a
motion for reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly
identified as a participant in the double murder. This was
granted. A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy,
William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now
witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp.
Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael
Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt.
Teofilo Viña.
ISSUE: The fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns
the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion
to admit amended information excluding some of the accused
named in the original information for utilization as witnesses
for the State.
RULING:
The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e.,
Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and
Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state
witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially
the offended party.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here
is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some
accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the
very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that
the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
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prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the
exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose
of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The
consequential question is, should the requirements for
discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section
17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section
14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one
provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which
excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110.
Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the
exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal
force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack
of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule
119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support
of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
determination of who should be criminally charged in court is
essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.[29] The
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department
of government whose principal power and responsibility is to
see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to
prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors.[30] By virtue of the trial court
having granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation,
the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government.[31] Having brought the
case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus
equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding
the disposition thereof.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not
boundless or infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself
that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of
utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
22. TEHANKEE VS MADAYAG (3/6/1992)
FACTS:
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Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the
crime of frustrated murder for shooting Hultman who was
comatosed some time. In the course of the trial, Hultman died.
The prosecution sought to change the information from
frustrated murder to consummated murder. Teehankee Jr.
questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary investigation
thereon .
There are three (3) questions to be answered here:
ISSUE #1: Was there an amend ment of the information or
substitut ion when the information was changed from
frustrated murder to consummated murder?
RULING: There is an amendment. “There is an identity of
offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a
variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but only a
change in the stage of execution of the same offense from
frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we
hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information
for murder is proper.”
ISSUE #2: What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial?
RULING: Formal. “An objective appraisal of the amended
information for murder filed against herein petitioner will
readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged
was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that
is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty
for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with
intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory.
There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner
may adduce under the original information for frustrated
murder equally applies to the amended information for
murder.” So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: “You shot
Hultman who almost died.” Teehankee Jr.:“W ala man ako du’n
ba! I was at home asleep!” Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now,
namatay si Hultman. Ano man ang depensa mo? Mao man
gihapon: “Wala man ako du’n!” The accused is not prejudiced
since the same defense is still available to him.
ISSUE #3: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the
new charge?
RULING: No need because you have not changed the crime. If
you change the crime or when there is substitution, kailangan
ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal
amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. “The
amended information could not conceivably have come as a
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surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and
charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8,
original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended
if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals,
facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge
preliminary investigation is not necessary.” Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for
the new informations. As earlier stated, respondent court
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the 18, 1994, hence this petition.
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
ISSUE: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
informations is null and void on the ground that there was no
amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
of the Rules of Court.
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the original RULING:
one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy,
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted
and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real
prescription.
grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original
three informations but the filing of four new informations,
three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an
additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed,
23. GALVEZ VS CA (10/24/1994)
there would obviously have been no cause for the instant
petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed
FACTS: procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and
granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original
Diego were charged in three separate informations with
informations and the consequent filing of the new ones
homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly
substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and
shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously
tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that
wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado,
had the original informations been amended so as to charge the
Jr. On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be
capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be
arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to
deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the
Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This
evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off
motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15,
with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It
1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the
really made no difference considering that where a capital
docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail
filed four new informations against herein petitioners for
becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of
new information. Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on
that—“The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss
January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of
despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
denying the motion to quash. In the meantime, and prior to the
deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The
arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an
court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the
order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is
granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners,

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either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise
cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal
from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
24. US VS INFANTE (36 PHIL 146)
PRINCIPLE:
 The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and
distinct documents. They had no relation to each other
as members of a series of instruments, so intimately
related, that the falsification of one individual of the
series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire
series. The crime of falsification of a private document
was complete and consummated when, with intent to
prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was
actually falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct
crime was initiated and consummated when the
second ticket was falsified
FACTS:
Appellants in this case were convicted in the former case of the
crime of falsification of a private document, in that they falsified
a pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, to the prejudice of
and with intent to prejudice the complaining witness. The
evidence disclosed that the accused changed the description of
the pawned article as it appeared on the face of the pawn ticket
and substituted therefor another article of greatly superior
value, and that thereafter the falsified ticket was itself pawned
in the pawnshop of the complaining witness for an amount
largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned in
the Monte de Piedad, for which the original pawn ticket was
issued.
Evidence discloses that this pawn ticket was falsified by these
accused at or about the same time when they falsified the pawn
ticket for the falsification of which they were convicted at the
former trial;
ISSUE:
CAN THE ACCUSED BE CHARGED IN A SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS ALTHOUGH IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE TWO
PAWN TICKETS WERE FALSIFIED AT OR ABOUT THE SAME
TIME?
RULING:
YES.
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The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct
documents. They had no relation to each other as members of a
series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification
of one individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification
of the entire series. The crime of falsification of a private
document was complete and consummated when, with intent
to prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was actually
falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct crime was initiated
and consummated when the second ticket was falsified. That
both documents may have been falsified to be used together in
the perpetration of an embezzlement in no wise affects the case,
as under the definition of the crime of falsification of private
documents set out in article 304 of the Penal Code, the crime is
consummated and complete at the moment when such a
document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent
to prejudice a third person, it matters not to what use the
document may be put thereafter, as will readily be seen from
the express terms of that article, which are as follows:
Any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any
of the acts of falsification enumerated in article three hundred
shall suffer the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum
and medium degrees and be fined in a sum not less than six
hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
We find no error in the proceedings had in the court below
prejudicial to the rights of the accused, and the judgment
convicting and sentencing him should, therefore, be affirmed,
with costs.
25. VILLAROSA VS MAGALLANES
(4/29/2003)
PRINCIPLE:
 As provided in Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, 15 it is a fundamental
principle that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or province where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients took place.
 it is not the intent of our lawmakers that all perjury
cases committed in relation to an election offense
must be filed in Manila — the seat of the Law
Department of COMELEC, which under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure conducts preliminary
investigations in election offenses. 19 Surely, such
situation will congest the dockets of courts in Manila.
It will also be physically and financially burdensome
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on litigants nationwide, who must travel from remote
areas just to pursue the course of justice in Manila.
This scenario will inevitably discourage the
prosecution of offenses of this nature — a situation
which, to our mind, is not only unlikely, but an absurd
one, farthest from the imagination of our legislators.
FACTS:
petitioner Emilio Villarosa and private respondent Jude
Thaddeus Sayson were candidates for barangay captain, with
private respondent emerging the victor.
one Victoria S. Delfin filed a verified complaint against
private respondents with the Office of the Election Officer
in Bacolod City, for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
The complaint alleged that private respondents posted
campaign streamers prior to the start of the campaign period.
the counter-affidavits of private respondents were forwarded
to the Law Department of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in Manila, Private respondent was also found to
have made untruthful statements upon a material matter in a
counter-affidavit submitted before the COMELEC, duly
subscribed and sworn to by him before Asst. City Prosecutor
Cesar L. Beloria of the Bacolod City Prosecution Office, a
competent person authorized to administer oath, which
counter-affidavit is required by law in the preliminary
investigation of said case, which found the existence of
probable cause for the indictment of private respondents. The
counter-affidavits filed by private respondents with the
COMELEC served as the basis for petitioner to file a complaint
for perjury against private respondents with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City.
private respondents filed a motion to quash the informations
on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction lies with the proper
court in Manila since the counter-affidavits were forwarded to
the Law Department of the COMELEC in Manila.
ISSUE: WHERE should the case be filed?
RULING:
In Bacolod City
We agree with the petitioner and the OSG that the perjury case
must be filed in Bacolod where the case for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code was pending. As provided in Section
15, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, 15 it is a
fundamental principle that the criminal action shall be
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instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients took place. In this case, the disputed
affidavit containing the alleged false statements was filed by
private respondents with the Office of the Election Officer in
Bacolod City, where a complaint for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code was lodged against them.
The transmission of the purported untruthful affidavit to the
Law Department of COMELEC in Manila for purposes of
preliminary investigation did not make the offense triable in
the Manila courts. We are in full accord with the reasoning of
the OSG that it was in the Office of the Election Officer in
Bacolod City where the counter-affidavits were executed and
originally submitted by private respondents; hence, it was in
that place that the operative acts constituting the crime of
perjury, if proven, were committed.
Lastly, to hold that the Manila court has jurisdiction over the
present case would open the floodgates to a judicial anarchy. To
our mind, it is not the intent of our lawmakers that all perjury
cases committed in relation to an election offense must be filed
in Manila — the seat of the Law Department of COMELEC, which
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure conducts preliminary
investigations in election offenses. 19 Surely, such situation will
congest the dockets of courts in Manila. It will also be physically
and financially burdensome on litigants nationwide, who must
travel from remote areas just to pursue the course of justice in
Manila. This scenario will inevitably discourage the prosecution
of offenses of this nature — a situation which, to our mind, is
not only unlikely, but an absurd one, farthest from the
imagination of our legislators.
In sum, jurisdiction over the crime of perjury in the instant case
is vested in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City,
where the affidavit constituting false evidence was filed.
Accordingly, respondent judge erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding otherwise.
26. PEOPLE VS YABUT (11/29/1977)
“ venue or jurisdiction in a case of estafa for postdating or
issuing a check without insufficient funds”
PRINCIPLE: . Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
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instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place." The theory is that a person
indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any
jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. 3 However, if all the acts material and essential
to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in
one municipality or province, the court of that municipality
or province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation
FACTS:
That during the period from February 22, to February 26, 1975,
in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulcan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Cecilia Que Yabut, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit
Line, by means of false pretenses and pretending to have
sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation, located
and doing business in Caloocan City, prepared issued and
make out Check Nos. CB-19035 B, CB-190396 and CB-190397,
dated February 22, 1975, February 24, 1975 and February 26,
1975, in the total sum of P6,568.94, drawn against the
Merchants Banking Corporation, payable to Freeway Tires
Supply, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan, in payment of
articles and merchandise delivered to and received by said
accused, gave and delivered the said checks to the said
Freeway Tires Supply, the said accused Cecilia Que Yabut well
knowing that at the time there was no or insufficient funds in
the said Merchants Banking Corporation, and upon
presentation of the said checks to the bank, the checks were
dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of
the Freeway Tires Supply to deposit the necessary funds to
cover the checks within the reglementary period enjoined by
law, failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires
Supply, in the total amount of P6,568.94.
Instead of entering a plea, respondent Cecilia Que Yabut filed a
motion to quash ON THE GROUND THAT the venue was
improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated
checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the
complainant in the City of Caloocan, where she (respondent
Que Yabut) holds office.
ISSUE:WHETHER VENUE IS IMPROPERLY LAID
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RULING:
NO
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par.
2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or
continuing offense. 1 Its basic elements of deceit and
damage 2 may independently arise in separate places. In the
event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action
in either place is legally allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: "In all criminal prosecutions
the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed
or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." The
theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may
be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. 3 However, if all the acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one
municipality or province, the court of that municipality or
province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.
. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in
Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn
there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered
and delivered. That is the place of business and residence
of the payee. The place where the bills were written,
signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the
place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as
an obligation. 4 An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until
delivery, the contract is revocable. 5 And the issuance as well as
the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as
a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." 6 Delivery of
the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or
constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer
title thereto. 7 Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of
Art. 315, par. 2 (d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check." Clearly, therefore,
the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the
worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos,
Bulcan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to
try the case.
The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was
executed and delivered to the payee. 16 Since in the instant case
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it was in Malolos, Bulacan where the checks were uttered and HELD:
delivered to complaint Andan, at which place, her business and
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a tran
residence were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa
sitory or
may be lodged therein.17 As earlier pointed out, the giving of the continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and dama
checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to ge may arise independently in separate places. In this case, it
Modesto Yambo cannot be treated as valid delivery of the did and jurisdiction may be conferred in any of the two places
checks, because Yambo is a mere "messenger" or "part-time wherein the two elements arose.
employee" and not an agent of complaint Alicia P. Andan.
For while the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it
wasn't completely
drawn thereat, but in Pampanga. What is of decisive i
mportance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to
27. PEOPLE VS GROSPE (1/20/1988) its consummation as an obligation. For although the ch
PRINCIPLE: eck was received
 What is of decisive importance is the delivery by the SMC Supervisor in Bulacan, that was not deliv
thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act ery in the contemplation of law. The rule is that the issuancve
essential to its consummation as an obligation. as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
FACTS: takes it as a holder, which means
the payee or indorser of a bill or note, who is in possessi
Manuel Parulan is an authorized dealer of San Mig Corp in on of it, or the
Bulacan. He issued 2checks in connection with beer purchases bearer thereof. The said representative had to forward th
and which he delivered to the Sales supervisor (Mr. Cornelio) e check TO the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit
of San Mig. The checks were dishonored by Planters Dev’t Bank took place in Pampanga where the check was legally issued and
(drawee) in Bulacan. delivered.

FIRST ISSUANCE:
III. RULE 111 (PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS)
ISSUED AT: Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch
28. HUN HYUNG PARK VS EUNG WON CHOI
SUM INVVOLVED: of P86,071.20 (2/12/2007)
Principle:
DELIVERED AND RECEIVED BY: the SMC Regional Office at  For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adju
San Fernando, Pampanga
dged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
WHERE DISHONORED: the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), San Fernando Branch where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) t
SECOND ISSUANCE: he court declares that the liability of the accused is o
nly civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
ISSUED AT: Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch
not arise from or is not based upon the crime of whic
h the accused was acquitted.
SUM INVOLVED: of P11,918.80

DELIVERED AND RECEIVED BY: SMC Regional Office in San Facts:

Fernando, Pampanga
In an Information, respondent, Eung Won Choi (Choi), was cha
WHERE DISHONORED: the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan.
rged for violation of BP 22, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133
in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for havin
ISSUE: WHERE SHOULD THE CASE BE FILED

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g been drawn against insufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, Choi, with the assistance of counsel, pleade
d "not guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial co
nference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief. Afte
r the prosecution rested its case, Choi filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his
Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that
he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of t
he element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise
. the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action h
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 (MeTC 65) gran
ted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC60), contending that t
he dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil as
pect.
By Decision, the RTC 60 held that while the evidence presente
d was insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it di
d not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly gra
nted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay hi
m the amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest.
Upon Choi’s MR however, the RTC set aside its decision and or
dered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceed
ings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce e
vidence on the civil aspect of the case."
Petitioner appealed RTC60's reversal of its prior decision but t
he same was denied by CA
Issue: Whether or not the private offended party can appeal fo
r the civil aspect of the case when the accused has been acquitt
ed.
Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal bec
QUANTUM LEAP (USJ-R SCHOOL OF LAW BATCH 2017) TEAM
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ause of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the acc
used.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, th
e whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evid
ence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have wai
ved the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is
called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless
as been waived or reserved.
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or p
riorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waiv
ed, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil li
ability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to b
e recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civil
ly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is ba
sed on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not a
rise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed exti
nguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the crimi
nal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denie
s the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary v
alue between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the cas
e. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the
criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to
the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insuf
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ficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the s
ame evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liabil
ity by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficie
nt as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that th
e same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on
the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recog
nized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it t
he dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that t
he act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did n
ot exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect
of the case must perforce continue.
The case is REMANDED to MeTC 65 which is DIRECTED to fort
hwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings on
ly for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of t
he case.
29. DAYAP VS SENDIONG (1/29/2009)
Principle:
 The civil action based on delict may be deemed extin
guished if there is a finding on the final judgment in t
he criminal action that the act or omission from whic
h the civil liability may arise did not exist or where th
e accused did not commit the acts or omission imput
ed to him.
Facts:
Herwin Petitioner Dayap was charged with the crime of Reckle
ss Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Inj
uries, and Damage to Property before MTC Sibulan.
After the prosecution has rested its case, Dayap filed demurrer
to evidence. MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petition
er of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that th
e evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the all
egations in the Information. RTC affirmed the acquittal of petit
ioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for furthe
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r proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.
Issue :Whether or not the acquittal of the accused carries with
it the extinction of the civil liability.
Ruling :
Yes. The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclu
de a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The e
xtinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extincti
on of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reas
onable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (
b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civ
il; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from o
r is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted
. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed exti
nguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the crimi
nal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit t
he acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by th
e court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civ
il aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exis
t.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evid
ence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal an
d civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the e
vidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is i
ssue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evi
dence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continua
tion of trial for the accused to adducevidence by way of rebutt
al. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil asp
ect of the case.
A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that t
he acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that p
etitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him;
hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his a
cquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated th
at it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime
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had been committed and that accused was the person responsi
ble for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that i
t was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its
witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was drivi
ng the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the
MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the da
mage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving o
f the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck an
d not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly est
ablishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. C
onsequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the t
rial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since
petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.
30. DMPI EMPLOYEES CORP VS VELEZ
(11/29/2001)
Principle:
 There is no more need for a reservation of the right t
o file the independent civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. T
he reservation and waiver referred to refers only to t
he civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ari
sing from the offense charged. This does not include r
ecovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission which may be prosecuted s
eparately even without a reservation.
Issue : Whether or not the civil case could proceed independe
ntly of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the
filing of the civil action.
Ruling :
Yes. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from
the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal acti
on unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves h
is right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action pr
ior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the i
ndependent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver r
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eferred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not in
clude recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 21
76 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same ac
t or omission which may be prosecuted separately even witho
ut a reservation.
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for
damages on account of the fraud commited against responden
t Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed inde
pendently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
31. CASUPANAN VS LAROYA (388 SCRA 28)
Principle:
 The accused in a pending criminal case for reckless i
mprudence can validly file, simultaneously and indep
endently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict again
st the private complainant in the criminal case.
Facts :
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other
owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by Casupanan, figure
d in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MCT
C Capas. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for rec
kless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the othe
r hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroy
a for quasi-delict.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss th
e civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the p
endency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion an
d dismissed the civil case.
Issue : Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case f
or reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and in
dependently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
Ruling :
Yes. The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the s
ame act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This i
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s expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Ru
le 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may b
e litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two rea
sons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any count
erclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the crim
inal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused doe
s not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptiv
e period may set in since the period continues to run until the
civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to i
nvoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent o
f the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a sepa
rate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process
of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by th
e MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shoppin
g is erroneous.
32. PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS (as to civil liability)
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to the civil liability of
Bayotas arising from his commission of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
HELD:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of
the convict personal liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary
penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
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1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Aricle
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts,
Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of separate civil
action and may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal
and civil liability based solely on the act of rape. Hence, his civil
liability also extinguished together with his criminal liability
upon his death.
33. PEOPLE VS DATO (12/12/2010)
FACTS:
Datu was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under
Art. 3 of R.A. 7610 because he inserted his middle finger inside
a 5 year old girl’s vagina. He was convicted thereof but during
appeal he died. In light of the supervening event In which
occurred while petitioner’s appeal of the judgment of his
conviction was pending resolution dismissed the appeal for has
been rendered moot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
HELD:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of
the convict personal liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary
penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
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Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Aricle
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts,
Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of separate civil
action and may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
It is therefore evident from the foregoing discussion that
venturing into the merits of petitioner’s appeal given the
circumstance of his untimely demise has become superfluous
because, even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the
lower court’s judgment of conviction, such a ruling would be of
no force and effect as the resultant criminal liability is totally
extinguished by his death. Consequently, his civil liability
arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, is likewise
extinguished by his death. Since his appeal was still pending
before this Court, there was no final judgment of conviction
upon which an award of civil indemnity could be based.
34. PEOPLE VS BERNARDO (10/5/2015)
FACTS:
Bernardo was charged with violation of B.P. 22. She
was convicted thereof in the RTC. On appeal, she died. Due to
such death, Bernardo’s heirs argued that the death of Bernardo
extinguished her civil liability. In the alternative, they
contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate
civil action.
ISSUES:
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1.) Whether or not the death of Bernardo extinguished
her civil liability arising out of the case for B.P. 22.
2.) Whether or not the B.P. 22 case as appealed by Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 be dismissed
and the civil liabilty be severed with separately in
another civil action.
HELD:
1.) No. Bernardo's civil liability survived her death as it is
based on contract.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal
extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil
liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts
to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally
mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can be
overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death
prevents the court from making. In a sense, death absolves the
accused from any earthly responsibility arising from the
offense — a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify,
much less disregard.
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death
and an action for recovery therefore may
begenerally pursued but only by filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced against the estate of the accused.
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil
liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are
deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of
Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was
deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may
still be enforced against her estate in the present case.
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. This rule was
enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed
with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors.
2.) No, because it would be costly, burdensome, and time-
consuming to dismiss the present case and require the
Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.
Other principles:
It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to
civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting
the offense charged are established by preponderance of
evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil
liability based ondelict is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
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35. SAN MIGUEL INC VS PEREZ (705 SCRA 38)
FACTS:
San Miguel as represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly
authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the SEC
purchased lots from BF Homes. San Miguel already paid the full
price thereof but the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) was not
yet delivered to it. BF Homes claimed that it withheld the TCT
because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile
replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands
promting San Miguel to file a criminal charge against the
directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of
Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256). At the same
time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to
release the TCT in its favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial question is present to the
subject criminal case while there is also a case for specific
performance pending before HLURB that needs to be resolved.
HELD:
Yes. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are
provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB,
an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF
Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific
performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that
must first be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved
is correct.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and
a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak
of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose
was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil
in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and
original.
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Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not
San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the TCT, while the criminal action would decide
whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the TCT. The resolution of the
former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the
delivery of the TCT because Atty. Orendain did not have the
authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for
the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating
the need to proceed with the criminal case.
IV.RULE 112 (PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION)
36. HASHIM VS BUNCAN (71 PHIL 216)
PRINCIPLE (as discussed in the lecture of Judge D):
 Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the
right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not
constitutional. Its oft-repeated purpose is to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State
from useless and expensive prosecutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Hashim, was arrested without warrant for the
possession of counterfeit treasury certificates of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. He was released on the same
day upon filing a bond. The following day, a complaint was filed
against him with the Office of the City Fiscal, and after the
corresponding investigation conducted by the respondent
Fiscal an information was lodged against him. A warrant of
arrest was issued, and he was later admitted to bail. Before
arraignment, his counsel filed motions asking the Fiscal to
furnish the clerk of court with the testimony of the witnesses
who testified at the PI. The Fiscal opposed the motion on the
ground that the provisions of the Rules of Court on "Preliminary
Investigation" do not apply to PIs conducted by the Fiscal for
the City of Manila. CFI Manila Judge Boncan dismissed the
motion. By another motion, petitioner asked the warrant be
cancelled and insisted that the court conduct the PI referred to
in Sec 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The respondent Fiscal
filed an objection on the ground, among others, that there was
no necessity for the court to conduct a PI in this case because
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the substitute therefor had already been performed by the
Fiscal. Judge Boncan again dismissed the motion.
ISSUE: Whether, in a preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the City of Manila, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the substance of the testimony and of the evidence
presented against him as marked in Section 13 of Rule 108.
RULING:
No. This examination corresponds to the preliminary
investigation conducted by a justice of the peace or municipal
judge after the arrest of the defendant in accordance with Acts
194, 1450 and 1627. To subject the respondent Fiscal to the
provisions of this section is, as elsewhere emphasized, to
prolong an otherwise brief investigation which said officer is
authorized to conduct under existing laws. Hence, our
persuasion that section 11, like section 13, of Rule 108 was not
meant to apply to the preliminary investigations conducted by
the City Fiscal.
Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to a
preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional. Its
oft-repeated purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him
from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the
State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The new Rules
were drafted in the light of the court’s experience with cases
where preliminary investigations had dragged on for weeks
and even months. The court had intended to remove this clog
upon the judicial machinery and to make a preliminary
investigation as simple and as speedy as is consistent with the
substantial rights of the accused. The investigation is advisedly
called preliminary, to be followed by the trial proper. The
investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable
cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. When all this is fulfilled,
the accused will not be permitted to cast about for fancied
reasons to delay the proceedings; the time to ask for more is at
the trial. The petitioner’s case is a good example. A preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent fiscal at which
evidence was adduced warranting the filing of an information
against the petitioner. The in formation was filed in court, and
the presiding judge, upon the strength of the said preliminary
investigation and sworn information, issued a warrant for the
arrest of the petitioner. To ask for the abstract of testimony at
this stage of the proceedings, ostensibly for no other purpose
than to scrutinize the same evidence which convinced the
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respondent fiscal and the presiding judge that there was
probable ground to proceed against the petitioner, is in effect
to ask for another preliminary investigation. Not this, however,
but a trial upon the merits, is what section 4 of Rule 108
ordains.
37. ARROYO VS DOJ (7/23/2013)
PRINCIPLE:
 The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is
no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is
the situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing
of substantially the same complaint with another
office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption
of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed
will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and
the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-
Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime
of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the
charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.Thereafter, petitioners
filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and
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Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines
the decisional independence of the Comelec AND
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not
exercise concurrent jurisdiction
RULING:
1. While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such
intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that
can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore,
under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms
of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.
To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant
to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the
amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012
Decision:
x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to
the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as
the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of
substantially the same complaint with another office (such as
the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the
second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it
is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.xxx
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the
Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the
assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint
Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall
still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore,
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that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as
an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the
1987 Constitution.
2. The procedure in conducting the preliminary
investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the respondent shall submit his
counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents.47 Also in both Rules,
respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such
right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have
been furnished and to copy them at her expense.
As to GMA’s right violated when her motion for extension of
time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence was consequently denied. The Rules
use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to submit
counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten
(10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use
of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores
the mandatory character of the rule.50 As in any other rule,
though, liberality in the application may be allowed provided
that the party is able to present a compelling justification for
the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008
Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors
allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to
submit counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands
that respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient
opportunity to engage the services of counsel; examine
voluminous records submitted in support of the complaint or
undertake research on novel, complicated or technical
questions or issues of law and facts of the case. PETITION
DENIED.
38. PEOPLE VS BELTRAN (6/1/2007)
PRINCIPLE:
 Inquest proceedings are proper only when the
accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical
right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may
be non-bailable for those accused as principals.
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FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition
and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion
and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the
investigation and prosecution of petitioners’ cases.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, are members of the House
of Representatives representing various party-list groups.
Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in
relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal
cases pending with the RTC Makati. Beltran was arrested
without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform
Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening,
Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of
Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a
rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the
20thanniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was
based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who
claimed to have been present at the rally. The authorities
brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected
to a second inquest, this time for Rebellion. The letters referred
to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDG’s
investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172074-76, San Juan, and several others as “leaders and
promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo
government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)and
the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed
a “tactical alliance.”
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
“leaders/promoters” of Rebellion. The Information alleged that
Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals “conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the
CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ngPilipinas (PKP)
and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan
(KAB) with theMakabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and
thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the
dulyconstituted government.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that
Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC
Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such
felony.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for
Rebellion was valid and
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2. whether the preliminary investigation On the Ladlad and
Maza Petitions were proper?
RULING:
1. The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is
Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused
has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the
officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to
Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for
Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another
group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority
rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting
officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion,
sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had
committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in
their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993,
the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest
of the detained person was made "in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If
the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should
proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest
Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the
Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the
action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the
City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to
comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule
113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest
void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary
investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial
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determination of probable cause, which effectively took the
place of such proceeding.
2. The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With
Irregularities. On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions. The
procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable
by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, "so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage,"38 respondent
prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent
prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112
which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in
their absence or unavailability, before a notary public.
Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of
Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and
accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some
of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing
that a prosecutor or qualified government official was
unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor,
after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are
grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he
shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to
the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to
petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13
March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments." By peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to
petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the
investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had
the opportunity to examine the charges against them,
respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation
but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical
right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may
be non-bailable for those accused as principals.
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39. TATAD VS SANDIGANBAYAN (159 SCRA
70)
PRINCIPLE:
 The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation (5 years in this case) and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to
due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him.
FACTS:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he
termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential
Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges
of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary
of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979
when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister)
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned
from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint
was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the
Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April
1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's
resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister
Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits
and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for
disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal
informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5)
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
ISSUE: Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution?
RULING:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
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of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be
due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking
government official." In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic
Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this
case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
40. OSCOLLUELA VS SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R.
191411)
Facts:
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12
arguing,among others, that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against
him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the
complaint was instituted.
Issue: The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is
whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that
petitioners ’right to speedy disposition of cases was not
violated.
Ruling:
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Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of
their criminal case had been violated. It is observed that the
preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted
amount of time to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s
position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was
terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when
Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of
the Information. This is belied by Section 4, Rule II of the
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise
known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman,” which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure–The preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial
Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions: x x x x No information may be filed and no complaint
may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of
the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all
other cases.
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no
complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation
until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s
recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to
dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the
preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners
were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March
27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the
time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB.
In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May
21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the
complaint.
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office
of the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case as well as the
concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it
is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due
process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As
the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy,
the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are
resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those
who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in
this case.
41. WINSTON GARCIA CASE (no citation)
42. PEREZ VS HAGONOY BANK (3/29/2001)
Facts:
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Meanwhile, pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of
Justice, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the
dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the
admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as
one of the accused in Criminal Case-No. 1604-M-94. 12 On
January 13, 1995, presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of the said
court granted the said motion. Private respondent assailed the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for
reconsideration filed in the RTC. However, the trial court
denied the said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995
after finding that the private respondent, as private
complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal
of the criminal charges against the petitioner.
Issue: whether or not the private respondent, as private
complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to
question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges
against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the
prosecutor
Ruling:
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 27 we held that: In
a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state
that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest
in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the
said complainant."
Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals
30 allowing the private offended party to file a special civil
action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge
granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the
Secretary of Justice is apropos. We held therein that although
the correct procedure would have been to appeal the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the
President, the said remedy was unavailable to the private
offended party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion
perpetua nor death. 31 Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was
available to the private offended party, filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper.
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It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case
may file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more
reason does it have legal personality to move for a
reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the
criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule,
a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to
allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
43. SANTOS VS GO (10/19/2005)
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that
it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and
final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-
judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.
The Department of Justice is not among the agencies
enumerated in Section 1of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius.
We cannot agree with petitioners submission that a
preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and
that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor
regarding the presence of probable cause.
Though some cases[19] describe the public prosecutors power
to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point.[20] A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature
which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making.[21] A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards,
determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the
same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause to file an information against a
person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary
of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions. Since
the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those
agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners
for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.
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44. VILLANUEVA VS OPLE (475 SCRA 531)
Fabian v. Desierto[31] held that appeals from the orders,
directives, or decisions of the OMB in administrative
disciplinary cases were cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
Tirol v. Del Rosario[32] clarified that, in non -administrative
cases in which the OMB had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed directly with this
Court. Accordingly, Kuizon v. Desierto[33] held that this Court
had jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning the
resolutions or orders of the ombudsman in criminal cases.
Thus, petitioners committed a procedural error in resorting to
a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. To
challenge the dismissal of their Complaint and to require the
OMB to file an information, petitioners should have resorted to
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
only ground upon which this Court may entertain a review of
the OMBs resolution is grave abuse of discretion,[34] not
reversible errors.
45. CRESPO VS MOGUL (151 SCRA 462)
PRINCIPLE:
 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed
a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing
of the information. the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul,
denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order
was denied.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the
Court of Appeals 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5
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A decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the
writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his
threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case
until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7
ThenUndersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal .the Judge denied the motion and
set the arraigniment.
ISSUE: whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits?
Ruling:
Yes.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the
right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it
was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted
to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that
justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of
the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed
with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the
Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of
the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then
the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the
fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to
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the private prosecutor but still under his direction and
control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
46. CEREZO VS PEOPLE (6/1/2011)
PRINCIPLE:
 Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed
with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a
motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely
and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor
or the Secretary of Justice.[20] It is the courts
bounden duty to assess independently the merits
of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion.[21]
The Facts
Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents
Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia
(respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).[5]
Finding probable cause to indict respondents,[6] the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the
corresponding Information against them before the RTC.[7]
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Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence
before the OP-QC.[8]
the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended
the withdrawal of the Information.[9] Consequently, a
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed
before the RTC.
In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the
RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order dated
March 17, 2004, viz.:
Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to
be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor
who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the
discharge of this function. Being vested with such power,
he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there
is reasonable ground to do so. x x x.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said
Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution
has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the
subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).[12]The RTC deferred action on the said motion
to await the resolution of the DOJ.[13]
The Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution
reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003
resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier
Information for libel.[14]
On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order
granting petitioners motion for reconsideration, conformably
with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied in the RTCs second assailed Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is bound by the recommendation
of the prosecutor and the ruling of the secretary of justice?
Our Ruling
NO.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the
court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the
court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely
and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice.[20] It is the courts bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment
must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion.[21] While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding
on courts.
In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the
RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to
make his own determination of whether or not there was
a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of
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the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and
recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been
more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the
prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and
irresolute on whether to indict respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006
Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make
a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the
Order and highlighted in the following portion thereof:
As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending on the
outcome of the Petition for Review. Considering the findings of
the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City
Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for
Reconsideration.[22]
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor
and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated
its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave
abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to due
process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced
no effect whatsoever.[23]
47. AGCAOILI VS COLINA (240 SCRA 482)
(NOT FOUND)
48. SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR (11/14/1988)
Principal issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
information for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
Principles:
1. The allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
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deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent
be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
2. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
49. OCAMPO VS ABANDO (2/11/2014)
Principle:
 A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is
a substantive right and a component of due process in
the administration of criminal justice.
 Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested."
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden of the PNP Regional
Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Army Captain Tiu of the 8th
Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Vivero. The letters requested
appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached
therewith accusing 71 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other
unnamed members.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor
Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners
to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.
Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and
the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner
Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006
during the preliminary investigation. However, petitioner
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Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly
not served a subpoena.
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding
probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of
the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.
Issue: WON Petitioners were accorded due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
Held:
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment,
expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due
process in the administration of criminal justice.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce."
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."
Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have
ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination
thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant
of arrest.
50. MINO VS NAVARRO (8/28/2007)
Principle:
 When the preliminary investigation was conducted by
the prosecutor, the judge has three options after the
filing of the information and upon evaluation of the
prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence.
He/she may (a) dismiss the case, (b) issue a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order, as the case may be,
against the accused, or (c) require the prosecution to
submit additional evidence to support the existence of
probable cause.
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Facts:
By letter of March 7, 20051 addressed to the Court
Administrator which was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on March 14, 2005, Sandra Mino
(complainant) charged Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro
(respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Cebu City, with gross inexcusable
negligence arising from his failure to issue a warrant of arrest,
within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court, in Criminal
Case No. 124511-R, People of the Philippines v. Allan Arcilla, for
Attempted Homicide.
It appears that the above-said criminal case was raffled to the
sala of respondent on October 21, 2003. Despite repeated
requests for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused, respondent did not grant the same.
After ninety seven (97) days from the raffling of the case to his
sala or on February 5, 2004, respondent issued an Order2
declaring that on the basis of the affidavits of the offended party
and his witness, "the accused may actually be charged only with
Grave Threats, as there is no probable cause to believe that the
accused had acted with intent to kill, not having persisted in his
threat against the offended party."
Respondent accordingly ordered the remand of the record of
the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor "so that the
information may be amended to reflect the proper crime."
Issue: WON judges are authorized to the proper crime that the
accused should be charged with.
Held:
No. SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the compliant or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to [S]ection 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecution to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
On the issue of downgrading the crime charged from attempted
homicide to grave threats, respondent judge manifested
ignorance of the rule mentioned above. When the preliminary
investigation was conducted by the prosecutor, the judge has
three options after the filing of the information and upon
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evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting
evidence. He/she may (a) dismiss the case, (b) issue a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order, as the case may be, against the
accused, or (c) require the prosecution to submit additional
evidence to support the existence of probable cause. Nowhere
in the rule was the judge authorized to determine the proper
crime that the accused should be charged with. The options
given to the judge are exclusive, and preclude him/her from
interfering with the discretion of the public prosecutor in
evaluating the offense charged.
51. LEVISTE ALAMEDA (G.R. 182677
8/3/2010)
IV. RULE 112 (PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION)
52. LARRANAGA VS CA (287 SCRA 581)
FACTS:
On the night of July 16,1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong, failed to come home on the expected time. Immediately,
at 5;00 o’clock in the morning, her family started to search for
her daughters, but there was no trace of them.
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18,1997 , a certain Rudy
Lasaga reported to the police that a young woman was found
dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan.awan Carcar Cebu. The police
found a dead woman lying on the ground. Attached to her left
wrist was a handcuff. Her face and neck were covered with
masking tape.
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that
engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was
resolved. Davidson Rusia, admitted before the police having
participated in the abduction of the sisters.
Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes were
committed and identified all the appellants as the perpetrators.
Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants
raised the defense of alibi.
Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the
prosecution moved that he be discharged as an accused for the
purpose of utilizing him as a state witness, the appellants
opposed the motion on the ground the he does not qualify as a
state witness under Section, Rule119 of the Revised Rules of
Court as he was convicted of third degree burglary in
Minessotta and considering he admitted in open court that he
raped Jacqueline Chiong.
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The court discharged Rusia as a state witness.
On the last day for the cross examination of Rusia, Judge
Ocampo provisionally terminated the cross-examination due to
the report that there was an attempt to bribe him.
The defense lawyers moved for the inhibition of Judge Ocampo.
When he informed the defense lawyers that he would not
inhibit since he found no just and valid reasons, the defense
lawyers withdrew en masse. For these reason, Judge Ocampo
held them guilty of direct contempt.
On August 26,1998, the defense lawyers filed their motion to
withdraw as lawyers for the appellants. Thus, the appellants
moved for postponement of the hearing for several weeks to
enable them to hire the services of new counsel. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that it could no longer delay
the hearing of the cases and directed the Public Attorney’s
Office to act as counsel de officio.
The appellants were convicted.
ISSUES: Whether or not the right to counsel of the appellants
was violated when the trial court appointed counsel de officio?
Whether or not the right of the appellants to confront
and cross examine the prosecution witnesses was violated?
Whether or not Rusia is considered the most-guilty
considering he admitted in open court that he raped Jacqueline
Chiong?
Whether or not the conviction of Rusia of third degree
burglary in Minessotta renders his testimony inadmissible?
RULING:
No. The appointment of counsel de officio under such
circumstance is not proscribed by the Constitution. The choice
of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a
plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself
scarce, the trial court is not precluded form appointing counsel
de officio counsel whom it considers competent and
independent to enable the trial court to proceed until the
counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of
a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused
to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to abandon
appellants in the proceeding before the trial court and
unceasingly represent them in the appellate courts. Indeed, in
doing so, they made a mockery of judicial process and certainly
delayed the hearing before the court below.
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No. For one, it is not true that they were not given
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Rusia. All of appellant’s
counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia
concerning his background to the kidnapping.
Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it
was just proper for the trial court to impose a time limit on their
cross examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive
questioning.
No. It bears stressing that appellants were charged
with kidnapping and illegal detention. Thus, Rusia’s admission
that he raped Jacqueline does not make him the most-guilty of
the crimes charged. Moreover, far from being the mastermind,
his participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was
limited to that of an oblivious follower who simply joined the
ride as the commission of the crimes progressed.
Rusia retained his passive stance as Rowen and
Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline at the waiting shed of
Ayala Center. He just remained seated beside the driver’s seat
not aiding Rowen and Josman in abducting the Chiong sisters.
Inside the car, it was Rowen who punched and handcuffed the
Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of Josman Aznar Group, Rusia
stayed at the living room while the appellants molested the
Chiong sisters on separate rooms. And Rusia did not even know
what ultimately happened to Jacqueline as he was the first to
leave the group.
No. The court held in People vs De Guzman as cited in
this case, that although the trial court may have erred in
discharging the accused, such error would not affect the
competency and the quality of the testimony of the accused.
The order for the discharge may only be recalled in
one instance, which is when he subsequently failed or refused
to testify against his co-accused.
53. LEVISTE VS ALAMEDA (As To Right To
Reinvestigation)
PRINCIPLES:
a. Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Bail; Waiver; An
accused, in appluing for bail, does not waive his
right t o challenge the regularity of the
reinvestiagation of the chage against him, the
validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, where he vigorously raised them prior
to his arraignment; The principle that the accused is
precluded after arraignment from questioning the
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illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters his
plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto. There must be clear
and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be
so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an
intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible
b. Preliminary Investigation; Inquest; Words and
Phrases; Inquest is defined as an informal and
summary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons
arrested and detained without the benefit of a
warrant of arres issued by the court for the purpose
of determining whether said persons should remain
under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court - A preliminary investigation is required before
the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
years, two months and one day without regard to fine.
As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need
for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful
arrest without a warrant involving such type of
offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has
been conducted. Inquest is defined as an informal and
summary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons
arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant
of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of
determining whether said persons should remain
under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court.
c. Before the filing of the complaint or information in
court, the private complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting officer and the
inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of
inquest, while the arrested person has the option to
avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objections
against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial
authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code; The accelerated process of inquest, owing to
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its summary nature and the attendant risk of
running against Article 125, ends with either the
prompt filing of an information in court or the
immediate release of the arrested person-the rules
on inquest do not provide for a motion for
recondsideration.
d. In cases subject of inquest, the private party should
first avail of a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter
to the Department of Justice Secretary - Contrary to
petitioners position that private complainant should
have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not
immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ
Secretary is by petition by a proper party under such
rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe. The
rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution
Service Rule on Appeal, Section 1 of which provides
that the Rule shall apply to appeals from resolutions x
x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/
reinvestigation. In cases subject of inquest, therefore,
the private party should first avail of a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before
elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary. In case the
inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the
private complainant may pursue the case through the
regular course of a preliminary investigation
e. Reinvestigation; Once a complaint or information is
filed in court, the accued is provided with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation
within five days from the time he learns of its filing,
while a private complainant can move for
reinvestigation in cases he is allowed to intervene
by counsel in the criminal action and is granted the
authority to prosecute, with the conformity of the
prosecutor – ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused
with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary
investigation within five days from the time he learns
of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on
Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private
complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the
victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for
a reinvestigation. The Court holds that the private
complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to
and in light of the ensuing disquisition. All criminal
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actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a
criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the
case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation
of the case after the information had been filed in
court, the proper party for that being the public
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of
the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant
is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal
action and is granted the authority to prosecute, the
private complainant, by counsel and with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion
for reinvestigation.
f. Amendment of Information; An information which
is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a
ground for quashal; An amendment which operates
to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible. - Before the accused enters a plea, a
formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After
the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be
made but with leave of court and only if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment,
a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the
same is beneficial to the accused. It must be clarified
though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An
information which is void ab initio cannot be amended
to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which
operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.
g. Any remedial measure springing from the
reinvestigation- be it a complete disposition or an
intermediate modification of the charge – is
eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which must make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. -
Considering the general rule that an information may
be amended even in substance and even without leave
of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean
that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a
mere superfluity? It is not. Any remedial measure
springing from the reinvestigation be it a complete
disposition or an intermediate modification of the
charge is eventually addressed to the sound discretion
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of the trial court, which must make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
Since the trial court would ultimately make the
determination on the proposed course of action, it is
for the prosecution to consider whether a
reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the
evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate
motion to be filed in court.
h. Due process of law demands that no substantial
amendment of an information may be admitted
without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation - Reinvestigation is required in cases
involving a substantial amendment of the information.
Due process of law demands that no substantial
amendment of an information may be admitted
without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial
amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation, unless the
amended information contains a charge related to or
is included in the original Information.
i. The amendment of the Information from homicide
to murder is considered a substantial amendment,
which would make it not just a right but a duty of
the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation. The question to be resolved is whether
the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is considered a substantial amendment, which
would make it not just a right but a duty of the
prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. The
Court answers in the affirmative.A substantial
amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All
other matters are merely of form. The following have
been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged
in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment
which does not adversely affect any substantial right
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of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely
adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material
facts, and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged. The test as to
whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment
is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.
j. There is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation
since both are conducted in the same manner and
for the same objective of determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to engender a weel-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. - Considering that another or a new
preliminary investigation is required, the fact that
what was conducted in the present case was a
reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same
manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. What is essential is that
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from
the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances
were made known to him as early as the first motion.
k. The rules do not even require, as a condition sine
qua non to the validity of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the respondent as
long as efforts to reach him were made an
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opportunity to controvert the complainant’s
evidence was accorded him.
l. Quantum of Proof; Bail; The standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to
an accused is markedly higher than the standard of
judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate
a criminal case. That the evidence of guilt was not
strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings
does not affect the prior determination of probable
cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated,
the standard of strong evidence of guilt which is
sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher
than the standard of judicial probable cause which is
sufficient to initiate a criminal case.
m. Probable cause; There are two kinds of
determination of probable cause; executive and
judicial; The executive determination of probable
cuase is one made during preliminary
investigation; The judicial determination of
probable cause is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. - There are two kinds of
determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that
function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and
may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial
determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant. Paragraph (a), Section 5 Rule
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112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be
followed by the RTC.
n. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; To move
the court to conduct a judicial determination of
probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to
personally evaluate the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting evidence. - To move
the court to conduct a judicial determination of
probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to
personally evaluate the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the
task of the presiding judge when the Information is
filed with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make
a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause
exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
o. The accused cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a
hearing for judicial determination of probable
cause - The rules do not require cases to be set for
hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any
warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a
matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner
cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records
should be [since t]he extent of the judges examination
depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the
circumstances of the case require. In one case, the
Court emphatically stated: The periods provided in the
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Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory,
and as such, the judge must determine the presence or
absence of probable cause within such periods. The
Sandiganbayans determination of probable cause is
made ex parte and is summary in nature, not
adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and
distracted from his determination of probable
cause by needless motions for determination of
probable cause filed by the accused.
p. Preliminary Investigation; Reinvestigation; It is not
material that no new matter or evidence was
presented during the reinvestigation of the case –
reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a
repeat investigation of the case which is simply a chance
for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings
and the evidence already submitted. - Petitioner
proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters,
arguing that no circumstances exist that would qualify
the crime from homicide to murder. The allegation of
lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves
no credence, because new pieces of evidence are not
prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It
is not material that no new matter or evidence was
presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It
should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word
itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the
case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites
for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the
prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and
the evidence already submitted.
FACTS:
Petitioner was, by Information of January 16, 2007, charged
with homicide on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial
Court to which the presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, who
forthwith issued a commitment order against petitioner who
was placed under police custody while confined at
the Makati Medical Center.
The private complainants-heirs of filed, with the conformity of
the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter
alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct
a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007
deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
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proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days
from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31,
2007[9] denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner
assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals. (RULE 65)
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public
prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after
the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive
reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the
prosecutors recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for
the judicial determination of probable cause
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders,
viz: (1) Order of February 7, 2007[12] that admitted the
Amended Information[13] for murder and directed the issuance
of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8,
2007[14] which set the arraignment on February 13,
2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental
petition before the appellate court.
Records show that the arraignment pushed through during
which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the trial court to
enter a plea of not guilty for him.
Prior to arraignment or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an
Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela
which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order
of May 21, 2007, it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime
of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post
bail in the amount for his provisional liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from
the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended
Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court
found petitioner guilty of homicide. From the Decision,
petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The
appellate court denied petitioners application which this Court,
in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the
present petition had been rendered moot since the
presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively
participated, had been concluded.[18]
ISSUES:
a. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED HIS OBJECTIONS OVER THE VALIDITY OF
THE REINVESTIGATION AND THE ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST WHEN THE COURT ENTERED
A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY FOR HIM.
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b. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAVE THE RIGHT
TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD
ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT.
c. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION
FROM THE ORIGINAL CHARGE OF HOMICIDE TO
MURDER IS A SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT
d. WHETHER THE AMENDED INFORMATION, THE
ISSUING of A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING
OF THE CASE FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY
OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007,
WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE
REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED
INFORMATION, ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT
e. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE NO NEW EVIDENCE
WAS PRESENTED DURING THE REEXAMINATION.
HELD:
Petitioner is not deemed to have
waived his objections when the
trial court entered a plea for his behalf.
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished
from mootness of the petition, for in the present case,
petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive
his stated objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal
arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission
to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but
not later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right
to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended
Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his
arraignment. During the arraignment, petitioner refused to
enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending
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resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court
to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment
from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation applies only if
he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto. There
must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had
an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the
existence of probable cause.
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably
infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him
from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so
timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation,
the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioners
participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In
fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the
early resolution of the present petition.
The petition (questioning the validity of reexamination) is
now moot, however, in view of the trial courts rendition of
judgment.
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the
Amended Information for murder operates as a supervening
event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there
is ground to annul the finding of probable cause for
murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the
concluded proceedings and retrying the case under the
original Information for homicide just to arrive, more
likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of
homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner
been convicted of murder, for proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would
have been established in that instance.)
Private Compalianant has the right
to ask for a reexaminitaion.
(Guys, to further appreciate this case I am constrained to
include the following discussion on the different remedies
available to the accused and complainant, before and after filing
of the Information for cases subject to inquest)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a
complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day
without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that
there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a
lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense,
so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted.
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Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation
conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving
persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant
of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining
whether said persons should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court.[
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN
COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating
with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the
latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has
the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay
in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this
remedy is not available to the private complainant since he
cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the
provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a
complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities
within the applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary
nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125,
ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or
the immediate release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules
on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant
should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not
immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary
is by petition by a proper party under such rules as the
Department of Justice may prescribe. The rule referred to is the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, Section 1 of
which provides that the Rule shall apply to appeals from
resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary
investigation/ reinvestigation. In cases subject of inquest,
therefore, the private party should first avail of a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before
elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the
private complainant may pursue the case through the regular
course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT,
the rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to
ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the
time he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules
on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private
complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did
in the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
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The Court holds that the private complainant can move for
reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing
disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is
merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by
himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that
being the public prosecutor who has the control of the
prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal
action, (RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Sec. 16) and is granted the
authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and
with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion
for reinvestigation.
The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite,
however. The standing principle is that once an information is
filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation
must be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view. Indeed, the
Court ruled in one case that:
The rule is now well settled that once
a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of
the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although the prosecutor retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even when the case is already
in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon
the tribunal. For while it is true that the
prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court, once the case had
already been brought therein any disposition
the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval. The only
qualification is that the action of the court
must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.
xxxx
In such an instance, before a re-
investigation of the case may be conducted
by the public prosecutor, the permission or
consent of the court must be secured. If
after such re-investigation the prosecution
finds a cogent basis to withdraw the
information or otherwise cause the dismissal
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of the case, such proposed course of action
may be taken but shall likewise be addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.
Amendment of the Information
from the original charge of homicide to murder
is a substantial amendment
Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal
information as what happened in the present case, the Courts
holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an
information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
xxx…A complaint or information may be amended, in form
or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea…xxx
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving
a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of
law demands that no substantial amendment of an information
may be admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan,[54] the Court ruled that a substantial
amendment in an information entitles an accused to another
preliminary investigation, unless the amended information
contains a charge related to or is included in the original
Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the
Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right
but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused; and
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(5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and
material facts, and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for
the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as
it originally stood would be available after the amendment
is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. An amendment to an information which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is
required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case
was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner
and for the same objective of determining whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made
known to him as early as the first motion.
Petition for certiorari shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless
a temporary retraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
retraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued.[63] The appellate court, by Resolution
of February 15, 2007,[64] denied petitioners application for a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs
proved futile.[65] The appellate court thus did not err in finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when
it proceeded with the case and eventually arraigned the
accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order
from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner opted to forego
appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was
available after the reinvestigation and which could have
suspended the arraignment.[66]
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A hearing for judicial determination of
probable cause is not necessary
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus
cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's]
examination of the records should be since the extent of the
judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound
discretion as the circumstances of the case require.
New pieces of evidence are not prerequisites
for a valid conduct of reinvestigation
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new
evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces of evidence
are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is
not material that no new matter
or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the
case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word
itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New
matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation,
which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-
evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted.
V. RULE 113 (ARREST)
54. PEOPLE VS GIVERA (349 SCRA 513) 
C/O RAMON
55. PEOPLE VS MENGOTE (210 SCRA 174) 
C/O RAMON
56. PEOPLE VS MALACAT (283 SCRA 159)
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand
grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when
he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging
around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with
other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached
the group of men, they scattered in all directions which
prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then
apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court.
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner contended that
the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him
and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an
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appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting
the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible because
it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was
valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31
The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante
delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and
frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts
of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.
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In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of
the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting
a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.We now proceed to the justification for
and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down
in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a
police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds
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that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk
was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner
was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza
Miranda two days earlier.This claim is neither supported by any
police report or record nor corroborated by any other police
officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing
Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the
probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and
search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of
Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the
affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e.,
upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his
companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion
other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
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grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by
the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his
companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was
tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object
in [sic] his person.
57. PEOPLE VS AMINUDIN (162 SCRA 402)
PRINCIPLES:
a. Criminal Procedure; Warrant of Arrest; Warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
not justified unless the accused was caught in
flagrante or an crime was about to be committedor
had just been committed. The evidence of probable
cause should be determined by ajudge and not by law-
enforcement agents
b. Vessels and aircraft may be searched without search
warrant - vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.
c. When a seach cannot be considered an incident of a
lawful arrest. – A search cannot be considered an
incident of a lawful arrest if there is no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest does not come under
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25,
1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their
informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He
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alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he
did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only
has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held:
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him
of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the
case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches
and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to
Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made
to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
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precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
58. PADILLA VS CA (269 SCRA 402)
PRINCIPLE:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST;
WARRANTLESS ARREST; GROUNDS. — Warrantless arrests
are sanctioned in the following instances: "Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense., (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRESENCE OF ARRESTING OFFICER OR
PRIVATE PERSON"; PRESENCE DOES NOT ONLY REQUIRE THE
PERSON TO SEE THE OFFENSE BUT ALSO WHEN HE "HEARS
THE DISTURBANCE CREATED AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO
THE SCENE"; CASE AT BAR. — Paragraph (a) requires that the
person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private
person.
FACTS:
Manarang and Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway
Restaurant where they took shelter from the heavy downpour
that had interrupted their ride on motorcycle.
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While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle
(Pajero) running fast down the highway. Immediately after the
vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a
screeching sound. Manarang went to the location of the
accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody. He
asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, took his motorcycle and chased the accused. He
reported through his radio the incident and the plate number
of the accused. Upon learning about the incident, the PNP
immediately took action. They were able to locate the vehicle
and were able to block the running vehicle. SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda approached the vehicle and instructed the driver
to alight the vehicle. They recognized the driver as Robin
Padilla. The police informed him that he was being arrested for
hit and run and searched his body and vehicle for contrabands.
When the police found firearms in his body and car, the police
modified the arrest by including as its ground illegal possession
of firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without warrant was lawful.
RULING:
Yes. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following
instances:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. –A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested
(i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or
is at least attempting to commit an offense,
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.
Both elements concurred here, as it has been established
that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an
offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that
the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears
the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
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scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of
tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut
vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave
chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order
to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the
actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest
by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were
not at, the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent
action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring
petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting
an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all
probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without
endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in
collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and
unsolved crimes.
59. PEOPLE VS EVARISTO (261 SCRA 431)
PRINCIPLE:
 As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Sucro,
(195 SCRA 388) "an offense is committed in the presence
or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when
the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND
PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."
FACTS:
Sgt. Romeroso, CIC Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary and
Sgt. Maligaya were on routine patrol duty about 5:50pm in
Cavite. They heard successive bursts of gunfire within the
vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same,
they came upon Rosillo who was firing a gun in the air.
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Upon seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of
Evaristo. Evaristo and Carillo were asked as to the
whereabouts of Rosillo but they told the police that the latter
had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt.
Vallarta observed a noticeable buldge around the waist of
Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38
revolver. After ascertaining that Cariloo was neither a member
of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said
firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for
questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso
sought Evaristo’s permission to scour through the house, which
was granted. In the sala, he saw number of firearms and
paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture
of firearms, all of which, became the basis for the criminal case
of Evaristo.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search.
RULING:
Yes. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as
a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate
judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and
inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these
exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by
this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. and Coolidge vs. New
Hampshire. Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently
falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may
be introduced in evidence.
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted
permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had
sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for
firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house,
thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as
inadvertent and even accidental.
With respect to the firearm seized from the appellant Carillo,
the Court sustains the validity of the firearm's seizure and
admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized
warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by
which a warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable.
For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on
patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and thus proceeded to
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investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
"offense" envisioned by par. 5(b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As
the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Sucro, "an offense
is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY
AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF.
60. PEOPLE VS ALBARIO (RAPE CASE)  NOT
FOUND
61. NAZARENO VS STATION COMMANDER
(187 SCRA 312)
PRINCIPLE:
REMEDIAL LAW.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.; WARRANTLESS
ARREST.; REQUISITE THAT OFFENSE "HAS IN FACT JUST BEEN
COMMITTED"; REQUIRES IMMEDIACY AFTER THE
COMMISSION OF THE ACT. — In the case of Espiritu, the arrest
was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says
his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but
approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were
supposed to continue their effects even to the following day.
The offense was considered as having been just committed (to
make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court)
despite the considerable time lapse. It was worse in the case of
Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the
Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was
identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the
validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of
the commission of an offense but from the time of the
identification of the suspect. Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a
peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been
committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the
word "just," which, according to Webster, means "a very short
time ago." The arrest must be made almost immediately or soon
after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the
arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was
committed.
FACTS:
In the morning of December 14, 1988, Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men in Muntinlupa. At about 5 am of
December 28, 1988, Regala, one of the suspects in the said
killing was arrested. He pointed to Nazareno as one of his
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companions during the killing of Bunye. The same morning,
without warrant, the police agents arrested Nazareno for
investigation.
ISSUE: Was the arrest valid?
RULING:
In this case, the court ruled on the affirmative.
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that
the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was
probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after
the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14)
days to prevent possible flight.
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu
and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them
were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were
based on probable cause and supported by factual
circumstances. They complied with the conditions set forth in
Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical
arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has
since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment
of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of
this date (CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
DISSENTING:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14,
1988. The information that Narciso Nazareno was one of the
killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December
28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense
"has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have lapsed is
to stretch Rule 113 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous
limits. A warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant
the motion for reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does
not reach back into the past and render legal what was illegal.
The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures
is not cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty
of the offense for which he was seized. A government of laws
must abide by its own Constitution.
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VI. RULE 114 (BAIL)
62. HARVEY ET. AL. VS DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
(162 SCRA 840)
DOCTRINE:
 In deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a
matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of
the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to
bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
FACTS:
American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and
72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch
citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences.
The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found
together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in
the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and
16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-
in for some time now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
were also found.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien
pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three
petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against
petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code.The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against
petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID
denied.
Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he
had “finally agreed to a self-deportation” and praying that he be
“provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under
the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the
country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the
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aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-
petitioners had already filed the present petition.
Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the
Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A
Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a
Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Whether or not the denial by the Commissioner on
petitioner’s release on bail was proper.
RULING:
1) Yes. There can be no question that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the
Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is
that it must be based upon probable cause.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable
cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months
during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure
of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant.
[The fact that] petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young
boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman
being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed
"pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving
children"; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which
children are the preferred sexual object". While not a crime
under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public
morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social
well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent
Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement of probable
cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.”
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do
not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation
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is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being
merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken
the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The
deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
(Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and
need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the
ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d],
155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest
shall give the alien sufficient information about the
charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs.
Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair
hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires,
before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F.
[2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all
the strict rules of evidence governing judicial
controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are
fundamental and essential like the right of cross-
examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs.
Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted,
provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut
it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp.,
437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a
fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if
desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent
evidence.
2) Yes. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners'
release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because
in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter
of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus,
Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of
Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the
power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442).
"Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing
deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al
vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be
invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
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Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude
aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun
vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an
act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this
case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend
the tight of children to assistance and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section
3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against
petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
63. HONGKONG VS OLALIA JR. (521 SCRA
570)
DOCTRINE:
 While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
 The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings.
In the latter, the standard of due process is premised
on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As
Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major
premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the
onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee
may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step
in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the
then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement
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for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took
effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted
back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants
of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received a request
from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional
arrest of Muñoz. The NBI later on arrested him on the basis of a
warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared void
by the CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the
meantime, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with
the RTC a petition for his extradition. He applied for bail which
was initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting
the petition for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but
it was denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed
alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post
bail.
RULING:
Yes. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection
to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive
an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
as deportation and quarantine,have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close
our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
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Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason
why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution
of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly
to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.
Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape
of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial
or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
"the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We
further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case
of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release
from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
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Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission
to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of
bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right
to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be
the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is
from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor
of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility
of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.Given
the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should
be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations
is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only
by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that
a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
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While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
64. MIRANDA VS TULIAO (G.R. 158763)
DOCTRINE:
 Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for
the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of
the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when
an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient
to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
 The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused
has not been arraigned and it was upon his express
motion that the case was dismissed.
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FACTS:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon,
Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio
Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police
officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The
venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review,
the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified the petitioners as the ones
responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting
Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or
quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and
issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground
that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In
the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of the State
Prosecutor to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered
the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to
petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio. The State Prosecutor Leo and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said
Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but
the motion for reconsideration and prayer for inhibition was
denied.
Respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition with the SC, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad.
The SC issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the
two Informations for murder against petitioners. The SC took
note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532
dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
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restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of
Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with the SC a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when
he issued the orders dismissing the informations for murder.
The motion was referred to the Court of Appeals in view of the
previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
The CA granted the petition and ordered the reinstatement of
the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases on the
ground that the order of dismissal issued therein had become
final and executory.
RULING:
1) No. The SC pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication
of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,cited by the Court
of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in
that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph
of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
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A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who
has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no
right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge
should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of
the accused before considering the application for bail.[14]
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as
it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil
or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that [t]he purpose of bail is to
secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail
to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of law. The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein
the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of
the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included;(2) in criminal cases, motions to
quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
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person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the
law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the
jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve
the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause,
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to
elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, upon the accuseds
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further
proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional
Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of
the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to
quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could
elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the
quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of
the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is
the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will
decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
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quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at
any time of the day and night. Furthermore, the continued
absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of
guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his
freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.
2) No. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express
motion that the case was dismissed.
65. COMENDADOR CS DE VILLA (200 SCRA
80)
DOCTRINE:
 The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. The
unique structure of the military should be enough
reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were
charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW
94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the
conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a
motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for
provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court
which was granted. However De Villa refused to release
petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the
appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military
officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by
the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release
for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that
there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail
does not apply among military men facing court martial
proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
ISSUE: Whether or not military men are exempted from the
Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
RULING:
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Yes. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and
is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough
reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the
people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes
a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional"
bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the
truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow
of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court,
and replace the same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members
of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.
66. JUROTA VS BITAS (2014)
PRINCIPLE:
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 The hearing for bail is different from the
determination of the existence of probable cause.
The latter takes place prior to all proceedings, so
that if the court is not satisfied with the existence of
a probable cause, it may either dismiss the case or
deny the issuance of the warrant of arrest or
conduct a hearing to satisfy itself of the existence of
probable cause. If the court finds the existence of
probable cause, the court is mandated to issue a
warrant of arrest or commitment order if the
accused is already under custody, as when he was
validly arrested without a warrant. It is only after
this proceeding that the court can entertain a
petition for bail where a subsequent hearing is
conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is
weak or not
FACTS:
Qualified Trafficking and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 were filed against Danilo Miralles
(Miralles), et al. before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Accused Miralles, through counsel, filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.
Complainant’s contentions:
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his
duties and violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court
when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused
Miralles, who was charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal
offenses. As early as November 19, 2009, criminal complaints
against Miralles for Qualified Trafficking were already filed, yet
respondent judge never issued a warrant of arrest for Miralles
despite accused's presence during the court hearings.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail
of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles even without any petition
for the fixing of bail.
Respondent’s averments:
He stressed that when the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, there is no more need to issue a
warrant of arrest. Respondent judge pointed out that Miralles
always made himself available, hence, he believed that the ends
of justice had not been frustrated. He insisted that there is no
anomaly in the procedure because a warrant of arrest will be
issued only upon the finding of probable cause. In this case,
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however, he was able to post his bail bond before a warrant of
arrest can be issued against him. Thus, the warrant of arrest had
become fait accompli.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF
ARREST SHOULD BE ISSUED?
2. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO BAIL
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
RULING:
NO TO BOTH.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified
Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty
prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the
evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the
application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether
the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong.19
As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, with life
imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense
charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.20
Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate
from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application
for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without
neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for
bail. Respondent judge's justification that he granted bail,
because he found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot
be sustained because the records show that no such hearing for
that purpose transpired. What the records show is a hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a
petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The latter
takes place prior to all proceedings, so that if the court is not
satisfied with the existence of a probable cause, it may either
dismiss the case or deny the issuance of the warrant of arrest
or conduct a hearing to satisfy itself of the existence of probable
cause. If the court finds the existence of probable cause, the
court is mandated to issue a warrant of arrest or commitment
order if the accused is already under custody, as when he was
validly arrested without a warrant. It is only after this
proceeding that the court can entertain a petition for bail where
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a subsequent hearing is conducted to determine if the evidence
of guilt is weak or not. Hence, in granting bail and fixing it
at P20,000.00 motu proprio, without allowing the prosecution
to present its evidence, respondent judge denied the
prosecution of due process. This Court had said so in many
cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who granted
applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt is strong.21
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the
accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
67. ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R.
213847 8/18/15)
PRINCIPLE:
 In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the
Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to: uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person (Section II, Article II of our
Constitution ).
FACTS:
Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental
Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post
bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions
were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not
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yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued,
Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July
7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8,
2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should
be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua. He
anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered.
"Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable." ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
SANDIGANBAYAN’S CONTENTION:
It denied Enrile’s application for bail.
It is premature for Enrile to ask the Court for the fixing of his
bail on the ground that [I]t is only after the prosecution shall
have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. AND
[F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of
the offense charged.
ISSUES:
1. WHEN BAIL IS GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
2. BAIL AS A MATTER OF DISRECTION
3. WHETHER BAIL BE GRANTED.
RULING:
1. BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
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The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
A.) As a result, all criminal cases within the
competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable
as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
B.) bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua ,
or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.2
2. BAIL AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3. YES. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
4.
WORTH AND DIGNITY OF EVERY PERSON
we do not determine now the question of whether or
not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail
despite the crime alleged against him being
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punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because
the determination, being primarily factual in context,
is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of
the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person (Section II,
Article II of our Constitution ).
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only
to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 )
that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk
of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was
granted bail during the pendency of his trial because
he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
POOR HEALTH
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions,
singly or collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of
Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could
lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of
stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-
fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful
conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future
risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4)
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exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by
certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or
allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s
advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional
liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
68. PEOPLE VS AMONDINO (200 SCRA 6) 
NOT FOUND
69. RASUL VS RAPATALO (269 SCRA 220)
PRINCIPLE:
 In the application for bail of a person charged with a
capital offense cpunishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
must actually be conducted to determine whether or
not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
FACTS:
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged
that an information for murder was filed against a certain Roger
Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a
petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May
31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent
Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said
date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for
June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the
accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for
bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses
in connection with said petition were not notified. Another
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the
accused in Rosario, La Union. He later learned that the accused
was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been
heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that
bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29,
1995[1] was issued on the basis of a marginal note[2] dated
June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant
Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection:
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P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor
and eventually by respondent Judge.
In his comment ,respondent Judge alleged that he
granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to
oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation
setting the bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred
that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for
bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He
further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a
right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing
since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the
preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor
was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended
bail.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of bail is proper in this case
RULING:
NO.
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of
bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is
charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court,[7] it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."[8]
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute
nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature
involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the
law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude
for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them
from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
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discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy.
Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in
granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a
court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must
be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful; but legal and regular."[9]
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person
charged with a capital offense cpunishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be
conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of
the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination."[10] If
a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a
violation of procedural due process.
Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his
discretion in granting bail to the accused since the Assistant
Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the
grant of bail and recommended, instead, the bailbond in the
sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although the
court may have the discretion to grant the application for bail,
in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due
hearing which, in this particular instance has not been
substantially complied with by the respondent Judge.
70. CORTES VS CATRAL (279 SCRA 1)
FACTS:
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging
Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gr
oss Ignorance of the Law committed as follows:
1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing: People v. D
uerme, et al., Criminal Case No. 07-893 for murder and People
v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case No. 08-866 for murder. A
lso, in Pp vs. Duerme, the Judge granted bail when the accused
is still at large.
Issue: Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the Law.
Ruling:
Yes. When a person is charged with an offense punishable b
y death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matt
er of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states
: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punis
hable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evi
dence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of t
he stage of the criminal action. Consequently, when the accuse
d is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion per
petua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of th
e court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to dete
rmine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, agai
nst the accused.
A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicabl
e and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely t
o determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On suc
h hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter int
o any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to t
he evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be th
erein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to
the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receivin
g such evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by t
he fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-8
74, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respond
ent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent e
vidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even ha
d to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneo
usly granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reite
rate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed
of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise depri
ved of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongr

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uous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet
to be curtailed.
71. PEOPLE VS GONZALEZ (1/24/1959) 
BONDSMAN
FACTS :
On October 15, 1956 the Alto Surety & Instance Co., Inc., poste
d a bail in the amount of P2,000 for the provisional release of t
he accused in Criminal Case No. 4470 pending in the Court of F
irst Instance of Nueva Ecija subject to the condition that the co
mpany will be liable should be accused fail to appear when req
uired by the court. On November 27, 1956, the date of hearing
of the case, the accused failed to appear notwithstanding due n
otice given to his bondsman, whereupon the court ordered the
confiscation of the bond and gave the bondsman a period of th
irty days within which to produce the accused and show cause
why judgment should not be rendered on said bond. On Decem
ber 7, 1956, the bondsman filed a motion to lift the order of co
nfiscation and at the same time explaining that the accused fail
ed to appear on the date of trial because his mother was very il
l and was brought to the San Lorenzo Hospital for treatment. I
n the meantime, the court, upon motion of special counsel Ferr
er, ordered the dismissal of the case against the accused. This n
otwithstanding, the court denied the motion to lift the order of
confiscation in an order entered on December 13, 1956, but re
duced the liability of the bondsman to 20% of the original bon
d. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bond
sman took the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct in not lifting the ord
er of confiscation of the bond.
Ruling :
Yes. under Section 17, Rule 110,a bondsman is in duty bound t
o produce the person of the accused when his appearance is re
quired by the court, which shows that mere notification is not
sufficient but the bondsman must make every effort to see that
he actually makes his appearance. Because of such inaction, th
e trial court considered the bondsman negligent in the perform
ance of its duty as the rule requires. We are not disposed to dis
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turb this finding for in cases of this nature the determination o
f the sufficiency of the explanation given is a matter that lies wi
thin the discretion of the court.
Also, When the obligation of bail is assumed, the sureties beco
mes the law the jailers of their principal. Their custody of him i
s the continuance of the original imprisonment, and though the
y cannot actually confine him, they are subrogated to all the ot
her rights and means which the government possesses to mak
e their control of him effective" (U.S. vs. Addison and Gomez, 2
7 Phil., 562).
72. SANTIAGO VS GARCHITORENA
(12/2/1993)  C/O LORELIE
73. MIRANDA VS TULIAO (3/31/2006)  C/O
LORELIE
74. ALBA VS CA (4/12/2006)
(On variance between ‘custody of the law’ and ‘jurisdiction of the
court’)
Facts:
Alva was not good lately so he was charged with estafa.
He posted bail which was eventually granted. During the
promulgation of judgement he failed to appear thus the court
reschedule the promulgation to a later date, however Alva again
failed to appear which opted the court to promulgate the
decision in absentia convicting Alva with the crime and commit
him to prison for 9 to 17 years the court also ordered the arrest
of Alva. Thereafter, Alva, filed an appeal and posted bail which
was however denied by the RTC due to Alva’s failure to submit
himself with the custody of the law by jumping bail and failure
to surrender, the same decision was affirmed on appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the court is correct in denying Alva’s posting of
bail on appeal?
2. WON the court is correct in denying Alva’s appeal?
3. What is the difference of ‘custody of the law’ and
‘jurisdiction of the court’? (Discussed topic)
Ruling:
1. Yes, because in the instant case bail is discretionary
with the court.
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SE C .5 . Ba il, w h e n d is c re t io na r y. U p o n co n vi c ti o n
by th e R e g io na l T ria l C o u rt o f a n o ff e ns e n ot
p un i sh a bl e b y d ea t h , re cl us i o n p e rp e t ua o r l i fe
imp r is o nm en t, th e c o ur t, on
a p p li ca ti o n, ma y a d m it t h e a c c us ed to ba i l.
X X X
I n t h e c a s e a t ba r , p e t i t i o ne r wa s c o n v i c t e d
by t h e RT C t o s u f f e r t h e p e na lt y o f i m p r i s o nm e nt
f o r a n i n d e t e r m i na t e t e r m o f ni ne (9 ) y e a r s a nd o ne
(1 ) d a y a s m i ni m u m o f p r i s i o n m a y o r t o s e v e nt e e n
(1 7 ) y e a r s a s m a xi m u m o f r e c lu s i o n t e m p o r a l .
Quite c le a r ly , the approval
p e t i t i o ne r ’s a p p li c a t i o n f o r ba i l wa s d i s c r e t i o na r y
u p o n t h e R T C.
2. Ye s .
SE C . 8 . D i sm i ssa l o f a p p e a l fo r
a ba n d on me n t or f a il ur e to
p ro se cu t e . T h e a p p e lla te co u rt ma y,
up o n mo t io n o f th e a p p ell ee o r it s
ow n m ot i o n a n d no t ic e t o th e
a p p ella n t, d i sm is s t h e a p p ea l i f th e
a p p ella n t fa il s t o fi le h i s b r ie f w i th i n
th e t im e p r es c ri be d b y t h i s R ule ,
ex c ep t in ca s e th e a p p ella n t i s
rep re se n te d b y a c o u n se l de o f ic io .
Th e c o u r t ma y a l so , up o n
mo ti o n o f t h e a p p el le e o r o n it s o w n
mo ti o n, d i sm i ss th e a p p ea l if th e
a p p ella n t es ca p e s fr o m p ri so n o r
co nf i ne me n t o r j u mp s ba il o r fl ee s to
a f or e ig n c o u n tr y d ur i ng th e
p en d en c y of th e a p p ea l .
By v i r t u e o f t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f t h e
a bo v e qu o t e d p r o v i s i o n, t h e a c t o f j u m p i n g b a i l ,
a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , wi l l r e s u lt i n t h e o u t r i g h t
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d i s m i s s a l o f p e t i t i o ne r s a p p e a l. As p o i nt e d o u t by
t h e C o u r t i n t h e c a s e o f P e o p le v . Ma p a la o , [ 3 9 ] t h e
r e a s o n f o r s a i d r u le i s t h a t :
[ O] nc e a n a cc us e d e sc a p es f ro m
p ri so n o r c on f in em e nt o r ju mp s ba il
or fl ee s to a f or e ig n co u n tr y, h e lo ss e s
h i s sta n d in g i n c o ur t a n d un le s s h e
su rr e nd e rs or su b mi ts to th e
ju ri s d ic t io n of t h e c o ur t h e i s d ee me d
to h a v e wa i ve d a n y r i gh t to s ee k
re li ef fr om th e co u rt.
3.
of
Cu s t o d y o f t h e la w i s a c c o m p l i s h e d
e i t h e r by a r r e s t o r v o lu nt a r y
s u r r e nd e r ; wh i le (the term)
ju r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p e r s o n o f t h e
a c c u s e d i s a c qu i r e d u p o n h i s a r r e s t
o r v o lu nt a r y a p p e a r a nc e .
O ne c a n be u nd e r t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e
la w bu t n o t y e t s u b je c t t o t h e
ju r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r h i s
p e r s o n, s u c h a s wh e n a p e r s o n
a r r e s t e d b y v i r t u e o f a wa r r a nt f i le s
a m o t i o n be f o r e a r r a i gn m e nt t o
qu a s h t h e wa r r a n t . O n t h e o t h e r
h a nd , o ne c a n be s u b je c t t o t h e
ju r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r h i s
p e r s o n, a nd y e t no t be i n t h e c u s t o d y
o f t h e la w, s u c h a s wh e n a n
accused escapes custody after his
t r i a l h a s c o m m e nc e d .
Mo r e o v e r , ju r i s d i c t i o n, o nc e
a c qu i r e d , i s no t l o s t a t t h e i ns t a nc e
o f p a r t i e s , a s wh e n a n a c c u s e d
e s c a p e s f r o m t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e la w,
bu t c o nt i nu e s u nt i l the case
i s t e r m i na t e d . E v i d e nt l y , p e t i t i o ne r
i s c o r r e c t i n t h a t t h e r e i s no d o u bt
t h a t t h e RT C a lr e a d y a c q u i r e d
ju r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p e r s o n o f t h e
accused p e t i t i o ne r wh e n he
a p p e a r e d a t t h e a r r a i gnm e nt a nd
p le a d e d n o t gu i l t y t o t h e c r i m e
c h a r ge d n o t wi t h s t a nd i ng t h e f a c t
t h a t h e ju m p e d ba i l a nd i s n o w
c o ns i d e r e d a f u gi t i v e .
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75. PADERANGA VS CA (247 SCRA 741)
Facts:
Paderanga was charged with the crime of multiple
murder. Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion
for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrest could be
issued by the lower court.
However, Paderanga was unable to appear for
the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention.
His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over
the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said
hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on his right to bail. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when
was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant
of the petition.
Issues:
1. WON it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner
is not yet in custody of law.
2. WON Paderanga may considered in custody of the
law?
Ruling:
1. No.
Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished
by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before
any court as required under the conditions specified in said
Rule.
Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors
of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure
one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before
custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities,
either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court
has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free."
2. Yes.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had
indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however,
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at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the
filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of
the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily,
to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted
bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual
restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may
be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of
military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted
to the military camp area.
VII. RULE 115 (RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED)
76. ALI VS CASTRO (151 SCRA 279)
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and
defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in
search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-
out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the
respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning,
the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing,
paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection.
Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the
items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the
provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without
a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior
orders and that operation was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the
assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the
fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting
them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Ruling:
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The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the
respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former
from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners
were entitled to due process and should be protected from
the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was
urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as
criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree”
were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against
the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation
should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said
evidence should remain in the custody of the law.
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and
paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-
incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-
incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
77. PEOPLE VS TODELO (320 SCRA 383) C/O
PAGAPONG
78. PEOPLE VS YATAR (428 SCRA 504)
Principle:
 The right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Facts:
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and was convicted for the same by the RTC of
Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos decision. On appeal,
Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much
weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in
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lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver)
vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of
DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-
postfacto laws.
Issue :WON the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs.
12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
Held:
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-
appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no
testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of
counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against
self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused.
79. VILLAFLOR VS SUMMERS (41 PHIL 62)
Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The
trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into
physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant
to prove and determine the crime of adultery being charged to
her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination
interposing the defense that such examination was a violation
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of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

81. US VS TAN TENG (23 PHIL 145)

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation PRINCIPLE:

of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-  The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of
Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
incrimination.
compulsion to extort communications from him, and
not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may
Held: be material.

No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The

constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in Facts:
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old
The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it
the body of the accused is permissible.
was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on

the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days
80. ONG VS SHIU HONG (36 PHIL 735) later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea.
Facts:
Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported
Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his
it to the police.
mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have been convicted by the
lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the
who were members of the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's
victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and
counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was
compelled to be a witness against himself. was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the

Issue:Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of
against himself when the morphine was forced from his mouth. the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and

Held: turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that

By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following The lower court held that the results show that the disease that
leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other
courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such
from the person of an accused is along the same line as disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal
requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in
evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said
accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in
substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving
his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of violation of his right against self-incrimination.
the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could
not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion a violation of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination.
by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions
from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.

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Held:
The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was
not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to
make any admissions or to answer any questions. The
substance was taken from his body without his objection and
was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if
the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by
him may be used as evidence against him.
82. PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ (COMPULSORY
DRUG TESTING)
PRINCIPLE:
 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they
held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for
purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, a public officer as PO2 of PNP
Cebu City, was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas. When
arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Petitioner denied the charges and testified that while eating at
Jollibee, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents.
When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine
for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
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done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also
requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of
his urine sample, to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the
petitioner is legal.
RULING:
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not
grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally
mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The
phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance
with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation," "sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation", "manufacture" and
"possession" of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties,
social gatherings or meetings" ; being "employees and visitors
of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or
resort"; "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and
essential chemicals" ; "manufacture or delivery" or
"possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous
drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings" ;
"unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof; "cultivation
or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof"; and "maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to
all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act
of extortion.
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now
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before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his
right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest."
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion
and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where
non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however,
that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People
vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against
self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving
of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People
vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA
455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it
has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.
145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu
Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced
to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas,
25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed
or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things
to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]) (Emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be
material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior
to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all
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of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
83. CHAVEZ VS CA (24 SCRA 663)
Principle:
 Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to
the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear
picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the
writ of Habeas Corpus, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Facts:
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An
information was filed against the accused together with other
accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of
confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took
the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the
fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends
that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not
an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against
self – incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of
Habeas Corpus?
HELD:
YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot
be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer
to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer
himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore
adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by
his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart
that gives protection – even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
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invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is
less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure
by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals
does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in
Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an
extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to
protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of
the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of
another constitutional right, in this wise:
A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the
course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court —
as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently
waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is
at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.
84. BELTRAN VS SAMSON ET AL (53 PHIL
570)  C/O SITOY
85. PEOPLE VS MONTEJO  SAME WITH NO.
4
86. PEOPLE VS CARRREDO (3/14/1990) 
C/O SITOY
VIII. RULE 116- 117-118 (ARRAIGNMENT &PLEA /
MOTION TO QUASH / PRE-TRIAL)
87. MIRANDA VS TULIAO (3/21/2006)
FACTS:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered
in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police
officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The
venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of
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reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review,
the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified the petitioners as the ones
responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting
Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or
quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and
issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground
that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
Subsequently, the new Presiding Judge Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan and he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio. State Prosecutor
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of
the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration and prayer for
inhibition were denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest
requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
HELD:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash
the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
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of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. (Judge
D made a distinction between these 2 in his previous
discussion.)
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking
an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to
the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are:
1. in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are
included; 18
2. in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and
3. motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The
first two are consequences of the fact that
failure to file them would constitute a
waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash
a warrant of arrest. (As discussed by
Judge D He focused on the 3 grounds
were the appearance of the accused does
not amount to voluntary appearance in
court.)
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction
over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he
must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
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88. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS SPOUSES
BERMOY (SEPT. 26, 2005)
FACTS:
Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine
Savings Bank ("petitioner"), respondents Pedrito and Gloria
Bermoy ("respondent spouses") were charged with estafa thru
falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 38 ("trial court"). Upon arraignment,
respondent spouses pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed,
with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the
accused. The trial court dismissed the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court
was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for
insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper
identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial
court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be
reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it
would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that
the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal case was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply
in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy had allegedly attached
in the case.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 ("Section 7") of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure14 on double jeopardy provides:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
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which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the
following elements in the first criminal case:
a) The complaint or information or other formal
charge was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
b) The court had jurisdiction;
c) The accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and
d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express
consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions,
namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or
on the denial of the right to speedy trial.16 A dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception.17 Since
such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an
acquittal.18
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in
Section 7 were all present in the criminal case. Thus, the
Information for estafa through falsification of a public
document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which
they entered "not guilty" pleas. Finally, the case was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
became vested on respondent spouses.
The Extent of the Right Against Double Jeopardy
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the
accused is charged with the same offense in two separate
pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the
same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such
offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in
the same case.19 The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court20 which provides that "[a]ny party may appeal
from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would
be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the Order dismissing the
criminal case for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect
appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution21 and Section 7, the courts are barred from
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entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits
of the dismissal.
89. IVLER VS SAN PEDRO
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
MeTC, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal
Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A.
No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered
his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No.
2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
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petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first
offense charged, bars his prosecution in the second offense
charged.
HELD:
Yes. The MeTC is mistaken in finding that the two
cases of reckless imprudence are entirely separate offenses
using the basis that the Second Criminal Case required proof of
an additional fact which the First Criminal Case does not.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the
same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses. The High Court reasoned that
reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on
persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article
365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as
the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from
a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
The ruling today secures for the accused facing an
Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
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constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall
be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
90. CAES VS CA (11/6/1989)
Principle:
 Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey,"
the right against double jeopardy prohibits the
prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has
been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose
is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at
rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter
be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second
charge against him for the same offense. It has been
held in a long line of cases that to constitute double
jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to
which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he
had been previously acquitted or convicted or which
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be
held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even
if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The
first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested.
Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal. The other exception is where the
dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because
of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a
failure to prosecute.
Facts:
On 21 November 1981, Joel Caes was charged in two
separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First
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Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on 10 December
1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled on 11 January
1982, but was for some reason postponed. On 31 August 1982,
Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled
for 13 October 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the
parties and was reset a couple of times more for various
reasons. On 14 November 1983, the prosecution moved for the
provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not
appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued
the order provisionally dismissing the case. On 9 January 1984,
a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had
been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado, who alleged
that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14
November 1983, for lack of notice. Copy of the motion was
furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not to Caes. On 18
May 1984, the judge issued the order granting the "Motion for
the Revival of the Case." A motion for reconsideration filed by
Caes but was denied and the revived cases were set for hearing
on 19 November 1984. Caes filed the petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which was referred to the appellate court.
The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on 20 May
1986, and reconsideration was subsequently denied. Caes filed
the present petition.
Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in
double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights?
Ruling:
Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey,"
the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a
person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or
convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall
not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a
second charge against him for the same offense. It has been held
in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, there
must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a
competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and
(d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or
which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
There is no question that the first three requisites are
present in the present case. It is settled that a case may be
dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused
himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express
consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly
denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional
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even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the
express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be
presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's
silence or his failure to object As held in a number of cases, such
consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the
defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be
regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will
be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for
all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused
himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a
judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The
other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on
motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to
a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases
against Caes was described by the trial judge as "provisional"
did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on
the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent
delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an
acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly,
there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the
provisional dismissal. Implied consent is not enough; neither
may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity,
for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a
constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
91. LOS BANOS VS PEDRO (4/22/2009)
Principle:
 The effects of sustaining a motion to quash, the
dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the
extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy.
 To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are
different concepts whose respective rules refer to
different situations that should not be confused with
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one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as
shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash
under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other
reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under
provisional dismissal.
Facts:
Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm
without authorization from the COMELEC a day before the
elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion
for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC
granted the quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in
which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional
dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express
conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the
provision used applies where both the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to
the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the
information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over
the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening.The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but
through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument that
a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the
CA's decision was reversed. Petitioner now argues using the
same argument of the public prosecutor.
Issue: Whether Section 8, Rule 117 (rule on provisional
dismissal) is applicable to the case?
Ruling:
The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
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A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it
does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The
modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which
Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-
filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent
(i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law,
rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those
barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous
extinction of criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and
the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the
accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these
dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the
grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked
contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified
under Section 3. A necessary consequence is that where the
grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the
appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other
remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under
Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A
motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the
conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses
on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This
feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an
information can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section
4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if
the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by
amendment. Section 5dwells on the effect of sustaining the
motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-filed,
except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter
section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that
Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based
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on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section
7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground
provided under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section
6.
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply
states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the
accused expressly consents and the offended party is given
notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly
to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions
for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately
suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the
express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double
jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates
a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section
8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which
provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the
dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction
of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique
terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared
with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable
implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a
quashal and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They
stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been
provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a
motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The
failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8
provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that
the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to
quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one
another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from
motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely
applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section
3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to
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quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not
apply.
Other than the above, we note also the following
differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting
dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with
other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the
accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information
filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast,
a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either
the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.[26]
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are
as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do
not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the
criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional
dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects
found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the
arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is
already underway provided that the required consents are
present.[27]
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own
terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it
becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information
that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a
motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by
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the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question
of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the
prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a
provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-
bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal
are different concepts whose respective rules refer to
different situations that should not be confused with one
another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic
deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its
face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of
Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the
dismissal of the complaint or information, before
arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in
Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not
apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and
which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally
proper.
92. PEOPLE VS LACSON (4/1/2003)
Principle:
 The order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after the issuance thereof without the case having
been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having
been revived.
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for
a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to a
provisional dismissal[10] does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a
case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the
periods provided in the new rule.
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The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar
either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily
included therein.
Facts:
On May 18, 1991, at around 4:00 A.M., eleven (11)
known members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) figured
in a shootout with the police forces during an operation
conducted by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) near the fly-over along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City. All of the 11 perished that fateful day.
Later, two members of the police team alleged that the killing
was in reality a summary execution, or, in popular parlance, a
rubout.
Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of
reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the
application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the
cases Q-99- 81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent.
The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent
of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the
aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination.
The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other
facts for its application are attendant.
Issue: Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec.
8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied
with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases?
Ruling:
No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of
prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is
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burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused
or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing
the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the
revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been
revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply
with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of
dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given
either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal
consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.[7] Where the accused writes on the motion of a
prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No
objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the
case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object
to a provisional dismissal[10] does not amount to express
consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a
case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the
periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express
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consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would
not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the
prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose
the same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such
revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar
either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily
included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation.[14] However, in a case wherein after the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses
of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation[15] must be conducted before an Information is
refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused,
other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for
the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a
new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded;
or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the
accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called
by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not
mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man
and to assist the court in dispensing that justice
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the
first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule
were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution
did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this
Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a
need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned
before the court for its examination.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the
new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his
resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in
the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
93. PEOPLE VS BALISACAN (8/31/1966)
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Doctrine:
(a) A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It
forecloses the right to defend oneself from said
charge and leaves the court with no alternative
but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances.
(b) The defendant was only allowed to testify in order
to establish mitigating circumstances, for the
purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony,
therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the
merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
(c) In view of the assertion of self-defense in the
testimony of the accused, the proper course
should have been for the court a quo to take
defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the
trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
(d) It is settled that the existence of a plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860,
December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true,
the accused had first entered a plea of guilty.
Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course
of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances, that he acted in complete self-
defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the
court a quo recognized in its decision — had the
effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a
quo should have required him to plead a new on
the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It
follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered
its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double
jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.1
(e) The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former
jeopardy.
Facts: This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of
acquittal. Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the
CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea
of guilty. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel.
At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to
present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.
Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed
the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling
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him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On
the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the
court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. As
stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom.
Issue: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S
PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Ruling: Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty
is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the
offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself
from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative
but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case,
the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish
mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty.
Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the
merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of
the accused, the proper course should have been for the
court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then
proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in
Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In deciding the
case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a
quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution
of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that: "The People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this
regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused
fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy
(People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-
12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June
30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the
accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of
a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People
v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860,
December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the
accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently,
however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to
prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete
self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating
his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required
him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a
new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not
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done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to
the appeal herein.1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case
upon the merits without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without
due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal,
therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no
acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis
for a claim of former jeopardy.
94. PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN (518 SCRA 358)
Principle:
 The institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription.
Facts:
The affidavit-complaints for the violations of BP 22 were filed
against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached
the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in
the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension
of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The
matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City
Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It
was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the
informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the
MeTC of Quezon City on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash
the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her
criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
Issue: The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing
of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of
prescription of such offense.
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Held:
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in
the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. when it
held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
In Llenes v. Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v.
CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving special
laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription.
95. PEOPLE VS CABALI (5/8/1990)
Facts:
Demetrio Cabale, Bonifacio Cualteros Florencio Daniel, and
Benito Terante alias "Bodoy" were charged in two (2) separate
informations before the Court of First Instance of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, with the crimes of Robbery in Band with Less
Serious Physical Injuries, docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
R-2894, for the crime committed against Ricarido Fernando;
and Robbery in Band with Homicide, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. R-2895, for the crime committed against
Rufina Rosello.
After joint trial of the two (2) cases the accused were convicted
as charged.
Accused Benito Terante alias "Bodoy" manifested his desire to
continue and pursue his appeal. He claims that there was an
irregularity in his arraignment since it was done after the cases
had been submitted for decision, so that he was not afforded the
chance to prepare properly for his defense.
Issue: WON arraignment after the case is submitted for
decision is fatal.
Held:
We find no merit in the appeal. On the procedural issue, we find
that while the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after
the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-
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prejudicial and has been fully cured. In the case of People vs.
Atienza, where a similar issue was raised, the Court said:
Counsel for the appellant attacks the procedure
followed in the trial already referred where the two
accused were arraigned after the prosecution had
rested its case, and he claims that the trial court erred
in considering such evidence, especially since the trial
court itself had declared all the proceedings had
before arraignment as null and void. The error, if any,
is non-prejudicial. The interests of the appellant have
not suffered thereby. His counsel entered into trial
without any objection on the ground that his client had
not yet been arraigned. Said counsel cross-examined
the witnesses for the prosecution. When the fiscal
offered to reproduce all his evidence by presenting
again his witnesses, instead of accepting said offer, he
agreed or rather did not object to having that same
evidence for the government declared by the court as
reproduced. We hold that this error or irregularity has
not prejudiced the right or interests of the appellant,
and considering that appellant's counsel had full
opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who
took the witness stand for the government and that
furthermore he agreed to the reproduction, of the
evidence from the prosecution, the error or defect had
been substantially or fully cured.
In the instant cases, counsel for the appellant entered into trial
without objecting that his client, the appellant herein, had not
yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity
of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then,
when the cases were being retried after the appellant had been
arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with
the prosecution, adopting all proceedings had previous to the
arraignment of the appellant. There was, therefore, no violation
of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
96. SANGGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GINDULMAN
VS CASTRO (462 PHIL 391)  NOT
FOUND
97. PEOPLE VS MENDOZA (231 SCRA 264)
Principle:
 There is no rule which provides that simply because
the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his
conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence
independent of the plea may be considered to
convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
Facts:
This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible
for forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon
National School of Home Industries.
It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the
Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag,
Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the
testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the
storeroom. After an on the spot investigation, the policemen
were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible
thereof.
Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the
identity of the perpetrators remained a problem.
RTC acquitted Magalop.
Issue:WON conviction automatically follows after a plea of
guilty by the accused.
Held:
No.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his
guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the
information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said
charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose
the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Thus, under
the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when
the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may
receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to
be imposed.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse
of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the
accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him
accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his
acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because

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the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction 99. PEOPLE VS SERZO (6/20/1997)
automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the
plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our
intelligently made. Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During custodial
investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the
accused is given the option to be represented by a counsel of his
choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option
during arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for
98. PEOPLE V DOCUMENTO (3/17/2010)
him. While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute,
the accuseds option to hire one of his own choice is limited.
It is true that the appellate court noted the trial courts failure to Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory
conduct the prescribed searching inquiry into the matter of tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally
whether or not Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently important rights of the state and the offended party to speedy
made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant and adequate justice.
proper. Its disquisition on Documentos plea of guilt is in point.
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by
With the trial courts failure to electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer
comply with the guidelines, appellants guilty or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented
plea is deemed improvidently made and thus by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of
rendered inefficacious. counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged
to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the
This does not mean, however, that statess and the offended partys equally important right to
the case should be remanded to the trial speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
court. This course of action is appropriate accuseds option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused
only when the appellants guilty plea was the insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is
sole basis for his conviction. As held in People not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent
v. Mira, - the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the
like.
Notwithstanding
the incautiousness that Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights,
attended appellants guilty waivable so long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public
plea, we are not inclined to order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a
remand the case to the trial third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver
court as suggested by is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.
appellant. Convictions
based on an improvident The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of
plea of guilt are set aside appellants constitutional right to counsel because he was
only if such plea is the sole adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers:
basis of the judgment. If the Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not
trial court relied on required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of
sufficient and credible the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy
evidence in finding the and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
accused guilty, the countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed,
judgment must be public policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled,
sustained, because then it considering that appellant was adequately represented by
is predicated not merely on counsels who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or
the guilty plea of the otherwise unable to represent him.
accused but also on
evidence proving his
commission of the offense 100. PAO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
charged. (3/15/2008)

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On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief
Public Attorney of PAO personally appeared before respondent
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to request the relief of
the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel for accused
President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada in their criminal
cases before the Sandigabayan. However, the request was
denied.
The issue is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to
act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent
persons.
In defense, respondent Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, stated that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since it did not act in an arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical manner in issuing the subject Resolutions.
It explained that it was facing a crisis when respondent
issued the subject Resolutions. At that time, the accused, former
President Joseph Estrada, relieved the services of his counsels
on nationwide television. Subsequently, the counsels of record
of co-accused Jose Estrada withdrew, and both accused were
adamant against hiring the services of new counsels because
they allegedly did not believe in and trust the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan had the duty to decide the cases, but could
not proceed with the trial since the accused were not assisted
by counsel.
The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing the subject Resolutions as the issuance is
not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the time of
PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail
themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a
judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused
to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the
cases.
101. PEOPLE VS LARRANAGA (421 SCRA
530)
102. CINCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (202 SCRA
706)
Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of
being charged with informations or crimes other than the crime
imputed in the dismissed cases is baseless. There could be no
double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not year
pleaded to the offense (see Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No.
68086, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 415, 420). Beside, a
preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double
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jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc v. Resultan (G. R. Nos.
59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43) that:
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
it is often that only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complain or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty therefor, and it does not place the person against
whom it is taken in jeopardy.
103. WEBB VS DE LEON (247 SCRA 652)
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and six other personswith the crime of Rape
with Homicide for the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde,her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde
and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80
W.Vinzons St., BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abused their discretion whenthey failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them. No, the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
information, theRegional Trial Court may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused
RULING:
.”a.Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides
:“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall beinviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable causeto be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplaint and
the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the
place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized.
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In arrest cases, there must be probable cause that a crime has
been committed andthat the person to be arrested committed
it.
Before issuing warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt, of an
accuses.
104. LEVISTE VS ALAMEDA
the information filed not valid and of no legal force and
effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said
case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as
purely civil.
ISSUE: The issue raised in this ease is whether the
trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on
the arraignment and trial on the merits.

105. CRESPO VS MOGUL RULING:

It is a cardinal principle that a criminal actions either

FACTS:
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala
fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends
with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
not file the complaint or information, follow or not
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City . When the case
follow that presented by the offended party, according
was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to
to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or
defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of
reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal
Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
prosecution under the direction and control of the
Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor,
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be
Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for
controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order
under the power vested in them by law, not only have
of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
who, according to the evidence received from the
the matter to the appellate court. Subsequently, the CA
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the case
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They
until the DOJ has decided on the petition for review
have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after
filed by the accused. Thereafter, the Undersecretary
an investigation they become convinced that the
Macaraig of the DOJ reversed the resolution of the
evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to
facie case. However, the action of the fiscal or
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
against the accused. A motion to dismiss for
The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial
city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court,
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that
opposition thereto. The Judge then denied the motion
a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
and set the arraignment. Hence this petition for review
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The
of said decision was filed by accused whereby
filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set
criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to
enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment
hear and determine the case. When after the filing of
and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring

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the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest
of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submited himself to the
Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The rule
therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
106. PEOPLE VS VILLARAMA (220 SCR 208)
FACTS:
Appellant Villarama was charged with rape of a 4 year old child.
The informationm states that the accused is the uncle of the
victim. A circumstance of rape is provided in par.1, Art. 335 as
amended by RA 3659, when the victim is under 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consaguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Paragraph 4 of the same law further provides, when the victim
is a religious or a child below 7 years old. The RTC rendered a
decision, finding accuse-appellant guilty and imposed the death
sentence on him.
ISSUE: WON it is enough for the information to merely allege
that appellant is the uncle of the victim?
RULING:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that if the offender is a relative…, the
information must allege that he is “a relative by consaguinity or
affinity [as the case may be] within the 3rd civil degree. It is not
enough for the information to merely allege that appellant is the
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“uncle” of the victim even if the prosecution is able to prove the
same during trial.
107. PEOPLE VS CARLOS GARCIA  NOT
FOUND
VIII. RULE 119 (TRIAL)
108. PEOPLE VS OBESO (kidnapping 
Judge D’s former client) C/O AUGUSTO
109. JACOB VS SANDIGANBAYAN (635 SCRA
94) C/O AUGUSTO
110. PARADA VS VENERACION (269 SCRA
371) C/O AUGUSTO
111. PEOPLE VS GO (677 SCRA 213) C/O
AUGUSTO
112. MANGUERRA VS RESOS (8/28/2008)
FACTS:
Respondents here were charged of Estafa through
falsification of public documents for falsifying of a deed of real
estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where
they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed
her signature to the document
Concepcion was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and
was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a
motion to take the latter’s deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical
condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Concepcion, as a prosecution witness,
be allowed to take deposition (due to her weak physical
condition and old age) outside the court where the case is
pending.
HELD:
No.
Section 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
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the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, OR has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused
to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119
applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so
that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the
same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
113. BOGO-MEDELLIN MILING CO., INC. vs.
SON (209 SCRA 329)  BY JIGO
FACTS:
Ramon was charged with qualified theft. At the same
time several persons including Albert were charged in separate
information for simple theft. The acts involved in both
informations related to the theft of the same item, Wela Babes
belly button.
Months later, Albert was dropped from the
information for simple theft and instead was charged as co-
accused of Ramon.
After arraignment of the two (2) accused, but before the
prosecution could commence presenting its evidence,
petitioner Wela Babes Inc., filed a manifestation informing the
trial court of petitioner Ramon's desire and willingness to act
as state witness and to testify against his co-accused, Albert
who, Ramon claimed, was the most guilty. Then, the court
granted the discharge of Ramon as a state witness.
Ramon failed to appear twice before the trial court for
the initial hearing of the case.
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Unfortunately, because of Albert’s motion for
reconsideration against the discharge of Ramon, he was
reinstated as co-accused of Albert for qualified theft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the discharge of Ramon as a state
witness amounted to his acquittal and that his reinstatement as
a co-accused of Albert constitutes Double Jeopardy.
HELD:
Yes.
The general rule is that the discharge of an accused in
order that he may turn state witness, is expressly left to the
discretion of the trial court. 7 The effect of the discharge of a
defendant is specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the following
manner:
Sec. 10. Discharge of Accused Operates as Acquittal. — The
order indicated in the preceding section, shall amount to an
acquittal of the accused discharged and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
On the claim of the private prosecutor that the discharge of
Ramon on the basis of the questioned order operated as an
acquittal and therefore would constitute double jeopardy if he
is reinstated as accused, it needs only to state that under
Section 10 of Rule 119, the discharge which amounts to an
acquittal and therefore a bar to a future prosecution for the
same offense, applies only if and after the discharged
accused shall have actually testified for the state or his
failure to testify is attributable to the prosecution. Thus,
where Ramon has not yet testified, the principle of double does
not yet apply. For even if he is not reinstated as accused and he
fails or refuses, for some reason, to testify against his co-
accused, then his discharge does not operate as an acquittal and
therefore not a bar to future prosecution o f the same offense.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record to
show that Ramon failed or refused to testify against his co-
accused, i.e., that he reneged on his covenant with the
prosecution. All the record shows is that petitioner Ramon
failed to attend two (2) scheduled hearings, which does not
necessarily show that he had violated his undertaking to
testify against his co-accused "in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge."
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There is thus on record no sufficient basis to withhold
the benefits of Section 10 of Rule 119 from Ramon. We conclude
that, petitioner Ramon having been acquitted of the charge of
qualified theft, could not be subsequently reinstated as a co-
accused in the same information without a prohibited second
jeopardy arising under the circumstances, absent satisfactory
proof that he had refused or failed to testify against his co-
accused.
114. PEOPLE VS LARRANAGA (421 SCRA
530)  DONE
115. SOBERANO VS PEOPLE (472 SCRA 125)
 DONE
116. PP VS BAUTISTA (106 PHIL 39)  C/O JIGO
117. PP VS MENDIOLA (82 PHIL 740)  C/O JIGO
118. WEBB VS DE LEON (8/23/1995)  C/O JIGO
119. PP VS SOBERANO (472 SCRA 125)  C/O JIGO
120. FRANCISCO VS CA (5/30/1983)
FACTS:
On February 6, 1966, Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then
the Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital, filed a case
for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on
December 26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry
Bernardino. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information against Francisco and Bernardino with the CFI
of Rizal of the crime of grave oral defamation. Later, upon
order of the court, the information was amended by adding
statements allegedly uttered by the two accused
constituting the crime of slander.
On Feb. 1, 1973, the trial court convicted Francisco and
Bernardino of the crime of grave oral defamation and
sentenced each of them the penalty of arresto mayor and
was made to pay the complainant P10,000. Upon appeal in
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the Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision was
modified finding the accused guilty of simple slander.
Bernardino passed away while this petition was instituted
in the Supreme Court. Francisco, then argues that since the
CA had found that the offense committed was the lesser
offense of simple slander, which under Art. 90 of the RPC,
prescribes in two months, the CA should have dismissed
the case.
Further, Francisco claims that the CA should have
acquitted him on the ground that the said crime had
already prescribed as per evidence presented, the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed on December 26,
1965, while the information charged against him was filed
more than four months later.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that "for the
purpose of determining the proper prescriptive period,
what should be considered is the nature of the offense
charged in the information which is grave oral defamation,
not the crime committed by the accused, as said crime was
found by the Court to constitute only simple slander". Since
the prescription for grave oral defamation is six months,
the crime has not yet prescribed when it the information
was filed. Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the
filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the
period of prescription. Only 39 days had passed from the
time the offense was allegedly committed to the day of the
filing of the complaint.
ISSUES: Whether or not the crime of simple slander found
by the CA to be the offense committed by the petitioners
has prescribed.
Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office
interrupts the prescription of an offense.
RULING:
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1. Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser
offense necessarily included in the crime charged if at the
time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has
already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the
Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the
defendant of the graver offense.
2. Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case
even if the court is without jurisdiction, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus,
the filing of the complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the
period of prescription.
121. PP VS LAGUIO
FACTS:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for
review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in criminal
case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer
to Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges filed against him.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings
that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to
rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search
is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as
a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the
trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however,
now posits that inasmuch as it has been shown in the present
case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs
and unlicensed firearms in the accused possession had been
validly made upon probable cause and under exigent
circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must
necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the
occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and
therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and
lawful. In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless
search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls
under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant
prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were
justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
ISSUE: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by
the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
RULING:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case
did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
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respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched
his person and commanded him to open the compartment of
the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend,
David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under
paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the
testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested
mainly on the information that he was the employer of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested
and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did
not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of
the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the
duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the
early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few
hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers
conducted surveillance operation in front of said apartment,
hoping to find a person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court,
is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.
122. PP VS UY (9/30/2005)  C/O GIME
123. DAYAP VS SENDIONG (G.R. 177960 1/29/2009)
FACTS:
Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage
to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the driver of a cargo
truck which figured in an accident with a Colt Galant driven by
Lou Gene Sendiong causing instant death to the latter and less
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serious physical injuries to the latter’s passenger. The MTC
granted Dayap Demurrer to Evidence saying that prosecution
failed to establish that Dayap was really the one driving the
cargo truck. The MTC further stated that prosecution also
wasn’t able to prove the death and injuries of the victim as there
were not death certificate and medical certificates submitted as
evidence. The MTC gave credence to the evidence of the Dayap,
showing that it was the victim’s car which swerved into the
cargo truck’s lane thereby being the proximate cause of the
accident. The MTC relied on the accident sketch contained in
the police blotter to support this conclusion.
Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for certiorari
under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the acquittal of Dayap
but ordered the case remanded to the MTC for the hearing of
the civil aspect.
Sendiong filed a petition for review (42) with the CA.
the CA concluded that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction and
not the MTC. The CA explained that according to Cuyos v Garcia,
jurisdiction over damage to property cases should be
determined by the imposable fine and not the penalty for the
physical injuries and following BP 129, MTC only has
jurisdiction over those felonies with imposable fine not
exceeding 10,000. Since in this case, no proof of total damage
was given and Sendiong claims 1.5M in civil damages, the same
should have been brought before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not remand to the MTC of the case for the
determination of civil liability was proper
RULING:
The acquittal of an accused does not carry
with it the extinction of civil liability when (1) acquittal was
based on reasonable doubt (2) court determines that there is
only a civil liability (3) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise or is not based on the crime for which he was acquitted.
On the other hand, acquittal of an accused carries the extinction
of civil liability when (1) there is a finding on the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or (2) the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him. In this case, the
acquittal by the MTC was based on findings that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been
extinguished by his acquittal. Thus, because there was no civil
liability to hear, the case should not have been remanded to the
MTC.
124. MAGLEO V QUINAGURAN (11/12/2014)
PRINCIPLE: An order granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence is a resolution of the caseon the merits, and it amounts
to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription
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on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
previously made some exceptions.30
People v. Tan31 eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not
attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham.
FACTS:
Complainant is the accused in the Criminal Case No. 137860-
PSG, entitled People of the Philippines v. Esther Magleo y
Pampolina, for Estafa presided by Judge Nicanor Manalo, Jr.
(Judge Manalo)who granted her demurrer to evidence and
acquitted her of the charge of estafa.
Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit Judge
Manalo from the case. THE CASE was later re-raffled to Branch
166, RTC, Pasig City, presided over by respondent judge
Quinagoran.
Complainant’s averments:
 instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground
of double jeopardy, respondent judge overturned the
order of acquittal and set the case for reception of
. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by respondent judge. HENCE, violating
complainant’s right against double jeopardy. (FOCUS
ON THIS ISSUE, others are merely incidental to
RULE 119)
 she did not receive a notice of hearing, Despite such
omission, respondent judge still issued a warrant of
arrest
 the amount of bail recommended was erased to bar
her from posting the bond for her temporary liberty.
Respondent Judge defenses:
 when the accused filed the demurrer to evidence, the
prosecution has not rested its case yet. Thus, the
granting of the demurrer to evidence is not proper
considering that it was filed prematurely. And that the
filing of the demurrer to evidence before the
prosecution could rest its case and the subsequent
granting thereof effectively denied the prosecution’s
right to due process.
ISSUE:
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whether the respondents committed transgressions in the
performance of their duties warranting the imposition of
disciplinary penalties.
RULING:
NO.
This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It was the February
2, 2011 Omnibus Order26 which elucidated the clear legal basis
why respondent judge continued the criminal casedespite the
earlier order granting the demurrer to evidence. Generally, if
the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not
sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the
ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the casewhich is
tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed.27
The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general
rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because it was
filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet
ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the
prosecution when complainant filed her demurrer to
evidence.28 Hence, respondent judge had legal basis to overturn
the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no
proper acquittal. The complainant elevated the matter to the CA
via a petition for certioraribut it sustained her ruling.29The CA
decision reads:
Indubitably, an order granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence is a resolution of the caseon the merits, and it amounts
to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however,
the Court has previously made some exceptions.30
People v. Tan31 eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not
attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham. In addition, in People v. Bocar,32 this
Court rule that there is no double jeopardy when the
prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of
evidence by the trial court.
125. PP VS SALAZAR (411 SCRA 598)
PRINCIPLE: The acquittal of the accused does not prevent
a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
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preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
FACTS:
petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from
J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As
payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private
complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential
Bank.
Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was
drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner
was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential
Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid
Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the
word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court[5] alleging that she
could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following
reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by
Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa
penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser
thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the
petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian
Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after
the first check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a
second one. The first transaction had therefore been
effectively novated by the issuance of the second
check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not
for insufficiency of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking
parlance means drawn against uncollected deposit. According
to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient
funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a
check, had not yet been cleared.
The court acquitted petitioner on the absence of
conspiracy between him and the endorser. As a mere indorser
of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the
check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent
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act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article
315(2)(d).
Within the reglementary period therefor, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect
of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present
evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. But the court
issued an order denying the motion.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner’s motion is meritorious.
RULING:
The last paragraph of Section 2 rule 111 provides that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.[7]
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the
punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended
party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal
action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is
merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the
accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are
primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty
for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused
by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the
private complainant and the accused is intended solely to
indemnify the former.[8]
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions
involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for
the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of
the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal
action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State
on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil
action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of
the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the
case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect
of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of
evidence.[9] Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure
to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
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SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of
conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability
or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.[10]
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability
of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil
action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
When the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is
to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case
126. PP VS ALFEREZ (G.R. 182301 1/31/2011)
PRINCIPLE: The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of
the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.
When petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of
court, the whole case was submitted for judgment on the basis
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of the evidence presented by the prosecution as the accused is receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice
of dishonor.

FACTS: 2. YES.

Petitioner Jaime Alferez purchased construction materials from
Cebu ABC Sales Commercial. As payment for the goods, he
issued three (3) checks for the total amount of P830,998.40.
However, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account. Petitioner was thus charged with
three (3) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City.
Instead of presenting evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer
to Evidence approximately ten (10) months after the
prosecution rested its case. Petitioner averred that the
prosecution failed to show that he received the notice of
dishonor or demand letter.
Nonetheless, petitioners acquittal for failure of the
prosecution to prove all elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt does not include the
extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.[29] In case of acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused

The trial convicted him of the charged. MR-denied; is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
appealed the case to RTC but only modified the penalty of does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
imprisonment.
which the accused was acquitted.[30] In a number of
Elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review similar cases, we have held that an acquittal based on
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court but sustained the crime as
charged. As to petitioners contention that he was denied his reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
right to present evidence after the denial of his demurrer to damages.[31]
evidence, the CA held that there was no such denial since it was
merely the consequence of the filing of demurrer without leave
of court. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as to petitioners civil
ISSUE:
liability.
1. Whether or not accused be held liable under BP 22
2. Whether the filing of the Demurrer of (sic) Evidence
without leave and denied by the trial court is a waiver Finally, in answer to petitioners insistence that he
of the right of the petitioner (the accused before the
should have been allowed by the trial court to present
trial court) to present his evidence in support and to
rebut the evidence of the respondent particularly with his evidence on the civil aspect of the case, suffice it to
respect to the civil aspect of the case.
state that when petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence
RULING:
without leave of court, the whole case was submitted
1. NO. the prosecution merely presented a copy of the
demand letter, together with the registry receipt and for judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by
the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner, there was the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have
no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on
the registry return card.[18] Receipts for registered waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture,
letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove

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the court is called upon to decide the case including its Petitioner appealed the civil aspect[7] of the case to the
civil aspect.[ Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the
dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

127. HUN HYUNG PARKVS EUNG WON CHOI (GR

165496 2/12/2007) DISTINCTION OF DEMURRER IN By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL) RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to
prove respondents criminal liability, it did not altogether
PRINCIPLE: Either the offended party or the accused may, extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of
however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the
petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount
acquittal of the accused.
of P1,875,000 with legal interest.[
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly
liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based ISSUE:
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
Whether or not acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not accused
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted
RULING:
NO. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately

FACTS: final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the
acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against
Respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for double jeopardy.
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine
National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, Either the offended party or the accused may,

1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the

having been drawn against insufficient funds. acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the

a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as

which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil

failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, aspect of a decision are the offended party and the

the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency accused.[

of funds did not arise.

MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence. If the filing of a separate civil action has not been
reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil
liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of

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conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by the
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any.[31]
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability
of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was acquitted.[32]
preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally
proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on
demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when
there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination,
trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce
continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,[35] held:
If demurrer is granted and the
accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case unless the court also
declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.[36]

The civil action based on delict may, however, be

deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or
civil liability may arise did not exist.[33]
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of

Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
court denies the demurrer.[34] Such denial bears no distinction
as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he
evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the
the interest, and that he already made a partial payment
demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant
of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the payments
the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far
made by respondent pertained to other transactions.[37] Given
presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond
these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case
reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate,
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
and for the trial court to resolve the same.
evidence.

Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
Section 1 of Rule 33,[38] and (2) when respondent orally

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opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that
proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case
continue.
128. CABARLES VS MACEDA (REOPINING OF TRIAL)
DOCTRINE:
The following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a
hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional
and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
days from the issuance of the order.
FACTS:
On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder. A day
before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2,
2003, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order
reopening the case. In it, he observed that the prosecution may
not have been given its day in court resulting in a miscarriage
of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the
dates specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when
the case was actually heard, the prosecution was unable to
present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing dates:
April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda
found that there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001.
Thereafter, the subpoena issued to Pedrosa required her to
appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned for the
prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that
another subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen
requiring them to appear on May 11 and June 20, 2001. But, the
May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001 because the
judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting
was concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for
the prosecution. Judge Maceda further observed that the May
18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and May 25, 2001 was
likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to Judge
Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its
evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was either no
return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no
subpoena issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution
should have been given a last chance to present the alleged
eyewitness and the doctor. His order in part read:
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As a consequence the promulgation set
tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set the reception of the
testimony of the eye witness and the doctor on May 1,
2003 at 2:00 [p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail
[of] the last chance granted by this Court. Issue the
corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr.
Romeo T. Salen directing them to appear on the
aforesaid date and time, to be served by the Branch
Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return
thereof.
ISSUE:
Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
motu proprio the April 1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before
judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two
prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case?
RULING:
Yes. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the
following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening
must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the
order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon
motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
(4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5)
the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should
be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.
However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no
abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus
properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment
is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of
judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a
motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This
remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage
of justice.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case
before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing
must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003
Order without notice and hearing and without giving the
prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their
position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process
clause of the Constitution which requires notice and
opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the said order, without
the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of
Section 24, Rule 119.
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IX. RULE 120
129. CASTILLO VS SALVADOR (7/30/2014)
DOCTRINE:
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused as follows:
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
FACTS:
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic)
correctional (sic) maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum and to indemnify
the private complainant in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine currency.
With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed
their respective pleadings, after which, the case was submitted
for decision.
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On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing
the decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision of Branch 202 of the RTC of Las Piñas City, dated
April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and
accused appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa.
Petitioner now files the instant petition on the matter of the
civil aspect of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting the
accused and not retaining the award of damages to the
petitioner.
RULING:
No. To begin with, in Manantan v. CA, we discussed the
consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused
as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is “for the same act or omission.” x x x.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been
committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a
person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor.
The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa
are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's
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primary witness herself could not even establish clearly
and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She
failed to convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into
a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining
circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her
submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt,
respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v.
National Bookstore, Inc., we explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.
However, petitioner in the case failed to prove even
preponderance of evidence to establish that indeed, she gave or
turned-over to herein respondent $100,000. Hence the CA is
correct in both acquitting the accused and not awarding to
petitioner the civil aspect claimed.
130. PP VS BUGARIN
DOCTRINE:
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing
and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals,
he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or
the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than
that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity
of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit.
FACTS:
Herein accused-appellant was charged by her
daughter with 5 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape.
After the prosecution and defense have presented their
respective evidence, trial court convicted the accused. In a two-
page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial
court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the
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complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her
story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an
undoubtful and a definite yes.
Based on said ruling, accused-appellant questioned said
decision on the ground that it failed to state the grounds
therefore.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed decision is in accordance with what
the Constitution and rules require.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, 14 that: No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule
120, 2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed
by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are
any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after
the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the
civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in
at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation
of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal
questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court
considered the complainants testimony credible despite the
fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could
not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly
raped. It does not explain why accused-appellants licking of
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complainants genital constituted attempted rape and not
another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had
been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December
24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December
23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested
by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six
informations were filed against him, but the decision found the
accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape (which the
trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of
attempted rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant
was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is
so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty
of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the four
counts of . . . rape.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing
and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals,
he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts or
the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than
that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity
of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit.
Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of
passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of
reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his
decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects
the judicial function.
131. PP VS CA (99 PHIL 786) C/O LORELIE
132. PP VS PAREJA (WON RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT
NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN RAPE BY CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE)
Doctrine:
(a) The date and time of the commission of the crime of
rape becomes important only when it creates serious
doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction.
In other words, the “date of the commission of the rape
becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically
hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.”
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Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime.
(b) However, since the charge in the Information for the
December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by
sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second,
and vice–versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of
rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with
was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja
was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be
convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said
crime is included in the crime of rape.
Facts: AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts
of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three (3)
different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February
2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight
years old]. At the time of the commission of the aforementioned
crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein
accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was
cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their
children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x,
Pasay City. With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004
[the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw
[Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while
the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately
brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said
incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she
had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial
and ill motive of AAA against him as his defense. He denied
raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the
daughter of his live–in partner and that they all stay in the same
house. [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that
the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja]
described the layout of their house and argued that there was
no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
Issue:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
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(b) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
[PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.
Ruling:
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of
his conviction as it was riddled with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the “assessment
of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage
point denied appellate courts–and when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding
and conclusive upon this Court.”21 While there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial
reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and
appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility.
The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape
becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as
to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the
evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the
“date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only
when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s
narration practically hinge on the date of the commission
of the crime.” Moreover, the date of the commission of the
rape is not an essential element of the crime.
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in
People v. Ladrillo, implying that our rulings therein are
applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in
Ladrillo are prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular,
the main factor for Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated when the
Information against him only stated that the crime was
committed “on or about the year 1992.”
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and
February 2004 incidents were not specified, the period of time
Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike “on or about
the year 1992.” Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he
had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly
happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he
raped the victim in that house in 1992. It is worthy to note that
Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime
charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had
an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced
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reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In
contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him and
even imputed ill motive on AAA.
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could
have prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires, but
they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape
cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion.
Lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies
constraints of time and space.
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico–Legal Report indicating that there
is evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma upon
examination of AAA’s hymen, “cannot be given any significance,
as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical
trauma were inflicted.”
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be
convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the
victim. In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full credence,
considering that no young woman, especially of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a
crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.
(Citations omitted.)
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on
the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was examined is of no
consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination
actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more
than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However,
as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and
prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266–A of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 266–A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, rape by sexual assault is “[b]y any person who, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
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another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.”
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December
2003, inserted his penis into her anus. While she may not have
been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident,
she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December
2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual
assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as
the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the
December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual
assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due
to the material differences and substantial distinctions
between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice–versa.
Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what he was charged with was rape through carnal
knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, even though the crime charged
against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he
can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
without violating any of his constitutional rights because
said crime is included in the crime of rape.
133. PP VS VILLENA (GR 184091)
Doctrine:
(a) While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the
mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court
thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this
principle presupposes that the party filing the notice
of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal
and had not lost standing in court.
(b) Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose
the remedies available under the Rules of Court
against the judgment(a) the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal
from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However,
the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in
court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his
surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of
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court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the
reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date
of promulgation of judgment. If the trial court finds
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused
shall be allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15
days from notice or order finding his absence justified
and allowing him the available remedies against the
judgment of conviction
(c) The term surrender under Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a
convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the
consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of
notices of appeal cannot suffice as a physical and
voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTCs
jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners valid
surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can
avail of the remedy of appeal.
(d) Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail (as in the case of petitioners), or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.
(e) The judgment of conviction against petitioners had
already acquired finality. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court, they had only 15 days from the date
of promulgation of judgment within which to
surrender and to file the required motion for leave of
court to avail of the remedies against the judgment.
Facts: Petitioners were charged and found guilty of robbery-
extortion by the RTC. During promulgation of their judgment
(September 3, 2007), they failed to appear despite proper
notices. Warrants of arrest were issued against them pursuant
to Rule 120, Sec 6, Pars. 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court.
It was only in October 11, 2007, that petitioners separately filed
their notices of appeal with the RTC, saying that they did not
receive the notices as they were transferred to another police
station. The RTC found their reason unmeritorious as they
should have notified their court of their new addresses
especially that they were the accused. Having to surrender is
their only option for appeal.
Petitioners argue that their notices of appeal have complied
with the Rules of Court and have placed them under RTC's
jurisdiction and that the CA should have considered their
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motion for reconsideration as they have offered their

explanation for their absence.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of
Issue: whether or not the petition has merit? the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
under the Rules of Court against the judgment(a) the filing of a
Ruling: The petition is without merit.
motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an
appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However,
While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere
the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in
filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court
order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b)
thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle
his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these
presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could
remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15
validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost
days from the date of promulgation of judgment. If the trial
standing in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their
court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the
standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during
accused shall be allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15
the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation of
days from notice or order finding his absence justified and
judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of
allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of
the RTC.
conviction.[17]

Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was

Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their
already substantial compliance with the requirements of
new counsel, therein only explaining their absence during the
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which states:
promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of
xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at surrender, despite the fact that said notices were filed within
the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when
shall be made by recording the judgment in their new counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of
the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof at his last known address or thru his conviction from the RTC. The term surrender under Section
counsel.
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act
If the judgment is for conviction and whereby a convicted accused physically and voluntarily
the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the
remedies available in these rules against the
consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of
judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from notices of appeal cannot suffice as a physical and voluntary
promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion submission of petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only
for leave of court to avail of these upon petitioners valid surrender, and only after proper
remedies. He shall state the reasons for
his absence at the scheduled motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent
promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he compliance with these requirements, their notices of appeal,
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice.

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the initiatory step to appeal from their conviction, were
properly denied due course.
Even if petitioners notices of appeal were given due course, the
CA would only be constrained to dismiss their appeal. This is
because petitioners, who had standing warrants of arrest but
did not move to have them lifted, are considered fugitives from
justice. Since it is safe to assume that they were out on bail
during trial, petitioners were deemed to have jumped bail when
they failed to appear at the promulgation of their sentence. This
is a ground for dismissal of an appeal under Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court. Once an accused escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail (as in the case of petitioners),
or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.
What is more, the judgment of conviction against
petitioners had already acquired finality. Under Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they had only 15 days from
the date of promulgation of judgment within which to
surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court
to avail of the remedies against the judgment. As the
judgment was promulgated on September 3, 2007, petitioners
had only until September 18, 2007 to comply with the
mandatory requirements of the said rule.
134. PP VS DE GRANO (6/5/2009)
Doctrine:
(a) Double jeopardy has the following essential
elements: (1) the accused is charged under a
complaint or an information sufficient in form and
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substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed
without his express consent.
(b) Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution,
authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused
to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of
the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during
trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence,
unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the
accused may appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived.
(c) The accused who failed to appear without
justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available
in the Rules against the judgment. However,
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment,
the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state in his motion the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days
from notice
Facts: On November 28, 1991, an information for murder
committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas,
against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando),
and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-
accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho
(Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large.
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. After the
presentation of the parties’ respective sets of evidence, the RTC
rendered a finding the accused JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO
DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER. The
case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil
is was sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as soon
as said accused are apprehended. Subsequently alias warrants
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of arrest were issued against accused Leonardo Genil and

Leonides Landicho. Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused

from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the

Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite
due notice to the other respondents. Thus, Respondents, accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear
thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, at the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof.
2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered
acquitting them. Petitioner opposed to said motion but was
denied by the RTC and giving due course to Estanislaos notice Petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.
of appeal.Petitioner then filed a Petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA but the same was
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy. A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or
Estanislao, none of the respondents appeared at the
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any
for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the
decision, stating the reasons for their absence. The trial court plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
thus had no authority to take cognizance of the joint motion for
law.[53] An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as grave
reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
such, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
void. Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void
Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a
dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
jeopardy.
Issue: power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner

(a) WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS because of passion or hostility.[54]

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by

Ruling: A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner
the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
has sought recourse before the CA, via a petition
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also
for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the
jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the
respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and
assailed judgment void.[55] In which event, the accused cannot

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be considered at risk of double jeopardy the revered Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the provides that the accused who failed to appear without

risk of answering twice for the same offense. justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the

Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from

Double jeopardy has the following essential promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and

elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or file a motion for leave of court to avail of these

an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his

a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves

has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be

convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from

express consent.[56] notice.[62]

Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was

availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was

acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and

demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and

to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for

power to dispense justice. Hence, any acquittal or conviction Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not

before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at

principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion. The RTC

place. clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint

Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents

Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution, authorizing
trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the who were at large.
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a)
at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC
(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it committed no reversible error when it entertained the Motion
is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear
by counsel or representative. At such stages of the for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost
waived.[60]
jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTCs ruling

downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide

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Issue:
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription
The question for decision is whether the court below had
against double jeopardy applies.
jurisdiction to modify its decision after the lapse of nearly seven
months from the date of its promulgation, notwithstanding the
fact that the fiscal's motion for reconsideration was filed within
X. RULE 121
fifteen days
135. PP VS TAMAYO
Held:
Principle:
Judgment in a criminal case may be revised or modified only
To summarize, judgment in a criminal case may be revised or
within the period to appeal, or fifteen days from the date of its
modified only within the period to appeal, or fifteen days from
promulgation. We see no reason why the Government may not
the date of its promulgation. We see no reason why the
make a motion for reconsideration as distinct from a motion for
Government may not make a motion for reconsideration as
new trial, before the judgment becomes executory, but such
distinct from a motion for new trial, before the judgment
motion cannot operate to suspend or extend the above period;
becomes executory, but such motion cannot operate to suspend
the court must act before that period terminates if the revision,
or extend the above period; the court must act before that
alteration, or modification are to be valid. Only a motion by the
period terminates if the revision, alteration, or modification are
defendant can interrupt the running of the period at the
to be valid. Only a motion by the defendant can interrupt the
expiration of which the judgment becomes final.
running of the period at the expiration of which the judgment
becomes final.

136. DEOTINA VS GONZALES (41 SCRA 68)  C/O RAZA

Facts:
Timoteo Tamayo, the appellant, was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte with illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition.
On July 16, 1947, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded
guilty, whereupon the court, taking into consideration said plea
of guilty and the recommendation of the fiscal, sentenced him
to pay a fine of P100 and costs.
On July 24, 1947, the Provincial Fiscal moved the court to
reconsider its decision on the ground that the imposable
penalty was that provided in Republic Act No. 4, which became
effective on July 19, 1946. Evidently when the case was tried
and decision rendered, neither the court, the fiscal nor the
defendant was aware of the enactment of the new law, which
considerably increased the penalty for the possession, etc., of
firearms and ammunition.
The defendant's counsel objected to the motion for
reconsideration. Nevertheless, the court, on February 14, 1948,
amended its decision and sentenced the accused to five years of
imprisonment, accessories of the law, and costs.
XI. RULE 122
137. PP VS CITY OF MANILA (4/24/1987)
Principle:
Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for
the new offense.
Facts:
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971.
The following day, October 18, an information for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against
private respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the
victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the
charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.

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He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion
of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide
thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double
jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy
Held:
NO. Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with
an offense cannot be charge again with the same or Identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, supra, the rule
of Identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that
in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the
first prosec ution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inexistent. "Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy." Stated differently, where after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the
information was filed, and the accused was arraigned two (2)
days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already
in jeopardy.
138. QUEMUEL VS CA (22 SCRA 44)
Facts:
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Quemuel was convicted of the crime of libel and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3)
months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but
imposed, instead the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of
P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the
offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six
(6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs.
Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
erroneous because: 1) it awarded said indemnity, despite the
fact that the offended had not appealed from the decision of the
trial court, which made no award of such nature; 2) the
assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil
action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts (and not
in appellate courts).
Decide.
Ruling:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal
case opens the whole case for review and this includes the
penalty, which may be increased 2 and the indemnity is part of
the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas vs. Director of Prisons, 3 this Court
held that:
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay forms an integral part of the penalty, it being
expressly provided by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code that every person criminally liable is civilly
liable.
Although the authority to assess damages or indemnify in
criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first
instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate
court. Thus, this Court has, in many cases, increased the
damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended
party had not appealed from said award, and the only party
who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the
accused. 4
139. CARINO VS DE CASTRO (4/30/2001)
Facts:
Cario charged De Castro with violation of BP22.
Subsequently, the charges were dismissed due to lack of
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probable cause. Cario appealed the dismissal with the RTC
which eventually affirmed said dismissal.
Thereafter, petitioner, through counsel (private prosecutor)
and with the conformity of Asst. City Prosecutor, filed a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition because it was filed only by the
private prosecutor and not by the Office of the Solicitor General
as mandated by law.
Issue:
WON criminal cases may be appealed by private prosecutor.
Ruling:
No.
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of
Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under
Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and
functions of the OSG was to represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.
Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
Appeals or the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate
to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to
adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do
so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the
direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the
provisions of law.
We are cognizant of our ruling in the cases of Perez v.
Hagonoy,[15] Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[16] People v.
Santiago,[17] and Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[18] where we held
that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic or represent the People or state in criminal
proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
(exception) At the same time, we acknowledged in
those cases that a private offended party, in the interest of
substantial justice, and where there appears to be a grave error
committed by the judge, or where there is lack of due process,
may allow and give due course to the petition filed. However,
the special circumstances prevailing in the abovementioned
cases are not present in the instant case. In those cases, the
petitioners availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In
the instant case, the petition was filed under Rule 45.

Although the petition for review before the Court of

Appeals was filed with the conformity of the Assistant City
Prosecutor, such conformity is insufficient, as the rules and
jurisprudence mandate that the same should be filed by the
Solicitor General.
While a private prosecutor may be allowed to
intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of
140. MALAYAN INSURANE VS PICCIO (8/6/2014)
Facts
The President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency
– the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies
(Yuchengco Group), to which Malayan Insurance is a corporate
member – filed a Complaint-Affidavit for thirteen (13) counts of
Libel against herein respondents.

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Upon the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause,[11] thirteen
(13) Informations were filed before the Makati-RTC.
A motion to dismiss was filed against one of these cases due to
lack of jurisdiction which dismissal was granted. Thus, Malayan
appealed the dismissal. It was however found out that the
appeal was taken by the private prosecutor without the
authority of the OSG - as a result the appeal was dismissed.
Issue:
Can a criminal case be appealed without the authority of the
OSG.
Ruling:
Of course no.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Court and the CA is vested solely in the OSG[45]which
is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and
functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the
People [of the Philippines] before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.”
“if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may
bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the
People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the
party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the
People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed
as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In view of the
corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal
case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is
perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended
party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of
the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. He may also file a special civil action
for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only
to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the
case.”
141. PP VS PEREZ (12/11/2013)
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; That only the
Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or
certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
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criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits the
exception concerning ”all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent
the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 That
only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal
or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings is the general rule,79 but the rule
admits the exception concerning "all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986." More specifically, Section 4(c) of Republic
Act No. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz: x x x x c. Civil and
criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. x x x x
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986.
Facts:
This is a very long case. The meat of this case is more on political
law with respect to denial of right to speedy disposition because
the Ombudsman took more than 6 years to investigate the
former DOJ Secretary and to file a case with the SB. But the
point is the Ombudsman, other the the Solicitor General is
authorized to file an appeal with the Supreme Court
142. PP VS CORNELIO (6/10/1971)
Criminal procedure; Death Sentence; Escape of death convict
does not relieve Supreme Court of duty of reviewing – Where the
accused, whom the CFI convicted 11 December 1946 of
robbery with homicide and physical injuries and sentenced to
death, escaped from prison 13 February 1947, their escape
does not relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of
automatically reviewing the case, in the same manner that a
withdrawal of appeal by a death convict would not remove the
case from the jurisdiction of the court.
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Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility of witnesses; When their failure
to report at once the the names of perpetrators of crime does
not affect credibility of witnesses. – Although the crime was
committed 12 January 146, the fact that the two women
prosecution witnesses reported their positive identification of
the accused only in their sworn statements of February 19467
and 7 February 1946, respectively, is sufficiently explained, i.e.
their fear for their lives, as their malefactors had threathened
to kill them if they report the matter to the authorities. The
initial fears of the two victims-witnesses in divulging the
identities of the accused until they were able to overcome
them and gather enough courage from the assurance of police
protection by the authorities were understandable, and could
not in any way detract from their straightforward testimony.
FACTS:
The accused were charged with brigandage with murder and
physical injuries (this is an old case).The two eye witnesess
were also victims of pyshical injuries by the hand of the
accused. One of whom was maltreated and molested while the
other was shot in the knee. After obtaining the loot, the
malefactors told the inmates, including the two witnesses not
to divulge the incident otherwise they would be killed.
At the trial, defense counsel concentrated efforts in his cross-
examination of the two victim — eye witnesses — Paula
Galicia, 21-year old niece of the deceased Narciso Galicia, and
Tranquilina Galicia, 45-year old sister of the said deceased on
seeking to discredit their positive identification of the accused
by bringing out the fact that these victims did not immediately
divulge the names of the accused and their companions to the
Police authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is correct
HELD:
NO.
The escape of the accused does not relieve the Court of the
burden of automatically reviewing the case, in the same
manner that a withdrawal of appeal by a death convict would
not remove the case from the jurisdiction of the Court.1 Hence,
the Court will no longer permit the case to remain further in
its docket and will proceed to discharge its task of passing
upon the cause en consulta and reviewing the facts and the
law as applied thereto by the trial court and determining the
propriety of its imposition of the death penalty
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The Court has thus satisfied itself of the correctness of the
conclusions and judgment of the trial court.
At the trial, defense counsel concentrated efforts in his cross-
examination of the two victim — eye witnesses — Paula
Galicia, 21-year old niece of the deceased Narciso Galicia, and
Tranquilina Galicia, 45-year old sister of the said deceased on
seeking to discredit their positive identification of the accused
by bringing out the fact that these victims did not immediately
divulge the names of the accused and their companions to the
Police authorities and did so only in their sworn statements of
February 6, 1946 and February 7, 1946 which were submitted
by the chief of police of Candon with his criminal complaint for
murder filed on February 12, 1946 with the justice of the
peace court.
These victims, however, readily explained that they were in
fear for their lives, as the malefactors had threatened to kill
them if they were to report the crime to the authorities. The
accused and their companions had treated the two women
roughly and brutally, boxing twice Tranquilina's face when
they could not get any more money from her and abruptly
shooting Paula through the right knee upon her telling them
also that she had no more Money. 4 They had taken away
Narciso, tied his hands behind and then mercilessly shot him
at his back. The women knew the malefactors well, as they
used to go to their barrio, and were known to be "SS" or the
ones who ruled over the barrio people as agents of the
guerrillas in the mountains. 5 As Tranquilina put it. "I did not
reveal the identity of the accused because I was thinking of
what the accused told us that they would kill all of us including
the children," 6 and it was later on February 6, 1946, after the
MP's had assured them of protection "that I was able to make
up my mind to have the authorities protect us and bring the
matter to the authorities.
That the two women were cringing in mortal fear and could
not even talk right after the crime was testified to as part of
the res gestae furthermore by the chief of police, Romualdo de
Castro, who recounted that when he went early in the morning
of January 13, 1946, to the house of the deceased
Narciso,"Paula Galicia could not talk because she was
groaning" 7 and "Tranquilina Galicia was trembling like a mad
woman and I could not talk to her." 8
The initial fears of the two witness in divulging the identities
of the accused until they were able to overcome them and
gather enough courage from the assurance of police protection
by the authorities were understandable and could not in any
way detract from their straight-forward testimony.
143. PP VS DABAN (1/31/1972)
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Criminal Procedure; Death sentence cannot become final until
reviewed by the Supreme Court – The counsel’s explanation that
the escape of the accused from detention relieved him of the
responsibility of pursuing the appeal, betrays his ignorance of
the law. The judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty
entered in the trial court is not final and cannot be executed and
is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed
upon by the Supreme Court en consulta. The mere fact of escape
of appellant is not sufficient cause for counsel’s failure to file
appellant’s brief.
FACTS:
Respondent, Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip is the counsel for the of
appellant beginning 1970 up to 1971. During the said period he
filed several motion for extension of time to file appellant’s
brief which amounted to 17 all in all.
It was only then that on October 11, 1971 this Court issued a
resolution, reading as follows:
"For failure to submit accused-appellant
Roscoe Daban y Ganzon's brief within the
extended period which expired on August 24,
1971, Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby
required to explain, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him."
What passed for an explanation for appellant's persistent
failure to file appellant's brief was submitted on November 25,
1971, worded thus: "[Comes now] the accused-appellant, by
and thru the undersigned counsel de oficio, unto this Honorable
Supreme Court most respectfully manifests and explains that,
in the opinion of the undersigned lawyer, grounded on settled
jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner automatically makes
the appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered
abandoned." It is his prayer, therefore, that the above be
considered a satisfactory explanation..
Issue:
Whether or not an appeal of a conviction of death is
abandoned by the escape the prisoner convicted.
HELD:
No.
His explanation disregards the facts and betrays ignorance of
the law.
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Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip
is unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: "The records of all
cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by
any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The
records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the
Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than
fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the
sentence in the form prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41. The
transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in section 12 of
Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographer." The penalty imposed on appellant Daban y
Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of
death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover,
until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached
to the lower court decision. As explained in former Chief Justice
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court:"In this connection, it
must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty entered in the trial court, is not final, and
cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until
the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en
consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by
the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final
judgment and sentence; and that until it has been reviewed by
the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not
final and conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme
Court is something which neither the court nor the accused
could waive or evade." The mere fact of escape of appellant,
therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as
sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief.
144. PP VS MATEO (GR 147678-87 7/7/2004)
FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the
complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to
the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC
and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the
Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct
appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or
lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion
or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
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perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.”
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision
is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily
prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the
accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the
Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the
crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to
convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and
appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme
Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is
the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.
145. GALMAN VS SB (144 SCRA 43) EFFECT/S WHEN
THE TRIAL IS A SHAM
Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine
the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed
that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the
assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall
guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the
premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the
Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a
resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to the
crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of
President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and
to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy
may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against
the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of constitutional rights
of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing
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the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and
prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of
the accused from the charges against them.
Held: The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision
of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial
was granted
In Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera’s expose, he affirmed
the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration. He
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-
Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the
extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating
Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where
the former President ordered then that the resolution be
revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent;
decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace
"a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who
tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist.
Also the final outcome of the case of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil
liability was predetermined.”
Moreover, there was suppression of vital evidence and
harassment of witnesses through the following: 1)
Disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination, 2) in the assignment of the case to Presiding
Justice Pamaran, there was no evidence that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself, 3) the
custody of the accused and their confinement in a military
camp, instead of in a civilian jail, 4) the monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel. In rendering its decision, the
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Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was
totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is
the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases
by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference
(and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel
Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan
and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the
world are entitled to know the truth, the integrity of our judicial
system is at stake.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of
the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public
posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the
public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of
office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience
and honor.
146. PP VS YU ( 2/9/2011) 15 DAY PERIOD
APPLICABLE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Facts
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner of
estafa.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal
with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for
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new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a
notice of appeal.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is
inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the
appeal and for the execution of the decision
Issues:
1. Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated
in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.
Held:
1. YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in
civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh
period” to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the
following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on
which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between
the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case.
Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from.”
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently
worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results
are concerned.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the
ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved
a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of
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which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the
petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November
16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying
her motion for new trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED.
147. PP VS FERNANDEZ (186 SCRA 830)
Primarily, appellant claims that S/Sgt. Edgard Groyon and Rosa
Zamora-Manalad are not the best witnesses to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that their
testimonies would at best be secondary, if not hearsay,
considerin that there are others more qualified and convincing
to testify. This submission is bereft of merit. The matter of
presentation of its witnesses by the prosecution is not for the
accused or, except in a hmited sense, for the trial court to
control. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial fiscal as to
how the prosecution should present its case. He has the right to
choose whom he would present as witness. Moreover, if the
defense believes that there are other witnesses who could have
exculpated the accused, it should have called for them, even by
compulsory process.
148. MELENCION VS SB
An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the
appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the
correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of
the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court
would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court reads: An appeal erroneously taken to the Court
of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright.
149. PP VS BALABA
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing
the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The
trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002.
Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court
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of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction
on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on
27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal
from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s
appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
XII. RULE 126
150. PP VS QUELMAN (GR 116061 7/6/2007) (NOT
FOUND)
151. NALA VS BARUSO JR. (GR 153087 8/7/2003)
DOCTRINE/S:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause
is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the
judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the person and place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
Where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by
virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the
course of the search are inadmissible against the accused.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
FACTS:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser together with
his witness Ruel Nalagon applied for the issuance of a warrant
to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R.
Nala, who was referred to in the application as “Rumolo Nala
alias Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.” The
application was filed in connection with petitioner’s alleged
illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm.
pistol in violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same
day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City,
issued Search and Seizure Warrant .On July 4, 2001, at around
6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and other police officer search the
petitioner’s house and allegedly seized the following: (1) one
piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number
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1125609; (2) one pc. Fragmentation grenade (cacao type); (3)
one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live ammunition for caliber
.38 revolver; and (5) 4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and
unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and
filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash but was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly
established from the deposition and examination of witness
Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally
conducted a surveillance to confirm the information given by
Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the
items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same
because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of
illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge also found that
petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although
his first name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and
not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was couched in
terms that would make it enforceable against the person and
residence of petitioner and no other.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was sufficiently described in the
search and seizure warrant.
(2) Whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance
of a search and seizure warrant against petitioner.
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found
in petitioner’s residence are admissible in evidence against him
even though said firearms were not listed in the search and
seizure warrant.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure
warrant the first name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not
“Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because
the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be
residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently
enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner.
. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and
not one which, as in the instant case, contains descriptio
personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused
without difficulty.
(2) No. The probable cause for a valid search warrant has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of
the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. In determining its existence, the
examining magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and
the witnesses. Probable cause must be shown by the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. On
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the part of the applicant and witnesses, the introduction of such
evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the
existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g.,
the absence of a license required by law. On the other hand, the
judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but
must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of such
license, as well as on whether the applicant and the witnesses
have personal knowledge thereof.
In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in
connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the
elements of which are (1) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the license or permit to possess the same.
Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms
would therefore be such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a
person is in possession of a firearm and that he does not have
the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere in the
affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3
Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search
warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to
possess a firearm. PO3 Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon
did not have personal knowledge but only personal belief of
petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions
and explosives; and did not adduce the evidence required to
prove the existence of probable cause. Hence, the search and
seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented
is void.
(3) No. The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to
be searched was gained by virtue of a void search warrant,
prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are
inadmissible against the accused. In Roan v. Gonzales, the
prosecution sought to charge the accused with illegal
possession of firearms on the basis of the items seized in a
search through a warrant which the Court declared as void for
lack of probable cause. In ruling against the admissibility of the
items seized, the Court said:
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search
is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid
search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioners premises had no right to
be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and
bullets.
Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of
petitioner cannot be used as evidence against him because
access therein was gained by the police officer using a void
search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioner’s
house without a warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and
the items seized, inadmissible.
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Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because
they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary,because
possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the
required permit or license therefor is not first obtained.
So also, admissibility of the items seized cannot be justified
under the plain view doctrine. It is true that, as an exception,
the police officer may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm, or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found
in plain view. However, said officer must have a prior right to
be in the position to have that view of the objects to be seized.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent.
No presumption of regularity may be invoked in aid of the
process when the officer undertakes to justify an encroachment
of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the firearms
and explosive were found at the rear portion of petitioner’s
house but the records do not show how exactly were these
items discovered. Clearly, therefore, the plain view doctrine
finds no application here not only because the police officers
had no justification to search the house of petitioner (their
search warrant being void for lack of probable cause), but also
because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving
that subject articles were inadvertently found in petitioners
house.
152. PP VS DICHOSO (GR 10126 6/4/1993)
DOCTRINE/S:
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
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It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his
control or possession.
FACTS:
A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellant’s
residence was issued after probable cause was personally
determined by the judge after examination of the applicant.
Appellant contends that the search warrant is a general
warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he
violated, and the search conducted was unconstitutional and
the items obtained inadmissible. The body of the warrant reads:
xxx
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examining under oath, T/Sgt. Iluminada S. Evangelista and his
witness Marlon Alcayde that there is probable cause to believe
that the above-named defendants are illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic) stored inside the nipa hut within the
compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San
Pablo City which should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.xxx
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the search warrant is void for being a general
search warrant.
2) Whether or not the the items seized were admissible in
evidence.
RULING:
1) No. It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a
general search warrant because while it is for "Violation of RA
6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended,"
the body thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the
offense involved, viz., illegal possession of marijuana and shabu
and paraphernalia in connection therewith. These are evident
from the clause, "are illegally in possession of undetermined
quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound
of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was
issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles
and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search
warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In
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short, following this theory, there should have been three (3)
separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu,
the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for
illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
2) Yes. The view of the appellant that the search was illegal and
the articles seized thereby cannot be used against him in
evidence since he does not own the nipa house searched or the
lot wherein it was built, is unmeritorious. It is not necessary
that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is issued; it is
sufficient that the property is under his control or possession.
It was established, even by the defense's own evidence, that the
appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa house.
He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent
to the big or main house in the Dichoso residential compound,
and that he and his family have been using the nipa house as a
resting place even before the search.
Any doubt as to the appellant's control over the nipa house
where the seized articles were recovered is wiped out by the
testimony of the defense's own witness, Francisco Calabia, who
affirmed that the appellant and his wife Sonia Dichoso actually
reside therein while Redentor's parents and brother reside in
the big house.
153. PP VS TEE (1/20/2003)
DOCTRINE/S:
The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily
identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
seizing the wrong items;and (2) leave said peace officers with
no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.What the
Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or
general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical
precision of description be required, particularly, where by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
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rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue.
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are
asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
FACTS:
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman,
and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine
National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at
premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground
that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with
the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the
appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated
July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged
Modesto Tee, alias “Estoy Tee,” with illegal possession of
marijuana.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the appellant's contention that the
description on the search warrant which says “an
undetermined amount of marijuana,” was too general and
hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.
2) Whether or not the failure of the witness to appear and
testify on twenty (20) hearing dates violated appellant’s
constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.
RULING:
1) No. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized is
primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and
thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave
said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to
be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of
broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions,
which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence
or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that
technical precision of description be required, particularly,
where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical
description would mean that no warrant could issue.
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Thus, it has been held that term narcotics paraphernalia is not
so wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant. Nor
is the description any and all narcotics and all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to the
use, possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so
broad as to be unconstitutional. A search warrant commanding
peace officers to seize a quantity of loose heroin has been held
sufficiently particular.
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description an
undetermined amount of marijuana must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy,
what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified
character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its
character and the circumstances under which it would be
found, said article is illegal. A further description would be
unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such
character, the place, and the circumstances.] Thus, this Court
has held that the description illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalia particularizes the things to be seized.
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar
wording, undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp,
in our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on
particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2)
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the peace
officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and
(3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects
to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it
prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the
Bill of Rights.
2) No. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the
law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In Conde v.
Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that
where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more
than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A
determination as to whether the right has been violated
involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the
delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution
and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to
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assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to
the accused.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for
criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution
witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there is no
showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused
Abratique’s absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny
him his rights. On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to
show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went
to the extent of praying that the trial court order the arrest of
Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution
likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter
was in the Bureau’s custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial
court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present
Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered.
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an
unreasonable length of time. Delay of less than two months has
been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of
time.
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee
objected to the inability of the prosecution to produce its
witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial
court to require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that
the latter would testify when required. Appellant could have
moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day
for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellant’s claim that his
constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. One must take
into account that a trial is always subject to postponements
and other causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing that
delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not
be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an
accused.
154. ALVAREZ VS CFI OF TAYABAS (64 PHIL 33)
DOCTRINE/S:
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When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary.
The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of
a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable
for damages caused.
The affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for
determining whether probable cause exist and whether the
warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description
of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied
with; but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
FACTS:
The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to
Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is
in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as
money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of
law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the
information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge
issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs,
cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the
articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of
the judge who issued the search warrant. Alvarez moved that
the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and
prays that all articles in question be returned to him because
the search warrant issued was illegal. On the other hand, the
Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain
custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When
the judge sustained the latter’s motion,. Alvarez elevated the
matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as
the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to
retain custody be declared null and void.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether the Search warrant issued by the judge is illegal for
having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose
oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of
the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the
warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through
information secured from a person whom he considered
reliable.
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2) Whether or not the warrant was issued illegally for lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized.
RULING:
1) Yes. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not
only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but
that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person
taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the
practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that
the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that
he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness.
The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative
necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay,
it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant
issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts
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2) No. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support
of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack
of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution,
and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the
affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for
determining whether probable cause exist and whether the
warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description
of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied
with; but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs.
Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the
affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are
being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest,
in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of
the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate
and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially
complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law
who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
155. PP VS DE GUZMAN (194 SCRA 601)
FACTS:
During the trial, the prosecution presented as its first
witness, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas, a police officer stationed at the
Noveleta Police Station. He testified that prior to the arrest
of accused-appellant, Danilo de Guzman, the Police Chief
Inspector of the Cavite Philippine National Police
Command issued an Order of Battle listing the names of the
suspected drug pushers in Cavite City.[4] Included therein
was the name of accused-appellant. In response to the said
directive, the Noveleta Police Station assigned SPO1 Arnel
Cuevas to conduct surveillance at the Villamar Beach Resort.[5]
On October 18, 1992, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de
Guzman at the Villamar Beach Resort, but the latter stayed
for only thirty (30) minutes.[6]Subsequently, he learned
that De Guzman was engaged in a drug sale that day and
reported the same to headquarters.[7] Pursuant to his
report, the Chief of Intelligence of their station, SPO2
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Rowell Tendero, instructed him to continue his
surveillance of said beach resort with the hope of catching
Danilo de Guzman.[8]
On October 26, 1992, at around 9:00 p.m., Danilo de Guzman
returned to Villamar Beach Resort with companion Edsel
Martin. They rented one of the resort cottages. Fifteen (15)
minutes later, SPO1 Cuevas climbed the ladder which he
perched on the concrete wall of the cottage. He, then, peeped
through the window of the cottage and saw Danilo and Edsel
seated face to face while using shabu.[9] He also saw on top of
the table three (3) plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and
other drug related paraphernalia.
SPO1 Cuevas hurriedly descended the ladder and hailed a
tricycle and instructed the driver to inform SPO2 Tendero
to proceed to Villamar Beach Resort
immediately.[10] Shortly, SPO2 Tendero, along with other
police officers, arrived at the beach resort. However,
instead of rushing to the cottage of De Guzman and Martin,
the police officers decided to wait for them to come out of
the cottage.[11] SPO1 Cuevas explained that they did this so
as not to forewarn the two of their presence. Otherwise, the
two might simply flush the shabu down the toilet bowl and
destroy the evidence.[12] The police officers waited the
whole night for De Guzman and Martin to come out of the
cottage.
Finally, De Guzman came out at around 7:40 a.m. the next
day. SPO2 Tendero nabbed him upon seeing that his waist
was bulging with a gun. While Police Officer Vedar held De
Guzman, SPO2 Tendero went up the cottage to check on
Martin.[13] SPO2 Alfaro and SPO3 Benavise, accompanied
by a chambermaid and a boy from the resort, also went up
with him.[14] Inside the cottage, the same paraphernalia
which the witness saw the night before were found,
namely, three plastic bags of shabu, a plastic scoop, a
burner, a lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils,
three (3) pieces of tooter, rubber band, several pieces of
paper, a black clutch bag containing a disposable lighter,
two (2) forceps, a pair of scissors, a knife and a key holder
with a knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket
electronic weighing scale.[15]
The offenders were brought to the police station for
questioning and detention.[16] The police officers were without
warrants of arrest or search warrants at the time of the arrests
and seizure of evidence.[17] As the operation was conducted
largely during nighttime, the police officers were unable to
secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of
surveillance.[18]
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, the Court finds the accused Danilo de Guzman y Perez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III,
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CAVITE CITY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECTS (sic),
COMMITTED A PATENT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR PRESENTED WAS OBTAINED IN
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH;
RULING: NO.
Necessarily, the search conducted immediately after the
accused-appellants arrest was valid. Rule 126, Section 12
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.
The legal parameters of this rule limit its application to
instances when the search is made contemporaneous to the
arrest and within a permissible area of search.
In this case, it was impossible for the police officers to obtain
a search warrant as they were merely on surveillance, and
to do so might abort any possible illegal activity that was
taking place. Any attempt at leaving the place may cause
them to lose sight of the accused-appellant
altogether. Second, their presence in the area was not
planned as they acted purely on a tip given by a fellow
officer. Further, there was not enough opportunity to obtain
a warrant of arrest or a search warrant as the surveillance
was conducted from 10:00 oclock in the evening up to 7:00
oclock in the morning.
The search conducted immediately after accused-appellant was
apprehended was made more necessary by the presence of his
companion inside the cottage which was just a few steps away
from where he stood. The presence of accused-appellants
companion posed a danger to the police officers life and limb,
hence, it became necessary for them to locate him. Upon entry
at the rented cottage, the police officers saw the shabu and
drug-related paraphernalia scattered on top of the table.
Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personalty despite
absence of warrant under the plain view doctrine, so long
as the area of search is within the immediate control of the
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arrested person and that the object of the search was open
to the eye, as in the instant case.
Furthermore, accused-appellant in this case is estopped
from questioning the legality of his arrest upon his failure to
move for quashal of the information against him prior to his
arraignment and entry of plea.[53] Any irregularity was
therefore cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial
courts jurisdiction.[54]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Cavite City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 39-94, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Danilo de Guzman y Perez is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 40-94, the decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
156. VALEROSO VS CA (9/3/2004)
Facts:
Prosecution theory:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a
Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and
three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a
case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance
on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and
Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the
Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle.
Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him
under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver,
bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live
ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
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Valeroso was then brought to the police station for
questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to
Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
Defense theory:
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr.
(Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes,
Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed,
"Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not
armed with a search warrant.12
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97,
Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision
ISSUE: Whether or not Valeroso’s constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure was violated?
RULING: YES.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to
where Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version
of the defense.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned
that, as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is
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required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the
fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in
Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The
following are the well-recognized instances where
searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are:
a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary
to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.34
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In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test
of reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless
search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an
incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident
to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search
is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35People v.
Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to
lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and
the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect,
but also in the permissible area within the latter’s
reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure
of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At
that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house
of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers
who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room,
placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. 43 The
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other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject
firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso
was charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily
conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of
arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed
him immediately under their control by pulling him out of
the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands
tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso,
was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within
his immediate control" because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching
the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used
against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining,
there was no comparable justification to search through all
the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which
cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may
be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under
the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece
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of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain
view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a
warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the
police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,
the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence
against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently,
the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
in evidence against him.1avvphi1
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot
invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54
157. NOLASCO VS PANO (147 SCRA 509)
FACTS:
The three petitioners will be referred to through their
surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without
the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She
was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued
against NOLASCO.
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3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time
is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by
respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents
have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the
same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G.
Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round
the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has
been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking
officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused,
Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August
6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises.
He was arrested by the searching party presumably without a
warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written
materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the
premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was
made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428
articles and documents attached to the Return was signed
by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-
ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short)
upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information
for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners
before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
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(the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge
Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress
in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the
431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was
claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on
the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be
litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently
not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued
in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Issues: Whether or not the search warrant is valid?
Whether or not the petitioners may recover the 431
items seized?
RULING:
1. No, the search warrant is not valid.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the
personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party
of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National
Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans
of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description
which includes everything conceivable regarding the
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Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized
thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general. Thus:
The lack of particularization is also evident in the
examination of the witness presented by the applicant for
Search Warrant.
SECOND ISSUE: NO.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search
Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot
be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.
Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus,
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A
person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to
the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be
search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own
facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the
decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or
premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered
is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the
public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with
Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a
considerable period of time; that she was arrested within
the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of
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her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we
are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-
B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest
of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained.
by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion
Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance
and to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her
any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on
August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the,
personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary
Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in
Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military
commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-
Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission
to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
158. EXPANO VS CA (288 SCRA 588)
PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST;
THE MARIJUANA SEIZED FROM PETITIONER'S HOUSE AFTER
HIS ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. —
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An
exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest of dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
FACTS: Petitioner was caught in possession of and under his
custody 12 plastic cellophane bags containing crushed
flowering tops, marijuana.
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Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, the police
officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm the reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw
petitioner selling “something” to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified
themselves as policemen and frisked him. The search yielded 2
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had
more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house.
The policemen went to his residence where they found 10 more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs.
ISSUE: WON the articles seized are admissible in evidence.
RULING: The two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence because he was caught in flagranti as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.
However, as for the other ten cellophane bags of marijuana
found at petitioner's residence, the same are inadmissible in
evidence considering that the said bags were seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest, hence, do not fall under the
exceptions provided under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
159. IPE VS OLAT MANDO (518 SCRA 641)
PRINCIPLE: In People v. Sarap ,we listed the exceptions where
search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the
evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6)
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The
only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable
cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place to be searched.
FACTS: At around 2:30 pm of September 6, 1998, a confidential
informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with
Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km.
96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted
vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay,
Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4pm of that same
day, the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it
did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan,
La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of
Benguet pine lumber. Petitioner could not produce the required
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DENR permit to cut and transport the same. The police

immediately arrested and investigated petitioners. Petitioners
were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised
Forestry Code.

ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause to justify such

warrantless search and seizure.

RULING: Yes. In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a

vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent
attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their
inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable
belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board
said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle
contained objects which were instruments of some offense.
This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the
Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in
evidence against petitioners.

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160. PP CS TUAZON (532 SCRA 152)
PRINCIPLE: In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing , this Court had
the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of
searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search
warrant, thus: THIECD
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object
of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
FACTS: The Antipolo City Police Station received through
telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini Car bearing
plate No. PFC 411 would deliver an unspecified amount of
shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip,
Antipolo City Chief of Police dispatched a team of policemen to
the area to conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in
Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and
immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a
stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen
the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the
Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Padlan saw a
gun tucked on appellant's waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the
gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor
could he produce any pertinent document relating to said
firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get
down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the
vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the driver's seat,
the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu.
Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police
station and was charged with illegal possession of shabu.
ISSUE: Was the arrest valid and were the shabu seized
admissible in evidence against the accused?
RULING: Yes. When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to
an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect
the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant.
The circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish
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probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and
the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets
against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility
of the evidence against him on the ground that the same was
obtained through a warrantless search. His failure amounts to
a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It was only
proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court
substantially complied with the requirements of the
Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts of
the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It
likewise contained an explanation as to why it found appellant
guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our
mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards the bases
for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial
court disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
enjoyed by police officers.
161. WORLDWIDE WEB VS PP (GR 161106 1/13/2014)
Principle: A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the
things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is being issued
Facts:
Worldwide Web filed the present Petitions under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants
previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional
Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine
National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of
petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the
11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis,
Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet
Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103,
21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners
were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted
to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing
the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
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Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters
and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).6
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the
warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants.25 Thus,
the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered
released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was
denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get the conformity
of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required
under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and
declared the search warrants valid and effective.28
ISSUE:
Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the
assailed search warrants were not general warrants.
HELD:
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 35 an
application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process,"
rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court.
It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process,
the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent
to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in
specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that
the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process
conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already
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filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether
the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident)
has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or
denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending
criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more
to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of
the guilt of the accused therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in
anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing
the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the
grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be
done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this
case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted
as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending
criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be
done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants
were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be
properly taken therefrom.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things
to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
In this case, considering that items that looked like
"innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal
operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers
would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were
required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent
precision. In
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not
be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions,
by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched
judicial interference."65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in
the description of the things to be seized when the things
described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued.66
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162. PP VS ARUTA (288 SCRA 626)
Principle : Lawful arrest must precede the search. Where a
search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest
would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
Facts:
Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of
P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose
Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found the
following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his
informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day,
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting
on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt.
Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt.
Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number
474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers
stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the
evening of the same day from where two females and a male got
off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the
team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents
of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team
confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a
Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves.
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Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer
to Evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of
the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as
their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied
without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the
items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case. Eventually, the trial court convicted
the accused.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.
HELD: NO.
The right of a person to be secured against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his
liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or
situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right
so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet
often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed
by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court [8] and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
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expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
The above exceptions, however, should not become
unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental
right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The
essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is
in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which
his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus
of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance.
The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can
be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected
with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the
place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is
necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and
used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause,
in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about
to be committed.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly
not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
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warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
xxx xxx xxx.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing
a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the
informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to
the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled
out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them
to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime,
except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court
could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM
agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants bag,
there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not
having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest
being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as
evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a
poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that
the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken,
and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the
search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for
being contrary to law.
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163. PP VS VILLANUEVA (GR 199042 11/17/2014)
Principle : A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a
waiver of an illegal search
FACTS:
Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The accused, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.5
PROSECUTION’S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan
Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6Their testimonies reveal that
a Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva
for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City.
After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan
Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1
Anthony Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the house
of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint
lodged against him. They invited him to the police station.
There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a
plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his
pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-
15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya brought it to the
National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-
SOCO) for examination.7
DEFENSE’S
VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at
home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others,
invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that
he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the
accused was then frisked and detained at the police station.8
The RTC convicted the accused which was affirmed by
the CA , hence this appeal on the ground of the illegality of the
warrantless arrest and search.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest and search was illegal.
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HELD :
YES.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down
the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace
officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant
and the arresting officer show none of the above that would
make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records
reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity
of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case.
Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed
by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an
illegal search. Records have established that both the arrest and
the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has
already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he
is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the
legality of the search.
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