Safety, Health and Environment For Chemical Engineering: Week 1# Introduction

Universitas Pertamina Copyright @2018
Safety, Health and
Environment
for
Chemical
Engineering
Week 1# ‐ Introduction
Mandatory References:
• Crowl and Louvar “Chemical Process Safety: Fundamental with Application”, 3rd
ed., Prentice Hall
• SACHE Course Certification Program on Process Safety @2018
2 1/17/2018 Week 1# ‐ K3L

Class Rules
Be on time
All assignment should be submited on time.
Please come to accademic division if you couldn’t come to the class.
No laptop or cellphone on during class.
 No Plagiarisme.
 > 80% presency is required to attend the Midterm and Final Exam
Course Assessment
10 % 20 %
SACHE
Certificate Quiz &
(Min Level 1) Homework
20 % 25 % 25 %
Group
Midterm Final Exam
Presentation
This course dealing with principles of process safety, Health,
and environment.
Topics covers: Toxicology, Industrial Hygiene, Source Models,
Toxic Release and dispersion models, Fire and Explosions,
Concept to prevent fire and explosions, chemical reactivity,
Safety Relief, Hazard Identification and case studies.
5 1/17/2018 Add a footer
Week 1# ‐ Outline
The Important of Process Safety:
‐ Process Safety Introduction
Case History Accident
Identifying & Minimizing
Hazard Recognition
Process Safety Hazard
Process Safety
Management
Case History Accident 1
Primary cause of this incident could be a hydrocarbon vapors ignition due to electrostatic
discharge during the opening of the sampling hatch on gasoline storage tank. It could be a
human error, however no evidence was provided to support this assumption. The detailed
investigation has not revealed the root cause of this accident. Three members of staff (whole
‘sampling’ team) were killed in explosion. It shall be noted that all of them were highly qualified
professionals providing similar services across the world.
Primary cause of incident was loss of containment during the tank filling. Spilled fuel evaporated
and drifted towards the ignition source (fire water pump station!!!). Explosion and major poll fire
escalated through facility. Several prevention and mitigation measures failed to operate.
Casualties: 43 injuries, 2 serious injuries, 0 fatalities
Primary cause of incident was loss of containment during the tank filling. Spilled fuel evaporated
and drifted towards the ignition source (Waste Water Treatment Plant – open dike valves).
Explosion and major poll fire escalated through facility. Several prevention and mitigation
measures failed to operate. Scenario almost identical to Buncefield case. Three members of staff
injured, no fatalities.
The enabling condition for the massive

hydrocarbon release was the modification
provided in process area – assembling the
pipeline to by-pass the damaged reactor. This
bypass was tested for leak-tightness at
working pressure. This bypass was
supported by scaffolding fitted with supports
provided to prevent the bellows having to
take the weight of the pipework between
them, but with no provision against other
loadings. The by-pass was damaged by
turning moment imposing shear forces on
the bellows for which they are not designed.
Explosion killed 28 people and seriously
injured 36 out of a total of only 72 people on
site at the time (none of the 18 occupants of
the plant control room survived).
This accident was a

consequence of large number
of procedural, technical and
organizational failings
(including pressure and level
control instruments
failure/inoperability) during
start-up operation. These
failings led to overfilling of the
splitter tower, hydrocarbon
release and finally vapor
explosion.
Casualties: 15 fatalities; 180
injuries.
The direct cause of the accident was the rupture of the pipeline which was connecting the storage
sphere to a series of the cylinders and within 10 minutes after, the gas cloud reached the ground flare
and ignited. It was too late for emergency shutdown procedures to be effective. Five minutes later the
first boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) occurred followed by some 15 explosions over
the next 90 minutes. The explosions destroyed the facility and devastated the local town of San Juan
Ixhuatepec, with 500–600 people killed, and 5000–7000 others suffering severe burns. Statistics do not
show how many, from these survivors who were suffering the burns, did experience the life changing
injuries.
13 1/17/2018
The root cause of this catastrophic accident was serious negligence / gross misconduct leading to
inappropriate maintenance and subsequent unavailability of the safety systems (none of the safety systems
responded to demand) at the Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) processing installation and storage. In practice the
failure of all safety systems was a result of the radical cost cuts applied mostly in the safety areas. Around
42 000 kg of MIC was released through vent stack. It was estimated that around 4 000 people were killed
instantly and next 16 000 died in following weeks. In addition around 550 000 residents experienced various
(mostly heavy internal burns) injuries. It is not known how many from the affected residents died from these
injuries in following years, however around 120 000 are chronically ill to date.
It shall be noted that Control Room staff was extremely brave attempting to prevent this accident but
available equipment, including water pumps (used to absorb MIC released through vent stack), was not
matching design requirements/specification.
14 1/17/2018
Are you not scared yet, are you?
What we can do?
1 2
3 4
18 1/17/2018
1. Hazards that are Inherent Properties of Materials
2. Hazards related to Physical Conditions of Materials or
the Process
22 1/17/2018
3. Hazards related to the size of equipment
4. Hazards Associated with the Surroundings or Other Conditions
Hazardous Scenario Development
Identifying and Minimizing Process Safety Hazards
1
2
3
4
26 1/17/2018
27 1/17/2018
29 1/17/2018
30 1/17/2018
31 1/17/2018
32 1/17/2018
34 1/17/2018
Approaches for Achieving Inherently Safer Design :
Inherently Safer Design and the Process Life Cycle
cost of change curve :
42 1/17/2018
Managing Process Safety Hazard
46 1/17/2018
Process Safety Management (PSM)
System
47 1/17/2018
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) created the
next generation process safety management framework:
48 1/17/2018
Safeguard
50 1/17/2018
Thank You
See You Next Week..
Don’t forget to review and
try SACHE Course
Theme for Week 2#  Toxicology

Safety, Health and Environment For Chemical Engineering: Week 1# Introduction

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Safety, Health and Environment For Chemical Engineering: Week 1# Introduction

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Universitas Pertamina Copyright @2018

2 1/17/2018 Week 1# ‐ K3L

The enabling condition for the massive

This accident was a

Anda mungkin juga menyukai