TITLE: RODRIGO ALBANO, administrator of the estate of the deceased Silverio Agtarap, vs.

CORNELIO AGTARAP, ET AL.

CITATION: G.R. No. L-7075, March 25, 1912, 22 Phil 345
TOPIC: ACTION BY ADMINISTRATOR; PARTITION.
DOCTRINE: The claim made by the administrator of an intestate estate for recognition of
the right the decedent has to a portion of the property, held by persons who are heirs with
him, should be enforced by an action for partition, and the trial in such case should
terminate with the judgment fixing the portion that belongs to the said decedent..

FACTS:
• Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural land and at his death left four sons,
one of whom, Silverio, died. Upon the death of Silverio Agtarap, his widow, Juana
Domingo, began special proceedings for settlement of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband by petitioning for an administrator and Rodrigo Albano was
appointed.
• As such administrator Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action against the other three
heirs of Lucio Agtarap
• Lucio Agtarap is the legitimate father of Silverio, Cornelio, and Nicolas Agtarap and the
grandfather of Melecio Agtarap and that he died leaving property.
• The property left at his death by Lucio Agtarap has been seized by his said descendants,
now the defendants, without giving Silverio his share.
• According to law, one-fourth of this property belongs to Silverio Agtarap. The judgment
of the court directs that one-fourth part of this property be delivered to the
administrator of the intestate estate of the late Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that,
after proper proceedings, their respective portions may be adjudicated to the widow and
other heirs of the said Silverio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Silverio should receive ¼ of the estate of Lucio and what is the
proper procedure.

HELD:
Yes he should, through a special proceeding.
The necessary procedure of a special proceeding in the intestate estate of Silverio
Agtarap, in which may properly be presented the claim of the administrator of the said
intestate estate on behalf of Juana Domingo for her "legal portion as widow," as well as the
proceedings for proving that Eugenia Agtarap is a legitimate daughter in order to have her
declared the sole heir of the whole of the said fourth part of the property which
corresponds to him whom she calls her legitimate father.
 A trial held for such purpose will determine the heirs of the intestate estate of
Silverio Agtarap; whether she who calls herself his legitimate daughter, Eugenia Agtarap;
or his brothers Cornelio and Nicolas and his nephew Melecio, all surnamed Agtarap.
The lawful usufruct pertaining to the widow will depend upon whether the alleged
daughter or the brothers and nephew of the deceased are entitled to the inheritance, for if
she who claims to be the daughter, Eugenia Agtarap, be declared the sole heir of the
deceased Silverio Agtarap, the widows share would be different from what it would if the
defendants in this case, as brothers and nephew of the deceased Silverio Agtarap, are
declared to be the sole heirs ---- in accordance with the various provisions of the Civil Code
in this respect.
Only in such special proceedings, wherein the necessary orders can be issued and
executed, can findings be made as to who are the heirs and what portions to them, the
nature of their titles, and in case of usufruct what part pertains to each.
TITLE: FELIX BAUTISTA VS. AQUILINA TIONGSON
CITATION: 11 PHIL 579 NOVEMBER 7, 1908
TOPIC: ACTION BY ADMINISTRATOR; ACTION BY HEIRS
DOCTRINES: The administrator of an intestate estate is not authorized by any of the
sections 181–196 of the Code of Civil Procedure to maintain an action to enforce the
partition of real estate not included in the inventory, or of which he did not take charge
when he commenced to discharge his office, but which is in the possession of a third party
who alleges that he is not a coheir or co-owner but the exclusive owner of the same; The
heirs of the deceased are alone entitled to maintain an action to enforce the partition of real
estate possessed by coheirs or co-wners in common with the deceased.

FACTS:
• Felix Bautista, administrator of the intestate estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, alleged that the
deceased and Aquilina Tiongson, were the owners pro indiviso of five parcels of land
located in the Province of Bulacan. One-half of the said land appertained to said intestate
estate, and the other half to the defendant, Aquilina Tiongson. The latter and her
husband were the only parties who had administered the aforesaid property, having
collected the rentals thereof without rendering an accounting of their administration to
anyone.
• Bautista prayed to the court to order that the same be partitioned in accordance with the
law, and that the defendants be instructed to render an accounting of their
administration and deliver the balance to the plaintiff. But such allegations were denied
by the defendants saying that the only land held jointly by the deceased and Aquilina
Tiongson was the lot located in the town of Baliuag, while the other 4 lots were owned
exclusively by the defendants who had purchased the same from the late Ciriaco
Tiongson.
• They also averred that Ciriaco Tiongson, while living, together with the defendants,
administered the undivided lands, and that, after his death, his widow, Marciana de
Zulueta, as the administratrix of the property of her seven minor children, received that
portion of the crops from the land in Baliuag belonging to the intestate estate until the
year 1903.
• Defendants alleged that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to bring this action because the
legal administration of the property of the late Ciriaco Tiongson, pertained to his widow
who lived with her minor children, acting on behalf of the latter. Moreso, the rentals
received by the widow of Ciriaco, on several occasions, took from the defendants, on
account of the rentals of the said land, the sum of P1,402.45 pesos, and that the deceased,
before his death, personally owed the defendants the sum of 143,75 pesos.
• Hence, defendants prayed that the appointment of the administrator of the intestate
estate of Ciriaco Tiongson, be annulled, and that the complaint be dismissed entirely.
ISSUES:
1. Is the administrator authorized to bring an action to demand partition of the subject
lots?
2. Was the demand of rendering accounts proper?

RULING:
1. NO.
An action to enforce the partition of real estate must be brought and proceeded with in
accordance with the provisions of sections 181 to 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The law refers to a coparcener, coheir, or other person interested in the undivided
property held, because any one of such persons is a real party concerned in the
partition. In cases like the present, where the property is held by a person, not as a
coheir but as the exclusive owner, the right of action for partition, which supposes joint
ownership or community of property, pertains only to the heirs of the late Ciriaco
Tiongson, not to the administrator who, when claiming the division of real estate not
included in the inventory, or which he did not take charge of on commencing to exercise
office, but which is alleged to belong to the estate, is not authorized to represent the
intestate succession of the property administered by him; neither is he authorized to
represent the heirs, because the latter, as successors to the deceased, are the only
parties who may maintain such an action for partition of real estate held pro indiviso by
coheirs or owners in common.

2. NO.
With regard to the rendering of accounts, the demand presupposes that the action for
partition brought by the administrator was in accordance with the law and that the
same could be granted by the court below. Once the latter is dismissed, it follows that
the former should likewise be denied.
TITLE: Intestate Estate of Alfredo Aquino Sr., deceased. Matilde V. Aquino, administratrix.
Teodoro S. Paulin vs. Matilde V. Aquino, ET AL.,
CITATION: L-11267, March 20, 1958 ( 103 Phil 1143)
TOPIC: EXTENSION OF TIME FOR THE FILING OF THE CLAIMS
DOCTRINE:
The one-month period specified in this section 2 of Rule 87 is the time granted
claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It
does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original
period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims.

FACTS:
• Claimant and appellant Teodoro S. Paulin filed a petition for a period of one month for
his claim against the estate of the deceased Alfredo Aquino Sr. which the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denied. The claimant then posted his appeal.
• The court made a finding that the administratrix had fraudulently omitted certain assets
amounting to around P320,000.00 and a parcel of land about 24 hectars in her original
inventory. Thus, sufficient justification for allowing claimants to have the period of filing
claims extended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claimant is entitled for an extension of one month for filing his
claim against the estate of the deceased.

RULING:
YES.
The claimant is entitled for an extension of one month for filing his claim against the estate
of the deceased.

Section 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that the one-month period specified
should however begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims and not from the
expiration of the original period fixed in the court’s order for the presentation of claims.

Hence, order appealed from in this case is reversed, and Teodoro S. Paulin is granted one
month from receipt of this order within which to formulate and file his claim in the court.
svirtu
TITLE: Intestate estate of the deceased Florentino San Gil. JOSEFA R. OPPUS vs BONIFACIO
GIL
CITATION: G.R. No. 48115 October 12, 1942
TOPIC: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; CIVIL ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR
FOR THE RECOVERY OF FURNITURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
DOCTRINE:
A judgment for the manual delivery and possession of specific articles of personal
property, the action for which survived by express provision of law "and may be
commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator. Moreover, the
prosecution of an action against an executor or administrator which the law allows
regarding the possession of specific articles necessarily includes the execution of the
judgment that may be entered in said action.

FACTS:
• Petitioner herein sue the defendant in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of
Florentino San Gil for the possession of certain furnitures.
• The court rendered a judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the
said furnitures to the plintiff. However, for some reasons, the judgment was not satisfied.
• Petitioner presented a motion in the iintestate proceeding of Florentino San Gil to deliver
to her the furniture however it was denined on the grounds (1) that the furniture in
question does not belong to the estate of the deceased Florentino San Gil and (2) that in
any event the execution of the judgement in the civil case should be applied for in said
case. virtual law library

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court is correct in denying the motion of the plaintiff.

RULING:

YES.
The court ruled that it finds no legal impediment to the execution of the said judgment by
the order of the court that rendered it because the administrator Bonifacio San Gil having
been sued as such in the ordinary count and judgment having been rendered there against
him.
The judgment in question is not one for a sum of money which has to be satisfied by levying
execution on property belonging to the estate and therefore in custodia legis. It is a
judgment for the manual delivery and possession of specific articles of personal property,
the action for which survives by express provision of law "and may be commenced and
prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator.
Therefore, the prosecution of an action against an executor or administrator which the law
allows regarding the possession of specific articles necessarily includes the execution of the
judgment that may be entered in said action. On the other hand, once the court determines
in such action that the property in litigation belongs to the plaintiff and not to the estate of
the deceased, it cannot be maintained that such property is in custodia legis, it not forming
part of the estate of the deceased. Hence appellant's motion herein was not in order and
was properly denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libr
TITLE: SEBASTIAN ABIERA, administrator of the estate of JUAN ABIERA, vs.
MIGUEL ORIN
CITATION: G.R. NO. L-3236, March 27, 1907
TOPIC: RIGHT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR TO INSTITUTE ACTIONS
DOCTRINE:
Administrator had only the right to institute actions which pertain to the estate he is
administering, and no action, dealing with obligations contracted in favor of third persons,
or others from whomhe does not derive such right, can be brought by him as such
administrator.

FACTS:
• Vicenta Cacao, Mariano Cacao, and Petra Cacao were brothers and sisters. Vicenta Cacao
is married to Miguel Orin who left no descendants or ascendants.
• When Vicenta died, Miguel Orin, Mariano Cacao, and Juan Abiera (husband of deceased
Petra Cacao) entered into an extrajudicial agreement in writing covering the disposition
of the properties and animals they had acquired during the marriage of Miguel Orin and
Vicenta Cacao.
• Miguel Orin onn the otherhand, obligated himself to pay over 1,000 pesos to Juan Abiera
as guardian and farther of the heirs of Petra Cacao; Mariano Cacao and Juan Abiera acted
as representatives of their children, who are the only heirs as well as the natural
nephews of the deceased woman Cacao.
• After Juan Abiera's death, his son, Sebastian Abiera, filed a complaint, not as a personal
right but in his capacity as special administrator of his deceased father, Juan Abiera,
alleging that Miguel has not complied with the said contract and agreement and prays
the court to compel the compliance of the Miguel therewith.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sebastian, in his office as administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera,
has the right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation.

RULING:
No.
Parental right or guardianship is an exclusively personal right that cannot survive the
person who had such right. The right of a parent to represent his children as father or
guardian of the same cannot be transferred to the administrator of his estate. As such
administrator he has only the right to institute such actions as correspond and pertain to
the estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing with contracts and
obligations contracted in favor of third persons, or others from whom he does not derive
such right, can be brought as such administrator
In this case, Juan Abiera entered into a contract, not as a personal right, but in the name and
representation of his children. This is because the contract deals with the matter of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate left by Vicenta Cacao whose heirs were, not Juan Abiera,
but his children. Therefore, the true interested parties in the obligation contracted by
Miguel Orin are the children of Juan Abiera, and not the latter, for the simple reason that
the obligation was executed in their favor and not in favor of said Abiera
TITLE: Intestate Estate of the deceased Emeterio Lopez. CONCEPCION LOPEZ vs.
ADELA LOPEZ ET AL.
CITATION: 68 PHIL 227, May 26, 1939
TOPIC: NOTICE OF PETITION AND DATE SET FOR HEARING
DOCTRINE:
The court ruled that where no such evidence is present to show that herre was no
notice given, the presumption of regularity should stand

FACTS:
• Petitioner herein filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Emeterio
Lopez claiming to be entitled to a summary award of his estate, the same being valued
at P6,000.
• He later filed an amended petition alleging that according to the new assessment, the
estate was woth P9,000 and that its distibution could not be made summarily but thru
regullar administration proceeding.
• Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who, thru Atty. Pena, filed later a motion
for a declaration of heirs and prayed tht the oppositors-appellants be so adjudged.
• After hearing, the court issued an order declaring the petitioner an acknowldged
natural daughter of the deceased entitlled to the rights accorded by law.
• The oppositors appealed that the petition filed by the petitioner in the intestate
proceedings is alleged insufficient.
• Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petition for the declaration of
heirs or of the date set for the hearing thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was notice given for the declaration of heirs or of the date set
for the hearing to the appellants

RULING:
YES.
The court ruled no evidence affirmatively showing that the appellants had no notice
for the hearing set for the declaration of heirs, therefore, the presumption of reglartiy of
proceedings should stand.
In the case at bar, the petition for declaration of heirs, althouh signed by the counsel,
was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositor appellant had notice of the petition as
well as of the hearing where the said attorney was present.
TITLE: REYES VS ROSENSTOCK
CITATION: 47 Phil 784, August 28, 1925
TOPIC: WHEN DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT MAY BE PROVED AGAINST ESTATE
DOCTRINE:
The court ruled that "A 'contingent claim,' within Comp. St., c. 23, secs. 258 et seq., is
a claim against a decedent, not absolute or certain, but depending upon some event after
the death of the testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A subsisting demand
against the estate of a deceased person which had matured and was capable of being
enforced during the lifetime of the deceased is not a contingent claim. If there is a judgment
for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged property in the foreclosere or other
roceeding to realize upon the security, he may prove his deficiency judgment before the
commiteed against the estate of the deceased.

FACTS:
• During the lifetime of Elser, he executed a mortgage on real property to the plaintiff
herein upon which he latter brought a suit to foreclose the subject property of
mortgage and the sale thereof to satisfy the judgment.
• Pending proceeding to appeal the judgment, Elser died and appointed herein
respondent as the executor.
• Execution of the judgment was issued and the mortgages property was sold at a public
at P13,000.
• Plaintiff duly applied the proceeds and obtained a deficiency judgment against the
estate of Elser for the sum of P64,700.88.
• After obtaining the deficiency judgment, the plaintiff based upon his deficiency
judgment filed with the commissioners his proof of claim which the defendant
objected.
• The defendant filed a MR, which was denied and from an order approving the
allowance of the committee on claims.
• The defendant prosecuted this appeal contending that the claim in question is a
contingent claim, and that as such it should have been presented to the original
committee on claims of the estate and because it was not presented, it is barred.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deficiency is already barred because it is a contingent claim.

RULING:
NO.
The court ruled that "A 'contingent claim,' within Comp. St., c. 23, secs. 258 et seq., is a
claim against a decedent, not absolute or certain, but depending upon some event after the
death of the testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A subsisting demand
against the estate of a deceased person which had matured and was capable of being
enforced during the lifetime of the deceased is not a contingent claim."
If there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged property in the
foreclosere or other roceeding to realize upon the security, he may prove his deficiency
judgment before the commiteed against the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff preceeded the remedy of foreclosing the mortgage,
making the executor as a party defendant which after the sale of the motgaged property, he
claimed the deficiency judgment before the commitee on claims against the estate of the
deceased.
TITLE: PNB vs CA, ALLAN CHUA AND MRS. ASUNCION CHUA
CITATION: G.R. No. 121597. June 29, 2001
TOPIC: MORTGAGE DEBT DUE TO THE ESTATE (ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES)
DOCTRINE:
The rules of court grants to the mortgagee 3 distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the
satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them are the following, namely;
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim; (2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively foreclosing the same at any
time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.

FACTS:
• Respondents herein are the heirs of Antonio Chua. Appointed as special administrator
by the court is Allan Chua who was authorized to obtain loan accommodation from the
petitioner PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage of a parcel of land belonging to
the estate of the deceased.
• For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extra judicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage. The amount due to PNB was P679,185.63 but the proceeds of the public
auction was on P306,360 having a balance payable of P372,825.63.
• To claim the deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PNB can no longer pursue its deficiency
claim against the estate of the deceased.

RULING:
NO.
The law provides that the Rules of Court grants to the mortgagee three distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the
mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them
are the following:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor
as an ordinary claim;
(2) To foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
(3) To rely on the martgage exclusively foreclosing the same at any time before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
In the case at bar, petitioner herein has chosen the third option which the mortgage-
creditors extra judicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now
bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua.
Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the
mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of
respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate.
TITLE: BPI VS. CONCEPCION HIJOS, INC. & VENANCIO CONCEPCION, HENRY
ELSER
CITATION: G.R. No. L-27701 July 21, 1928
TOPIC: ENFORCEMENT OF PAYMENT OF DEBT SECURED BY MORTGAGE OR
OTHER COLLATERAL SECURITY
DOCTRINE: A creditor holding a claim, secured by mortgage or other collateral security,
against the estate of a deceased person has the election of one out of three courses: (1) He may
abandon his security and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate, or (2) he may
foreclose, secure a deficiency judgment and prove his deficiency judgment before the committee,
or (3) he may rely upon his security alone, in which case he can receive no share in the
distribution of the assets of the estate. Having failed to present its claim to the committee on
claims and appraisal, it must be regarded as having elected to rely on its mortgage alone and
therefore can have no personal judgement against the estate of the deceased.

FACTS:
• Defendants herein executed a promissory note in favor of plaintiff bank BPI for a certain
sum, payable on demand. As a security for payment, defendant deposited 700 shares of the PNB
as collateral and gave it a mortgage on the 5,680 sq. meters of land, with improvements. They
then defaulted in the payment, hence a foreclosure proceeding was instituted.
• Elser entered into negotiations with Concepcion Hijos Inc. and offered to take over the
mortgaged property and assume the mortgage debt, where the latter agreed. Elser wrote to the
bank of his intent to assume, however no answer was given by the bank.
• Conversations with the representatives of the bank were made, after which, Elser wrote
the bank again, as what he understood from the conversations transpired that the bank would bid
in the land at the foreclosure sale for the full amount of the judgment and sell it to him for the
same price, however, no reply was made by the plaintiff in that second letter.
• Elser and the Concepcions entered into an agreement in the form of bilateral deed of sale,
stating therein that the Concepcions are defendants in a civil case filed by BPI for the recovery of
its mortgage credit, and that the properties owned by the Concepcions with existing
encumbrances in favor of BPI is transferred to Elser, and in return, Elser would subrogate
himself to the obligation of the Concepcions in favor of BPI and release the defendants from the
total of said obligation.
• The bank never gave notice of its conformity with the bilateral agreement and instead
made Elser as defendant in the same complaint filed against the Concepcions.
• The Concepcions filed their answer praying that Elser be made as a substituted
defendants in their place, as the bank had accepted the subrogation of Elser as its debtor. It was
the defense of the bank that they had no waiver of right of action against them. Elser likewise
has the same contention that it did not appear in the amended complaint that plaintiff accepted
Elser as debtor, which the court sustained.
• Elser died, and was substituted by its administrator C.W. Rosenstock as suggested by
plaintiff. The administrator filed an opposition to have the action continued and administatrator
be made as substitute considering that the action is not a foreclosure action, hence, the action
against Elser was abated by reason of his death, and any claims should be presented to the
committee on claims and appraisals of his estate. The trial court overruled such opposition.
Trial ensued, and the court rendered its decision absolving Elser estate from the complaint and
ordered the Concepcions to pay sum of money with interest to plaintiff bank.
• The bank insisted that their cause of action against Elser estate still exists, as the one who
subrogates the obligation of the Concepcions, and may demand its fulfillment, preovided that he
has given notice of his acceptance to the person bound be bound before the stipulation has been
revoked.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BPI may maintain its action against Elser?

RULING:
NO, on the ground that it is barred by the statue of non-claims from the Elser Estate.
The law provides that a mortgagee has three alternative options for the settlement of his
claim, namely; (Rule 86, Sec.7 of ROC), to wit:
1. abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and
share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or
2. he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the
executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment deficiency, after the sale
of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to
realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section, or
3. he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a
creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate
In the case at bar, the bank did not abandon the security and took no steps of any sort before the
committee within the time limit provided by the law. It must therefore be regarded as having
elected to rely on its mortgage alone and can consequently have no personal judgment against
the estate of the deceased.
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the presentation and prosecution of the claim of
deficiency must be made after the sale (not before) and that if mortgagee presents his claim from
a deficiency before a deficiency judgment have been rendered, he will lose his rights under the
mortgage and be regarded as having abandon security.
This is a clear misconception of the statute, until a foreclosure sale was made; the
demand for the payment of deficiency is a contingent claim within the meaning of the code. The
amount of the deficiency must be presented to the committee within the time fixed by law. The
committee then reports it to the court, if the court is satisfied that the contingent claim is valid,
the executor or administrator may be required to retain in his possession sufficient assets to pay
the claim when it becomes absolute, or enough to pay the creditor his proportionate share if the
assets of the estate are insufficient to pay the debts. When the contingent claim has become
absolute, its amount may be ascertained and established in the manner provided for in the law.
The bank could have and should have presented its claim to the committee within the time
prescribed by the law.
TITLE: ECHAUS VS. HON. BLANCO
CITATION: G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989
TOPIC: TIME WITHIN WHICH CLAIMS SHALL BE FILED
DOCTRINE: The period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money
claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at
the discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable.

FACTS:
• Angelina Echaus, the administratrix of her father’s estate filed a complaint against C.N.
Hodges for the recovery of profits and remaining assets of their business covering Ba-Ta
Subdivision in the CFI of Negros Occidental.
• During the trial, C.N. Hodges died and was substituted with Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) as administrator of the estate. On March of 1963, a notice to creditors
was published in Yuhum which is a newspaper of general circulation.
• A judgment was rendered in favor of Echaus ordering PCIB in its capacity as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to pay the sum of P851,472.83 with legal interest
thereon from the date of judgment until paid.
• Echaus filed a writ of execution which was not enforced since she filed a motion in the
estate proceedings of the deceased C.N. Hodges for the payment of the judgment on 1967.
• Consequently, opposition has been filed and the heirs have filed a motion to intervene. It
in effect resulted to the holding in abeyance of the resolution for the payment of the judgment.
Meanwhile, the respondents contended that the judgment being a money claim should have been
dismissed in the estate proceedings since it is already barred by the statute of non-claims since it
has been filed for more than 4 years from the publication of said notice.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment claim in the estate proceedings is barred by the statute of non-
claims
RULING:
NO.
The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the
notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The period prescribed
in the notice to creditors is not exclusive and that money claims against the estate may be
allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause
and upon such terms as are equitable.
In the case at bar, at the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of the judgement credit was
filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. Moreover, the record does not show that the
administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The court is also
persuaded to say that the pendency of the case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the
claim.
Nevertheless, although petitioners' judgment credit is allowed as a claim against the estate,
immediate payment thereof by the administrator of the estate, is not a matter of right. A
judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pays, in due course of
administrator, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create a lien upon the property of
the estate, or give the judgment creditor any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule 86, Revised
Rules). The time for paying debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by the probate court having
jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased who is taking cognizance of the estate proceedings.
TITLE: MARIANO ESCUETA vs LEON SY-JUILLIONG
CITATION: G.R. No. 2370. December 12, 1905
TOPIC: ENFORCEMENT OF A CLAIM
DOCTRINE:
The court ruled the contract made between the administrator and the lawyer does
not bind and estate to such an extent that the lawyer can maintain an action against it and
recover a judgment which is binding upon it. In such a case the creditor has two remedies:
He can prosecute an action against the administrator as an individual or the creditor can
also present a petition in the proceeding relating to the settlement of the estate, asking that
the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator
to pay it as an expense of administration.

FACTS:
 Sy-Tiongtay executed his last will, whereby he disposed of an estate among his five
children, Carlos Pabia, Baldomero (the mother of these two being Chan-Sinnin),
Felipa, Manuel, and Faustina (the mother of these three being Ana Cuanci). He
afterwards died; the exact date of his death not appearing in the record, and Sy-
Giang was appointed his executor and at the time this case arose was in possession
of the property left by the deceased. After the death of his father, his son and her,
Baldomero, died, leaving no will, and leaving as his only heirs his brothers and
sisters above named. When Baldomero died the property left by his father had not
been divided, and he had an interest therein.
 After the death of Baldomero, Carlos Pabia, his brother, employed the plaintiff, who
is a lawyer, to procure the appointment of an administrator of the estate of
Baldomero and to attend to the settlement of that estate in the Court of First
Instance.
 The plaintiff, by virtue of such employment, performed services and expended
money in procuring the appointment of the administrator, and in other work
connected with the settlement of the estate.
 The person appointed as administrator of the estate of Baldomero was Carlos Pabia.
Carlos Pabia died and the defendant was appointed administrator of the estate of
Baldomero in succession to said Carlos, and this action was commenced against the
defendant in his capacity as administrator of said estate, to recover the value of such
services and the money so expended.
 Baldomero left an estate of about 46,000 pesos. Almost all of it consisted of his
interest in his father’s estate. This estate had not been divided and was in the hands
of the executor of that estate. It appeared from the evidence that this executor
refused to deliver any of the property to the administrator of the estate of
Baldomero, or to the heirs of the latter. It also appears that the question as to whom
such heirs are as now in litigation in court.
 Under these circumstances it seems to us that the appointment of an administrator
and the settlement of Baldomero’s estate in the probate court was necessary. The
 final decree rendered in the proceeding under the provisions of section 753 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would be a determination of the question as to who the
heirs of Baldomero were, and when such decree was presented to Sy-Giang, the
executor of the estate of the father, he would be obliged to deliver the interest of
Baldomero to the persons named in that decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim filed by the plaintiff be enforced in the estate of
Baldomero.

RULING:
NO.
The court ruled the contract made between the administrator and the lawyer does
not bind and estate to such an extent that the lawyer can maintain an action against it and
recover a judgment which is binding upon it. In such a case the creditor has two remedies:
He can prosecute an action against the administrator as an individual. If judgment is
rendered against the administrator and it is paid by him, when he presents his final account
to the Court of First Instance as such administrator he can include the amount so paid as an
expense of administration. The creditor can also present a petition in the proceeding
relating to the settlement of the estate, asking that the court, after notice to all persons
interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration. Whichever course is adopted the heirs and other persons interested in the
estate will have a right to inquire into the necessity for making the contract and the value of
the work performed by the attorney.
In the case at bar, if Carlos Pabia were now alive the plaintiff might have a right of
action against him, but under the rule above stated he has no right of action against the
present defendant, because he (the present defendant) is not in any way connected with
Carlos Pabia. He is not his executor or administrator. The estate which he present
defendant represents is the estate of Baldomero, and against that estate, as we have seen,
an ordinary action can not be maintained by the plaintiff.
TITLE: Lao vs. Dee and Lao
CITATION: G.R. No. L-3890, June 23, 1952
TOPIC: INTEREST OF THE HEIRS, DEVISES AND LEGATEES BEFORE SETTLEMENT OF THE
ESTATE
DOCTRINE: Before distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs, or
devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administrator for recovery of the
property left by the deceased.

FACTS:

 Ignacia Lao, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the late Albina
de los Santos, as well as heir of said deceased, and Domingo Lao, also as heir of the
deceased, filed a complaint for the annulment of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated January 38, 1949, rendered In the testate proceedings of
the deceased, approving the sale of certain real property in favor of Francisco Dee,
and for the annulment of the sale Itself. The complaint was filed against Francisco
Dee as vendee and Maria Lao, a co-special administratrix of the estate, also an heir,
in her individual capacity.
 The order of the probate court is sought to be annulled on the following grounds:
the court overlooked the fact that a special administrator has no power to sell real
property; the court approved the tale In the belief that Ignacia Lao had given her
consent to toe sale, when In fact she was Induced to sign the deed of sale by Maria
Lao and her attorney through misrepresentation that the deed of sale was a mere
petition for the approval of the proposed sale; the court did not know that the
vendee Francisco Dee was not a Filipino citizen, or that Ignacia Lao executed the
deed of sale on the alleged misrepresentation that Francisco Dee was a Filipino
citizen.
 Both Francisco Dee and Maria Lao filed separately a motion to dismiss. The lower
court granted the motions to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint,
with costs against the plaintiffs. From this order the plaintiffs appealed.
 One of the grounds on which the lower court based its order of dismissal is that
Ignacia Lao and Domingo Lao were suing as heirs of the deceased Albina de los
Santos to recover the title and possession of a property which formed part of the
estate which, according to the court, they have no right to do unless such property
has been assigned to them as their share In the Inheritance. This is also assigned as
error in the appeal made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ignacia Lao and Domingo Lao have the right to sue as heirs, to
recover the title and possession of a property which formed part of the estate
RULING:
NO
Section 8, rule 88, of the Rules of Court, bars the filing of an action by an heir to
recover the title or possession of lands belonging to the estate until there is an order of the
probate court assigning said lands to such heir. In other words, there must be first a
partition of the estate, and delivery of the latter to the heir. The reasons for this rule are
aptly stated by former Chief Justice Moran as follows: “An executor or administrator who
assumes the trust, takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the purpose of
paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and unpaid, no residue may be settled for
distribution among the heirs and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or
before any residue is known, the heirs, or devisees have no cause of action against the
executor or administrator for recovery of the property left by the deceased.”
In this case, there has been so far no partition of the estate. Precisely the property
was sold as a preliminary step to partition. The sale was made by express authority of the
court on the strength of the petition of the heirs themselves, including the now appellant
Ignacla Lao. The sale was made by the two administratrices of the estate. The terms of the
sale were more than what the heirs expected. The authority was to sell the property for
P250,000, and yet Francisco Dee paid P260,000. The heirs, therefore, have no reason to
complain. In any event, under the rule, only the two administratrices of the estate can
impugn the validity of the sale. Further, this is not a case which comes under the exception
of the rule that “when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in
which event the heirs may act in his place.”
TITLE: CELSO S. GUANCO vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
CITATION: G.R. No. 31679. January 14, 1930
TOPIC: PURPOSE OF THE ESTATE PROCEEDING
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit evidence, and the section does not, in
terms, authorize the court to enforce delivery of possession of the things involved. To
obtain the possession, recourse must therefore generally be had to an ordinary action.

FACTS:

 On January 18,1921, the now deceased Espiridion Guanco obtained a credit, not
exceeding P175,000, with interest, from the Philippine National Bank, pledging as
security 250 shares of the capital stock of the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., and 6,196
shares of the capital stock of the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc.
 After Guanco's death, the administrator of his estate, Celso S. Guanco, on October 5,
1928, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings asking that the Court of First
Instance issue an order requiring the president or manager of the bank to appear in
court for examination in regard to the 250 shares of the Binalbagan Estate under
section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 The court issued the order in conformity with the administrator's motion and
ordered the manager of the bank, Miguel Cuaderno, to appear before the court,
Cuaderno did not appear, but the attorney for the bank filed an answer to the
administrator's motion in which answer it was asserted that the pledge of the 250
shares was still in force as security for the debts of Guanco and the Hinigaran Estate.
Thereupon the court, in the same proceedings and without any trial, ordered the
manager of the bank to deliver the said 250 shares to the administrator of the
Guanco Estate within thirty days from notice of the order.
 Upon appeal, the counsel of Philippine National Bank raises the defense that the
court below exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery of the shares to the
administrator in a proceeding under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the trial court ordering the delivery of the 250 shares
to the administrator proper?

RULING:
NO
The law provides that if an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or
other person interested in the estate of a deceased person complains to the court having
jurisdiction of the estate, that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person
has in his possession, or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other
writing which contains evidence of, or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of
the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the deceased, the
court may cite such suspected person to appear before it, and may examine him on oath on
the matter of such complaint; if the person so cited refuses to appear and answer such
examinations, or to answer such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may, by
warrant, commit him to jail or prison of the province, there to remain in close custody until
he submits to the order of the court; and such interrogatories and answers shall be in
writing and signed by the party examined, and filed in the clerk's office."
In the present case, the court ruled by way of citing a case that the section quoted
only provides a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away property of the deceased or withholds information of
documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the deceased to such property
or to disclose the possession of his last will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is
to elicit evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court to enforce delivery
of possession of the things involved. To obtain the possession, recourse must therefore
generally be had to an ordinary action.
The court had no right to deprive her (the appellant) of her evidence relating to the
property, until the question of ownership had been settled."
Hence, the order to deliver the shares of stocks is not proper.
The appealed order is hereby reversed and annulled without costs. So, ordered.
TITLE: Tan Sen Guan vs. Go Sui San
CITATION: G.R. No. L-22451, December 22, 1924
TOPIC: Rule 86
DOCTRINE: A person having a claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the
committee, who does not, after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the
committee as provided in this chapter, shall be barred from recovering such demand or
from pleading the same in offset to any action, except as hereinafter provided. xxx

FACTS:
 Petitioner is administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue and the defendant
is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Antonio Tampoco. Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue, about the month of
January, 1920, the sum of P25,802.60, which with the interest stipulated by the two
deceased Tan Peng Sue and Antonio Tampoco in their lifetime at the rate of 9 6/10
per cent per year, amounted to P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922
 Upon the death of Antonio Tampoco on February 5, 1920, proceeding was instituted
in the CFI Manila for the settlement of his estate. On December 14 of that year
commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim might be
presented against the estate, and d rendered their final report on June 27, 1921,
which was approved by the court below on July 14 of said year. About August 30,
1922, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue,
moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new
committee appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to
present against the estate.
 Geo. R. Harvey, judge, appointed new commissioners and the latter recommend
payment by the defendant administrator, which was by agreement of the parties
estimated at P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922.
 The court presided over by Judge Diaz rendered decision, absolving the defendant
administrator of the estate of Tampoco from the complaint, holding that the
commissioners appointed on September 21, 1922, had no authority under the law to
hear and decide said claim, because the court that had appointed them had on the
said date no jurisdiction to appoint them in view of the fact that more than fourteen
months have elapsed since their final report was submitted by the former
committee on claims in the aforesaid testamentary proceeding and approved by the
court. To this decision the plaintiff excepted on the 29th day of the same month, and
moved for the new trial on January 9, 1924, on the ground that said decision was
against the law and the facts proven at the trial.
 The lower court presided over by the Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after
considering the motion for new trial, rendered a new decision, setting aside that of
December 22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of the estate of Antonio
Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum of
P28,802.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March
28, 1920.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the action has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the notice to the creditors was done in the proper manner.

RULING:
1. YES
The failure of Tan Chu Lay, heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an
omission committed by an heir who had knowledge of the existence of the credit of
his deceased father. The fact that Tan Chu Lay might have been induced by
fraudulent machinations and unlawful influence of the defendant administrator
cannot affect the legal consequences of said act. And even if it be admitted that the
widow of Tan Peng Sue was in China while the committee on claims was acting in
the proceeding for the settlement of Antonio Tampoco's estate, still the result would
be the same. The law does not make any reservation or exception whatever, and this
court cannot make either.

The pertinent part of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: A person
having a claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the committee,
who does not, after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the
committee as provided in this chapter, shall be barred from recovering such
demand or from pleading the same in offset to any action, except as hereinafter
provided.

Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period
fixed by the committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the
period previously fixed, for the renewal of the commission for the purpose of
examining his claim. Also a creditor may make such application even after six
months from the expiration of the period formerly fixed and before the final
settlement of the estate, if the committee shall have failed to give the notice required
by section 687.

The application of the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration
of the period fixed for the filing of claims. And while it was presented before the
final settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that
the committee had published in the newspaper La Nacion the notice required by
law, there was no possible ground for granting said application. Even considering
this application under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we believe that the
lapse of fourteen months is an unsurmountable barrier opposing the granting of
said application.
2. YES

Before a credit may be held barred by our procedural statutes relative to liquidation
of inheritance, it must appear, among other things, that the committee have
designated convenient hours and places for the holding of their meetings for the
examination and admission of claims, and that they have published this fact in the
manner provided by the law. Unless this is done, the right of a creditor cannot
prescribe, and he who claims the benefit of prescription has the burden of proof.

The committee on claims in the aforesaid proceeding had published for three
consecutive weeks a notice to claimants, stating that they might present their claims
within the period of six months, the committee to hold meetings at the office of
Attorney M.G. Goyena, room No. 1, 34, Escolta, on the last Wednesday of each month
at 3:30 p. m. for the purpose of hearing and deciding claims, notwithstanding the
appointment issued by the court, in which the places are designated where the
notice should be posted, and the newspaper in which it should be published for
three weeks, giving the creditors the period of six months to present their claims.
TITLE: DEL ROSARIO vs DEL ROSARIO
CITATION: 2 PHIL 321 MAY 19,1903

FACTS
In 1897, Don Nicolas died leaving a will in which he bequeathed 5,000 pesos to his
nephew Enrique and Ramon del Rosario, natural children of his brother Clemente del
Rosario. The delivery of the said sums to be effected by the wife of the Testator Honorata
provided that these young men behave themselves as they have done up to the present
time, and do not cease to study until taking the degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a
business course, if their health will permit, their support to be paid out of the testamentary
estate and they to live in the house of the widow; that in a case the said young men should
be still engaged in study at the time of the death of the testator's wife, they shall continue to
be supported at the expense of the testamentary estate, without deducting such expenses
from their legacies, if they should desire to continue the same studies; and that in case
Honorata would remarry, the young men may live separately from their aunt in which
event they are to be supported by the testamentary estate on a small allowance of twenty-
five pesos per month, provided that they continue their studies or should be in poor health,
this without in any respect reducing the amount of their shares.
In 1902, Ramon del Rosario brought an action against Clemente del Rosario, the then
executor, that the said executor pay him an allowance from the death of the widow of the
testator at the rate of 75 pesos a month, and that the executor allow him to live in the house
in which the widow was living at that time. However, the court found that he is no longer
entitled to such because while the support of the plaintiff and of Enrique is charged against
the estate, yet this unconditional right was to last only during the lifetime of the widow.
After her death the right to this allowance is made to depend on the continuance of their
studies. The court did not find that the plaintiff was still pursuing his studies. On the
contrary, he found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the condition by obtaining the degree of
bachelor of arts in 1898. The right to live in the house of the widow terminated at her
death.
Furthermore, in the 7th clause of the will of Don Nicolas, he stated that the Conjugal
property which equally belongs to him and Honorata shall not be partitioned, but will pass
to the latter upon the formers death without authority to convey any of such property,
inasmuch as she, being grateful for the benefit resulting to her, binds herself in turn to
deliver said property at her death to the testator's brothers, Clemente and Rosendo, and his
sister, Doña Luisa del Rosario, who shall enjoy the revenue from the said property during
their respective lives, and shall then, in turn, transmit the same to their male children, both
those born in wedlock and natural children who may be known. He also emphasized in the
Codicil (to modify the 7th clause), that in the distribution, Ramon and Enrique must be
understood to be included, in addition to their legacies.
Also in the 13th clause, as modified by a codicil, testator wishes that if Luisa del Rosario
dies before or after the testator, the remainder of all her portion, except 1,000 which is to
be given to her children, shall be divided into equal parts one-third to go to his brother Don
Clemente del Rosario and the other two-thirds to be divided equally among his said
nephews, Enrique Gloria and Ramon del Rosario.
Dona Honorata made her will 3 days after that of her husband in which she stated that
upon the death of her sister-in-law, Doña Luisa, then her share shall not pass in its entirety
to her male children, except the sum of 1,000 pesos, Enrique and Ramon, natural children
of her brother-in-law Don Clemente del Rosario.
Doña Luisa died one yea after Don Nicolas and two years before the death of Doña
Honorata, which, as has been said, occurred on July, 7, 1900.
Don Enrique Gloria died on July 6, 1900.
Ramon del Rosario claims in this action that he is now entitled, by virtue of both wills,
to a certain part of the share of the estates left to said Doña Luisa during her life, and he
asks that the defendant be directed to render accounts and to proceed to the partition of
the said estates.
However, defendant claims that the plaintiff is entitled to nothing under the wills,
because the gift to him was conditional, the condition being that he should be the natural
son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter as such in one of the ways pointed out by the
Civil Code; that he can not prove such recognition, the parol evidence presented at the trial
being prohibited by said Code, and that he has therefore not complied with the condition.

ISSUE
Whether or not Ramon is entitled to under the wills?

RULING
YES,
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in the aunt's will to Doña
Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from doubt. It is distinctly declared that
Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take certain parts of it after 1,000 pesos have
been deducted. They are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are called
the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is merely a further description of persons
already well identified, and, if false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of
article 773 of the Civil Code, which by article 789 is applicable to legatees.
Where legatees are pointed out by name in the will the fact that they are referred to as the
natural sons of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such
relationship but is descriptive merely.
(2) The ninth clause of the will of Doña Honorata is as follows:
The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her nephews Enrique Gloria and Ramon
del Rosario in equal parts — that is, 1,500 pesos each.
The plaintiff was entitled to one-half of this legacy in his own right. This has been paid to
him. Don Enrique Gloria died before his the testatrix. By the provisions of articles 982 and
983 of the Civil Code the right of accretion exists as to the other half in favor of the plaintiff
and he is entitled to have it paid to him.
A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal shares is payable in its entirety to the
survivor of them in case one dies before the testator.
(3) The right of accretion exist in the share of Doña Luisa in favor of the Ramon, for the
reasons stated in connection with the legacy of 3,000 pesos, after the 1000 is given to
Luisa’s children.
(4) Applying article 668 of the Civil Code, we must hold that any interest which the plaintiff
may have taken in the share of Doña Luisa under the will of Don Nicolas he took as an heir
and not as a legatee.
(5) The legatee can demand his legacy from the heir or from the executor, when the latter
is authorized to give it.
Where the will authorizes the executor to pay legacies, expressly or by natural inference,
action will lie by the legatee against the executor to compel allowance and payment
thereof.
In an action to compel payment of legacies the defense that an inventory is being formed or
that creditors have not been paid must be set up in the answer in order to be availed of.
(6) While in this action he has a right to have his interest as legatee declared, yet it cannot
be delivered to him without a partition of the estate.
An executor who is also an heir is not qualified to make partition of the estate, and a legatee
who seeks the payment of a legacy involving a partition must sue all persons interested in
the estate. Don Clemente, the executor, against whom the action was directed, was not only
an heir as a life tenant but also in the fee after his death of Don Rosendo if the latter died
without issue.
In summary SC held that the only thing that can be decided in this case is the rights of
Ramon as legatee.
The court below ordered the executor to render accounts of his administration of both
estates.
As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the only thing here in question is the right to the allowance.
As we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, he is not entitled to any statement of
accounts as such pretended legatee.
As to the estate of Doña Honorata, he is entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500 pesos. Article
907 requires the executor to render accounts to the heir, not to the legatee; and although
by article 789 all of the provisions of Chapter II (in which both articles are found) relating
to heirs are made applicable to legatees, we cannot hold that this requires an executor to
submit his accounts to one who has no interest in the estate except to a money legacy when
there is no suggestion that it will not be paid when the right to it is established.
In respect to the share of Doña Luisa, there is reason for saying that a legatee on an aliquot
part is entitled to an accounting. But, inasmuch as in this case there can be no final
determination of the rights of the parties interested in the estate, because they are not all
parties to this suit, the executor should not in this suit be ordered to submit his accounts.