February 22, 2019

1. Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844
considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose
COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or
certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.

ISSUE: Can a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC of nuisance candidate under Section 69 as in
Section 78 be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68?

RULING: No. Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78
cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did
when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered
stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly
speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said
votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC.

2. Jalosjos vs. Cardino, G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536, Oct. 9, 2012

FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in
the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny
due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false
material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for
the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional
Trial Court Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation.

The COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.
It concluded that “Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is
not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served.”

ISSUE 1: Is the perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by
final judgment, a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code?

RULING: Yes. Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible
to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used
in Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all
the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to “qualifications or eligibility.” One
who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering
from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that “he is eligible
to run for (public) office,” as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

ISSUE 2: Can the COMELEC cancel the certificate of candidacy without a petition?

RULING: Yes. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and
the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed
not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final
judgment under the law. To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly
that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was
elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
“enforce and administer all laws” relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final
judgment.

ISSUE 3: Can second-placer Cardino be proclaimed?

RULING: Yes. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of
candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’
ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections―Cardino―who received the highest number of votes.

3. Talaga vs. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 196804 & 197015, Oct. 11, 2012

FACTS: On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo respectively
filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the
scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-
CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days
later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already
Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which Ramon allegedly have known the
same.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May
10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC. In focus in these consolidated
special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty
election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification.

ISSUE: Is the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu
of her husband Ramon, who was disqualified on term violation, valid?

HELD: No. The COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s
ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law.
Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena
City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section
44 of the LGC, to wit: Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice- Governor,
Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.·If a permanent vacancy occurs in the Office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vicemayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.

4. Federico vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 199612, Jan. 22, 2013

Facts: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal mayor
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the
Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate. On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and
the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for
her deceased husband. Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA
as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna.

Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed after the
deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678. The COMELEC En Banc gave due course
to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico
as substitute mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas. However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots
had already been printed, the name of Edna was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas
against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna garnered the most votes for that election, beating Private
Respodent for the position of mayor. Eventually the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to
Petitioner (who was the replacement of Edna). Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the
proclamation of Petitioner Federico.

Issue: Was there a valid substitution of Sanchez by Federico?

Ruling: NO. Different deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the
substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification,
the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the
situation at bench, the substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009. The reason for the
distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a
candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet
started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be
accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted. When Batangas Governor
Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late
husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The party actually had the option to
substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate
for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the
deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute her as
mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his
widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.

5. Cardino vs. Jalosjos, G. R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017

Facts: During the May 13, 2013 Elections, Cardino and Jalosjos both ran for the position of Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte. On May 15, 2013, Jalosjos was proclaimed the winner after garnering
18,414 votes compared to Cardino's 16,346 votes. Cardino immediately filed a petition for quo warranto
before the COMELEC, which sought to nullify the candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility.
Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently became a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America (USA). Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los
Angeles, California, USA. On August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and reacquisition was issued in her favor.
However, when Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October
1, 2012, she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship that was subscribed
and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De Guzman-Laput of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Cardino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Jalosjos left the Philippines
for the USA on May 30, 2012 and she presented her US passport to the immigration authorities. Jalosjos
then arrived back in the Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 p.m.
using her US passport. Cardino, therefore, argued that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have
personally appeared in Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012
to execute, sign and swear to her Affidavit of Renunciation.

Issue: Was Jalosjos able to fully divest herself of her American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run
for the mayorship of Dapitan City?
Ruling: Yes. In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained in detail the
requirements that must be complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a person with dual citizenship
can be qualified to run for any elective public office, to wit:

[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic,
thus: Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.·Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: “I _____________, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.”

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated
repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz.: Sec. 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities.·Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. x x x x The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms
that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

6. ER EJERCITO vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, Nov. 25, 2014

FACTS: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar
“Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. The causes of action include:
(1) Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province
of Laguna the “Orange Card” which could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for
their medical needs – a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s
favor in violation of Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code; (2) Under Sec 5 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may spend for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every
voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy” The
Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the position
of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to
P4,576,566.00. However, for television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent P23,730,784.
Even assuming that Ejercito was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still paid
the sum of P16,611,549. Hence, Ejercito committed an election offense under Sec 35 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Sec 68 of the OEC.

On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
as duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor of Laguna. Ejercito: 549,310 votes. San Luis: 471,209 votes.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the
dismissal of the petition which was: (a) Improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election
offenses, thus, the case should have been filed beforethe COMELEC Law Department, or the election
registrar; (b) San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, that he (Ejercito) was
previously convicted or declared by final judgment for being guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of
having committed, the punishable actsunder Sec 68 of the OEC; (c) Moot and academic by his proclamation
as duly-elected Prov. Governor of Laguna for 2013-2016.

The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. The COMELEC En Banc
agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. One
ground for disqualification listed in Sec 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by law. Hence, COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition.

As to Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that the filing of an election
offense and the factual determination on the existence ofprobable cause are required before a
disqualification case based on Sec 68 of the OEC may proceed, the COMELEC EnBanc cited Lanot vs.
Comelec which declared that each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification under Sec 68 of theOEC
has two aspects – electoral and criminal. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, andan erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation

ISSUE: Is the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section
68 of the OEC were indeed committed a requirement prior to actual disqualification?

RULING: NO. The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the
electoral aspect of a disqualification case.

The "exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases
involving criminal infractions of the election laws" stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050
pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election
offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the
offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summaryin character. This Court said in Sunga:

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal
aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any
other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to
secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a
determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance
of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned
with, under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.

and equally in Lanot:

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should
be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in
character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and
vice-versa.

7. OLIVIA DA SILAVA CERAFICA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136 December

2, 2014

Facts: Kimberly filed her COC for councilor of City of Taguig for the 2013 election and indicated her age
therein that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the
requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set out in
Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487. She withdrew her candidacy and Olivia, of the same political
party, filed a substitution for Kimberly’s spot pursuant to Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881). However, Director Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation
of Kimberly’s COC and denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia through a Comelec Resolution No.
9551. The Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec adopted the recommendation of the Director Amor-
Ladra.

Issue: In the cancellation of certificate of candidacy a quasi-judicial process to be heard by the COMELEC
in division and en banc on appeal?

Held: In the exercise of COMELEC’s adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it
to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the
exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed
quasi-judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the Comelec,
the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.

8. Villafuerte vs. Comelec & Villafuerte, G.R. No. 206698, Feb. 25, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the province of
Camarines Sur in the May 2013 local elections. Petitioner file a with the COMELEC a verified Petition to
deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent alleging that the latter intentionally
misrepresented a false and deceptive name/ nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under
oath in his COC that LRAY JR.MIGZ was his nickname or stage name and that the name he intended to
appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately
omitted his first name MIGUEL and inserted, instead LRAY JR., which is the nickname of his father, the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, L Ray Villafuerte, Jr. COMELEC's First Division and COMELEC
en banc ruled that there is no reason to cancel the COC of respondent as matters of material
misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a candidate and nothing is mentioned about
a candidate`s name.

ISSUE: Did respondent commit material misrepresentation when he declared in his COC that his
name/nickname to be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.?

RULING: NO. In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.

Clearly, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification
for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Hence,
petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” written in his COC is a material
misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent’s nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a
material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office.

Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As said, respondent’s
nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the
nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his
identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.

9. CABALLERO vs COMELEC and NANUD, G.R. 209835, September 22, 2015

FACTS: Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr., the respondent were
both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May
13, 2013 elections. The private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy claiming that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes. However, the
petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13,
2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.Furthermore, he asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen. On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes, on May 14, 2013. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
the COMELEC En Banc but the same was denied. Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private respondent took his Oath of Office on
December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the OEC, what should the material
representation pertain to?

RULING: In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed
the certificate of candidacy. Material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to
run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Furthermore, aside from the
requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Therefore, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.

10. Grace Poe vs COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697, 221698 – 700 March 8, 2016

FACTS: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental
care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano)
and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling
with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and
Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.”
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.”

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and
19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport. Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree
in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her studies abroad
and left for the United States of America (U.S.). On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City.10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple
flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. On 18 October 2001,
petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19
December 2001. On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. After a few months, specifically on
13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating
medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the
country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship. On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before
the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.” On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question
“Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her CoC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.56 In her CoC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her CoC an “Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015. Petitioner’s filing of her CoC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Issue: Did Poe commit false material misrepresentation in her CoC?

Ruling: No, The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the
position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July
2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was
here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material
fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the
United States of America.

Issue: Can the COMELEC, in the same cancellation of COC case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate?

Ruling: No. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate. The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission
on Elections, which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC is our guide,
which ruled that, “It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on
age, residence and citizenship of voters. “
The pronouncement of Romualdez leds to an amendment done in 2012, which provides, “Grounds. - Any
candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court,
guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution. A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination
thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.” Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality
of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of
a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the
other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in
a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due
course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity
of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to
prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.

11. Albania vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 226792 June 6, 2017

FACTS: In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O.
Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco’s proclamation
by filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition was decided in
respondent’s favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte
from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term. Respondent ran again in the 20104
and 20135 National and Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of Camarines Norte,
respectively. On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Camarines
Norte in the May 9, 2016 National and Local elections. On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered
voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition for respondent’s disqualification from
running as Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 95238 on two grounds: (1) he violated
the three-term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent’s suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its
accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the
Ombudsman’s Order dated October 2, 2015.

On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It
ruled that a violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative
case are not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-
term limit rule is a ground for ineligibility which constituted false material representation under Section 78
of the OEC; and such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, which
respondent failed to do.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016.

ISSUE: Was the petition for disqualification grounded on the three-term limitation filed on time?

RULING: No. Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc
affirmed such dismissal.

Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office. The word
“eligible” in Section 74 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. And We had held that a violation
of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to
or to cancel a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, the filing of the same must comply
with the period prescribed therein, i.e., the filing of the same must be made not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In this case, respondent filed his COC for
Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016 elections on October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom to
file the petition for denial of due course or cancellation of COC on the ground of violation of the three-term
limit rule, which fell on November 10, 2015. However, the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015
which was already beyond the period to file the same; thus, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the COMELEC in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time.