Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. 6 When their second child was born, the couple decided
to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations 8 and
thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by
Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene,
born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on
June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically
assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and
gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to
his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow
from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry
to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in
1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be
banned from the gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the
property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his
family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers
would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons
and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez
Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. 26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his
family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-
earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while
Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by
Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992. 29 Wasawas stated that she personally
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children. 30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic
notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. 32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of
Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. 33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological
behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers. 34 Contrary to Dr.
Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist. 35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found
him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a
person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant
null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It
faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals 40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with
the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of
stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent
thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous
ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s
decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and
Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, 50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy
and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United
States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in
his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started
with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it
would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3)
the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used
to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict
rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton
and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added
that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in
error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life
in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis
deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known
as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not
a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges
can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.
The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal
doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare
decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has
likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so
changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 53

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck
down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a
law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of
serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. 57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. 58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on
the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must
be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely
affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of
a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the
root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the
appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 61 The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 621avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She
merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations:
Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, 63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there
is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside
from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his
(Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his
wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of
evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In
this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision
and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 602 dated March 20,
2009.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Sergio L. Pestaño,
concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.

2
Rollo, pp. 110-111.

3
Id. at 35-45.

4
Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No. 227 dated July
17, 1987]

5
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.

6
Id. at 12.

7
Id. at 17.

8
Id. at 14; Exhibit "3."

9
Id. at 13, 15.

10
Id. at 21-23.

11
Id. at 10.
12
Rollo, p. 48.

13
Id. at 35.

14
TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.

15
Rollo, p. 36.

16
Id. at 37.

17
Id.

18
Id. at 40.

19
Id. at 44.

20
Id. at 40.

21
Id.

22
Id. at 36.

23
Id. at 40.

24
Id. at 48-49.

25
Id. at 42, 49.

26
Id. at 49.

27
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.

28
Id. at 26.

29
TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.

30
Id. at 7-9.

31
Rollo, p. 38.

32
Id. at 39.

33
Id. at 41.

34
Id. at 54-55.

35
Id. at 42.

36
Id. at 35-45.

37
Id. at 45.

38
Id. at 47-65.

39
Id. at 64.
40
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.

41
335 Phil. 664 (1997).

42
Rollo, pp. 80-81.

43
Docketed as G.R. No. 150479.

44
CA rollo, pp. 199-202.

45
Rollo, pp. 78-79.

46
Supra note 1.

47
Pertinent portion of the CA’s Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads:

The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court of the new "Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages" (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which took effect on March 15, 2003, this Court hereby RECONSIDERS
itself and GRANTS the motion for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner-appellee on November 29, 2000.
Consequently, respondent-appellant’s appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the DECISION of the court below
declaring the marriage between CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING and BENJAMIN G. TING null and void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is hereby AFFIRMED.

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision dated 29 August 2002 of the
court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee Carmen Velez-
Ting and respondent-appellant Benjamin G. Ting void from the beginning under Article 36, Family Code (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987).

Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the Court a quo.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.)

48
Rollo, pp. 110-111.

49
De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA 433, 440.

50
Id. at 438.

51
Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

52
G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.

53
Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)

54
408 Phil. 713 (2001).

55
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

56
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.

57
Supra note 41, at 680.

58
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
 59
Id. at 850.

60
Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to the Supreme Court, November
11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in Family Law Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11.

61
Supra note 40, at 34.

62
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 58, at 850-851.

63
Rollo, p. 39.

64
Id. at 54-55.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the expenses of the
salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on
January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer
a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial
Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior
to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation,
whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November
17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost
one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12,
after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize
the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the
Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of
October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially
that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating
on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal . . . 5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB,
961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to
accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior
courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga
v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could
have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular
No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A.,
104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal
cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity;Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded
retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see
also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may
not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of
the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC,
197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to
entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6Our decision in People
v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should
 appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973)
and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the
petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by
these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the
law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations
of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new
doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take
account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.

Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some
members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done
in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional,
was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis
for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228
U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts,
 state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the
moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held
in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal
rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once
judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to
its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may
have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior
to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent
instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114,
Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 — declaring invalid
criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and
incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should
be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed
by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious
denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a
retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us
from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in
crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been
violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance
by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among
others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid
defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but
upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though
not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of
the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation
antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the
principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the
criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing Mayflower Shipping
Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were
apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively
contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.

2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration, promulgated by the Special
Former Second Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by Paras, J., with whom
concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee."

4 Emphasis supplied.

5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras
(Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal
law favorable to accused, if ; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power :
e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31,
1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del
Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).

6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms,
and both holding that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a
"secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who
under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearm.

7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

 8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957],
while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].

9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.

10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the decision.

11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order
creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686
(1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA
200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.

12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of
Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].

14 SEE footnote 3, supra.

15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be
exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .

16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound
for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as
petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely
a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to
build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of
the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-
year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to
perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He
was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the
morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as
they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to
give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the
children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital,
which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was
filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and
sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an
apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As
respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city
prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her
report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âwphi1.nêt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted
by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also
confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however,
the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that
there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and
subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would
cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the
incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or
clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine
enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the
Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory
in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that
has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined inSantos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has
been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
 Canon
Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. 3 The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the
relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family 6that the State
cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally
terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite
given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.

Footnotes:

1
Rollo. pp. 42-43

2
240 SCRA 20.

3
268 SCRA 198.

4
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607

5
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507;
Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.

6
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.