VIRGILIO SINDICO and VIRGINIA TORCUATOR SINDICO

v. HON. GERARDO D. DIAZ et al.

440 SCRA 50 (2004), THIRD DIVISION
Spouses Virgilio and Virginia Sindico (Sindico) sued respondents Felipe and Erlinda Sombrea
(Sombrea) who refused to return the land owned by the former. The arrangement arose from the
request of Sombrea‘s parents from the Sindicos that former will cultivate the disputed land in exchange
of an income sharing.
After the death of the Sombrea‘s parents, Spouses Sindico demanded the return of the said land which
brought about the suit filed with the Regional Trial Court. The Sombreas assailed the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the case as they assert that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has exclusive
and original jurisdiction as provided under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
The RTC dismissed the case ruling in consonance with the Sombreas‘ contention and subsequently
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Sindico.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the pending case
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is not affected
by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, jurisdiction
would be dependent on his whims. The allegations in petitioner‘s complaint show that the action is one
for recovery of possession, not one which involves an agrarian dispute.
Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines agrarian dispute over which the DARAB has
exclusive original jurisdiction as “refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture…”
That respondents only basis in assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court is that the subject matter of the
case is an agricultural land and that they do not deny at all the allegation of the complaint of petitioners
that there is no tenancy or leasehold agreement between them unmistakably show that there is no
agrarian dispute to speak of over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction.
Finally, since petitioners‘ action is one for recovery of possession and does not involve an agrarian
dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Case Digest: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

v. COURT OF APPEALS 508 SCRA 72 (2006)
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS 508 SCRA 72 (2006)
Commission on Audit, in response to anonymous complaint alleging that certain municipal employees
of Infanta, Pangasinan allegedly committed graft and corruption, conducted a fraud audit. The audit
team found that the Municipal Treasurer granted various loans to Municipal Employees in violation of
COA Circular 90-331. One of the municipal employees to whom loans were extended was Luzviminda
M. Maniago (Luzviminda). A complaint against Luzviminda was then filed before the Office of the
Mayor for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). In her Answer, Luzviminda claimed that the loan was extended to her by the
Municipal Treasurer in the latter‘s personal capacity. The then Acting Mayor Charlito M. Kho (Kho),
found Luzviminda guilty of Grave Misconduct on the basis of the “Fraud Audit Report” and dismissed
her from the service. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified Kho‘s resolution,
finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
accordingly modified the penalty to suspension of one year. Luzviminda filed a motion for
reconsideration of said judgement, but the same has been denied. Hence, Luzviminda filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed the CSC decision and ordered the
reinstatement of Luzviminda. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether there is substantial evidence to hold Maniago guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
HELD:
It bears noting that an audit team, Luzviminda herself, following which it confirmed that the amount of
loan granted, formed part of the “cash shortage” of the Municipal Treasurer. And that the decision of
Kho, was based not only on the Fraud Audit Report, but also on Luzviminda‘s Answer to the complaint
wherein she did not deny having secured a loan, her only defense being that the loan did not involve
public funds, which defense does not deserve consideration in the absence of any iota of proof thereof.
The absence of a hearing did not deprive Luzviminda of due process. She was given the opportunity to
file, and she did file, an Answer to complaint against her. She was also afforded the opportunity to
appeal to the CSC from the September 20, 2000 Resolution of Acting Mayor Kho.
Luzviminda having obtained a loan for her personal use out of municipal funds, through the active
intercession of the Municipal Treasurer, cannot be countenanced. Although already paid in full, said
loan resulted in the diversion of municipal funds for purposes other than what the amount was
supposed to be appropriated for in the municipality. Thus, public service was prejudiced.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX