Table

 of  Contents  
Art.  VIII  –  The  Judiciary  (cont.)  ................................................................................................   2  
Section  5(5)  Power  to  Promulgate  Rules  of  Procedure  ......................................................................  2  
Philippine  National  Bank  v.  Asuncion  (1977)  .......................................................................................  2  
Santero  v.  CFI  of  Cavite  (1987)  ............................................................................................................  2  
Damasco  v.  Laqui  (1988)  ......................................................................................................................  3  
People  v.  Lacson  (2003)  .......................................................................................................................  4  
St.  Martin  Funeral  Home  v.  NLRC  (1998)  .............................................................................................  5  
In  Re:  Exemption  of  the  National  Power  Corporation  from  Payment  of  Filing/Docket  Fees  (2010)  ...  7  
Section  6  Administrative  Supervision  ...............................................................................................  8  
Maceda  v.  Vasquez  (1993)  ...................................................................................................................  8  
Section  8(1)  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  Membership  ............................................................................  9  
Chavez  v.  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  (2012)  ............................................................................................  9  
Chavez  v.  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  (2013)  ..........................................................................................  12  
Villanueva  v.  Judicial  and  Bar  Council  (2015)  ....................................................................................  14  
Section  10  Salaries  in  the  Judiciary  .................................................................................................  16  
Nitafan  v.  Commissioner  of  lnternal  Revenue  (1987)  ........................................................................  16  
Section  11  Security  of  Tenure  and  Power  to  Discipline  Lower  Court  Judges  ....................................  17  
Vargas  v.  Rilloraza  (1948)  ..................................................................................................................  17  
Article  IX-­‐A  –  Constitutional  Commissions  (Common  Provisions)  ...........................................  20  
Section  5  Fiscal  Autonomy  ..............................................................................................................  20  
Civil  Service  Commission  v.  Department  of  Budget  and  Management  (2006)  ..................................  20  
Section  7  Decisions  on  Cases  or  Matters  .........................................................................................  23  
Filipinas  Engineering  and  Machine  Shop  v.  Ferrer  (1985)  .................................................................  23  
Saligumba  v.  Commission  on  Audit  (1982)  ........................................................................................  23  
 

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 ART. VIII – THE JUDICIARY (CONT.)

Section 5(5) Power to Promulgate Rules of Procedure

Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion (1977)

x x x Respondent Court’s reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was
erroneous.

A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein
prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely
sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against
the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. x x x

xxx

It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.
Said provision gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously.” The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary
debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors
without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him
to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of
the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making
it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would
deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.

x x x if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the
New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no
choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision
diminishes the Bank’s right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of
the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, x x x that a substantive
law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former
being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.

Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X, provides
that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.

Santero v. CFI of Cavite (1987)

Civil Law; Family Relations; Support; Fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married is not a determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 188 of the
Civil Code; While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased, the Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his or her children without

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distinction.—The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art.
188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children
of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed
Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father
Pablo Santero.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate
of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is
a procedural rule; "Spouse" interpreted to be the legitimate spouse, not common-law spouse.—
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted
however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law
spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

Damasco v. Laqui (1988)

x x x After trial, respondent Judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of
grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime x x
x

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent
Judge’s decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in
grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the
information was filed. x x x

In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an accused has been found
to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be
convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, x x x, would be to
sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the
defendant of the graver offense.

xxx

x x x Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by

the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. Hence, while it is the rule
that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription,
which under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. x x x

Thus, x x x a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA can be done only “through an overhaul
of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere
bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable.” But this will have to

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contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.

People v. Lacson (2003)

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8[, Rule 117] retroactively simply because it is
favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar
under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:

“In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and
the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties.
The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly
short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.”

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice,
may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective.
The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of
the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has
its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the
administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with
the dictate involved.

xxx

The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia,
to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule
144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its
opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former
procedure shall apply.

xxx

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x x x when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and
not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose
for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the
provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a
denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new
rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases
were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust
and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

x x x It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by
existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8
had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased
by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.

St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC (1998)

x x x under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC. x x x

xxx

x x x the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of
sixty days from notice of the decision. x x x

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided
as follows: x x x

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective
March 18, 1995, to wit: x x x

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, the
following amend   ments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by
R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines
and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph
granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within
its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3)
of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides “except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and

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 subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.”
(Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial
agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology.
As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time
now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. x x x

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial
Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among
others, “those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x
x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.” This
would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from
decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals
has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified
cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded
from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical
and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no
cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there
may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in
the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in
the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but
prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress,
more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Conference Committee Report on S. No.
1495/H. No. 10452.

xxx

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use
of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a

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lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes
of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed
would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

xxx

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a
law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases
being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand
the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of
Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on
labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired. x x x

In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees
(2010)

On December 6, 2005, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, In re: Exemption of the National
Power Corporation from the Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, on the basis of Section 13, Republic
Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation) x x x

xxx

On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that:

“The Court Resolved x x x to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6395 x x x.
The request appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution x x x.”

Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing
fees and court fees.

Section 22 of Rule 141 reads:

“Sec. 22. Government exempt.—The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government

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units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent
charters are not exempt from paying such fees.” (emphasis supplied)

Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on
privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC “shall remain as a national government-
owned and -controlled corporation.”

Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.

The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M.
No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court x x x stressed that
the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus:

“Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less the Executive. x x x”

Section 6 Administrative Supervision

Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)

The issue in this petition x x x is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court,
and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

xxx

x x x We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

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The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel,
but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. x x x

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time
to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not
yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the
present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.

Section 8(1) Judicial and Bar Council Membership

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (2012)

Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one
(1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? x x x

xxx

Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition of the
JBC as stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads: x x x

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision
is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same
under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated:
a representative of the Integrated Bar,
a professor of law,
a retired member of the Court and
a representative from the private sector.
On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of
the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice and
“a representative of Congress.”

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As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of
Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. x x x

The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold:

First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that
of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition
for the rule of law to prevail.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. x x x

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, “from the enumeration of the membership
of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.”

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any of these
instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the subject
constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such
as records of the Constitutional Commission.

Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. x x x

xxx

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This

  10  
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter. x x x

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. x x x On this score, the Court cites the insightful analysis of another
member of the Court and JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Thus:

“x x x The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio
member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed
to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice
of judicial nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under
Article XVII of the Constitution. x x x

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign
the same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring
nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. x x x”

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the
Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident
that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government—to legislate.

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the
Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident
that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government—to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process.

The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers such as, inter alia,
the power of appropriation,
the declaration of an existence of a state of war,
canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and
impeachment.

  11  
In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the
roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official
act by voting jointly or separately.

An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to
1) its relationship with the other chamber; and
2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of
government.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of
oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with
firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the co-
equal branches of government.

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (2013)

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss
the petition on the following grounds:
1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature;
2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift
from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight;
3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers
to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and
4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide
a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

xxx

x x x the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter “a” to
describe “representative of Congress,” the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as
to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election
shall be broken “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.”

  12  
 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to
be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.”
Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.
In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its
two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence,
to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough.
Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in
the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function―to legislate. JBC was created
to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned
a contributory non-legislative function.

xxx

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the
JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of government―the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The
total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the
Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a
major branch of government.

xxx

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. x x x

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the
JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of
checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the

  13  
JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which
is composed of members of Congress.

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted,
simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

x x x This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. x x x

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. x x x

Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council (2015)

The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.

xxx

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the
judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may
be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a
great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who
will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC’s
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying out its main
function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree
of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order
to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the
JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the

  14  
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office.
Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner’s case is
necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

Equal Protection

There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who
cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best
qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears
a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.

xxx

x x x In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the
constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence. “To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in
every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices,
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and
suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the
possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more
importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.”

Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it
employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition.
The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which
may be measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower
court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five years,
on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows:

xxx

At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the
selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this
qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The
applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual
merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without
any basis.

Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The
foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five-year

  15  
experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose.
The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause
as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the
applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.

[Other Doctrines]

Due Process

The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect
all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR
because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative
agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the
supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. x x x

xxx

Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner’s
private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in
the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name
be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
within the discretion of the JBC.

Section 10 Salaries in the Judiciary

Nitafan v. Commissioner of lnternal Revenue (1987)

x x x As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete
the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary,
so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of
Commissioner Rigos. x x x

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution
as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been
obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the

  16  
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the
salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the Judiciary.

The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

xxx

x x x construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, x x x

x x x it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after
its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

Section 11 Security of Tenure and Power to Discipline Lower Court Judges

Vargas v. Rilloraza (1948)

[SC cites Article VIII, section 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the 1935 Constitution] x x x Section 13 of the same
Article VIII, inter alia, enunciates that the then existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure
are thereby repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same, and to the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement them.
Art. XVI, section 2, provides that "all laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until
the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and thereafter they shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress
of the Philippines * * *"

Before the adoption of the Constitution, the law on disqualification of judges was contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, sections 8 and 608. If said sections should be considered as parts of the
then existing adjective legislation, Article VIII, section 13, of the constitution repealed them x x
x as statutes, and declared them rules of court x x x If said sections should be deemed as pertaining
to the then existing substantive legislation, then they were continued as laws or statutes by the
aforecited provision of Article XVI, section 2.

By virtue either of Article VIII, section 13, or Article XVI, section 2, of the constitution, therefore,
the grounds for disqualifying judges, which had been held to include justices of the Supreme Court
x x x were those established in sections 8 and 608 of the former Code of Civil Procedure. x x x

  17  
By reason of the fact that the aforementioned provisions of the former Code of Civil Procedure
were continued by the constitution itself, either as rules of court or as laws or statutes—a point we
need not now decide—there can be no question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy of said
provisions to the constitution as regards the disqualification of judicial officers. In other words,
the framers deemed it fit, right, and proper that said provisions shall continue to govern the
disqualification of judicial officers.

Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation

to the disqualification of certain members of the Supreme Court provided for in section 14 of the
People's Court Act which says: x x x

We propose to approach this question from the following angles:

(a) whether or not the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing grounds of
disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court, x x x;
(b) whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been
duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
pursuant to the constitution, even only as a "designee"; and
(c) x x x

(a) We start with the principle x x x that no act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution can
become a law x x x To discover whether the above quoted section 14 of the People's Court Act is
repugnant to the constitution, one of the best tests would be to compare the operation of the
pertinent constitutional provisions without said section, with their operation with the same section
if the latter were to be allowed to produce its effects. x x x

xxx

x x x In other words, what the constitution in this respect ordained as a power and a duty to be
exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the quoted section of the People's Court Act
would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section
prohibits. A clearer case of repugnancy to the fundamental law can hardly be imagined.

For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the
disqualified Justice from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged
section 14 there would have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice
and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office, saving
only proper cases or disqualification under Rule 126.

What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and
to enjoy the emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the other duties of his
office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities
of said office in all cases properly coming before his Court under the constitution, again without
prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126. Any statute enacted by the legislature
which would impede him in this regard x x x can not become law.

xxx

  18  
x x x If, according to section 4 of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it
as thus composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court—
particularly, as in the instant case, a majority of them—in a treason case, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation
of the judicial power of the court itself. It would seem evident that if the Congress could disqualify
members of this Court to take part in the hearing and determination of certain collaboration cases
it could extend the disqualification to other cases. The question is not one of degree or
reasonableness. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.

xxx

Let it not be argued that the Court is the same, only the membership being different. Because
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme
Court other than by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein
provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of
the Court—as in this case—are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme
Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. x x x

(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement x x x that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, we
are of opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme Court and that
the "designation" authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be made by the President
of any Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge can not possibly
be a compliance with the provision requiring that appointment.

An additional disqualifying circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation by or

consent of the Commission on Appointments. x x x A Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of
First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised Administrative Code, need not
be at least forty years of age, nor have for ten years or more been a judge of a court of record or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines x x x So that it may happen that a "designee"
under section 14 of the People's Court Act x x x does not possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular member of said Court. Here again is another point of repugnancy
between the challenged section and the constitution. And if we consider the actual fact that only
four of the present ten Justices of this Court are not adversely affected by the disqualification
established in section 14 of the People's Court Act, we see that the "designees" constitute a majority
when sitting with said four Justices x x x.

  19  
 ARTICLE IX-A – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (COMMON PROVISIONS)

Section 5 Fiscal Autonomy

Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management (2006)

The DBM posits that this Court’s ruling that fiscal autonomy means preference in terms of cash
allocation is not supported by the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, x x x

The DBM cites the comments of then Commissioner Blas Ople x x x

A close reading of Commissioner Ople’s comments shows, however, that he was not questioning
nor seeking to qualify the concepts of “fiscal autonomy” and “automatic release” as provided for
in what is now Article VIII Section 3 of the Constitution. What was then under consideration was
the original draft article on the Judiciary x x x

What the original draft thus provided for was automatic appropriation, which is not the same as
automatic release of appropriations. The power to appropriate belongs to Congress, while the
responsibility of releasing appropriations belongs to the DBM. Commissioner Ople objected to
automatic appropriation, it bears emphasis, not to automatic release of appropriations.

xxx

In support of its position, the DBM also cites Commissioner Monsod’s explanation x x x Again,
what Commissioner Monsod objected to was automatic appropriation for the judiciary, not
automatic release of appropriations once approved. The following statement of Commissioner
Monsod, read in its context, does not in any way support the position taken by the DBM.

“The Commissioner will recall that when the provision giving fiscal autonomy to the judiciary was
presented to the body, we were the ones who denied to it the percentage of the budget because,
precisely, we wanted the judiciary to go through the process of budget-making to justify its budget
and to go through the legislature for that justification. But we also said that after having gone
through this process, it should have fiscal autonomy so that there will be an automatic and
regular release of such funds. The whole purpose of that provision is to protect the independence
of the judiciary while at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position of privilege
by an automatic percentage.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The DBM further claims that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash payment schedule for all agencies, including
those belonging to the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAG). x x x

[The cash payment schedule system according to the DBM:

1.   General Appropriations Act (GAA) is signed into law
2.   the DBM prepares the financial plan for the year for each agency
3.   Financial planning results in an Agency Budget Matrix (ABM)
a.   ABM reflects individual “obligation authority ceilings” for each agency, called “allotments”
i.   An allotment allows the agency to enter into a contract or otherwise obligate funds although
cash has not yet been received by said agency

  20  
 ii.   Allotments serve as a guarantee that the national government will look for cash to support
the agency’s obligations
iii.   Allotments of an ordinary agency does not cover its full appropriations, while those for
entities vested with fiscal autonomy always cover the full amount of its appropriations
4.   The ABM of an ordinary agency is disaggregated into those Needing Clearance and Not Needing Clearance
a.   The full allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG is placed under the Not Needing Clearance
column
5.   Under the Not Needing Clearance Column, agencies are further disaggregated to “this release” (the initial
allotment authorized under the ABM), and “for later release” (the amount to be released after the conduct
of the agency performance review)
a.   the total appropriation and allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG are all placed under “this
release” since no agency performance review is conducted by the DBM on these entities.
6.   After the ABMs are issued, the Notices of Cash Allocations (NCAs) are issued every month to support
approved allotments with cash
a.   NCAs, however, are subject to revenue projections, e.g., if collections do not meet the monthly
revenue target, then the NCA to be released for that month may not cover 100% of the allotment]

The DBM goes on to emphasize that it has no discretion on how much cash enters petitioner’s
coffers, as cash payment schedules are “dictated by the amount of revenue collection, borrowings,
deficit ceilings and total disbursement program of the national government”; and if the cash
payment schedule prescribes that the total cash to be released for a given month is 85% of
allotment, then a Notice of Cash Allocation amounting to 85% of each agency’s allotment is
released for all agencies. It thus contends that this equality in treatment does not violate the fiscal
autonomy of the agencies belonging to the CFAG, for “since approved allotments of agencies
belonging to the CFAG are higher than ordinary agencies, they automatically get higher cash
allocations.”

The DBM’s protestation that it has no discretion on the amount of funds released to agencies with
fiscal autonomy fails. The Court finds that the DBM, in fact, exercised discretion [that is] denied
[to] it by the constitutional mandate to automatically release such funds.

Understandably, a shortfall in revenue in a given year would constrain the DBM not to release the
total amount appropriated by the GAA for the government as a whole during that year. However,
the DBM is certainly not compelled by such circumstance to proportionately reduce the funds
appropriated for each and every agency. Given a revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the
DBM to release the full amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal autonomy, especially
since x x x the total appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even reach 3% of the
national budget.

That the full amount is, in fact, not fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly due to
a policy decision of the DBM. Such a decision, whether it goes by the label of “cash payment
schedule” or any other term, cannot be reconciled with the constitutional mandate that the release
to these agencies should be automatic.

xxx

The DBM furthermore argues that this Court’s Resolution of June 3, 1993 x x x reading:
“After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and
regularly released subject to availability of funds. (Italics supplied)”

  21  
means that fund releases may still be subject to a cash release program.

In support of this argument, the DBM cites a letter dated May 18, 1993 of then Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio (now a member of this Court) x x x

The letter quotes then Chief Justice Narvasa’s summary of this Court’s position on the controversy,
which summary states, inter alia:

“4) the Court will look to releases by the DBM of funds against the approved budget of the
Judiciary, in the full amount sought and promptly upon notice; it is willing to consider and pass
upon suggestions by the DBM for scheduling of releases; x x x”(Italics supplied)

In the same letter, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel x x x opined that x x x “[a]fter approval
by Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released
subject to availability of funds”—which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position adopted by this
Court.

Instead of supporting the DBM’s position, however, this letter only shows the consistency of this
Court in interpreting “automatic release” as requiring the full release of appropriations. The
Court’s willingness to pass upon suggestions for scheduling of releases in no way implies that it
was assenting to an incomplete or delayed release of funds. Rather, it was a recognition by this
Court that scheduling of releases, as such, does not violate the Constitution and is, in fact,
presupposed in the phrase “automatically and regularly released.”

The phrase “subject to availability of funds” x x x is not an authority for the DBM to implement a
policy which, although labeled “cash payment schedule,” actually goes beyond mere scheduling
of releases and effects a withholding and reduction of the approved appropriations, as it did in the
present case against petitioner Civil Service Commission.

Finally, while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of imposing a “no report, no release” policy
on agencies clothed with fiscal autonomy, the DBM prays for a clarification that such agencies are
still responsible for the timely submission to it of financial reports. The Court considers it sufficient
to echo the following statements in the Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr.:

“This is not to say that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at
all to the DBM. x x x the Supreme Court, or constitutional commissions clothed with fiscal
autonomy for that matter, may submit reports relative to its appropriation “for records purposes
only.” The word “may” is permissive x x x”

  22  
Section 7 Decisions on Cases or Matters

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer (1985)

x x x it has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance,
which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a
private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to Its
invitation to bid comes within the purview of a “final order” which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term “final orders, rulings and
decisions” of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission
on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.

Same; Same; COMELEC orders issued not pursuant to its quasijudicial character, but an incident
to it’s administrative functions is not the kind of order reviewable by the Supreme Court. Any
question arising therefrom is cognizable in the trial courts.—We agree with petitioner’s contention
that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal
controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence
after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was Issued
pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the
COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a “final order”
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may
be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Saligumba v. Commission on Audit (1982)

Courts; Supreme Court; Power of judicial review over decisions of Commission on Audit refer to
money matters, not to administrative cases involving personnel discipline.—Our power to review
COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline
of its personnel.

Same; Same; Same; Power to review limited to legal issues, not factual issues.—Even assuming
that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We
can not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to legal issues.

  23