G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management,
respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in

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 the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of

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 the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

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 MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).

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Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the
public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why
is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of
a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and
bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of
law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t]
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding

of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

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In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be

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frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting

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specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of
the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than
internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding
of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
— including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,

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 interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one
a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As

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former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President
of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an

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 obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the

Page 11 of 71
 last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by
the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed,
for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is
in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

Page 12 of 71
 (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 71
.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working
as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled
"Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7
Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April
1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9
He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of
Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases
and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15

Page 14 of 71
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received
P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months
of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21
Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22
Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty.
23
Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without
mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was
tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for
his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same
as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:

Page 15 of 71
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer
fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by
former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal
consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39
IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict
of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the
imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related
with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Page 16 of 71
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest
except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former
client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters
relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the
conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-
240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt
with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the
corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994
ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court,
which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111;
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Page 17 of 71
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in
the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test
of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a
lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation
of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains
to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no
longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove
that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his
previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal
complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does
not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment
with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is
to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent
is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are

Page 18 of 71
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law
does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls
within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
"Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 –
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved
also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in
his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended
or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on
the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Page 19 of 71
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Page 20 of 71
G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by
legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment of
ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack of a
case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the
petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel
and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations
(UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act
of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70,
disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157
pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career
or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the
DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing
to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.4 Second, the Office of the
President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s
citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment
because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does
not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public
respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo
warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated retirement age
applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent
Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We
have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
"transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our determination
to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character

Page 21 of 71
of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition,
and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of
petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a
judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by
its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest
to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age
unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a
citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are
claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received
commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for
which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in the annual
budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office under color of
authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, 8 negating
petitioner’s claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension
from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition
raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of
statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

Page 22 of 71
 A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016

SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v.

ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by complainants spouses
Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales
(respondent), praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay
rent and to vacate the apartment he is leasing despite demands.

The Facts

Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok,
SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated April 16, 2005.
However, respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay
monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite
repeated oral and written demands.3 This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay
conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby respondent promised to pay
complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31,
2009. Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement, constraining
complainants to file an ejectment case4 against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants
filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the
laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to complainants.5chanrobleslaw

Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory conference, and to file
his position paper.

Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in
favor of the complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay
complainants the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b)
further rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said
premises to complainants; (c) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of
suit.8chanrobleslaw

During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of
Quezon City.9chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same shall be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that respondent displayed unwarranted
obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he

Page 23 of 71
eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent
violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should
be held administratively liable.12chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution14 dated September 15,
2014 adopting and approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP
and, accordingly, meted respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's order of suspension on October
16, 2014.16 Records are bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and,
thus, the Court's order of suspension against him became final and executory.

Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension

On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
Certification17 was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent
has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In
connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated September 8, 2015 to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view
of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate action.19chanrobleslaw

Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned
Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38.

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that respondent be
further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for
a period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective
immediately.22 It found that since respondent received the order of suspension against him on October 16,
2014 and did not move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days
therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension. In this relation, the OBC ratiocinated
that since respondent was holding a position .which requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal
matters and practice of law, i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and desisted from
acting as such. However, as per the Certification dated September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38,
respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In view thereof, the OBC recommended to
increase respondent's suspension from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City
Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6) months.23chanrobleslaw

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the OBC and adopts the
same in its entirety.

Page 24 of 71
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the
Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from
holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.24 The practice of law embraces
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or
rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory
fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent
should have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never
heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City
Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification27 issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the
present.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010,"
provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial
prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations
he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of
witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by
application to any trial court; and cralawlawlibrary

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal
ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant
City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous
discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's
order of suspension against him.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case - are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to

Page 25 of 71
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v.
Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month
suspension from the practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier suspended.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty to respondent in
addition to the earlier six (6)-month suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC.
Thus, respondent's total period of suspension from the practice of law - and necessarily, from the holding
the position of Assistant City Prosecutor as well - should be fixed at one (1) year.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the
law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the
legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this
kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment
if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."32chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period
of six (6) months from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Page 26 of 71
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am—
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The

Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is

Page 27 of 71
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to

distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

Page 28 of 71
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have
on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of

all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject

of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and
that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support

services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts

contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in

question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered
by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law

Page 29 of 71
student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between

a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message

being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of
the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because

Page 30 of 71
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent

offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.

Page 31 of 71
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively

at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody

should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court
See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its

Page 32 of 71
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated

herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

Page 33 of 71
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration

should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of

study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to

give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal
Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its

President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Page 34 of 71
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged
in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and

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regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of

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men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should

consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole.
I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of
the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental
legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if,
even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which
are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a

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 party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal

problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as
that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar
to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

Page 38 of 71
 It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270
[1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

Page 39 of 71
 xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.
16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions

Page 40 of 71
 and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the

Page 41 of 71
 public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained

paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction
of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a
case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or
foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find
useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact

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that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.

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Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.
29

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In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited

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 reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the

Page 46 of 71
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50
after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's

Page 47 of 71
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar
matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Page 48 of 71
 A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY.

PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar
Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A.
Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while
complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at
the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon
his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he
married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant
rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in
Muntinlupa.9 chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and
focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva
Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went
back to school to earn a college degree.12
chanrobleslaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the
former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother
informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's
University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14
Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15 chanrobleslaw

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's
office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he
was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support.17 chanrobleslaw

Page 49 of 71
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was
ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was
informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its
office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that
point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he
was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni
Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was
because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph
G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20 chanrobleslaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful
activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating
to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July
2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that
they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting
with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call
from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into
believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was
not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25 cralawredchanrobleslaw

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan,"
complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of
conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use
of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28 chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a
defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the
administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared
closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to
humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33 chanrobleslaw

Page 50 of 71
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both
parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On
such date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue
an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties
submitted any.37chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally
and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that
respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to
prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41 chanrobleslaw

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the
Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43 chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed
complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent
and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and
finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute
appropriate actions against respondent.47 chanrobleslaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting
the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and recommendations of the IBP.

Page 51 of 71
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is
Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar
Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50
This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to
Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the
one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile,
complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan,"
among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick
A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55 chanrobleslaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used
complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant
- the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan,"
be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences
with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the
PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral

Page 52 of 71
character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the
2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from
PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would
be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which
exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62 chanrobleslaw

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged
unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the
primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent)

is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court
hereby resolves that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and
STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any
representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under
the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates
issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the
bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, "
Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a
statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Page 53 of 71
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Page 54 of 71
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the
roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court,
he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according
to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the
educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high
school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained
his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as
an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title
from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Page 55 of 71
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously
of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in
Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the
study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted
to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Page 56 of 71
 [A.C. No. 2131. May 10, 1985.]

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G.

COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., Respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and in his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for Respondents.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought
to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker
& McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H. E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie. chanrobles law library

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents’ memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practice law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

Page 57 of 71
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate
in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
"counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading
as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.

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On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted
his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a
copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by
Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as
a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his

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admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath.
In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for
George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the
"(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN."
Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as
his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged
in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the

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determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports
the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support

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the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

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January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said
Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of
the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962,
arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded
before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter
granted leave to file written memoranda.4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,

out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be

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 necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and
financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce
must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with

power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice

and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the

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principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and

adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting

officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly
of local practice maintained through influence or position;

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 (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to

obtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for

practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees

schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide

involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

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Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of

law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,

moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is

far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective

action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions,
the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a
rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of

his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is

not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

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Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of

the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as
a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while

the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose
a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject
in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to
positions taken by the Unified Bar.

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 For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a

"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because

although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will
give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not
had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they
have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in
a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and
old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by
the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the
public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.

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Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar
has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In
addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association
or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662
(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this
time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article

VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Abounds

Outset

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