VIII.C De Camilo filed a civil action for Forcible Entry against Ong
Peng Kee and Adelia Ong with the Justice of Peace (JP) of
• VIUDA DE CAMILO V. ARANIO, L-15653, SEPTEMBER Malangas, with respect to the portion belonging to her
29, 1961MARCELO wherein the building of Ong Peng Kee was erected.
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; INTERPLEADER; NO Severino Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case
CONFLICTING CLAIMS; COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER
WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION. — It appearing that there is no Pending trial of the two cases, the respondents Ong Peng Kee
conflicting claims among the defendants — their respective and Adelia Ong filed a complaint for Interpleader against De
claims being separate and distinct from the other — and Camilo, Severino Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert
that the plaintiffs have interest (the prolongation of their Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas.
occupancy or possession of the portions encroached
upon by them), the requirements for an action to interplead Ong Peng Kee alleges that the filing of the three cases (by
do not exist, and consequently, the complaint of interpleader Bannister, de Camilo, and Francisco), indicated that the
in question is without cause of action. defendants (in the Interpleader) had conflicting interests,
since they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the
2. COURTS; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION; lot in question and they (Peng Kee and Adelia), could not
ACTION INVOLVE TITLE TO REALTY; SUBJECT-MATTER determine without hazard to themselves who of the
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. — As the action defendants was entitled to the possession. Interpleader
for interpleader would necessarily involve title to or plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the
possession of real property or any interest therein, and property other than as mere lessees.
that the subject-matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation (there being no showing that rentals were Motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners alleging, inter
asked by the petitioners from the respondents), the case alia, that the Interpleader case lacks of cause of action.
would come under the original jurisdiction of the Court of
JP denied the motion. Appeal was made with the CFI.
First Instance (Sec 44, pars. (a) and (b), Judiciary Act).
ISSUES:
FACTS:
a. WON the interpleader lacks a cause of action
Petitioner Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo, had been by herself
and predecessors-in-interest in peaceful, open and adverse b. Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to
possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, wherein a take cognizance of the Interpleader case.
commercial building stood.
HELD:
The other petitioners, Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana,
Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all Cause of Action.
surnamed Francisco, the said minors represented by their
mother Susana, had also been in possession in common Yes.
peaceful, open and adverse, of a parcel of public foreshore
The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective
land is adjoining that land occupied by de Camilo. There is
portion of the lands belonging to them on which the
also a commercial building here erected by the Franciscos.
respondents had erected their house after the fire which
Respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the destroyed petitioners' buildings. This being the case, the
apartments of said commercial building of Petra. contention of petitioners-appellants that the complaint to
interplead, lacked cause of action, is correct.
Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case
against both De Camilo and Ong Peng Kee with the Justice of Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides —
Peace (JP). Bannister was declared in default and P100.00
"Interpleader when proper . — Whenever conflicting claims
was awarded to De Camilo on her counterclaim.
upon the same subject-matter are or may be made against
The two commercial buildings were burned down. a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-
Thereafter, respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong, matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
constructed a building of their own. The building, however, disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
was so built that portions of the lands previously occupied by conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
petitioners (De Camilo and the Franciscos) were encroached litigate their several claims among themselves."
upon.
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The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment
the respondents. Their respective claim was separate in the said civil case.
and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the
respondents to vacate that portion of her property which It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
was encroached upon by them when they erected their too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
building. The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
They claimed possession of two different parcels of land, of where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
have any interest, in the subject-matter. Their interest was was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to
portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident the latter.
that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not
LONG DIGEST
exist.
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
Jurisdiction
of Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's
No. complaint of interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state
a cause of action and res judicata.
The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead,
practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP In its amended and supplemental complaint, the Wack Wack
court, because the action would then necessarily "involve the Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein" corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines,
over which the CFI has original jurisdiction (par. [b], sec. 44, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleged, for its
Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also, the subject-matter of first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of
jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila
pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par. [a], Judiciary Act), there and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial
having been no showing that rentals were asked by the no. 1478 issued by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court
petitioners from respondents. of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president
and the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank
BAR TYPE QUESTION: & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation;
that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand,
A owns a parcel of land with a commercial building with B as claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee
lessee. C and D also owns a parcel of land adjoining than of A. certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-
serial no. 1199 issued to him pursuant to an assignment
Fire burned both the commercial buildings. B, thereafter
made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the
erected his own building on the lands previously occupied by
original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201;
A, C and D.
that it has no means of determining who of the two
A, C, and D subsequently filed for forcible entry with respect defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without
to land belonging to them where B built his building. B filed power to issue two separate certificates for the same
an action for interpleader alleging A, C and D have conflicting membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another
interest over the parcel of land. membership fee certificate to the defendant Lee, without
violating its articles of incorporation and by-laws; and that
If you are the judge. How will you settle the case? (W.W.J.D.) the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by
the defendant Tan and the membership fee certificate 201-
• WACK-WACK GOLF V. LEE WON, L-23851, MARCH 26, serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee proceed from the
1976 VALDEZ same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the
name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz".
Doctrine:
For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership
The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk
had already been made independently liable in Civil Case No.
of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader
Corporation is null and void because it is issued in violation
of its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation
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of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate against double vexation in respect of one liability. The
duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under
that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is the Code of Civil Procedure, except that under the former the
not binding upon the defendant Tan. remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature
of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter
Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; of the controversy is personal property or relates to the
and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who performance of an obligation.
of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate
201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of There is no question that the subject matter of the present
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is
name of Lee. proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the
propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the facts and circumstances obtaining.
complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the
These motions were duly opposed by the Corporation. contending claimants to court. He need not await actual
Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to institution of independent suits against him before filing a
state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader
the complaint, with costs against the Corporation. within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without
waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But
erred (1) in finding that the allegations in its amended and where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
an action of interpleader, and in holding that "the principal
motive for the present action is to reopen the Manila Case Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view
and collaterally attack the decision of the said Court"; (2) in of all the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the
finding that the decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of
Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action; the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the
and (3) in dismissing its action instead of compelling the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the
appellees to interplead and litigate between themselves their present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the
respective claims. lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed
the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case
properly dismissed the complaint, because, having the effect 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final
of reopening civil case 26044, the present action is barred by judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has
res judicata. already been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to
invoke the remedy of interpleader.
Issue:
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
Ruling: him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
No. rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to
personal property in his possession, or an obligation to the latter.
render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to
either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it
the said personal property or who consider themselves did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044
entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be to compel the appellees herein to litigate between
required to litigate among themselves in order to determine themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only
finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the
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remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said
late, because to he entitled to this remedy the applicant must civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and
be able to show that lie has not been made independently because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final
liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed
already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or
interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. unreasonable delay.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to QUICK DIGEST
be in a position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must
be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has Facts:
not become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25
Lee Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at
Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8.
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a civil case, he
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too was issued such certificate. On the other hand, Bienvenido
late when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in Tan also claims ownership over such certificate pursuant to
favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially an assignment made by the alleged true owner of the same
true when the holder of the funds had notice of the certificate. Thus, Wack Wack filed a complaint to compel Won
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the Defendants filed their separate motion to dismiss the
suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure to state a
Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. cause of action and bar by prescription.Trial court dismissed
McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. the complaint.
11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16
Issue:
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the
Whether or not the interpleader suit will prosper.
adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final
judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of Ruling:
the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at
hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to No.
final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for
its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is
situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against
because it was filed much too late. him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially
where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to
the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility the latter.
that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable
judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because
take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full the Corporation had already been made independently liable
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
consequences of defeat interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because already established his rights to membership fee certificate
the Corporation had already been made independently liable 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this
in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
already established his rights to membership fee certificate possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said
201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and
interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final
anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
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inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or The reason for the interpleader action ceased when in Civil
unreasonable delay. Case No. 6202 the court directed (Z) METROCAN to pay (X)
LEYCON "whatever rentals due on the subject premises x x x."
• RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION V. While (Y) RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202,
METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 127913, could not be bound by the judgment therein, (Z) METROCAN
SEPTEMBER 13, 2001 VILLAGANAS is bound by the decision. When the decision in Civil Case No.
6202 became final and executory, (Z) METROCAN has no
PRINCIPLE:
other alternative left but to pay the rentals to (X) LEYCON.
A party who initiates an interpleader action may not be Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to (Z)
compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with Civil
reason for the interpleader action ceased. Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus, METROCAN moved for the
dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no
FACTS: longer interested but because there is no more need for it to
pursue such cause of action.
(X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was
secured by a real estate mortgage. Having failed to settle It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is
obligation, a foreclosure took place with (Y) RCBC as the afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
highest bidder. against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires,
as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon
(X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z) the same subject matter are or may be made against the
METROCAN, lessee of the property, docket as civil case no. plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in
6202. the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No.
(Z) METROCAN filed the interpleader action (Civil Case No.
6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of
4398-V-94) because it was unsure which between (X)
rentals was concerned.
LEYCON and (Y) RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of
monthly rentals on the subject property. (Y) LEYCON was (Y) Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by the
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property decision in Civil Case No. 6202. It is not a party thereto.
while (X) RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the However, it could not compel (Z) METROCAN to pursue Civil
consolidation of the title of the property in its name. Case No. 4398-V-94. (Y) RCBC has other avenues to prove its
claim. Is not bereft of other legal remedies. In fact, the issue
Thereafter, the court in civil case no. 6202 dismissed the
of ownership can very well be threshed out in Civil Case No.
complaint in view of an amicable settlement they entered
4037-V-93, the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial
and ordered (Z) METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever
Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by (X) LEYCON against
rentals due on the subject premises.
(Y) RCBC.
And so in this case, (Z) METROCAN moved for the dismissal
SHORT DIGEST:
of the interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because
there is no need to pursue such cause of action because it is (X) LEYCON contracted a loan from (Y) RCBC which was
already moot and academic. secured by a real estate mortgage. Failure to pay, it was
foreclosed with (Y) RCBC as the highest bidder.
(Y) RCBC on the other hand wants to prove his claim in the
interpleader action filed, thus, compelling (Z) METROCAN to (X) LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against (Z)
pursue the interpleader case. METROCAN, lessee of the property. The court dismissed the
action in view of an amicable settlement they entered and
ISSUE:
ordered (Z) METROCAN to pay (X) LEYCON whatever rentals
Whether or not a party who initiates an interpleader action due on the subject premises.
may be compelled to pursue the interpleader case when the
Prior to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case, (Z)
reason for the interpleader action ceased.
METROCAN filed the interpleader action because it was
RULING: unsure which between (X) LEYCON and (Y) RCBC was
entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the
NO. subject property.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the Despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously
following cases: refused to pay the stipulated rent. Because petitioners still
refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
xxxx private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to
collect; Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent
for the leased premises starting July until November 1992,
x x x x.
but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at internal squabble in respondent company as to the person
the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender authorized to receive payment.
of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents,
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for
Issue:
consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes Whether or not Interpleader is the proper remedy
not imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they made a when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to on the right to collect).
constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it
was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for Ruling:
want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule
that tender of payment must be accompanied by An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee
consignation in order that the effects of payment may be does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made
produced. due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: against double liability but to protect him against double
vexation in respect of one liability.
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners
be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in opted to refrain from making payments.
the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against VIII.H
the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
MAGLENTE V. HON. BALTAZAR-PADILLA, G.R. NO. 148182,
litigate their several claims among themselves.
MARCH 7, 2007 ESPARAGOZA
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper
VIII.H Determination.
when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals
should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the
on the right to collect) The remedy is afforded not to protect conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been
a person against double liability but to protect him against conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall
double vexation in respect of one liability. proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate
their several claims.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners
Doctrine:
opted to refrain from making payments.
A party is not automatically entitled to a writ of possession
Short Digest after being adjudged in the interpleader case as the proper
parties to buy a subject property; it is only when the right of
Facts: possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case
directly relating to either that writ of possession complements
the writ of execution.
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Facts: It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the
owners of the property. The execution of the "deed of sale" in
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a parcel of their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition
entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of of the property. Although the contract of sale between
the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained
stated that, if PRC were to sell the leased property, Maglente from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution
would be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had
it. Both parties likewise agreed that the lessee was yet to transfer to them at that time.
prohibited from subleasing any portion of the property
without the consent of the lessor. However, after the A writ of possession complements the writ of
execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente execution only when the right of possession or ownership has
subleased portions of the property to respondents. been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.
When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
written offer to sell the leased property to Maglente. PRC
received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a
purchase the same property. writ of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be
in conformity with the trial court's judgment in the
PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against interpleader case.
both petitioners and respondents so they could litigate
among themselves on who had the right to purchase the Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property
property. via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in
court against respondents to recover possession. While this
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared remedy can delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an
them as the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property. abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which justice.
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
IX.C
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued
by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract of • Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners. VILLAMANTE
As ordered, PRC executed a "deed of sale" in favor of
petitioners. The latter then filed a motion for the issuance of Basic Principle:
a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying
the property) objected on the ground that the trial court's The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
decision on the interpleader case merely resolved essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
petitioners' right to purchase the leased property but did not Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
declare them as the owners entitled to possession. The trial most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
court sustained respondents' argument and denied the Court would just consider them as petitions for
petitioners' motion. prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
Issue: and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after
being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper
Facts:
parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed
of sale" has already been executed in their favor.
This is a consolidated petition which assails the
Ruling: constitutionality of , Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
No. Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
The trial court's decision in the interpleader case merely
resolved the question of whom, between petitioners and Petitioners argue that the assailed law violates various
respondents had the right to purchase PRC's property. constitutional provisions which includes but not limited to
these grounds:
The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary
contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties,
nothing else. a. The right to life
b. The right to health,
c. The right to protection against hazardous
substances
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d. The right to religious freedom During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted
e. The right against involuntary servitude that they owned the subject property and presented
f. The right to due process documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
g. The right to family
h. The right to privacy
Issue: Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing petitioners’ Complaint on the ground of
Whether or not the petitions assailing the constitutionality of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No.
the RH Law partakes of a declaratory relief over which this 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
court has no Jurisdiction. as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the
RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed
Held: value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found
that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00;
No. hence, petitioners’ action to recover the same was outside
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most
of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. It
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action.
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real
for prohibition under Rule 65. actions where the assessed value of real property does not
exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject
• Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the
BRAGAT real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
C. Where to file (§1)
RULING:
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to
NO.
the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit: title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought
under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a
person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
possibility, an opportunity or an option.
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
"shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for
to or possession of real property where the assessed value
declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
does not exceed P20,000.00.
63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Principle: The Supreme Court has held that the special civil
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the
of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by even if only questions of law are involved.
Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
Facts: Petitioner conducted an investigation on the alleged
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil
scam on the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay
Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three
Development Corporation. The alleged anomaly was
remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
committed through the issuance of checks which were
they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
subsequently deposited in several financial institutions.
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
Petitioner issued an Order directing private respondent
judgment into effect.
Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines branch at Julia Vargas Avenue, Pasig City, to
produce several bank documents for inspection relative to
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions the accounts reportedly maintained in the said bank. Private
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of respondent failed to comply with petitioners order.
the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with Petitioner reminded private respondent that her acts
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constitute disobedience or resistance to a lawful order and is judicial determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that
punishable as indirect contempt and might also constitute petitioner has threatened private respondent with indirect
willful obstruction of the lawful exercise of the functions of contempt and obstruction charges should the latter not
the Ombudsman. Instead of complying with the order of comply with its order.
petitioner, private respondent filed a petition for declaratory
relief with an application for temporary restraining order 2. Before an in camerainspection of bank accounts may be
and/or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
Court of Makati City, Branch 135, presided by respondent competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
Judge Francisco Ibay. Public respondent issued an order identified, and the inspection limited to the subject matter of
declaring that it has jurisdiction over the case since it is an the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified
Court. to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case
Issue: whether or not public respondent acted without (Marquez vs. Desierto).
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the cited petition for declaratory relief. SC ruling: In the present case, since there is no pending
litigation yet before a court of competent authority, but only
Ruling: No. an investigation by the Ombudsman on the so-called scam,
any order for the opening of the bank account for inspection
The Supreme Court has held that the special civil action of is clearly premature and legally unjustified.
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. It is not among the actions within the • DELA LLANA V. ALBA, L-57883, MARCH 12, 1982 GIME
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only
questions of law are involved. FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed an erroneously entitled Petition for
In this case, the public respondent has jurisdiction to take Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition in the supreme
court seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
said that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which
doing so. mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
Other principles: the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established
by such act, would be considered separated from the
1. The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
has been ignored and disregarded.
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; ISSUE:
Does the supreme court have the jurisdiction to decide on
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the the Declaratory Relief ?
controversy; and
RULING:
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. No, according to the opinion of justice aquino "The petition
should have been dismissed outright because this Court has
SC ruling: In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is
the power of petitioner to examine bank accounts under not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law.
Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under the petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is
involved."
Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to
deposits of whatever nature. The interests of the parties are Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They
adverse considering the antagonistic assertion of a legal right have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the said
on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine law even as taxpayers.The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la
bank deposits, and on the other, the denial thereof Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for
apparently by private respondent who refused to allow declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229,
which called for a referendum. De la Llana his Comelec, 80
petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The
SCRA 525), has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not
party seeking relief, private respondent herein, asserts a being removed from his position.
legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked is ripe for
In the case at bar, the petition will be dismissed because a During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition should died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with
be files in the RTCs. petitioners. Petitioners then advised respondent that they
IX.D shall assess and collect VAT on its monthly rentals.
• ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING, G.R. NO. 150806, Respondent, however, contended that VAT may not be
JANUARY 28, 2008 ALTERADO imposed, as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were
DOCTRINE: As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief supposed to include the VAT therein. Subsequently,
should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate petitioners informed respondent that its monthly rental shall
action for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial be increased by 73% pursuant to their contract (SEVENTH
court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case clause) and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent
during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, opposed to such increase contending that there was no
the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article
initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the 1250.
resolution of the action for declaratory relief
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a amount set forth in their contract. Respondent then
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.
are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in In turn, petitioners filed an action for ejectment, rescission
question; and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.
the ripening seeds of one between persons whose Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory
interests are adverse; relief case for being an improper remedy considering that
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that
and the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of
6) adequate relief is not available through other means the parties.
or other forms of action or proceeding.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent denying to the
FACTS: petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of
Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. (respondents), as lessee, paying the VAT. The court, likewise, denied their right to
renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no
A contract of lease entered was entered into by P (Ponciano Issue: won the plaintiff is entitled for declaratory relief
Almeda) and B (Bathala). In the said contract, P agreed to
The present case does not come within the purview of the Plaintiff Hilario Tolentino is a certified public accountant.
law authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither Respondents, the Board of Accountancy is an administrative
concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, body created by law and vested with the power and authority
nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or to regulate and supervise the practice of the profession of
validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any accountancy in the Philippines, and that the defendants
justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann are foreigners,
inheritance which Plaintiff desires to assert against the the former being a British subject and the latter a Swiss
Defendants as basis of the relief he is seeking for have not yet subject, both admitted to the practice of accountancy in the
accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father Emigdio Philippines.
Edades has not yet died. In fact, he is one of the herein
Defendants. And the law is clear that “the rights to the An action for declaratory relief was filed by Plaintiff in the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of CFI of Manila for the purpose of testing the Constitutionality
the decedent” (Article 777, new Civil Code). Up to that of Section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 3105 otherwise
moment, the right to succession is merely speculative for, in known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by
the meantime, the law may change, the will of the testator Commonwealth Act 3105 on the ground that it is a class
may vary, or the circumstances may be modified to such an legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in
extent that he who expects to receive property may be other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring or
deprived of it. Indeed, the moment of death is the using a trade name in connection with the practice of such
determining point when an heir acquires a definite right to callings or professions. The action is addressed against the
the inheritance (5 Manresa, 5th ed., 324). This action Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans
therefore cannot be maintained if considered strictly as one Hausamann and notice thereof has been served on the
for declaratory relief. Solicitor General under section 4 of rule 66 of the Rules of
Court; but the Board of Accountancy did not answer the
complaint, nor has the Solicitor General intervened. Only
Bar question Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and answered through
counsel.
X an illegitimate child filed an action for declaratory relief
against his father, seeking recognition of his right to inherit The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and
to the estate of the latter. the Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is
constitutional. From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this
May the court validly issue the same Based on the said
Court.
ground?
ISSUE:
No,present case does not come within the purview of the law
authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it neither Whether or not the plaintiff has established the requisite
concerns a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, facts to entitle him to an action for declaratory relief.
nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or
validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any RULING:
justiciable controversy for admittedly the alleged rights of
NO.
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The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action PRINCIPLES:
for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be
predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) 1. Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to judgments or
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) judicial functions. The rule does NOT apply to interlocutory
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe functions or to its administrative orders.
for judicial determination. These requisite facts are wanting
2. As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC
and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient
is not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.
cause of action.
But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically,
Justiciability; its requisites. — Except that accomplished with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
physical wrong need not be alleged in a petition for jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may
declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all the seek redress from the SC via a special civil action for
usual conditions of an ordinary action. There must be (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
real parties in interest (2) asserting adverse claims and (3)
FACTS:
presenting a ripe issue. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
summarized its exhaustive opinion on the requisites of Petitioner Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by saying that of Canvassers as the winning candidate for the position of
the court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. over his
ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are adversary, private respondent Salacop.
sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought
will be a practical help in ending the controversy." Justice Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to
Brandeis thought that "the fact that the plaintiff's desires are annul the elections and the proclamation of candidates
thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others does alleging that there was a massive substitution of voters,
not confer a cause of action." But the doubt becomes a rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in
justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of several precincts.
right which is actually contested.
Petitioner alleged that the grounds relied upon by private
SHORT DIGEST: respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in
a pre-proclamation controversy.
Mr. CPA is a certified public accountant. He filed an action for
declaratory relief against the Board of Accountancy (BOA), The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and
Mr. Fergie and Mr.Haus, foreigners who are practicing issued an order directing the Election Officer to bring to and
accountant in the country. The purpose of the action is to test produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original
the constitutionality of Section 16 of Commonealth Act No. VRRs of the questioned precincts for technical examination.
3105 known as the Accountancy Law on the ground that it is
a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons In the same order, the COMELEC characterized the petition as
engaged in other callings or professions from adopting, one for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure
acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the of election in the municipality and concluded that there was
practice of such callings or professions. Notices were served convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the
upon the respondents but the BOA did not answer, nor has elections.
the solicitor general intervened. Only Mr.Fergie and Mr. Haus
Petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil action
appeared and answered through counsel.
for certiorari under Rule 65 praying for the reversal of the
The case was submitted on judgment on the pleadings and order of the COMELEC EN BANC.
the Court dismissed it holding that the disputed law is
ISSUE:
constitutional. From that decision, plaintiff appealed to this
Court. 1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to SC under Rule 65
is in order.
X.A
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
• MACABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 152163, 18
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
NOVEMBER 2002 CHUA
taking cognizance of the petition of private respondent and
in issuing the assailed Order.
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HELD: The Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a
1. Yes. Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being
made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to
matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and
its administrative orders.
consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the
In this case, the assailed order of the COMELEC declaring members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the
private respondents petition to be one for annulment of the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can
elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in the directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is
municipality and ordering the production of the original not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the
copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.
administrative in nature. Rule 64, a procedural device for the
Facts:
review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the
Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur where
issued in the exercise of its administrative function. petitioner Cagas was proclaimed winner during the May
2010 automated national and local elections. Bautista filed
2. Yes.
an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities,
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is vote-buying and violations of election laws. The protest was
not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. But raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with
Petitioner averred as his special defense that Bautista did not
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista
jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may
did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for
omissions complained of. The COMELEC denied its
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
affirmative defenses and its subsequent motion for
The grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition reconsideration. COMELEC held that petitioner’s prayer to
before the COMELEC are those for a regular election protest elevate the Motion for reconsideration to the Commission en
and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; nor is banc is merely interlocutory and does not dispose of the
such petition one for annulment of the elections or for a instant case with finality.
declaration of failure of elections. The COMELEC should have
Not satisfied, petitioner commenced the special civil action
ordered the dismissal of the petition instead of issuing the
directly to SC arguing that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC
assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse
Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form
issuing the same. The error is correctible by the special civil
and content; and that the insufficiency in substance arose
action for certiorari.
from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how
• CAGAS V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 194139, 24 JANUARY 2012 the various irregularities and anomalies had affected the
CUEVAS results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested
precincts were pre-shaded bogus-ballots used; (c) identify
Principle: the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to
accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d)
GR: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a allege with particularity how many additional votes Bautista
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an stood to receive for each of the grounds he protested. He
election protest may not directly assail the order in the SC concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to discretion in allowing the protest of Bautista despite its
seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal insufficiency.
of the decision of the Division in due course.
Issue:
Exception:
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be To emphasize, the Auditor noted that “nowhere in the
faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented with REMAD.” It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-
before the COA was insufficient to prove their case. So also, judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded
even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
of petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the
this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for specific matters under their jurisdiction.
their claims.
If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
Short Digest: should have produced the document to prove such fact as
alleged by them in the present petition. However, as stated
FACTS:
before, even this Court is at a loss as to whether the
Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are prepayment scheme was authorized as a review of the
Senior Field Operations Specialist and Loans and Credit document (CATTLE
Analyst II, respectively, of the Land Bank’s branch in Ipil
BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to
which received loan applications from four farmers’
which petitioners base their authority to make advance
cooperatives under the bank’s cattle financing program.
payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision.
Consequently, after approval of the loan applications, the Ipil
Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated
Branch issued to Remad Livestock Corporation (Remad)
the procedure in releasing loans found in the Manual on
advance payment for the cattle to be released. But, because of
Lending Operations which provides that payments to the
foot-and-mouth disease that broke out among its herds,
dealer shall only be made after presentation of
Remad failed to make the deliveries when they fell due.
reimbursement documents acknowledged by the authorized
During a post audit, the Land Bank resident auditor, Belen LBP representative that the same has been delivered.
Oranu-Lu, disallowed the advance payment in view of non-
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be
delivery of the cattle. She pointed out that the Ipil Branch
faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission
paid for the cattle in advance in violation of the Land Bank
of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented
Manual on Field Office Group (FOG) Lending Operations and
before the COA was insufficient to prove their case. So also,
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations.
even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity
The bank branch’s resident auditor held Reyna and Soria, of petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before
together with four other employees of the Ipil Branch, this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for
personally liable for the disallowed advances. This led to the their claims.
filing of a criminal complaint against the bank officers and
X.B
employees with the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
negligence, violation of reasonable office rules and • IBRAHIM V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192289, 8 JANUARY
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the bank, 2013 LAMBAN
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PRINCIPLE: HELD:
-COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed December 22, In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated
2009 Resolution: December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with
finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and
a. disqualifying the foregoing candidates for not being
the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by
registered voters of the respective municipalities where they
way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the
seek to be elected without prejudice to their filing of an
issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in
opposition within two (2) days from publication hereof; and
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
b. Filing of election offense cases against said candidates for appreciation of the election returns or to the composition
violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus and proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant
Election Code. Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend
Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue
-Ibrahim and 50 candidates filed their Petition/Opposition the assailed resolutions which can be assailed via certiorari.
but was denied anchored on the certification which was
issued in the performance of official duty, hence, the ADDITIONAL INFO:(DILI NA NI PROVREM)
presumption of regularity attached to it in the absence of
WON THE RESOLUTION AND SUSPENSION IS VALID.
contrary evidence. Ibrahim and company failed to adduce
evidence proving their allegations of registration and HELD:
residence.
Negative.
-In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the
Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay; However, the Municipal certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve
Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation on the basis of the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC
Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so
in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated
- the instant Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the
banc to issue the assailed resolutions. barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut
the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action
ISSUE:
by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
WON certiorari is the proper action in questioning the
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein
authority of:
assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even
a. MBOC in suspending wining candidate's proclamation and when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let
it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections,
b. COMELEC to issue resolution disqualifyig a candidate. a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
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candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by
petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim Supreme Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule
considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of 45, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64
Datu Unsay disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an
act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of
Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,19 is clear on
had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave this:
abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter,
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
which by both constitutional prescription and
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of
on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
its divisions.
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
The MBOC has no authority to suspend Ibrahim’s hereinafter provided.
proclamation especially since the herein assailed resolutions,
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a
upon which the suspension was anchored, were issued by
special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 is the
the COMELEC en banc outside the ambit of its jurisdiction.
difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible
Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that: scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by restricting the review of
judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil
(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined action for certiorari, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such
in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
are limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of
function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA
the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each cannot be reviewed—even by Supreme Court.
candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them,
and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. x x LONG DIGEST:
x.42 (Italics ours)
Facts:
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting while
assailing the Decision of the Commission on Audit (COA),
all other questions are to be tried before the court or other
which denied the petitioner’s claim for additional retirement
tribunal for contesting elections or in quo warranto
benefit.
proceedings.43
Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy born on
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended
May 22, 1944. Prior to entering military service, he rendered
Ibrahim’s proclamation when the issue of the latter’s
civilian government service as a Barrio Development Worker
eligibility is a matter which the board has no authority to
at the Department of the Interior and Local Government
resolve. Further, under Section 644 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC
(DILG) from 6 January 1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered
and not the MBOC has the authority to order the suspension
military service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine
of a winning candidates’s proclamation. Such suspension can
Navy and was called to active duty effective August 26, 1974.
only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or
intervenor relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition On 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially
to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian
pending before the COMELEC, and only when the evidence of government service at the DILG with his length of active
the winning candidate’s guilt is strong. Besides, the service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential
COMELEC en banc itself could not have properly ordered Decree (PD) No. 1638,9 as amended by PD No. 1650 which
Ibrahim’s disqualification because in taking cognizance of the provides:
matter, it had already exceeded its jurisdiction.
Section 3. For purposes of this Decree active service of a
• REBLORA V. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. military person shall mean active service rendered by him as a
NO. 195842, 18 JUNE 2013 CABUENAS commissioned officer, enlisted man, cadet, probationary
officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the
Principle(s):
Philippines and service rendered by him as a civilian official or
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employee in the Philippine government prior to the date of his as compulsorily retired on 22 May 2000 and not on 22 May
separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the 2003.
Philippines, for which military and/or civilian service he shall
have received pay from the Philippine Government and/or The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has
such others as may hereafter be prescribed by law as active already reached the age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-
service; Provided, That for purposes of retirement, he shall one (31) years in active service, inclusive of his four years in
have rendered at least ten (10) years of active service as an the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for compulsory
officer or enlisted man in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended.
and Provided further, That no period of such civilian Verily, the COA found that, applying the provisions of PD No.
government service longer than his active military service 1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually underpaid but
shall be credited for purposes of retirement. was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount of
P77,807.16.
On 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34)
years of active service, the petitioner was compulsorily The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
retired from the military. He was, at that time, already ranked COA remained steadfast on their resolution. Aggrieved,
as a Commander in the Philippine Navy. Petitioner chose to petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA
avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to via the present Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.
receive in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to
ISSUE:
three (3) years worth thereof for the first three years after
his retirement. 1. WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by
Supreme Court via Rule 45.
After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the
from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of
requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless
claimed additional retirement benefit. The COA rendered a tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of
Decision denying petitioner’s claim. COA agreed with the judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed by
petitioner that his civilian service at the DILG should and Supreme Court.
ought to be included as part of his active service in the
military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits 2. The Court finds that the computation of COA is the
under PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should one that is supported by PD No. 1638. Sections 5 and
be included as part of his active service in the military, the 7 of PD No. 1638, as amended, identifies the
COA opined that petitioner should also have been considered instances of compulsory retirement in the military
service:
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Section 5 (a). Upon attaining fifty-six (56) years of age or upon special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
accumulation of thirty (30) years of satisfactory active service, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
whichever is later, an officer or enlisted man shall be
compulsorily retired; Provided, That such officer or enlisted- Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
man who shall have attained fifty-six (56) years of age with at resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
least twenty (20) years of active service shall be allowed to on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
complete thirty (30) years of service but not beyond his Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
sixtieth (60th) birthday; xxxx hereinafter provided.
This Court discerns that the COA was correct in holding that • SAHALI V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 201796, 15 JANUARY
petitioner should be considered as compulsorily retired on 2013 SURRALTA
May 2000 for purposes of computing his retirement benefits
Doctrine: (1) "A party agrieved by an interlocutory order
under the same law. COA correctly held that for purposes of
issued by a division of the Comelec in an election protest may
computing his retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as
not directly assail the order to the Court through a special
amended, petitioner should have been considered
civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of
compulsorily retired as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of
the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of
the same law.20 This is so because it was on 22 May 2000
the Division in due course; (2) The power of the Court to
that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56) after a total of
review election cases falling within the original eclusive
thirty-one (31) years in active service—fulfilling thereby the
jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends to final decisions or
conditions for compulsory retirement under the said
resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, not to interlocutory
section.21 In coming up with such a conclusion, COA most
order issued by a Division thereof."
certainly reckoned the beginning of petitioner’s active
service in the military from his stint as civilian worker at the FACTS:
DILG.
Petitioner Sahali and private respondent Matba were
The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at candidates for governor in the province of Tawi-Tawi in the
the DILG in the computation of his length of active service in 2010 Automated Elections. The provincial board of
the military, on the other hand, is only but proper in light of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
Section 3 of PD No. 1638, as amended. governor of the province. Alleging that said elections in the
province were attended by massive and wide scale
SHORT DIGEST:
irregularities, private respondent filed an election protest
Facts: with the Comelec and moved for a technical examination of
the Election Day Computer's Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters
X, a retired Philippine Navy, questioned the judgment or Registration Records (VRR), and the Book of Voters for the
decision made by COA with regards to his retirement benefit contested precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by
computation. Instead of 34 years length of service as X’s comparing the signatures and the thumbmarks appearing on
alleged, COA discern that X has only 31 years length of active the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and Book
service reckoned at the beginning of petitioner’s active of Voters.
service in the military from his stint as civilian worker at the
DILG. The comelec first division issued an order which granted the
motion and thus directed its Election Records and Statistics
X filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to Department to conduct the said technical examination. The
question said decision of COA. petitioner filed with the Comelec first division a Motion for
Reconsideration of said order granting the technical
Issue: examination. However, the Comelec First division issued an
order (interlocutory) denying the motion for
WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme
reconsideration.
Court via Rule 45.
Aggrieved by such order, petitioner went directly to the
Held:
Supreme Court via certiorari assailing the interlocutory
The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it order issued by the Comelec first division.
being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the
Is petitioner correct in resorting to the extraordinary remedy
COA are reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an appeal by
of certiorari to question an interlocutory order issued by the
certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a
Comelec first division?
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Answer: Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election
NO. contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications,
and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.
division of the Comelec in an election protest may not
directly assail the order to the Court through a special civil Facts:
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the March 26, 2007 - Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Division in due course. Certificate of Candidacy for a position of a Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental.
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within
the original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends April 4, and April 11, 2007 - Napoleon Camero and Renald F.
to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, Villando, respectively, registered voters of filed the petition
not to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof. for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the
citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of
BAR EXAM QUESTION Representatives, claiming that when Limkaichong was born,
her parents are Chinese Citizens as the proceedings for the
Jun Lacobo, a defeated candidate in the 2010 governatorial
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
elections for the Province of Bundok Tralala, filed with the
finality due to procedural and substantial defects. The Office
COMELEC an election protest against the duly elected
of the Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all
governor, Elsie Lacsa, and moved for recounting of election
the stages of the proceedings therein, as required under
returns. The Comelec first division issued an order granting
Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization
the motion and directed its concern officers to conduct the
Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional
recount. Elsie Lacsa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Provisions for Naturalization. The OSG, being the counsel for
order granting recount to which the Comelec first division
the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so
denied.
that it could be bound by what has transpired therein.
Can she assail the interlocutory order issued by a division of Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the
the Comelec directly to the Supreme Court via certiorari? same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights
could arise therefrom.
Answer:
LImkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since
No. she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-
born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such
A party agrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her
division of the Comelec in an election protest may not birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already
directly assail the order to the Court through a special civil passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Naturalization on the same day.
Division in due course.
May 14, 2007 – The National and Local Elections were
The power of the Court to review election cases falling within conducted and the disqualification case remained pending
the original eclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec only extends
to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC EN BANC, After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said
not to interlocutory order issued by a Division thereof. elections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner with Olivia
Paras as the second.
Optional Readings:
May 15, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, G.R. NOS. 178831-32/G.R. Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the
NO. 179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R. NOS. 179240-41, Proclamation of Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the
APRIL 1, 2009 CANETE First District of Negros Oriental
Principle: May 17, 2007 - COMELEC Second Division granted the
petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the First
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial
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Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her name from the review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of issued by a division or en banc.
Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation as winning
candidate, if any, until this decision has become final. July 3, 2007 - Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases
against her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification
Evening of the same day, the Provincial Board of Canvassers and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance
received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second with Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Division and suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.
Despite Limkaichong's repeated pleas for the resolution of
May 18, 2007 - COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. her manifestation and motion for clarification, the COMELEC
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the did not resolve the same.
proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the August 1, 2007 - filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
cases. Civil Procedure praying for the annulment of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and
May 20, 2007 – Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of May 17, disqualification cases for having been issued with grave
2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She
Proclamation averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25,
2007 as Representative of the First District of Negros
May 22, 2007 - Limkaichong filed another motion for the Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had
lifting of the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting started to perform her duties and functions as such, the
that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET
congressional race pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. which has jurisdiction over any issue involving her
8062 qualifications for the said office.
May 25, 2007- the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC August 16, 2007 - the COMELEC En Banc ruled on
Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed Limkaichong's manifestation and motion for clarification and
Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of resolves that all pending incidents relating to the
Representatives for the First District of Negros Oriental qualifications of Limkaichong as Member of the House of
Representatives should now be determined by the HRET.
May 30, 2007 - Paras filed with the COMELEC Fist Divisiona
Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn ISSUE:
Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros
Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of WON a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
the COMELEC Second Division but was dismissed Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final Limkaichong proper
when Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her
proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested HELD:
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the cases.
YES
Paras moved for a reconsideration.
The petitioner’s proclamation was valid. When she timely
June 29, 2007 – COMELEC en banc , on 3:3 vote , denied filed her motion for reconsideration and lifting the order
Limkaichong's motion for reconsideration of the Joint suspending her proclamation on May 20, 2007, it effectively
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in the suspends the execution of the May 17, 2007 Resolution of the
disqualification cases which reads: COMELEC Second Division, Thus, there is no impediment to
proclaim her as the winner.
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the
Commission has jurisdiction to rule on Respondent Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Limkaichong's Motion for Reconsideration provides:
notwithstanding her proclamation as it is only this
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. ' A
Commission, and not the House of Representatives
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has jurisdiction to
a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule (actually, one of the actions i.e. certiorari, prohibition and
19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution mandamus, was filled by Limkaichong herself assailing
has not yet attained finality for it to be implemented. COMELEC’s jurisdiction)
Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the The petitioners (in one of the cases) argue that the issue
COMELEC En Banc dated June 29, 2007 has since been concerning Limkaichong’s disqualification is still within the
remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc to resolve
16, 2007, recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction over because when Limkaichong was proclaimed the matter was
the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of still pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of
the House of Representatives. Issue:
• LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC, RESOLUTION, G.R. NOS. Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET,
178831-32/G.R. NO. 179120/G.R. NOS. 179132-33/G.R. instead of the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the
NOS. 179240-41, JULY 30, 2009 PAGAPONG disqualification cases.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his The Court has invariably held that once a winning
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's
and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation
does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
Long digest: proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
Facts:
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
(These are consolidated cases) decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
Limkaichong filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the and qualifications.
position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Time to File Petition: - September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Rule 64, Sec. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be
filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his
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petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his RULING: Yes.
Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing
was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that
working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this
The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule
Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
petition, arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause except
number of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The fresh as hereinafter provided.
period refers to the original period provided under the Rules
of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for Rule 64, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it
reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules
period for the preparation and filing of the motion for for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
reconsideration. most patent difference between the two i.e., the exception
that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which
He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the provides for a special period for the filing of petitions
prevailing rule in filing petitions for certiorari. This Court, he for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997 COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of
Rules of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule
provided for the filing of petitions within the remainder of 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the
the original period, the remainder being the original period filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from
less the days used up in preparing and filing a motion for the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh
reconsideration. He then points out that on September 1, period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
2000 or only three years after, this Court promulgated A.M.
No. 00-02-03-SC bringing back the fresh period rule. General Rule is strict compliance of the rules.
- September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a The COA denied Osmeas motion via a Resolution
dated June 8, 2009.1[13] The Office of the Mayor of Cebu
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the
City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June
petition). 29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmea left for the United
States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery in
- September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the April 2009 and returned to his office only on July 15, 2009.
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008 Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmea filed the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition COAs Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009.
for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the Issue:
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his
petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his Whether the Petition of Mayor Tom was timely based on Rule
64 in the rules of Court?
Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing
was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first Ruling:
working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his
petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, YES.
our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.
Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at
Petitioner argued that under Rule 65, it should be the fresh least be accompanied by an explanation of why the
period rule of 60 days that is to be applied for the filing of party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a
petition for certiorari. justification for the requested liberal construction.
Where strong considerations of substantive justice are
Respondent to the contrary also argued that it should be 30 manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its
days from the notice of decision or ruling of the COMELEC
legal jurisdiction.
that must be applied for the filing of petitioner for certiorari.
Hence, resolution of dismissal is correct because of In the foregoing case, The High Court find
petitioner’s late filing. Osmena’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the
Rules. Although the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of
Rule on the motion. (99.9%) the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the
notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City, we
• Osmena v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818, 31 consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as
May 2011 SITOY the effective date when he was actually notified of the
resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If
| City of Cebu hosted the Palarong Pambansa, as part we were to rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmea
of the preparation, renovation of Cebu City Sports Complex is of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the
necessary and contracted WT Construction and DAcay merits of his case.
Construction. City Council of Cebu made an ordinance for
allocation of funds for the renovoation. However, as Mayor
Tomas sees it necessary, the latter issued an Change/extra Bar Question:
work to the contractor but such was not covered by the
supplemental budget. When the contractor claimed the X (Mayor) was adjudged by COA to be personally
amount of payment, the City did not pay because it was not liable in erroneously disbusing funds of the City. X
in the supplemental budget. Hence, 2 Contractors sued received the copy of decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen
Mayor Tom and the City Council at the RTC. The RTC ruled in days after or on June 10, 2008, X filed a motion for
favor of the contractors and during appeal it was affirmed. reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.
During the execution of judgment the City Auditor The COA denied X motion via a Resolution dated
issued two notices containing that the City is not liable to pay June 8, 2009.2 The Office of the Mayor X received the June 8,
the judgment award but Mayor and Sangunian Members are 2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before,
personally liable. The decision of the City Auditor was however, X left for the United States of America for his check-
affirmed by the Regional Director of COA and the national up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his
office of COA.
1
2
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office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
2009 that X filed the present petition for certiorari under funds from the General Appropriation Act (GAA).
Rule 64 to assail the COAs Decision of May 6, 2008 and Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriation made by
Resolution of June 8, 2009.
Congress in the GAA.
Note: Apply the issue above and the ruling
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an expose’ claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
XI.A.1 • ARAULLO V. AQUINO, G.R NO. 209287, 1 JULY incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
2014 10/13 AMORES SEE XI. B Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
PRINCIPLES request of the Senators.
Certiorari - The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were
jurisdiction. also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
Prohibition – A preventive remedy issued to restrain future
National Liberation Front), Php700M for the Quezon
action, and is directed to the court itself.
Province, Php50 – 100M for certain Senators each, Php10B
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate for Relocation Projects, etc.
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
officials.
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme
Doctrine of Operative Fact – recognizes the legal effect of an Court questioning the validity of DAP. Among their
act prior to it being declared unconstitutional by the contentions was:
Supreme Court
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
LONG DIGEST constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
FACTS: appropriation made by law”.
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus provisions thereof), Sec. 25 (5), Art VI of the Constitution
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
Program (DAP). expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
In the common law, from which the remedy of A petition for prohibition is also not the proper
certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
to determine from an inspection of the record whether the further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
inferior court’s judgment was rendered without authority. excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
acted without authority, the record was then revised and ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to
quasi-judicial acts. afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior
judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the
court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary
power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by
course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where
laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court
the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’
in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to
remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action
an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Court compelling provides the requirements for the purpose,
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
viz:
“respondents are performing or threatening to perform
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
discretion must be grave, which means either that the
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
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review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment
executive officials. in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1,
to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or unconstitutional. It is true that the President
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all (and even the heads of the other branches of the
precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge government) are allowed by the Constitution to
was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The make realignment of funds, however, such
Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary transfer or realignment should only be made
implication with both the duty and the obligation of “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-
determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed border transfers/augmentations may be
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
with the Republican system of checks and balances. because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the
OTHER ISSUES Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
I. WON the DAP violates the principle “no money shall Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
Constitution). within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
II. WON the DAP realignments can be considered as
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
impoundments by the executive.
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because
III. WON the DAP realignments/transfers are they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
constitutional. such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
IV. WON the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the On the issue of what are “savings” these DAP transfers are
DAP is constitutional. not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
V. WON the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable. savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
HELD: finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
I. No, the DAP did not violate Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the
appropriation. It is a program for
end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
prioritizing government spending. As such, it
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
in Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution. In DAP no
particularly by the DBM.
additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot
law would have been required. Funds which be used as money source for the DAP because
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were under the law, such funds may only be used if
merely being realigned via the DAP. there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the
collections have exceeded the revenue targets.
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
In this case, no such certification was secured
President’s power to refuse to spend
before unprogrammed funds were used.
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
unless there will be an unmanageable national being declared as unconstitutional by the
government budget deficit (which did not Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
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definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
then it may cause more harm than good. The board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
return what they received especially so that they quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Although
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
to the authors, implementers, and proponents of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is
they have not acted in good faith. directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and
not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventive
QUICK DIGEST remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to
the court itself. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS:
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
When President Benigno Aquino III took office the then to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad came up with a executive officials.
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
XI. B. Distinguished from each other
(DAP) to speed up the funding of government projects.
However, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made ARAULLO, id
an expose’ claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
Corona which was taken from the DAP. It turns out that the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive but this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
some non-Executive projects were also funded. This warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
the validity of DAP. respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
ISSUE: contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
WON certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
jurisdiction.
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances Prohibition is an extraordinary writ against any tribunal,
allegedly implementing the DAP. corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said
HELD:
entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies. The said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
are governed by Rule 65. The sole office of the writ of not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
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clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void
which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief judgment.
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly Facts:
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact Rules of Court assails the May 29, 2001 decision of the Court
that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed the
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises,
cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the Inc. for lack of merit.
court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing
Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land
to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.
situated in Tagaytay City by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid
The writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct Builders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to award
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, instead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioners claim
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi- was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of the
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo properties to Solid Builders, Inc. After the rejection of
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting petitioners bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or whose services were engaged by petitioner for its
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Tagaytay properties, obtained a legal opinion from the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)xxx
• TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES, INC V. PNB-REPUBLIC BANK,
G.R. NO. 151007, JULY 17, 2006 RAVENS During the pre-trial conference, petitioner marked the
December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit C and
LONG DIGEST offered the matter of its existence for stipulation between the
parties. Respondents admitted the existence of the opinion
Principles: but manifested their disagreement with its contents.
Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify.
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial When Roques testimony was offered specifically with respect
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or to the legal opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any objected to its admission for being violative of the rule on
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and PNB-
issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower Republic Bank. The trial court sustained the objection.
court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in refusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order
contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its dated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed the
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony
passion or personal hostility. referring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. The
prohibition was based on the ground that the testimony was
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate in violation of the rule on privileged communication between
remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.
tribunal has issued an order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.xxx with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial
body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors Issue:
of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of
this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
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disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of Whether or not Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
Roques testimony. trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of
Ruling: NO Roques testimony.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of Ruling: NO
the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and
the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court
corrected only by appeal. The determination made by the disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of
trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court.
perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction.
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on error in judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari.
admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a XI.A.2 • DAVID V. RIVERA, G.R. NOS. 139913 & 140159,
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be JANUARY 16, 2004 CORTES
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken
Principle: It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper
from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
the case.
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in
grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court. the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. obtained.
Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an
Facts: Claiming to be the owner of an eighteen thousand
error in judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari.
(18,000)- square meter portion (hereafter, "subject land") of
SHORT DIGEST Lot No. 38-B,1 a five (5)-hectare lot situated at MacArthur
Highway, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, herein respondent
Facts: Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint 2 for
"Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract, Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" before the
mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against Leverage Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando,
& Services Group, Inc. and respondents PNB-Republic Bank Pampanga against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino and
and Solid Builders, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Consolacion David. The respondent averred that the
Pasig City, Branch 153. It was docketed as Civil Case No. petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of
64941. making him vacate the subject land although it had already
been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court a quos
petitioners as "disturbance compensation", in consideration
refusal to admit its evidence but it was denied in an order
of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over the original
dated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed the
eighteen (18)-hectare farmholding.
presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony
referring to the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. The For their part, the petitioners filed a Complaint for ejectment
prohibition was based on the ground that the testimony was before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat
in violation of the rule on privileged communication between and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the respondent
attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank. was occupying the subject land without paying rentals
therefor. The petitioners also averred that they need the
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
subject land for their personal use but the respondent
with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.
dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered its Decision
ordering the respondent to vacate the subject land. The court
Issue:
found that there was a dearth of evidence supportive of the
ISSUES: 1. WON there was usurpation or erroneous g) Those cases previously falling under the original and
assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC? exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946,
2. WON Petition for Prohibition was a proper remedy? except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree
No. 815.
RULING:
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints
1. YES. There was erroneous assumption of or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29,
jurisdiction by the MCTC since jurisdiction is 1987.
expressly vested DAR.
As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the
prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous DARAB.
assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. Indeed, the
propriety of the recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition 2. YES. Petition for prohibition was the proper remedy
is beyond cavil in view of the following considerations:
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, where two jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the
tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special
same subject matter, issue, and parties, and ultimately civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition
rendered conflicting decisions, clearly makes out a case for is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
prohibition. The MCTC manifestly took cognizance of the jurisdiction or power by an inferior court or when, in the
case for ejectment pursuant to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its
Blg.129, as amended. On the other hand, the ratiocination of cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
the DARAB, which the respondent echoes, is that the case prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
falls squarely within its jurisdiction as it arose out of, or was remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such
connected with, agrarian relations. The respondent also relief can be obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is
points out that his right to possess the land, as a registered to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
tenant, was submitted for determination before the PARAB order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
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channels. While appeal is the recognized remedy to question • ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 137237,
the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 TIU
the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition
to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from In certiorari, the grave abuse of discretion must be
proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided established.
the case without jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is
A writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. As an
remedy by appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate.
extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to
QUICK DIGEST: when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law
are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only
Facts: Agustin Rivera(claiming to be the owner of an 18,000 where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford
SQM which is part of Lot No. 38-B, a 5 hectar lot) filed a redress.
Complaint for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction" Mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
before PARAB against petitioners heirs of Spouses David. The when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief
respondent averred that the petitioners have been harassing use and not a discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial
him for the purpose of making him vacate the land. Spouses only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
David filed a complaint for ejectment before MCTC, which exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
ordered Agustin Rivera to vacate the land and ruled that
LONG DIGEST:
Spouses David as registered owners. Rivera, without
appealing, filed a Petition for Prohibition with the RTC FACTS:2 policemen, Eduardo and catacutan, filed a complaint
seeking to annul the MCTC’s decision. David filed a motion to in the PNP for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
dismiss but denied by the court. Subsequently, the maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats against
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA herein petitioners Antonio, municipal mayor, and mark ,
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in barangay captain.
denying the motion to dismiss.
Eduardo alleged in his affidavit that on his way to the house
Issue: WON Petition for Prohibition was the proper remedy of his mother, the petitioners arrived and disarmed him. He
(Filed by Augusto Rivera)? was asked to board the vehicle and was brought to the
municipal hall.
Ruling: YES
Eduardo told the PNP that Eduardo was most likely
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and padua and
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
the mayor thinks that Eduardo was one of those who raided
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
the said activities.
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no After the investigation of the PNP, the record was forwarded
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
which such relief can be obtained.
Later on, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for resolution recommending that both the mayor and the Brgy
prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous Captain be indicted for the crime of less serious physical
assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC. While appeal is the injury and the mayor only for grave threats.
recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior
court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher After the Ombudsman approved the resolution, the criminal
court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior cases for less serious physical injuries against the mayor and
court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the the captain and grave threats against the mayor were filed in
ground that it heard and decided the case without the Sandiganbayan.
jurisdiction. Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by
the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
may accordingly be granted where the remedy by appeal is however denied.
not plain, speedy or adequate.
Hence, the petitioners elevated the matters to the SC alleging
GAD on the part of the public respondents in rendering the
It ’s not a PROVREM 2015 40
Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
resolution and order. They also plea for the issuance of TRO they are not covered by said law under the principle
directing the public respondents to refrain from prosecuting of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
the said cases.
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
ISSUE: Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall
1.) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
discretion in directing the filing of the informations against Sandiganbayan. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
petitioners? 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the
accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions
(2) WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that "exclusive
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional
24777 and 24778?
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
HELD: municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave 129, as amended."
abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the
exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor
PO2 Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain
left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija. With such Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of
admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27,
he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him and the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
need not be proven in any other proceeding. in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as
over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence,
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof Extra ruling of the SC:
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
For the same reason, petitioners’ prayer for a writ of
the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme
prohibition must also be denied.
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court
good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. As earlier
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
discussed, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over Criminal
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
rendering the disputed resolution and order.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the
be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies
Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2
provided by law are adequate and available. Prohibition is
Eduardo’s admission that he was in good physical condition
granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient
when he was released from the police headquarters. Such
to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and
admission was never brought up during the preliminary
complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is
investigation. The records show that no such averment was
generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of
made in petitioners’ counter-affidavit nor was there any
the writ.
document purporting to be the exculpatory statement
attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an
raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration. inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper
alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The foundation of this
remedy.
rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court
2. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;
their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not
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Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
a discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the to the Department Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA,
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
discretion nor judgment.
On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted
Short digest: clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal structures on
petitioner's property within three (3) months from receipt of
FACTS: Two police officers filed complaint-affidavits against the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the
petitioners Antonio Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva 24 families (squatters) to the Sapang Palay Resettlement
Ecija and his brother, Mark Anthony Esquivel, barangay Project. The clearance was addressed to Mayor Asistio.
captain of Barangay Apo, Jaen, Nueva Ecija. They were
charged with illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated
maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. After the September 16, 1982, General Tobias inquired from Mayor
preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing
issued a resolution recommending that both petitioners be petitioner's properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. On
indicted for less serious physical injuries and Mayor Esquivel December 13, 1982, Mayor Asistio replied that "considering
alone for grave threats. The Ombudsman approved the the said properties are private in character, the City has no
resolution. Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges. underwrite the development of said properties."
XI.A.3 MILITANTE V. CA, G.R. NO. 107040, APRIL 12, 2000 On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested
SAURA for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation
of the squatters.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob
Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of three (3) revalidated the demolition clearance and informed
contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,590 Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough
square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for
the 24 families.
In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1315 expropriating forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project
Barrio, Caloocan City. Almost all of these 40 hectares had Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the
been expropriated as early as 1979 except the 1,590 sq. m. clearance to eject the squatters on petitioner's land. At
lot of petitioner. the conference of February 13, 1991, Carangdang claimed
that petitioner’s land had already been declared
The land sought to be expropriated under P.D. No. 1315 is
expropriated by P.D. 1315.
defined as an area "identified as a blighted area and included
in the SIR Program" which means Slum Improvement and Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a
Resettlement Program. On October 2, 1981, however, Human "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) Commissioner as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree
Dizon, Jr. certified that petitioner's lot is "outside the No. 1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.
declared Urban Land Reform Zone."
In a decision dated April 24, 1992, the respondent Court of
With this certificate, petitioner asked the National Housing Appeals dismissed the petition.
Authority (NHA) to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting
on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General ISSUE:
Manager, sent a letter dated October 6, 1981 to Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of WON issuance of writ of mandamus will be granted to
the families occupying petitioner’s lots. compel Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their
shanties on the subject property when there is no direct
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the order for her to do so.
possibility of amicably settling the eviction problem and/or
to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the RULING:
removal/demolition of all the illegal structures in the said
No. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
property." The squatters did not attend the meeting. In view
board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or
of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division
he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum
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Weeks 8 & 9- only until CPM distinguished
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, void." Indeed, petitioner assails P.D. No. 1315, purely out of
trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use pique against respondent Carangdang who refused to
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is implement the demolition order of her superior. To use
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate petitioner's own words, he has to attack the constitutionality
remedy in the ordinary course of law. of P.D. No. 1315 "to . . . break respondent Carangdang's
hypocrisy and pretension." We hold that petitioner has no
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well- privilege to assail P.D. No. 1315 as unconstitutional to serve a
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the petty purpose.
writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The
records show that there is no direct order from the NHA Short digest/Principle (Atty. Acosta issue-ruling type)
General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to
evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the Facts: P asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land.
subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by NHA General Manager granted clearance to dismantle and
General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to Mayor remove all illegal structures on P's property. Clearance was
Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearance's also granted for the relocation of the squatters. The clearance
revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was was addressed to Mayor A. Demolition did not take place. R,
likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio. NHA Project Manager, refused to implement the clearance to
eject the squatters on P's land.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that
may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and Issue: WON issuance of writ of mandamus is proper to
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition compel a person to do an act when there is no direct order
for mandamus is premature if there are administrative for that person to do so.
remedies available to the petitioner. If superior
Ruling: No.
administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for,
special civil actions are generally not entertained. In the Mandamus cannot be granted to compel a person to do an act
instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative when there is no direct order for that person to do so.
remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the
NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or
##### he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
These are other issues in the case other than trust or station.
Mandamus :
XI.B • PAMANA V.CA, G.R. NO. 133033, JUNE 15, 2005
On Petitioner’s petition for Prohibition: EDOMBINGO
It was alleged that petitioner was the owner and in 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
lawful possession of parcels of land located at barrios Bocal when it ruled that the decision of the Municipal Trial
and Lecheria, Calamba, Laguna evidenced by Transfer Court of Calamba in Civil cases do not include lots 5
Certificate of Titles; and that respondents by means of force, & 7, the premises occupied by the respondents.
strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied said
parcels of land and built their shanties. 3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when it prohibited the implementation of the writ of
Respondent’s answer denied the material demolition, as prohibition is a preventive remedy
allegations of the complaints averred that the lots they are and does not lie to restrain an act which is already
occupying are not owned by the petitioner but owned and fait accompli.
registered under the name of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Corporation which give them permission to HELD:
occupy. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
The petition lacks merit.
complaints for petitioner’s lack of cause of action against
them. 1. In the petition for prohibition filed by
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, they did not
MTC tried the cases under the Rules on Summary
seek to annul or modify the Order of Execution, Writ
Procedure and rendered a joint decision ordering
of Execution and Writ of Demolition issued by the
respondents to vacate the premises.
MTC. What they there assailed was the sheriffs
Respondents went on appeal to the Regional Trial power and authority to implement said writs vis--vis
Court at Calamba, Lagana where it initially set aside the the lots actually occupied by them, namely, Lot No. 5
decision of the MTC and ordered the remand of the cases to and Lot No. 7 of TCT Nos. T-66140 and T-61703,
the latter for the reason that the suits could not have been respectively, registered in the name of the Philippine
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure because the Sugar Estate Development Corporation. It is as
defense interposed by the respondents raised the question of regards those lots that they want the sheriff
ownership. restrained and prohibited from implementing said
writs, more particularly the writ of demolition.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, RTC Consequently, prohibition, not certiorari, is the
set aside its decision and affirmed en toto the appealed MTC appropriate remedy for them.
decision. Said order become final and executory.
2. Lots 5 and 7 are never included in the
MTC issued a Writ of Execution commanding the complaints for ejectment filed by the petitioner
sheriff to cause respondents removal from the premises and before the MTC as it is under the name of Philippine
to restore petitioner. The order was followed by a Writ of Sugar Estate Development Corporation. The sheriff’s
Demolition ordering the sheriff to destroy and demolish act of implementing the writs on said lots by causing
respondent’s houses and constructions. the demolition of respondents’ houses clearly
constitutes a violation of his mandate, restrainable
Respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a by prohibition.
Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order praying to restrain the sheriff from The Sheriffs Return persuasively proved that the
implementing the writ of demolition. Order of Execution, the demolition was effected prior to respondents filing of their
Writ of Execution and the Writ of Demolition are ordered to petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
desist from further implementing. having failed to prove its point, the Court of Appeals finding
must be left undisturbed. It appears undisputed that
Petitioner’s motion for consideration having been respondents are still in occupancy of Lots 5 and 7. The
denied by the appellate court; hence this petition implementation of the order of demolition does not alter that
decision of the Court of Appeals from setting aside the order
ISSUE:
of execution and writs complained of and ordering
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred respondents to desist from further implementing the same.
when it gave due course and acted favorably on the
SHORT DIGEST:
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred • Araullo, id. AMORES
when it gave due course and acted favorably on the
petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary • ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG, G.R. NO. L-2422, SEPTEMBER
restraining order of a final and executory decision. 30, 1949 DAPANAS
Issue/s:
Held:
1st issue:
NO. The Rules of Court requires that actions affecting title to
or recovery of possession of real property be commenced
and tried in the province where the property lies, while the
defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion to
dismiss the action when "venue is improperly laid." In this
case, as the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and
the recovery of possession of real property situated in
Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was improperly
brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion to
dismiss was therefore proper and should have been granted.
2nd issue:
NO. While the respondent judge committed a manifest error
in denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy
for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a
tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case where a judge is
proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to
dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his
court.