Agapay vs Palang HELD:

Agapay vs. Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997 The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their
marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved,
FACTS:
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-
months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident
sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the
that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972,
subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel
he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its
unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to
justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA,
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and
Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of and should not be so inferred.
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this
case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back
the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she
was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by
Cirila as its absolute owner.
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
FACTS: assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since
Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece,
Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of HELD:
Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other
hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his
mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper
though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became
bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near
the public streets.
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not
valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was
not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where
he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted
the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the
VALENCIA v LOCQUIAO
October 3, 2003Ponente: J. Tinga
FACTS:
-2 consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of title and an action for
ejectmentconcerning the same parcel of land in Pangasinan originally owned by spouses Locquiao.
-May 22, 1944: they executed a deed of donation propter nuptias
in favor of their son Benito andprospective bride Tomasa, which includes the land in question.
-The donees took their marriage vows and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back
ofOriginal Certificate of Title No. 18383.
-With the permission of Benito and Tomasa, petitioner
Romana Valencia took possession andcultivated the subject land. When her husband got sick, her
daughter Constancia was inpossession of the land.
-Respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the deed of donation propter
nuptias and TransferCertificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in their name.
-Constancia then filed an action for annulment of title against respondents
in RTC of Pangasinan,the case was dismissed but it did not indicate the reason for dismissal.
-EJECTMENT CASE
: Benito then filed with the MTC of Urdaneta a complaint seeking theejectment of
Constancia from subject property.
MTC ruled in favor of Benito
and orderedConstancia to vacate the property.
-ANNULMENT OF TITLE
: Constancia and Romana countered with a complaint for
theannulment of TCT No. 84897 alleging among others, that the donation did not observe the formrequir
ed by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separatepublic instrument.
The decision for the ejectment case was appealed on the same RTC, finding that the questionon ownershi
p was the central issue the ejectment case was suspended until ownership issue issettled.
-RTC ruled in favor of Benito
in the complaint for annulment of title and as
such affirmed in totothe decision of MTC in the ejectment case.
-Petitioners then elevated the 2 decisions with the
Court of Appeals which AFFIRMED theassailed RTC decisions.
ISSUE:
WON acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donations propter nuptias.
HELD:
No, acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts.
-Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter
nuptias or donations by reason of marriage arethose made before its
celebration in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of thefuture spouses. Distinction is
crucial since they have different formal essential requisites.
-Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter
nuptias must be made in a public instrument inwhich the property must be specifically described.
However, Art. 1330 of the same codeprovides that
acceptance is not necessary
for the validity of such gifts. The marriage betweenthe beneficiary couple,
and compliance with the prescribed form, is enough to effectuate thedonation propter nuptias.
-Under the New Civil Code, as per Art. 127 donations propter
nuptias are regulated by theStatutes of Frauds. Art. 1403(2) requires that the contracts must be in writing
to be enforceable.However, as provided in Art. 129,

express acceptance is not necessary for the validity ofthese donations. Implied acceptance is sufficient.

-TheOld Civil Code applies to the case at bar

since the donation propter nuptias was

executedin 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Although the Philippineswas
under Japanese occupation at the time, only political laws are deemed abrogated by achange of sovereig
nty.

As such, petitioners' arguments must fail either under the Old or New Civil Code. CA decision isAFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 132803. August 31, 1999 a) The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located at
Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a registered land in the name of
Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of Title No. 18422, containing
an area of 83,536 square meters, more or less.
Petitioner: JESSIE V. PISUEÑA

b) Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948;

Respondents: HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR, represented by Salvador

Upod and Dolores Bautista

c) Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953;
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

d) The spouses had two [legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar:
FACTS:

1) The present case is rooted in an action for: (a) recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of
land, as well as (b) a sum of money and damages. a. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962

b. Catalina Villar died on February 21, 1967

2) Lot No. 1201 was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. She registered the lot in her name
during her marriage to Aquilino Villar. They had two children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar.In 1982,
defendant Jessie Pisuena, son-in-law of Agustin wrested possession of the property from the heirs of
Felix and Catalina. The latter filed a complaint for its recovery, assailing the validity of the deed of
sale in favor of Agustin.
e) In this case, (a) Felix Villar is represented by Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four
children, and (b) Catalina Villar is represented by Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three (3)
children, all as plaintiffs [herein respondents].

3) This case was originally filed against herein petitioner, Jessie Pisueña before the RTC-Roxas City on f) Defendant [who was the herein petitioner], Jessie Pisueña, is the son-in-law of Agustin Navarra
May 15, 1989, by herein respondents, the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar represented by who was once a municipal mayor of the Municipality of Ivisan.
Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista. The CA adopted the trial court’s summation of the facts as
follows:

g) Agustin Navarra died on October 30, 1958.

 h) Salvador Upod filed a petition for reconstitution of its title with the Court of First Instance of 2. Whether the Lot 1201 belongs to the conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino
Capiz, and then defendant Jessie Pisueña filed his opposition to this. Nevertheless, the title was Villar.
reconstituted in the name of the registered owners (Petra Unating & Aquilino Villar) pursuant to
the resolution of the court dated August 6, 1980.

i) June 24, 1992 - the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of DECISION:
Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to
Agustin Navarra could be considered valid. The court, however, ruled that its validity pertained
only to the share of the late Petra Unating, considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jessie
was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents, as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to Pisueña and his wife, Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot. No. 1201, Cadastral 228 of
his one-half share in the disputed lot. the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz. The Register of Deeds of Capiz is AUTHORIZED to cancel the Original
Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name
of Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. No costs.
j) Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod assailed the trial court’s ruling upholding the validity of
SO ORDERED.
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta. But Jessie Pisueña questioned the court’s conclusion that the
subject lot was conjugal. He claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the Deed of Sale
transferred the whole lot to Agustin Navarra, his predecessor-in-interest.

RATIONALE:
k) Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto,
holding that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar.
Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1201 became
ISSUES: vested in Jessie Pisueña and his wife.

1. Whether the phrase “having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso”, found By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra
in the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of First Instance, a mere obiter. on February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not
have disposed of their father’s share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet its owners. At
the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their father’s share.

Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal. Such prima facie presumption,
however, can be overturned by a cadastral court’s specific finding, which has long become final, that the
lot in question was paraphernal in character. The title to the entire property shall pass by operation of
law to the buyer once the seller acquires title over it by hereditary succession, even if at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property.

Article 1434 (Civil Code) – already in force during Aquilino Villar’s death
Sunga – Chan v. Chua

Facts:

On June 22, 1992, respondent Lamberto T. Chua filed a complaint against petitioners, Lilibeth Sunga
Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga, daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga, for
winding up of Partnership Affairs, accounting, appraisal and recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila with initial capital contribution of Php100,000.00 each,
with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto agreed to register the business name of their partnership SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER under the name of Jacinto as sole proprietorship.
Yes. The court ruled that a partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property
or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary. Also, Article
1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnership with a capital of Php3,000.00 or more must register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, however this registration requirement is not mandatory. Article
1768 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails
register. The failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the
partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is
to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents
of their contract.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed in the absence of any written document to show partnership between respondent
and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto’s death.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Lamberto Chua and Jacinto L. Sunga has entered into a partnership?

Held:
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286 April 14,2004
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint befor e the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ sonwith Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subjectproperties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legalwife of defendant Nicolas, having been
married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, theybegot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya
resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage, theyacquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which heinherited from hisparents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the
properties earn income fromcoconuts leased to corporations.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, PacitaVillanueva,
wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the onlyperson who received the
income of the properties. Pacita, fr om the time she started living inconcubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation. She had no properties of her own from which shecould derive income. From the time Nicolas
suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son isalready the one who has been receiving the income
of his properties.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugalpartnership
s established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquiredunder the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquiredduring the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the partyclaiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the propertiesmust first be proven to have
been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in1936.
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.Petitioners
themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No.
152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolasand
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugalproperties of
Nicolas and Eusebia

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor ofEusebia Natuya.Petitioners
appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substitutedby her heirs. CA upheld trial court’sdecision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia
andPr ocopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmedR ATIO: The Family Code provisions
on conjugal partnerships govern theproperty r elationsbetweenNicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before the effectivity of Family Code.
Navarro vs. Escobido, GR 153788, November 27, 2009
(Provisional Remedies: Replevin: Prior demand is not a condition precedent)
Facts: Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin
against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement. Petitioner
maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no prior demand
was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for
replevin were filed.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return
be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant
in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to make a
prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus,
prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Issue: WON prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Held: No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin
is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the
facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to
the possession thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention
thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or
seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if
so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.